GEOTESS (NIG) LTD v. SOLID UNIT (NIG) LTD & ORS (2020)

GEOTESS (NIG) LTD v. SOLID UNIT (NIG) LTD & ORS

(2020)LCN/14029(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, March 26, 2020

CA/J/194/2018

Before Our Lordships:

Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru Justice of the Court of Appeal

Mudashiru Nasiru Oniyangi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Boloukuromo Moses Ugo Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

GEOTESS NIGERIA LIMITED APPELANT(S)

And

(1) SOLID UNIT NIGERIA LIMITED (2) MINISTRY OF MINES AND STEEL DEVELOPMENT (3) MINING CADASTRE OFFICE RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WHO IS A PARTY IN A SUIT?

I pause to ask the question, who is a party in a suit. In the case of GREEN V GREEN (1987) NSCC pg. 115 at page 121, a party is defined thus:
“Persons whose name appears on the record as Plaintiff or Defendant”
Further to the foregoing, in the case of FAWEHINMI V NBA (No.1) (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 105) page 494 at page 550, a party is defined thus: “A party to an action is a person whose name is designated on record as Plaintiff or Defendant, the term party refers to that person(s) by or against whom a legal suit is sought whether natural of legal persons but all others who may be affected by the suit indirectly or consequently are persons interest and not parties.”
Another question that I consider ideal is what are the determining factors for joining a party. In my humble view, determining whether or not to join a party as a Defendant as in the suit before the trial Court now in this appeal, the Court has to consider the following questions:-
(a) Whether it is possible for the Court to adjudicate upon the cause of action set up by the Plaintiff unless the person is added as a Defendant.
(b) Whether the person is someone who ought to have been joined as a Defendant ab initio.
(c) Whether the cause or matter is liable to be defeated for non-joinder.
For a joinder to be justifiable, the foregoing questions must be answered in the affirmative. Having said all these, let me add that, it is the prerogative of the Plaintiff to determine ab initio the Defendant in the suit while the liability of each party in the suit would be determined by the Court having regard to the pleadings and evidence led by the claimant in the light of the applicable law. In order therefore to determine whether a party is a proper Defendant to a suit, what the Court should do is to examine the claim of the Plaintiff before the Court. See the case of CHIEF EMMANUEL BELLO V. INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND ANOR (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1196) 342. It is trite that the only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled therefore must be a question in the action which cannot be effectively and completely settled unless he is a party. See RINCO CONSTRUCTION CO. V VEEPEE IND. LTD. (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 929) 85. PER ONIYANGI, J.C.A.

DEFINITION OF THE TERM “ACADEMIC EXERCISE”

In the case of ODEDO V INEC (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1117) 554 at 600 paras. C-E. Tobi JSC (of Blessed memory) define the term academic exercise thus:
“One which does not require answer of adjudication by a Court of law because it is not necessary to the case at hand. An academic issue or question could be hypothetical or moot question. An academic issue or question does not relate to the live issues in the litigation because it is spent as it will not ensure any right or benefit on the successful party. Tanimola Vs Surveys & Mapping Geodata Ltd. (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 406) 617, Nwobosi V A.C.B. (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 404) 658, Ogbonna v President FRN (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 504) 281 and Ndulue v Ibezim (2002) 12 NWLR 1.”
In the case of ABUBAKAR V. YAR’ADUA (2008) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1078) 467 at 497 paras. C-E, his Lordship said thus: “… Such academic matter is one raised for its qua reason which cannot in any way affect the determination of the live issue in the matter but to satisfy intellectual process and intellect. It is said to be theoretical and build on hypothesis based only on a suggestion that has not been proved or shown to be real but only imaginary probably introduced order to test its logical or empirical consequences”. PER ONIYANGI, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT DEALS WITH ACADEMIC QUESTIONS OR ISSUES

MUDASHIRU NASIRU ONIYANGI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the ruling of the Federal High Court of Nigeria Jos Judicial Division sitting in Jos Plateau State in Suit No. FHC/J/CS/17/2017 and Motion Number FHC/J/M/179/2017 delivered by Hon. Justice D. V. Agishi on 12th day of March, 2018 where by the Applicant, Geotess Nig. Ltd application to join as a Defendant was refused and dismissed.

The application which was by way of a Motion on Notice dated and filed on the 9th day of October, 2017 and supported by an affidavit of 5 (five) paragraphs and annextures sought for an order of the trial Court joining Geotess (Nig.) Ltd as a 3rd Defendant in the pending suit. I consider it worthy to note that the application was brought after the hearing in the substantive suit has been concluded and adjourned for judgment. For ease of reference the final address was adopted on 6th day of July, 2017 and the suit was adjourned to 15th day of November, 2017 for judgment. As I said before, the Appellant filed his application for joinder on 9th day of October, 2017.

The gist of the fact of the case before the trial Court is that the

1st Respondent in this appeal and Plaintiff before the trial Court commenced a suit at the Federal High Court Jos against the 2nd and 3rd Respondents namely Ministry of Mines and Steel Development and Mining Cadastre office as 1st and 2nd Defendants. The suit which was by way of an Originating Summons sought for the determination of the following questions and reliefs:
(1) Whether having regard to the mandatory provisions of Regulation, 2011 made pursuant to Section 21 of the Nigeria Minerals and Mining Act, 2007, the 2nd Defendant’s letter to the Plaintiff dated 26/01/2017, and entitled “NOTIFICATION FOR REFUSAL OF APPLICATION FOR MINING LEASE NO. 11810”, is not a NULLITY, having been written after more than five (5) years of the submission and receipt by the Defendants of the Plaintiff’s application for Mining Lease No. 11810?
(2) Whether in view of the provisions of Sections 71(1) and (2) and 102(2) of the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act, 2007, Regulations 56, 57, 100, 115 and 118(1) of the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations, 2011 particularly Regulation 57(3), (4), (5), (6), (12), (13), (14) and (15), the reason

given by the Defendants in their letter dated 27/01/2017 for refusing to grant the Plaintiff’s application for Mining Lease, are tenable in Law?
(3) Whether, having regard to the answer to question 2 and in view of the provisions of Regulation 57(16) of the Nigeria Minerals and Mining Regulations, 2011, this is proper case where this Honourable Court should exercise its powers and direct the Defendants to issue the Plaintiff with a Mining Lease within seven (7) days in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 57(21) of the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations, 2011.

Reliefs claimed by the Plaintiffs
(i) A DECLARATION that the 2nd Defendant’s letter to the Plaintiff entitled “NOTIFICATION LEASE No. 11810” is a nullity having been written after more than five (5) years of the submission and receipt by the Defendants, of the Plaintiff’s application for Mining Lease, contrary to the mandatory provisions of Regulation 57(16) of the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations, 2011.
(ii) An ORDER of the Honourable Court setting aside the 2nd Defendant’s letter of 26/01/2017 to the Plaintiff entitled:

NOTIFICATION OF REFUSAL OF APPLICATION OF MINING LEASE No. 11810”, for being in violation and or breach of the provisions of the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations, 2011.
(iii) A DECLARATION that by the extant provisions of the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act and the Nigeria Minerals and Mining Regulations, the reasons given by the Defendants in their letter of 26/01/2017, for refusing to grant the Plaintiff’s application for Mining Lease are not tenable in Law.
(iv) AN ORDER of this Honourable Court mandating the Defendants to issue the Plaintiff with a Mining Lease written seven (7) days from the date of the judgment of this Honourable Court in line with the provisions of Regulation 57(21) of the Nigerian Minerals And Mining Regulations, 2011.
(v) AN ORDER of mandatory injunction restraining the Defendants, their Agents, privies, Licensees or person claiming, by or through them by whatever name called from doing anything or taking any steps adverse to, or interfering with the Plaintiff’s interest in the area covered by the Plaintiff’s application for Mining Lease No. 11810 (which is also covered by the subsisting

Plaintiff’s Exploration License No. 10399 EL) pursuant to the 2nd Defendant’s letter of 26/01/2017.

The fact of the case as can be gathered from the Record of Appeal is that the Plaintiff (1st Respondent) is a Mining Company and holder of Exploration License No. 10399 EL issued to her by the Defendants (2nd and 3rd Respondents). Following a dispute between the Plaintiff and another title holder, Geotess Nigeria Ltd, in the mining area covered by the Plaintiff’s exploration license, the Defendants issued a Stop Work Order to the Plaintiff and the said Geotess Nigeria Ltd. The dispute led to two suits before the trial Court. During the subsistence of the Stop Work Order by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents the Defendants (2nd & 3rd Respondents) wrote a letter to the Plaintiff and gave her four (4) conditions to be met before the Stop-Work-Order will be lifted. The case of the Plaintiff is that he met the four conditions given by the Defendants. The second condition which in effect is that the Plaintiff should transform her mineral title from Exploration License to a Mining Lease in order to make her mining activities lawful was also

pursued.

According to the Plaintiff he duly completed and submitted the application forms for Mining Lease to the Defendants as directed. It is his case that his application form was duly verified by an officer of the 2nd Defendant who upon being satisfied that the forms were in order assigned an identifying code (11810) to the application and carried out other required actions. It is also the Plaintiff’s case that his application which ought to be considered within 45 days was not determined till after 5 years from the date of the submission of the application. The Plaintiff application was refused and hence her suit before the trial Court.

It is that suit that the Appellant sought to join at the stage after the adoption of written address as 3rd defendant. The application was refused by the trial Court and dismissed and hence this appeal.

By the notice of Appeal dated and filed on the 19th day of March, 2018, the Appellant registered 3 Grounds of Appeal and sought for the following reliefs from this Court.
(i) An Order setting aside the ruling of the Federal High Court, Jos delivered on the 12th day of March, 2018.
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(ii) An Order granting the Appellant’s application dated the 9th October, 2017 to be joined as the 3rd Defendant in this suit No. FHC/J/CS/17/2017.

Briefs of argument were filed and exchanged. In the Appellant’s brief of argument filed on 17th day of September, 2018 and deemed as properly filed and served on 7th day of November, 2018, the following lone issue was submitted for the determination of the appeal.
“Whether the learned trial judge was right in refusing the Appellant’s application to join Suit No. FHA/JCS/17/2017 as an interested party.”

The 1st Respondent’s brief of argument dated 7th November, 2018 was filed on the 8th day of November, 2018. Therein he adopted the issue formulated by the Appellant but with a slight moderation. It goes thus:
“Whether the learned trial judge was right in refusing the Appellant’s application to be joined in suit No. FHC/J/CS/17/2017 as the 3rd Respondent”

On the part of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, learned Counsel also adopted the Appellant’s issue for determination but also with moderations. It goes thus:
“Whether the trial judge

was right in refusing the application for joinder on the ground that there is no any legal right upon which the Appellant’s application could be tied.”

Having read and carefully compared and considered the respective issues formulated for the determination of the appeal, it is my view that the respective issues are same and designed to achieve the same goal. For that reason, I will proceed with the issue formulated by the Appellant for the determination of the appeal i.e.
“Whether the learned trial judge was right in refusing the Appellant’s application to join Suit No. FHA/JCS/17/2017 as an interested party.”

The argument of the learned Counsel representing the Appellant on this lone issue after referring the Court to paragraphs 3, 4, 13, 14, 15 of the Affidavit in support of the Originating Summons by the 1st Respondent before the trial Court, paragraphs 6 and 8 of the Counter Affidavit of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents Counter affidavit, paragraphs 4, 4(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j) of the Appellant’s Affidavit in support of the Motion on Notice to join as an interested party and paragraph 3,

3(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) (viii) and (ix) of the 1st Respondent’s Counter Affidavit to the Motion on Notice to join as a interested party filed by the Appellant and coupled with his summary of the facts from processes filed by respective parties, he posed the question:- “whether the trial Court can effectively determine the case filed by the 1st Respondent against the 2nd and 3rd Respondent over the said mining site in the absence of the Appellant”

He argued that the learned trial Judge closed his eyes on the materials and facts before him and answered the question in the positive and dismissed the Appellant’s application. He added that the fact that the Appellant and the 1st Respondent had dispute that culminated in the suits before the Federal High Court and that there are pending appeals before the Court of Appeal Jos relating to the same mining site meant nothing to the trial judge. He argued that since the appeal in the Court of Appeal is yet to be determined, the outcome of the appeal will affect the Applicant/Appellant. On the finding of the trial Court contained on page 231 of the Record of Appeal, to the

effect that there is no way the decision of the Court can affect the interest of the Appellant since the Appellant’s licence has been revoked, he contended that the issue before the trial Court is the application to join the suit as person having interest in the subject matter and not the issue of expiration of the Appellant’s exploration licence which is not the subject matter before the trial Court and that it can only be determined by the trial Court after the Appellant had joined. On the finding of the trial Court on page 231 of the Record of Appeal that the Applicant has not been able to convince the Court that the pending appeal has anything to do with the application of the Appellant to join, also the heading of the application to join as 3rd Defendant by the Appellant and argued that by that heading, it is clear that Geotess Nigeria Ltd. is the Applicant seeking to join suit as 3rd Defendant. Therefore the Court was wrong to conclude that the Appellant’s application before it was not properly headed to show that the Appellant was the Applicant. He argued that the trial Court based his finding on technicality which has been condemned

in the case of INAKOJU V ADELEKE (2000) ALL FWLR (Pt. 353) pg. 121.

On the principle guiding the issue of joinder of parties he referred to the case of GREEN V GREEN (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 480 at 493, UBN V OSUZEC (2017) NWLR (Pt. 1246) pg. 293 at 309-311 Paras H-D, IWEKA V A.G. FEDERATION (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 362) (complete reference not provided) SALIM V IFENKWE (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 450) (Incomplete reference) IGE V FARINDE (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 354) 45. For the foregoing, he urged the Court to allow the appeal, set aside the Ruling of the trial Court and make an order joining the Appellant to the suit.

On behalf of the 1st Respondent it was submitted that the learned trial judge was right in refusing the Appellant’s application to join the suit as a 3rd Defendant. He argued that the law is settled that the test as to whether there should be joinder of a party is based on the need to have before the Court such parties as would enable it to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions in the suit. He relied on the case of PEENOK INVESTMENT LTD V HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL LTD (1982) NSCC 477 at 486. He added that for a person to

be joined as a party, the question to be tried must be one which cannot be effectively and completely settled unless such party is made a party. He cited the case of LAGOS STATE BULK PURCHASE CORP V PURIFICATION TECHNIQUES (NIG) LTD (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1352) 82 at 107 to 109. It is his case, that in the present case, it is possible for the trial Court to adjudicate upon the cause of action in the suit without the Appellant being joined as a Defendant because he had no role to play. On other questions, he submitted that the Appellant had no legal right. Also he argued that the Appellant is not a person whose presence before the Court as Defendant would have been necessary in order to enable the trial Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the matter. (he referred to pages 230 to 231 of the Record) he added that the Appellant having not appeal against the specific finding and conclusion of the trial judge as it relate to the expiration of the Appellant’s Exploration Licence No. 1100 EL and the legal consequences of the Expiration, it is not open to the Appellant to attack those findings and conclusion by

way of arguments contained in the Appellant’s brief of argument. He urged the Court to discountenance all the said arguments in paragraphs 4.08 and 4.10 of the said brief. The Court will not set aside a decision not appealed against. He referred to the case of UGO V UGO (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1597) 218 at 236 to 237. He contended that in view of the unchallenged finding of the trial Court to the effect that the Appellant neither has a subsisting Exploration Licence nor an application for Mining Lease over the area of Land Covered by the 1st Respondent’s application for Mining Lease, the Appellant had no interest to be protected and upon which her joinder in the suit could stand.

On the finding of the trial Court that there was no proper Applicant stated on the Appellant’s application and that the Appellant did not satisfy the mandatory requirements of Order 9 Rule 15(1) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009. He relied on the case of CORPORATE IDEAL INS. LTD VS AJAOKUTA STEEL CO. LTD (2014) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1405) 165 at 193 Paragraphs D-F and 199 to 200. He submitted that the law is settled that in an Originating Summons

proceedings, the Affidavit in support of the Originating Summons is the statement of claim and the Counter Affidavit of the Defendant is the statement of Defence, he referred to the case of DIRECTOR OF STATE SECURITY SERVICES AND ANOR V OLISA AGBAKOBA (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 595) 314 at 354 C-E. The application having not been made in compliance with the Rules of Court, accompanied the application with the defence, the application for joinder is incurably defective and ought to be struck out, he relied on the case of OKEREKE V YAR’ADUA (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1082) 37 at 64 paragraphs A-F.

On a final note, he submitted that the appeal is an academic exercise as it no longer raises any live issue(s) because it has been overtaken by event having regard to the fact that the trial Court has delivered the final judgment in the substantive suit on the 5th day of July, 2018. Therefore if the relief sought by the Appellant is granted, there is no suit subsisting to join. The exercise would be in futility and academic exercise. He relied on the following casesDAHIRU V A.P.C. (2017) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1555) 218 at 244 paras. E-F, K.R.K HOLDINGS NIG LTD VS FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA

(2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1552) 326 at 341 paras. G-H. In the end he urged the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower Court for want of merit.

In the same vein, the learned Counsel representing the 2nd and 3rd Respondents submitted that the trial judge was right in refusing the Appellant’s application for joinder as 3rd Defendant in suit No. FHC/CS/17/2017 since the Appellant’s Exploration Licence No. 1100 EL has expired and not renewed. He reproduced the provision of Section 62 of Nigeria Mineral and Mining Act 2007 and Regulation 37 of the Nigeria Minerals and Mining Regulations 2011 and submitted that with the combined provisions the learned trial judge come to the conclusion contained on page 231 of the Record of Appeal. He added all the legal right and obligation attached to the said exploration Licence are no longer enforceable in law as from the date of expiration. He relied on the case of ADEPOJU V YINKA (2012) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1288) page 572. He added that from the foregoing and since the Appellant’s Exploration Licence 1100 EL expired by effluxion of time in 2014, there is no any legal right or obligation

that could be tied to the expired exploration licence 1100 EL to warrant the joining of the Appellant as a 3rd Defendant by the trial Court. He argued that the appeal before this Court has become academic exercise because there is no live issue upon which the Appellant claim could be tied. He urged the Court to dismiss the appeal with substantial cost and affirm the decision and judgment of the lower Court.

Upon a careful reading of the foregoing arguments and the processes before the trial Court and the ruling of the trial Court (Federal High Court Jos) in suit No. FHC/F/CS/17/2017 delivered on 12th March, 2018 (see pages 221-235 of the Record of Appeal) which is the subject matter of this appeal, it is my considered view that the germane question that agitates the mind is whether or not the Appellant ought to be joined as a 3rd Defendant in the suit.

In summary, the facts culminating in this appeal, is that the 1st Respondent initiated an action by way of an Originating Summons against the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as 1st and 2nd Defendants in suit No. FHC/J/CS/17/017. Issues were joined by both parties and the matter went into trial. Upon the

adoption of their respective written address, the trial Court adjourned the matter on the 6th July, 2017 for judgment. Precisely the matter was adjourned to 15th November, 2017 for judgment. On the 9th of October, 2017 the Appellant, GEOTESS (NIG) LTD. filed a motion on notice pursuant to Order 9 Rule 8, Order 26 Rules 2 and 3 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, seeking for an order to join Goetess (Nig.) Ltd. as 3rd Defendant.

As stated somewhere before now in this judgment, the suit by the 1st Respondent against the second and third Respondent before the trial Court was challenging the decision of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ refusal to renew the mining licence of the 1st Respondent in this appeal.

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“A party to an action is a person whose name is designated on record as Plaintiff or Defendant, the term party refers to that person(s) by or against whom a legal suit is sought whether natural of legal persons but all others who may be affected by the suit indirectly or consequently are persons interest and not parties.”
Another question that I consider ideal is what are the determining factors for joining a party. In my humble view, determining whether or not to join a party as a Defendant as in the suit before the trial Court now in this appeal, the Court has to consider the following questions:-
(a) Whether it is possible for the Court to adjudicate upon the cause of action set up by the Plaintiff unless the person is added as a Defendant.
(b) Whether the person is someone who ought to have been joined as a Defendant ab initio.
(c) Whether the cause or matter is liable to be defeated for non-joinder.
For a joinder to be justifiable, the foregoing questions must be answered in the affirmative. Having said all these, let me add that, it is the prerogative of the Plaintiff to determine ab initio the Defendant in the suit

while the liability of each party in the suit would be determined by the Court having regard to the pleadings and evidence led by the claimant in the light of the applicable law. In order therefore to determine whether a party is a proper Defendant to a suit, what the Court should do is to examine the claim of the Plaintiff before the Court. See the case of CHIEF EMMANUEL BELLO V. INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND ANOR (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1196) 342. It is trite that the only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled therefore must be a question in the action which cannot be effectively and completely settled unless he is a party. See RINCO CONSTRUCTION CO. V VEEPEE IND. LTD. (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 929) 85.

In the appeal at hand, a careful perusal of the claim of the 1st Respondent as Plaintiff against the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as 1st and 2nd Defendants in the main, is for an order compelling the Defendants (2nd and 3rd Respondents) to renew his mining exploration licence simplicita. In my candid view, the Appellant has no role to play in the

circumstance. By law it is within the prerogative of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to grant or to refuse. Whether such grant or refusal is a product of proper consideration is a different issue. I am not unmindful of the litigation between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent determined by the Federal High Court. That suit in my candid opinion has nothing to do with the issue of renewal of the exploration licence of the 1st Respondent which is the main issue in the suit which the Appellant sought to join as 3rd Defendant. Again the Appellant has not shown in any of her processes how the grant or refusal of renewal of licence of the 1st Respondent will affect him or will constitute a ground to deny him of such request. That is to say that he has not shown how such grant or refusal would adversely affect his interest.

Another straw that broke the Carmel’s back in this scenario is the fact that the suit which the Appellant sought to join at the stage when it was adjourned for judgment has been determined and a final judgment delivered on the 5th day of July, 2018. This fact supplied by the 1st Respondent has not been controverted, denied nor challenged

by the Appellant. That situation poses the question as to which suit will the Appellant join as a third Defendant considering the fact that a final judgment in the said suit No. FHC/J/CS/17/2017 has been finally determined. The process therefore in my ardent view will amount to nothing but an academic exercise. In the case of ODEDO V INEC (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1117) 554 at 600 paras. C-E. Tobi JSC (of Blessed memory) define the term academic exercise thus:
“One which does not require answer of adjudication by a Court of law because it is not necessary to the case at hand. An academic issue or question could be hypothetical or moot question. An academic issue or question does not relate to the live issues in the litigation because it is spent as it will not ensure any right or benefit on the successful party. Tanimola Vs Surveys & Mapping Geodata Ltd. (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 406) 617, Nwobosi V A.C.B. (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 404) 658, Ogbonna v President FRN (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 504) 281 and Ndulue v Ibezim (2002) 12 NWLR 1.”
In the case of ABUBAKAR V. YAR’ADUA (2008) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1078) 467 at 497 paras. C-E, his Lordship said thus:<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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“… Such academic matter is one raised for its qua reason which cannot in any way affect the determination of the live issue in the matter but to satisfy intellectual process and intellect. It is said to be theoretical and build on hypothesis based only on a suggestion that has not been proved or shown to be real but only imaginary probably introduced order to test its logical or empirical consequences”

It is trite that Court does not indulge itself in dealing with and considering academic questions and or issues. See the case of OWNERS OF THE M.V. ARABELLA V NAIC (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 182, INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR WEST AFRICA LTD AND ANOR V PAVEX INTERNATIONAL CO (NIG) LTD. (2000) 4 SCN 200, ALHAJI KASIM SHETTIMA AND ANOR V ALHAJI MOHAMMED GONI AND ORS (2011) LPELR – 417 and FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA V T. A. DAIRO AND ORS (2015) LPELR – 24303. In the light of all the foregoing, I do not consider it worthy or of any probative value to dissipate any judicial energy on the lone issue by the Appellant rather to answer the question in the negative. On that note I resolve the sole issue against the Appellant and hold that

the learned trial Judge was right in refusing the Appellant’s application to join the suit No. FHC/J/CS/17/2017 as an interested party.

I conclude that the appeal is lacking in merit and I accordingly dismiss it.

In consequence, the Ruling of the Federal High Court Jos Judicial Division in Suit No. FHC/J/CS/17/2017 delivered on the 12th day of March, 2018 Coram Hon. Justice D.V. Agishi is affirmed.

Parties to bear their cost.
HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading before now the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, Mudashiru Nasiru Oniyangi, JCA. His Lordship has ably considered and resolved all the issues in contention in the appeal. I agree with the reasoning and abide the conclusions reached therein.

I too find no merit in the appeal and I hereby dismiss Same. affirm the decision contained in the Ruling delivered by the Federal High Court, Jos Judicial Division sitting in Jos, on the day of March, 2018 by Honorable Justice D. V. Agishi in Suit No FHC/J/CS/17/2017 and in respect Motion Number FHC/J/M/179/2017 wherein it dismissed the motion of the Appellant seeking to be

joined as a defendant in the action. I abide the order on costs in the lead judgment.

BOLOUKUROMO MOSES UGO, J.C.A.: I am of the same opinion with my learned brother MUDASHIRU N. ONIYANGI, J.C.A.

I also dismiss the appeal and affirm the ruling of the trial Court dismissing Appellant’s application.

Appearances:

Not Represented For Appellant(s)

N Ugwuala Esq. for the 1st Respondent

Y. M. Yakubu Esq. for the 2nd and 3rd Respondent For Respondent(s)