GEORGE ONWUDIKE EJIMBE V. FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC
(2013)LCN/6702(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 22nd day of February, 2013
CA/E/75/2008
Before Their Lordships
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADEJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJUJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIMJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
GEORGE ONWUDIKE EJIMBEAppellant(s)
AND
FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLCRespondent(s)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN FORCE AN EMPLOYEE ON AN UNWILLING EMPLOYER
The law is that the court does not force an employee on an unwilling employer. See John Holt Ventures Limited v. Augustine Oputa (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt.470) 101, Ondo State Univeristy v. Folayan (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt.354) 1. PER OWOADE, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT REMOVAL BY WAY OF TERMINATION IN CASES OF EMPLOYMENT MUST BE IN THE FORM AGREED TO
In cases of employment governed by agreement of parties, removal by way of termination of appointment or dismissal will be in the Form agreed to.
SEE UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LIMITED V. CHUKWUELO CHARLES OGBOH (1995) 2 NWLR (Part 380) 647 at 664. PER OWOADE, J.C.A.
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the Judgment of P.N.C. Umeadi J. in the High Court of Justice, Idemili Judicial Division, sitting at Ogidi on Assignment from the Nnewi Judicial Division, Anambra State in Suit No. HN/128/2000.
The Appellant as plaintiff before the court below by his further Amended Statement of Claim dated 28/5/2001 and filed on 18/6/2001 claimed from the Respondent particularly as follows:-
“24. The summary dismissal was contrary to the conditions of service governing plaintiff’s employment.
Particulars
(a) Plaintiff was not referred to the Regional Disciplinary Committee and did not appear before any disciplinary committee.
(b) Plaintiff was never issued with a query which ordinarily should come from the Chief Inspector of the Regional Officer (sic).
(c) Staff who had involved the branch in heavy financial losses or suppressed cheques had received less punishment than plaintiff including recall.
(d) The bank suffered no financial loss. Senior Managers, both field and Head office, were promoted and given heavy pay for performance in respect of the operation on this account.
26. Wherefore, Plaintiff had suffered great loss and damage, his reputation lowered in the estimation of right-thinking methods (sic) men of the society, and has been denied his salaries until attainment of retirement age, and deprived of his gratuities, entitlements and pensions on retirement. Plaintiff further contends that he had been of reasonably robust age (sic) and expends to live up to 70 years enjoying his pensions.
29. And plaintiff claims the sum of N14,275,497.30 (Fourteen million, two hundred and seventy-five thousand, four hundred and ninety-seven naira, thirty kobo) being general and special damages…………..”
Pleadings were filed and exchanged in the court below. The relevant pleadings being the aforementioned plaintiff’s further further Amended Statement of Claim dated 28/5/2001 and filed on 18/6/2001 and the further further further or 3rd further Amended Statement of Defence dated 14/12/2001 and filed on 19/12/2001.
The case of the Appellant is that after serving the Respondent for a period of 23 years, he was summarily dismissed as a manager from his employment by the Respondent by a letter of 22/10/99. That when the Appellant became the Respondent’s Nnewi Branch Manager, he met or inherited three main Corporate accounts one of which was known as Rimco account being managed by the Chief Executive of the Respondent and controlled by the Bank’s Head Office under the close supervision of the senior manager, while the branch manager handled only payment of cheques on the account. That the practice which was already in existence and inherited by the Appellant in respect of the Rimco account when he took over as the Respondent’s Nnewi Branch Manager was that over the years, cheques of about N300 Million were moving in and out of the account on a weekly basis and honoured without clearing in a peculiar banking practice between Oceanic Bank and the Respondent Bank thus creating a fake turnover of N12 Billion and consequent monthly profit of N8.12 Million and which high artificial or non-existent turn over enabled the customer (Rimco) enjoy a credit facility by way of an overdraft facility or N690 million with the Respondent.
Appellant witnessed that as was the usual practice, several batches of cheques were lodged into the Rimco account at the Respondent’s Nnewi branch and simultaneously Oceanic bank cheques were lodged into the account to cover same and the cheques were given immediate value to the customer without waiting for clearance. But, that, sometimes, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) wrote two letters to the Oceanic Bank and to the Respondent Bank requesting the banks to furnish them with certain information. But Oceanic Bank panicked and returned all of the several batches of cheques totaling N807 million which resulted in an excess position which the Appellant reported to the Respondent’s head office.
That the Respondent suspended the Appellant and moved into action and with the assistance of the Appellant fully recovered the money and in fact made a profit of N113 Million from the transaction. That the Respondent directed its Chief Inspector to investigate the matter which he did and made a report which did not personally indict the Appellant for the returned cheques but blamed same on the abuse of uncleared effect facility. When the situation normalized, the Appellant wrote pleading that his suspension be lifted but the Respondent handed him a letter summarily dismissing him from its employee (Exhibit J and K) without any entitlements or retirement benefits.
The dismissal according to Appellant was contrary to the Appellant’s conditions of service which is that the Appellant being a Senior Staff, ought to have been referred to a disciplinary committee before a decision could be taken on whether or not he should be dismissed.
The Respondent’s case on the other hand is that the Appellant was guilty of gross negligence and financial recklessness in allowing the customer (Rimco) to exceed its credit facility limit of N690 Million to the tune of N800 Million, thus resulting in an excess and an unauthorized facility limit. That the Appellant’s conduct consequently attracted summary dismissal. Each of the parties called one witness each and tendered several documents.
Before the court below, the parties focused on the traversed contention in between the averment in paragraph 22 of the Appellant’s Statement of claim and paragraphs 19-22 of the Respondent’s Statement of Defence on whether or not the summary dismissal of the Appellant from the Respondent’s employment was in conformity with the conditions of service governing Appellant’s employment. In dismissing the plaintiff’s/Appellant’s suit, the learned trial judge held severally as follows: First at pages 165 – 166 of the record that:
“I take it that the first step of inquiry demanded by the plaintiff which is a query has been met. That is that Exhibit ‘E’ which the plaintiff conveniently termed a query was later in time than Exhibits ‘B’ and ‘C’. Exhibit ‘B’ obviously was answer to some query albeit oral. As I have said, it is the first detailed account from the plaintiff to the defendant about the “staggering excess position of this account” In that light, Exhibit ‘E’ ought to seem as a continuation of the inquiry into the excess account rather than the initial query. I also see that the plaintiff was suspended in line with Exhibit ‘P’ Article 4 (iii) (a) and (c) and Exhibit ‘S’ paragraph 11(4). I do not see that the other step of the envisaged inquiry of bringing the plaintiff before a Regional Disciplinary Committee for instance was fulfilled. See Exhibit ‘S’ Paragraph 11.
It is pertinent to mention here that the words of section 11 of Exhibit ‘S’ on where to take an employee to after a query for misconduct has been issued is merely directory and not mandatory. This is so because the nature of the misconduct in each particular case will help to find the suitable measure to be taken. In any event, it will serve no useful purpose dilating on that issue because events went beyond the contemplation of mere suspension of the plaintiff. Following the new trademark, belligerent tone of plaintif’s letters even in his uncertain situation with the defendant, the letter dated 15/10/99 Exhibit ‘J’ was written by plaintiff to the defendant who swiftly replied summarily dismissing the plaintiff by Exhibit K”.
The learned trial judge continued:
“I see that Exhibit ‘P’ declares that there was no agreement as to how the parties could proceed in matters leading to summary dismissal. So individual employers were free to follow the dictates of the circumstances of their work and I think survival. Also in Exhibit ‘S’ paragraphs 11.5 itemizes instances where an employee could be summarily dismissed. I agree that paragraph 11.5 (supra) would be governed by paragraph 11 (supra) itself. But I have also declared paragraph 11(c) (supra) directory and not mandatory. There is also the provision at the end of paragraph 11.5 (supra) which states as follows:
“No notice shall be given in the case of summary dismissal. In the event of summary dismissal, all terminal benefits shall be forfeited to the bank”. So under Exhibit ‘P” the defendant need not follow any procedure to summarily dismiss the plaintiff and under Exhibit ‘S’ no notice is required. Further, the defendant relied on Exhibit ‘S’ 3.1.2. I hold that paragraph 3.1.2. (supra) is germane and relevant to this case and I quote inter alia;
“In the event that it is determined that a bank employee acted in a manner that is inconsistent with the minimum level of credit discipline required, such action attract severe disciplinary sanction(s) which may include summary dismissal”.
At pages 166-167, the learned trial Judge concluded on Plaintiff’s/Appellant’s case as follows:
“Whatever happened, it was unfortunate that something went wrong in the time the plaintiff was branch operations manager. The defendant held him responsible for the excess and the plaintiff was branch operations manager. The defendant held him responsible for the excess and the plaintiff joined in recovery efforts. The latter story in court by plaintiff about the account being controlled from Head office of the defendant and the Head office being aware of the excess seem to be after thoughts. The bank eventually summarily dismissed him and threatened to take him to court to recover the losses. The law is that the court does not force an employee on an unwilling employer. See John Holt Ventures Limited v. Augustine Oputa (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt.470) 101, Ondo State Univeristy v. Folayan (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt.354) 1. I hold from the above that the defendant was entitled to summarily dismiss the plaintiff
……………
The suit of the plaintiff lacks merit, fails and is hereby dismissed.”
Dissatisfied with this judgment, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal (containing eight (8) grounds of appeal) before this court on28/06/07.
Appellant’s brief of argument dated 1/4/2008 was filed on 02/04/08. Respondent’s brief of argument dated 12/6/08 was filed on 10/09/08.
Appellant’s Reply brief dated 10/11/08 and filed on the same date was deemed filed on 9/2/09.
Learned counsel for the Appellant nominated a sole issue for determination to wit:
“Whether the Appellant established his case of wrongful dismissal so as to entitle him to judgment.
Learned senior counsel for the Respondent submitted two issues for determination namely:
i. whether the plaintiff proved his case as required by the law.
ii. Whether the judgment of the trial court is sustainable.
Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that in determining whether or not the Appellant established that his dismissal was wrongful, the following two sub-issues should be considered.
(i) Whether the Respondent followed the proper procedure applicable to the Appellant in the investigation of the alleged wrongful misconduct and subsequent dismissal of the Appellant.
(ii) If the Respondent followed the proper procedure, whether the Appellant had established in court on a balance of probabilities, that his dismissal was wrongful.
Counsel submitted that Exhibit ‘S’ the Respondent’s Employee hand book which was tendered by D.W.1. clearly laid down the disciplinary procedure to be followed by the Respondent in handling the case of an erring staff.
(a)The first step is to issue a query to the staff 11(a).
(b) If from the reply of the staff to the query there is need to carry out a further investigation, same will be at the discretion of the Respondent to do so. 11(b).
(c) The next step to be taken after the Query and Reply and/or conclusion of further investigations if found necessary is to refer the matter to the Disciplinary Committee if the offence is a serious offence; and here the Respondent would have the option of referring the matter to its Head office Disciplinary committee or Human Capital Disciplinary Committee or Regional Disciplinary Committee, depending on the location/grade of the affected employee.
(d) It is only subsequent to or after the trial of the affected staff or employee by the Respondent’s Disciplinary Committee that the accused staff may be let-off, cautioned verbally or in written, of have his or her employment terminated or summarily dismissed, but any of the above disciplinary measures will be entirely dependent on the decision of the Disciplinary Committee 11(c).
(e) 11(d) and 11(e) of exhibit “S” go on to outline the rights of the accused staff in presenting his defence before the Disciplinary Committee including his right of Appeal against the decision of the Disciplinary Committee.
The Appellant, said counsel, led evidence that he was neither referred to the Regional Disciplinary Committee nor any Disciplinary Committee at all before the Respondent served him with a letter summarily dismissing him. His evidence was supported by D.W.1, the only witness called by the Respondent, who under cross-examination admitted that a staff that has risen up to the status of a branch manager, ought to be taken before the Disciplinary committee, depending on the gravity of the offence he is being accused of. (pages 113 and 147 of the Record).
In summary, said counsel, the Appellant’s pleading and oral evidence that he ought to have been tried by the Respondent’s Disciplinary committee but was not so tried before he was summarily dismissed was neither challenged in the Respondent’s further Amended Statement of Defence nor by the oral evidence of its sole witness. Counsel submitted that based on the above clear and established evidence, the learned trial judge held that the Respondent failed to fulfill the step of taking the Appellant before its Disciplinary committee, but strangely let the Respondent off the hook by concluding that it was at the discretion of the Respondent in paragraph 11(c), to determine “where to take an employee after a Query”. The said conclusion, said counsel, is neither here nor there as it did not absolve the Respondent. This according to counsel is because the discretion to take the Appellant to either of its three Disciplinary committees would not amount to a waiver of the Appellant’s right to be taken before a Disciplinary Committee.
Counsel submitted that since the parties are ad-idem that the Appellant was being accused of a very grievous or serious offence, he ought to have been taken before the Disciplinary Committee.
Counsel submitted that since the parties are ad-idem that the Appellant was being accused of a very grievous or serious offence, he ought to have been taken before the Disciplinary Committee where he would be tried and given an opportunity to defend himself and if found liable, the right of the Respondent to summarily dismiss him without giving him one month or three month’s prior notice as in the case of termination would now arise.
Counsel argued that the right to dismiss summarily without notice as provided in paragraph 11(5) of exhibit “S” subsequent to the trial of the staff and outcome at the Disciplinary Committee as per paragraph 11(c) of exhibit “S” was misconstrued by the learned Trial Judge as meaning aright to dispense with the trial of the staff before a Disciplinary Committee, once the investigation reveals a case of grievous or gross misconduct against the staff.
On the 1st sub-issue, learned counsel for the Appellant urged us to hold that:
(1) The Respondent failed to follow the procedure which it laid down for its employees before it summarily dismissed the Appellant from its employment.
(2) The Appellant was not given the right to be heard let alone having a fair hearing before his 23 years of service as a senior management staff was determined by the Respondent without any benefit whatsoever.
(3) As the laid down procedure was not followed in dismissing the Appellant from his employment, the dismissal was wrongful.
(4) Since the Appellant’s dismissal was wrongful, and he was not given an opportunity to defend himself before the appropriate body, it simply means that his dismissal was null and void and of no legal effect. In other words, the Appellant was never dismissed; and consequently giving the Respondent the opportunity at the court below to prove that the Appellant was guilty and the learned trial judge making a jig-saw-puzzle out of the documents tendered in court so as to find him guilty of misconduct and justify his dismissal, amounted to a mere academic exercise.
On this, counsel referred to the cases of F.C.S.C. v. Laoye (1982) 2 NWLR (Pt. 106) P. 652 at 680.
Ekpeogu v. Ashaka Cement Company (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 508) 280 at 290.
On the second sub-issue, learned counsel for the Appellant recapitulated on the evidence given by the Appellant as PW1 and submitted that had the Appellant been given the opportunity to defend himself before a Disciplinary Committee, his pieces of unchallenged evidence would obviously have been very damaging to the chief Executive Officer of the Bank and the Superior Officers who were directly managing the Rimco account, but to save their own heads, the Respondent’s Bank reacted by dismissing their manager of 23 years standing, making him a scape goat and claiming that it was because of exceeding of credit limit.
Counsel submitted that the Appellant at this stage had discharged the burden on him by establishing on a balance of probabilities that his summary dismissal was wrong and unjustified; thus shifting the burden to the Respondent in line with Section 137(2) of the Evidence Act to lead evidence in rebuttal so as to justify the Appellant’s summary dismissal. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that in an effort to discharge this burden, the Respondent put only one witness, D.W.1 who joined the bank since 1967 and was now manager at the Appellant’s former Nnewi Branch. That, the said D.W.1 could not give evidence in rebuttal of the Appellant’s evidence. That under cross-examination, he stated that he did not know who is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of his bank; he did not know how many members are on the Board of Directors of his bank; he did not know the name of his bank’s Managing Director in 1969 when the Cause of Action arose; he did not know that after the recovery of the debt from Rimco, what was left was converted into a normal loan, he did not know that Rimco account is still being operated by his bank’s head office.
He submitted that the Respondent woefully failed to discharge the burden of justifying their summary dismissal of the Appellant.
Finally, learned counsel for the Appellant urged us to allow the appeal for the following reasons:
(i) The Respondent’s summary dismissal of the Appellant without giving him an opportunity to defend himself before its Disciplinary Committee was wrongful and a violation of the Appellant’s right to a fair hearing.
(ii) The learned trial judge failed to consider or make reference to the pleadings of the parties so as to determine the admitted facts and the live issues for determination at the trial and consequently went on to try and determine the already admitted facts on the pleadings and made contrary findings of admitted facts.
(iii) The learned trial judge failed to place the evidence of the Appellant and that of the Respondent on an imaginary scale so as to weigh same in order to determine which one out weighs the other but simply picked up the evidence of the Appellant, ignored all the unchallenged evidence of facts clearly established with in the Appellant’s pleadings and oral evidence, and went on to unearth non existence contradictions in the Appellant’s oral and documentary evidence, and finally, without any evidence from the Respondent to back same up, put up a defence for the Respondent, and concluded that the Respondent was justified in summarily dismissing the Appellant.
(iv) When the evidence of the Appellant and that of D.W.1 are both placed side by side on an imaginary scale to determine which one out weighs the other, it becomes crystal clear that the Appellant’s evidence heavily out weighed that of the Respondent thus making the case seem to look like an unchallenged case.
(v) The Appellant discharged the burden on him by establishing that his dismissal was wrongful but the Respondent failed to discharge the burden of justifying its summary dismissal of the Appellant.
(vi) The learned trial judge wrongly held that by paragraph 3(1)(2) of exhibit “S” the Respondent was entitled to summarily dismiss the Appellant when by the said exhibit “S” the Respondent at pages 43 – 46 specifically provided the category of offences by its employees and the penalties attached thereto, and the only offences applicable to the Appellant were specified in No.25 and 26 to wit: Drawing of cheques on unfunded account and financial embarrassment attracted penalties of either a warning letter or termination of appointment depending on the gratuity. There was no where in the 27 specified offences and penalties where the Respondent provided for summary dismissal without a trial before a Disciplinary Committee for honouring or drawing of cheques on unfunded account.
(vii) The Appellant established his case on a balance of probabilities and is consequently entitled to judgment for wrongful dismissal and for damages as same was not challenged by the Respondent.
On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the Respondent referred to the provision of section 6 and 137(1) of the Evidence Act and reminded us that the burden lies on the Appellant to prove his alleged wrongful dismissal on the balance of probabilities.
He submitted that the Appellant was required as the manager to ensure that the said customer Rimco did not exceed the limit of N690,000,000.00 credit facility. That, despite this standing order or instruction, the Appellant as the branch manager and in flagrance disobedience of the order of the bank allows Rimco (the said customer) to exceed the aforesaid limit to the tone of N800,000.000.00 (Eight hundred million naira). Respondents counsel submitted that by exhibit ‘S’, the employee Hand Book, the breach of the standing order or Regulation in respect of Rimco’s account by granting excess facility amounted to gross misconduct which entitles the Respondent to summarily dismiss the Appellant. Learned senior counsel for the Respondent referred to the evidence of D.W.1 and what he termed admission in paragraph 17 of the Appellant’s Amended Statement of Claim and submitted that by these the contention of the Appellant that he was not given a query or that he was not brought before a Disciplinary Panel becomes untenable and unsustainable. That, the learned trial judge was perfectly right in rejecting the contention of the Appellant by dismissing the claim.
Learned senior counsel for the Respondent submitted that contrary to the Appellant’s assertions, the Respondent denied paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Appellant’s Amended Statement of Claim in paragraphs 11-15 of the Amended Statement of Defence. That in any event, it is not in dispute that the Appellant was the branch manager of the Nnewi branch of the Respondent’s branch at that point in time. Respondent’s counsel submitted that the contention of the Appellant in paragraph 5.03 at page 5 of the Appellant’s Brief that the Appellant was not referred to Disciplinary committee before the summary dismissal is misconceived. That, paragraph 4.10 page 15 of the Employee Hand Book, Exhibit ‘S’ reads thus:
“6. Summary Dismissal: Notwithstanding the above provisions, any employee who is guilty of gross misconduct shall be liable to summary dismissal”.
Respondent’s counsel also referred to the provisions of paragraph 11.5(b) at page 42 of exhibit ‘S’ which stipulates as follows:-
“11.5.Summary Dismissal: An employer may be summarily dismissed for certain acts of gross misconduct negligence such acts include:
(a) Wilful disobedience of a lawful order or serious negligence”.
Counsel submitted that the learned trial judge was right in holding that the Respondent acted within the powers conferred on it by paragraph 11.5(b) of the Employee Hand book as well as paragraph 4.10(c) in summarily dismissing the Appellant as it did.
Learned senior counsel for the Respondent referred to the cases of Chief Victor Woluchem v. Chief Simon Gudi (1981) 5 S.C. 291 at 292.
Ganiyu Ilase v. Madam T. Coker (1982) 12 SC. 252 at 271 and Mogo Chunwendu v. Nwanagbo Mbamali (1980) 34 SC 31 at 75 and submitted that it is the law that an Appeal court does not ordinarily interfere with the findings of fact of a trial court.
Learned counsel for the Appellant took the opportunity of his Reply Brief to reiterate the disciplinary procedure contained in the Respondent’s Hand Book – exhibit ‘S’ and submitted that as both parties are ad idem that the Appellant was not tried before the Respondent’s disciplinary committee, before he was summarily dismissed from his employment, this appeal should be allowed.
In determining the sole issue nominated by the Appellant in this case, the central question turned to be whether the learned trial judge was right in holding that the reference to the Respondent’s disciplinary committee in the Appellant’s circumstance was optional and that the provision of paragraph 11(c) of the Respondent’s Hand book exhibit ‘S’ was directory and not mandatory in the situation of the Appellant.
I think the learned trial judge in the instant case was clearly in error after accepting and or holding that the misconduct of the Appellant was grievous to say that the need to refer the Appellant’s case to one of the Respondent’s disciplinary committee was optional and not mandatory.
The content of paragraph 11 of exhibit ‘S’, the Respondent’s Employee Handbook dictates that the moment the Respondent is not satisfied with the Reply of his employee after the issuance of a query and or further investigations of the employee’s misconduct reveals a grievous or serious offence, the employee’s case must necessarily be referred to one of the Respondent’s disciplinary committees as provided for in paragraph 11(c) of exhibit ‘S’ the Respondent’s Employee Handbook before any form of punishment including that of summary dismissal can be meted out to an employee of the Respondent as in this case. I do agree with the learned counsel for the Appellant in this case that the right to dismiss summarily without notice as provided in paragraph 11(5) of exhibit “S” subsequent to the trial of the staff and outcome at the Disciplinary committee as per paragraph 11(c) of exhibit “S” was misconstrued by the learned trial Judge and perhaps also the learned senior counsel for the Respondent as meaning a right to dispense with the trial of the staff before a Disciplinary Committee, once the investigation reveals a case of grievous or gross misconduct against the staff. To the contrary, paragraph 11 of exhibit ‘S’ implies that in all cases of grievous or gross misconduct, the provision of paragraph 11(c) on reference to a disciplinary committee of the Respondent must be complied with before any of the prescribed punishments in exhibit ‘S’ can be applied to the erring staff.
In cases of employment governed by agreement of parties, removal by way of termination of appointment or dismissal will be in the Form agreed to.
SEE UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LIMITED V. CHUKWUELO CHARLES OGBOH (1995) 2 NWLR (Part 380) 647 at 664.
In the instant case, the disciplinary procedure agreed to by the parties as governing the employment of the Appellant includes the need to comply with the provision of paragraph 11 of exhibit ‘S’. The Respondent in this case ought to but failed to refer the Appellant’s case of misconduct to its Disciplinary committee and thereby breached a fundamental condition of service as agreed to between them which renders the Appellant’s dismissal without trial wrongful.
The only issue in this appeal is resolved in favour of the Appellant. The appeal has merit and it is accordingly allowed.
I noticed that the Respondent both in pleadings and evidence did not contest the monetary claims of the Appellant for wrongful dismissal. I therefore set aside the judgment of P.N.C. Umeadi j. in suit No. HN/ 128/2000 and hereby allow the claims of the plaintiff (now Appellant) in suit No. HN/128/2000′
The plaintiffs claims as per his further further Amended Statement of Claim dated 28/5/2001 and filed on 18/6/2001 succeeds.
The plaintiff/Appellant shall be entitled to a Grand Total of the sum of Fourteen Million, Two hundred and seventy five Thousand, four hundred and ninety seven naira and thirty kobo ((N14,274,497.30 which he termed general and special damages for wrongful dismissal by the Respondent.
In actual fact, the plaintiff/Appellant has itemized his total special damages as N14,275,497.30.
The respondent has not contested, controverted or contradicted the Appellants claim. The Appellants is therefore only entitled to the itemised claim of special damages of fourteen million, two hundred and seventy five, thousand, four hundred and ninety seven naira and thirty kobo. There shall be no award of general damages.
The aforesaid judgment debt shall attract 10% post judgment interest from this day until the judgment debt is finally liquidated. There shall be costs of N30,000.00 awarded to the Appellant as against the Respondent.
ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU, J.C.A: My learned brother, MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE JCA gave me the privilege of reading before now the judgment just delivered. I agree that the appeal is meritorious based on the reasons advanced therefore. I too allow the appeal and abide by the consequential orders.
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM J.C.A: I had read the draft of the Judgment delivered by my learned brother MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE JCA. I agree with the reasoning and conclusions in the Judgment. I agree that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. I also set aside the judgment of the trial court in suit No. HN/128/2000. I abide by the award of special damages in the sum of N14,275,497.30 to the appellant for wrongful dismissal by the respondent and award of costs.
Appearances
Chike Onyemenam with S.I. AbudeiFor Appellant
AND
Dr. Ejike-Ume SAN with C.V. Ejike-Ume and I. Onyekwuluje Esq.For Respondent
