GEONNASONS PHARMACEUTICALS (AFRICA) LTD. V. FRANCIS EDHEKU
(2016)LCN/8463(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Monday, the 10th day of April, 2006
CA/J/102/2001
RATIO
ACTION: DETINUE; WHAT CONSTITUTES A CLAIM FOR DETINUE
An action in detinue must be premised on a demand being made for the return of property seized. This was succinctly put by the Supreme Court in Odumosu v. A.C.E. Ltd. (1976) 6 U.I.L.R. 583 at 588 thus: –
“Primarily the claim in this type of action is not for damages but for the return of the specific goods wrongfully detained (or their value as assessed).”
See: Clayton v. Le Roy (1911) 2 K.B. 1031, Udechukwu v. Okwuka (1956) SCNLR 189, (1956) 1 FSC 70 at 71. At common law, a claim in detinue lay at the suit of a person who has an immediate right to the possession of the goods in issue against another who is in actual possession of them, and who, upon proper demand, failed or refused to deliver them up without lawful excuse. See: Ihenacho v. Uzochukwu (1997) 2 NWLR (pt. 487) 257, (1997) 1 SCNJ 117; Oshevire Ltd v. Tripoli Motors (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt.503) 1; (1997) 4 SCNJ 246; Benin Rubber Producers Ltd. v. Ojo (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt.521) 388; (1997) 7 SCNJ 365; Guinness (Nig.) Plc. v. Nwoke (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 135 and Bullen and Leake and Jacob’s Precedents of Pleadings, 12th Ed. (Common Law Library No.5) at page 359. PER AKAAHS, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: RES JUDICATA; WHETHER AN ISSUE CAN BE RELITIGATE
There is no requirement under the law to relitigate an issue, which a court of competent jurisdiction had already determined, to put it simply.
The legal authorities relied on by the appellant convey well known principles. Such is the case in Odumosu v. A.C.B. Ltd. reported in (1976) University of Ife Law Report 584 (in the appellant’s brief cited as 6 UILR …. ), Guuinness v. Nwoke (2002) 15 NWLR (Pt.689) 135; Ordia v. Piedmont (Nig.) Ltd. (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt.379) 516; (1995) 2 SCNJ 175 at 182 and Oshevire Ltd. v. Tripoli Motors (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt.503) 1; (1997) 4 SCNJ 246 at 260. PER NZEAKO, J.C.A.
ACTION: DETINUE; REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN AN ACTION IN DETINUE
In the latter case, the Supreme Court held that –
” … A plaintiff who has a right of action in detinue has three remedies open to him and it is up to him to decide which option of the following to take:-
(a) claim for value of the chattel and damages for its detention;
(b) claim for the return of the chattel and damages for its detention;
(c) claim for the return of the chattel or its value as assessed, and damages for its detention.”
This, undoubtedly is binding authority where there is need to claim for detinue and also damages for the unlawful detention of plaintiff’s chattel. It will not apply however where the only remedy required to be obtained is one in damages arising from the detention, even continued detention of the chattel by the defendant in what may be considered disobedience to a subsisting lawful order of a court of competent jurisdiction that it be returned by the defendant to the plaintiff. PER NZEAKO, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
KUMAI BAYANG AKAAHS Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
IFEYINWA CECILIA NZEAKO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOHAMMED LADAN TSAMIYA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
GEONNASONS PHARMACEUTICALS (AFRICA) LTD. Appellant(s)
AND
FRANCIS EDHEKU Respondent(s)
AKAAHS, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Plateau State delivered by Damulak, J. on 3/12/99 in suit No. PLD/J589/95. In paragraph 17 of the statement of claim, the plaintiff claimed both special and general damages against the defendant as follows:-
“(i) the sum of N436,050.00 (Four hundred and thirty-six thousand and fifty Naira) being special damages for loss of earnings from his Mazda Bus Registration No. BA 596T from 9/2/94 to 9/9/95.
(ii) the sum of N850.00 (Eight hundred and fifty Naira) per day being loss of earnings on the bus from the date of filing of this action i.e. 11/9/95 till the vehicle is delivered up to the plaintiff.
(iii) the sum of N250,000.00 (Two hundred and fifty thousand Naira) being general damages for the unlawful detention of plaintiff’s degree certificate, his cel1ificate of provisional registration and his Mazda Bus Registration No. BA 596T.
(iv) the costs of this action.”
The plaintiff testified in person and called three other witnesses but the defendant did not lead any evidence in defence. Counsel for the parties addressed the court and in a reserved judgment the learned trial Judge found in favour of the plaintiff and awarded him damages in the sum of N500,000.00 against the defendant. The defendant is dissatisfied with the said judgment and appealed against it in the notice of appeal dated 25/12/99 containing six grounds of appeal (see pages 201-203 of the records of appeal). The defendant will hereinafter be referred to as the appellant while the plaintiff will be called the respondent.
The appellant filed a brief of argument from which the appellant’s counsel formulated the following three issues for determination:-
1. Was the claim of the respondent being one in detinue, properly constituted in law? (Ground 6).
2. Was the trial court right in law when it failed to resolve the issue of “demand and refusal to deliver” in its judgment, when the action was founded in tort of detinue? (Ground 2).
3. Was the trial court right in entering judgment in favour of the respondent in the entire circumstance of this case?
(Grounds 1, 3, 4 and 5).
The respondent’s counsel adopted the issue formulated by the appellant’s counsel.
When the appeal was called, only the appellant’s counsel, Mr. H. N. Ugwuala was present in court. The Registrar informed the court that Ayo Adeniyi, Esq., of counsel appeared for the respondent on 27/9/2005 when the appeal was adjourned to 15/2/2006 for hearing. Since the parties had filed and exchanged briefs of argument the appeal was deemed as having been argued on the briefs in accordance with Order 6 rule 9(5) Court of Appeal Rules, 2002. Learned counsel for the appellant’s contention is that the entire suit of the respondent was not properly constituted in that there was no head of claim for the return of the detained chattels (or their value) but only claims in damages for the loss of use of the chattels.
He argued that in a claim founded in the tort of detinue, damages can only be claimed or awarded in addition to, and not in isolation of, the primary claim for the specific return of the chattel detained, or its value. He then listed the three remedies which a plaintiff suing for detinue has in law. As damages flow from the primary claim of the return of the chattel or its value as assessed, it follows that an order for payment of damages can only be made as an ancillary order to a specific order for return of the chattel or payment for its value. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the claim of the respondent is unknown to law since it was not for any of the remedies enunciated by the Supreme Court in Oshevire Ltd. v. Tripoli Motors (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt.503)1, (1997) 4 SCNJ 246 at 260. Learned counsel also referred to Bullen and Leake and Jacob’s Precedents of Pleadings, 12th Edition to state that where there is no demand and or refusal, no action in detinue lies. He then made reference to the address of counsel both in the main address and reply where the respondent admitted that he did not lead evidence in proof of demand and refusal and submitted that the trial court ought to have dismissed the claim of the respondent since there could not have been a refusal to deliver. He reasoned that exhibit K on which the respondent relied for the judgment in his favour was made on 9/6/95 whereas the claim of the respondent for damages predates the order as the pleading in paragraph 17(1) of the statement of claim put the period of the claim from 9/2/94 to 9/9/95. He argued that exhibit K determined the competing rights of the parties to the property with finality and cannot create a new cause of action between the parties, it contains live and enforceable orders enuring to the respondent and the option opened to him was to secure the enforcement of this right as ordered in exhibit K and not to bring another action in the tort of detinue, founded on exhibit K without a prior demand. He therefore urged this court to allow the appeal.
Learned counsel for the respondent in his reply submitted that the argument put forward by the appellant’s counsel as to whether or not respondent’s action was properly constituted is untenable because it overlooks the peculiar circumstances of this case wherein a court of competent jurisdiction had previously ordered the appellant to return the respondent’s items having found that the detention of the items by the appellant was “unlawful and illegal”. In the face of a pre-existing and subsisting order of court for the return of the items, it would be tantamount to abuse of Courts process to include a claim for the return of the items. Learned counsel argued that in none of the cases cited by the appellant namely:-
Oshevire Ltd. v. Tripoli Motors (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt.503) 1; (1997) 4 SCNJ 246; Odumosu v. A.C.B. Ltd. (1976) 6 U.I.L.R. 583 and Guinness (Nig.) Plc. v. Nwoke (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 135 – was it ever decided that the absence of a claim for the goods detained, was fatal to the action. He further argued that the gist of the tort of detinue as decided by the Federal Supreme Court in Udechukwu v. Okwuka (1956) SCNLR 189, (1956) 1 FSC 70 at 70 is wrongful detention and submitted that once the plaintiff is able to establish wrongful detention, it becomes immaterial whether or not there was a “demand” and “refusal to deliver”.
The appellant’s arguments are anchored on the fact that there was no demand and refusal to return the seized items before the respondent sued for damages. An action in detinue must be premised on a demand being made for the return of property seized. This was succinctly put by the Supreme Court in Odumosu v. A.C.E. Ltd. (1976) 6 U.I.L.R. 583 at 588 thus: –
“Primarily the claim in this type of action is not for damages but for the return of the specific goods wrongfully detained (or their value as assessed).”
See: Clayton v. Le Roy (1911) 2 K.B. 1031, Udechukwu v. Okwuka (1956) SCNLR 189, (1956) 1 FSC 70 at 71. At common law, a claim in detinue lay at the suit of a person who has an immediate right to the possession of the goods in issue against another who is in actual possession of them, and who, upon proper demand, failed or refused to deliver them up without lawful excuse. See: Ihenacho v. Uzochukwu(1997) 2 NWLR (pt. 487) 257, (1997) 1 SCNJ 117; Oshevire Ltd v. Tripoli Motors (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt.503) 1; (1997) 4 SCNJ 246; Benin Rubber Producers Ltd. v. Ojo (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt.521) 388; (1997) 7 SCNJ 365; Guinness (Nig.) Plc. v. Nwoke (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 135 and Bullen and Leake and Jacob’s Precedents of Pleadings, 12th Ed. (Common Law Library No.5) at page 359.
In paragraphs 12 and 13 of the statement of claim, the plaintiff pleaded the background facts which led to the institution of this action now under appeal when he averred as follows:-
“12. Plaintiff knew defendant’s Chief Executive Prince (Dr.) Geoffrey Nnannah as an influential personality who was capable of carrying out the threats hence plaintiff instructed his solicitors who on his behalf applied to this court – the High Court of Plateau State, Jos for the enforcement of his fundamental rights to personal liberty and to own property without same being unlawfully seized, in suit No. PLD/J22M/94 – Francis Edheku v. Geonnasons Pharmaceuticals (Africa) Ltd. and 2 ors. Defendant, who was 1st respondent in the case, delayed its hearing by requests for long adjournments and motions for dismissal of the case. Thus, an application to enforce fundamental rights filed in February, 1994 was only determined on 9/6/95 when this court, per Hon. Justice B. Maina, declared the seizure and retention of plaintiff’s properties listed in paragraph 7 above, a breach of his fundamental right and ordered defendant to return same forthwith to plaintiff. The ruling of the court is hereby pleaded.
13. Defendant has not complied with the said orders of court and, indeed, during the pendency of the case, defendant again caused plaintiff to be arrested and detained at the State Intelligence and Investigation Bureau, (S.I.I.B.), Jos from 30/6/94 to 3/7/94, on precisely the same allegations for which he had been arrested and detained at defendant’s instance in Lagos, for which he had instituted legal proceedings.”
A ruling was delivered in suit No. PLD/J22M/94 on 9/6/95.
The said ruling was tendered as exhibit “K”. At page 13 the learned trial Judge found as follows:-
“… even if the applicant gave the terms (his properties) voluntarily to which he denied, since there is nothing yet to hold the applicant or along with others responsible for the missing money I candidly feel the seizure and continued retention of the applicant’s properties by the 1st respondent is in contravention of section 40(1) of the Constitution and accordingly declare the seizure and retention of the properties enumerated (sic) in the 3rd prayer unlawful and illegal and amount (sic) to breach of his fundamental right to own properly without the same being unlawfully seized as guaranteed in section 40(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).”
Having found that the seizure and continued retention of the applicant’s properties was unlawful and illegal, the learned trial Judge then ordered that the properties be returned to the applicant. The action was brought under Order 2 rule 1(1) of the Fundamental Right Procedure Rules, 1979 seeking for the following reliefs amongst others:-
“1. …
2. …
3. A declaration that the compulsory seizure of the applicant’s property – namely, his Mazda bus with registration No. BA 596T with the particulars, thereof, the original copy of applicant’s Bachelors of Pharmacy Degree Certificate, and the original copy of the certificate of provisional registration No. 020093 issued to the applicant by the Pharmacists Board of Nigeria seized by the 1st respondent is unlawful and illegal and amounts to breach of his fundamental right to own property without the same being unlawfully seized as guaranteed by section 40 of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).
4. An order compelling the 1st respondent to release forthwith to the applicant, applicant’s following properties to wit:
(i) A red coloured Mazda bus with registration No. BA596T and all the documents and particulars thereof.
(ii) Original copy of the applicant’s Bachelor of Pharmacy Degree Certificate awarded by the University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria and signed by the Vice Chancellor and the Registrar on 7/2/87.
(iii) Original copy of the Certificate of Provisional Registration No. 020093 issued to the applicant by the Pharmacists Board of Nigeria on 13/11/86 which were compulsorily and unlawfully seized by the 1st respondent through its servants and agents contrary to section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 (as amended).
5. Learned counsel for the appellant stated the principle of law regarding actions in detinue correctly when he said. “In a claim founded on the tort of detinue, damages can only be claimed or awarded in addition to, and not in isolation of the primary claim for the specific return of the chattel detained, or its value”.
I therefore do not accept the interpretation which learned counsel for the respondent sought to give to the Federal Supreme Court decision in Udechukwu v. Okwuka supra that the gist of the tort of detinue is detention. The argument which he is seeking to advance is that once a plaintiff proves wrongful detention by the defendant, he would automatically be entitled to damages. That line of argument is faulty because in a claim for detinue in addition to proving that the detention of the chattel is wrongful, the plaintiff is required to establish that he had demanded for the return of the chattel but the defendant refused to return it for no justifiable reason. The decision in Clayton v. Le Roy supra justifies the position, the facts of which are as follows: The plaintiff’s watch, which had been bought some years previously at the defendant’s shop, was stolen from the plaintiff, who gave information of the theft to the defendant. The watch was pledged with a pawnbroker, and eventually, together with a large number of other unredeemed pledges, was sold by auction in a room on the first floor of a building in the city of London, which room was used solely for the sale by auction of all classes of goods. Shortly afterwards, the watch was purchased in a jeweller’s shop in the country by one B who sent it to the defendant for an opinion as to whether it was a genuine antique watch. The defendant wrote both the plaintiff and to B, telling them that it was the watch which had been stolen, and inquiring as to their wishes in the matter. No answer was sent by the plaintiff to the defendant’s letter but a few days afterwards a clerk of the plaintiff’s solicitors called at the defendant’s shop and, on being shown the watch, demanded that it should be then and there handed over to him, and, on his request being refused, at once served the defendant with a writ in detinue which he had taken out on behalf of the plaintiff about two hours previously.
Scrutton, J. gave judgment for the plaintiff but on appeal to the Court of Appeal (Fletcher Moulton, L. J. and Farwell, L. J; Vaughten Williams, L. J. dissenting) held that upon the facts given in evidence there had been no wrongful refusal on the part of the defendant to return the watch to the plaintiff before the date of the issue of the writ, and that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendant either in detinue or in trover.
This case reinforces the view that a demand for the return of the detained item must precede an action in detinue. I am of the considered opinion that the result would have been different if the writ had been issued after the request for the return of the watch had been made and the defendant unreasonably refused to return it to the plaintiff. But in that case B had written to the defendant that he was ready to surrender the watch if the plaintiff was prepared to refund the money he had expended in purchasing the watch at the auction. This is as far as I am ready to agree with the arguments of the appellant’s counsel. Before the present action for damages, the respondent had earlier commenced action for the enforcement of his fundamental right to liberty of his person and right to own property in suit No. PLD/122M/94. That action tantamounts to a demand for the return of his seized chattels and his right to damages crystallized on 9/6/95 when Maina, J. declared the seizure and retention of the properties unlawful and illegal and ordered for their return to the respondent. This case is similar to what transpired in Ordia v. Piedmont (Nig.) Ltd. (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 379) 516. The facts of the case may be summarized as follows:-
The appellant bought two galvanized steel barges from the liquidator of the company that constructed the bridge on Ethiope River and they were moored near the new bridge. By the time the appellant sought to take delivery of the barges he discovered they had been taken away by the defendant to Ologbo were the defendant put them to use. The appellant then instituted an action to recover the barges at Sapele in the High Court of the former Mid-Western State but his action was dismissed. He then appealed to the Supreme Court where by consent judgment it was ordered as follows:-
“(a) The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant/respondent the sum of N900.00 being the present price agreed to by the parties in respect of both barges constituting the subject matter of appeal.
(b) After payment of the said amount of N900.00 by the plaintiff/appellant to the 2nd defendant/respondent the 2nd defendant/respondent shall permit the plaintiff/appellant to take possession of the said barges and remove same for his own use and benefit.
(c) The plaintiff/appellant shall pay to the 2nd defendant/respondent the cost of this appeal assessed at N500.00.”
The appellant promptly complied with the consent judgment by paying the sum of N1,400.00 into the respondent’s account (i.e. N900.00 and cost of N500.00) which the respondent refused to accept by sending a cheque for the same sum back to him on 9th April, 1976. The appellant then paid this same sum into the Registry of the High Court in respondent’s favour but despite notice of this payment, the respondent still refused to collect the sum. The appellant then demanded the return of the barges as ordered by the Supreme Court but this demand was not heeded. This led to the suit that found its way from the High Court through the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court.
The High Court entered judgment in favour of the appellant on the issue of not handing over the barges to the appellant, finding in conversion rather than in detinue. He awarded N2,000,00 as damages for loss of use for four days detention. Against the award of damages the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal. And with leave filed a further appeal to the Supreme Court. It was held that in an action where the defendant has been found liable in detinue, he cannot deprive the plaintiff of his right to damages for detention of his chattel simply because he was not earning anything from its use. Iguh, J.S.C. in his contribution on the claim in detinue stated as follows at pages 535-536:-
“On the plaintiff’s claim of N525,000.00 in respect of loss of use of the said barges, it is not in dispute that it was on the 10th April, 1976 that the plaintiff unsuccessfully made a demand on the defendant for the return of the barges. It was on that date therefore that the cause of action in the suit arose …”
The cause of action in detinue arose on 9/6/95 when Maina, J. ordered for the return of the respondent’s property since they had been illegally detained. Once a court of competent jurisdiction had ruled that detention of the respondent’s goods was wrongful and ordered for their release to the respondent, it was no longer necessary for the respondent in filing a fresh action to demand for their return; neither did it amount to abuse of judicial process to institute a fresh action and claim for damages. I do not agree with the appellant’s contention that the entire suit of the respondent was not properly constituted because there was no head of claim for the return of the detained chattels.
What remains to be considered is the damages awarded to the respondent. As at the time the respondent gave evidence and was cross-examined on 1/6/98, his properties had not been returned to him. There is no evidence that they were returned by the time judgment was delivered on 3/12/99. There is unchallenged evidence that the net amount which the bus was making per day was N850.00 and it worked for 27 days in the month. At the time judgment was delivered on 3/12/99 it had been detained for 1,634 days from 9/6/95 when the order for the release was made. The amount that should have accrued to the respondent was N981 ,750.00 But the learned trial Judge awarded damages of N500,000.00. I do not see any justification to interfere with the award of damages. I only wish to observe that had the respondent cross-appealed on the issue of damages, he would have been entitled to an upward review. The damages which the respondent claimed were special damages which were proved and he was entitled to every kobo. In this type of cases the principle of mitigation of damages cannot be invoked since he was earning income from the bus and the only evidence which could have been used to reduce the income is the depreciation value of the vehicle and the cost of maintenance which was not forthcoming from the appellant. Whatever admission was made by counsel in his address cannot adversely affect the respondent’s case.
In conclusion, I find that the appeal has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed. I award N10,000.00 as costs in favour of the respondent against the appellant.
NZEAKO, J.C.A.: I would adjudge this appeal entirely unmeritorious and agree with my learned brother, Akaahs, JCA’s reasoning and conclusion in his leading judgment. The appeal ought to be dismissed.
I only wish to add a few words of my own regarding the issue raised in the appellant’s brief as to whether the suit was properly constituted.
The appellant contended that the suit was not properly, constituted, his reason being that there is absence of a claim for the return of the detained chattel or the value thereof as there ought to be in an action in detinue.
Learned counsel for the appellant had argued that the action being one in detinue, in order to be properly constituted, it ought to have a head of claim for the return of the chattel or the value thereof but that the respondent’s claim, sounding only in damages for loss of use of the detained chattel, was not properly constituted. He urged the court to dismiss the claim because, according to him, no cause of action in detinue had been disclosed.
For the respondent, it was argued that it was unnecessary to demand and claim for the return of the chattel in the circumstances of this case, in view of a subsisting order of a court of Justice to which there has been no appeal, directing the appellant to return the chattel to the respondent as shown in exhibit K. Exhibit K is the certified true copy of the proceedings wherein the order is embodied.
On my part, I would uphold the submission of learned counsel for the respondent. With respect to the learned counsel for the appellant, his submission simply tends to the abstract and the legal authorities poured out in his brief of argument, fail to address this particular case within its own circumstances.
The position in this case is that a court of competent jurisdiction had already determined the issue of the return of the same chattel in an earlier suit – as shown in exhibit K. It ordered the return of the said chattel and that order subsists. It has not been appealed against.
The foregoing facts are not in dispute, nor is it in contention that the appellant is still detaining the chattel, the said order of the court, notwithstanding.
I have particularly observed that in the whole of the submission for the appellant, no regard was given or mention made to the order in exh. K. That has not helped its case. Did it deliberately ignore it?
There is no requirement under the law to relitigate an issue, which a court of competent jurisdiction had already determined, to put it simply.
The legal authorities relied on by the appellant convey well known principles. Such is the case in Odumosu v. A.C.B. Ltd. reported in (1976) University of Ife Law Report 584 (in the appellant’s brief cited as 6 UILR …. ), Guuinness v. Nwoke (2002) 15 NWLR (Pt.689) 135; Ordia v. Piedmont (Nig.) Ltd. (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt.379) 516; (1995) 2 SCNJ 175 at 182 and Oshevire Ltd. v. Tripoli Motors (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt.503) 1; (1997) 4 SCNJ 246 at 260.
In the latter case, the Supreme Court held that –
” … A plaintiff who has a right of action in detinue has three remedies open to him and it is up to him to decide which option of the following to take:-
(a) claim for value of the chattel and damages for its detention;
(b) claim for the return of the chattel and damages for its detention;
(c) claim for the return of the chattel or its value as assessed, and damages for its detention.”
This, undoubtedly is binding authority where there is need to claim for detinue and also damages for the unlawful detention of plaintiff’s chattel. It will not apply however where the only remedy required to be obtained is one in damages arising from the detention, even continued detention of the chattel by the defendant in what may be considered disobedience to a subsisting lawful order of a court of competent jurisdiction that it be returned by the defendant to the plaintiff.
Without doubt, the respondent in this matter had need to claim and rightly, in my view, claimed damages for the detention of his chattel. Those basic and well-known principles on a claim in detinue which the appellant relied on so heavily, though well researched, may not serve to hoodwink any court of Justice in its duty to determine a case such as this, in terms of its own facts and particular circumstances.
The submissions of learned counsel for the appellants fail to answer the case in hand and I do not hesitate to jettison them. I would answer this and other issues in this appeal against the appellant, in favour of the respondent and dismiss the appeal with N 10,000 costs to the respondent.
TSAMIYA, J.C.A.: I have read before now the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Akaahs, JCA. I agree with his reasoning and conclusions. I agree that the appeal has no merit and it is hereby dismissed. I abide by all the consequential orders made in the leading judgment including the order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Appearances
H. N. UgwualaFor Appellant
AND
Respondent absent and unrepresentedFor Respondent
