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GARGA v. STATE (2022)

GARGA v. STATE

(2022)LCN/16353(CA)

In The Supreme Court

On Wednesday, April 13, 2022

SC.820/2016

Before Our Lordships:

Musa Dattijo Muhammad Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Chima Centus Nweze Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Tijjani Abubakar Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Emmanuel Akomaye Agim Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

SANUSI GARGA APPELANT(S)

And

THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)

 

RATIO:

WHEN AN APPEAL HAS NO REASONABLE GROUND OF APPEAL

By virtue of Order 8 Rules 3 and 4 of the Supreme Court Rules 2013, no ground of appeal which is vague or general in terms and which discloses no reasonable ground of appeal shall be permitted or regarded valid and competent. A ground of appeal may be described as vague when it is couched in a manner which does not give allowance for its being understood. Where a ground of appeal is articulated in general language making it patently imprecise in its meaning to the adversary or the Court, such a ground of appeal would be held to be vague and therefore liable to be struck out.

WHEN AN APPEAL HAS NO REASONABLE GROUND OF APPEAL

Again, from a long line of seemingly endless decisions of this Court, a ground of appeal is held to be vague if it is allusive, ambiguous, broad, debatable, disputable, evasive and inexact, See: LAGGA V. SARHUNA (2008) LPELR-1740 (SC). A ground of appeal which is precise, concise, exact and unequivocal cannot be said to be vague, the Court has a duty to examine all grounds of appeal upon which Appellant’s appeal is erected, to ensure that the appeal is concreted on competent and permissible pedestal. I have carefully examined the seven grounds of appeal of the Appellant and I am of the view that the grounds are couched in general terms and therefore disclose no reasonable grounds of appeal from where issues could be distilled for proper discourse.

MEANING OF A GROUND OF APPEAL

The law is settled that a ground of appeal is basically a highlight of the error of law or fact or mixed law and fact made by the Court in the decision sought to be set aside in the appeal.

WHEN A GROUND OF APPEAL IS CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING THE PURPOSE OF SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION APPEALED AGAINST

It follows therefore that for a ground of appeal to be capable of achieving the purpose of setting aside the decision appealed against, it has to be substantial and must relate to the ratio of the decision, not directed at the obiter dictum of the Court, or crafted in the abstract.

WHETHER THE COURT CAN SUO MOTU STRIKE OUT AN APPEAL FOR BEEN INCOMPETENT 

Let me state it clearly here that where a ground of appeal is incompetent as in the instant appeal, the Court is vested with sufficient powers to suo motu raise the issue and strike out the appeal. I find this appeal one of such appropriate avenues to exercise such powers, see: ABUBAKAR & ANOR V. JOSEPH & ANOR (2008) LPELR-48(SC) where this Court held as follows and I quote;
“It need to be borne in mind that where no objection is raised by a respondent, the Court can suo motu draw the attention of an appellant’s learned counsel to an incompetent ground of appeal. See the cases Okorie & Ors. v. Udom & Ors. (1960) 5 FSC. 162 at 164; Nta & Ors. v. Anigbo & Ors (1972) 5 S.C. 156 at 160; Amadi v. Okoli & Ors. (1977) 7 S.C. 57 at 63; Osawaru v. Ezeiruka (1978) 67 SC. 135; Chief Agbaka v. Chief Amadi (supra) and Pfeiffer v. The Midland Railway Co. (1887) 18 Q.B.D. 143.”

INGREDIENTS REQUIRED BY LAW FOR PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE OFFENCE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

The ingredients required by law for the Prosecution to prove the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 97 (1) of Penal Code are:
a) An agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done some illegal act or some act which is not illegal by illegal means.
b) Where the agreement is other than an agreement to commit an offence that some act besides the agreements was done by one or more of the parties in furtherance of the agreement.
c) Specifically, that each of the accused individually participated in the conspiracy.
See Yusuf v. FRN (2017) LPELR-43830 (SC) Pg. 26-27, paras. F; State v. Salawu (2012) ALL FWLR Pt. 614 Pg. 30-31; Kayode v. State (2016) LPELR-40028 (SC) Pg. 51-52, paras. F; Eze V. FRN (2017) LPELR-42097 (SC) Pg. 62-63, para. D; Obiakor v State (2002) 6 SC Pt. 11 Pg. 33 at 39-40 and Clark v. The State (1986) 4 NWLR Pt.35 Pg. 381. HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.:

INGREDIENTS REQUIRED BY LAW FOR PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE OFFENCE OF AIDING ESCAPE

The ingredients for the offence of aiding the escape under Section 127 of the Penal Code Laws of Jigawa State are:
a) That the accused is a public servant charged with a duty to arrest or keep a person in confinement.
b) That the person was arrested or that he escaped or attempted to escape from custody.
c) That the public servant omitted to arrest the person or allowed the person to escape from custody or aided the person to escape or attempt to escape.
d) That the public servant acted with intention to aid the escapee. HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.

POSITION OF LAW WHEN THE COURT WILL DISTURB THE CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACTS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE TWO LOWER COURTS

The law is that this Court would not unless exceptional circumstances are shown, disturb the concurrent findings of facts and legal conclusions of the two lower Courts. The findings must be shown to have been arrived at injudicially in a perverse manner. The findings must be shown to be unsupported by admissible evidence and there must be an inherent violation of the rights to fair hearing of the Appellant that on the face of the record has occasioned gross miscarriage of justice and needs to be corrected by this Court. See –
1. EGWUMI V. STATE (2013) 13 NWLR Pt. 1372 Pg. 525 at 556-557, paras. E-A.
2. IFEANYI V. FRN (2018) 12 NWLR Pt. 1632 Pg. 164 at 195, paras. G—H.
3. AFUAPE V. STATE (2020) 17 NWLR Pt. 1754 Pg. 381 at 416, paras. C—E; 417, paras. A—B.
4. IDAM V. FRN (2020) 12 NWLR Pt. 1737 Pg. 1 at 13, paras. E
5. AMEH V. STATE (2018) 12 NWLR Pt. 1632 Pg. 99 at 125, paras. G—H.
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.: 

DUTY OF A PROSECUTOR IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL

It is a settled law that in a criminal trial, the Prosecution may prove the guilt of the defendant either by direct eyewitness account or by circumstantial evidence from which the guilt of a defendant can be inferred or by free and voluntary confessional statement of guilt which is direct and positive or by a combination of any of the three modes. See Emeka v. State (2001) 14 NWLR Pt. 734 Pg. 666; Umar v. State (2014) 13 NWLR Pt. 1425 Pg. 497 and Ilodigwe v. State (2012) 18 NWLR Pt. 1331 Pg. 1. HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.: 

TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the Court of Appeal Kaduna Division delivered on the 4th day of December, 2015.

​The Appellant in this appeal, Sanusi Garga was arraigned before the High Court of Justice Jigawa State together with one other accused person on a two Count charge of conspiracy to assist and aiding the escape of a condemned prisoner from prison custody contrary to and punishable under Sections 97 (1) and 127 (a) of the Penal Code.

The charge against the Appellant reads as follows:
1. That you, Sanusi Garga (M) of medium security Prison Service Hadejia and Comfort Dodo (F) of Medium Security Prison Service Hadejia on or about the 14th day of December, 2011 conspired among yourselves and assist the escape of Rabi Isma’il (Condemned Prisoner) from Hadejia Medium Prison within the Jigawa Judicial Division and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 97 (1) of the Penal Code.
2. That you Sanusi Garga (m) of Medium Security Prison Hadejia and Comfort Dodo (F) of Medium Security Prison Service Hadejia on or about the 14th day of December, 2011 at about 2300 hrs at Hadejia Medium Security Prison within the Jigawa Judicial Division being public servants intentionally aided the escape of one Rabi Isma’il (Condemned Prisoner) from custody and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 127 (a) of the Penal Code.

When the charge was read and explained to the Appellant, he pleaded not guilty to the charge and case immediately proceeded to trial. At the trial, the Respondent called ten witnesses and tendered exhibits in proof of its case while the Appellant testified in his defence and called two additional witnesses for the defence. At the conclusion of trial, the trial Court found the Appellant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two years imprisonment or in the alternative a fine of N50,000.00 on the first count and three years’ imprisonment or a fine of N100,000.00 on the second count. The Appellant was miffed by this decision and therefore filed notice of appeal at the lower Court on the 6th day of October, 2014. The lower Court found no merit in the Appellant’s appeal it was therefore dismissed, the judgment of the trial Court was therefore affirmed. Further aggrieved by the decision of the lower Court, the Appellant further appealed to this Court via an amended notice of appeal filed on the 31st day of July, 2017.

The Appellant through learned Counsel Yakubu Maikasuwa Esq, filed the Appellant’s brief of argument on the 31st day of July, 2017, the brief was deemed as properly filed and served on the 24th day of January, 2019. Learned Counsel crafted sole issue for the determination. The issue reads as follows;
“Whether the learned justices of the Court of Appeal were right in affirming the trial and conviction of the Appellant when the Appellant did not have a fair hearing before the trial Court. If the answer to the above is in the negative, what is the appropriate order to make having regard to the entire circumstances of the case.”

​Learned counsel for the Respondent Abdulhamid Mohammed, on the other hand, filed the Respondent’s brief of argument on the 13th day of April, 2019, it was deemed as properly filed and served on the 27th day of January, 2019.

​Learned counsel also nominated a corresponding sole issue for determination, the issue is also reproduced as follows:

Whether the learned trial Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in affirming the sentence and conviction of the Appellant having regard to the totality of the evidence before the trial Court and the fairness of the trial proceedings.

As a starting point, I must mention that a ground of appeal is the totality of the reasons why the decision complained of is considered wrong by the party appealing against the decision, the Appellant or the aggrieved party, See: EHINLANWO V. OKE (2008) LPELR-1054 (SC).

I have carefully examined the amended grounds of appeal filed by the Appellant in this appeal, it is apparent that the seven grounds of appeal contained in the notice of appeal are defective, incompetent and therefore incapable of activating the jurisdiction of this Court. The grounds vis-a vis their particulars are not only imprecise, vague, argumentative, repetitive, but also general in nature and therefore liable of being struck out.
By the provisions of Order 8, Rules 3 and 4 of the Supreme Court Rules;
“Rule 3
The notice of appeal shall set forth concisely and under distinct heads the grounds upon which the Appellant intends to rely at the hearing of the appeal without any argument or narrative and shall be numbered consecutively”.
“Rule 4
no grounds which is vague or general in terms which discloses no reasonable grounds of appeal shall be permitted, save the general ground that the judgment is against the weight of evidence, and any ground of appeal or any part thereof which is not permitted under this rule may be struck out by the Court of its own motion or on application by the respondent”.
This Court reiterated the settled position of the law in UMANAH V. N.D.I.C (2016) 14 NWLR (PART 1533) Pg. 466 when the Court held that;
“an appellate Court can strike out, on its own motion, any ground of appeal which is vague or general in terms or which does not disclose a reasonable ground.”

In obedience to the settled position of the law therefore, I will navigate through the Appellant’s grounds of appeal to determine whether they are competent and therefore sufficient to activate the jurisdiction of the Court. The grounds of appeal and their respective particulars are set out as follows.
GROUND ONE
The learned justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law in affirming the conviction of the Appellant when the prosecution did not establish the offences to the standard require by law.
“PARTICULARS OF ERROR
l. There was no evidence before the trial Court of any agreement between the Appellant and any other person to do any illegal act in an illegal manner.
ll. There were material contradictions in the evidence laid by the prosecution against the Appellant in respect of the offences charged.
III. The trial Court relied heavily on the alleged confessional statements that were contradictory in material respects in convicting the appellant.
GROUND TWO
The learned justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they held as follows;
“the contents of the confessional statements and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses showed that there was a premeditated plan hatched by the Appellant, the escape convict and the other accused person to spring the escape of the from prison and they showed the part played by each of the parties in actualizing the plan. ”
“PARTICULARS OF ERROR
I. There was no evidence that the appellant had a meeting of mind with any other person to commit offence.
II. There was no evidence before trial Court that the Appellant had a common intention with any other person to do any unlawful act.”
GROUND THREE
The learned justices of the Court of appeal erred in law when they held as follows;
“the evidence laid by the respondent proved the offences of conspiracy to assist and assisting the escape of a prisoner from prison contrary to the provisions of Section 97 (1) of the Penal Code Law brought against the appellant. The appellant has not given this Court any reason to temper with the judgment of the lower Court in the instant appeal”.
“PARTICULARS OF ERROR
I. There was no evidence that the appellant had a meeting of the mind with any other person to commit any offence.
II. There was no evidence before the trial Court that the appellant had a common intention with any other person to do any unlawful act.
III. The trial Court relied heavily on the alleged confessional statements that were contradictory in material respects in convicting the appellant.
GROUND FOUR
The learned justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they held as follows;
“as stated earlier the first confessional statement exhibit P5, was admitted in evidence after a trial within trial. The lower Court in its ruling of the trial within trial made specific findings on the evidence laid by the parties on the voluntariness of confessional statement and it was on the basis of the findings that it held the statement was made voluntarily. The appellant did not appeal against any of the findings of fact made by the lower Court in the ruling, even in his final notice of appeal to challenge those findings,”
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
I. The complaint of the appellant at the trial Court and the Court below was that the confessional statements allegedly made by him were not voluntarily.”
GROUND FIVE
The learned justices of the Court of appeal erred in law when they held as follows;
“it is obvious that when viewed as a whole, along with the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses there was no contradiction on material or substantial facts in the contents of the confessional statements or in any part of the entire evidence led by the respondent in proof of the case against the appellant”.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
i. The confessional statements allegedly made by the appellant had different accounts of how the convict escaped from the prison custody
ii. There was no explanation by the respondent as to which of the confessional statements to consider and which to disregard.
GROUND SIX
The learned justices of the Court erred in law in law when they held that the evidence of some of the prosecution witness corroborated the confessional statements allegedly made by the appellant.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
I. The three confessional statements allegedly made by the Appellant had different accounts of how the convict escaped from prison custody.
II. There was no explanation by the Respondent as to which of the confessional statements to consider and which to disregard.”
GROUND SEVEN
The learned justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law in affirming the trial and conviction of the Appellant when the Appellant did not have a fair hearing before the trial Court.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
i. The Appellant denied making exhibit p5 and 6 voluntarily
II. The appellant gave evidence before the trial Court during the trial within trial of how he was beaten and bodily injuries inflicted on him before exhibits P5 and 6 were made.
III. The learned trial Judge in his ruling in trial within trial said that the injuries on the Appellant could be as a result of leg chaining or that he may have inflicted them on himself to derive benefit therefrom or that other inmates may have inflicted those on the Appellant.
IV. The Appellant was not examined on the alleged injuries inflicted on him before exhibits P5 and 6 were made under cross-examination during the trial within trial by the prosecution.
v. None of the prosecution witness gave evidence on the Appellant’s injuries during the trial within trial
vi. The learned trial Judge relied on the imagined explanation for the injuries in holding that the confessional statement was voluntarily made.
vii. The learned trial Judge relied solely on the alleged confessional statement in convicting the Appellant.

By virtue of Order 8 Rules 3 and 4 of the Supreme Court Rules 2013, no ground of appeal which is vague or general in terms and which discloses no reasonable ground of appeal shall be permitted or regarded valid and competent. A ground of appeal may be described as vague when it is couched in a manner which does not give allowance for its being understood. Where a ground of appeal is articulated in general language making it patently imprecise in its meaning to the adversary or the Court, such a ground of appeal would be held to be vague and therefore liable to be struck out.
Again, from a long line of seemingly endless decisions of this Court, a ground of appeal is held to be vague if it is allusive, ambiguous, broad, debatable, disputable, evasive and inexact, See: LAGGA V. SARHUNA (2008) LPELR-1740 (SC). A ground of appeal which is precise, concise, exact and unequivocal cannot be said to be vague, the Court has a duty to examine all grounds of appeal upon which Appellant’s appeal is erected, to ensure that the appeal is concreted on competent and permissible pedestal. I have carefully examined the seven grounds of appeal of the Appellant and I am of the view that the grounds are couched in general terms and therefore disclose no reasonable grounds of appeal from where issues could be distilled for proper discourse.

The law is settled that a ground of appeal is basically a highlight of the error of law or fact or mixed law and fact made by the Court in the decision sought to be set aside in the appeal. It is the sum total of the reason(s) why the decision on appeal is considered by learned counsel for the Appellant to be wrong and liable to be set aside. It follows therefore that for a ground of appeal to be capable of achieving the purpose of setting aside the decision appealed against, it has to be substantial and must relate to the ratio of the decision, not directed at the obiter dictum of the Court, or crafted in the abstract. In ALHAJI BANI GAA BUDO NUHU v. ALHAJI ISHOLA ARE OGELE (2003) LPELR-2077(SC) this Court held as follows;
“The term vague connotes something woolly, equivocal, a state of affairs that does not lend itself easily to comprehension, something blurry and nebulous, uncertain or shadowy.”

​Let me state it clearly here that where a ground of appeal is incompetent as in the instant appeal, the Court is vested with sufficient powers to suo motu raise the issue and strike out the appeal. I find this appeal one of such appropriate avenues to exercise such powers, see: ABUBAKAR & ANOR V. JOSEPH & ANOR (2008) LPELR-48(SC) where this Court held as follows and I quote;
“It need to be borne in mind that where no objection is raised by a respondent, the Court can suo motu draw the attention of an appellant’s learned counsel to an incompetent ground of appeal. See the cases Okorie & Ors. v. Udom & Ors. (1960) 5 FSC. 162 at 164; Nta & Ors. v. Anigbo & Ors (1972) 5 S.C. 156 at 160; Amadi v. Okoli & Ors. (1977) 7 S.C. 57 at 63; Osawaru v. Ezeiruka (1978) 67 SC. 135; Chief Agbaka v. Chief Amadi (supra) and Pfeiffer v. The Midland Railway Co. (1887) 18 Q.B.D. 143.”

Having said this much, I am of the view that the seven grounds of appeal contained in the amended notice of appeal filed by the Appellant are vague and therefore incompetent, they are hereby struck out.
Appeal struck out.

MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.: Having had a preview of the lead judgment of my learned brother TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, JSC just delivered and being in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion therein, I adopt same in dismissing the unmeritorious appeal.

The Appellant was charged and convicted by the trial Jigawa High Court, on the 8th July 2014, for the offences of conspiracy to and aiding a condemned prisoner to escape from prison custody under Section 97(1) and 127(a) of the Penal Code respectively. Both conviction and sentence of the trial Court were affirmed by the Court of Appeal, the lower Court. This appeal, therefore, is against the concurrent findings of the two Courts below.

The pertinent question to answer is whether the Appellant has established the concurrent findings of both Courts to be perverse.
He has not.

The two Courts found exhibits P5 and P6B, Appellant’s extra-judicial statement, to be confessional and true. It is trite that an accused’s confessional statement the Court finds to have been freely given is often the best evidence of his guilt for what offence he is charged, tried and convicted. Both Courts are right to have so held. See AGBOOLA V. STATE (2013) LPELR-20652 (SC).

Furthermore, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses demonstrate materially that the Appellant has committed both offences.

​The trial Court that saw and observed these witnesses believed their account. An appellate Court is handicapped in taking a contrary position except where the trial Court’s inference from the evidence is shown to be perverse. The Appellant has failed to show this much to me.

For the foregoing and, more so, the fuller reasons adumbrated in the lead judgment, I am unable to interfere. This accounts for my dismissal of the unmeritorious appeal and further affirmation of the trial Court’s judgment convicting and sentencing the Appellant for the two offences.

CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C.: My Lord, Tijjani Abubakar, JSC, obliged me with the draft of the leading judgment just delivered. I entirely agree with the reasoning and conclusion in the leading judgment. I adopt the judgment as mine in striking out the appeal. I also abide by the consequential orders in the lead judgment.

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.: I have read the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, TIJJANI ABUBAKAR JSC. I completely agree with the reasoning and conclusion that this appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.

This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Kaduna Division, delivered on the 4th day of December, 2015 in which the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the High Court of Jigawa State, sitting at Dutse, delivered on the 8th day of July, 2014. The Appellant (who was arraigned before the learned trial Judge as the 1st Defendant at trial) was convicted for the offence of conspiracy to assist and of aiding the escape of a condemned prisoner from prison custody contrary to the provisions of Sections 97 (1) and 127 (a) of the Penal Code Law. Consequently, the Appellant was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment or a fine of N50,000 on the first count and three years’ imprisonment or a fine of N100,000 on the second count.

Being dissatisfied by the affirmation of his conviction and sentence by the Court below, the Appellant appealed further to this Court, which appeal was initiated by a Notice of Appeal dated 23rd of December, 2015 containing six grounds of appeal.

​Thus, this is an appeal against the concurrent findings of facts and conclusions of law by the two lower Courts. A summary of the facts in this case is appropriate here.

This case arose from the escape of one Rabi Ismail, a condemned criminal (a person legally convicted and sentenced to death) who escaped from the Hadejia Medium Security Prison on 15/12/2011.

PW1, DSP Muhd Hamisu Isah, was the officer in charge of the Hadeija Medium Prison at the time of the alleged commission of the offence. He testified that he received a report on the 16th of December, 2011 of the escape of Rabi Ismail. A search party which was organized arrived at a point in which Sanusi Garga (the Appellant) was believed to have induced/assisted in the process of the escape of Rabi Ismail. The witness swore that there was an ongoing relationship between the Appellant and the escapee. He testified that the report also pointed to the fact the 2nd Defendant at trial left her duty post without lawful authority on the day of the incident.

The Appellant was subsequently arrested after thorough investigation by the Police during which a techno phone, love letters and novels were found in his possession.

​The Appellant also confessed in Exhibits P5 & P6B to have committed the offence he was charged with.

At the end of the trial, the learned trial Judge found that Exhibits P5 & P6B (which were retracted but admitted after a trial within trial was conducted) were made by the Appellant, found the two counts proved against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt and consequently sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment or a fine of N50,000 for the first count and three years’ imprisonment or a fine of N100,000 on the second count.

My Lords, all the grounds of appeal here are grounds of mixed law and facts and this Court is being asked to re-evaluate the evidence presented at the trial Court and reconsidered by the Court of Appeal to which both Courts returned a verdict of “guilty” to criminal conspiracy and aiding the escape leveled against the Appellant.

​The ingredients required by law for the Prosecution to prove the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 97 (1) of Penal Code are:
a) An agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done some illegal act or some act which is not illegal by illegal means.
b) Where the agreement is other than an agreement to commit an offence that some act besides the agreements was done by one or more of the parties in furtherance of the agreement.
c) Specifically, that each of the accused individually participated in the conspiracy.
See Yusuf v. FRN (2017) LPELR-43830 (SC) Pg. 26-27, paras. F; State v. Salawu (2012) ALL FWLR Pt. 614 Pg. 30-31; Kayode v. State (2016) LPELR-40028 (SC) Pg. 51-52, paras. F; Eze V. FRN (2017) LPELR-42097 (SC) Pg. 62-63, para. D; Obiakor v State (2002) 6 SC Pt. 11 Pg. 33 at 39-40 and Clark v. The State (1986) 4 NWLR Pt.35 Pg. 381.

The ingredients for the offence of aiding the escape under Section 127 of the Penal Code Laws of Jigawa State are:
a) That the accused is a public servant charged with a duty to arrest or keep a person in confinement.
b) That the person was arrested or that he escaped or attempted to escape from custody.
c) That the public servant omitted to arrest the person or allowed the person to escape from custody or aided the person to escape or attempt to escape.
d) That the public servant acted with intention to aid the escapee.

​The learned trial Judge in reasoning that the Respondent herein had sufficiently proved the ingredients of criminal conspiracy against the Appellant held as follows on page 143 of the Record:
“In the case at hand, there is no direct evidence to establish that the accused persons had met and agreed to commit the offence charged but there is evidence that, the accused persons were public officers working in the same prison and that the 2nd accused was attached to the cell in which the escapee was housed and there is also evidence that, the 1st accused duplicated the key to the cell where the escapee was kept. It is also in evidence that the 2nd accused left her duty post at the time when the escapee run (sic) away without the permission of any authority, The cumulative effect of the evidence before this Court and the circumstances leading to the escape of the escapee would invariably makes (sic) this Court to infer that, the accused persons have conspired to commit the offence charged and consequently the offence of conspiracy under Section 97(1) is hereby established against the accused persons.”

​In finding the Appellant guilty of the offence of intentionally aiding the escape of a prisoner from the prison custody, I align myself with the submission of the trial Court from the last paragraph on pages 143—145 of the record, wherein the trial Court held that the learned prosecution’s counsel established all the ingredients of the offence the Appellant was charged with.

My Lords, confessional statement which is voluntary, direct and positive as contained in Exhibits P5 and P6B is sufficient to sustain a conviction. See KAMILA V. STATE (2018) ALL FWLR Pt. 965 Pg. 1 at 28; AGBOOLA V. STATE (2013) LPELR-20652 (SC) Pg. 50, para. D; ADIO V. STATE (1986) 2 NWLR Pt.24 Pg. 581; and ADEYEMI V. STATE (2014) LPELR-23062 (SC).

The Court below found on pg. 312 of the record as follows:
“The contents of the confessional statements and the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses showed that there was a premeditated plan hatched by the Appellant, the escaped convict and the other accused person to spring the escape of the convict from prison and they showed the part played by each of the parties in actualizing the plan. They showed that the Appellant was at the times material to the charge an officer with the Nigeria Prison Service serving in the Hadejia Medium Prison with responsibility of keeping convicts confined in the prisons and that a convict, Rabi Ismail, escaped from the Hadejia Medium Prison and that the Appellant aided the escape of this convict from prison and that he did so intentionally. The ingredients of the offence of conspiracy brought against the Appellant and the one other are easily inferable from these facts. The evidence led by the Respondent proved the offences of conspiracy to assist and assisting the escape of a prisoner from prison contrary to the provisions of Sections 97 (1) and 127 (a) of the Penal Code Law brought against the Appellant. The Appellant has not given this Court any reason to tamper with the judgment of the lower Court in the instant appeal.”

I agree with the findings of the two Courts below that there are no material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses since no witness said the opposite of what another witness had said even though there may be slight inconsistencies on oath relating to immaterial facts. See Gabriel v. The State (1989) 5 NWLR Pt. 122 Pg. 457 at 468.

​My Lords, the intricate and inventive argument of the Appellant’s Counsel in trying to pick holes in the findings of fact of the trial Court and the Court below even though a show of industry is of absolutely no use in the circumstances of this case.

In any event, it is trite that the evaluation of evidence and the ascription of probative value to such evidence is the primary function of the trial Court. This much was given judicial credence by my Lord, Iguh, JSC in OGUONZEE V. STATE (1998) 4 SC 110 at 121-122, when His Lordship held thus:
“Before I turn to the treatment of the above findings of fact by the Court of Appeal, I think I need re-emphasize that where facts in issue, whether in a criminal or civil proceedings are accepted or believed by the trial Court and no question of misdirection arises, an appellate Court, will not ordinarily interfere with such findings of fact made by a trial Judge which are supported by evidence simply because there is some other evidence in contradiction of the finding or that if the same facts were before the appellate Court, it would not have come to the same decision as the trial Judge, See Ike v. Ugboaja (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 301) 539; Odofin v. Ayoola, supra; Ogbero Egri v. Ukperi (1974) 1 NMLR 22; Ogundulu & Ors. v. Philips & Ors. (1973) NMLR 267 etc. This, as already stated, is because findings of fact made by a trial Court are matters peculiarly within its exclusive jurisdiction and they are presumed to be correct unless and until an appellant satisfactorily proves that they are wrong, Such trial Courts saw the witnesses and heard them testify and unless the findings are perverse or unsupported by credible evidence, the Court of Appeal will not interfere with them. See, Adelumola v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 73) 683. An appellate Court may however interfere with such findings in circumstances such as where the trial Court did not make a proper use of the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses at the trial or where it drew wrong conclusions from accepted credible evidence or took an erroneous view of the evidence adduced before it or its findings of fact are perverse in the sense that they did not flow from the evidence accepted by it. See, Okpiri v. Jonah (1961) 1 SCNLR 174; (1961) 1 All NLR 102 at 104-5; Maja v. Stocco (1968) 1 All NLR 141 at 149; Woluchem v. Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291 at 295-6 and 326-9. ”

​The law is that this Court would not unless exceptional circumstances are shown, disturb the concurrent findings of facts and legal conclusions of the two lower Courts. The findings must be shown to have been arrived at injudicially in a perverse manner. The findings must be shown to be unsupported by admissible evidence and there must be an inherent violation of the rights to fair hearing of the Appellant that on the face of the record has occasioned gross miscarriage of justice and needs to be corrected by this Court. See –
1. EGWUMI V. STATE (2013) 13 NWLR Pt. 1372 Pg. 525 at 556-557, paras. E-A.
2. IFEANYI V. FRN (2018) 12 NWLR Pt. 1632 Pg. 164 at 195, paras. G—H.
3. AFUAPE V. STATE (2020) 17 NWLR Pt. 1754 Pg. 381 at 416, paras. C—E; 417, paras. A—B.
4. IDAM V. FRN (2020) 12 NWLR Pt. 1737 Pg. 1 at 13, paras. E
5. AMEH V. STATE (2018) 12 NWLR Pt. 1632 Pg. 99 at 125, paras. G—H.

​It is a settled law that in a criminal trial, the Prosecution may prove the guilt of the defendant either by direct eyewitness account or by circumstantial evidence from which the guilt of a defendant can be inferred or by free and voluntary confessional statement of guilt which is direct and positive or by a combination of any of the three modes. See Emeka v. State (2001) 14 NWLR Pt. 734 Pg. 666; Umar v. State (2014) 13 NWLR Pt. 1425 Pg. 497 and Ilodigwe v. State (2012) 18 NWLR Pt. 1331 Pg. 1.

In this case, the prosecution proved by both circumstantial evidence and the credible confessional statement of the Appellant that the Appellant committed the offence.

I agree with the elaborate and erudite opinion contained in the lead judgment that this appeal has absolutely no merit. The judgment of the Court below affirming the judgment of the trial Court sentencing the Appellant to two years’ imprisonment or a fine of N50,000 on the first count and three years’ imprisonment or a fine of N100,000 on the second count is also hereby affirmed. Appeal dismissed.

EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.S.C.: I had a preview of the judgment of my learned brother, Lord Justice, TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, JSC. I completely agree with the reasoning, conclusions, decisions, including the orders therein.

Appearances:

Yakubu Mai Kasuw, Esq. with him Abbas Ajiya, Esq. For Appellant(s)

Abdulhameed Mohammed SAN, with him, A.A Umar, Esq. and Genevieve Opara, Esq. For Respondent(s)