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GANIYU GBADAMOSI & ANOR. V. THE STATE(1992)

GANIYU GBADAMOSI & ANOR. V. THE STATE

In The Supreme Court of Nigeria

On Friday, the 18th day of December, 1992

SC.290/1991

RATIO

EVIDENCE-CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN A STATEMENT IS WRONGLY ADMITTED AS A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

“…a statement wrongly admitted as a confessional statement can, if it has no other defects, be admitted as an ordinary statement and be relied upon as such, as a basis for conviction.” PER OMO, JSC. 

EVIDENCE-DOCTRINE OF RECENT POSSESSION:  THE SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF RECENT POSSESSION FOR CONVICTION IN CERTAIN OFFENCES  

“I agree with the submission of respondent’s counsel that convictions for armed robbery is not invalid because it rests on the doctrine of recent possession vide Madagwa v. The State (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt.92) 60 : and Mufutau Aremu v. The State (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt.201) 1. But recent possession alone cannot justify an inference of murder vide Omogodo v. The State (1981) 5 S.C. 5. In the most recent case of Mufutau Aremu (supra), there was further evidence to buttress the application of this doctrine, evidence of identification and confessional statements which, though retracted, amply corroborated the evidence of prosecution witnesses in material details as to the actual robbery and the matter of execution thereof.” PER OMO, JSC. 

EVIDENCE- TRIAL WITHIN TRIAL: WHAT WILL BE REQUIRED OF A JUDGE WHERE THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A STATEMENT IS CHALLENGED ON THE GROUND THAT IT WAS NOT MADE VOLUNTARILY

“Where the admissibility of a statement is challenged on the ground that it was not made voluntarily, it is for the judge to determine whether or not the prosecution have established that it was made voluntarily to the extent that the judge is satisfied so that he feels sure about it. Where the question is raised it is for the judge to rule upon it after hearing any evidence on either side bearing upon any contested question of fact relevant to the determination. It is the duty of the trial judge to hear any evidence as to the manner in which it is made at a trial within a trial in the absence of a jury. See: R. v. Chardwick (1934) 24 Cr. App R. 138  The Queen v. Igwe (1960) SCNLR 158; 5 F.S.C. 55 The Queen v. Eguabor (1962) 1 All NLR 287 at 292.  Chan Wei Keung v. R. (1967)  R. v. Burgess (1968) 2 All ER 54, (1968) 1 Q.B. 112  D.P.P. v. Ping Line (1975) 3 All E.R. 175 Maiduguri v. The State (1969) 1 NMLR 143 R. v. Francis and Murphy (19869) Cr. App. R. 174 R. v. Richards (1967) 51 Cr. App. R. 226. R. v. Moor (1972) 56 Cr. App. R. 373 Wong Kam Ming v. The Queen (1979) 2 W.L.R. 81.” See also Saidu v. The State (supra).  In The Queen R. v. Igwe (1960) SCNLR 158, 5 F.S.C. 55, 56 (1960) SCNLR. Hubbard, (Ag. FJ.) delivering the judgment of the court said at page 345. “…It is now too late to question the rule whether voluntariness or otherwise of a confession must be decided by the Judge before its admission even where the Judge is sitting without a jury since the courts of this country have applied that rule for many years…” See also Section 140(1)(a) of the Evidence  Act.PER OGUNDARE, JSC.

EVIDENCE – CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: THE STANDARD REQUIRED OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT CAN SUSTAIN A CONVICTION 

“It is the law that circumstantial evidence must be so cogent and compelling as to lead to only one rational conclusion which is the offence with which the accused is charged. See Abieke v. The State (1975) 9 – 11 S.C. 97. As Nnamani J.S.C. put it at pages 23 – 24 of the Report in Omogodo v. The State (supra). “…It seems to me quite inconceivable that an inference of guilt can be drawn from that fact alone. It falls far short of the standard required of circumstantial evidence which is that it must lead irresistibly to the guilt of the accused persons. The evidence to be acceptable must be consistent with the prisoner’s guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion. It is also necessary before drawing the inference of accused’s guilt to be sure that there are no other co-existing circumstances which would weaken such inference. See on Circumstantial Evidence Obalum Anekwe v. The State (1976) 9 – 10 S.C. 255, 264; Tepper v. Queen (1952) A.C. 480 at 489; P.C. Stephen Ukorah v. The State (1977) 4 S.C. 167 at 174, 176-177; Valentine Adie v. The State (1980) 1-2 S.C. 116, 122 and recently Joseph Lori and Anor. v. The State (supra).”

 

JUSTICES

SAIDU KAWU    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

UCHE OMO    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

IDRIS LEGBO KUTIGI    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

MICHAEL EKUNDAYO OGUNDARE    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

EMMANUEL OBIOMA OGWUEGBU    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

 

  1. GANIYU GBADAMOSI
    2. TIMOTHY AYELABOLA Appellant(s)

AND

THE STATE  Respondent(s)

  1. OMO, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The two appellants and one other were jointly charged on two counts of conspiracy and armed robbery in the Lagos High court (Ikeja) in May, 1983. After a trial, in which they testified but called no witnesses, they were all found guilty on 10th September, 1985 of conspiracy and robber simpliciter (not armed robbery). They were then sentenced to 25 years imprisonment on each count, sentences to run concurrently.
    Whilst the convicted persons appealed against their conviction and sentence, the State cross-appealed against the conviction for robbery simpliciter, contending that the conviction be set aside and a verdict of guilty of armed robbery be substituted.
    On 18/6/91, after considering the briefs filed and the oral arguments offered by both sides, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the two appellants and allowed the appeal of the third convict. It also allowed the cross-appeal, finding the appellants guilty of armed robbery as originally charged.
    Dissatisfied with this judgment, the appellants have appealed to this Court against the conviction and sentence.
    The relevant facts of this case, briefly stated, are that one Ayodele Bakare drove his mother’s Mercedez Benz car by 6.30a.m. on 11th September, 1981, from Adeniyi Jones Street, Ikeja, to Anthony Village, to deliver a message to one Chief Lamikanra resident there. As he left the house, driving home alone in the car, his path was blocked by a Peugeot 504 saloon car. Some men from this car and others coming by foot from the nearby main road converged on him armed with cutlasses. They forced the door open and took possession of the Mercedez Benz car, abandoning the Peugeot 504 some of them emerged from, at the scene. He ran away into the nearby house of Dr. Beko Kuti from where he reported the event to his parents. A few hours after, in the afternoon, the police reported that the vehicle had been recovered at Badagry, where his parents and himself went and identified the car.
    According to the prosecution, the three accused persons were arrested at Ajara Village, Badagry, between 9-10 a.m. when a motor mechanic invited by the 3rd accused was helping them change the tyre of the stolen car – Mercedez Benz. No. LA 6788K. They had been arrested by a Police Constable because the name of the owner of the vehicle given by the accused, on being queried by him, was different from the name on the vehicle’s particulars.
    All the accused denied the charges against them. They were only victims of circumstances who had left their respective abodes to come to Ajara Village Badagry, where a policeman arrested them. While the 1st appellant testified that he left Okoya Ajegunle that morning to buy some planks, nails and other tools at Ajara village, and that it was at the place of purchase that he was arrested. The second appellant said that he left his Alaba residence, and traveled through Orile-Iganmu to Ajara Village, Badagry, to buy palm wine. He had bought the wine and was waiting for transport to convey him home when he was arrested. The third accused said he had a shed at the village and had gone looking for one Mr. Onyemoto P.W. 3 volunteered to take him to where he was if he waited for him. It was while he was waiting that he was arrested along with the other accused and about 5 others.
    In his judgment, the trial High Court Judge considered the alibi relied on by the accused persons and held they had not been established. He believed the prosecution’s story about the snatching and recovery of the Mercedez Benz car. He held that since the accused had been found in recent possession of a stolen good, section 148(a) of the Evidence Act applied to raise the presumption that they were guilty of the theft of the car. He also relied on statements of the accused made after their arrests which he held were confessional, and duly corroborated by the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.6. In his view, armed robbery as charged had not been proved because the weapon used had not been produced and tendered in court. Applying section 179(2) of the Criminal Procedure Law, he convicted the accused of robbery simpliciter. He also convicted them of the charge of conspiracy which he held could be inferred from the confessional statements and evidence led by the prosecution.
    At the Court of Appeal, the procedure in conducting the trial within trial by the trial Judge was attacked. It was submitted that it was incurably bad, and therefore since the burden on the prosecution of proving that the statements made by the appellants to the police had not been discharged, the whole trial is a nullity. The Court of Appeal held that the conduct of a trial within a trial is not part of Nigerian Law and whether it was properly conducted or not made no difference to the trial. If however it is material, the wrong procedure used had not occasioned any injustice to the accused. Exhibit J, the 2nd appellant’s statement to the police, it held is not a confession, and has been wrongly so admitted by the trial Judge. There was really therefore no need to conduct a trial within trial. It therefore upheld the trial and conviction of the present appellants; but proceeded to set aside their conviction for robbery simpliter and substituting therefore, a conviction for armed robbery. It arrived at this decision because the reason for the trial Judge’s decision is obviously wrong and there is strong evidence in favour of a conviction for armed robbery.
    In this Court, issues for determination were set out by the appellants in their briefs as follows:-
    “(i) Whether there was sufficient evidence before the court to support the conviction and sentence for armed robbery in the absence of any direct identification of the appellants as two of the armed men who robbed P.W.1.
    (ii) Whether the irregularity of the trial within trial resulting in the shifting of the onus of proof from the prosecution to the defence nullified the whole trial.
    (iii) Whether Exhibit ‘J’ should be expunged from the records having been found not to be a confessional statement.
    (iv) Whether the prosecution succeeded in proving its case beyond reasonable doubts.
    (v) Whether the doctrine of recent possession is applicable.
    (vi) Whether the doctrine of recent possession in this matter in the absence of any identification evidence, considering the fact that the offence of armed robbery requires proof of being armed with firearms or offensive weapons or being in the company of one so armed and in spite of the fact that these vital ingredients were not proved by the prosecution.”
    I will begin by considering the third issue for determination. In his judgment, the learned trial Judge held Exhibit J. which is the statement of the 2nd appellant to the police to be a confession. It is set out at pages 100/102 of the record of proceedings. What the 2nd appellant “admitted” in that statement is to being a party to the attempted sale of the stolen car. That is not the offence for which he was charged. To constitute a confession, a statement must admit or acknowledge that the maker thereof committed the offence for which he was charged. It must in so doing be clear, precise and unequivocal. Exhibit J is therefore not a confessional statement and I agree with the decision of the Court of Appeal to that effect. What is the result of so finding Appellants’ counsel has submitted that the consequence of so finding is that the statement wrongly treated as a confession should be expunged from the record of the proceedings, and not relied on in any way. It should in fact be treated as if it never existed. Respondent’s counsel, on the other hand, whilst agreeing with the decision of the court below that it is not a confession, submitted that it is not therefore rendered inadmissible in evidence. It is admissible and whatever admissions are contained within it can be acted upon.
    In support of her submission, appellants’ counsel has cited and relied on Saidu v. The State (1982) N.S.C.C. Vol. 13 page 70, (1982) 4 S.C. 41 where she said it was held that a statement, which is not proved to be made voluntarily, cannot be used against an accused person. It must not only be expunged from the records but it’s contents cannot be relied upon to convict the appellant. She also referred to the observation of Idigbe, J.S.C., in Salawu Olukade v. Abolade Alade (1976):2 S.C. 186 at 187-188 thus:-
    “A court is expected in all proceedings before it to admit and act only on evidence which is admissible in law (i.e. under the Evidence Act or any other law or enactment relevant in any particular case) and so if the Court should inadvertently admit inadmissible evidence it has a duty generally not to act upon it.”
    She therefore submitted that the court below had a duty not to act upon Exhibit J which it had found to be wrongly admitted as a confession. She finally referred to Section 226(1) of the Evidence Act on the effect of the wrongful admission of evidence which provides that:-
    “The wrongful admission of evidence shall not of itself be a ground for the reversal of any decision in any case where it shall appear to the court on appeal that the evidence so admitted cannot reasonably be held to have affected the decision and that such decision would have been the same if such evidence had not been admitted.”
    She finally contended that the court below relied on Exhibit J to find the appellants guilty of conspiracy and armed robbery. There was in her submission no other reliable and direct evidence before the court to warrant the conviction of the appellants.
    Saidu v. The State cited and relied on by appellant is not quite apposite as an authority in this case. In that case, the statement objected to was fatally flawed, because it was admitted and acted upon as a confession without the test of its voluntariness being conducted, to wit, a trial within trial. A document was therefore admitted as a confession without proof of its being so. What is worse, the accused in that case, on a homicide charge, was convict thereon, without his being given the opportunity of at least cross-examining the writer of the document (who was not produced to testify) with a view of establishing that the statement was not voluntary. In the present case the document. Exhibit J was incorrectly regarded as confession. It was otherwise properly admitted, its voluntary nature not being objected to. In my view, therefore, the question or totally expunging Exhibit J from the record cannot arise. What is objectionable and cannot be allowed, is any decision arrived at which appears to be based on the document being regarded as a confession. The answer to the first issue as set out therefore is that a statement wrongly admitted as a confessional statement can, if it has no other defects, be admitted as an ordinary statement and be relied upon as such, as a basis for conviction.
    I think it is convenient for me to proceed now to consider the second issue for determination since it also concerns a confessional statement. Exhibit H. to which the question asked here refers, is the statement of the 1st appellant to the police. Ex facie, this statement, which is reproduced at pages 98 to 100 of the record of proceedings, appears from its contents to he a confessional statement. It contains admissions which unequivocally relate to the offences charged. It was retracted by the 1st appellant in court, and objected to by his counsel when it was sought to be tendered in evidence. The learned trial Judge therefore also bilged to conduct a trial within a trial. It is agreed by counsel for both sides that his conduct of this “trial within trial” was irregular. He called upon 1st appellant to give evidence first instead of the prosecution. It is argued that by so doing, he shifted the onus of proof from the prosecution to the defenec, vide Ashake v. the State (1969) 2 All N.L.R. 198; Auta v. The State (1975) 1 All NLR (Pt, 1) 165; Adekanbi v. Attorney-General (Western Region) (1966) 1 All NLR 47. (Western Region) (1966) 1 All NLR 47. It is submitted that this is prejudicial to the appellants and denied him a fair trial. I agree with counsel that the trial within trial conducted by the learned trial Judge was irregular and that calling on the appellant to first testify, in an inquiry whether or not the statement he is alleged to have made is voluntary, does suggest a shih of the onus on proof from the prosecution to the defence (appellant), The immediate result of this irregularity is that the end result of it i.e. the admission of the Exhibit H as a confession, is improper and must be set aside Obidiozo & Ors. v. The State (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt.67) 748 at 751. On whether this irregularity should result in the whole trial being pronounced a nullity, no serious argument has been advanced by appellant’s counsel. The irregularity attaches to only an aspect of the trial designed for a specific purpose. The aspect is the test of the voluntariness of a confessional statement. The specific purpose is the admission in evidence of the document. The only effect of this irregularity cannot possibly go beyond its specific purpose, and lead to the vitiating of the whole trial. The irregularity therefore does not make the whole trial null and void. This disposes of issue 2. So much has been said by the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal on the history and position and conduct of a “trial within trial” in our criminal procedure. I do not intend to embark on the same exercise in this judgment, as there has been no ground of appeal filed challenging the long-standing procedure as illegal or contrary  to law and therefore inviting us to set it aside. If and when that is done, the whole matter may have to be re-examined. Suffice if for me to say firstly, that I share the views of the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal as to the problems surrounding this procedure; but secondly, that the procedure is now very much part of our law vide The Queen v. Igwe (1960) 1 SCNLR 158; (1960) 5 F.S.C. 55 at 56, that it cannot be overlooked or decreed into illegality by the Court of Appeal. The learned Justice, of the Court or Appeal were, with respect, very wrong to have done so in the face of decisions of this Court which have made this procedure mandatory, and part of the law.
    The other three issues can conveniently be taken together. They attacked the judgment on the ground that there was not enough evidence before the learned trial Judge to support the convictions of the appellants and to justify the Court of Appeal’s judgment. I will consider the charge of conspiracy first. To convict on this charge the court below relied on Exhibits H and J. Tobi, J.CA. stated thus:-
    “…..the one evidence of conspiracy against the 1st and 2nd appellants as found by the learned trial Judge, is Exhibit H, the confessional statement at the 1st appellant.” (note: italics mine)
    and further stated
    “The learned trial Judge also found evidence of conspiracy in Exhibit J. the statement of the appellant.”
    and concluded thus
    “Although both applicants took a complete “U” turn at the trial, I entirely agree with the learned trial Judge that the two statements are conclusive of offence of conspiracy and I so hold.” (note italics mine).
    The Court below therefore relied on the two statements which as shown earlier have been adjudged wrongly admitted in evidence as confessions to base it’s decision that the offence of conspiracy has been proved, These are statements which must be treated with caution and the courts show action. The effect of the taint on Exhibit H, as earlier considered, is that it is not evidence which can be acted upon in this case. It has not been shown to be capable of admission (since its voluntariness was not established), it’s purported admission was wrong, and it cannot now be admitted in evidence. It is therefore not evidence on which the court below can rely, as did the trial court, in proof of conspiracy, If Exhibit H cannot be relied upon, then what is left is Exhibit J, I have held that the admissions therein can be acted upon, even though it is not a confession, But the admissions therein cannot be evidence against the 1st appellant. They only bind the 2nd appellant. The net effect is that the necessary meeting of the minds and acting in concert which are necessary ingredients of the offence of conspiracy do not exist. The conviction of the appellants of that offence is therefore wrong and must be set aside.
    We are now left with the charge of armed robbery. It is admitted by counsel for both sides that there is no direct evidence that the appellants took part in the act of armed robbery which the court found, and I believe, took place. What have been relied upon are circumstantial evidence and the doctrine of recent possession ride s.148(a) of the Evidence Act. The attempt to buttress these with “confessional statements”, to wit, Exhibits J and H came to grief.
    It must be conceded that the learned trial Judge was satisfied that a robbery had taken place as testified to by P.W.1 from whom the Mercedez Benz was snatched. It is part of his finding that the persons who carried out the robbery were armed (albeit with cutlasses), Counsel for the respondent has proceeded from this basis to state as follows:-
    “What was left therefore was to prove that there was a nexus between the appellants and the alleged robbery. This nexus was provided in two important ways. First, by the appellants themselves in their confessional statements exhibits ‘H’ and ‘J’ (pages 98 – 100 and 100 – 102 respecitvely) wherein they owned up to the robbery. They gave a graphic account of how they planned and executed the robbery. Second by the doctrine of recent possession. We must be reminded that the 1st and second appellants were caught with the stolen vehicle only three hours after the theft. The vehicle was stolen at 6.10a.m on September, 11th, 1981 and was recovered from the appellants at about 9.35a.m on the self same 11th September, 1981, that is about 3 hours thereafter! See pages 26 lines 6 and page 42 lines 5 – 10 respectively). If the doctrine of recent possession could not be invoked in the circumstances of this case the respondent cannot conjecture any other occasion when it can validly invoked. By the combined effect of the confessional statements – Exhibit ‘H’ and ‘J’ and the doctrine of recent possession, therefore, the inference that the appellants were the hoodlums that robbed P.W.1 of his vehicle became inescapable.” (Note; italics mine).
    In these submissions in his brief, the respondent’s counsel recognized the need to rely on Exhibits H and J to provide the nexus that can take back the appellants to the scene of the crime and, with the presumption that is available under the doctrine of recent possession, connect them with the offence of armed robbery charge. But, in view of my earlier findings, Exhibit H and J are not longer available to play that role. The only one of them admitted in evidence is Exhibit J. That does not connect either one or both appellants to Anthony Village. It binds the 2nd appellant to Ajara Village Badagry, and possession of the vehicle stolen and no more.
    I agree with the submission of respondent’s counsel that convictions for armed robbery is not invalid because it rests on the doctrine of recent possession vide Madagwa v. The State (1988).5 NWLR (Pt.92) 60: and Mufutau Aremu v. The State (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt.201) 1. But recent possession alone cannot justify an inference of murder vide Omogodo v. The State (1981) 5 S,C, 5. In the most recent case of Mufutau Aremu (supra), there was further evidence to buttress the application of this doctrine evidence of identification and confessional statements which, though retracted, amply corroborated the evidence of prosecution witnesses in material details as to the actual robbery and the matter of execution thereof. In Madagwa’s case (supra), the appellant was found not only in possession of the stolen taxi-cab, but also three locally made pistols, when they were stopped and arrested at a road block on the same day the robbery took place. In addition, at a subsequent identification parade, the appellant was picked out by one of the eye witnesses of the robbery. In the present case on appeal the prosecution appears only able to rely on the doctrine of recent possession simpliciter. There is no sufficient admissible or admitted evidence to create a nexus between the appellants and the armed robbery. Since that is the case, the only evidence available points to the alternative presumption created by section 148(a) of the Evidence Act, which states that –
    “a man who, is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen unless he can account for them.” (note: italics mine)
    If, the appellants cannot be presumed to be the thieves (robbers) of the car, can they be presumed to be receivers thereof I think they can. The 2nd appellant is bound by his admissions in Exhibit J. in which he admitted that he went along with 1st appellant and some others to go to Seme border to sell a car, the stolen Mercedez Benz No. LA 6788 K. He was found at the Ajara Village scene by the car and arrested by the policeman. His new story in his evidence in court was not believed by the trial court, found with the vehicle as he was only three to four hours after P.W.1 was robbed of it, the presumption that he was at least the receiver thereof is inescapable. His statement Exhibit J is not evidence against the 1st appellant, who may have succeeded to escaping a conviction for armed robbery because of the unfortunate handling of Exhibit H. Even though Exhibit J and H do not bind him, he was found with the stolen vehicle very soon after it was stolen and the presumption that he received the goods knowing them to be stolen can be drawn. What is his explanation for possession of the goods at Ajara Village when he was arrested. His story about being arrested when he went there to buy planks was clearly not believed. It is an unbelievable explanation. So also is the 2nd appellant’s story that he went buy palm wine and was waiting to take transport home when he was arrested.
    In conclusion therefore, I allow the appeal of the appellants and find them not guilty of the offences of conspiracy and armed robbery for which they were convicted by the court below, the judgment of which court is hereby set aside. In exercise of the courts powers order section 179(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act. I substitute for the conviction of the offence of armed robbery charged, a conviction for the offence of receiving stolen property contrary to section 427 of the Criminal Code. I sentence each of the appellants to a term of 5 years imprisonment. The nine years in which they have been in custody since their arrest will be taken into account. They are therefore to be deemed to have served their sentence and their immediate release is hereby ordered.S. KAWU, J.S.C.: I have had the advantage of reading, in draft, the lead judgment of my learned brother, Ogundare, J.S.C. I am in complete agreement with his reasoning and also with his conclusion that the appeal of the 2nd appellant should be allowed on the two counts of conspiracy and robbery and that of the 1st appellant on the charge of conspiracy. The 1st appellant is however, convicted of the offence of receiving stolen property an offence under section 427 of the Criminal Code of Lagos State and he is sentenced to ten years imprisonment.

    I. L. KUTIGI, J.S.C: I have read before now the judgment o of my learned brother, Omo, J.S.C. I agree with his reasoning and conclusions. The evidence against the appellants was such that it could not he said that the charges of conspiracy and armed robbery had been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Their appeals are therefore allowed and their convictions and sentences set aside. The appellants are however convicted of the offence of receiving stolen property under 427 of the Criminal Code, (see section 179(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act). They are such sentenced to 5 yeas imprisonment with effect from 26th day of December, 1985 when they were first convicted by the Ikeja High Court.

    M. E. OGUNDARE, J.S.C.: The appellants and one other person were charged in the High Court of Lagos State on an information which read:-
    “STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – 1ST COUNT
    Conspiracy to commit armed robbery contrary to Section 403A of the Criminal Code (Amendment No. 1) Law.
    PARTICUALRS OF OFEENCE
    1. Ganiyu Gbadamosi (m)
    2. Timothy Ayelabola (m)
    3. Innocent Obodoekwe (m)
    on or about the 11th day of September, 1981 at Anthony Village in the Ikeja Judicial Division did conspire to commit armed robbery.
    STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – 2ND COUNT
    Robbery contrary to Section 402(2a) of the Criminal Code Law Cap, 31 as amended by the Criminal Code (Amendment No. 1 Law 1980).
    PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
    1. Ganiyu Gbadamosi (m)
    2. Timothy Ayelabola (m)
    3. Innocent Obodoekwe (m)
    on or about the 11th day of September, 1981 at Anthony Village, in the Ikeja Judicial Division, being armed with offensive weapons to wit; cutlasses robbed one Oyedele Bakare (m) of a Mercedes Benz Car with registration No. LA 6788K.”
    Each of the three accused persons pleaded not guilty to each of the two counts. The prosecution called in all 8 witnesses whilst each accused person gave evidence in his defence but called no further witnesses. At the conclusion of the trial and after addresses by learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial Judge found each of the three accused persons guilty on the conspiracy charge and sentenced each to 25 yeas IHL. On the second charge, however, he found each not guilty of robbery with violence but guilty of robbery under section 402(1) of the Criminal Code Cap. 31. Laws of Lagos State. He sentenced each of them to 25 yeas IHL; the sentences on the two counts were to run concurrently.
    Being dissatisfied with their convictions and sentences, each accused person appealed to the Court of Appeal (Lagos Division). The prosecution, too, was dissatisfied with the acquittal of the accused persons on the charge of robbery with violence and it too appealed against that part of the judgment of the trial court. The appeal of the 3rd accused person was allowed and he was acquitted and discharged on both charges that he stood trial for. The appeals of the 1st and 2nd accused persons were dismissed. The appeal of the prosecution too was allowed and each of the 1st and 2nd accused persons was convicted of robbery with violence under section 403(2) of the Criminal Code. They were each sentenced to death. It is against their convictions and sentence of death that each of the 1st and 2nd accused persons have now appealed to this court. Both appellants are represented in this court by the same counsel. Their learned counsel relies on the following four amended grounds to the appeal; to wit:-
    “GROUND 1
    1.  The Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law by allowing the cross-appeal and substituting a conviction and sentence for armed robbery when there was insufficient rent evidence before the trial court to prove that the appellants were among the armed men who robbed P.W.1 of his car.
    PARTICULARS OF ERROR
    (i) The learned trial Judge who heard all the available oral evidence at the trial found that a case of armed robbery was not proved and therefore found the appellants guilty of robbery under section 402(1) of the Criminal Code Law 31.
    (ii) P.W.1 failed to identify either of the appellants as part of the gang that robbed him.
    (iii) No weapons or cutlasses were found in the stolen car.
    (iv) The totality of the evidence before the court was insufficient to found a conviction of armed robbery.
    (v) The statement of 1st appellant is not in Law evidence against the 2nd appellants.
    GROUND 2
    2. The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law by failing to make a finding on the appellant’s contention that the whole trial was a nullity since the procedure for a trial within trial was not adhered to.
    PARTICULARS OF ERROR
    (i)  Instead of making a finding on the appellants grievance the learned Justices rather dealt on the desirability of the continued practice of conducting a trial within trial in Nigeria.
    (ii) In so far as the practice of a trial within trial is still in force the proper procedure must be followed by the court and failure to do so will amount to a nullity.
    GROUND 3
    3. The majority judgment was erroneous in point of law in so far as their Lordships failed to expunge the entirety of Exhibit “J” from the records having found that the said statement was not a confessional one but merely a denial by 2nd appellant.
    PARTICULARS OF ERRORS
    (1) Having found that Exhibit “J” was wrongly admitted as a confessional statement, the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred by confirming the learned trial Judge’s finding that the two statements were conclusive of the offence of conspiracy.
    GROUND 4
    4. The verdict is unsafe and unsatisfactory and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
    FURTHER ADDITIONAL GROUND OF APPEAL
    GROUND 5
    5. That the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law by wrongfully applying the theory of recent possession to a charge of Armed robbery when there was no direct and compelling evidence before the trial court that the two appellants were part of the armed gang that robed P.W.1.
    PARTICULARS OF ERROR
    (i)  There was no proof that the appellants were armed with dangerous weapons.
    (ii) There was no proof that the appellants were in the company of persons so armed.
    (iii) There was no identification evidence linking the appellants with armed gang.
    (iv) Recent possession of the stolen vehicle can only be related to the offence of stealing or receiving and not to a case of armed robbery where possession of dangerous weapons is an essential ingredient.”
    And the following five questions are set down in the appellants’ written brief as calling for determination, that is to say:
    ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
    (i)  Whether there was sufficient evidence before the court to support the conviction and sentence for armed robbery in the absence of any direct identification of the appellants as two of the armed men who robbed P.W.1.
    (ii) Whether the irregularity of the trial within trial resulting in the shifting of the onus of proof from the prosecution to the defence nullified the whole trial.
    (iii) Whether Exhibit “J” should be expunged from the records having been found not to be a confessional statement.
    (iv) Whether the prosecution succeeded in proving its case beyond reasonable doubts.
    (v) Whether the doctrine of recent possession is applicable in this matter in the absence of any identification evidence, considering the fact that the offence of Armed robbery requires proof of being armed with firearms or offensive weapons or being in the company of one so armed and inspite of the fact that these vital ingredients were not proved by the prosecution'”
    Now to the appeal itself but before considering the issues raised. I think it pertinent to state at this stage the facts, howbeit briefly, in the morning of 11th September, 1981, at about 6.30a.m.  a Mercedez benz Saloon Car Registration No. LA 6788.K was snatched from one Ayodele Bakare (P.W.1) at Anthony Village, Lagos. As Ayodele was driving from the house of one Chief Lamikanra onto the tarred road, a 504 saloon car blocked his passage and some men came out of the 504 car while some were standing at a nearby road junction. They all converged on Ayodele with cutlasses in their hands and forced the door of Ayodele’s car open. Ayodele ran out of his Mercedes Benz car and the attackers chased him, brandishing their cutlasses. Ayodele escaped into Dr. Beko Kuti’s house nearby from where he telephoned his parents and informed them about what had happened to him. Meanwhile his attackers had made away with the Mercedes Benz car, abandoning their 504 car at the scene.
    A few hours later (about 9.35 a.m.) the Mercedes Benz car was seen at Ajara Village at Badagry, some distance away from Lagos by Cpl. Philip Asogba (P.W.6) who had gone to the village on information received. Cpl. Asogba met at the scene the appellants, 3rd accused and one other person who later testified as P.W.3. P.W.3 was changing one of the tyres of the vehicle. P.W.6 questioned the four persons. They were subsequently arrested and taken to the police station Badagry. Later in the day, Ayodele and his father (P.W.2) came to Badagry police station on the invitation of the police where they identified the Mercedes Benz car as the one snatched earlier in the day from Ayodele.
    The case was later transferred to the State C.I.D, Yaba. Each appellant and the 3rd accused made in all three statements to the police at Badagry and at the C.I.D. One of the statements, the one the 1st appellant made to the police at the C.I.D., became the subject of a trial within trial and was subsequently admitted in evidence by the learned trial Judge
    I shall now proceed to consider the issues arising in this appeal.
    As the issues raised in this appeal dovetail into each other, I will consider them together. It is the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that Exhibit J not having been found to be a confessional statement should have been expunged from the record and should not have been relied upon to convict the appellants of the offence of conspiracy and armed robbery. Learned counsel refer to Saidu v. The State (1982) 13 NSCC page 70. This authority, however, appears not to support the submission of the learned counsel. For what was decided by that case is that the statement which is not proved to be made voluntarily cannot be used against an accused but must be expunged. The submission would have been more relevant as regards Exhibit H the statement of the 1st appellant to the police at the State C.I.D. I shall come to this later.
    I have examined Exhibit J the statement of the 2nd appellant at the police station. I agree it is not a confessional statement because the 2nd appellant did not agree in that statement to committing any of the offences for which he was charged. What he sought to do in that statement was to implicate the 1st appellant. It is the law that the statement made by an accused person implicating another is not evidence against that other accused person. See: R. v. Ajani 3 W.A.C.A. 3; Aigbe v. The Store (1976) 9-10 SC. 77, therefore, whatever 2nd appellant said in Exhibit J implicating: the 1st appellant would not be evidence against the latter. It is however not the law that simply because the trial Judge had erroneously referred to Exhibit J as a confessional statement (which it is not) it must be expunged from the record. It depends on the use or the effect on the mind of the learned trial Judge of erroneously regarding Exhibit J as a confession made by the 2nd appellant. In his judgment, the learned trial Judge said as follows:-
    “Obviously, Exhibits ‘H’, ‘J’ and ‘K’ are confessional statements.
    Confessions, if voluntary, are deemed to be relevant facts as against the persons who make them – Section 27(2) of the Evidence Act. On issue of weight to be attached to confessional statements retracted or not retracted, the tests to be applied and or followed were laid down in R. v. Sykes (1913) 8 CAR 233 and was approved and applied by the Supreme Court in Jona Dawa & Anor. v. The State (1980) 8 -10 SC 236 at 267; the Supreme Court said that the questions a Judge must ask himself are as follows:-
    1. Is there anything outside the confession to show that it is true
    2. Is it corroborated
    3. Are the relevant statements made in it of facts, true as far as they can be tested
    4. Was the accused one who had the opportunity of committing the offence
    5. Is his confession possible
    6. Is it consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved
    In applying the above tests to the case in hand, one only needs to consider the evidence of the 1st and 6th P.W’s and relate into the statements of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd accused persons, Exhibits ‘H’, ‘J’ and ‘K’ respectively. After a deep and anxious consideration of the evidence. I am of the view that the confessional statements made by each of the accused person, namely, Exhibits ‘H’, ‘J’ and ‘K’ respectively are substantially and materially corroborated by the evidence of the 1st and 6th P.W.’s and that the confessions have therefore passed the tests in Syke’s case. Accordingly, the three accused persons are therefore entitled to be convicted on their said statements.”
    There is no doubt whatsoever that the impression of the learned trial judge that Exhibit J was a confessional statement of the 2nd appellant weighed heavily in his mind and contributed immensely to his conviction of the 2nd appellant. I must state that on this ground alone the Court of Appeal ought to have allowed the appeal of the 2nd appellant.
    The Court of Appeal per Tobi, J.C.A, said and I quote:
    “How can Exhibit J be a confessional statement What position of it gave the learned trial Judge that impression What are the ‘material particulars’ of the facts contained in the alleged confessional statement One can ask and ask questions galore.
    The factual and true position of Exhibit J is that it is not a confessional statement. Far from it, it cannot be. On the contrary, it is a statement of denial on the part of the 2nd appellant. If the learned trial Judge was not quite sure whether the statement was a denial right through, it ought to have dawned on him in the penultimate five-word sentence that the statement was nothing but a clear denial of the 2nd appellant’s participation in the crime. Let me once again quote the very important sentence in Exhibit J.
    ‘I am not a robber.’
    Such are the clear words of the 2nd appellant. He said that he is not a robber. And there is nothing in the rest of Exhibit J to the effect that he committed the offence he was charged with. In my view, Exhibit J was wrongly admitted as a confessional statement and I so hold.”
    In my respectful view, having concluded he did above in respect of Exhibit J and realizing the use made of it by the learned trial Judge in the mistaken belief that it was an admission by the 2nd appellant of his commission of the offences, he ought to have allowed the appeal of the 2nd appellant on the charge of armed robbery and to have acquired him of that charge.
    I now come to Exhibit H, the statement said to have been made by 1st appellant to the State C.I.D. That statement resulted in a trial within trial at the end of which the learned trial Judge held that it was voluntarily made and admitted it in evidence. The procedure adopted by the learned trial Judge in his conduct of the trial within trial was so highly irregular that his decision to admit that statement in evidence must be set aside. In conducting the trial within trial the learned trial Judge made the 1st appellant to testify first, thereby shifting the onus of proof on him. The burden of proof of the voluntariness of a statement of an accused person lies on the prosecution. See sections 28 and 14(1)(a) of the Evidence Act Cap. 112 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, as this court held in Saidu v. The State (supra) no statement by an accused is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shown by the prosecution that it was a voluntary statement. Obaseki, J.S.C. delivering the lead judgment of this court in that case said on page 78 of the report:
    “A confession, if voluntary, is deemed to be a relevant fact as against only the person who made it (see section 27(2) Evidence Law Cap, 49 L/EN 1963). A confession is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding if the making of the confession has been caused by any inducement, threat, or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority (se section 28 Evidence Law Cap. 49 L/EN 1963).
    It has therefore long been established as a positive rule of Nigerian Criminal Law that no statement by accused is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shown by the prosecution that it was a voluntary statement. The principle is as old as the laws received from England and in England the principle is as old as Hale. See Ibrahim v. R. (1914) AC. 559 at 609; Godwin Ikpasa v. The State (1981) 9 SC, 7 at 29; Corporal Jona Dawa and Anor v. The State (1980) 8 – 11 SC, 236 at 258.”
    (Italics are mine)
    Also in Auta v. The State (1975) 1 All NLR, 163, 169 Fatayi-Williams, J.S.C. (as he then was) delivering the judgment of this court observed:-
    “There were many irregularities in the conduct of the hearing of ‘the trial within the trial’. In the first place, the onus is on the prosecution which asserted that the statement was voluntary to prove that it was so made and they should have started. (See sections 137 and 138 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 62 Laws of the Federation). By making the accused person start, they have shifted, no doubt wrongly, the onus placed upon them on to him. Even when the 5th P.W. had been cross-examined and re-examined, he said nothing about the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement (EX. 1). He merely denied that he compelled the accused to tell the truth. He said nothing about the threat with a stick and a gun. Although the 5th P.W. stated in his evidence during the main trial that he took the confessional statement along with the accused in his superior officer, one Mr. Y. Y. Tarfa, and Assitant Superintendent of Police, who was alleged to have read the statement to the accused, and to have asked him if he made it, and to whom the accused confirmed that he did, this superior police officer was never called. In the face of all these irregularities, the evidential value of this confessional statement, assuming it was properly admitted in evidence (although we pointed out that it was not), is negligible and no weight should have been attached to it at all.”
    The procedure adopted by the learned trial Judge in the trial within trial came under attack in the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal rather than rule on counsel’s submission criticized the continued existence in Nigeria of the procedure of trial within trial. Tobi, J.C.A., in his lead judgment, summarised learned counsel’s submissions in these words:-
    Mr. F. Ola udoh, counsel for the 1st appellant in his brief or argument submitted that where there is an objection on the part of an accused person as to the voluntariness of a statement, the Judge should first hear evidence on the point from both parties and make a ruling on the admissibility of the statement before receiving or rejecting it in evidence. He relied on R. v. Onabanjo (1936) 3 WACA 23; R. v. Kassi (1939) 5 WACA 154; R. v. Bodoni (1935) 2 WACA 39 and sections 27(2) and 28 of the Evidence Act. The incidental inquiry which the Judge makes in order to determine the admissibility of the disputed voluntary confession is the procedure of a trial within a trial counsel submitted; relying on R. v. Igwe (1960) 5 FSC 55; (1960) SC NLR 158.
    Learned counsel argued that the learned that Judge adopted a wrong procedure in the trial within trial by making the 1st appellant start giving evidence instead of the prosecution. The burden on the prosecution to show that the statement was voluntarily made never shifts. The enquiry never starts with the accused or any other defence witness being placed on it unto the accused. He relied on Adekanbi v. Attorney-General West (1966) 1 All NLR 47; Ashake v. The State (1968) 2 All NLR 198; Auta v. The State (1975) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 165.

    Counsel submitted specifically that since the correct procedure was not followed in the trial within trial. Exhibit H was wrongly admitted, which made the whole trial a nullity. He called in aid R. v. Thompson (1893) 2 Q.B. 2 and Oku v. The State (1970) 1 All NLR 60 at 68. He contended that since Exhibit H was the only evidence upon which the conviction of the 1st appellant was based, its expunction will result in his acquitted…
    Counsel also attacked the procedure adopted by the learned trial Judge in the trial within trial. Describing the procedure as grossly inadequate, she submitted that the conviction cannot stand. She relied on Lawson v. The State (1975) 4 S.C. 115 at 132 and Oku v. The State (1970) 1 All NLR 60.”
    The learned Justice of Appeal summarised the submissions of learned counsel for the State thus:-
    “Learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. David Onyeike Legal Officer, in his joint respondent’s brief which included the cross-appeal, dealt exhaustively with the issue of trial within trial. Tracing the history of trial within trial in Nigeria law, learned counsel said that it was a colonial heritage which was applicable in Nigeria when the jury system was in operation. Since the abolition of the jury system in Lagos State, the procedure of trial within trial was no longer necessary. He referred as to the decision of the Supreme Court in Michael v. The State (1990) 1 T.L.R. (Pt.1) 34 and 45. He submitted that the procedure has the effect of eroding and indeed does erode the presumption of innocence guaranteed by section 33(5) of the 1979 Constitution.
    Even if there was any irregularity that occurred in the trial within trial, which is denied there is no authority that the irregularity make the entire trial a nullity. It only makes the exhibits inadmissible, counsel argued. He relied on Auta v. The State (1975) 1 All NLR 165.”
    Rather than resolve the conflicting submission the learned Justice of Appeal observed:
    “Let me now take the issue of a trial within trial. All counsel dealt with it at some length. The first point I would like to address myself is whether there is an enabling law on the procedure of a trial within trial. I have examined all the relevant adjectival laws on the procedure and I cannot place my hands on any enabling law on the issue. There is no provision in the Evidence Act on it. There is also no provision in either the Criminal Procedure Act or the Criminal Procedure Code on the issue. I do not even see the procedure in the Judges Rules of England, 1964 applicable to the Southern States and the Criminal Procedure (Statement to Police Officer) Rules, 1960, applicable to the Northern States. I can still go further to say that the procedure is not contained in the substantive criminal laws of the country. And here I have in mind the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. Of course, I do not expect the codes within trial, which is procedural in nature.
    And so, the question is; Why is it still part of Nigerian, law Historically, Nigeria was a British colony. This was way back in 1861, until 1960 when she became independent. Being a British colony, English law was made applicable to Nigeria, with certain restrictions, section 45 of the interpretation Act made the reception of English law possible in Nigeria. Since one aspect of the laws received by Nigeria was the English Common Law, the English Procedure of a trial within trial was received. The Courts in Nigeria therefore used the English Common Law Procedure whenever there was a denial by an accused person that he made a confessional statement voluntarily. See Auta v. The State (1975) 1 All NLR 165. Owen v. The State (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.31) 470; Ogbodu v. The State (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 41) 294; Okarah v. The State (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1) 214.
    A rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the respondents, the procedure of a trial within trial is basically necessary in respect of jury trials. In such a situation, the law will not like to expose the jury to work in favour of the accused person, a person who is presumed innocent by the consecution until he is proved guilty.
    In view of the fact that I cannot place my head and my hands on any enabling law on this time honoured practice. I hold that it is not party of Nigeria law, particularly in republican and sovereign Nigeria where there is no jury system. With the above, I dare say that the trial within trial conducted by the learned trial Judge is superfluous. In other words, it was a surplusage.  I would, in the place of trial within trial, like to see a procedure where the trial Judge resolves the issue of confessional statement at the end of the trial, in the same way he resolve all other issues in the judgment. That looks to me tidier and neater and less troublesome.”
    Another learned Justice that sat on the appeal in the Court of Appeal also shared in Tobi J.C.A, criticisms of the trial within trial procedure. For Ademola, J.C.A. observed: .
    “I agree with the conclusion reached in this appeal by Tobi J.C.A. This case has given me an opportunity to say a word about the procedure of conducting ‘a trial within trial’ when an accused person disputes the voluntariness of a confessional statement during a trial. My learned brother has examined this at some length in his judgment.
    The brief titled by the Respondent counsel. Mr. David Onyeike has really put it in its historical con. It is a relic of the past or more appropriately a hand over. Nigeria must be one of the few countries in the Commonwealth whose judges still continue trial within trial after the repeal of the Jury Act in Lagos by Edict No. 1 of 1975 of 3/3/75.
    But happily there are voices raised calling for a stop to conducting a trial within the trial by trial judges. It is absolutely obsolescent and we should say no in no uncertain language.
    Nnaemeka-Agu, J.S.C in the following passage in the case of Michael v. The State (1990) 1 TLR (Pt.1) page 34 at page 45 said:
    ‘I must confess that I have my reservation about the continued need for a trial-within-a-trial in this country in which our judges are both judge and jury. In England where judges and jurors are different, there is always need to prevent jurors from being influenced by arguments (which may mention some of the contents of an inadmissible statement) as to whether or not a particular statement was obtained under duress or the like. In the country in which it is not possible to shield the judge being judged and jury, from any part of the proceedings. I doubt whether the duplication of the haring by conducting a trial within a trial is anything but a cosmetic mimicry. It is regrettably, still the law in this country.’
    With respect, the learned Justice was very cautious in his approach on this issue. It is said that where angels far to tread, fools rush in. let me be labelled as one of this issue.
    A trial within the trial is an off-shoot of the jury system. In this country the jury system having been on in Lagos in the 1930’s if not before that time.
    In 1945, an Ordinance relating to Jurors and Trial with a jury was enacted for the whole of Nigeria, see Cap. 90, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos 1958.
    By Legal Notice 1955 No. 47 of 1955, the 1945 Ordinance was applied to Northern. Western and Eastern Regions, and to Lagos and the Southern Cameroon. I am not aware of any legislation on jury trials in the Northern, Western, Eastern Regions and Southern Cameroons.
    By the Adaptation of Law Notice 112 of 1964, the Jury Ordinance was applicable only in Lagos.
    Lagos when it became a State on its own enacted a Jury Law. See Cap. 58 Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria, 1973.
    By section 67 of Cap. 58, statutory recognition was given to the fact that jury must withdraw during a trial when certain legal arguments are being unfolded before the court, the section read thus:-
    “Where an argument or certain evidence takes place or is likely to be about to take place and the Judge is of the opinion that the accused must be unfairly prejudiced if such argument is heard in the presence of the jury, the Judge may direct the jury to retire to their room during evidence.”
    Edict No. 1 of 1975 abolished the Jury Law. Cap. 58 Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria
    In my opinion as far as Lagos is concerned since there is no law that gives statutory (sic) for a Judge to conduct a trial within the trial determining the admissibility of evidence which may be regarded as prejudicial to an accused person during a trial.
    I go further to say that as far as the rest of Nigeria, is concerned, Cap. 90 of the Laws of the Federation can no longer apply here, because each of the Regions of the Federation then had the legislative competence by the Constitution of the Federation 1963 No 20 and the Adaptation of Laws (Miscellaneous Provisions) Order 1964, to enact a Law about jurors and trial by jury.
    The absence of jury in the new and revised Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 confirms my view that there is no Jury Act or Law which is in operation to day in Nigeria.
    As I said before, trial within the trial is firmly rooted in the jury system.
    Remove the jury, off goes trial within the trial.
    Do we need a statute here to abolish it when it was just a matter of practice and not law adopted by our Judges in the days when English Law & Practice held sway in our land
    I must bring out the contribution of two distinguished Chief Judges who recently expressed their views on this issue.
    Mr. Justice P.K. Nwokedi CJ (then) of Anambra State said in an unpublished paper; Admissibility of Confessional and other Statements thus:-
    “Personally, I have often wondered what is the necessity of a trial within the trial before the admission of an alleged confessional statement in our courts. In England, where trial is by jury, it may be said that the jury may be prejudiced by the controversy as to whether the same had been made voluntarily or not. In this country, where the court is the Judge and jury, it seems to me that the Judge can as well resolve the issue as to voluntariness, with other issues, in his judgment.
    The prosecution if challenged as to the voluntary nature of a confession should lead all evidence at its disposal to establish same. The accused in his defence may lead refuttal evidence. The Judge makes his findings at the conclusion of evidence. The same judge, who conducts the mini-trial, conducts the main trial. The issue of being prejudiced would not arise. Even of wrongfully admitted, the same may be expunged from the record while writing the judgment. The issue of mini-trial as far as this country is concerned, is an unnecessary, and at the same time, cumbersome adjunct to our criminal trial. It is carry-over form the English legal system which operates under a different background.”
    (Judicial Lectures for Judges & Kadis: Zaria No. 1989)
    Mr. Justice Shedu Mohammed C.J Kaduna State added his own view on the issue in another unpublished paper title: ‘Admissibility of Confessional Statements; Trial within Trial thus:
    ‘I ought to point out at this stage, that quite a number of eminent Judges and jurists do not see the necessity of trial within trial, arguing that the system has no relevance in Nigeria since the jury system has been abolished. They feel that it is much simpler and less cumbersome to listen to the objection of the accused and to decide on it at the judgment sage. It is a view, I associate myself with as it is less time consuming. I hope this body would address the issue squarely.’
    (Judicial Lectures for Judge and Kadis: Enugu Nov. 1990).
    I add my own voice for the discontinuance by trial courts in Nigeria of conducting a trial within the trial.”
    Awogu, J.C.A., however has a different approach to the issue.
    He observed:
    “The issue of a trial within a trial is, for me, subsumed under the question whether or not there has been a fair trial according to law. Even if no law specifically prescribes it, a trial court must resolve the issue of admissibility of a document, be it a confessional statement or otherwise, and whether it does so after a trial within a trial cannot per se be a basis for a mistrial. In criminal law, section 28 of the Evidence Act postulates that –
    ‘A confession made by an accused is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears of the court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise, having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient in the opinion of the court, to give the accused persons grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid or any evil of a temporal nature.’
    The verbosity of the section and its inelegance grammatically notwithstanding, it merely declares voluntariness as a test of the truth. In civil proceeding also, the admissibility of a document in often fought in limine, and a ruling on same may be given. The fact that it was admitted or rejected does not mean that in the final judgment, the trial Judge may not change his mind on his interlocutory ruling on the document. No estoppel arises from the earlier ruling. Similarly, there ought to be no hullaballo as to whether a trial within a trial in a criminal proceeding was held, since it is not meant to be a be-all and end-all. It ought not to prejudice the mind of the trial Judge and, if at the final judgment he changed his mind, he should say so. I am satisfied that in the instant appeal, the trial within a trial did not lead to a miscarriage of justice.
    The court below did not rule whether there was an irregularity in the conduct of trial within trial and the effect of such irregularity but proceeded to make use of Exhibit H in affirming the conviction of the appellants. Let me state at this stage that, with profound respect to the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal, their criticisms of the system of trial within trial appear to be misplaced. I have already cited above a passage in the judgment of Obaseki J.S.C. in Saidu v. State (supra). Section 28 of the Evidence Act provides that a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding if the making of the confession appears to the court to have been involuntary. That being so, the issue of admissibility of such a statement, which is an issue of law, must be determined by a trial Judge at the time the statement is being tendered in evidence. It cannot be received in evidence without the prosecution first establishing that it was made voluntarily the accused. See Dawa v. The State (1980) 8-11 S.C. 236, 258; (1980) 12 NSCC 334, 345 where Obaseki, J.S.C. delivering the lead judgment of this Court said:
    “It has long been established as a positive rule of law which has found a healthy place in our statutes (S.28 Evidence Law of Northern Nigeria 1963 L/NN. See also section 28 Evidence Act L/FN. 1958) that no statement by an accused is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shown by the prosecution to have been a voluntary statement in the sense that it was not obtained from him by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage, exercised or held out to him by persons in authority. The principle is as old as Hale and in this country since the reception of English law into our legal system. Voluntariness is only a test of admissibility. It is not an absolute test of the truth.
    Where the admissibility of a statement is challenged on the ground that it was not made voluntarily, it is for the judge to determine whether or not the prosecution have established that it was made voluntarily to the extent that the Judge is satisfied so that he feels sure about it. Where the question is raised it is for the judge to rule upon it after hearing any evidence on either side bearing upon any contested question of fact relevant to the determination. It is the duty of the trial Judge to bear any evidence as to the manner in which it is made at a trial within a trial in the absence of a jury.
    See:
    R. v. Chardwick (1934) 24 Cr. App r. 138
    The Queen v. Igwe (1960) SCNLR 158; 5 F.S.C. 55
    The Queen v. Egaabor (1962) 1 All NLR 287 at 292.
    Chan Wei Kenng v. R. (1967)
    R. v. Burgess (1968) 2 All ER 54, (1968) 1 Q.B. 112
    D.P.P. v. Ping Line (1975) 3 All E.R. 175
    Maiduguri v. The State (1969) 1 NMLR 143
    R. v. Francis and Murphy (19869) Cr. App. R. 174
    R. v. Richards (1967) 51 Cr. App. R. 226.
    R. v. Moor (1972) 56 Cr. App. R. 373
    Wong Kam Ming v. The Queen (1979) 2 W.L.R. 81:
    See also Saidu v. The State (supra). In the Queen R. v. Igwe (1960) SCNLR 158, 5 F.S.C. 55, 56 (1960) SCNLR. Hubbard, (Ag. FJ.) delivering the judgment of the court said at page 345.
    “…It is now too late to question the rule whether voluntariness or otherwise of a confession must be decided by the Judge before its admission even where the Judge is sitting without a jury since the courts of this country have applied that rule for many years…”
    See also section 140(1)(a) of the Evidence Act.
    In any respectful view there is logic in this rule. When evidence is tendered and objection is taken to it, as a matter of law a Judge decides on the admissibility of that evidence before allowing it to go in. To allow evidence objected to go in first and decide at the end of the trial on its admissibility might most likely result in some miscarriage of justice for it would be impossible to say that the mind of the Judge, as a Judge of fact, would not be poisoned or affected by the content of that evidence even where at the end it was held to be inadmissible. Whether a piece of evidence is admissible or not, is an issue of law for a Judge to decide at the time the evidence is offered either after taking arguments from counsel or after taking evidence as I the case of a confession.
    A case in point on this issue is Murphy v. R. 43 C.A.R. 174. 175-177 where objection was taken to the admissibility of an alleged confession. The Recorder said that he could not rule on the issue of admissibility until all the evidence relating to the alleged confessions had been put before the jury. The evidence was, accordingly, put before the jury, but the Recorder in fact never did give a ruling. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, the convictions were quashed. The Lord Chief Justice delivering the judgment of the Court held:
    “The matter which the court had in mind when granting the appellants leave to appeal was the manner in which the question of the admissibility of certain alleged confessions by both appellants had been dealt with by the Recorder. It is to be observed that there was hardly any evidence against either appellant other than statements made to the police at any early stage. When the detective constable who had taken the statements was being examined by counsel for the prosecution, objection was taken by counsel on behalf of both prisoners to the admissibility of those statements. The allegation was that the confessions had been obtained by promises of bail and matters of inducement of that sort. The Recorder, however, said that he could not rule on their admissibility until he had heard all the evidence and that the simpler and better course would be for the evidence to be called before the jury first. In fact, Recorder never gave his ruling. The matter was put before the jury and they were invited to say whether they believed that the confessions where obtained voluntarily or under inducements.
    It has always been settled practice cases of this sort of a challenge to be made to the admissibility of the statement at an early stage in the absence of the jury. The matter is set out in the 34th (1859) edition of Archbold’s Criminal Pleading, etc…at paras 1114 and 1115. ‘The proper course.’ It is said there, ‘where objection is raised to the admissibility of an alleged confession, is for the judge to hear evidence in the absence of the jury and to rule upon that evidence whether the alleged confession should be admitted or not.’ The passage goes on to say that the evidence of the prisoner may be admitted at that stage. Then, if the evidence is admitted, ‘the weight and value of a confession remain matter for the jury.’ It is quite clear that a prisoner is entitled both to a ruling on admissibility from the judge and also to hear the verdict of the jury on the weight and value of the confession.Although the criterion is the same, namely whether it is a voluntary confession, there may well be case where the judge might not think it right to allow the confession to be put before the jury at all. If the course adopted in this case were adopted in all cases, something would come before the jury which the judge might at a later stage have to rule to be inadmissible. In the result, either the jury would be left with minds poisoned against the prisoner or they would have to be discharged and the trial started again. The court is of opinion that no departure should be made from what has always been the settled practice in these maters.
    (Italics are mine)
    Another case that I need refer to is R. v. Kassi & Ors. 5 W.A.C.A. 154 where objection was raised to the admissibility of some confessional statements on the ground that they had been made under duress or induced by promises. The learned trial Judge admitted them “temporarily pending evidence as to the facts alleged, if those are proved the exhibits will be refused.” On appeal to the West African Court of Appeal, that Court observed at page 156:
    ‘In our opinion this was incorrect procedure. If on the tendering of any evidence an objection is taken which raises an issue of fact, the correct procedure is for the Court to resolve that issue of fact before deciding whether the evidence should be admitted or not. Where the evidence is tendered by the prosecution the issue of fact should be resolved and a final ruling given as to the admissibility of the evidence before the close of the Crown Case. (See R. v. Onabanjo 3 W.A.C.A. p. 43).
    I agree completely with the views expressed in the two cases just referred to. It is immaterial that the trial is without a jury for in such a case the judge acts I the dual role of being a judge of law and of fact. In his role as judge of law, he has a duty to decide on the admissibly of the confessional statement tendered by the prosecutions and objected to by the defence on the ground of involuntariness. Indeed, where evidence is otherwise admissible the trial Judge may still exclude it if it will be highly prejudicial to the accused. As a judge of fact, the trial Judge, at the conclusion of trial, has a duty to decide on the weight to be attached to such a confessional by applying the tests laid down in R. v. Sykes 8 C.A.R. 233 which tests have been adopted in numerous cases in this country – see, for example R. v. Kanu, 14 W.A.C.A. 30.
    There is yet, however, another case where the prosecution seeks to render the statements of an accused person, and the accused says that the statement was never made by him. As this does not involve a question of the voluntariness of the statement it will be admitted in evidence but at the end of the trial, the Judge, as a Judge of fact, will have no decide whether or not the statement was made by the accused. See R. v. Igwe (supra) even here, too, if the statement is a confessional one, the prosecuting is still under a duty to prove that it was made by the accused voluntarily before it can be admitted in evidence. Where the accused denies making it as against contending that he made it involuntarily, the issue whether he made it all would be a matter of fact to be resolved at the end of the trial.
    In view of all that I have just said, I can see no justification whatsoever for the criticisms that have been levied in the court below of this age long practice. I believe the practice ensures fairness and promotes the cause of justice which cannot be scarified at the altar of a burred trial.
    In the case on hand, when the statement was sought to be tendered by P.W.4 Sergeant Amos Ekokoje, learned counsel for the 1st appellant objected to its admissibility and said:
    “I am objecting under section 28 of the Evidence Act.”
    This prompted the learned trial Judge to, rightly in my view, embark on a trial within trial but he did this in a very irregular way by making the 1st appellant commence, thereby shifting the onus of proof that the statement was not made voluntarily on him.The law is clear that where in criminal proceedings an objection is raised to admission of an alleged confession by the accused on the ground that the confession was not voluntary, the onus is on the prosecution to satisfy the Jugde beyond reasonable doubt that the statement in question had been made voluntarily. The Judge has to determine the issue at that stage as one of fact and causation – See D.P.P. v. Ping Lin (1975) 3 All ER 175. The statement admitted in evidence under such an irregular procedure must be expunged from the record. See Auta v. The State (supra).
    With the view I hold of Exhibits H and J, the question that now arises is without these two statements was there sufficient evidence to justify the conviction of the appellants for the offence of robbery with violence contrary to section 402(2)(a) of the Criminal Code of Lagos State From the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.3 and P.W.6. Sergeant Ekokoje the following facts emerge. A Mercedes-benz saloon can was snatched from the P.W.1 at Anthony Village, Lagos at about 6.30am. on 11/9/81 and found about 9 to 9.30 a.m at Ajara Village, Badagry, some distance away from Lagos. The two appellants, among others, were with the vehicle when it was seen at Ajara village. Ordinarily, one would say that there was no sufficient circumstantial evidence to link the appellants with those who snatched the vehicle from P.W.1 earlier that morning, but there is section 149(a) (formerly 148(a) of the Evidence Act to consider.
    Section 149(a) provides as follows:
    “149.  The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened regard being had to the common course natural events, human conduct and public and private business in their relation to the facts of the particular case, and in particular the court may presume-
    (a) that a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession.”
    This provision has come for consideration in a number of cases. In Phillip Omogodo v. The State (1981) 17, this Court refused to extend the doctrine of recent possession without anything more as a sufficient link of an accused with the death of the deceased in a case depending not on direct evidence but on circumstantial evidence. This Court also arrives at the same decision in Joseph Lori & Anor. v. The State (1980) 8 – 11 S.C. 81. In the former case just cited Nnamani J.S.C. delivering the lead judgment of the Court said at pages 17 – 18 of the report:
    “The doctrine of recent possession without anything more as a sufficient link of the appellant with the death of the deceased in a case depending not on direct evidence but on circumstantial evidence, was recently rejected by this Court in Joseph Lori and Anor v. The State (1980) 8 – 11 S.C. 81 at 91. In that case the two appellants were found in the deceased’s taxi cab on the very day the deceased was found missing. The 2nd appellant was a passenger in the vehicle and had a clear pecuniary interest in the taxi ca in that case. Mere possession of the vehicle shortly after the suspected crime cannot be enough to link the accused person with the murder of the deceased. There should be other circumstances strong enough not only to invoke the presumption implicit in Section 148(a) of the Evidence Act against the accused but to justify holding with some degree of certainty that he killed the deceased at the time the vehicle was stolen. See also Queen v. Donald Ororosokode (1960) SCNLR 501, 5 F.S.C. 208”
    Generally, the doctrine of recent possession is applicable more to ceases of stealing. Robbery with violence obviously has an element of stealing as it is a case of stealing with violence or threat of violence. One has to look more into the facts. On the evidence of P.W.1, a clear case of robbery with violence under section 402(2)(a) was established against his attackers that morning. To that extent, I agree entirely with the judgment of the Court of Appeal and find myself unable to share the view of the learned trial Judge that because the cutlasses allegedly branch-dished were not tendered, it would be a case of robbery simpliciter under section 402(1) of the Criminal Code. With profound respect to the learned trial Judge, he could not be right in his conclusion. First he accepted the evidence of P.W.1 which clearly showed that his attackers were armed with dangerous weapons at the time they snatched the vehicle from him. Secondly, there was no evidence below the trial judge that these men of the underworld left behind the cutlasses they brand-dished that morning and with which they chased P.W.1 that morning before his escape. How then could he expect the prosecution to tender the cutlasses which presumably the attackers took away In my view, the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the case was one of robbery under section 402(2(a) .
    Coming now to the appellants part from the evidence that they were found with the stolen vehicle a few hours after theft, there was no evidence that they were among the persons that snatched the car from P.W.1, P.W.1 said in evidence that he could not recognize any of the people who attacked him that morning. It is in evidence that none of the people, including the appellants arrested at Ajara Village, Badagry was found with arms. Could it then be said that mere finding the appellants with the vehicle a few hours after the theft without more would be sufficient evidence to link the appellants with the robbery of Anthony Village, Lagos Is it not possible that the actual robbers somewhere between Anthony Village Lagos and Ajara village, Badagry, after snatching the vehicle, gave the same to the appellants, among others, to dispose of which would make them to be receivers of the vehicle knowing same to be stolen It must be remembered that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. And for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to justify a conviction it must irresistibly and unequivocally point to one direction only and that is, that the appellants were among those who P.W.1 of the Mercedes Benz car. It is the law that circumstantial evidence must be so cogent and compelling as to lead to only one rational conclusion which is the offence with which the accused is charged. See Abieke v. The State (1975) 9 – 11 S.C. 97. As Nnamani J.S.C. put it at pages 23 – 24 of the Report in Omogodo v. The State (supra).
    “…It seems to me quite inconceivable that an inference of guilt can be drawn from that fact alone. It falls far short of the standard required of circumstantial evidence which is that it must lead irresistibly to the guilt of the accused persons. The evidence to be acceptable must be consistent with the prisoner’s guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion. It is also necessary before drawing the inference of accused’s guilt to be sure that there are no other co-existing circumstances which would weaken such inference. See on Circumstantial Evidence Obahon Anekwe v. The State (1976) 9 – 10 S.C. 255, 264; Tepper v. Queen (1952) A.C. 480 at 489 P.C. Stephen Ukorah v. The State (`977) 4 S.C. 167 at 174, 176-177; Valentine Adie v. The State (1980) 1-2 S.C. 116, 122 and recently Joseph Lori and Anor. v. The State (supra).”
    In my respectful view, I do not think that the evidence available in this case was sufficient to meet the required standard nor to justify applying section 149(a) in such a way as to make the appellants guilty of robbery with violence. Had exhibit H been admissible in evidence, this would have provided further evidence linking that 1st appellant with those who attacked P.W. 1 on the fateful morning and would have justified his conviction for robbery with violence as charged. Exhibit H even if it were admissible, would not be evidence against the 2nd appellant. See section 27(3) of the Evidence Act since there is no evidence that 2nd appellant any anytime adopted Exhibit H by words or conduct.

    There is however, some evidence from P.W.6 against the 1st appellant from which an inference could be drawn that he knew that the vehicle found in his possession at Ajara village was stolen. I refer to his evidence wherein he said:
    “I demanded for the particulars of the vehicle. I also enquired who was the owner of the vehicle from the accused persons. The name of the owner as given to me by the accused did correspond with the name on the particulars. The 1st accused told me that he was sent by his master to Cotonu Republic of Benin.
    I disgrace with him. I did not believe him because the name given to me as that of the owner did not correspond with the one on the particulars.”
    Under cross-examination by Mr. Olatunbosun, counsel for the 1st appellant P.W.6 further deposed:
    “At the time I arrested the accused person, the 1st accused claimed to be the owner.”
    The learned trial Judge accepted the evidence of P.W.6. That evidence taken along with the evidence that a few hours earlier the vehicle in question had been stolen from P.W.1, it could safely be inferred that the 1st appellant received the vehicle knowing same to be stolen and could rightly be convicted accordingly. He denied, in his evidence on oath, being found with the vehicle. The trial Judge rejected his evidence. That evidence also ran counter to the account he gave in his other statements to the police which statements were admitted in evidence without objection. In my view, the learned trial Judge was justified in rejecting 1st appellant’s evidence at the trial. He has, therefore, not accounted for his possession of the vehicle. Suffice it to say that on the evidence of P.W.6. I cannot say the same of the 2nd appellant.
    The charge for conspiracy was held proved by the courts below on the statements Exhibits H and J of the 1st and 2nd appellants respectively. In view of what I have said in respect of those two statements. I hold that the court below was in error to have convicted them on the charge of conspiracy. Merely being seen together with the stolen vehicle without more would not be sufficient evidence of conspiracy to rob.
    In conclusion, from all I have been saying, I allow the appeal of the 2nd appellant and discharge and acquit him on each of the two counts of conspiracy and robbery. I also allow the appeal of the 1st appellant on the charge for conspiracy but pursuant to section 179(2) of the Criminal Procedure Law Cap. 32 Laws of Lagos State. I convict him of the offence of receiving stolen property to wit: Mercedes Benz saloon car Registration No. LA 6788 K knowing same to be stolen contrary to section 427 of the Criminal Code of Lagos State. I sentence him to ten (10) years imprisonment with hard labour on that count.

    E. O. OGWUEGBU, J.S.C.: I have had a preview of the judgment read by my learned brother Omo, J.S.C. I allow the appeal and find the appellants not guilty of conspiracy and armed robbery. The judgment of the court below is therefore set aside.
    In the exercise of the powers under S.179(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act Cap. 40 Vol. v. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. I hereby substitute a conviction for the offence of receiving stolen property, that is, the Mercedes Benz saloon car Registration No. LA 6788K.
    Each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 (Five) years imprisonment with hard labour as set out in the lead judgment.
    Appeal allowed in part.

 

Appearances

H.I. Musa (Mrs.) for Stella O. Ugboma (Mrs.) For Appellant

 

AND

David Onyeike, Legal Officer, Ministry of Justice, Lagos State For Respondent