GANI TARZAN MARINE ENTERPRISES LTD. V. CARAVELLE RESOURCES AND INVESTMENT LTD. & ANOR (2013)

GANI TARZAN MARINE ENTERPRISES LTD. V. CARAVELLE RESOURCES AND INVESTMENT LTD. & ANOR

(2013)LCN/5933(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 18th day of February, 2013

CA/L/1120/2010

RATIO

EXAMINATION OF THE PLEADINGS OF THE PLAINTIFF TO DETERMINE IF THE CLAIMS ARE WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

Section 251 (p)(q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution states –
“251 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters (relating to) –
(p) the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies;
(q) subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the operation and interpretation of this Constitution in so far as it affects the Federal Government or any of its agencies;
(r) any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies”. While section 272(1) thereof states – “Subject to the provisions of section 251 and other provisions of the Constitution, the High Court of a State shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any Person”. Then section 6(1), (6)(b) of the same Constitution provides –
“6(1) The judicial powers of the Federation shall be vested in the courts to which this section relates, being courts established for the Federation.
(6) The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section –
(b) shall extend to all matters between persons, or between government or authority and to any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of the person.”
The constitutional provisions quoted above are to be interpreted purposively and liberally to give the words therein their natural and ordinary grammatical meaning see Aqua Ltd. v. Ondo State Sports Council (1990) 4 NWLR (pt.91) 622, N.N.P.G. v. Lutin Investment Limited (2006) 2 NWLR (pt.965) 506, Adetayo (supra) at 204. And, in so doing, it is clear on the face of the statement of claim that neither the Federal Government of Nigeria, nor any of its agencies is a party to the respondents’ suit pending at the court below as to come within the range of section 251 (1)(p), (q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution. In that regard I gratefully adopt the words of my learned brother, Augie, J.C.A., in W.R.P.C. Ltd. v. Agbuje (2005) 5 NWLR (pt.917) 63 at 90 –
“… the aim of paragraphs (q), (r) and (s) of subsection (1) of section 230 (now 251) of the 1999 Constitution as amended was to vest exclusively jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in matters in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies was a party ….”
(my emphasis). Again in P.D.P. v. Sylva (2012) 13 NWLR (pt.1316) 85 at 138, the Supreme Court held thus – “Section 251 of the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court for the items listed in the section. All items not listed in the section are to be heard and determined by the State High Court. When the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is in issue, the following must co-exist:
(a) the parties or party must be the Federal Government or its agency.
(b) Subject matter of the litigation
Satisfying the above is not the end of the matter. The pleadings of the plaintiff must be carefully examined so as to understand the facts and circumstances of the case in order to. It is clearly not enough only to have an agency of the Federal Government as a party before Federal High Court has jurisdiction.” Even in the NEPA case (supra) Ogundare J.S.C., was careful to state in the lead judgment at page 95 of the law report that exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the Federal High Court only where “… the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party” to the suit. Per. JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

FATIMA OMORO AKINBAMI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

GANI TARZAN MARINE ENTERPRISES LTD. Appellant(s)

AND

1. CARAVELLE RESOURCES AND INVESTMENT LTD.
2. ADETUNJI ADEGBOYEGA ADEBAYO Respondent(s)

JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): Pursuant to a ruling of the High Court of Justice of Lagos State, Lagos Judicial Division, holden at Lagos (the court below) overruling the appellant’s preliminary objection on jurisdiction in respect of a suit concerning a strip of land located at Ikoyi, Lagos, said to belong to the Federal Government, the appellant brought this appeal against the respondents questioning the said ruling.
In summary, the respondents issued a writ of summons accompanied by a statement of claim, frontloaded written statement of a witness on oath together with copies of some documents in support, claiming against the appellant at the court below declaratory and injunctive reliefs as well as damages for trespass and an order to set aside a licence granted to the appellant over a plot of land situate at Oyinkan Abayomi (formerly Queen’s) Drive, Ikoyi, Lagos.
Upon the parties joining issues on the pleadings, in which the appellant counter-claimed the right to occupy and use the same plot of land, the appellant brought a notice of preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit on the ground that it affects the validity of an administrative or executive action or decision of the Federal Government and/or its agency. The court below heard the preliminary objection. It saw no merit in it and overruled the preliminary objection accordingly.
An amended notice of appeal containing two grounds of appeal was filed by the appellants on 17-11-11. The appellants’ amended brief of argument filed on 21-6-12 formulated four issues for determination on page 3 of the amended brief. The four issues (supra) were argued chronologically.
The first issue reproduced sections 1(1)(2) and 2 of the Lands (Title Vesting etc) Act Cap L7 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, and sections 12(1)(2) and 13 of the National Inland Waterways Authority Act Cap N47 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, to submit that the writ of summons and statement of claim disclosed that the subject matter of the suit is Federal Government land leased to Diskarbog Nigeria Limited on 1-5-95, by the then Minister for Housing and Urban Development, and registered in the Federal Lands Registry Ikoyi, Lagos, which was subsequently purportedly leased to the respondents by the same Federal agency.
The first issue also contended that the appellant’s counter-claim of a declaratory relief that she is the rightful occupier of the disputed plot of land through a permit and licence for ferry services granted to her by the Federal Government comes under the jurisdiction of only the Federal High Court in line with section 251 (1)(p) and (r) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (1999 Constitution) and the cases of Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdul-Raheem (2009) 13 NWLR (pt.1157) 83 at 126, Attorney General of Anambra State v. Attorney General of the Federation (1993) 6 NWLR (pt.302) 692 at 742, NEPA v. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (pt.798) 79 at 99 – 100, Adebileje v. NEPA (1998) 12 NWLR (pt.577) 219 at 227.
The second issue rehashed the argument on the first issue relating to section 251 (1)(p) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution and the cases of Oloruntoba-Oju (supra) and NEPA (supra) together with section 2 of the Lands (Title Vesting etc) Act (supra) and sections 12 and 13 of the National Inland Waterways Authority Act (NIWA Act) (supra) vis-Ã -vis the reliefs sought in the statement of claim to contend that by section 272(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution read with the case of Madukolu and ors. V. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 ANLR 581 at 589 – 590 the jurisdiction of the court below does not extend to the suit brought by the respondents.
The appellant’s third issue again discussed sections 1 and 2 of the Lands (Title Vesting etc) Act and sections 12(1)(2) and 13 of the NIWA Act labeling them of peculiar nature and purposed for preservation of the disputed piece of land under the control and management of the Federal Government to aid water transportation and ferry services under the control and management of the Ministry of Transport through the NIWA that gave the appellant the licence and permit to run ferry services thereat, so the clear and unambiguous words of the two enactments should be given their natural meaning to achieve the peculiar objective of the two enactments in relation to the disputed piece of land.
The fourth issue drew attention to section 5 of the Lands (Title Vesting etc) Act stipulating that registration of the disputed area of land with the Federal Lands Registry under section 1 thereof must be in the name of the Federal Government and no other person or corporate body; and that the clear language of the provision should receive its literal meaning following the cases of Cotecna International Ltd. v. I.M.B. Ltd. (2006) 9 NWLR (pt. 985) 275 at 290, NDIC v. Okem Enterprises Ltd. (2004) 10 NWLR (pt.880 107 at 196; consequently the lease between the then Federal Minister and Diskarborg Nigeria Limited registered in the name of the latter at the Federal Lands Registry Ikoyi, Lagos, and subsequently assigned to the respondents and registered in their name at the same Federal Lands Registry, instead of in the name of the Federal Government under section 5 of the Lands (Title Vesting etc) Act, is null and void vide UAC v. Macfoy (1961) 3 All ER 1169 at 1172 – 1173. The appellant concluded by urging the appeal to be allowed and the ruling of the court below set aside with back-up order that only the Federal High Court has the jurisdiction to hear the suit.
The respondents’ amended brief dated and filed on, 20-7-12 was prefaced by objection to the proliferation of four issues for determination from two grounds of appeal by the appellant citing in support the case of Nwaogwu v. Okere (2008) 13 NWLR (pt.1105) 445 at 478 – 479 where the Supreme Court (per the lead judgments of Tobi, J.S.C.) condemned the proliferation of issues by stating emphatically that it is wrong for issues to be more than the grounds of appeal.
The respondents then proceeded to react to the issues for determination of the appellant serially, starting with the first issue to the effect that the reliefs sought by respondents at the court below and the ruling of that court on the issue indicate the parties in the suit at the court below are private bodies, not the Federal Government or any of its agencies, unlike the cases of NEPA (supra) and Adebileje (supra), which were held to be Federal agencies; also, the reliefs sought in the suit at the court below a declaration as to a statutory right of occupancy over a piece of land at Ikoyi, Lagos; setting aside a licence granted to the defendant over the said piece of land; injunction against appellant’s further acts of trespass on the said land; and N500,000 damages against the appellant for trespass on the land, do not relate to section 251 (1)(p) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution vide the case of Adetayo v. Ademola (2010) 15 NWLR (pt.1215) 169 at 191, 192, 194, 195, 204.
In responding to the second issue, the respondents’ brief adopted the arguments on the first issue (supra) and added sections 6(6)(b) and 272(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution as interpreted in the case of Okealialam v. Nwanna (2003) 12 NWLR (pt.835) 597 at 610 – 611 to urge that section 251 (1)(p)(q) and (r) does not take away the jurisdiction of the court below to entertain the respondents’ suit.
The respondents objected to the third issue that it did not arise from any of the two grounds of appeal and amounts to the proliferation of issues and must be struck out on ground of incompetence following the cases of W.A.E.C. v. Adeyanju (2008) 9 NWLR (pt.1092) 270 at 291, Oyegun v. Nzeribe (2010) 16 NWLR (pt.1220) 568 at 577, Nwaogwu v. Okere (supra), Okwuagbala v. Ikwueme (2010) 19 NWLR (pt.1226) 54 at 62 – 63, Nwankwo v. Yar’adua (2010) 12 NWLR (pt.1209) 518 at 587; all the more so the issue at the court below is not on ownership of the disputed land by the Federal Government, nor does the ruling appealed against and the two grounds of appeal refer to the issue; as the respondents’ claim at the court below seeks to protect the lease granted to them over the disputed land by the Federal Government upon which the appellant is alleged to be a trespasser.
The objection taken by the respondents on the competence of the third issue for determination (supra) was adopted by the respondents as their answer to the fourth issue upon which the respondents, in placing further reliance on the list of additional authorities dated 21-1-13, containing the case of G.M. Enterprises Ltd. v. C.R. Investments Ltd. (2011) 14 NWLR (pt. 1266) 125 at 150 and the statutory provisions of sections 1 and 2 of the Lands (Title Vesting etc) Act together with section 13 of the NIWA Act pressed for the dismissal of the appeal for lacking in merit.
The reply brief dated 17-10-12 and filed on 18-10-12 argued over the objection to the issues framed by the appellant that the question of the ground(s) of appeal having no bearing on the issue(s) for determination is a mere irregularity that does not nullify the issue(s) vide Labiyi v. Anretiola (1992) 8 NWLR (pt.258) 139 at 168, Aduku v. Adejoh (1994) 5 NWLR (pt.346) 582 at 594, particularly as the respondents did not object to it timeously vide Labiyi (supra) at 168 and Aduku (supra) read with Order 10 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011; so, Nwaigwe (supra) should be discountenanced and the Court could use its inherent powers to formulate issue(s) consistent with the appellant’s grounds of appeal to give the appeal a fair hearing following the cases of Tanko v. U.B.A. Plc (2010) 17 NWLR (pt. 1221) 80 at 93, Labiyi (supra), Aduku (supra), and section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution.
The reply brief repeated and re-emphasised substantially the argurnents earlier proffered in the appellant’s brief with the addition of the case Udoh v. O.H.M.B. (1993) 7 NWLR (pt.304) 139 at 143 to the other cases led by NEPA (supra) cited in the appellant’s brief and urged that Adetayo (supra) is irrelevant and was cited in error by the respondents, as it has nothing to do with Federal Government land along the bank of an inland waterway, the subject matter of the dispute at the court below; that the cases of W.A.E.C. (supra), Momodu (supra), Oyegun (supra), Nwaogwu (supra), Okwuagbala (supra) should be discountenanced in light of the fact that issues 3 and 4 submitted by the appellants are based on ground one of the amended notice of appeal, and are on that account competent vide Otu v. A.C.B. International Bank Plc (2008) 3 NWLR (pt.1073) 179 at 196 and should be considered by the Court in holding that only the Federal High court has the jurisdiction to hear the respondents’ suit pending at the court below.
The four issues formulated by the appellant are more than the two grounds of appeal in the amended notice of appeal. The said issues are on that premise incompetent, as rightly submitted by the respondents’ learned senior counsel, Chief Uwechue – See in addition the cases of Onyioha v. Ayashe (1996) 2 NWLR (pt.432) 567, Oyekan v. Akinrinwa (1996) 7 NWLR (pt.459) 128, Onyemaizu v. Ojiako (2000) FWLR (pt. 2) 310 or (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt.659) 25 and Ikenne Local Government v. West African Portland Cement Plc (2012) All FWLR (pt.642) 1747 at 1760.
But in the interest of justice and fair hearing the defective brief of the appellant may be considered on the issue(s) the Court may formulate to rhyme with the grounds of appeal in line with the cases of Tanko (supra), Labiyi (supra) and Aduku (supra) cited by the appellant taken together with the cases of Igboidu v. Igboidu (1999) 1 NWLR (pt.585) 27 at 35-36, Akpan v. State (1992) 6 NWLR (pt.248) 439 at 471 – 472, Mohammed v. Klargester (Nig.) Ltd. (1996) 1 NWLR (pt. 422) 54 at 61. Moreover, the respondents did not object to the defect at the earliest opportunity by filing a notice of preliminary objection under Order 10 Rule 1 of the Rules of this Court after the brief was served on them and are deemed to have waived the irregularity.
I note that the reply brief reiterated in great measure the arguments canvassed in the appellant’s brief. So, I advise myself to limit the consideration of the reply brief to new or fresh issues arising from the respondents brief in accordance with Order 18 Rule 5 of the Rules of this Court read with the cases of Olafisoye v. FRN (2004) 4 NWLR (pt. 864) 580, Umeji v. Attorney General of Imo State (1995) 4 NWLR (pt. 391) 552.
With the preliminaries settled, I most respectfully reason that having regard to the two grounds of appeal vis-Ã -vis the ratio of the ruling appealed against the sole issue for determination on the appeal is –
“Whether the suit filed by the respondents at the High Court of Justice of Lagos State (the court below) is within the jurisdiction of that court having regard to section 251 (1)(p), (q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution vis-Ã -vis sections 6(6)(b) and 272(1) of the said Constitution”.
Both the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned senior counsel for the respondents submitted, aright, in my modest opinion, that the jurisdiction of a court of law is determined by looking only at the claim before it – see Oloruntoba-Oju (supra) and Attorney General of Anambra State (supra) cited by the appellant’s learned counsel and Umanah v. Attah (2005) 12 NWLR (pt.938) 103, Yalaju-Amaye v. A.R.E.C. Ltd. (1990) 4 NWLR (pt.145) 422 at 441, Oduko v. Government of Ebonyi State (2009) 4 SCNJ 76.
The reliefs sought by the respondents against the appellant are pleaded in paragraph 14 of the statement of claim on page 5 of the record thus –
“14. WHEREFORE the Claimants claim from the Defendant as follows:
(i) A declaration that the statutory rights of occupancy over the piece or parcel of land comprised in the deed of lease dated 1st May 1995 and registered as No. 68 at page 68 in volume 14 of the Federal Land Registry Ikoyi, Lagos belongs to the 1st Claimant subject to the consent of the Honourable Minister of Housing and Urban Development.
(ii) An order setting aside any purported licence or temporary right of occupancy granted to the defendant over the said piece of land, same being illusory, invalid and void.
(iii) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant its servants, agents or privies from further trespass into the land.
(iv) N500,000 damages for trespass into the said land”.

While section 272(1) thereof states –
“Subject to the provisions of section 251 and other provisions of the Constitution, the High Court of a State shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any Person”.

Then section 6(1), (6)(b) of the same Constitution provides –
“6(1) The judicial powers of the Federation shall be vested in the courts to which this section relates, being courts established for the Federation.
(6) The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section –
(b) shall extend to all matters between persons, or between government or authority and to any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of the person.”
The constitutional provisions quoted above are to be interpreted purposively and liberally to give the words therein their natural and ordinary grammatical meaning see Aqua Ltd. v. Ondo State Sports Council (1990) 4 NWLR (pt.91) 622, N.N.P.G. v. Lutin Investment Limited (2006) 2 NWLR (pt.965) 506, Adetayo (supra) at 204. And, in so doing, it is clear on the face of the statement of claim that neither the Federal Government of Nigeria, nor any of its agencies is a party to the respondents’ suit pending at the court below as to come within the range of section 251 (1)(p), (q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution. In that regard I gratefully adopt the words of my learned brother, Augie, J.C.A., in W.R.P.C. Ltd. v. Agbuje (2005) 5 NWLR (pt.917) 63 at 90 –
“… the aim of paragraphs (q), (r) and (s) of subsection (1) of section 230 (now 251) of the 1999 Constitution as amended was to vest exclusively jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in matters in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies was a party ….”
(my emphasis).
Again in P.D.P. v. Sylva (2012) 13 NWLR (pt.1316) 85 at 138, the Supreme Court held thus –
“Section 251 of the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court for the items listed in the section. All items not listed in the section are to be heard and determined by the State High Court. When the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is in issue, the following must co-exist:
(a) the parties or party must be the Federal Government or its agency.
(b) Subject matter of the litigation
Satisfying the above is not the end of the matter. The pleadings of the plaintiff must be carefully examined so as to understand the facts and circumstances of the case in order to determine if the claims are within the jurisdiction of the court. It is clearly not enough only to have an agency of the Federal Government as a party before Federal High Court has jurisdiction.”

Even in the NEPA case (supra) Ogundare J.S.C., was careful to state in the lead judgment at page 95 of the law report that exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the Federal High Court only where “… the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party” to the suit.
Secondly, from the reliefs sought by the respondents in their statement of claim (supra), it is obvious that the suit does not relate to the functioning of the Federal Government and/or the organs it uses for performance of its functions. The suit is therefore not on the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies, but an action by private bodies against another private body over the occupation and use of a plot of land, which takes the dispute outside the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, but within the jurisdiction of the court below under sections 6(1)(6)(b) and 272(1) of the 1999 Constitution taken together with the case of Onuorah v. K.R.P.C. Ltd: (2005) 6 NWLR (pt.921) 393 and the elaborate judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Adetayo v. Ademola (2010) 15 NWLR (pt. 1215) 169 followed by this Court (Ibadan Judicial Division) in Ikenne Local Government v. West African Portland Cement Plc (supra) at 1768.

It may be that the appellant was influenced by the averments in her statement of defence on pages 74 – 77 of the record to believe that the alleged invalidity of the lease and the statutes pleaded thereto – NIWA Act and the Lands (Title vesting etc) Act – are necessary for ascertaining the issue of jurisdiction, when such an issue of jurisdiction is not decided by looking at the statement of defence and/or at the processes filed by the defence but by looking only at the statement of claim see Adetayo v. Ademola (supra) at 189 following Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 9 – 10 SC 31, Orthopaedic Hospital Management Board v. Garba (2002) 14 NWLR (pt.788) 538, Izenkwe v. Nnadozie (1953) 14 WACA 361, Attorney General of Kwara of State v. Olawale (1993) 1 NWLR (pt.272) 654, Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (No.2) (1989) 4 NWLR (pt. 117) 517, Justice Elelu-Habeeb and Anor. v. Attorney General of the Federation and Ors. (2012) All FWLR (pt.629) 1011 at 1047.

By way of recapitulation, I hold that the court below, not the Federal High Court, has jurisdiction over the suit brought by the respondents at the court below. Accordingly, I find no merit in the appeal. I hereby dismiss it and affirm the ruling of the court below (Lufadeju, J.) overruling the appellant’s preliminary objection that the court below lacked the jurisdiction to determine the said suit. The appellant shall pay N50,000 costs to the respondents.

AMINA A. AUGIE, J.C.A.: I have read in draft the lead Judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Ikyegh, JCA, and I agree entirely with his reasoning and conclusion. Jurisdiction of Court is so fundamental that it forms the foundation of adjudication. It has been described as the lifeline of an action because if a Court lacks jurisdiction, it automatically lacks the necessary competence to try the case at all – see Achebe V. Nwosu (2003) 7 NWLR (pt.818) 103; University of Ilorin (2003) 17 NWLR (pt. 849) 214; & Akeem V. Unibadan (2003) 10 NWLR (pt.829) 584. See also Trade Bank Plc. V. Benilux (Nig.) Ltd. (2003) 8 NWLR (pt. 825) 416, wherein it was held that for the purposes of determining the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High court in respect of section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, the Court must carefully examine the facts of the case to see whether they justify the application of the sub-section. See also the statement of Tobi, J.S.C. in NEPA V. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (pt. 798) 79, as follows-
“In construing Section 230 (1) of the 1979 Constitution as amended, two important matters arise. They are the parties in the litigation as well as the subject matter of the litigation. The Court must consider both. In construing the parties, the Court will have no difficulty in identifying the Federal Government but it may have some difficulty in identifying the agency of the Federal Government in certain matters. The case law and the law of agency will certainty be of help in relevant cases. – – – Another important area is the subject matter of the litigation. – – For the Federal High Court to have exclusive jurisdiction, the matter must be a civil matter arising from the administration, management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies. The matter must arise from the operation and interpretation of the Constitution. And finally, the matter must arise from any action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decisions by the Federal Government, or any of its agencies.”
In this case, it is not enough for the Appellant to say the land belongs to the Federal Government, and so, the matter must go to the Federal High Court. No, not at all; the matter must be a civil one arising from the administration, management, and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
It is also trite law that it is the claim of the Plaintiff that determines the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a suit – see Akeem V. Unibadan (supra). In this case, it is clear, even from a cursory look at the Statement of Claim, that neither the Federal Government nor any of its agencies is a party to the suit, and that the Respondent’s claims have nothing to do with the administration, management, and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
Courts are known to guard their jurisdiction jealously – see A-G., Lagos State V. A-G., Fed. (2004) 18 NWLR (pt.904) 1, where Uwais, C.J.N. observed-
“It is a general principle of law that the Court will not readily deny itself jurisdiction unless the jurisdiction is expressly ousted by legislation”.
In this case, the lower Court had every reason, and was right to hold on to the jurisdiction that rightfully belongs to it. Thus, I also find no merit in the appeal, and I also dismiss it. I also affirm the Ruling of the lower Court, and abide by the consequential orders in the lead Judgment including the order as to costs.

FATIMA OMORO AKINBAMI, J.C.A.: I have read in advance the Judgment of my learned brother Ikyegh, JCA delivered this morning.
I agree with the reasoning of my learned brother and the conclusions reached therein.
I abide with the order as to costs.

Appearances

MR. A. NWOGBE (WITH MESSRS. R. DARANIJO AND I. MATESUN)For Appellant

AND

CHIEF G. N. UWECHUE, S.A.N. (WITH MRS. E. OKPOKO AND MESSRS A. FALOYE AND C. HALIM)For Respondent