FRN v. AFE
(2022)LCN/16689(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Thursday, January 13, 2022
CA/ABJ/CR/473/2021
Before Our Lordships:
Fatima Omoro Akinbami Justice of the Court of Appeal
Abubakar Mahmud TalbaJ Justice of the Court of Appeal
Peter Oyinkenimiemi Affen Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA APPELANT(S)
And
OSARENKHOE AFE RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
THE MODES OF ESTABLISHING THE GUILT OF AN ACCUSED PERSON
The three modes of evidential proof in a criminal trial are: (a) direct evidence of witnesses; (b) circumstantial evidence; and (c) the confessional statement voluntarily made by a criminal defendant. See OKUDO v THE STATE [2011] 3 NWLR (PT. 1234) 209 at 236, ADIO v THE STATE (1986) 5 SC 194 at 219-220, EMEKA v THE STATE [2002] 14 NWLR (PT. 734) 666 at 683 and OLABODE ABIRIFON v THE STATE [2013] 13 NWLR (PT. 1372) 587 at 596. PER AFFEN, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT A VOLUNTARY STATEMENT MADE BY AN ACCUSED PERSON IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
A statement made voluntarily by a person suspected to have committed a criminal offence, be it confessional or in denial of the crime with which he is being charged, is admissible. See OKOH v STATE [2014] 8 NWLR (PT. 1410) 502 (SC). The prosecution has the burden of proving the voluntariness of a confessional statement, which is a handy potent tool in its arsenal for proving the offence charged. A free and voluntary confession of guilt made by an accused person, if direct and positive, is sufficient to warrant his conviction without any corroborative evidence insofar as the Court is satisfied as to the truth of the confession. See YESUFU v STATE (1976) 6 SC 167 at 163, IDOWU v STATE (2000) 7 SC (PT 11) 50 at 62 and NSOFOR v STATE [2004] 18 NWLR (PT 905) 292. PER AFFEN, J.C.A.
THE POSITION OF LAW ON A TRIAL DE NOVO
In the scheme of adjudication, a trial de novo [or vanire de novo] is “[a] new trial on the entire case – that is, on both questions of fact and issues of law – conducted as if there had been no trial in the first place”. See Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Edition), p. 1544. It connotes that the matter is to be “tried anew as if no trial whatever had been had in the first instance”. See SUNDAY KAJUBO v STATE [1988] 1 NWLR (PT. 73) 721 -per Oputa, JSC. I reckon therefore that the Respondent is on firma terra in urging this Court to discountenance the copious reference made in the Appellant’s Brief to the previous proceedings before Kolawole, J. (now JCA). By Section 46(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, “Evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding, or before any person authorised by law to take it is admissible for the purpose of proving in a subsequent judicial proceeding or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding the truth of the facts which it states, when the witness cannot be called for any of the reasons specified in Section 39, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party: Provided that (a) the proceeding was between the same parties or their representatives in interest; (b) the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross-examine, and (c) the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as in the second proceeding”; whilst Subsection (2) thereof provides that “a criminal trial or inquiry shall be deemed to be a proceeding between the prosecutor and the defendant within the meaning of this section”. PER AFFEN, J.C.A.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES
The point has already been made that the burden is on the prosecution to prove the voluntariness of a confessional statement. The admissibility vel non of a confessional statement is largely dependent on the evidence adduced in a trial-within-trial. Once a confessional statement is admitted or rejected following a trial-within-trial proceeding, it becomes very difficult for an appellate Court to intervene in an appeal against its admissibility or rejection as in the instant case. The evaluation of evidence presented at the trial is often based on credibility of witnesses, which is the forte of a trial Court. See RASHEED LASISI v THE STATE NWLR [2013] 9 NWLR (PT. 1358) 74 at 96-97. PER AFFEN, J.C.A.
PETER OYINKENIMIEMI AFFEN, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): Introduction
The Respondent herein [Oserenkhoe Afe] is the 2nd Defendant in a criminal trial at the Federal High Court (Abuja Division) in Charge No. FHC/ABJ/CR/297/2015: Federal Republic of Nigeria v Stephen Orosanye & 2 Ors. The matter was previously pending before G. A. Kolawole, J. (now JCA) but in the wake of his Lordship’s elevation to the Court of Appeal in 2018, it was reassigned to l. E. Ekwo, J. whereupon trial commenced de novo. A trial-within-trial was conducted to ascertain the admissibility vel non of two extra-judicial statements made by him on 24/2/11 and 16/3/11, which statements are confessional in nature. In a considered “RULING ON TRIAL WITHIN TRIAL” delivered on 6/10/20, the statements were rejected and marked accordingly. Intriguingly, Kolawole, J. (now JCA) had earlier adjudged the said extra-judicial statements admissible prior to the reassignment of the case as aforesaid.
The Appellant’s initial application for leave to appeal was declined by the lower Court, but this Court subsequently granted leave on 10/6/21 (as shown in p. 368 of the records), whereupon the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal dated 30/6/2 which is at pp. 356-367 of the Records, whilst the ruling appealed against lies at pp. 339-355 thereof. On his part, the Respondent filed a Respondent’s Notice of Contention dated 1/7/21 as well as a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 9/8/21 challenging the competence of this interlocutory appeal and ex ipso facto the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine the same. Briefs were filed and duly exchanged. The Appellant’s Brief is dated 28/7/21; the Respondent’s Brief (which incorporates arguments in support of the Respondent’s Notice of Contention as well as the Notice of Preliminary Objection urging the dismissal and/or striking out of this appeal for want of competence/jurisdiction) is dated 9/8/21; whilst the Appellant’s Reply Brief (which incorporates arguments in opposition to the Respondent’s Notice of Contention and the Notice of Preliminary Objection was filed on 13/8/21. At the hearing of the appeal on 18/19/21, the preliminary objection was argued and opposed by learned counsel for the parties who equally adopted their respective briefs of argument. Let us first grapple with the Respondent’s objection, which raises a threshold issue as to the competence of this appeal as constituted.
Preliminary Objection
The four grounds upon which the Respondent relies in urging this Court to dismiss and/or strike out this appeal are: (i) there is no valid Notice of Appeal filed in this appeal; (ii) the Notice of Appeal was filed out of the statutorily prescribed period without a prayer and/or order for extension of time to seek leave and appeal against the ruling of the lower Court; (iii) the Notice of Appeal filed in this appeal is null and void; and (iv) this Honourable Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.
The Respondent’s contention is that whereas Section 24(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Act enjoined the Appellant to appeal within 90 days from 6/10/20 (when the ruling appealed against was delivered) as, the notice of appeal was filed out of time without any prayer/order for extension of time to appeal, which renders the notice of appeal a nullity, citing ODOFIN & ANOR v CHIEF AGU & ANOR (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 229) 350, (1992) LPELR-2225(SC) 1 at 26-27 -per Nnaemeka- Agu JSC, and p. 37 -per Babalakin JSC; that the Appellant merely sought a sole prayer for “leave to appeal against the ruling of the lower Court delivered on the 6th of October, 2020” which was granted by this Court several months after the 90-days window on 10/6/21 without any prayer/order for extension of time to seek leave to appeal, and the Notice of Appeal was equally filed out of time on 30/6/20; that this Court granted leave out of time without an order for extension of time to appeal, and this appeal is consequently grossly incompetent, calling in aid the case of NIGERIAN AIR FORCE v SHEKETE [2002] 18 NWLR (PT. 798) 129 at 151-per Niki Tobi, JSC (on the proposition that leave to appeal and leave for extension of time to appeal are not synonyms or procedure of a similar or like content), CO-OPERATIVE & COMMERCE BANK (NIGERIA) PLC v ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ANAMBRA STATE & ANOR [1992] 8 NWLR (PT. 261) 528 at 561 -per Olatatwura JSC and TUNJI BOWAJE v MOSES ADEDIWURA (1976) 6 SC. 743 (on the imperative for an application for leave to appeal against an interlocutory decision to be filed and heard within 14 days); and that having established that the notice of appeal was filed out of time without an order for extension of time, there is no competent appeal before this Honourable Court, placing reliance on JUDE ONWUZULIKE v THE STATE [2020] 10 NWLR (PT. 1731) 91 at 101-102.
The Appellant’s reaction (as contained in the Reply Brief) is that the basis of the Respondent’s objection is faulty and unfounded in that the instant appeal does not fall under Section 24 (2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Act as contended by the Respondent, rather it falls squarely under Section 24(3) thereof which empowers the Appellant to file a similar application at the Court of Appeal within 15 days of the refusal of leave by the lower Court; and that from the date of determination of the application for leave by the trial Court, the issue of leave is removed from the realm of Section 24 (2) even if the application was determined within the prescribed 90 days as in the instant appeal. The Appellant maintained that it promptly sought the leave of the trial Court to appeal the ruling of 6/10/20, but the said application was refused on 21/12/69, whereupon it approached this Honourable Court with the same prayer for leave pursuant to Section 24 (3) of the Court of Appeal Act 1976 and Order 6 Rules 1, 2, 3 and 7 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016 which empower this Honourable Court to grant leave and extend time for the Applicant to file its notice of appeal; that even an application for leave is regarded as an appeal under the law, citing KALU v. ODILI & ORS (1992) LPELR-1653(SC); that upon being satisfied that the Appellant filed its application within 15 days after the lower Court’s refusal to grant leave as stipulated in Section 24 (3) of the Court of Appeal Act and Order 6 Rule 3 of 2016 Rules of this Honourable Court, this Court granted leave and extended time on 10/6/21 for the Appellant to file its Notice of Appeal “within 21 days from the date JUSUN strike is called off or suspended and the Court resumes” in accordance with Order 6 Rule 6 thereof; and the Courts resumed from JUSUN strike on the 15/6/21, insisting that the Notice of Appeal was filed together with the Order granting leave by this Honourable Court as directed by this Honourable Court were within the 21 days extended/granted by this Honourable Court in accordance with Order 6 Rule 6 of Court of Appeal Rules 2016. The Appellant relied on EYO & ANOR v JACKSON & ORS (2012) LPELR-19702(CA) where this Honourable Court is said to have made clear that the filing of a similar application for leave to appeal within 15 days after refusal of an initial application for leave by the trial Court is all that is required, and urged this Court to dismiss the objection.
Resolution of objection
The Respondent’s objection is that this appeal as constituted is incompetent for having been filed outside the 90-day period prescribed in Section 24 (2) (b) of the Court of Appeal Act, insisting that the Appellant should not only have sought extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal, the leave itself ought to have been obtained within 90 days from 6/10/20 when the lower Court delivered the ruling appealed against wherein it rejected the Respondent’s extra-judicial statements. Without much ado, the preliminary objection is misconceived and ought to fail. The records reveal that following the lower Court’s rejection of the Respondent’s extra-judicial statements on 6/10/20, the Appellant sought leave to appeal which was declined by the lower Court on 21/12/20, whereupon the Appellant beseeched this Court with another application for leave to appeal dated 5/1/21, which was granted on 10/6/21. The Court of Appeal Act 1976 provides for timelines for lodging appeals in Section 24(2) as follows: “The periods for giving notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal are: (a) in an appeal in a civil cause or matter, fourteen days where the appeal is against an interlocutory decision and three months where the appeal is against a final decision; (b) in an appeal in a criminal cause or matter, ninety days from the date of the decision appealed against”. The above provision makes clear that either a notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal can be given within the prescribed periods, but no distinction is drawn between interlocutory and final decisions in respect of appeals in criminal cases and matters. Crucially, Section 24(3) thereof provides that: “Where an application for leave to appeal is made in the first instance to the Court below, a person making such application shall in addition to the period prescribed in Subsection (2) of this Section, be allowed a further period of 15 days from the date of determination of the application to the Court below to make another application to the Court of Appeal”. To my mind, this provision envisages that an application for leave to appeal made to the lower Court within the prescribed period may not be determined with the said period, hence the Act provides that a similar application for leave to appeal may be made to this Court within ‘a further period of 15 days from the date of determination of the application’. In essence, this provision is a statutory extension of time that obviates the necessity of applying for extension of time to seek leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal upon refusal of leave by the lower Court insofar as the application is made within 15 days of the lower Court’s decision. It bears pointing out that Section 24(3) of the Court of Appeal Act is complemented by Order 6 Rules 3 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016 to the effect that “Where an application has been refused by the Court below, an application for a similar purpose may be made to the Court within fifteen days after the date of the refusal”; as well as Order 6 Rule 6 which provides that “Where an application for leave to appeal from a decision of the Court below has been brought within the time prescribed by the Court of Appeal Act but has not been heard within that period, the Court, if satisfied that there has not been an unreasonable delay in bringing the application, may extend time to appeal and in proper case grant leave to appeal”. This latter provision clearly empowers this Court to extend time to appeal suo motu if satisfied that the application for leave was made within the prescribed time without unreasonable delay.
In the case at hand, this Court granted leave to appeal on 10/6/21, and ordered that notice of appeal together with the order granting leave shall be filed at the Registry of the lower Court within 21 days from the date the JUSUN strike is called off or suspended (see p. 368 of the records). The Respondent’s contention, as I understand it, is not that the application by which the Appellant sought leave to appeal from this Court was not made within 15 days of the decision of the lower Court declining the initial application for leave to appeal, or that the notice of appeal dated 30/6/21 was filed outside 21 days from the date the JUSUN strike was called off or suspended as ordered by this Court. This Court having extended time for the Appellant and granted leave to appeal on 10/6/21 pursuant to Order 6 Rule 6 of the Court of Appeal Rules, the notice of appeal filed on 30/6/21 cannot be said to be incompetent. To the extent that the cases cited by the Respondent dealt with Section 24(2) (a) and (b) of the Court of Appeal Act (or similar provisions) but not Section 24(3) thereof and/or Order 6 Rules 3 and 6 of the Court of Appeal Rules, they are clearly inapposite and inapplicable. The proposition that ‘a case is merely an authority for what it decides’ is a notorious one for which the citation of authorities is unnecessary, but for reasons of completeness, I will refer to the decisions of the Supreme Court in ANEKWE v STATE [2014] (PT. 1415) 10 NWLR 353 at 370-371 and NSEFIK v MUNA [2014] 2 NWLR (PT. 1390) 151 at 188-189 -per M. D. Muhammad. And even if the Respondent has any quarrel with the leave granted by this Court, his remedy lies on appeal but not to challenge the competence of the appeal (filed with the leave of this Court) by way of a notice of preliminary objection, and thereby inviting this Court to sit on appeal over its own decision through the backdoor. The preliminary objection fails and is accordingly dismissed.
Respondent’s Notice of Contention
At pp. 369-371 of the record of appeal lies the Respondent’s Notice dated 13/8/21 wherein it is contended that the decision of the lower Court be affirmed on the following additional grounds: (i) the lower Court was in error to have conducted a single trial-within-trial in respect of the extra-judicial statements made on 24/2/11 and 16/3/11; (ii) there ought to have been distinct trail-within-trial proceedings conducted in respect of the said extra-judicial statements; (iii) the admissibility of the extra-judicial statements ought to have been tested one by one by a trial-within-trial; and (iv) failure to conduct a distinct trial-within-trial proceedings in respect of the extra-judicial statement render them inadmissible. The Respondent formulated a sole issue for determination on the Respondent’s Notice, namely: “Whether the statements of 24th of February, 2011 and 16th of March, 2011 [are] admissible having regard to the joint trial-within-trial conducted on them by the lower Court”; and contended that the joint trial-within-trial proceedings conducted in respect of the two extra-judicial statements of 24/2/11 and 16/3/11 and the ruling delivered thereon on 6/10/2020 rendered the statements a nullity, insisting that where there are more than one confessional statement made on different dates, times or places, and the accused person retracts the statements on the basis that he was induced to make them, their admissibility must be tested one by one in a separate trial within trial, calling in aid the cases of MOSES JUA v THE STATE (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 440) 766 at 787- 783 -per Ogunwumiju, JCA (as he then was), VICTOR ONODAVWERHO v FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2019) LPELR- 47185(CA) at 22-25, ANTHONY ITU v THE STATE (2013) LPELR-22002(CA) 7 at 40 -per Saulawa JCA (as he then was) and WASIU YINUSA v THE STATE (2019) LPELR-47937(CA) 1 at 75-16 -per Bada JCA. The Respondent maintained that the concept of waiver or acquiescence does not arise and compliance with the required procedure cannot be waived or acquiesced in because the confessional statements were eventually rejected by the lower Court. The Court was urged to affirm the rejection of the statements on account of the procedure adopted by the lower Court in lumping up the trial-within-trial of both statements.
The Appellant’s response (as contained in the Reply Brief dated 13/8/21) is that the Respondent’s Notice raises a fresh issue not placed before the trial Court, and having not sought and obtained leave to raise it for the first time on appeal, the same should be discountenanced, placing reliance on ODUKOYA v MARCUS & ANOR (2017) LPELR-41958(CA) and CBN v AZORO & ORS (2018) LPELR-44389(CA). The Appellant contends that even if arguendo leave is not required to raise the issue as to whether the trial Court ought to have conducted separate trials-within-trial for the two extra-judicial statements, the issue raised in the Respondent’s Notice and the arguments in support thereof are not dependent on the appeal and cannot be accommodated through a Respondent’s Notice, citing LEE v AJAYI (1970) 1 All NLR 293 at 297-298 and CBN v OCHIFE & ORS (2020) LPELR-52495(CA); and that the Respondent cannot take the advantage (benefit) of the proceedings before the trial Court and come before this Court to find fault with the proceedings on appeal. The Appellant submitted that “the proceedings before the trial Court in the trial within trial were appropriately done and they were not vitiated in any way”; that following the Respondent’s objection to the admissibility of his extra-judicial statements, the procedure laid down by the appellate Courts was complied with in the trial-within-trial leading to instant appeal: the Appellant set the ball rolling by fielding Mustapha Gadanya (PWA) and Rouqayya Ibrahim (PWB) as prosecution witnesses in the trial-within-trial who gave vivid and separate evidence on the circumstances of the recording each of the statements and were thoroughly cross-examined by Respondent’s counsel of the records), just as the Respondent fielded Osagie Enogie (as DWA) and testified for himself as DWB in the trial-within-trial. The Appellant referred to pp. 237-280 of the records and maintained that the voluntariness of each statement was separately tested and considered, as such the Respondent’s Notice and the arguments in support thereof are misconceived; and that MOSES JUA v STATE supra and other cases upon which the Respondent has relied turned on their peculiar facts and are distinguishable from the instant case, citing ANEKWE v STATE supra. The Court was urged to discountenance the Respondent’s Notice.
Resolution of Respondent’s Notice
Now, Order 9 Rule 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules provides that a Respondent who desires to contend on appeal that the decision of the lower Court should be affirmed on grounds other than those relied upon by that Court must give notice to that effect specifying grounds of that contention. This provision makes it clear beyond peradventure that the import of a Respondent’s Notice is not to destroy the Respondent’s victory at the lower Court. Rather, it is aimed at finetuning the decision given by the lower Court by affording the Respondent the opportunity to demonstrate to the appellate Court that there are additional grounds upon which the decision appealed against should be affirmed. A Respondent’s Notice is certainly not an avenue or platform for the Respondent (who should ordinarily drum up support for the decision given in his favour) to argue against the decision of the lower Court. See CBN v OCHIFE & ORS (2020) LPELR-52495(CA). A respondent who intends, for instance, to disrupt the jurisdiction of the trial Court, or to contest the competence of the proceedings leading up to the decision appealed against, or to urge the absence of a fundamental prerequisite, cannot come under this rule. See IN RE CAVANDER’S TRUST (1881) 76 Ch. D 270. In the case at hand, the argument put forward in support of the Respondent’s Notice is that notwithstanding the lower Court’s eventual rejection of the extra-judicial statements dated 24/2/11 and 16/3/11, the failure or neglect to conduct a separate trial-within-trial for each of the two statements rendered the proceedings fundamentally flawed. What the Respondent is saying in essence is that the composite trial-within-trial conducted by the trial Court for the two statements is invalid. This constitutes a challenge to the competence of the trial-within-trial proceedings. A contention aimed at vitiating the proceedings before the trial Court does not lie in a Respondent’s Notice. I reckon that it is if, and only if, the trial-within-trial conducted by the trial Court is valid that the eventual decision reached thereon can be affirmed on other grounds. Not otherwise. Since an invalid proceedings cannot be affirmed, the Respondent’s contention that separate trials-within-trial ought to have been conducted for the two statements is patently inappropriate for a Respondent’s Notice: he can only do so by way of a substantive cross-appeal. See PML (NIG.) LTD v FRN (2017) LPELR-43480(SC), OZURUMBA NSIRIM v AMADI (2016) LPELR-26053 (SC) and EZE & ORS v OBIEFUNA & ORS (1995) LPELR-1191 (SC). The Respondent is certainly not at liberty to impugn the validity of the trial-within-trial in one breadth, and urge this Court to affirm the decision of the lower Court in respect of the same trial-within-trial (rejecting his extra-judicial statements) on other grounds in another breadth. The proper thing to do in the circumstance is to discountenance the Respondent’s Notice dated 1/7/11, and I entertain no reluctance whatsoever in discountenancing it.
Substantive appeal
From the six grounds of appeal contained in the Notice of Appeal dated 30/6/11, the Appellant distilled a sole issue for determination (which was adopted without modification by the Respondent), namely: “Whether the trial Court was right when it held that the confessional statements made by the Respondent on 24th February 2011 and 16th March 2011 were inadmissible in evidence and rejected the statements”. Citing AJIBOYE v FRN [2018] 13 NWLR (PT. 1637) 430 at 462, (2018) LPELR-44468(SC) 1 at 56-57 -per Peter-Odilli JSC, the Appellant submitted that the lower Court’s reliance on alleged denial of legal representation during the making of the statements as basis for rejecting the Respondent’s statements is flawed, insisting that it is not the law or practice that an accused person’s legal representation must be present before a statement from him can be accepted or voluntarily obtained; that the lower Court failed to consider the fact that the statements were recorded in 2011 long before Section 17 (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 (ACJA) was enacted; and even then, the position of this Honourable Court is that the ACJA “cannot regulate admissibility” calling in aid the cases of OGUNTOYINBO v FRN (2018) LPELR-45218 (CA) 1 at 28-31 and NNEOYI ITAM ENANG v THE STATE (Appeal No. CA/C/237C/2078, delivered on 18/10/19, unreported). The Appellant maintained that the voluntariness and admissibility of a confessional statement specifically regulated and “guided solely by the provision of Section 29 of the Evidence Act 2011” but not Section 35 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (CFRN) which was wrongly applied to the circumstances of this case. The Applicant maintained that Section 35(2) CFRN which provides that “any person who is arrested or detained shall have the right to remain silent or avoid answering any question until after consultation with a Legal Practitioner or any other person of his choice” has nothing to do with the admissibility or voluntariness of a confessional statement as it does not in any way provide or suggest that a statement made by a suspect in the absence of a legal practitioner or any other person of his choice is ipso facto inadmissible in evidence or involuntarily made, insisting that where a person thinks that his right under Chapter IV of the Constitution (including 35 (2)) is violated or likely to be violated, Section 46 thereof provides for how he/she can enforce his fundamental right, but not to object to the admissibility or voluntariness of a statement on the basis of alleged non-compliance with the Constitution.
The Appellant further contended that cautionary words (which is part of the Judges’ Rules) administered to the Respondent before he made his statements on 24/2/11 and 16/3/11 afford a wider coverage and safeguard than Section 35(2) CFRN in that whilst the latter only talks about a suspect having the right to refuse to answer any questions until his legal practitioner or other person of his choice is present, the former goes a step further to ensure voluntariness by adding that the suspect may not make a statement whether his legal practitioner or person of his choice is present or not, citing IBRAHIM KAMILA v THE STATE [2018] 8 NWLR (PT. 1621) 252 at 269, (2018) LPELR-43603(SC) 1 at 16; that Exhibit DWB-3 (at p. 199 of the records) reveals that the Respondent had stated under cross-examination before Kolawole J. (now JCA) on 2/5/17 in the initial trial-within-trial that “I do not need a lawyer to make a statement”, thus, the statements are admissible even if Section 35 (2) CFRN were applicable to admissibility or voluntariness of a confessional statement; that the finding that the Appellant (Prosecution) did not deny that the Respondent asked for and was denied access to his legal representation is misconceived in view of the evidence before the trial Court; and that whilst the lower Court took the erroneous view that the Respondent was denied access to his legal practitioner based on his unsubstantiated and/or well debunked claim in respect of the statement of 24/2/11, it was even more erroneous to have rejected the statement of 16/3/11 on the same blanket claim. Calling in aid the decision of the Supreme Court in FRN v DAIRO [2015] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1454) 141 at 191-192, the Appellant contended that a defendant who raises a ground of objection to the voluntariness of his extra-judicial statement the said defendant must stick to that ground, thus the Respondent who had maintained before Kolawole, J (now JCA) that he was “induced, threatened and harassed” to make these same statements of 24/12/11 and 16/3/11 cannot turn round to allege before Ekwo, J. that he was denied legal representation and/or that the statements were dictated to him, insisting that the Respondent ought to have raised that at the earliest opportunity if that was his grouse; and citing BERENDE v FRN [2021] LPELR-54991 (CA) in support of the proposition that it remains the Respondent’s burden to prove the alleged oppression, inducement, threat or harassment. Placing reliance on OFORLETE v STATE [2000] 12 NWLR (PT. 681) 415 at 439, ABADOM v STATE [1997] 1 NWLR (PT. 479) 1 at 20, AWOPEJO v STATE [2000] 6 NWLR (PT. 659) 1 at 20 and IFEAJUNA v IFEAJUNA [1997] 7 NWLR (PT. 513) 405 at 427, the Appellant maintained that prosecution witnesses (PWA and PWB) gave unchallenged evidence at the trial-within-trial which was not dented under cross-examination; and that there was evidence before the lower Court pointing to the voluntariness of the statements, citing OGUNO v STATE [2013] 15 NWLR (PT. 1376) 1 at 31-32 wherein the Supreme Court reiterated the requirements for ascertaining the voluntariness of a confessional statement. The Appellant invited this Court to consider the evidence adduced in the main trial, and the ruling of Kolawole, J. (now JCA) in respect of the previous trial-within-trial in determining this appeal, insisting that the Respondent’s extra-judicial statements of 14/2/11 and 16/3/21 were voluntarily made but wrongly rejected by the lower Court.
Reacting to the Appellant’s submissions, the Respondent urged the Court to discountenance the copious references to the proceedings before Kolawole, J. (now JCA) in the Appellant’s Brief as being of no moment, insisting that this appeal is against the ruling of Ekwo, J. before whom the trial commenced de novo, citing KAJUBO v STATE [1988] 1 NWLR (PT. 73) 721 at 740, (1988) LPELR-1646(SC) 1 at 25 -per Oputa JSC, OMOSAYE v STATE (2014) LPELR-22059(SC) at 37 and EZEOGWUM v C. O. P. (2020) LPELR- 50103(CA) at 47-48; that the evidence on record and applicable law vindicate the findings of the lower Court, and the eventual rejection of the extra-judicial statements is unassailable; that Section 29 of the Evidence Act 2011 places on the Appellant the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a confessional statement was not vitiated, citing the dictum of Pats-Acholonu, JSC in BUHARI v OBASANJO [2005] 12 NWLR (PT. 941) 1 at 295 on what proof beyond reasonable doubt connotes, and insisting that FAWEHINMI v IGP [2002] 7 NWLR (PT. 767) 606 at 681 emphasised the unlawfulness of effecting arrest before investigation. The Respondent maintained that he was denied him the opportunity of engaging counsel of his choice before statements were obtained from him and the Appellant failed to demonstrate the contrary; that not only did the Supreme Court (per Rhodes-Vivour JSC) underscored the imperative of rejecting statements extracted from accused persons in the absence of counsel of their choice in OWHORUKE v C.O.P (2015) 15 NWLR (PT. 1483) 557 at 576, this Court rejected statements made in the absence of counsel in AKAEZE CHARLES v FRN [2018] 13 NWLR (PT. 1635) 50 at 64, paras. C-D and NNAJIOFOR v FRN [2019] 2 NWLR (PT. 1655) 157 at 170; and that it is only the Courts that can protect the Respondent by rejecting statements obtained in breach of the law. The case of FRN v IFEGWU [2003] 15 NWLR (PT. 842) 113 at 184-185 is relied upon. The further submission of the Respondent is that any statement obtained by the use of threat (of whatever kind) or inducement is clearly inadmissible, calling in aid the case of OZAKI v STATE [1990] 1 NWLR (PT. 124) 92 at 112 -per Obaseki, JSC; that the principle (both at common law and under relevant statutory/constitutional provisions) is that any statement extracted involuntarily from an accused person (such as the statements under reference) is inadmissible as a matter of law; that the Appellant’s contention that admissibility of confessional statements is governed exclusively by the Evidence Act is not only simplistic but equally overlooks the supremacy of the Constitution, citing AMINU TANKO v THE STATE (2009) LPELR-3136(SC) at pp. 18-19 and insisting that Section 17 ACJA merely reinforces and complements the provisions of Section 35(2) of the Constitution on treatment of suspects and recording of extra-judicial statements, as such it is immaterial that the rejected statements were made before the ACJA was enacted. The Court was urged to dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the lower Court rejecting the Respondent’s extra-judicial statements.
Resolution of appeal
Now, this appeal is against the ruling delivered on 6/10/20 by Ekwo, J. rejecting the Respondent’s extra-judicial statements dated 24/2/11 and 16/3/11. The point was made at the outset that this matter was previously pending before Kolawole, J. (now JCA) who had admitted these same statements in evidence after conducting a trial-within-trial. But when trial commenced de novo upon reassignment of the case, Ekwo, J. conducted another trial-within-trial and eventually rejected the statements, hence this appeal. In the scheme of adjudication, a trial de novo [or vanire de novo] is “[a] new trial on the entire case – that is, on both questions of fact and issues of law – conducted as if there had been no trial in the first place”. See Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Edition), p. 1544. It connotes that the matter is to be “tried anew as if no trial whatever had been had in the first instance”. See SUNDAY KAJUBO v STATE [1988] 1 NWLR (PT. 73) 721 -per Oputa, JSC. I reckon therefore that the Respondent is on firma terra in urging this Court to discountenance the copious reference made in the Appellant’s Brief to the previous proceedings before Kolawole, J. (now JCA). By Section 46(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, “Evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding, or before any person authorised by law to take it is admissible for the purpose of proving in a subsequent judicial proceeding or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding the truth of the facts which it states, when the witness cannot be called for any of the reasons specified in Section 39, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party: Provided that (a) the proceeding was between the same parties or their representatives in interest; (b) the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross-examine, and (c) the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as in the second proceeding”; whilst Subsection (2) thereof provides that “a criminal trial or inquiry shall be deemed to be a proceeding between the prosecutor and the defendant within the meaning of this section”. Section 39 (to which Section 46(1) refers) provides for the admissibility of written or oral statements of facts in issue or relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or cannot be found, or has become incapable of giving evidence; or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable. Needless to say that none of these conditions are present in the case on appeal, as such the mere fact that the record of proceedings before Kolawole J. (now JCA) was tendered and admitted as Exhibits PWA-2 and DWB-1 at the trial-within-trial before Ekwo J. is of no moment. Other than being used for purposes of cross-examination in order to test the veracity of witnesses, the proceedings before Kolawole J. are patently irrelevant to the proceedings before Ekwo J. and this Court is not at liberty to examine same in determining the admissibility vel non of the Respondent’s extrajudicial statements.
The three modes of evidential proof in a criminal trial are: (a) direct evidence of witnesses; (b) circumstantial evidence; and (c) the confessional statement voluntarily made by a criminal defendant. See OKUDO v THE STATE [2011] 3 NWLR (PT. 1234) 209 at 236, ADIO v THE STATE (1986) 5 SC 194 at 219-220, EMEKA v THE STATE [2002] 14 NWLR (PT. 734) 666 at 683 and OLABODE ABIRIFON v THE STATE [2013] 13 NWLR (PT. 1372) 587 at 596.
A statement made voluntarily by a person suspected to have committed a criminal offence, be it confessional or in denial of the crime with which he is being charged, is admissible. See OKOH v STATE [2014] 8 NWLR (PT. 1410) 502 (SC). The prosecution has the burden of proving the voluntariness of a confessional statement, which is a handy potent tool in its arsenal for proving the offence charged. A free and voluntary confession of guilt made by an accused person, if direct and positive, is sufficient to warrant his conviction without any corroborative evidence insofar as the Court is satisfied as to the truth of the confession. See YESUFU v STATE (1976) 6 SC 167 at 163, IDOWU v STATE (2000) 7 SC (PT 11) 50 at 62 and NSOFOR v STATE [2004] 18 NWLR (PT 905) 292.
The Appellant’s anxiety over the lower Court’s rejection of the Respondent’s extra-judicial statements is therefore perfectly understandable. But the point to underscore is that at the stage a trial Court is invited to determine the voluntariness of an extra-judicial statement that imbeds a confession during a trial within trial, (and ex ipso facto the admissibility vel non of the statement), the Court’s preoccupation is with the integrity of the process by which the statement was made or recorded rather than the truth or otherwise of its content. This much is made abundantly clear by Section 29(3) of the Evidence Act 2011 which provides that:
“(1) In any proceeding, a confession made by a defendant may be given in evidence against him in so far as it is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the Court in pursuance of this section.
(2) If, in any proceeding where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by a defendant it is represented to the Court that the confession was or may have been obtained –
(a) by oppression of the person who made it, or
(b) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession which might be made by him in such consequence, the Court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the Court beyond reasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained in a manner contrary to the provisions of this section.
(3) In any proceeding where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by a defendant, the Court may of its own motion require the prosecution, as a condition of allowing it to do so, to prove that the confession was not obtained as mentioned in either Subsection (2)(a) or (b) of this Section.
(4) Where more persons than one are charged jointly with an offence and a confession made by one of such persons in the presence of one or more of the other persons so charged is given in evidence, the Court shall not take such statement into consideration as against any of such other persons in whose presence it was made unless he adopted the said statement by words or conduct.
(5) In this section “oppression” includes torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use or threat of violence whether or not amounting to torture” (underlining supplied)
In rejecting the Respondent’s extra-judicial statements dated 14/2/11 and 16/3/11, the lower Court ruled thus (at pp. 350-352 of the record of appeal):
“The Prosecution asserts that the alleged denial of access to legal representation when the 2nd Defendant made his statement is not a ground that can vitiate admissibility of an extra-judicial statement as this was not a requirement until the enactment of the ACJA in 2015. I must quickly respond to this that the learned Counsel for the Prosecution is wrong in this regard. His position is not in accord with the provision of Section 35 (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) wherein it stated that: (2) Any person who is arrested or detained shall have the right to remain silent or avoid answering any question until after consultation with a Legal Practitioner or any other person of his choice. Therefore, if any person who is arrested or detained is by virtue of the arrest or detention not allowed to exercise the right to remain silent or avoid answering any question until after consultation with a Legal Practitioner or any other person of his choice, otherwise his constitutional right in that regard has been breached. It was for the Prosecution to show that this right was not breached if they so desire. In this case, it established beyond peradventure by the evidence of PW-A, PW-B, DW-A and DW-B that there was arrest of the 2nd Defendant. It is also established beyond peradventure by the evidence of PW-A and DW-B that there was detention of the 2nd Defendant pending his compliance with the bail terms of the Prosecuting Agency. This means that the circumstances for the application of the provisions of Section 35 (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) had crystallized and ought to have been applied. However, by the oral evidence of PW-A and PW-B, it has been established that the 2nd Defendant was not given the opportunity to consult with a Legal Practitioner or any other person of his choice. It is also established by the evidence that extra-judicial statements obtained by PW-A and PW-B while the 2nd Defendant was alone with them. The learned Counsel for the Prosecution has demonstrated very grave insensitivity to the provision of the groundnorm by saying that denial of access to Legal representation is not a ground that can vitiate admissibility of an extra-judicial statement as this was not a requirement of law until the enactment of the ACJA in 2015. Converse to this postulation, it must be stated that it has always been the requirement of law preserved by the Constitution in successive amendments. The feeling of apprehension and pressure of insecurity that comes with being alone with investigative or interrogative officers is the very reason the law demands that some form of assurances of fairness be made available to the person required to make extra-judicial statement so that he can co-operate and state his side of the matter to the best of his forthrightness. The Prosecution has not denied that the 2nd Defendant demanded for this right and was not obliged. They are rather saying that the right was not necessary. This is unfortunate. A fundamental right cannot except as provided by law be denied any person who is entitled to such right” (underlining supplied).
The trial Court equally held at pp. 353 – 354 of the records that:
“The fundamental requirement of voluntariness in this country must be tied to the provisions of Section 35(2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which is the opportunity to consult with a Legal Practitioner or any other person of his choice. It is the business of the Court to interpret the Constitution and statutes to the extent intended by the legislature and nothing more. Where the Constitution or statute requires that an act must be performed in a certain manner, no person within the bounds of the Constitution or statute would be allowed to outsmart same by advocating any other method. Now, even if the 2nd Defendant signed the cautionary words with both hands, it does not change the fact that before Interrogation he ought to have been given the opportunity to consult with a Legal Practitioner or any other person of his choice.”
The Appellant contends that the decision of the lower is flawed, placing reliance on FRN v AJIBOYE [2018] 13 NWLR (PT. 1637) 430 and insisting that it is neither the law nor practice that an accused person’s legal representative must be present before a statement from him can be accepted as having been voluntarily obtained. In FRN v AJIBOYE supra at 452-453, Sanusi, JSC held thus: “On the alleged absence of his counsel when [the confessional statement] was recorded, that reason is not cogent as it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to record an accused statement (sic) only in the presence of his counsel. The important and essential thing is that words of caution must be administered to the accused person to his understanding and to endorse same before he decided to make the statement. Evidence abounds that the words of caution were duly administered in the exhibits before they were duly signed. The second confessional statement was also made under words of caution and it was also subjected to a trial within trial, conducted by the trial Court before it was admitted in evidence by the trial Court which later found that it was also voluntarily made by the accused/appellant”. And the concurring judgment of Peter-Odili JSC (at p. 462) chipped in that it is not the law or practice that an accused person’s legal representation must be present before a statement from him can be accepted as voluntarily obtained nor is it mandatory that the superior officer who before (sic) the attestation was made must be called in evidence. In effect from the proceedings of the trial-within-trial, not only was the procedure followed, the learned trial Judge was right in his conclusion that the statement was voluntarily made and had to be admitted. See Edoho v. State (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 17 at 51”. What is immediately obvious from the foregoing is that the Supreme Court was confronted in FRN v AJIBOYE supra with whether an accused person’s extra-judicial statement must necessarily be recorded in the presence of his counsel before it can be accepted as having been made voluntarily, which issue was resolved in the negative. The Supreme Court did not consider the legal effect of rebuffing a request by an accused person to consult with his counsel before answering any questions put to him or making a statement, which is what the lower Court was not confronted with in the case that generated the present appeal. To that extent, I hold, with respect, that FRN v AJIBOYE supra is distinguishable.
The Appellant’s contention that admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence is exclusively governed by the Evidence Act loses sight of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 2011 which provides that “nothing in this Act shall preclude the admissibility of any evidence that is made admissible by any other legislation in force in Nigeria”. In law and as in logic, the converse of a proposition commands the same respect as the proposition itself. In different words, the truth of the converse follows from the truth of the proposition itself. Thus, the true import of Section 3 of the Evidence Act is that nothing therein shall preclude the admissibility or inadmissibility of any evidence that is made admissible or inadmissible by any other legislation in force in Nigeria. It is therefore erroneous to contend that admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence is exclusively regulated by the Evidence Act. Depending on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, the Constitution (which is the grundnorm) and other legislation in force in Nigeria enacted by the National Assembly, could impact the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence.
The point to underscore is that Section 35(2) CFRN guarantees the fundamental right of a person arrested or detained to remain silent or not answer any questions put to him until after consultation with a legal practitioner or any other person of his choice. This is a constitutional prescription that cannot be lightly esteemed. Whilst the proposition in AJIBOYE v STATE supra is that absence of counsel per se when an accused person makes an extra-judicial statement will not render the statement inadmissible, I reckon that where there is evidence accepted by the trial Court that an accused person’s request to consult with a legal practitioner or any other person of his choice before answering questions put to him or making a statement was rebuffed by “investigative or interrogative officers”, it seems to me that that would undoubtedly have a bearing on the voluntariness of the statement and therefore its admissibility.
The point has already been made that the burden is on the prosecution to prove the voluntariness of a confessional statement. The admissibility vel non of a confessional statement is largely dependent on the evidence adduced in a trial-within-trial. Once a confessional statement is admitted or rejected following a trial-within-trial proceeding, it becomes very difficult for an appellate Court to intervene in an appeal against its admissibility or rejection as in the instant case. The evaluation of evidence presented at the trial is often based on credibility of witnesses, which is the forte of a trial Court. See RASHEED LASISI v THE STATE NWLR [2013] 9 NWLR (PT. 1358) 74 at 96-97. In the case at hand, the lower Court conducted a trial-within-trial to ascertain the voluntariness of the Respondent’s extra-judicial statements dated 24/2/1 and 16/3/11 and held (at p. 352 of the records) that: “The Prosecution has not denied that the 2nd defendant [Respondent herein] demanded for his right [to consult with a legal practitioner] and was not obliged. They are rather saying that the right was not necessary. This is unfortunate”. The evidence put forward by the Prosecution at the trial-within-trial through PWA (Mustapha Sanni Gadanya) is that he took the 2nd Defendant (Respondent) to the Unit Head (Mr Momokoli) who gave them two seats in front of his desk and they “discussed what transpired and how he (Respondent) was involved in the head of service pension fraud and following that Mr Momokili asked [that] we go down and take his statement. We went down and I instructed Roukaya Ibrahim to take his statement. So he volunteered his statement” (see p. 239 of the records). This circumstance recounted by PWA does not appear to me as one in which the Respondent can be said to have volunteered a statement. Being asked “to go down and take his statement” indicates a command by a person in authority, or at best a demand for a statement from the Respondent. The decision of the Supreme Court in THE STATE v OLASHEHU SALAWU (2011) 12 SCNJ (PT. 11) 554 at 575 donates the proposition that a statement made by an accused person upon demand by a police officer cannot be said to be voluntary, as the demand wholly dissipates the effect of the caution administered by the police. Also, DWA (Osagie Enogie) testified that sometime in March 2011, she was requested by the Respondent to accompany him to the EFCC; they were asked to drop their phones and the Respondent introduced her to an officer as his counsel when they got inside, but the officer said that lawyers are not to be present during investigation and asked her to wait outside, and so she waited outside until they were done with the Respondent. The Respondent (DWB) equally testified that his request to consult with a lawyer before answering questions or making a statement on 24/2/11 was rebuffed. In respect of the second statement, he stated under cross-examination that the lawyer (DWA) who accompanied him to EFCC office on 16/3/11 was asked to remain outside as they do not allow lawyers; and that he was scolded for bringing his lawyer and made to wait till the end of the day to give a statement. A confessional statement recorded in such scenario can scarcely be said to have been voluntarily made.
Conclusion
The point to vigorously underscore is that law enforcers, who are no doubt saddled with an onerous statutory responsibility, must scrupulously observe procedural safeguards required of them, in order to maintain the delicate balance between law enforcement on the one hand, and according due regard and recognition to human rights on the other hand. See ODOGU v A-G, FEDERATION [1996] 6 NWLR (PT. 456) 508. The right to consult with a lawyer or other person of one’s choice before answering questions or making a statement guaranteed under Section 35(2) CFRN is one of such procedural safeguards or rights that cannot be lightly esteemed. Failure to observe the same especially upon request by a suspect (as in the instant case) will impact negatively on the voluntariness of a statement made by the suspect, notwithstanding the administration of words of caution. The Appellant’s contention that the only remedy available to the Respondent in such a situation is to initiate a fundamental right enforcement action seems to me overly misconceived. All authorities, including the judiciary, owe a duty to ensure the observance of the emphatic dictates of the Constitution from which all other laws derive their validity. The Court’s position is crucial in this regard for the purpose of safeguarding constitutional rights through effective intervention whenever, in an appropriate case, it is shown that such rights have been violated. See FRN v IFEGWU [2003] 15 NWLR (PT. 842) 713 at 184-185. The Court, as the ultimate custodian of the rule of law, cannot shut its eyes to constitutional infractions that come to light in judicial proceedings before it. Law enforcers must conduct their investigative activities and operations within the confines of the Constitution and other laws they are required to enforce in order to make law enforcement more effective and effectual. That is to say, law enforcers must observe and ensure the observance of “the law behind the law’ by demonstrating a moral commitment to the very laws they are required to enforce, for without such moral commitment to the law, ‘who will guard the guard, and who will police the police’. See P. O. Affen, The Principles of Fair Hearing and Powers of Arrest and Sanctions by Law Enforcing Agencies in Nigeria, (2009) 2 NJPL 258.
This appeal lacks merit, and I will and do hereby record an order dismissing it without further assurance. The ruling delivered on 16/10/2020 by Ekwo, J. in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CR/297/2015 (rejecting the Respondent’s confessional statements of 24/2/11 and 16/3/11) is accordingly affirmed.
FATIMA OMORO AKINBAMI, J.C.A.: I have read in draft, the lead judgment of my learned brother, Peter Oyinkenimiemi Affen, JCA, where the facts and issues in contention have been set out.
I am in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion and adopt the judgment as mine. I have nothing extra to add.
ABUBAKAR MAHMUD TALBA, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft, the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, P. O. AFFEN, JCA. I concur with the reasoning and conclusion reached.
The appeal is against the ruling delivered on 6/10/2020 by Ekwo J. he rejected the respondent’s extra-judicial statements dated 24/2/2011 and 6/3/2011. The appellant placed heavy reliance on the fact that the matter was previously pending before Kolawole J. (now JCA) who had admitted these same statements in evidence after conducting a trial within trial. But when trial commenced de novo upon reassignment of the case Ekwo J conducted a trial-within-trial and he rejected these statements hence this appeal. It should be noted that once a trial commences de novo, it is as if there was no trial ab initio. There is no basis either in law or in fact to make reference to the earlier trial which was aborted.
In rejecting the extra-judicial statements, the learned trial Judge placed reliance on Section 35(2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which provides that:
“any person who is arrested or detained shall have the right to remain silent or avoid answering any question until after consultation with a legal practitioner or any other person of his choice.”
The appellant denied the respondent the right to consult with his legal practitioner upon his demand to do so before obtaining the extra-judicial statements. The appellant claimed that it was not necessary for the respondent to consult with his legal practitioner before obtaining the said statements. The appellant acted in clear breach of the provision of the Constitution and therefore it affects the voluntariness of the statements. The learned trial Judge was right when he rejected the statements.
It is for the forgoing and more detailed reasons contained in the lead judgment, that I too dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit. I abide by the consequential orders in the lead judgment.
Appearances:
O. A. Atolagbe, Esq. with him, O. D. Mese, Esq. and H. T. Adebiyi, Esq. For Appellant(s)
Oluwole Aladedoye, Esq. with him, M. D. Ojo, Esq. For Respondent(s)
