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FRED EGBE V. ALHAJI ABUBAKAR ALHAJI & ORS.(1990)

FRED EGBE V. ALHAJI ABUBAKAR ALHAJI & ORS.

In The Supreme Court of Nigeria

On Friday, the 2nd day of March, 1990

SC.189/1986

 

JUSTICES

MOHAMMED BELLO    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

ANDREWS OTUTU OBASEKI    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

AUGUSTINE NNAMANI    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

MUHAMMADU LAWAL UWAIS    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

ADOLPHUS GODWIN KARIBI-WHYTE    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

SALIHU MODIBBO ALFA BELGORE    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

PHILLIP NNAEMEKA-AGU    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

 

FRED EGBE  Appellant(s)

AND

  1. ALHAJI ABUBAKAR ALHAJI
    2. ALHAJI M. D. YUSUF
    3. MR. S. A. OJOMO Respondent(s)

RATIO

THE PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE SUPREME COURT WILL DEPART FROM AND OVERRULE ITS DECISION

Next, the Appellant has canvassed that the decision in Fred Egbe v. Justice Adefarasin & Anor. (supra) should be overturned in favour of the decision in Nwankwere’s case (supra). As already shown, there is a clear distinction between the facts in the former case and the latter case. Neither evidence nor admission of the malice or bad faith alleged by the Appellant in his pleadings – statement of claim and reply – has satisfactorily been shown by the Appellant. Since both cases are by their facts different and the decisions in them were based on different circumstances, the ground on which they can be said to be in conflict has not been established. No foundation has therefore been laid, for us to depart from the decision in Fred Egbe v. Justice Adefarasin & Anor. (supra) – See Mrs. Bucknor-Maclean & Anor. v.  Inlaks Ltd. (1980) 8-11 S.C. 1 at pp.23-25; Nofiu Surakatu v. Nigeria Housing Development Society Ltd. (1981) 4 S.C. 26; Oduola & Ors v Coker & Ors. (1981) 5 S.C. 179; Bronik Motors Ltd. v. Wema Bank Ltd. (1983) 6 S.C. 158 at p.298.[1983] SCNLR 296 and Akinsanya v U.B.A. Ltd. (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.35) 273 at p.323, where I said –
“The principle on which this Court will depart from and overrule its decision has been well stated in a number of cases. The underlying consideration being that the decision has been impeding the proper development of the law or has led to results which were unjust or which are contrary to public policy.” PER UWAIS, J.S.C.

THE OPINION OF THE COURT WHEN A DEFENDANT APPEARS TO BE ACTING AS A MEMBER OF A PUBLIC BODY UNDER STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND PLEADS THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES PROTECTION ACT

In my opinion, when a defendant appears to be acting as a member of a public body under statutory authority and pleads the Public Authorities Protection Act, the plaintiff can defeat that claim by proving on sufficient evidence that the defendant was not really intending to act in pursuance of the statutory authority, but was using his pretended authority for some improper motive, such as spite, or a purpose entirely outside statutory justification. When defendants are found purporting to execute a statute, the burden of proof in my opinion is on the plaintiffs to prove the existence of the dishonest motives above described and the absence of any honest desire to execute the statute, and such existence and absence should only be found on strong and cogent evidence.” Greer, L.J. had only this to say at p.444:
“If this opinion is correct it is unnecessary to consider the protection afforded by the Public Authorities Protection Act, but if I should be wrong in holding that there was no cause of action, the question whether they are so protected would arise. In my judgment they would be so protected, because they were acting in intended execution of the Stepney Electricity Order, in as much as they were endeavouring to secure a continuance of the supply of electric light for their borough, and they were also acting in intended execution of their public duty as members of the Council and representatives of the people of the borough. I do not think it follows from the fact that they knew that the necessary result would be that the corporation would be involved in an illegality would prevent the application of S.1 of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893.”PER BELLO, J.S.C.

THE POSITION OF TE LAW WHERE AN ACT WHICH HAS CAUSED DAMAGE IS DONE IN THE PURSUANCE OF ANY LAW OR PUBLIC DUTY

It is the law that where an act which has caused damage is done in the pursuance of any law or public duty an injured party can recover damages or other relief whether the act was done in good faith or not. The arguments of the appellant have not established any case for departing from the decision in Fred Egbe v. Adefarasin (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.3) 549 (supra). It is otherwise where the act is not in pursuance of any law or public duty. PER OBASEKI, J.S.C.

UWAIS, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): On the 20th day of December, 1978, the appellant brought an action for libel in the High Court of Lagos State against the respondents claiming, as per his amended writ of summons, as follows-
“The plaintiff’s claim against the defendants is for the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND NAIRA (N500,000.00) being general and special damages suffered as a result of a conspiracy by the defendants and a libel of the plaintiff by the first and second defendants in a letter dated 21st March, 1978 addressed by the first and second defendants to the Inspector General of Police and repeated by the third defendant to the Commissioner of Police Department on 22nd day of March, 1978.”
The facts of this case, as gathered from the pleadings exchanged by the parties are simple. They are briefly thus. At the time material to this case the Federal Ministry of Trade was made responsible for insurance as a subject, negotiations began between the ministry and an insurance company called American International Insurance Company (Nigeria) Limited to enable the Federal Government to purchase some shares from the company, in addition to those that the Federal Government was previously holding. The plaintiff was the company’s legal adviser. Just before the negotiations to purchase the additional shares were completed, certain information came to the possession of the 1st respondent as permanent secretary to the Federal Ministry of Trade. The 3rd respondent, who was the legal adviser to the ministry, was instructed by the 1st respondent to write a letter to the 2nd respondent, who was then the Inspector General of Police, on the information received. The letter written by the 3rd respondent reads as follows-
FEDERAL MINISTRY OF TRADE,
LEGAL DIVISION,
LAGOS.
21st March, 1978.
The Inspector-General of Police,
Force Headquarters,
Moloney Street,
Lagos.
Report of Investigation into the Activities of American International Insurance Company (Nigeria) Limited (AIIC)
Further to this Ministry’s letter Ref. No. TS.526/Vol.2/315 of 9th March, 1978 on the subject captioned above, I am directed to bring to your attention an information divulged in confidence to the Permanent Secretary that AIIC sometime ago paid the sum of N450,000.00 to Mr. Fred Egbe on behalf of an estate agency company which sum was not guaranteed by any property, real or personal, and no document prepared to show the terms and conditions relating to payment.
2. The name and address of the informant will be furnished on request.
3. Mr. Fred Egbe is the legal adviser of AIIC and a personal friend of Mr. L.D. Lafevre, the managing director. Their relationship appears to have transcended that of lawyer and client.
4. The purpose of this letter is to invite you to investigate this information which if proved to be true; a clear case of stealing would have been established.
(Signed) S.S. Ojomo,
Legal Adviser,
for Permanent Secretary.”
After the exchange of pleadings, the 2nd and 3rd respondents brought a motion in the High Court on the 15th day of February, 1984, pursuant to the provisions of order 22 rules 3 and 4 of the High Court of Lagos Civil Procedure Rules, 1972 praying that court to dismiss the plaintiffs action on, inter alia, the following grounds-
“(a) That the 2nd defendant/applicant was at the material time a public officer under the Public Officers Protection Law, (Cap.114) of Laws of Lagos State, (1973) and the Permanent Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Trade.
(b) (i) That the 3rd defendant/applicant was at the material time a public officer under the Public Officers Protection Law (Cap. 114) of Laws of Lagos State (1973) and the Inspector General of Police.
(ii)………………………..
The motion was heard by Olusola Thomas J. who, in his ruling dismissing it, observed thus-
“In the matter before me, the plaintiff’s case as can be gathered from his pleadings is that the two defendants falsely conspired to accuse him with criminal offence or offences and further published a libelous letter which injured his character, credit and reputation in the way of his occupation or employment. On the face of the pleadings, these acts constituting the cause of action may possibly have been done not in pursuant of any law or public duty and not in respect of execution of alleged neglect or default of such laws or public duty. The acts cannot therefore be presumed to have been so done or intended under the law. The issue will remain unsolved until evidence from either or both parties is adduced at the trial.”
After adverting to the English decisions in Cross v. Rix 29 T.L.R. 85 and Scamell & Nephew Ltd. v. Hurley (1929) 1 K.B. 419 and the Nigerian decisions in I.G.P. v. Olatunji, 21 N.L.R. 52 and Godwin Nwakwere v. Joseph Adewunmi, 1967 N.M.L.R. 45, learned trial Judge concluded the ruling as follows –
“The principle running through the gamut of these authorities, foreign and local, is that where the act of a person claiming to be entitled to protection under section 2(a) of Cap. 114 is shown to be apparently illegal, it is a question of fact whether the illegal act was done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority. The court must receive evidence from either or both parties in order to determine whether the person is so protected. It will be absurd law, other than the limitation law prescribing period of action for different actions where every injuria, that is, an infringement of another’s legal right; whether justified or not by law or duty shall be given a blanket cover of immunity. The defendant’s application is misconceived. It is dismissed and the costs shall be in the cause.”
Aggrieved by the ruling, the 1st and 2nd respondents appealed against it, to the Court of Appeal. Upholding the appeal by reversing the decision of the High Court, Kutigi J.C.A. (with whom Ogundere and Kolawole JJ.C.A. agreed) stated as follows –
“All that the respondent says is that the appellants were actuated by malice or bad faith and that they have no protection under section 2(a) of Cap. 114. This is certainly not acceptable. “Malice” or “bad faith” should not be imported or read into the section.
It is also clear from the pleadings that the appellants committed the act complained of on 21/3/1978 and the respondent filed his writ of summons in respect thereof on 20/12/78 a period of about nine months. I agree with Chief Sowemimo that the action against the appellants was statute barred and that the respondent has lost his cause of action,Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C., succinctly put it in Egbe v. Adefarasin (supra) at p.568 thus-
The general principle of law is that where the law provides for the bringing of action within a prescribed period, in respect of a cause of action accruing to a plaintiff, proceedings shall not be brought after the time prescribed by statute see Obiefuna v. Okoye (1961) 1 A. N.LR. 357. An action brought outside the prescribed period offends against the provision of the section and does not give rise to a cause of action.”
So it is in this case. Applying the above principles of law to this case it is manifest that the respondent has no cause of action against the appellants having inter alia brought the action after three months from the time the cause of action arose.
For the reasons already stated, this appeal succeeds and it is hereby allowed. The ruling of Olusola Thomas, J., in suit No. LD/1284/78 dated 21st May, 1984 is hereby set aside. The case is accordingly struck out.”
The appeal before us is from that judgment of the Court of Appeal. The notice of appeal contains only one ground of appeal. The ground reads-
“The learned trial (sic) Justice of Appeal erred in law in holding that admittedly malicious actions are protected under section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law Cap. 114.
PARTICULARS
1. A person who acts maliciously cannot under any circumstances be said to have acted ‘in the course of his official duty’ or ‘within his official duty.’
2. The authority of Nwankwere v. Adewunmi 1967 N.M.L.R. at page 45 was misinterpreted by the learned Justices of Appeal in that the court sought to limit the application of that authority to malicious acts regarded as criminal. The defence was raised in civil proceedings in Nwankwere’s case, whilst on the other hand, the actions and motives of the respondents in this appeal are just as criminal as they were in Nwankwere’s case.”
Briefs of argument were filed and exchanged by the parties with the 1st and 2nd respondents filing a joint brief of argument. As discernable from the appellant’s brief of argument, only one question for determination has been formulated by the appellant and it reads-
“The question that arises for determination in this appeal is that since all three defendants have now admitted that their actions were conspiratorial and malicious see Foko v. Foko & Ors. (1968) N.M.L.R. at 441, can they still claim protection under the statutory defence enshrined in the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap.114″
The respondents pose in their different briefs questions for determination which are wider in scope than the sole question contained in the appellant’s brief. The joint brief of the 1st and 2nd respondents poses three questions, viz-
(i) Whether the plaintiff/appellant’s action is maintainable given the fact that it was brought outside the three months period of limitation prescribed in the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap.114, Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria. As a coronary to this main question, two further questions which need to be resolved are:-
(ii) Whether it is open to a court to conduct an investigation into the motives of the defendants/respondents’ in this case before investing them with the protection of the said Public Officers Protection Law
(iii) Whether the authority of Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (1967) N.M.L.R. 48 is relevant to the facts of the present case”
The 3rd respondent was not a party in the Court of Appeal but has been made so in this appeal. The questions formulated by the 3rd respondent read as follows:
“(a) Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were in error in holding that the plaintiff/appellant has no cause of action against the respondents, having brought the action outside the three months period of limitation prescribed in the Public Officers Protection Laws Cap.114, Laws of the Lagos State of Nigeria.
(b) Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were to inquire into and determine the motives of the defendants/respondents as a prerequisite in availing them the protection of the Public Officers Protection Law Cap.114.
(c) Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were correct in holding that the cases of  I.G.P. v. Olatunji 21 N.L.R. at 52 and Nwankwere v. Adewunnmi (1967) N.M.L.R. 48 are not relevant in the determination of the present case.
It is settled practice that questions for determination must be related to the ground or grounds of appeal filed in any appeal. See A-G., Anambra State v. Onuselogu Enterprises Ltd. (1987) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt.66) 547; Oniah v. Onyia (1989) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt.99) 514 at p.527; Osinupebi v. Saibu (1982) 7 S.C. 104 at p.110; Western Steel Works Limited v. Iron & Steel Workers Union of Nigeria (1987) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt.49) p.304; Ugo v. Obiekwe (1989) 1 N.W.L.R (Pt.99) 566 at p.580 and Okpala v. Ibeme (1989) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt.102) 208 at p.220. In the present case, it appears to me that the questions framed by the 3rd respondent are more comprehensive and, therefore, preferable. Consequently, I adopt them for the purpose of determining this appeal.
The gravamen of the appellant’s contention both or any and in his brief is that a public officer cannot benefit from the protection afforded by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law. Cap. 114 of the Laws of Lagos, 1973, if it is shown that the public officer acted maliciously or in bad faith. This interpretation of section 2(a) of the Law is supported by the decision of this court in Nwankwere’s case (supra) and the decision in the English case of Scamen & Nephew Ltd. v. Hurley (supra).
However, in the case of Fred Egbe v. Hon. Justice Adefarasin & Anor. (1985) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt.3) 549 the Supreme Court contrarily held that when the protection under the law is invoked, the question whether the act which the plaintiff complains of was performed maliciously or in bad faith is irrelevant. Thus, there is a conflict between the two decisions of this court. The appellant, therefore, submitted that the decision in Fred Egbe v. Hon Justice Adefarasin & Anor, is questionable and unreliable on the interpretation of section 88(1) of the High Court Law of Lagos State and section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Law, Cap.114. He therefore urged us to hold that malice vitiates the defence under section 2(a) of the Public Officer’s Protection Law. Learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents, Mr. Seyi Sowemimo, contends in his brief of argument that it is clear from the actions based on the letter which was alleged to be libellous, that the respondents acted in pursuance or intended pursuance of their public duties. He submitted that the respondents qualified for the protection accorded to public officers by the Public Officer’s Protection Law, Cap. 114 and since the appellant’s action was brought after the expiration of three months prescribed by the law, the action was statute barred by virtue of the provisions of section 2(a) of the law. Learned counsel relied on the decision of this court in Fred Egbe v. Hon. Justice Adefarasin & Anor. (supra) to submit that the decisions in the cases of Nwankwere (supra) and I.G.P. v. Olatunji (supra) which established that motive of the public officer’s action is to be determined before it can be decided that the protection under the law is available to the public officer, are irrelevant once the defence set up by the public officer is unanswerable. He canvassed that malice or bad faith should not be imported when interpreting the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officer’s Protection Law, Cap.114 and that the section should be given its ordinary meaning. He buttressed the argument by quoting page 117 of Craises on Statute Law, 7th Edition. Learned counsel further submitted that this court should not depart from its decision in Fred Egbe v. Hon. Justice Adefarasin & Anor. because no basis has been established by the appellant to justify the departure. He cited Yonwuren v. Modern Signs Nig. Ltd. (1985) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt.2) 244 at p. 251 per Kazeem, J.S.C., in support of the submission.
Finally, learned counsel for the 3rd respondent argued in the 3rd respondent’s brief and made submissions which are almost on all fours with the argument advanced by learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents. In addition, learned counsel drew attention to the fact that in Fred Egbe v. Hon. Justice Adefarasin & Anor. (supra), the 1st respondent therein was, as a Judge, entitled to both the protections afforded by section 88(1) of the High Court Law and section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap.114, whilst the 2nd respondent therein, as Director of Public Prosecutions, was only entitled to the defence under section 2(a) of the Public Officers Law, Cap. 114.
Section 2(a) of the Public Officer’s Protection Law, Cap.114 of the Laws of Lagos State, 1973, as relevant, reads thus-
“2. Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect –
(a) the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury within three months next after the ceasing thereof;
Now a careful perusal of the section will show that its provisions apply to an action being brought against a public officer in relation to any act done by the public officer either-
(a) In pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law; or
(b) In pursuance or execution or intended execution of any public duty or authority; or
(c) In respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any law, duty or authority.
If the action is brought or commenced after the expiration of three months after the commission of the act being complained against, then the action –
(i) Cannot be instituted; and
(ii) If instituted shall not lie against the public officer.
The same applies to any prosecution or other proceedings against a public officer for any act committed by the public officer in any of the circumstances enumerated under (a) or (b) or (b) above.
Does a proper interpretation of the section then permit or admit allegation of malice or bad faith This question was answered in the affirmative in the cases of I.G.P. v. Olatunji 21 N.L.R. 52, by Ademola, J. (as he then was) and Godwin Nwankwere v. Joseph Adewunmi (1967) N.M.L.R. 45 at p.48 decided by this court. In Olatunji’s case (supra) the protection under the law (ordinance) was raised as a preliminary objection before any evidence was heard in the case and the trial Magistrate Grade 1, upheld the objection. On appeal to the High Court, Ademola, J., (as he then was) relied on English authorities, namely, Morgan v. Palmer (1824) 2 B & C 729; Irving v. Wilson (1791) 4 Term Rep: 485; Pearson v. Dublin Corporation (1907) A.C. and Scammell & Nephew Ltd. v. Hurley (1929) 1 K.B. 429 and the then Gold Coast (i.e. Ghana) case of Commissioner of Police v Dennis, (unreported) judgment delivered by McCarthy and Turbett, JJ., to hold that to claim the protection under section 2(a), the public officer must have done the act complained of in good faith and there can be no bona fides in the commission of a fraudulent or malicious act. In Nwankwere’s case, the action was instituted in a Magistrate’s Court. Evidence adduced by both the plaintiff and the respondent was heard by the Magistrate before he gave judgment for the plaintiff. The respondent Nwankwere appealed from the decision to the High Court (Duffus, J.). The protection under section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law was not mentioned or raised before the trial Magistrate but on appeal to the High Court. In his judgment dismissing the appeal, Duffus. J. relied on the decision in Scammel & Nephew Ltd. v. Hurley (supra) to hold that-
“To require the protection of the Public Authorities Protection Act, the acts must be acts not authorised by any statute or legal justification, but acts intended to be done in pursuance or execution of some statute or legal power.”
And when Nwankwere appealed further to this court (Bren. Onyeama and Coker. JJ.S.C.), the court dismissed the appeal holding that-
“We agree with Duffus, J., in regarding that passage (in Scammell & Nephew v. Hurley) as applying to the Public Officers Protection Law. The law is designed to protect the office that acts in good faith and does not apply to acts done in abuse of office and with no semblance of legal justification, if the plaintiff’s story was true, the defendant did not purport to be acting in the execution of any public duty.”
It is pertinent to mention that in both the English cases of Pearson v. Dublin Corporation (supra) and Scammell & Nephew v. Hurley (supra), full trial took place in the lower courts and evidence was adduced by the parties therein. The relevant provisions of Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 were raised at the hearing of the cases.
Now, in Fred Egbe v. Justice Adefarasin & Another (supra) (1985) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt.3) 549, the plaintiff after instituting the action, filed his statement of claim. The defendants before filing their statements of defence brought an application under inter alia, order 22 rule 4 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap.52 of the Laws of Lagos State, 1973 praying that the endorsement to the writ of summons be struck out and the action be dismissed on the ground that the 1st defendant, as a Judge, was protected from the action under the provisions of section 88(1) of the High Court Law, Cap.52 of the Law of Lagos State, 1973 and section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap.114; and secondly, the 2nd defendant, as Director of Public Prosecutions, was protected under the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. 114. The application was heard and the prayers were granted by the trial Judge who, consequently, dismissed the action in limine. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the trial Judge arguing that the protection under section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law could not avail the 2nd defendant because, he, like the 1st defendant, acted maliciously and in bad faith. The appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal and the plaintiff appealed further to this court. In again dismissing the appeal, this court held (per Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C) as follows on p.569-
“Again where the defendant has raised an unanswerable plea or protection under the Public Officers Protection Law on the uncontested facts as 2nd respondent has done in this case, there is absolutely no basis for prying into the conduct of such a defendant which gave rise to the action. The Court of Appeal need not have gone into the question of whether malice was a relevant consideration in determining the liability of the 2nd respondent. The issue before the court was whether the action was maintainable. It is not whether the 2nd respondent was liable ….. As I have already stated, there was no cause of action against the 2nd respondent in respect of which he is answerable to the appellant.  The cases of Inspector-General of Police v. Olatunji (supra) and Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (1967) N.M.L.R. at p.45 are irrelevant to the determination of this appeal.”
From the foregoing, it is clear that whilst the decisions in the cases of Olatunji (supra) and Nwankwere (supra), that malice or bad faith would vitiate protection under section 2(a) of the Public Officer’s Protection Law, Cap.114, it was decided in Fred Egbe v. Justice Adefarasin & Anor., that it would not if the defence was raised in limine, that is before evidence was heard in the case because at that stage, the issue is not whether the defendant is liable of the action but whether the action is at an maintainable against the defendant.
The appellant has argued that since the application in the present case to dismiss the action was brought in the High Court under the provisions of Order 22 rule 4 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap.52, the respondents were taken to have admitted the averment in his statement of claim to the effect that they acted maliciously in conspiring to libel him in the letter copied earlier in this judgment. He relied on the decision in Foko & Ors v. Foko & Ors. (1968) NMLR 441 in support of the argument. (As a matter of interest, the same submission was made in the case of Fred Egbe v. Justice Adefarasin & Anor. (supra) See p.559). I do not think that the appellant is right in stating that by making the application under order 22 rule 4, the respondents have admitted malice. Order 22 rule 4 reads-
“4. The Court or Judge in chambers may order any pleading to be struck out, on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or answer, and in any such case or in case of the action or defence being shown by the pleadings to be frivolous or vexatious, the court or a Judge in chambers may order the action to be stayed or dismissed, or judgment to be entered accordingly, as just.”
Rule 1 of the same order provides “No demurrer shall be allowed.” This makes the provisions of order 22 markedly different from those of order 28 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules Cap.211 of the Laws of Nigeria, 1948 which made demurrer applicable. Order 28 rules 1 and 2 of the latter rules read –
“1. Where a defendant conceives that he has a good legal or equitable defence to the suit, so that even if the allegations of the plaintiff were admitted or established, yet the plaintiff would not be entitled to any decree against the defendant, he may raise this defence by a motion that the suit be dismissed without any answer upon questions of fact being required from him.
2. For the purposes of such application, the defendant shall be taken as admitting the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations, and no evidence respecting matters of fact, and no discussion of questions of fact, shall be allowed.”
Although the provisions of Order 22 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap.44 of the Laws of Western Region of Nigeria, 1959 are the same as those of Order 22 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap.52, the decision in Foko’s case (supra), at p.445 thereof, was based on the decision in Adewale Fashalu v. Governor, Western Region & Anor. (1956) WRNLR 138 at p.140, which in turn was based on the provisions of Order 28 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap. 211, which allowed demurrer. As there is no provision for demurrer under the High Court of Lagos (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap. 52 and indeed under Order 22 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap.44 of the Laws of Western Region, 1959, the trial Judge in Foko’s case (supra) was in error to have held that by applying under Order 22 the defendants were taken to have admitted the averments in the statement of claim. Accordingly, the Appellant’s submission that the respondents are deemed to have admitted malice since they made their application to dismiss his action under Order 22 rule 4 of the High Court of Lagos (Civil Procedure) Rules. Cap.52 is misconceived. There is no such admission.
Next, the Appellant has canvassed that the decision in Fred Egbe v. Justice Adefarasin & Anor. (supra) should be overturned in favour of the decision in Nwankwere’s case (supra). As already shown, there is a clear distinction between the facts in the former case and the latter case. Neither evidence nor admission of the malice or bad faith alleged by the Appellant in his pleadings – statement of claim and reply – has satisfactorily been shown by the Appellant. Since both cases are by their facts different and the decisions in them were based on different circumstances, the ground on which they can be said to be in conflict has not been established. No foundation has therefore been laid, for us to depart from the decision in Fred Egbe v. Justice Adefarasin & Anor. (supra) – See Mrs. Bucknor-Maclean & Anor. v.  Inlaks Ltd. (1980) 8-11 S.C. 1 at pp.23-25; Nofiu Surakatu v. Nigeria Housing Development Society Ltd. (1981) 4 S.C. 26; Oduola & Ors v Coker & Ors. (1981) 5 S.C. 179; Bronik Motors Ltd. v. Wema Bank Ltd. (1983) 6 S.C. 158 at p.298.[1983] SCNLR 296 and Akinsanya v U.B.A. Ltd. (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.35) 273 at p.323, where I said –
“The principle on which this Court will depart from and overrule its decision has been well stated in a number of cases. The underlying consideration being that the decision has been impeding the proper development of the law or has led to results which were unjust or which are contrary to public policy.”
What has emerged from all that has been stated above may be summarized as follows. In a civil action, where the defendant invokes, in limine, the procedure under Order 22 rule 4 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules. Cap.52, to claim protection under section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law. Cap.114 (which is, indeed. a defence by way of limitation of action; it is, as laid down in Fred Egbe v. Justice Adefarasin & Anor (supra). not proper for the trial Court to infer or conclude from the pleadings that the protection afforded the defendant by the law. has been vitiated by malice or bad faith. For what the trial court is obliged to decide at that stage is whether the action is maintainable and not whether the defendant is liable. The proof of liability can only come about after evidence in support of the pleadings has been adduced by the parties or the plaintiff, as the case may be. The defendant has of course, the burden to show, at the time of making the application under Order 22 rule 4, that the cause of action arose from or the act complained of was carried out, in the course of performance of his duty and that the action was not instituted before the expiration of the three months prescribed by the Public Officers Protection Law.
On the other hand, where the protection under section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. 114 is pleaded and evidence has been led by the parties, then the trial court is entitled to examine the facts and the circumstances under which the cause of action or the act complained of was performed, in order for it, in determining liability, to decide whether the protection has been vitiated by malice or bad faith. This is the ratio decidendi in Nwankwere’s case as decided by this Court and is also the ratio decidendi in the English authorities cited in Olatunji’s case, namely, Pearson v. Dublin Corporation, (supra) and Scammell & Nephew v. Hurley (supra). Hence, the absence of conflict between the different decisions of this Court in the cases of Nwankwere and Fred Egbe v. Justice Adefarasin & Anor.
In the result, this appeal has failed and it is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is hereby affirmed with N500.00 costs to each set of the respondents.

BELLO, C.J.N: I agree with the conclusion of my learned brother, Uwais, J.S.C. that the appeal should be dismissed. I endorse the order as to costs.
The facts of the case and the submissions of Counsel have been fully considered by Uwais, J.S.C. I do not intend to repeat them. I shall only deal with the apparent inconsistency in the decision of the former Supreme Court in Inspector-General of Police v. Olatunji (1955) 21 NLR 52 and of this Court in Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (1967) NMLR 45 which decided that a public officer could not benefit from the protection afforded by section 2(a) of the Public Officer’s Protection Law, if it was shown that the public officer had acted maliciously or in bad faith, and the decision in Egbe v. Justice Adefarasin (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.3) 549 which decided that once the protection accorded by the section was invoked, the question whether the act complained of had been done maliciously or in bad faith was irrelevant.
For the resolution of the apparent conflict, I consider it necessary to examine the very foundation upon which the decision in each case was predicated. Inspector-General of Police v. Olatunji (Supra) was a criminal case in which the accused who was a public officer was charged with the offences of abuse of office under section 104 of the Criminal Code and also with contempt of court under section 21 of the Native Courts Ordinance, Cap. 142, 1948 Laws of Nigeria. The Magistrate did not hear evidence but dismissed the summons on the ground that the prosecution was not commenced within three months as required by the Public officers Protection Ordinance, Cap. 186, 1948 Laws of Nigeria.
In allowing the appeal and remitting the case to the court below for trial, Ademola, J. stated:
“The allegation against the accused respondent in the present appeal was that he has acted in abuse of the authority of his office. On the strength of all the authorities I have referred to, I am of the view that the learned Magistrate was wrong in not hearing evidence in the case and in holding that the accused respondent can rightly claim the protection of the Ordinance.
I therefore allow this appeal. I hereby order that the case be remitted to the court below and that the trial be re-opened: that the charges be determined on the basis that the Public Officer’s Protection Ordinance is inapplicable to the case.”
It may be observed that although the report did not state the duty of the public officer for the performance of which the Magistrate afforded him the protection of the Ordinance, a reasonable tribunal may rightly infer that whatever was his public duty, the commission of criminal offences could not be done “in pursuance or execution of any Ordinance or Law or of any public duty” as envisaged by the Ordinance. Accordingly, one may rightly conclude that Ademola J. held that the Ordinance was inapplicable because the accused could not have committed the alleged crimes in the lawful execution of his public duty.
The five authorities upon which Ademola J. based his judgment were referred to in his judgment. I shall consider each one. In the case of Morgan v. Palmer (1824) 2 B & C 729, bad faith was not in issue. For 65 years publicans had been paying 4 shillings fee annually to Mayors for licensing public houses. The plaintiff sued the defendant, who was a Mayor and a Justice of Peace, for the refund of the fee on the ground that there was no statutory basis for it. The defendant pleaded the Act, 43 G.3 C.99, which required a prior notice to be given before commencing an action against a Justice of the Peace for any thing done by him. It was held since the fee was given to the defendant in his capacity as the Mayor and not as a Justice of Peace, the Act was inapplicable.
Irving v Wilson (1971) 4 Term. Rep. 485 was a case of extortion in which Custom Officers had seized goods as forfeited which were not liable for seizure and later took money from the owner and released the goods. In an action to recover the money, it was held a month’s notice needed not to be given to the officers under the 23 G.3, C. 70.
Again, in Pearson v. Dublin (1907) A.C. 351, the cause of action was in respect of a fraud arising out of a private contract and consequently the defence under the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, that the action was instituted outside the 6 months, was over-ruled on the ground that the action was not brought before any act done in pursuance of any public duty or authority” as required by the Act.
Scammell and Nephew Ltd. v Hurley (1929) 1 K.B. 419 was complicated. The plaintiffs were entitled to receive electricity from Borough Council but were deprived due to strike. They sued the defendants, the Borough Electricity Supply Committee, for damages accusing the Committee of conspiracy with Trade Union to discontinue supply of electricity to the plaintiffs. The defendants denied and pleaded the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893.
At the trial, it was proved to quote from the report at p.419;
“They (the defendants), discussed the position with the Trades Union Council, and eventually resolved that if the union workers would continue the supply of light they would abandon the supply of power. The result of this was that the supply of power to the plaintiffs, as to another occupier of premises in the borough, was discontinued, whereby the plaintiffs suffered damage. The jury found that the defendants in making the agreement whereby power was not supplied to the plaintiffs were not acting in good faith and in the honest belief that they were carrying out their statutory duties, and that they were actuated by an indirect motive to injure the plaintiffs and to further the interests of those taking part in the strike. Upon these findings, judgment was entered for the plaintiffs.”
On appeal, it was held that there was no evidence to support the findings of the jury and that the acts and neglects complained of were done in the execution of statutory duties and the defendants were entitled to the protection of the Act. It follows therefore that although, bad faith was put in issue, to wit the alleged conspiracy, it was not proved.
It appears the peroration of Scrutton, L.J. which may be regarded as an obiter dictum, went beyond the ratio decidendi of the case. The learned Lord Justice opined at pp.427 to 429:
“The Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, is wanted only if the acts complained of are illegal. It may be an answer to the action that those acts were legal, or gave no cause of action; but it is unnecessary to consider this if though the acts were illegal, they are acts in respect of which an action can only lie if brought within the statutory limit of time, in this case six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of. To require the application of the Public Authorities Protection Act, the acts must be acts not authorized by any statute or legal justification, but acts intended to be done in pursuance or execution of some statute or legal power. It would appear, therefore, if illegal acts are really done from some motive other than an honest desire to execute the statutory or other legal duty and an honest belief that they are justified by statutory or other legal authority; if they are done from a desire to injure a person or to assist some person or cause without any honest belief that they are covered by statutory authority, or are necessary in the execution of statutory authority, the Public Authorities Protection Act is no defence, for the acts complained of are not done in intended execution of a statute, but only pretended execution thereof. In the same way as to “defaults” which in my view cover simple omissions to do something which is required by statute to be done, if it can be proved that the default is the result of the motives or intentions specified above, motives other than the desire and intention to perform statutory duty, the Act would not give protection. But a default in executing the statute from no positive motive or intention, but from simple forgetfulness or ignorance, would not lose the protection of the statute. In my opinion, this represents the law, though there is not at present, much direct case authority for it. In Newell v. Starkie (1), an Irish appeal to the House of Lords, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant did certain acts, apparently in executing a statute, “maliciously,” but gave no evidence of malice, treating the defendant as having the burden of proving that he acted in performance of a statutory duty. An the members of the House agreed that in the acts complained of, being apparently acts in the execution of statutory duty, there was no evidence on which a question could be left to the jury whether the defendant acted maliciously, and therefore outside the protection of the statute; but Lord Finlay went on to say what was presumably not necessary for the decision (2): “The second observation I have to make is that the Act necessarily will not apply if it is established that the defendant had abused his position for the purpose of acting maliciously; in that case he has not been acting within the terms of the statutory or other legal authority; he has not been bona fide endeavouring to carry it out. In such a state of facts, he has abused his position for the purpose of doing a wrong, and the protection of this Act, of course, never could apply to such a case.”
In Selmes v. Judge, (3) surveyors of highways made a rate of an amount not authorized by any Act. Blackburn. J. said (4): “Here, the defendants were surveyors of highways, elected under 5 & 6 Will. 4. C. 50. It is probable that they did not know what was the Act under which they were appointed; but assuredly they intended that everything which they did as surveyors of highways should be done under the authority of the statute under which they were appointed.
The Judge thought that the defendants were not acting under the 5 & 6 Will. 4, C. 50, and that consequently, they were not entitled to the notice of action allowed thereby. I agree that if a person knows that he has not under a statute authority to do a certain thing, and yet intentionally does that thing, he cannot shelter himself by pretending that the thing was done with intent to carry out that statute.”
The defendants were there protected, though they had done a thing unauthorized by any Act, and did not know the terms of any Act authorizing the act they did, because they honestly thought they were carrying out some statutory duty.
Again in Cross v. Rix (1) Ridley, J. said, obiter,  there was an issue of fact as to whether the defendant’s actions were done bona fide in pursuance of a public duty, or were done out of malice or spite,” which must be determined to see whether the Public Authorities Protection Act applied.
In my opinion, when a defendant appears to be acting as a member of a public body under statutory authority and pleads the Public Authorities Protection Act, the plaintiff can defeat that claim by proving on sufficient evidence that the defendant was not really intending to act in pursuance of the statutory authority, but was using his pretended authority for some improper motive, such as spite, or a purpose entirely outside statutory justification. When defendants are found purporting to execute a statute, the burden of proof in my opinion is on the plaintiffs to prove the existence of the dishonest motives above described and the absence of any honest desire to execute the statute, and such existence and absence should only be found on strong and cogent evidence.” Greer, L.J. had only this to say at p.444:
“If this opinion is correct it is unnecessary to consider the protection afforded by the Public Authorities Protection Act, but if I should be wrong in holding that there was no cause of action, the question whether they are so protected would arise. In my judgment they would be so protected, because they were acting in intended execution of the Stepney Electricity Order, in as much as they were endeavouring to secure a continuance of the supply of electric light for their borough, and they were also acting in intended execution of their public duty as members of the Council and representatives of the people of the borough. I do not think it follows from the fact that they knew that the necessary result would be that the corporation would be involved in an illegality would prevent the application of S.1 of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893.”
In his judgment relating to the issue, Sankey, L.J. simply stated “Not only was there no evidence of conspiracy, but in my view also the defendants are protected by the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893.”
The last case relied upon by Ademola. J. was Commissioner of Police v. Deniss, Gold Coast, 29th March, 1941 (unreported) in which it was held the accused could not be protected by the Gold Coast Public Officers Protection Ordinance for the crime of “theft.”
It now remains to consider Nwankere v. Adewumi (supra) where a public officer, Vehicle Inspection Officer, laid a motor vehicle off the road and impounded its certificate of road-worthiness. He inspected the vehicle and after certain repairs required by him had been done, he declared it roadworthy but refused to issue a certificate of roadworthiness until a bribe was given to him. The owner sued for wrongful detention of the vehicle. The Magistrate awarded N300 damages. The defence under section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law was raised for the first time at the hearing of the appeal in the High Court which it dismissed. In upholding the decision of the High Court, on further appeal, this court said.
“The Law (The Public Officers Protection Law) is designed to protect the officer acts in good faith and does not apply to acts done in abuse of office and with no semblance of legal justification; if the plaintiff’s story was true the defendant did not purport to be acting in the execution of any public duty.” (Bracket mine)
The decision of the court is clear that the cause of action was not based on the lawful act of the Vehicle Inspection Officer for inspection of the vehicle and causing its repairs but for its wrongful detention for the purpose of obtaining a bribe, which was a criminal offence that could not have been committed in the execution of his public duty.
It is clear from the ratio decidendi of the foregoing cases, except that of Morgan v Palmer (supra) and Scammell v Hurley (supra), the bad faith in each case which was held to be unprotected by the relevant statute was the commission of a criminal offence which could not have been committed in pursuance or execution of the lawful duty of each public officer. Consequently, the rationale for the non-application of the relevant statute is that in all the cases the offences were committed outside the scope of the lawful duties of the public officers concerned. As I have earlier shown, bad faith was not in issue in Mortan v Palmer (supra) while in Scammell v Hurley (supra) there was allegation of bad faith, conspiracy, which was not proved.
I now come to consider Egbe v Adefarasin and Anor. (supra). In the lead judgment, Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. stated the facts and circumstances of the case as follows at pp. 554 and 555:
“This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal Division, Lagos. Appellant, a Legal Practitioner, residing at Plot 197, Adeleke Adedoyin Street, Victoria Island, Lagos issued a writ of summons claiming the following declarations-
“1. The document of consent dated 11th October, 1978 issued by the 1st defendant for the criminal prosecution of the plaintiff is illegal and void.
2. The said document was issued maliciously.
3. The preferment of Charge No. LCD/24/78 – The State v. Fred Egbe by the 2nd defendant in furtherance of the said charge are illegal and void.”
The 1st defendant is and was at an material times the Chief Judge of Lagos State, whereas the 2nd defendant is now a Judge of the High Court of Lagos State, but was at the material time the Director of Public Prosecutions in the Ministry of Justice of Lagos State. Both defendants are therefore public officers. The 1st defendant, the Chief Judge of Lagos State has given consent to the prosecution of the Appellant of an indictable offence, as is required by Section 340(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. This is undoubtedly a judicial duty done virtue office. The 2nd defendant was at the material time the Director of Public Prosecutions in the Ministry of Justice of Lagos State. It is he who made the application for consent to the 1st defendant. This duty of prosecution is traditionally undertaken by this officer on behalf of the Attorney-General, whose constitutional function it is to undertake prosecution of criminal offences. (See S.191 (1) and (2) Constitution 1979).Again, the application was made in the course of his duties as a public officer. There are averments in the statement of claim alleging bad faith, improper motive and collusion in the application for consent to the prosecution and the giving of the consent between the 1st and 2nd defendants and other who are not parties to the action.”
The judgment was clear that it was on the strength of the facts of the case that this court held that the 2nd respondent was entitled to the protection of the Public Officers Protection Law, the action having not been brought within the prescribed period of three months from the accrual of the cause of action.
In my view, Egbe v Adefarasin & An. (supra) is distinguishable from all the cases, other than Scammell v. Hurley (supra), I have referred to in this judgment. On the face of the writ of summons and the Statement of Claim, and the courts so found, that the acts complained of in Egbe v. Adefarasin were done by the public officers in pursuance and execution of their constitutional and statutory duties. So it was of the public officers in Scammell v. Hurley. In all the other cases I have referred to, the public officers acted outside their lawful duties. It is clear that the cause of action in the Egbe v. Adefarasin arose out of the performance of the duties of the two public officers. The same applies to the cause of action in the case on appeal. Finally, my understanding of the ratio decidendi in Egbe v. Adefarasin may be stated thus: where it is shown that a cause of action arose out of an act done by a public officer in pursuance or execution of his lawful duty, then malice is irrelevant for the purpose of his protection by the law.

OBASEKI, J.S.C.: The appellant was the plaintiff in an action he filed in the Lagos High Court claiming “N500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira Only) general and special damages suffered as a result of a conspiracy by the defendants and a libel of the plaintiff by the 1st and 2nd defendants in a letter dated 21st March, 1978 addressed by the 1st and 2nd defendants to the Inspector-General of Police and repeated by the 3rd defendant to the Commissioner of Police ‘D’ Department on 22nd day of March, 1978.” The respondents contended that the action was barred by section 2(a) of the Public officers Protection Law but were overruled. The appellant was successful in the Lagos High Court but lost in the Court of Appeal as the 3 months bar created by the Public Officers Protection Law Cap 114 Laws of Lagos State 1973 was held to extinguish the right of the appellant to file his action 9 months after the acts complained of.
Dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court of Appeal, he has now appealed to this court raising in his grounds of appeal the following issue:
“Since all three defendants have now admitted that their actions were conspiratorial and malicious (see Foko v. Foko & Ors. 1968 NMLR at 441) can they still claim protection under the statutory defence enshrined in the Public Officers Protection Law Cap. 114”
The 1st and 2nd respondents formulated 3 issues from the ground of appeal and they are as follows:
“whether the plaintiffs/appellant’s action is maintainable given the fact that it was brought outside the three months period of limitation prescribed in the Public Officers Protection Law Cap. 114, Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria. As a corollary to this main question, two further questions which need to be resolved are….
(a) whether it is open to a court to conduct an investigation into motives of the defendants/ respondents in this case before investing them with the protection of the said Public Officers Protection Law
(b) whether the authority of Nwankwere v Adewunmi (1967) NMLR 48 is relevant to the facts of the present case
The third respondent formulated the issues for determination slightly different as follows:
i. whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were in error in holding that the plaintiff/appellant has no cause of action against the respondents having brought the action outside the three months period of limitation prescribed in the Public Officers Protection Laws Cap. 114 Laws of the Lagos State of Nigeria;
ii. whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were to inquire into and determine the motives of the defendants/respondents as a prerequisite in availing them the protection of the Public Officers Protection Law Cap.114;
iii. whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were correct in holding that the cases of the Inspector-General of Police v. Olatunji 21 NLR at 52 and Nwankwerre v. Adewunmi 1967 NMLR 48 are not relevant in the determination of the present case.”
The facts relevant to this appeal have been fully stated and the issues dealt with in detail in the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Uwais, J.S.C. I fully agree with him that there is no merit in the appeal and that the appeal be dismissed.
It is common ground that the three respondents are Public Officers and that the offending letter was written in the course of the official duties and in execution of their duties. Being public officers, the question that arose from the issue joined in the pleading was whether they were entitled to the Protection of the Public Officers Protection Law Cap 114 of the Laws of Lagos State 1973 which they have pleaded in their defence. It was the contention of the appellant that the interpretation of the law in the case of Fred Egbe v. Justice Adefarasin & Anor. (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.3) 549 was in conflict with the interpretation given in Nwankwere v Adewunmi (1967) NMLR 48. The appellant then urged this court in a bitter attack on the case of Fred Egbe v. Hon. Justice Adefarasin (supra) to depart from and overrule that decision. He contended that to avail the defendants of the protection of the Public Officers Protection Law Cap. 114 the defendant must show good faith and absence of malice. The limitation section of the Public Officers Protection Law Cap. 114 is section 2. This section 2 reads:
“Where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect:-
(a) the action prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or in case of a continuance of damage or injury within three months next after the ceasing thereof …………………..”
The decision in Inspector General of Police v. Olatunji 21 NLR 52 delivered by Ademola, J. (as he then was) along with that in Godwin Nwankwere v. Joseph Adewunmi (1967) NMLR 45 at 48 by this court imported the element of bad faith or malice as a requirement that can deprive any public officer of the defence available under the law. This created the necessity for a critical analysis and interpretation of the section.
The appellant cited in support of his contention Scammel & Nephew Ltd. v. Hurley (1929) 1 KB. 419; Godwin Nwankwere v. Joseph Adewunmi (1967) NMLR 45. He maintained that public powers can only be exercised in good faith and in the public interest.
(b) that statutory powers can only be exercised in furtherance of the statutes and in good faith; and that the statutory defence enshrined in the Public Officers Protection Law Cap. 114 as opposed to limitation enactments is available only to persons acting in good faith.
He passionately urged the court not to follow the decision in Egbe v. Adefarasin (supra) decided on the interpretation of section 88(1) of the High Court Law, Cap.52 of the Laws of Lagos State 1973.
The three issues before the court resolve themselves on the correct and proper interpretation of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law Cap. 114.
One of the cardinal principles of interpretation is to give the words of the statute when unambiguous their ordinary grammatical meaning. It is therefore not the function of the court or judge to import words which do violence to the intent and meaning of the statutory provision.
Looking at the provision of section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law Cap. 114, I see no ambiguity. The words are clear and unambiguous.
They deal with
(1) any act done
(a) in pursuance or
(b) execution or
(c) intended execution of any ordinance or law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any neglect; or default in the execution of any such ordinance, law, duty or authority which gives cause for an action or proceeding in a court of law for relief, redress or remedy.
Paragraph (a) of section 2 extinguishes the right of action in prosecution or proceeding unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of and in the case of a continuance of damage or injury within three months next after the ceasing thereof. There is a proviso for the preservation of the right of a convicted prisoner to take out an action, a prosecution or proceeding within 3 months after his discharge from prison custody.
It does not require good faith to avail a defendant the special defence of limitation of action nor does it require malice to deprive him of the defence. Similarly, the right of any person injured or wronged by the act, neglect or default is not extinguished by the good faith of the public officer. If the action, prosecution or other proceeding is brought within three months whether good faith and absence of malice will be a defence depends on the nature of the case.
Any action or prosecution or other proceeding commenced outside the 3 months period is totally barred as the right of the injured person to commence the action, prosecution or proceeding has been extinguished by the law. Indeed, it is proper to say that at that state the person has no cause of action.
Olatunji v. Inspector General of Police 21 NLR 52 and Godwin Nwankwere v. Joseph Adewunmi (1967) 1 NWLR 45 were decided on their peculiar facts. The importation of malice and good faith into the section by the appellant defeats the intention of the law makers and does violence to the section.
It is the law that where an act which has caused damage is done in the pursuance of any law or public duty an injured party can recover damages or other relief whether the act was done in good faith or not. The arguments of the appellant have not established any case for departing from the decision in Fred Egbe v. Adefarasin (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.3) 549 (supra). It is otherwise where the act is not in pursuance of any law or public duty.
The learned trial Judge was therefore wrong to have overruled the objection and rejected the plea. The Court of Appeal was perfectly justified in law to have reversed the decision of the Judge of the High Court and dismiss the action.
The appeal of the appellant to this court lacks merit. The appellant was not only barred from instituting the action but also by virtue of the fact that his action does not lie, he has no cause of action.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed and the decision of the Court of Appeal is hereby affirmed. The respondent will have costs in this appeal fixed at N500.00.

NNAMANI, J.S.C.: I had the preview of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, UWAIS, J.S.C. and I entirely agree with his reasoning and conclusions.
For purposes of this concurring opinion, I shall adopt the facts of this case as set down in my learned brother’s lead judgment except of course what I need for this opinion. It is sufficient to state that in December, 1979, the plaintiff/appellant filed a suit for libel against the respondents in the Lagos State High Court. After pleadings had been ordered and closed, but before any evidence was taken, the 2nd and 3rd respondents brought an application in the Lagos High Court pursuant to order 22 rules 3 and 4 of the High Court of Lagos Civil Procedure Rules, 1972 praying for an order “that the writ of summons and statement of claim herein be struck out on the ground that it discloses no legal cause of action.”
One of the grounds of the prayer was that the 2nd and 3rd respondents were at the material time public officers under the Public Officers Protection Law (Cap. 114) Laws of Lagos State, 1973. In discussing the application, Olusola Thomas, J., concluded at page 14 of his ruling –
“The principle running through the gamut of these authorities, foreign and local, is that where the act of a person claiming to be entitled to protection under section 2(a) of Cap.114 is shown to be apparently illegal, it is a question of fact whether the illegal act was done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority the court must receive evidence from either or both parties in order to determine whether the person is so protected.”
The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeal which allowed the appeal relying heavily on the decision of this court in Justice Adefarasin v. Egbe (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.3) 549. The single ground of appeal filed with the particulars was:
“The learned trial Justices of Appeal erred in law in holding that admittedly malicious actions are protected under section 2 of the Pubic Officers Protection Law Cap 114.”
Several issues for determination have been formulated by appellant and the respondents in their briefs of argument. I am also of the view that the issues as formulated in the brief filed by the 3rd respondent appear to cover all the matters that were raised before the court. The issues were:
“(a) Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were in error in holding that the plaintiff/appellant has no cause of action against the respondents, having brought the action outside the three months period of limitation prescribed in the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. 114, Laws of the Lagos State of Nigeria.
(b) Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were to inquire into and determine the motives of the defendants/respondents as a prerequisite in availing them the protection of the Public Officer Protection Law, Cap.114.
(c) Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were correct in holding that the cases of Inspector-General of Police v. Olatunji 21 NLR 52 and Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (1967) NMLR 48 are not relevant in the determination of the present case.”
Even at the risk of repetition, it is necessary to state the submissions of learned counsel to the parties if only to indicate the main issues placed before this court. In his submissions, Mr. Egbe, appellant, who appeared in person, said that the interpretation of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law which is similar to the old English Statute is that absence of malice is implied in the execution of public office. He submitted that the Public Officers Protection Law in section 2(a) is a defence not a limitation. It is not the same as the statute of limitation. He referred to Egbe v. Adefarasin (supra) and to Scammell and Nephew v. Hurley (1929) 1 K.B. 419. He argued that the interpretation he was arguing had been approved in cases here and in England. He said that once there was malice, there can be no executing of public duty. He urged this court to depart from its decision in Egbe v. Adefarasin. For the 1st and 2nd respondents, Mr. Sowemimo submitted that the Court of Appeal was right in following Egbe v. Adefarasin, he submitted that the Public Officers Protection Law is clearly a limitation law. He referred to Gregory v. Torquay Corporation (1911) 2 K.B. 556, 559. He argued that from the terms of the Public Officers Protection Law it would be wrong to read good faith into it as this would be reading words of limitation into the legislation which were not intended by the legislature. He relied on Crais on Statute 7th Edition. Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap.114 provides as follows:-
“2. Where any action, prosecution or other proceedings is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution of any law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect:-
(a) the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or in the case of a continuance of damage or injury within three months after the ceasing thereof … “(italics ours)
It does appear to me that the words used in this legislation are plain and ought to be given their ordinary meaning. It is indeed the first rule of interpretation of statutes that statutes are to be construed in their ordinary and natural meaning of the words. See Attorney-General v. Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association Ltd. (1876) 1 EX.D. 469.
It is also a rule of interpretation to assume that, the legislature meant what they have actually expressed. See R v. Banbury (Inhabitants) (1834) 1A & F 136. Looking at section 2(a), there is no bad faith or good faith contained therein expressly. What seems to stand out so vividly are the words shall not lie unless commenced within three months. It seems to me that this is more a provision of limitation and is only one of defence in the sense that a person sued after three months can rely on it to have the suit dismissed. In my view, the mandatory provision shall not lie indicates that the action cannot be maintained or cannot take off unless brought within three months.
In my view, it is only when such action can be maintained, i.e., where there is a cause of action that the question of whether the act complained of was done in the execution of a public duty can be canvassed. To give an interpretation which allows examination of whether the action complained of was done in the execution of a public duty without reference to whether the action was brought within three months would mean that a public officer can even be sued several years after his retirement for an act which he carried out in the execution of his public duty. That to my mind would completely destroy the main protection which the statute gives a public officer. Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. puts it succinctly in his lead judgment in Egbe v. Adefarasin (supra), he said at page 568:-
“The general principle of law is that where the law provides for the bringing of action within a prescribed period, in respect of a cause of action accruing to a plaintiff, proceedings shall not be brought after the time prescribed by statute. See Obiefuna v. Okoye (1961) All NLR 357. A cause of action means the factual situation stated by the plaintiff if substantiated entitles him to a remedy against the defendant. See Latana v. Cooper (1964) 2 All ER.929.”
As to the question of malice which has featured so much in the submission of the appellant, I do not think there can be any dispute as to the assumption that the protection afforded a public officer is for the legal or proper execution of his public duty. To that extent, I am inclined to agree with the proposition which Mr. Egbe put to the High Court and repeated to this court that a public officer who in the course of performance of a public duty does so maliciously or for private spite has no protection from law. However, the parting is as to the moment of decision about the public officer’s act. It would seem to me that that question comes for determination only after an action is maintainable against him, i.e., where the suit is commenced within three months. The High Court and Mr. Egbe appear to hold the view that once the suit is filed, the question of malice has to be determined so as to decide whether the statute applies, and this is I suppose even if the suit is filed after three months. That I cannot accept.
In the instant case, malice was irrelevant at the stage the learned trial Judge sought to introduce it by taking evidence. The action was clearly not maintainable as the appellant filed his suit on 20th day of December, 1978 period of about 9 months from the act complained of. In Egbe v. Adefarasin (supra) this court, Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C., said at page 569-
“Again where the defendant has raised an unanswerable plea of protection under the Public Officers Law on the uncontested facts as 2nd respondent has done in this case; there is absolutely no basis for prying into the conduct of such a defendant which gave rise to the action. The Court of Appeal need not have gone into the question of whether malice was a relevant consideration in determining the liability of the 2nd respondent. The issue before the court was whether the action was maintainable. It is not whether the 2nd respondent was liable.”
It would seem to me that some decisions of the court here and in England have been advanced by the High Court and by Mr. Egbe for authority for the position that malice is immediately relevant to determine whether the statute is applicable. Reliance is placed on the views of Scrutton, L.J., in Scammel’s case (Supra). There the action was brought under the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 and brought against the defendants outside the six months period prescribed in the Act.
At page 427, the learned Justice said:
“To require the application of the Public Authorities Protection Act, the acts must be acts not authorised by any statute or legal justification but acts intended to be done in pursuance or execution of some statute or legal power. It would appear therefore, if illegal acts are really done from some motive other than an honest desire to execute the statutory or other legal duty and an honest belief that they are justified by statutory or other legal authority, if they are done from a desire to injure a person or to assist some persons or cause, without any honest belief that they are covered by statutory authority…the Public Authorities Protection Act is no defence for the acts complained of are not done in intended execution of a statutory duty, but only pretended execution thereof.”
But it has been forgotten that the same Scrutton, L.J., had earlier in the same judgment said at the same page 427:-
“The Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 is wanted only if the acts complained of are illegal. It may be an answer to the action that those acts were legal, or gave no cause of action; but it is unnecessary to consider this if though the acts were illegal they are acts in respect of which an action can only lie if brought within the statutory limit of time, in this case six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of. ” (Italics ours) Besides, in that case, the Court of Appeal decided that the acts and neglects complained of were done in purported execution of a statutory duty; the defendants were entitled to the protection of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 and the action failed as it was not commenced within six months. In Inspector-General of Police v. Olatunji 21 NLR 52, proceedings were commenced more than three months after the date of offence. The Supreme Court per Ademola, J., (as he then was) nevertheless held that a public officer to claim the protection of the Public Officer’s Protection Ordinance must have done the act complained of in good faith.
The learned Judge said:-
“Now it is clear that whilst protection is afforded by this section, one who claims the protection must have acted colores officii and not for his own benefit. Morgan v. Palmer (1824) 2 B.C. 739; also Irving v Wilson (1791) 4 Term Rep.485.”
Also in Godwin Nwankwere v. Joseph Adewunmi (1967) NMLR 45, it was held by the Supreme Court that the Public Officers Protection Law is designed to protect an officer who acts in good faith and does not apply to acts done in abuse of office and with no semblance of legal justification. Here, the proceedings were not instituted within three months from the act complained of which took place on 8th February, 1961. Duffus, J., in the High Court relied on the dictum of Scrutton, L.J., in Scammel and Nephew’s case (supra) to which I made reference earlier in this judgment. The Supreme Court in agreeing with Duffus, J., held that the law, i.e., the Public Officers Protection Law, is designed to protect the officer who acts in good faith and does not apply to acts done in abuse of office and with no semblance of legal justification.
It is clear that these two decisions have gone on the basis of the good faith of the public officer concerned, and although both actions were instituted after three months, the defendants were held liable. To this extent, there appears to be a conflict with Egbe v. Adefarasin in which it was held in effect by this court that if the action was not commenced within three months, it was not maintainable. The Court of Appeal sought to draw a distinction between the two lines of cases.
Kutigi, J.C.A., in the lead judgment said as follow, inter alia:-
“As already stated, Nwankwere dealt with a case of extortion of bribery and as such, the officer clearly could not claim to be acting in discharge of a public duty. Olatunji was a case of abuse of the authority of office and contempt of court. At first hearing in the Magistrate Court, the summons was dismissed on a preliminary objection raised under the then Public Officers Protection Ordinance because the action was not commenced within three months. On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was ordered that the case be remitted to the Magistrate Court for reopening of trial because the allegation against the accused/respondent was that he acted in abuse of the authority of his office. The nature of “abuse” is not disclosed in the judgment. But I take notice of the fact that the summons against the respondent was a criminal summons. By its nature therefore, it would not easily permit the respondent to claim the protection offered by the ordinance as was the case with Nwankwere which was a criminal case as well. The law in my view is not intended to offer protection to any public officer engaged in criminal acts and or acts outside official duties.”
I am not sure that the criminal nature of the acts in Nwankwere and Olatunji is a complete justification for distinction. I rather think that it is more important to note that in both Nwankwere and Olatunji, evidence was taken from the Magistrate Court to the High Court. In such a case, it would seem to me that what is in issue is no longer whether the act was maintainable but one of liability. This is as distinct from the situation where the question whether the Public Officers Protection Law is applicable is taken in limine as happened in Egbe v. Adefarasin and in the instant case. In the case in hand, the question was taken in limine and no evidence was taken.
Not only was evidence not taken but contrary to the contention of the appellant, the pleadings of the plaintiff cannot be taken as admitted for order 22 rule 1 of the High Court of Lagos Civil Procedure Rules stated clearly that no demurrer is allowed. The application in this suit was brought under rules 3 and 4 of the same order. It is admitted that in order 22 of the High Court Civil Procedure Rules of Western Nigeria under which Foko v. Foko (1968) NMLR 441 was decided rule 1 has abolished demurrer. Nevertheless, the trial Judge in that case still held that where there is a dispute in the pleadings the defendant must be taken as admitting the facts as stated by the plaintiff.
Finally, it is my view that there is a sense in which a distinction can be drawn between those lines of cases by saying that if a public officer is obviously acting outside the colour of his office, or outside his statutory or constitutional duty as in Nwankwere, he loses the protection of the act without question. Where, however, he is acting within the contour of his office, he can only lose protection of the act if he is sued within three months, and if on the evidence in the case, he is shown to have acted in pretended execution of his lawful duty, having acted from improper motives.
From all I have said, it follows that I can see no reason to depart from Egbe v. Adefarasin.
For these reasons, and the fuller reasons in the lead judgment, I would also dismiss this appeal.
I endorse the order for costs made by Uwais, J.S.C.

KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.: This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, sitting in Lagos delivered on the 20th of January, 1986. The Court of Appeal had set aside the ruling of the High Court of Lagos State, which dismissed the preliminary objection to the hearing of action by plaintiff against the defendants/respondents for conspiracy and libel and claiming N500,000.00 being general and special damages. The defendants/respondents are public officers.
The preliminary objection of the defendants, hereinafter referred to as the respondents was founded on the ground that being public officers, they were protected from liability from suit by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. 114 of the Lagos State, 1973 Armed forces and Police (Special Powers) Decree 1967, Detention Orders (Bar to Civil Proceedings) Decree 1969.
In the High Court, Olusola Thomas, J, dismissed the preliminary objection of the defendants and held that plaintiff having shown the conduct of defendants to be apparently illegal, he could not at that stage of the proceedings and without hearing evidence determine whether the defendants were entitled to protection under the Public Officers Protection Law, as having committed the acts complained of in pursuance or execution or intended execution of official duty, or authority. As it transpired, the case centered only on construction of the provisions of sections 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law.
The learned trial Judge after holding that the plaintiff has shown the conduct of the defendants to be apparently illegal, he could not at that stage of the proceedings dismiss the action against the defendants under the Public Officers Protection without hearing evidence to determine whether the defendants were entitled to protection under that law, as having committed the acts subject matter of the suit in pursuance or execution or intended execution of official duty or authority. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal against the ruling.
The Court of Appeal, Lagos Division, after hearing argument from counsel, allowed the appeal and set aside the ruling of the learned trial Judge. The court relied on its construction of the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, and the judgment of this court in Egbe v. Adefarasin (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.3) 549 to hold that actions brought outside the period prescribed in section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, are incompetent and could not give rise to a cause of action. It was accordingly held that the plaintiff had no cause of action. It was accordingly held that the plaintiff had no cause against the defendants, the action having been brought outside the period of three months prescribed by the law. Respondent hereinafter referred to as the appellant, not satisfied with the judgment, appealed to this court.
Appellant filed one ground of appeal that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that admittedly malicious actions are protected under section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap.114 Laws of Lagos State 1973. The particulars of error referred to the contention that a person who had acted maliciously could not be said to have acted “in the course of his official duty” or “within his official duty.” It also referred to error in the interpretation of Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (1967) NMLR.45 and the distinction made in the judgment between that case and the instant appeal.
Appellant, who appeared in person, filed his brief of argument which he adopted and relied upon during the hearing of the appeal. Mr. Seyi Sowemimo appeared for the 1st and 2nd respondents, and argument filed on their behalf. D. A. Omotade appeared for the 3rd respondent and adopted the brief filed on his behalf.
Before argument, Mr. Egbe, the appellant sought and was granted leave of this court to file and rely on the ruling of the High Court, Lagos, dated 21st May, 1984, inadvertently omitted during the compilation of the record of appeal.
Appellant related in meticulous and considerable detail, the background facts resulting in the institution of this suit. As he pointed out, there is only one issue for determination which he formulated as follows-
“The question that arises for determination in this appeal is that since all three defendants have now admitted that their actions were conspiratorial and malicious see Foko v. Foko & Ors. (1968) NMLR at 441, can they still claim protection under the statutory defence enshrined in the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. 114 ”
The contention is that where a Public Officer has admitted that his acts are illegal, he cannot claim protection under the Public Officer Protection Law irrespective of the provisions of the law barring actions instituted after three months from the date of the cause of action.
On the other hand, counsel to the 1st and 2nd respondents has formulated the issues differently and counsel to the 3rd respondent agrees with the formulation. I think the formulation of the issues by the respondents properly and adequately covers the issues for determination in this appeal. It is as follows –
(i) Whether the plaintiff/appellant’s action is maintainable given the fact that it was brought outside the three months period of limitation prescribed in the Public Officers Protection Laws, Cap.114, Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria.
As a corollary to this main question, two further questions which need to be resolved are:-
(ii) Whether it is open to a court to conduct an investigation into the motives of the defendants/respondents in this case before investing them with the said Protection of the said Public Officer’s Protection Law”
(iii) Whether the authority of Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (1967) NMLR.48 is relevant to the facts of the present case.
I think it is now well understood in the appellate Courts that formulation of the issues for determination in the appeal must be consistent and fall within the scope of the grounds of appeal filed. The issues cannot be formulated to be wider than the grounds of appeal from which it derives its existence. Again, the grounds of appeal against a decision must relate to the decision and should be a challenge to the validity of the ratio of the decision.
A careful reading of the judgment of the Court of Appeal before us, clearly discloses that the ground on which the ruling of the trial Judge was reversed was that the action of the plaintiff/appellant, having been brought outside the period prescribed under section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, for actions against wrongs done by Public Officers, disclosed no cause of action in the appellant. The trial Judge was therefore in error to have dismissed the preliminary objection on the ground that he was entitled to hear evidence before deciding whether there was a cause of action.
In his submissions before us, appellant put forward three propositions establishing the principles that-
(a) Public powers can only be exercised in good faith and in the public interest.
(b) Statutory powers can only be exercised in furtherance of the statutes and in good faith.
(c) The statutory defence enshrined in the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. 114 as opposed to limitation enactments are available only to persons acting in good faith.
Appellant cited and relied on Scammell & Nephew Ltd. v. Hurley 1929 1 KB.419 and Godwin Nwankwere v. Joseph Adewunmi 1967 NMLR.45 in support of these propositions. Appellant submitted that a person who acted maliciously could not claim the protection of the Public Officers Protection Law.
Appellant then referred to and criticised the recent decision of this court in Egbe v. Adefarasin (supra) decided on the interpretation of section 88(1) of the High Court Act and submitted that on the basis of Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (supra), it is of questionable authority on the immunity conferred on Judges for judicial acts.
Appellant referred to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in this case where Nwankwere v. Adewunmi and Egbe v. Adefarasin were distinguished and submitted that the distinction was invalid. Appellant concluded his submission on the theme that “it is the presence of good faith that distinguishes an honest mistake by a public officer from the deliberate wrong doing of a public thug.” He observed that “the decision if accepted will convert the entire public service into an instrument for the attainment of negative ends.”
In his reply to the above submissions, Mr. Sowemimo for the 1st and 2nd respondents referred to the consequence of filing the action outside the three months period of limitation prescribed in section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. 114. He pointed out that in the instant case the cause of action arose on 21st March, 1978 whilst action was instituted on 20th December, 1978 an interval of eight months. Counsel also pointed out that it has not been in dispute that respondents are Public Officers, namely, Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Trade, Inspector-General of Police, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Trade respectively. Learned counsel re-Ors. v. Onasanya (1976) 6 S.C. 89, 94. The pleadings of the defendant are irrelevant and are not at the stage, in issue. The rationale for this procedure is to save valuable time and money, and that the defendant having admitted the facts pleaded by the plaintiff notwithstanding, is contending that in law they do not give rise to a cause of action.
It is under order 18 r.11 R.S.C. of England similar to order 22 r.3 High Court Rules, of Lagos State 1972 that defendants brought their application to dismiss the action of the plaintiff. Appellant was therefore in error to assume that the facts are taken to have been proved in the event of an unsuccessful application.
The central core of appellant’s contention is that the actions of the defendants are malicious and cannot be said to be in the execution of their duty as Public Officers. Appellant is not denying that respondents are Public Officers. His contention, as it seems to me, is that the malice they have demonstrated in the execution of their duty as public officers has destroyed the lawfulness and therefore rendered their duty unlawful and illegal. They therefore are not entitled to the protection of section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law.
I think it is important for an understanding of the protection sought by defendants to construe the provisions of the relevant law.
Section 2 provides –
“2. Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any ordinance or law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such ordinance, law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect:-
(a) the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof. Provided that if the action, prosecution or proceeding be at the instance of any person for cause arising while such person was a convicted prisoner, it may be commenced within three months after the discharge of such person from prison”
A careful reading of the provision set out above relied upon by both parties, discloses that it concerns only time within which action can be brought against a public officer and the right of action to the period of within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury within three months after the ceasing thereof. There is indeed provision in respect of convicted prisoners. This law first came into force on the 21st September, 1916 and has remained essentially the same.
It seems to me on an ordinary construction of the words which are clear and not ambiguous, that there is no provision for any other defence under the law. The clear meaning should be given to the words see Okumagba v. Egbe (1965) 1 All NLR.62. The idea of bona fide, malice or improper motive is without doubt an essential ingredient in the exercise of every lawful act. But a determination whether the act is lawful or not can only arise after a cause of action has been established.
It is now appropriate to refer to a few decided cases on the interpretation of this provision. The earliest of the reported cases is J. D. Fasoro v. E. K. Milbourne & Nwagu Onyeji 4 NLR.85 decided by the divisional court at Calabar on the 30th January, 1923. The plaintiff, a Minister of the African Church, had brought an action against E. K. Milbourne, a district officer, and Nwagu Onyeji for assault. The facts were that the owners of the land in which a building at Efa Iman, used by Milbourne, who was the assistant district officer, Uyo District for his duties had been placed at his disposal. Whilst in the building, the plaintiff entered and objected to the use of the building by the defendant. On the orders of Milbourne, Onyeji who was his police orderly assaulted the plaintiff. At the trial, it was established that plaintiff also used the same building for his religious services, but there was no evidence that he had exclusive use of it. Both had the licence to use the building.
It was held that since defendant did not prove that plaintiff refused to leave the building after having been requested to do so, the assault was without justification and the district officer was liable. In respect of the 2nd defendant, the police orderly, it was held that notice of the claim against the defendant was not given till more than three months after the occurrence, the claim was barred by section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Ordinance. It is important to consider that in this case the court held that the assistant district officer was at the time engaged in carrying out his duties as a district officer.
But he was held liable because-
“…the defendant had no right forcibly to eject the plaintiff without first giving him the opportunity of withdrawing quietly when his presence was objected to, and still less had he the right to have blow administered to the plaintiff unless this was necessary for the carrying out of a lawful ejectment.”
The assault and battery was committed by the 2nd defendant acting under the order and direction of the 1st defendant. The action against the 2nd defendant was not commenced until more than three months after the cause of action arose when he was made a party. It was held that the action against him was barred by section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Ordinance. The claim against the 1st defendant brought within the period of three months succeeded because the act complained of was outside the execution of his lawful duty.
Obiefuna v. Okoye (1961) All NLR 357, also a decision on the construction of section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Ordinance is directly in point. In this case, plaintiff, a motorcyclist who was seriously injured in a collision with a police vehicle driven by the defendant on the 24th May, 1958, and was consequently hospitalised till the 17th January, 1959 issued a writ of summons against the defendant on the 17th March, 1959, claiming damages for the injury. The action was commenced more than nine months after the cause of action arose. Dickson, J., rejected the contention of counsel to the plaintiff that time did not begin to run until the plaintiff was discharged from the hospital. He held that the act which gave rise to the cause of action was the act of 24th May, 1958 whereby the plaintiff was injured, and concluded that ” …. it is beyond question that on the authorities the action in hand is barred by the operation of the Public Officers Protection Ordinance. There is therefore no alternative but to dismiss the action.” The learned Judge relied on the interpretation of the similar provision in the English Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 in Carey v. Bermondsey Metropolitan Borough Council (1903) 67 J.P.447; Rawlings v Gillingham Corporation (1932) 146 L.T.487.
Ekemode v. Alausa (1961) All NLR 135, like Fasoro v. Melbourne (supra) decided the scope of the protection under the Public Officers Protection Act. In this case, the defendant, a Road overseer under the Epe District Council, had the duty to remove plaintiffs canoe from the water-way at Epe in the ordinary execution of his duty in carrying out the instruction of the district council. But in this case, the defendant having removed plaintiff’s canoe from the water-way caused the canoe to be broken. As in this case, the only ground of appeal on appeal was that the action should have been dismissed under the Public Officers Protection Ordinance 1947, (Cap. 186) because it had not been commenced within three months of the defendant’s wrongful act. Charles, J., went on to spell out in detail the effect of section 2; as follows:
(i) An act or omission on the part of a person to whom the section relates is within the section if it is proved that it was done or it occurred
(a) in the course of commencing to discharge, or in the course of discharging a public duty, or
(b) in the course of doing something incidental to the discharge of such a duty, or
(c) in the course of commencing to exercise, or in the course of exercising an authority or power conferred for a public purpose, or
(d) in the course of doing something incidental to the exercise of such an authority or power.
(ii) An act on the part of a person to whom the section relates is also within the section if it is proved that it, by itself, was incidental to the discharge of such a duty, or the exercise of such an authority or power as above mentioned.
(iii) A total failure to discharge any duty or to exercise any authority or power as above mentioned on the part of a person to whom the section relates is also within the section.
The learned Judge relied on Bradford Corporation v. Myers (1916) 1 AC. 242 and Edwards v Metropolitan Water Board (1922) 1 K.B. 291 C.A.
I think I will agree with this formulation of the protection of section 2. I will go further to agree that the section does not prima facie protect from wrongful acts or omissions where such acts of omissions are not done in the execution of lawful duty and the actions are brought outside the period of three months prescribed in the section for bringing actions.
In this case although, the removal of the plaintiff’s canoe from the water way was in the ordinary course and due execution of defendant’s duty, not so the deliberate breaking up of the canoe after its removal. This was neither necessary nor incidental to the duty imposed on him by his employer for the purpose of exercising his authority, to clear the foreshore. The act of breaking up the canoe was therefore wrongful and defendant is not entitled to protection under the section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Ordinance.
All the above cases are decisions of the High Court. They disclose the following trend. An action is not maintainable against a Public Officer in respect of injury done to another by him in the due execution of his duty if brought before the expiration of three months from the date of such injury. Actions brought against a public officer after the expiration of three months from the date of the injury is statute barred and incompetent. Appellant has contended before us relying on the decision of this court in Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (supra) and the English case of Appeal decision of Scammell & Nephew Ltd. v. Hurley (1929) 1 KB 419 that where the action of the defendant is malicious or wrongful, he cannot enjoy the protection of section 2. In effect, the argument is that the time prescribed for bringing an action does not run where defendant’s action is shown to be wrongful. It was submitted that in Nwankwere v. Adewunmi, the plaintiff brought his action after the expiration of three months. The defence under section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Ordinance was raised, but the learned Judge held and this court affirmed that it did not apply to acts done in abuse of office and with no substance of legal justification. It was held as in Ekemode v. Alausa (supra) that the defendant did not purport to be acting in the execution of any public duty. Of course, injurious acts done by Public Officers without authority are not protected.
It seems to me that this decision ignored the fundamental distinction in there being a cause of action because action was brought within the three months prescribed where the claim is not statute barred and where the cause of action is extinguished because the claim is statute barred. In the former, an action lies and is maintainable against the defendant who cannot rely on the defence of due execution of duty or exercise of lawful authority because of the wrongfulness of his act. In the latter, action having not been brought within the period prescribed, the claim is incompetent.
It is important to state here that the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Scammell & Nephew Ltd. v. Hurley (supra) relied upon by Mr. Egbe for his submission and cited in Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (supra) seems to me an authority for the opposite proposition. The defendants in that case, who relied on the Public Authorities Act, 1893 as their defence appealed against the judgment of Avory, J. rejecting the defence. On appeal, the Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and held that they were entitled to the protection of the act.
In his judgment Scrutton, L.J. referring to the defence said.
“The Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 is wanted only if the acts complained of are illegal. It may be an answer to the action that those acts were legal, or gave no cause of action; but it is unnecessary to consider this, if though the acts were illegal, they are acts in respect of which action can only lie if brought within the statutory limit of time, in this case six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of.”  See also pages 434, 435. The words italicized are significant and clearly applies to the appeal before us.
This dictum which comes immediately before the passage relied upon in Nwankwere v. Adewumi (supra) where the dictum of Scrutton, L.J. at p.427 adopted was
“To require the protection of the Public Authorities Protection Act, the acts must be acts not authorised by any statute or legal justification, but acts intended to be done in pursuance or execution of some statute or legal power.”
In my opinion, this proposition relates to a defence available after a cause of action has been established by action being brought within the period prescribed by statute for bringing actions. This is clear from what Scrutton, L.J., said at p.429.
“In my opinion, when a defendant appears to be acting as a member of a public body under statutory authority and pleads the Public Authorities Protection Act, the plaintiff can defeat claim by proving on sufficient evidence that the defendant was not really intending to act in pursuance of the statutory authority, but was using his pretended authority for some improper motive, such as spite, or purpose entirely outside statutory justification.”
See also Greer, L.J. at page 444, and Sankey, L.J. at p.449 to the same effect. I do not wish to go into the distinction between Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (supra) and Egbe v. Adefarasin (supra) and the question whether there is a conflict between the two decisions of this court. I adopt in its entirety the opinion lucidly expressed by my learned brother, Uwais. J.S.C. that no conflict has been established between the two decisions, and there is therefore no foundation laid for this court to depart from its recent decision in Egbe v. Adefarasin & Anor. (supra). See Nofiu Surakatu v. Nigeria Housing Development Society Ltd. (1981) 4 SC.26; Oduola & Ors. v. Coker & Ors. (1981) 5 SC.179, Bucknor-Maclean & Ors. v. Inlaks Ltd. (1980) 8-11 SC. 1; Akinsanya v. U.B.A. Ltd. (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.35) 273.
I think I am emboldened to conclude from my analysis and construction of the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law and the decided cases discussed herein that where a defendant relies upon the provisions of section 2(a) to dismiss the action of the plaintiff in limine under order 22 r.4 of the High Court of Lagos (Civil Procedure) Rules, it is only necessary for the Judge to determine whether action has been brought within the period prescribed by the statute. If the writ of summons was issued after the period of three months from the date of the injury complained of, the plaintiff has no cause of action, and the claim shall be dismissed in limine.
However, where the action was instituted within the period of three months prescribed, there is a cause of action, and the legality vel non of the action complained of can be in issue. It is in such a situation that at the trial evidence can be led to determine whether the protection under the Public Officers Protection Act has been vitiated by malice, improper motive, bad faith, or deliberate exercise of power without lawful authority. See Croix v. Rix (1912) 29 Times L.R. 85; Selmes v. Judge L.R. 6 Q.B. 724, South Wales Mines Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co. (1905) AC. 239.
The ground of appeal totally fails and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. I have read the judgment of my learned brother, Uwais, J.S.C. in this appeal. I agree with his reasoning and conclusions. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is hereby affirmed with N500 as costs to each set of respondents.

BELGORE, J.S.C.: I had a preview of the lead judgment of my learned brother, Uwais, J.S.C., and I agree with his conclusion that this appeal lacks merit. I also agree with the historical exposition of Public Officers Protection Act in the judgment of, Bello, C.J.N .. The Act is nothing but what it says when read as a whole. I can see no malice or bad faith in an officer whose duty is to receive a complaint and pass the same to another officer whose function is to investigate. I certainly find no merit in this appeal and I also dismiss it with the same consequential orders made in the lead judgment of Uwais, J.S.C.

NNAEMEKA-AGU, J.S.C.: This appeal once more brings into focus the relevance or otherwise of malice in the protection given to public officers by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law.
The facts leading to this appeal have been clearly set out by my learned brother, Uwais, J.S.C., in his lead judgment. I do not intend to repeat any more of the facts than as will be sufficient to give meaning to the short contribution I propose to make. The action brought by the plaintiff/appellant against the defendants/respondents jointly and severally was for conspiracy and libel contained in a letter dated 21st March, 1978 which has been set out in the lead judgment.  The letter was written by the 3rd respondent as legal adviser to the Ministry of Trade of which the 1st respondent was the Permanent Secretary. It was addressed to the 2nd respondent, the Inspector-General of Police at the time. The gist of the action is that by the conspiracy and as a result of the letter, the respondents procured the arrest, detention and malicious prosecution of the appellant. It was never suggested by the appellant that any of the respondents played his part in the arrest, detention and prosecution of the appellant other than in the course of his duty. But the appellant by his pleading tried to show that the entire accusation leading to it all was completely baseless and malicious in that the 1st and 2nd respondents had their own interests to serve and used the 3rd respondent to set it in motion. They were serving the bona fide interest of their offices. They had ulterior motives for the prosecution. The respondents in their pleadings joined issues with the appellant on these averments.
It was common ground that the appellant’s action was brought well over three months, in fact nine months, from the date the cause of action was alleged to have accrued. The 3rd respondent in his statement of defence pleaded that as he was at all times material to the action, a public servant, the action which was filed some nine months after the accrual of the cause of action was statute barred and unmaintainable in view of the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law. Subsequently, all the respondents filed a motion dated 15th day of February, 1984, praying that the action be struck out or dismissed because it was not maintainable by reason of the said statute as it was filed well after three months of the accrual of the cause of action, it was statute-barred and unmaintainable. The learned trial Judge, Thomas, J., held that in view of the averments in the statement of claim, which, for purposes of the application, would be deemed to have been admitted, it would be necessary to hear evidence before he could reach a decision on the motion. On the relevance or not of malice, he held:
“In my humble view, malice, in whatever form plaintiff might have pleaded it in this case, is a part of the whole of any act the plaintiff had complained of. In the sense I see it, the issue of malice, though prominently pleaded by the plaintiff is only to ascribe a motive for the defendant’s acts upon which the complaints were brought.”
Later he continued:
“On the face of the pleadings, these acts constituting the causes of action may possibly have been done not in pursuance of any law or public duty and not in execution of alleged neglect or default of such law or public duty. The acts cannot therefore be presumed to have been so done or intended under the law. the issue will remain unsolved until evidence from either or both parties is adduced at the trial.”
He relied heavily on the case of Scammell & Nephew Ltd. v. Hurley (1929) 1 K.B. 419 as well as two Nigerian decisions in I.G. of  Police v. Olatunji  20 N.L.R. 52 and Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (1967) NMLR 45. The respondent’s application was therefore dismissed.
On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the ruling of the learned trial Judge was reversed. In the lead judgment of Kutigi, J.C.A., with which Ogundare and Kolawole, JJ.C.A. agreed, he held that following my decision in that Court of Appeal No. FCA/L/165/82: “Fred Egbe v. Justice Adefarasin & S. O. Ilori the present case in which it was admitted that the respondents (i.e. appellants before that court) were performing their public duty, although, as alleged, not bonafide in that they had an ulterior motive for doing what was complained of, must be distinguished from cases such as Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (supra) in which the particular officer merely used his office as a cover for perpetrating the act in question, quite unconnected with his official function. He also cited the decision of Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C., in the case of Fred Egbe v. Justice Adefarasin (1985) 1 N.W.L.R. (Part 3) 549. His Lordship concluded that the general principle of law is that where the law provides for bringing an action within a prescribed period, in respect of a cause of action accruing to the plaintiff, proceedings shall not be brought outside the period prescribed by statute Obiefuna v. Okoye (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 357. An action brought outside the period does not give a cause of action; as in the instant case at the time the action was brought nine months after the accrual of the cause of action, there was no cause of action. He therefore allowed the appeal.
The crucial question in this appeal is, therefore, whether this general principle should be applied or whether malice will deprive the respondents of the protection conferred by the statute. Needless to mention that on an application, such as the one in this case, under order 22 rules 2 and 3 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1972, I shall restrict myself to the averments in the statement of claim. See Shell-BP v. Omosanya (1976) 6 S.C. 89 at p.94. See also Fadare & Ors. v. Attorney-General, Oyo State (1982) 4 S.C.1, p.19. On this view of the rules, I shall consider this appeal on the basis of the allegations in the statement of claim.
The straight question is, therefore, this: is it the law that a public officer who acted maliciously ipso facto looses his right to rely upon the protection otherwise given to him under section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law if an action is, as in this case, brought against him after three months with respect to an act done in pursuance or execution of any law or public duty, or neglect or default thereof, in connection with his office
The answer turns on the interpretation of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. 114 Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria, 1973, which provides as follows:
“Where any action, prosecution or other proceedings is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect:
(a) the action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in the case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.”
By way of a preliminary observation, it is noteworthy that:
(i) the protection intended by the provision was designed in favour of public officers not qua public officers, but with respect to acts done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or public duty or authority or in respect of any default or neglect thereof;
(ii) there is no express provision that malice shall deprive such a public officer of such a protection.
The first question I wish to deal with is this: ought I, as urged by the appellant to read malice into the operation of the statute Should I hold that a public officer who acted maliciously, and not bona fide, has no protection under the above provision What principles of construction should guide me in the exercise
First on the principle, I believe I should first ask myself: what object does the statute seek to achieve It is plain to me that the main object of the statute is to protect public officers who have acted pursuant to the duties of their office from being harassed with state claims and proceedings. If I am right, I cannot rightly read into the enactment an exception which it has not expressed and which will deprive that person intended to be protected of that protection. Besides, I believe it to be a sound principle of construction that “beneficial” statutes which were designed to protect a section of the public ought to be construed in such a way as to meet that objective. This implies that where there is a choice between a wide meaning which carries out the legislative intent and a narrow meaning which does not, I should choose the former. See Maxwell (On Interpretation of Statutes 12th Edn.) p.92. In urging the court to read bona fide as an implied condition for the operation of the provision, appellant appears to me to have confused the statute which, as I have stated, was designed to protect a section of the public, with that class of statutes which confer statutory powers. The latter class of statutes always carry with them the implication that the statutory power must be exercised bona fide and reasonably, and according to set principles see on this Roberts v. Hopwood (1925) A.C. 578; Prescott v. Birmingham Corporation (1955) Ch. 210, at pp. 237 and 238. In the class of statutes under construction which is beneficial in intention, I cannot supply any words in order to defeat the legislative intention, as, for what I have stated, there is no principle of interpretation or reason in the statute itself to support such a course. Rather, there is a presumption that the legislator meant what he actually expressed. So, on principle, I cannot read the requirement of good faith as a condition for applying the statute for the protection of the section of the public, to wit public officers, whom the statute intended to protect.
Now, ordinarily the word malice is, of course, a term of art of rather imprecise import: see R v. Tolson 23 Q.B.D. 168. It may mean doing mischief to another knowing of a person’s right, and doing something with intent to interfere with that right. In another con it may mean doing something with ill-will, probably with hatred. It sometimes refers to the intention for doing a thing, but more often to its motive. So, it may sometimes mean doing something intentionally. This complication in the connotation of the word is increased when it is assumed that mala fide, the latin expression for malice has its opposite in bona fide. But, as I see it, the issue of malice in connection with section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law may arise in two circumstances. A public officer might have done an act in pursuance or execution or intended execution of a law or his public duty with an ulterior motive, such as helping himself or his friend or injuring the plaintiff. Another public officer may, while a public officer and under cover of the office do an act contrary to, or not authorized by law or not in accord with his public duty. If both acts result in an injury to a plaintiff, it may be said that both acted maliciously. But it is my view that the former can successfully plead the statute if any action is filed against him after three months of the accrual of the cause of action, whereas the latter cannot. The former was contemplated by the statute; but the latter was not, as to do so would tantamount to using the statute as a cover for malefaction.
In the instant case, as it is conceded that the respondents were public servants, and it has not been suggested that in the acts complained of, that is the writing of the letter, arrest, detention and prosecution of the appellant, any of them did more than what he was employed to do, then, on my above conclusion that it does not matter whether or not they acted maliciously or from ulterior motive, I must hold that they are entitled to the protection given by the statute. A different situation would have arisen if the respondents did any act other than what they were employed to do and acted maliciously or with the knowledge that what they were doing was wrongful. They could not have taken umbrage under the statutory protection see South Wales Miners Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co. (1905) A.C. 239.
Before I conclude, I wish to dispose of a subsidiary question which the appellant raised in argument. He submitted that the decision of this court in Egbe v. Adefarasin (supra) is in conflict with those in Nwankere v. Adewunmi (supra) and Inspector-General of Police v. Olatunji 21 NLR 52. He also submitted that the Court of Appeal contradicted itself in certain decisions of its own as to whether malice was a material consideration in such cases.
In my opinion, my learned brother, Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C., kept the two lines of cases distinct in that part of his judgment where he stated:
“As I have already stated, there was no cause of action against the 2nd respondent in respect of which he is answerable to the appellant. The cases of Inspector-General of Police v. Olatunji (supra) and Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (1967) NMLR at p.45 are all irrelevant to the determination of this appeal.”
It appears to me that the line of cases represented by those two decisions simply establish one principle in law, to wit that for the protection contemplated by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law to apply, the officer taking advantage of such a protection must have at all times material to the action, been acting colores officii. In other words, if the facts show that although he was holding a public office, his act which is called in question in the action is contrary to, or has no connection with, his duties in the public office which he holds, he cannot take advantage of the provisions of the statute. Cases decided in England under the Public Authorities Protection Acts amply support the proposition see, for example Irving v. Wilson & Anor. (1791) 100 E.R. 1132; Morgan v. Palmer (1824) 107 E.R. 554; S. Pearson & Son Ltd. v. Lord Mayor, etc. Dublin (1907) A.C. 351, H.L. (P.C.).
Ademola, J., (as he then was) encapsulated the principle in Olatunji’s case where he stated at p.52:
“Now it is clear that whilst protection is afforded by this section, one who claims the protection must have acted colores officii and not for his own benefit.”
In Nwankwere v. Adewunmi, (supra) although “good faith” was mentioned in the judgment, it is clear from a careful reading of the judgment that the real reason why the defendant was deprived of the protection of the statute was that his detention of the plaintiff’s certificate of road-worthiness for three months after he had tested and passed the plaintiffs motor vehicle in order to extort a bribe and the consequent damage for which he was sued had nothing to do with his official functions as a Vehicle Inspection Officer. It appears to me from all the decided cases that the real divide between cases in which the public officer is protected and those in which he is not is marked by the question of whether he was acting pursuant to or in execution of his official function. Where this question is answered in the affirmative, malice or ulterior motive cannot deprive the officer of the statutory protection intended for him. If the appellant keeps these principles in view, he will be able to appreciate the reasonings in the different decisions he discussed.
In the instant case, as it has been conceded that all the respondents did just what they were officially supposed to do, even though, as alleged. Maliciously, they were entitled to be protected under the statute. They cannot be sued for those official acts more than three months of the accrual of the cause of action.
For these reasons, I agree with my learned brother, Uwais, J.S.C., and also dismiss the appeal with the same orders made by him. Appeal dismissed.

 

Appearances

Fred Egbe For Appellant

 

AND

Seyi Sowemimo, Esq.
D.A. Omolade, Esq., Assistant Director of Civil Litigation, Federal Ministry of Justice (with him, K.F. Ozuzu, Esq., State Counsel, Federal Ministry of Justice) For Respondent