FRANK JOWAN & ORS. v. DELTA STEEL COMPANY LTD.
(2010)LCN/3784(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 13th day of May, 2010
CA/B/214/2002
RATIO
COURT: DUTY OF A COURT NOT TO GO BEYOND THE CLEAR TERMS OF THE CLAIM BEFORE IT
It is one of the guiding principles of adjudication in matters like this one that a Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction cannot go beyond the clear terms of the claim before it or make any attempt to do a panel beating work on it. PER ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL. J.C.A.
LABOUR LAW: HOW ARE EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE DISPUTES RESOLVED
It is also important to note that in any employer/employee dispute, it is the applicable conditions of service or any other stipulation incorporated or deemed to have been incorporated into it that must be referred to and applied in the resolution of the dispute. The conditions of service have been described as the bedrock of any contract of service. See KALE v. CBN (1999) 5 SCNJ 2. PER ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL. J.C.A.
JUSTICES
GEORGE OLADEINDE SHOREMI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
FRANK JOWAN & 77 OTHERS Appellant(s)
AND
DELTA STEEL COMPANY LTD Respondent(s)
ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL. J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Federal High Court, Benin Judicial Division in Suit No. FHC/B/142/95 delivered on 6th August,2002. The appellants were employed on different dates by the Respondent. Each of them had worked in different capacities for a period of over ten years. In the year 1995, the respondent embarked on a staff rationalization exercise in the course of which the appellants were declared redundant. By a letter dated 6th October, 1995, the Respondent, upon declaring the appellants’ redundant dispensed with their services.
In November, 1995, the appellants, as Plaintiffs, brought a representative action before the lower Court, on behalf of themselves and other staff of the Respondent that were affected by the staff rationalization exercise that led to the loss of their respective employments. In their further Amended Statement of Claim dated 6th November, 2000, the Appellants, as Plaintiffs before the lower Court claimed as follows: –
1. A declaration that the letter titled “REDUNDANCY” issued by the Defendant and served on the Plaintiffs between the 4th of October, 1995 and 6th of October, 1995 with which the Defendant purports to have dispensed with the service of the Plaintiffs is illegal, null, void and of no consequence or effect whatsoever;
2. A declaration that the Plaintiffs are entitled to continue to remain in the employment of the Defendant and enjoy all the entitlements, rights and privileges of that status, unless and until their appointments were validly terminated in a manner that accords with laid down procedures and all relevant laws;
3. A declaration that the Plaintiffs are entitled to their remuneration and all forms of entitlements due to them during the pendency of this action;
4. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant from withdrawing, tampering, interfering or in any way depriving the Plaintiffs and their dependants of all the rights, benefits, entitlements and privileges of the ‘status of staff heretofore enjoyed by the Plaintiffs, relating but not limited to housing, educational, medical and recreational facilities; and
5. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant from rejecting the Plaintiffs from staff residential quarters and/or denying Plaintiffs and their dependants access to staff medical clinic and schools absolutely or on terms made more onerous as a consequence of the purported sack of the Plaintiffs in a manner not in accord with laid down procedures and all relevant laws.
Issues were duly joined in the filed and exchanged pleadings and the matter went to trial. At the trial oral and documentary evidence were adduced. After the addresses of respective learned Counsel, the lower Court gave its judgment wherefor it dismissed the claim in Suit No. FHC/B/142/95 for lacking in merit. The Plaintiffs/Appellants were dissatisfied with this decision and appealed to this Court vide a notice of appeal dated 7th August, 2002.
In a 2nd Amended Brief of Argument dated 19/09/06 and filed on 20/09/06 but deemed properly filed and served on 21/02/07, the appellants formulated the following 4 issues for determination in this appeal. They are: –
i. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that the Labour Act does not apply between the appellants and the respondent;
ii. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that the Respondent company, by virtue of being wholly owned by the Federal Government is not a Public Company;
iii. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that there is no nexus between the condition of service (Exh. C) and the Labour Act; and
iv. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in predicating his judgment on a point not canvassed by the parties at the trial.
In its brief of argument the Respondent identified the following 3 issues for determination. They are: –
i. Whether the provisions of the Labour Act CAP 198 LFN on redundancy apply to the employment of the appellants when Exhibit C has made similar provisions on redundancy;
ii. Whether the mere reason that the Respondent Company is l00% owned by the Federal Government of Nigeria elevates the status of the appellants to that of employment with statutory flavour; and
iii. Whether in the circumstances of this case the Appellants are entitled to be re-instated to their
employment.
At the hearing of this appeal before us on 16th February, 2010, respective learned Counsel identified, adopted and relied on their respective briefs. Learned Counsel to the Appellants adopted and relied on the appellants 2nd Amended brief of argument and reply brief and urged this Court to allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the lower Court. Also, learned Counsel to the Respondent adopted and relied on the Respondent’s brief of argument and urged the Court to dismiss this appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower Court dismissing the suit of the appellants for want of a reasonable cause of action.
Having regards to the judgment of the lower Court, the grounds of appeal and the issues distilled therefrom by the appellants, I am of the view that the 1st and 3rd issue formulated by the appellants encapsulate one and the same question or complaint on the judgment of the lower Court. I would therefore merge these 2 issues and consider the argument and submissions of the Appellants on them together.
In arguing these issues learned Counsel to the appellants Chief E. L. Akpofure SAN, after reviewing some of the undisputed evidence on record submitted that the provisions of S.86 of the Labour Act is applicable to the contract of service between the Appellants and the Respondent in conjunction with the approved conditions of service pleaded and admitted in evidence as Exhibit C. In addition to submissions, learned Counsel made other efforts to create a link or nexus between Exhibit C and the provisions of the Labour Act and also to show that those provisions were not complied with in the declaration of the redundancy which led to the loss of jobs by the appellants. Upon this background learned Counsel to the Appellants went further to submit that the lower Court was wrong to hold and decide that the Labour Act was not applicable to the case of the Appellants and this error occasioned a miscarriage of justice on the appellants.
In his reply to these issues learned Counsel to the Respondent Mr. Abijogun also began by underscoring some of undisputed facts in this matter and explained that the law is now fully settled that where there is a condition of service governing any particular contract of employment it operates to the exclusion of all other considerations. Learned Counsel added further that a Court is enjoined not to look outside the identified and established conditions of service in determining the rights and obligations of the parties thereto. In support of these explanations learned Counsel referred to and relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in KATTO v. CBN (1995) 5 SCNJ 1 and FAKUADE v. OAUTH (1993) s NWLR (PT.291) 47. Using these 2 decisions as reinforcement and his springboard, learned Counsel urged this Court to discountenance the submissions of learned Counsel to the Appellants that S.20 of the Labour Act applies in conjunction with Exhibit C in the circumstance of this appeal. He also urged this Court to hold that the lower Court was right in deciding that Exhibit C, was the only applicable conditions of service in this matter.
While still referring to the case of FAKUADE v. OAUTH (supra) learned Counsel recalled the facts of that case and pointed out that the same argument was made therein that with respect to redundancy of the Appellant S.19 of the Labour Act was applicable along side the main conditions of service. Learned Counsel emphatically maintained that the Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that the power to declare redundancy was derivable from the contract of service and not the provisions of the Labour Act. In his conclusion learned Counsel urged this Court to hold and affirm the decision of the lower Court that Exhibit C is the applicable conditions of service and that it operates to the exclusion of any provisions of the Labour Act.
It is one of the guiding principles of adjudication in matters like this one that a Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction cannot go beyond the clear terms of the claim before it or make any attempt to do a panel beating work on it. It is also important to note that in any employer/employee dispute, it is the applicable conditions of service or any other stipulation incorporated or deemed to have been incorporated into it that must be referred to and applied in the resolution of the dispute. The conditions of service have been described as the bedrock of any contract of service. See KALE v. CBN (1999) 5 SCNJ 2.
As is customary, the appellants pleaded their conditions of service in the amended statement of claim as follows: –
4. “That the terms of employment of the Plaintiffs by the Defendant are as contained in their respective letters of appointment, the approved condition of service for Federal Government Owned Steel Companies as updated from time by various circulars, as well as provisions of relevant sections of the Labour Act (at the trial of this action plaintiffs shall rely on the current approved conditions of service for Federal Government Owned steel Companies 1989 as updated by various circulars hereby plead same and serve notice on the Defendant to produce original copies of same.”
This paragraph of the amended statement of claim was admitted in paragraph 5 of the statement of defence only to the extent that it is only the approved conditions of service for Federal Government Owned Steel Companies that apply to the contractual relationship of the Appellants and the Respondent. At the trial these approved conditions referred to in the respective letters of employment of the Appellants was tendered and admitted in evidence. It is Exhibit C.
It is trite law that where there is a document or series of documents incorporating the terms and conditions of an employment, a Court of law should not look outside those terms in deciding the rights and obligations of parties thereto. With respect to the facts and circumstances of this appeal, there was no other document that was put in evidence to indicate same being conditions of service apart from Exhibit C. This Exhibit C is in line with part of paragraph 4 of the amended statement of claim. The averment that the conditions of service were from time to time updated by circulars etc must be deemed to have been abandoned to the extent that no such circulars were adduced in evidence.
I have carefully read the provisions of Exhibit C. Paragraph 9.01.5 at page 29 appears to me to be of great interest. It provides thus: –
“The Company may declare redundant such staff as it deems fit. A redundant staff shall be entitled to one month’s basic salary for each completed year of service subject to a maximum redundancy payment of one year’s salary. Any redundant staff who has worked for a sufficient length of time to qualify for gratuity and/or pension benefits shall be entitled to them instead.”
Inspite of this provision, learned Counsel to the Appellants had strenuously argued that S.20 of the Labour Act applies to the circumstances of this matter. Let me therefore compare the provisions of S.20 and paragraph 9.01.5.
S.20 (1) Labour Act Cap. 198 LFN 1990.
(1) In the event of redundancy –
a) the employer shall inform the trade union or workers’ representative concerned of the reasons for and the extent of the anticipated redundancy;
b) the principle of “last in, first out” shall be adopted in the discharge of the particular category of workers affected, subject to all factors of relative merit, including skill, ability and reliability; and
c) the employer shall use his best endeavours to negotiate redundancy payment to any discharged workers who are not protected by regulations made under subsection (2) of this section.
2) The Minister may make regulations providing, generally or in particular cases, for the compulsory payment of redundancy allowances on the termination of a worker’s employment because of his redundancy.
3) In this section ‘”redundancy” means an involuntary and permanent loss of employment caused by an excess of manpower.
In the preamble to Exhibit C, its declared objective was stated as to allow for easy reference, discharged and avoidance of misunderstanding and was also stated to be applicable to all the staff of the Defendant. Since Exhibit C has made adequate provisions on redundancy and it has not in any manner whatsoever incorporated any other provisions of any law or regulations to be applicable to the staff of the Defendant, there does not appear to be any room for the provisions of S.20 to be brought in as suggested and argued by learned Counsel to the Appellants. In my humble view, the learned trial judge was right and spot on that in the con and circumstance of this matter the provisions of S.20 of the Labour Act does not apply to the contract of employment between the Appellants and the respondent. Issues 1 and 3 in the Appellants’ brief of argument must therefore be resolved against the appellants and are accordingly hereby so resolved.
I have taken a very hard look at issues 2 and 4 in the brief of the appellants and I do not think it is necessary to go into them after having resolved issues 1 and 3 against the appellants as the main complaints of the appellants in the grounds of appeal appear to have principally predicated on issues I and 3. There is nothing more of any significance to consider again.
This appeal is hereby dismissed for being devoid merit. The judgment of the lower court delivered on 6th August, 2002 dismissing the Appellants’ claim is affirmed. I shall not make any order for costs.
GEORGE OLADEINDE SHOREMI, J.C.A.: I read before now the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother Gumel J.C.A , I agree entirely with the judgment. I also dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower court.
No order as to cost.
CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME (PH.D.) J.C.A.: I agree.
Appearances
For Appellant
AND
For Respondent
