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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA v. UCHENNA IWUAFOR (2019)

 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA v. UCHENNA IWUAFOR

(2019) LCN/4848(SC)

In The Supreme Court of Nigeria

On Thursday, the 21st day of February, 2019

SC.390/2016

RATIO

EFFECT OF PLEADING GUILT TO A CHARGE WHERE THE CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR A VALID ARRAIGNMENT UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 215 AND 218 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH

On pleading guilty, an accused person wholly and voluntarily gave himself up to the law and became his own accuser but then, the question that must be asked and answered is if the condition precedent leading to that plea had been fulfilled and that being whether the accused actually understood the charge as read to him. Therein lies the duty of the trial Court to ensure not only that the charge was read and explained to the accused, it must be in the language he understands, It is no use to read a charge in English language without interpretation to a stark illiterate Ibo man and when he pleads guilty for the Court to say that indeed there was compliance with the law. This is because compliance with Section 215 Criminal Procedure Act is strict and I shall quote the provisions thereof thus:- SECTION 215 CPA: “…The person to be tried upon any charge or information shall be placed before the Court unfettered unless the Court shall see cause otherwise order and the charge or information shall be read over and explained to him to the satisfaction of the Court by the Registrar or other officer of which and such person shall be called upon to plead instantly thereto unless where the person is entitled to service of a copy of the information he objects to the want of such service and the Court finds that he has not been duly served therewith. (Underline mine). Also along the same line is Section 285 (1) CPA which provides as follows:- “…at the commencement of hearing, the Court shall state or cause to be stated to the defendant the substance of the complaint and shall ask him whether he is guilty or not guilty.” The learned counsel for the appellant had made much of Section 33 (2) of the Federal High Court Act Cap F12 LFN, 2004 on the procedure for summary proceedings and anchoring on that, contended that what the learned trial judge did was fine and so Section 33 (2) of the Federal High Court would make it regular for what transpired at the trial Court.Section 33 provides thus: – “(1) Subject to the provision of this Section, Criminal Proceedings before the Court shall be conducted substantially in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act and the provisions of that Act shall, with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of this Act, have effect in respect of all matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Court”. Section 33 (2) then provides: “Notwithstanding the generality of Sub-section (1) of this Section, all criminal causes or matters before the Court shall be tried summarily”.(All emphasis added). The attempt by the appellant to seek a subordination of Section 218 of the CPA by Section 33 of the Federal High Court Act would be a futile act since the fair hearing right of the respondent accused is paramount hence the mandatory nature of the provisions of Sections 215 and 218 CPA. This is because any proceedings without the strict compliance of those provisions of Sections 215 and 218 are rendered a nullity. See Kajubo v The State (supra), Ewe v The State (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.246) 147 at 152-153; Erekanure v The State (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt.294) 3845; Isiaka Rufai v The State 7 NSCQR 420 at 433; Eyorokoromo v The State (1979) 6-9 SC 3; State v Moshood Oladimeji 15 NSCQR 173 at 188-189. The duty required of the trial Court is to ensure the strict compliance with those laws and there is no running away from that obligation. PER MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.

 

JUSTICES

IBRAHIM TANKO MUHAMMAD – Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI – Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD – Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN – Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

AMIRU SANUSI – Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

 

APPELLANTS 

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA  

 

BETWEEN

 

 RESPONDENTS

UCHENNA IWUAFOR 

 

 

 

 

MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal Ibadan Division or Court below or Lower Court delivered on the 5th May 2015, Coram: O. Daniel-Kalio, M. N. Oniyangi, N. Okoronkwo JJCA which upturned the decision, conviction and sentence of the appellant at the trial Federal High Court per Ofili- Ajumogobia J.

The matter at the trial High Court was handled summarily and to make the position clearer as to what transpired at that Court of first instance, I shall cite the charge and the proceedings on the day of arraignment: –
“BETWEEN
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA – COMPLAINANT
AND
(1) UCHENNA IWUAFOR (M) – ACCUSED
CHARGE
That you Uchenna Iwuafor (M) and Mohammed Abubakar (M) on or about the 14th day of January 2008 at Oyo town in Oyo State, within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court without lawful authority knowingly possessed 92 kilogrammes of Cannabis sativa otherwise known as Indian hemp, a narcotic drug similar to cocaine, heroin and LSD thereby committed an offence contrary to and punishable under Section

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11(d) of the NDLEA Act Cap. N.30 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.
(SIGNED)
P. E. UDOMIAYE ESQ., (Prosecuting Counsel)
For: Attorney General of the Federation.

On the 6th day of May, 2008 date of arraignment, the following transpired: –
“BETWEEN:
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA – COMPLAINANT
AND
1. UCHENNA IWUAFOR (M)]
2.MOHAMMED ABUBAKAR(M)] – ACCUSED PERSONS
Case called.
Accused person in Court.
P. E. Udomiaye appears for the prosecution.
Udomiaye: I apply the charge be read to accused persons in order to take plea.
Charge read to both accused persons. Both accused plead guilty.
UDOMIAYE: We urge Court to convict Accused Persons based on their plea.
COURT: 1st Accused can you tell me anything about your circumstances to influence the sentence I am about to hand out to you.
1st Accused Person: My mother is dead. Have mercy on me.
2nd Accused person: I have nobody. For past 4 years, I have not visited Adamawa State my home State.
COURT: In view of their pleas of guilt for the offence of possession 92 Kilogrammes of cannabis sativa contrary to Section 11 (d) of the NDLEA Act Cap N.30 LFN

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2004 I hereby sentenced the 1st and 2nd Accused persons each to 15 years imprisonment with hard labour.
(SIGNED)
HON. JUSTICE R. N. OFILI-AJUMOGOBIA
JUDGE
6TH MAY, 2008”.

BRIEFLY, THE FACTS:
The appellant herein was the complainant at the Federal High Court, Ibadan, Oyo State in a charge wherein the respondent was jointly charged with One Mohammed Abubakar for unlawful possession of 92 Kilogrammes of Cannabis Sativa, a narcotic drug similar to Cocaine, LSD or heroin. The respondent was convicted and sentenced as charged under Section 11 (d) of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Act Cap No.30 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004.
Consequently, the respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal, Ibadan. Upon the hearing of the appeal, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence of the Federal High Court, Ibadan.
The appellant has now filed an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Ibadan.

At the hearing of the appeal on the 6th day of December, 2018, learned counsel for the appellant, Segun Ololade Esq. adopted the amended appellants brief filed on

 

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7/3/18 and deemed filed on 6/12/18 and in the brief were couched two issues for determination, viz:-
1. Whether the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they held that the arraignment of the respondent fell far below the position of the law.
2. Whether in view of the plea of guilty by the respondent, the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in holding that the proof of a crime in a trial is beyond reasonable doubt.

Learned counsel for the respondent, Prince Abioye A. Oloyede – Asanike adopted the amended brief of argument filed on 30/11/2018 and deemed filed on 6/12/18. He made use of the issues as crafted by appellant.
I shall make use of the issues so crafted and together.

ISSUES 1 & 2:
ISSUE 1:
Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they held that the arraignment of the respondent fell far below the position of the law.
ISSUE 2:
Whether in view of the plea of guilty (sic) by the respondent, the learned Justices of Court of Appeal were right in holding that the proof of crime in a trial is beyond reasonable doubt.

 

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Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the respondent was given ample opportunity to defend himself and he opted to plead guilty and accept the facts as presented by the appellant and there being a presumption of regularity in favour of judicial acts all was as shown on the record and in compliance with Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA for short).

He cited Section 168 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011; Ogheneovu v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2013) All FWLR (Pt.667) 704; Nwachukwu v State (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt.1062) 31.

That the issue of expert evidence does not apply where the accused pleads guilty to the charge against him as in the present case. He referred to Omoju v FRN (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt.1085) 38; Offor v State (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt.1333) 421.

Learned counsel stated for the appellant that the Court cannot apply the provisions of the CPA to negate the summary proceedings when the jurisdictional power of the Court is so activated. He referred to Section 33 (1), (2) of the Federal High Court Act; Section 285 of CPA; FRN v Ibori (2014) 13 NWLR (Pt.1423) 168; Uwazuruike & Ors v Attorney General, Federation (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt.1361) 105 etc.

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Responding, learned counsel for the respondent stated that the law is trite that in arraignment of an accused, it is necessary to state the language in which the charge was read and explained to the respondent and the language he spoke which was not done in the case at hand. He cited Kajubo v State (1988)1 NWLR(Pt.83)721; Eyorokoromo v State (1979) 6-9 SC3; Erekanure v State (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt.294) 285; Andrew Idemudia v The State (1999) 5 SCNJ 47 at 55-56.

That there was a clear non-compliance with the provisions of Section 215 CPA during the arraignment at the trial Court so much so that a conviction cannot be sustained thereby since the provisions of Sections 215 and 218 CPA are mandatory and failure to comply with any of them renders the whole proceedings a nullity. He cited Kajubo v The State (supra); Ewe v The State (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.246) page 147 at 152-153; Rufai v The State 7 NSCQR 420 at 433 etc.

What is before this Court has to do with the arraignment of the accused/respondent and whether or not it was properly done and if it can safely be said there was compliance with the requirements of the law. In this instance, the respondent

 

PAGE 6

had pleaded guilty but it has to be reiterated that the mere fact of such a plea is not an open and shut situation and the judge proceed to conviction and sentence without some conditions being in place. On pleading guilty, an accused person wholly and voluntarily gave himself up to the law and became his own accuser but then, the question that must be asked and answered is if the condition precedent leading to that plea had been fulfilled and that being whether the accused actually understood the charge as read to him. Therein lies the duty of the trial Court to ensure not only that the charge was read and explained to the accused, it must be in the language he understands, It is no use to read a charge in English language without interpretation to a stark illiterate Ibo man and when he pleads guilty for the Court to say that indeed there was compliance with the law. This is because compliance with Section 215 Criminal Procedure Act is strict and I shall quote the provisions thereof thus:-
SECTION 215 CPA:
“…The person to be tried upon any charge or information shall be placed before the Court unfettered unless the Court shall see cause otherwise order and

 

PAGE 7

the charge or information shall be read over and explained to him to the satisfaction of the Court by the Registrar or other officer of which and such person shall be called upon to plead instantly thereto unless where the person is entitled to service of a copy of the information he objects to the want of such service and the Court finds that he has not been duly served therewith. (Underline mine).
Also along the same line is Section 285 (1) CPA which provides as follows:-
“…at the commencement of hearing, the Court shall state or cause to be stated to the defendant the substance of the complaint and shall ask him whether he is guilty or not guilty.”
The learned counsel for the appellant had made much of Section 33 (2) of the Federal High Court Act Cap F12 LFN, 2004 on the procedure for summary proceedings and anchoring on that, contended that what the learned trial judge did was fine and so Section 33 (2) of the Federal High Court would make it regular for what transpired at the trial Court.
Section 33 provides thus: –
“(1) Subject to the provision of this Section, Criminal Proceedings before the Court shall be conducted

 

PAGE 8

substantially in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act and the provisions of that Act shall, with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of this Act, have effect in respect of all matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Court”.
Section 33 (2) then provides:
“Notwithstanding the generality of Sub-section (1) of this Section, all criminal causes or matters before the Court shall be tried summarily”.(All emphasis added).
The attempt by the appellant to seek a subordination of Section 218 of the CPA by Section 33 of the Federal High Court Act would be a futile act since the fair hearing right of the respondent accused is paramount hence the mandatory nature of the provisions of Sections 215 and 218 CPA. This is because any proceedings without the strict compliance of those provisions of Sections 215 and 218 are rendered a nullity. See Kajubo v The State (supra), Ewe v The State (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.246) 147 at 152-153; Erekanure v The State (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt.294) 3845; Isiaka Rufai v The State 7 NSCQR 420 at 433; Eyorokoromo v The State (1979) 6-9 SC 3; State v Moshood Oladimeji 15 NSCQR 173 at 188-189.

 

PAGE 9

The duty required of the trial Court is to ensure the strict compliance with those laws and there is no running away from that obligation. Taking that in context to what happened on that day of arraignment, 6th May, 2008 where the prosecutor applied for the charge to be read to the accused persons in order to take their pleas. Indeed, the charge was read but no record of the language used and the next on the record is that both accused pleaded guilty. Again, since the accused were two, the charge ought to be read to each of them and upon the understanding of what was read and explained to him, the individual accused would plead. There is nothing recorded as to any explanation of what was facing the accused and also nothing to show that the learned trial judge was satisfied that the accused knew what he was being told and understood it. What language used is a matter for conjecture and that the law rejects. The trial judge then proceeded to ask the respondent if he had anything to say, again, one guesses this to be the allocutus since the response elicited was:
“My mother is dead. Have mercy on me”.

 

PAGE 10

new_annoThe learned trial judge proceeded with the sentencing since according to her:
“In view of their plea of guilty for the offence of possessing 92 kilogrammes of cannabis sativa contrary to Section 11 (d) of the NDLEA Act Cap N.30 LFN 2004, I hereby sentenced the 1st and 2nd Accused Persons each to 15 years imprisonment with hard labour”.
The appellant’s learned counsel is persuading the Court to accept that Section 168 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011 would apply to get the trial Court off the hook of whether or not compliance with Sections 215 and 218 CPA was in place.
Section 168 (1) provides thus: –
“When any judicial or official act is shown to have been done in a manner substantially regular, it is presumed that formal requisites for its validity were complied with”.
With humility Section 168 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011 is certainly inapplicable here where what was done at the trial Court cannot be said to be substantially regular nor can the mandatory provisions of Sections 215 and 218 CPA which requires strict compliance with the processes carried out and so Evidence Act, Section 168 is out of place here and in

 

PAGE 11

this I am at one with the findings and conclusion of the Court below that what transpired at the trial Court fell below the stipulations of the Criminal Procedure Act and the right of the respondent to fair hearing was compromised. When that is the case there is no justification that would save the day as the entire proceedings are null and void. That an accused pleaded guilty does not take away the rights guaranteed for him by Section 36 of the Constitution 1999 (as amended).
I would want to reiterate that the right to fair hearing is all the more in the course of a plea of guilt since by the admission he has cut short otherwise lengthy and possibly laborious process and so the Court must ensure that he knows and understands the accusation against him and with the shortened distance the burden of proof placed on the prosecution becomes light and so the need to bend a little, making sure he know what he is doing in the process. See Omoju v FRN (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt.1085) 38; Offor v State (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt.1333) 425; Ogheneovu v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2013) All FWLR (Pt.667) 704.
As I said earlier, the respondent had a raw deal at the trial Court and there is no evidence that he understood

 

PAGE 12

what he was there for and why and what the plea was. The Court below cannot be faulted in the findings and conclusion which I adopt. The appeal lacks merit and I dismiss it as I affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal which acquitted and discharged the respondent.

IBRAHIM TANKO MUHAMMAD, Ag. C.J.N..: 
This is an appeal against the Judgment of the Court of Appeal, Ibadan Division, delivered on the 5th May, 2015. The Appellant was the complaint at the trial Court which is the Federal High Court, Ibadan, Oyo State. Wherein the respondent was jointly changed with one Mohammed Abubakar for unlawful possession of 92 kilogrammes of Cannabis Sativa. The respondent was convicted and sentenced under Section 11 (d) of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Act, Cap. N30 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004.

He consequently appealed to the Court of Appeal, Ibadan, in which the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence of the trial Court.
There are two (2) issues for determination in this appeal;
(1) “Whether the Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they held that the

 

PAGE 13

arraignment of the respondent fell far below the provision of the Law.”
(2) “Whether in view of the plea of guilty by the respondent, the Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in holding that the requirement for proof of a crime in a trial is ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’.”

I have the privilege of reading in advance the Judgment of my Learned brother Odili, JSC; I agree with his reasoning and conclusion that the appeal is lacking in merit and same should be dismissed.
I, too, hereby, dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.

MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.: Having read in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI J.S.C. just delivered I entirely agree with the reasoning and conclusion therein that the appeal lacks merit. Accordingly, I also dismiss the appeal and abide by the consequential order made in the lead judgment.


KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C.:  
I have had a preview of the judgment of my learned brother, Mary Peter-Odili, JSC just delivered. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion that this appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.

 

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The proper arraignment of an accused person is the most important aspect of a criminal trial. This is because it affects the accused person’s constitutionally guaranteed right to fair hearing, as provided in Section 36(6) (a) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act makes provision for what constitutes a proper arraignment as follows:
“The person to be tried upon any charge or information shall be placed before the Court unfettered unless the Court shall see cause otherwise to order, and the charge or information shall be read over and explained to him to the satisfaction of the Court by the registrar or other officer of the Court, and such person shall be called upon to plead instantly thereto, unless where the person is entitled to service of a copy of the information he objects to the want of such service and the Court finds that he has not been duly served therewith.”
This Court has, in numerous decisions, held that the provisions are mandatory and failure to comply would render the trial a nullity. See: Kajubo Vs The State(1988) 1NWLR (Pt.73) 721@ 732 E -F; Eyorokoromo Vs The State (1979)

 

PAGE 15

6  9 SC 3; Josiah Vs The State (1985) 1 SC 406 @ 416.
The brief summary proceedings at the trial Court on 6th May 2008 can be found at page 2 of the record as follows:
“Case called.
Accused person in Court
P.E. Udomiaye appears for the prosecution.
Udomiaye: I apply the charge be read to accused persons in order to take plea. Charge read to both accused persons. Both accused plead guilty.
Udomiaye: We urge Court to convict Accused Persons based on their plea.
Court: 1st Accused can you tell me anything about your circumstances to influence the sentence I am about to hand out to you.
1st Accused Person: My mother is dead. Have mercy on me.
2nd Accused Person: I have nobody. For past 4 years, I have not visited Adamawa State my home State.
Court: In view of their plea of guilt for the offence of possessing 92 Kilogrammes of cannabis sativa contrary to Section 11 (d) of the NDLEA Act Cap N30 LFN 2004 I hereby sentence the 1st and 2nd Accused Persons each to 15 years imprisonment with hard labour.”
The Court below made several findings arising from the proceedings reproduced above, which include the following:

 

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  1. That there is nothing on the record to show in what language the charges were read and explained to the appellant.
    2. The plea was not recorded in the words used by the appellant.
    3. Non-observance of the requirements of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act negates the principle of fair hearing and fair trial which renders the proceedings void.
    4. There was no expert evidence before the Court confirming that what the appellant had in his possession was indeed weeds suspected to be Indian Hemp otherwise known as Cannabis sativa, the subject of the charge brought under Section 11(d) of the National Drug and Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Act Cap. N.30 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
    5. There is nowhere in the proceedings where the appellant was pronounced guilty before calling on him for allocutus.
    6. There were two accused persons before the Court who ought to have been convicted and sentenced separately but the record does not reflect that this was done.
    I shall stop here. I am in full agreement with the lower Court and my learned brother in the lead judgment that there was a

 

PAGE 17

clear breach of the appellant’s right to fair hearing from the beginning of the proceedings to its conclusion. As observed by His Lordship Mudashiru Nasiru Oniyangi, JCA who wrote the lead judgment, in the exercise of its powers to convict an accused person on the basis of his guilty plea, the Court must act judicially and judiciously and not irrationally or whimsically. The provisions of the law must be strictly complied with. It is most unfortunate that the appellant was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in such a cavalier manner. Much more is expected from those of us entrusted with the sacred duty of adjudication over our fellow men.

For these and the better marshalled reasons advanced in the lead judgment, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal. It is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the lower Court is affirmed.

AMIRU SANUSI, J.S.C.: I have read before now the lead judgment prepared by my learned brother Mary Peter-Odili, JSC I am in entire agreement with her reasoning and conclusion that this appeal is devoid of any merit and have to be dismissed. While adopting them as mine, I however for purpose of emphasis, wish to chip in a few words of mine in support of the judgment.

 

PAGE 18

As could be gleaned from the record, the respondent, as accused person, and one other person were on 6th May, 2008 arraigned before the trial Court (Coram Ajumogobia J) on a charge of being found in possession of 92 kilograms of Cannabis sativa (Indian Hemp), contrary to Section 11 (d) of NDLEA Act Cap N30 LFN 2004. The record shows that after reading the charge to the two accused persons, the learned trial judge simply recorded thus “accused plead guilty.” The Court thereupon proceeded to convict and sentence them.
It seems to me and as shown in the record,
(1) that an interpreter not was called to interpret the proceedings to the respondent and his co-accused
(2) There is no indication that the charge was read and explained to the respondent.
(3) Their pleas were not taken separately
(4) The substance allegedly found in their possession were not tendered at the proceedings
(5) Analysis report from government chemist was/were not tendered to confirm that the substance allegedly found in their possession were cannabis sativa/Indian Hemp.
By virtue of the provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal

PAGE 19

Procedure Act, any person to be tried upon any charge shall be placed before the Court unfettered, unless the Court shall otherwise order, and the charge shall be read over and explained to him to the satisfaction of the Court by the registrar or other officer of the Court and such person shall be called to plead instantly thereto, unless where the person is entitled to service of a copy of the charge, he objects to the want of such service and the Court finds that he has not been served therewith. See State V Emmanuel Olabode (2009)11 NWLR (pt.1152)254; Sharfal v The State (1992) NWLR (pt.255)570.
Therefore, an arraignment simply consists of charging the accused and reading over and explaining the charge to him to the satisfaction of the Court then followed by Akpiri Ewe v. State (1992) 7SCNJ 15 OR 1992 NWLR (pt.246) 147; Sunday Kajubo V The State (1988) NWLR (pt.73)721; Oyediran vs The Republic (1967) NMLR 122;GODWIN JOSIAH v. THE STATE (1985) 1 SC 406 AT 416.
In the present appeal, the record clearly shows a glaring non-compliance with the provisions of Section 215 of Criminal Procedure Act as well as the provisions of Section

PAGE 20

36 of the Constitution  of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) for want of explanation of the charge to the respondent and there is also no indication as to what language was used in reading the charge to the appellant and who did so since there interpreter reflected in no indication that the service of an not shown or reflected in the record.
Thus, in the light of the above, I too shall hold that trial of the respondent and sentence was a null, void and of no effect whatsoever. I therefore join my learned brother in holding that this appeal lacks merit and must be dismissed. I accordingly dismiss the appeal and endorse the judgment of the Court below which had, rightly in view, ordered the acquittal and discharge of the present respondent.

 

 

 

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Appearances:

Segun Ololade
For Appellant(s)

Prince Abioye A. Oloyede-Asanike For Respondent(s)

 

Appearances

Segun Ololade For Appellant

 

AND

Prince Abioye A. Oloyede-Asanike For Respondent