FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTRE, IDO EKITI & ORS. V. OMIDIORA KOLAWOLE O.
(2011)LCN/4726(CA)
RATIO
GROUND OF APPEAL: CONSEQUENCE OF NOT FORMULATING AN ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION FROM A GROUND OF APPEAL
It is trite that where no issue is formulated from a ground of appeal, the ground is deemed abandoned the resultant effect is that the said ground 2 of the additional grounds of appeal is deemed abandoned. In the case of ONUOHA VS. NDUBUEZE (2001) 48 WRN 84 at 91, the court held thus: “It is trite law that where an issue is not formulated from a ground of appeal the ground of appeal is deemed to have been abandoned”. PER CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.
EMPLOYMENT: WHAT THE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT AN EMPLOYMENT IS STATUTORILY FLAVOURED; CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYMENT; WHAT IS AN EMPLOYMENT WITH STATUTORY FLAVOUR
The appellants gave the conditions required before an employment could be said to have statutory flavour. In determining whether the respondent’s appointment is statutorily flavoured or not in line with the appellants’ view, the courts have held that recourse should be had to the contents of the letter of appointment. In the case of N.I.I.A. VS AYANFALU (2007) page 265 (SUPRA) this court enumerated the three categories of employment as follows:- (a) A pure master/servant relationship under the common law. (b) Employment where the office is held at pleasure. (c) Employment protected by statute see IDERIMA V. R.S.C.S.C. (2005) 7 SC (PART 111) 135; (2005) 16 NWLR (PART 951) 378; OLANIYAN V. UNILAG (1985) 2 NWLR (PART 9) 599. An employment with statutory flavour is one where the procedure for employment and discipline are governed by statute. The conditions of service would determine whether the respondent’s termination of his employment was done following due process. PER CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.
ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT: WHETHER A REINSTATEMENT ORDER IS THE PROPER ORDER TO MAKE WHERE IT IS SHOWN THAT THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED IN THE REMOVAL FROM OFFICE OF A PERSON WHOSE APPOINTMENT HAD STATUTORY FLAVOUR, WAS UNLAWFUL, NULL, AND VOID.
Having held that the respondent’s appointment had statutory flavour and that the procedure adopted in his removal was unlawful, null and void, the natural sequence of events would be an order re-instating the respondent. The termination being null and void, it is as if the respondent was never dismissed and the employment still subsisting. The trial court was therefore right to have ordered the re-instatement of the respondent. See, U.N.T.H.M.B. VS NNOLI (1994) 8 NWLR (PART 363) 376; OGIEVA v. IGBINEDO (2004) 14 NWLR (PART 894) 467 and SALIMAN VS KWARA POLY (2006) 5 NWLR (PART 974) 477 and ADEFEMIWA VS. OSUN STATE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, ILESA (SUPRA). PER CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 14th day of July, 2011
CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal arose from the judgment of the Federal High Court, Akure, Ondo State presided over by Lambo J. Akanbi, J delivered on the 2nd day of October, 2007, the suit was subsequently transferred to the Ado-Ekiti Judicial Division of the Federal High Court on creation of same.
The respondent herein was the plaintiff in the High Court, a nursing officer employed by the 1st appellant herein (then defendant) on the 24th day of September, 1999 as a Nursing Officer I. The letter of appointment is dated 24th September 1999, with reference NO FMC/ID |EK/ADM/678. By a letter reference No. FMC/ID/EK/232 dated 14th November, 2002 the respondent was confirmed. He was by a letter dated 13th July, 2004, Ref. No. FMC/ID/EK/P.158 /41 promoted to Principal Nursing Superintendent Grade II, a Senior Staff. The appellants found the respondent culpable for his role in refusing to allow a Medical Doctor perform an operation in the theatre, which resulted in the death of a mother and child and his appointment was terminated by the 1st appellant. The respondent as plaintiff originally filed his action at the Federal High Court, Akure. The learned trial judge on 2nd October, 2007 gave judgment in favour of the respondent and ordered the reinstatement of the respondent among other reliefs. The appellants were dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial court, appealed to this court.
The appellants originally filed a sole ground in their original notice of appeal dated 8/10/07 filed on 9/10/07, later amended on application on 14/10/09 when the amended Notice dated 17/7/08, filed on 18/7/08 was deemed as properly filed and served. The amended Notice of appeal had additional grounds 2 – 6. From the six (6) grounds of appeal, the appellant distilled four (4) issues for determination. They are:-
1. “Whether the trial court was justified in holding that the Plaintiff/Respondent’s employment is one with statutory flavour.
2. Whether the trial judge was justified in ordering reinstatement of the plaintiff/Respondent.
3. Whether the procedure adopted in terminating the appointment of the Plaintiff/Respondent violate the rules of natural justice.
4. Whether from the issues arising, the trial court was justified in ordering payment of all salaries and allowances to the Plaintiff/Respondent.”
The respondent on his part adopted the issues formulated by the appellant even though he was of the opinion they are not apt and pungent, thus:
(i) “Whether the trial judge was not justified in holding that the plaintiff-respondent’s employment is one with statutory flavour.
(ii) Whether the trial judge was not justified in ordering reinstatement of the plaintiff-respondent.
(iii) Whether the procedure adopted by the appellant in terminating the appointment of the respondent did not violate the rules of natural justice.
(iv) Whether from the issues arising before the trial court, the court was not right in ordering the payment of all salaries and allowances to the respondent.”
In arguing the appeal, the learned counsel to the appellants, Kola Kolade Esq., adopted and relied upon his brief of argument dated 4th October, 2010, filed on the same day but, deemed properly filed and served on 1st November, 2010. In arguing his issue one, it was submitted that the respondent’s employment is not one with statutory flavour, therefore that the respondent owed the duty of proving the conditions of service, of his employment and the breach thereof to entitle him to judgment, Learned counsel gave the conditions for an employment to be held to have statutory flavour as:
1) The employer must be a body set up by a statute.
2) The establishing statute must make express provisions regulating the employment of the staff of the category of the employee concerned.
Reliance was placed on the case of CHIEF TAMUNOEMI IDONIBOYE-OBU VS NIGERIA NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION (2005) 3 NLLR PART 8, 276 at 281 and BABATUNDE V. OSHOGBO STEEL ROLLING AND CO. LTD (2005) 2 NNLR PART 5, 294 at 302. It was the submission of counsel that the 1st Appellant who employed the respondent is not a creation of any law, even though a parastatal under the Federal Ministry of Health, that it hires and fires its staff without recourse to the Federal Civil Service Commission, Also, that the Federal Ministry of Health does not interfere in the issues of employment of the 1st appellant’s staff.
Further, that the respondent failed to prove his terms of employment and conditions of service. Learned counsel was of the opinion that the trial court was wrong to have relied on the evidence of the respondent that he was employed by the 1st appellant on a delegated authority from the Federal Civil Service Commission, even though the appellants denied such delegation. To succeed in an action for wrongful termination, it was submitted that the following conditions must be placed before the court:
(a) The terms of the contract of employment and
(b) Proof of the manner in which the terms were breached by the employer.
The case of KATTO V. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (2005) 2 NLLR 4 page 1, page 6 was cited and relied upon. The learned counsel contended that the respondent failed to prove that his employment was governed by the Civil Service Rules. Part of the content of the respondent’s appointment letter was reproduced as follows:
Your conditions of service will generally be in accordance with those applicable in cognate institution within the Federal Public Service, as may be adopted or varied from time to time.”
The above, stated terms was said not to be delegated authority, and confirms that the 1st appellant is not bound by the Public Service Rules, particularly when it states “as may be adopted or varied from time to time.” Further, that since the 1st appellant could vary the said Rules, it cannot be bound by it and that the respondent failed to prove how such rules bind the appellants, in citing and relying on the case of AMODU V. AMODE (1990) 5 NWLR PART 150, 356 at 373, where it was held that “the terms of the contract of service are the bedrock of the Appellant’s case” argued that the respondent failed to prove the terms of his employment, It was the contention of learned counsel that a public servant who seeks the protection of rules and regulations must prove that he was employed subject to those rules and regulations. See IDONIBOYE-OBU V. NNPC (SUPRA). We were urged to allow the appeal.
On their issue two, it was the argument of learned counsel that, the learned trial judge ought not to have ordered reinstatement of the respondent. It was argued that since the respondent’s employment is not one with statutory flavour, and since he who hires can fire, the 1st appellant is empowered to terminate the respondent’s employment with or without reason, in this case that the reason is justified, that of gross misconduct. See, NITEL PLC V. AWKA (2006) 1 FWLR PART 285, 61 at 65, relied upon by the appellants. Finally, that, the court cannot force an employee on an unwilling employer.
With the appellant’s third issue, it was the contention of the learned counsel that the procedure adopted by the 1st appellant did not in any way violate the rule of natural justice, of fair hearing. It was argued that the respondent was given fair hearing since he was given queries to which he answered, which was said to be enough, preceding any disciplinary action.
Apart from the queries, the 1st appellant also set up an internal staff disciplinary committee to inquire into the allegation of misconduct against the respondent, a ministerial committee was also set up to inquire into the allegation. It was argued that the respondent stated his case before the two committees and was unable to clear himself of the allegations, which resulted in the termination of his appointment by the 1st appellant. It was argued that contrary to the view of the trial court that there was no fair trial, thus this appeal ought to succeed,
On the fourth and last issue formulated by the appellant, the learned counsel argued that the respondent is not entitled to the salaries and allowances as ordered by the trial court. It was argued that if the respondent’s termination is held to have been proper, all other ancillary reliefs must fail. On the other hand, without conceding, that assuming the respondent was wrongly terminated, his remedy would not be reinstatement or full entitlement but, only in what he would have earned in the period of notice required to be given. Since there was no agreement, a reasonable time. See, NITEL V. AKWA (SUPRA).
We were urged to set aside the judgment of the trial court that held that the respondent’s appointment is one with statutory flavour without any evidence in support.
The undated respondent’s brief was filed on 29th November, 2010 which the learned counsel to the Respondent Olabanjo Ayenakin Esq., (with Lola Adewumi Miss) adopted and relied upon in responding to the learned counsel to the appellants’ submissions. To start with, the learned counsel to the respondent urged us to deem ground two of the appellants’ additional grounds of appeal as abandoned, as no issue was formulated from it.
In his issue one, Mr Ayenakin submitted that in deciding whether the respondent’s appointment had statutory flavour, the courts have held that recourse should be had to the content of the letter of appointment, reference was made to the case of N.I.I.A. VS AYANFALU (2007) 2 NWLR PART (1018) page 246. Learned counsel reproduced the contents of the respondent’s appointment letter, earlier reproduced in this judgment. Reference was also made to the respondent’s averment in his pleadings to the effect that his appointment was in contradiction to the Public Service Rules, in his Reply to the Statement of Defence. It was argued that this was neither contradicted nor traversed by the appellants; the same was argued to have been admitted. See, NWARANTA V. EGBOKA (2006) ALL FWLR PART 338, 768, 772 and LUFTHANSA AIRLINES V. ODIESE (2006) 7 NWLR PART 975, 49. Learned counsel contended that since the respondent’s employment was subject to the RULES, his employment enjoyed statutory flavour, see. IDERIMA V. RIVERS STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2005) 16 NWLR PART 951 page 378, where the Apex Court held that Public Service Rules have constitutional force. The case of TAMUNOEMI OBU VS NNPC (SUPRA) was distinguished.
Further, that by the provisions of the Public Service Rules (PSR), Rules 02101 and 01001 applies to the respondent’s employment, which was evident by the contents of the respondent’s letter of appointment. The respondent also pleaded the Public Service Rules under which his appointment was made. We were urged to resolve this issue in favour of the respondent.
On the appellants’ second issue, it was the submission of the learned counsel that once a court has come to the conclusion that the appointment of an employee is statutorily flavoured, and the rules have been breached, the necessary order the court would make is that of reinstatement and payments of the employee’s entitlements. Reliance was placed on the case of ADEFEMIWA V. OSUN STATE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, ILESA (2009) ALL FWLR PART 456, 1860, 1862.
In arguing his issue three, the learned counsel to the respondent submitted that the procedure adopted in terminating the respondent’s appointment violated the Rules of fair hearing. The appellants had argued that a query was given to the respondent prior to the termination of his appointment and a disciplinary panel set up to try him but the learned counsel to the respondent stressed that this was not the position and that apart from the averments in the pleadings of the appellants, there was no evidence to prove such query and that a panel was set up, also that there was no evidence to show that the Board of the 1st appellant summoned the respondent.
The procedure stipulated under Rule 04306 of the Public Service Rules; requiring issuance of a query, invitation to a panel and shown whatever document or witnesses that would testify against him were breached. See, KWARA STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. ABIODUN (2009) ALL FWLR PART 493, 1315, 1367, which gave the effect of a termination that has been declared null and void, it is like there was never a dismissal and would be entitled to be restored to their status quo ante. See, IDERIMA V. RIVERS STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2005)(SUPRA), SHTTTA-BEY V. FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION (1981) 1 S.C. 40.
The Generic Guidelines for the Reform of Public Service under which the appellants claim as the basis for the termination of the respondent’s appointment was also not tendered, but the appellants did admit that the Guideline commenced or became operative in 2007, while the respondent’s appointment was terminated on 18th November, 2005. It was argued that the learned trial judge rightly found that the PSR was not followed before the appointment of the respondent was terminated and was right in ordering his reinstatement and payment of all his entitlements.
Under the respondent’s issue four (even though also headed issue three, (iii), learned counsel to the respondent adopted his argument on issue two in urging us to resolve this issue in favour of the respondent, We were urged to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial court,
The issues raised by the appellants were adopted by the respondent with a slight difference in the wordings that of the respondent posed in the negative. I will utilize the issues as raised by the appellants in determining this appeal.
The resolution of the first issue would lead to the answer to issue three, resolution of issue two, would assist in resolution of issue four. For convenience and sequence, I would resolve the issues in the following order: issues 1, 3, 2 and 4, Before going into the resolution of the issues raised, I do agree with the learned counsel to the respondent that ground two of the appellants’ additional grounds of appeal on the trial court’s holding that the 1st and 3rd appellants are juristic persons was not considered or included under the issues formulated by the appellants.
It is trite that where no issue is formulated from a ground of appeal, the ground is deemed abandoned the resultant effect is that the said ground 2 of the additional grounds of appeal is deemed abandoned. In the case of ONUOHA VS. NDUBUEZE (2001) 48 WRN 84 at 91, the court held thus:
“It is trite law that where an issue is not formulated from a ground of appeal the ground of appeal is deemed to have been abandoned”.
Accordingly, the second ground of appeal is struck out.
The appellants had argued that the respondent’s employment was not one with statutory flavour and that it was the respondent’s duty to prove his conditions of service/employment and the breach thereof to have been entitled to judgment. The appellants gave the conditions required before an employment could be said to have statutory flavour. In determining whether the respondent’s appointment is statutorily flavoured or not in line with the appellants’ view, the courts have held that recourse should be had to the contents of the letter of appointment. In the case of N.I.I.A. VS AYANFALU (2007) page 265 (SUPRA) this court enumerated the three categories of employment as follows:-
(a) A pure master/servant relationship under the common law.
(b) Employment where the office is held at pleasure.
(c) Employment protected by statute see IDERIMA V. R.S.C.S.C. (2005) 7 SC (PART 111) 135; (2005) 16 NWLR (PART 951) 378; OLANIYAN V. UNILAG (1985) 2 NWLR (PART 9) 599.
An employment with statutory flavour is one where the procedure for employment and discipline are governed by statute. The conditions of service would determine whether the respondent’s termination of his employment was done following due process.
In the respondent’s amended statement of Claim, paragraphs 3 and 4 averred as follows:-
3. “Plaintiff was offered an appointment by defendant as a Nursing Officer I by a letter reference number FMC/ID/EK/ADM/678 of 24th September, 1999.
4. By a letter reference number FMC/ID/EK/232 of 14th November, 2002 plaintiff appointment was confirmed by the defendants.”
The respondent’s letter of appointment which was tendered before the trial court as Exhibit ‘P1′ read thus:
3. “Your conditions of service will generally be in accordance with those applicable in cognate institutions within the Federal Public Service, as may be adopted or varied from time to time………………..”
Further, in the respondent’s Reply to the Statement of Defence, paragraph 10, he averred as follows:-
10. “Plaintiff shall contend at the trial that the termination of his appointment was in flagrant violation of the Public Service Rules, Evidence shall be led at the trial to this effect.”
The appellants did not contradict or traverse the above averments, which are deemed, admitted. The appellants have in no way faulted the respondent’s letter of appointment which clearly stated that he was employed under the Public Service Rules (PSR), by these therefore the respondent’s appointment had statutory flavour, and the trial court was right to have held so.
The next question that arises is whether the Generic Guidelines for the Reform of Public Service could competently govern the termination of the respondent’s appointment? In paragraph 5 of the appellants’ statement of defence they averred thus:
5. “The Defendants deny paragraph 8 of the plaintiff’s statement of claim and aver that the plaintiff’s appointment was terminated based on Generic Guidelines for the Public Service Reforms of parastatals and being found guilty of gross negligence and general inefficiency. The said Generic Guidelines for the Public Service Reforms in collaboration with Bureaus of Public Enterprises dated March, 2006 is hereby pleaded.”
The respondent in his reply to the statement of defence, challenged the utilization of the guideline in deciding on the termination of his appointment the board removed the respondent on 18th November, 2005, while the Generic Guidelines took effect from March, 2006. The respondent pleaded as follows:-
5. “The Generic Guidelines for the Public Service Reforms referred to in paragraph 5 of the statement of defence has no bearing with the plaintiff’s case as the board decided on plaintiff’s removal on 18th November, 2005 while the Generic Guidelines takes effect from March, 2006.”
The respondent as PW1 also testified (at page 43 of the records) as follows:-
“…….The decision to terminate my appointment was taken in November, 2005 and it was not even communicated to me where the guidelines had not been issued by the Federal Government. When the defendant terminated my appointment. It was after I had left office that the Guidelines Rules were distributed to parastatals. All the guidelines in the rules are not official (sic) to my case.”
The learned trial court held that the respondent’s appointment was terminated on 18th November, 2005 but was not communicated to him until March, 2006, and I agree that the Generic Guideline which came into being in March, 2006 could not have governed an act that took place in November 2005,
Paragraph 5 of the statement of defence of the appellants which pleaded that the respondent’s appointment was terminated under the “Generic Guidelines for the Public Service Reform” also shows that the respondent was appointed under the Public Service Rules, which the appellants acknowledge by their averment.
As to whether the procedure adopted in terminating the appointment of the respondent violated the rules of natural justice, the appellants had argued that before the respondent’s appointment was terminated he had been issued a query, while the respondent insisted he was not issued with one, the appellants did not prove the respondent was issued with a query and failed to tender the one they pleaded in paragraphs 4 and 8 of their statement of defence. While the respondent testified that no disciplinary panel was set up to try him, the appellants who stated otherwise were unable to prove that one was set up. There was also no proof that the appellants’ board summoned the respondent and he failed to show up. I am in agreement with the submissions of the learned respondent’s counsel that mere oral assertions that he was summoned without more are not enough.
Rule 04306 of the Public Service Rules stipulates the procedure to be followed before the appointment of a Senior Public Officer in the cadre of the respondent could be terminated; he must be given a query, invited to a panel, shown whatever document that would be used against him and witnesses that might testify against him. A Public Servant/Officer can only be validly removed from service if the proper procedure prescribed by the Rules has been followed. In the present case, the proper procedure was not adopted in the termination of the respondent’s appointment, a Senior Officer on Grade Level 9. The respondent’s termination letter reads:
TERMINATION OF APPOINTMENT
I am directed to inform you that the Board at its meeting held on 18th November, 2005 at the Board Room of the Centre, decided and approved that your services are no longer required.
Consequently, your appointment with the Centre is hereby terminated with immediate effect. You are to contact the Accountant for your one month’s basic salary in lieu of notice.
Please submit all the properties of the Centre in your possession including staff identity card to your Head of Department for necessary clearance”.
The termination letter Exhibit ‘PP’8 shows clearly that the respondent’s appointment was terminated on 18th November, 2005. See, paragraph 5 of the appellants’ statement of defence earlier reproduced in this judgment.
It is also not disputed by the appellants that the Generic Guidelines was made in March, 2006. The respondent in his evidence before the trial court testified that it was after he had left office that the Guideline Rules were distributed to parastatals. There is no evidence to the contrary. The resultant effect is that the Guidelines could not have been followed in the respondent’s termination for the reason that it had not come into existence when the Board took its decision on 18th November, 2005. The appellants not having followed the laid down procedure for terminating Senior Public Officers, violated the rules of natural justice, the termination is therefore null and void. See, IDERIMA V. R.S.C.S.C. (2005) (SUPRA) SHITTA-BEY VS F.P.S.C. (1981) 1 SC 40; OLANIYAN V. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (SUPRA). I hold that issues 1 and 3 are resolved in favour of the respondent.
The second issue is the question as to whether the reinstatement of the respondent as ordered by the trial court was right? Having held that the respondent’s appointment had statutory flavour and that the procedure adopted in his removal was unlawful, null and void, the natural sequence of events would be an order re-instating the respondent. The termination being null and void, it is as if the respondent was never dismissed and the employment still subsisting. The trial court was therefore right to have ordered the re-instatement of the respondent. See, U.N.T.H.M.B. VS NNOLI (1994) 8 NWLR (PART 363) 376; OGIEVA v. IGBINEDO (2004) 14 NWLR (PART 894) 467 and SALIMAN VS KWARA POLY (2006) 5 NWLR (PART 974) 477 and ADEFEMIWA VS. OSUN STATE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, ILESA (SUPRA).
The learned counsel to the appellants had argued that he who hires can fire, with or without any reason at all, in justifying the 1st appellant’s termination of the respondent’s appointment, this argument does not support the present case but, would apply in ordinary master and servant cases where the terms of the contract of employment would be specified. I am of the humble view that the learned trial judge was justified to have made the order re-instating the respondent. This issue is resolved in favour of the respondent.
The fourth issue was whether the trial judge was justified in ordering payment of all salaries and allowances to the respondent. Since, I have held while resolving the second issue, that the termination of the respondent’s appointment was unlawful, null and void and had the effect of , as if the respondent had never left his office, Obviously, if the respondent is treated like he had never left office, he would and is entitled to all his salaries and allowances as ordered by the learned trial judge, the order is unassailable and a necessary one having held in the preceding issues that the respondent’s employment which has statutory flavour was unlawfully terminated, also having ordered that he be re-instated.
The appellants’ alternative prayer that the respondent be paid what he would have earned in the period of Notice required to be given. In this case where there was no agreement, a reasonable time, does not hold water and is not applicable in the present case, having held that the respondent’s appointment has statutory flavour but, it is applicable where in a contract of service the period of Notice to be given is specified, when breached, the employee would be entitled to payment of salary in lieu of Notice. NITEL V. AKWA (2006) (SUPRA) relied upon by the learned counsel to the appellants does not apply to the present case. See. a recent decision of this division in a similar case, FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTRE, IDO EKITI & 3 ORS VS. ISAAC OLUKAYODE OLAJIDE (UNREPORTED) delivered on 31st MARCH, 2011. Issue four is resolved in favour of the respondent.
In sum, I am of the view and do hold that the appeal is without merit and fails in its entirety, I dismiss it. I affirm the judgment of the learned trial judge L.J. Akanbi, J. delivered on 2nd October, 2007 granting all the reliefs sought in the plaintiff’s claims.
I award costs of N50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira) to the respondent.
UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, J.C.A.: I have read before now the leading judgment of my learned brother C.N. Uwa, JCA, just delivered. I entirely agree with the reasoning and conclusion that the appeal is without merit which I adopt as mine. I also dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial court delivered on the 2nd October, 2007. I also abide by the order as to costs.
HARUNA M. TSAMMANI, J.C.A.: I had the advantage of reading in draft, the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, Chidi Nwaoma Uwa, J.C.A.
My learned brother has adequately considered all the issues raised in this appeal and has come to the conclusion that the appeal is without merit. I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusion my Lord has arrived at and accordingly adopt same as mine. I have nothing else meaningful to add. Accordingly, I also dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower court.
I abide by the order as to cost.
Appearances
Kolawole Kolade Esq.,For Appellant
AND
Olabanjo Ayenakin Esq.,;
Adewumi (Miss);For Respondent
