ETUKAPAN & ANOR v. ESIT & ORS (2020)

ETUKAPAN & ANOR v. ESIT & ORS

(2020)LCN/14132(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Monday, April 27, 2020

CA/C/126/2017A

Before Our Lordships

Uchechukwu Onyemenam Justice of the Court of Appeal

Yargata Byenchit Nimpar Justice of the Court of Appeal

Muhammed Lawal Shuaibu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

1. NSE ESSIEN EYO UMAN ETUKAPAN 2. OLIVER ETIM UMAN ETUKAKPAN APPELANT(S)

And

1. AUGUSTINE ETIM AKPAN ESIT 2. EMMANUEL ETIM AKPAN AKPAN ESIT 3. NSIKAK ETIM AKPAN ESIT 4. FUTURE ETIM AKPAN ESIT RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

THE IMPORTANCE OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

The first issue raised by the Appellants is that of jurisdiction contending that the writ initiating the suit at the Court below was fundamentally defective thereby divesting the Court of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is very important in the adjudication process; see APGA VS. ANYANWU (2014) LPELR-22182 (SC) where the apex Court said as follows:
“The law is by now well settled that jurisdiction is the lifeblood of any adjudication and where it is lacking it would render any proceedings, no matter how well conducted, liable to be set aside for being a nullity. Jurisdiction is so fundamental that once the Court’s jurisdiction to hear a matter is challenged, it must be dealt with and resolved first before any other step in the proceedings. It is because it is so fundamental that it can be raised at any time, in any manner and at any stage of the proceedings. In Petrojessica Enterprises Ltd. v. Leventis Technical Co. Ltd. (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 244) 675 this Court per Belgore, JSC (as he then was) held: “This importance of jurisdiction is the reason why it can be raised at any stage of a case, be it the trial, on appeal to Court of Appeal or to this Court; a fortiori the Court can suo motu raise it. It is desirable that preliminary objection be raised early on issue of jurisdiction; but once it is apparent to any party that the Court may not have jurisdiction it can be raised even viva voce as in this case. It is always in the interest of justice to raise issue of jurisdiction so as to save time and cost and to avoid a trial in nullity.” Also in: Issac Obiuweubi VS. Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 465 @ 494 D- F per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC: “It is thus mandatory that Courts decide the issue of jurisdiction before proceeding to consider any other matter. See Bronik Motors Ltd.” PER NIMPAR, J.C.A.

DUTY OF A LAWYER IN ENDORSING DOCUMENTS

The allegation here is the failure of the legal practitioner to put his name on the writ after his signature to identify who exactly signed the writ. The manner in which a writ is to be signed was settled in the case of SLB CONSORTIUM LTD. VS. NNPC (supra) wherein standard prescribed is as follows:
“All processes filed in Court are to be signed as follows: First, the signature of counsel, which may be any contraption. Secondly, the name of counsel clearly written. Thirdly, who the counsel represents. Fourthly, name and address of the Legal Firm.”
The foundation for the above format is rooted in the Legal Practitioners Act and the Rules of the trial Court. Sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act, Laws of the Federation, 2004.
The identity of a party in an action or whoever is acting on his behalf must be clearly stated. It cannot be shrouded in uncertainty. Likewise, the identity of the legal practitioner acting on behalf of a party must be unambiguously evident and clear. A legal practitioner must be one who is described by the provisions of Sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act. A legal practitioner who can validate a Court process must be a named legal practitioner whose name is on the Roll of Legal Practitioners in the Supreme Court of Nigeria and registered to practice as a Barrister and Solicitor in this country. The provisions of Sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act have received judicial interpretation, the import of which is now well settled, a process prepared and filed in a Court of law by a legal practitioner must be signed by a legal practitioner who must also be named on the face of the process, see OKAFOR VS. NWEKE (2007) 10 NWLR (PT 1043) 521; FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC VS. MAIWADA (2012) LPELR-9713(SC); SLB CONSORTIUM LTD. VS. NNPC (2011) 4 SCNJ 211; (2011) 9 NWLR (PT 1252) 317; (2011) LPELR-3074(SC). PER NIMPAR, J.C.A.

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State sitting at Uyo and delivered on the 14th October, 2016 by Hon. Justice I. E. Ukana wherein the judgment was entered in favour of the Respondents. Dissatisfied with the decision, the Appellant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal setting out 6 grounds of Appeal.

Facts relevant to this appeal are amenable to brevity. The respondents initiated a claim before the court below wherein they sought the following reliefs:
i. A declaration that the practice of granting land every farming season to the family of the defendants by the Claimants on agreement that certain items as tributes shall be given to the claimants’ family creates customary tenancy.
ii. A Declaration that the acts of the Defendants of claiming ownership of the 20 parcels of land granted to the Defendants by the Claimants in 2002 terminates the customary tenancy and liable to forfeiture.
iii. A Declaration that the encroachment by the defendants on the 18 parcels of land belonging to the Claimants that were not in dispute

amounted to trespass.
iv. An order of Court quashing the judgment of the Offot Ukwa Clan Council which was reached in error.
v. A Declaration that the Claimants are entitled to the statutory right of occupancy over disputed pieces of land at Ndon Essien alias Obot Umana.
vi. An Order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants by themselves or through their agents, privies and workmen from trespassing on either the 20 parcels or 18 pieces of land situate at Ndon essien alias Obot Umana in Nsukka Offort.

The matter proceeded to trial with the Claimant calling 3 witnesses while the Appellant (as defendant) called 2 witnesses. Counsel to both sides filed their final written addresses which were adopted and after which the trial court found for the claimants and dissatisfied with the decision, the Appellants filed this Appeal.

The Appellants’ Brief settled by IMEH ATANG JNR, ESQ., is dated 12th March, 2018 and filed on the 13th March, 2018. It distilled 4 issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether the Respondents had properly invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear and determine the suit when the

initiating process was not properly signed by a legal practitioner known to law. (Ground 4 of the Amended Notice of Appeal).
2. Whether or not the learned trial judge had properly evaluated Exhibit D when he held at p. 352 of the record of appeal that “inspite of the decision of the six man arbitration panel in Exhibit D, the defendants refused to appease/pay tribute to the claimants for the continued use of the 20 plots of land and thereby implying that the defendants/appellants were customary tenants to the plaintiffs/respondents. (Ground 5 of the Amended Notice of Appeal).
3. Whether the respondents has satisfactorily proved their case before the trial Court especially in view of the content of exhibit D and their failure to produce the arbitration award of the Offot Ukwa Clan Council. (ground 1 and 6 of the Amended Notice of Appeal).
4. Assuming but not conceding that the appellants were customary tenants who had failed to pay tribute since 2002 whether the suit was not statute barred by 2014 when the Respondents instituted it. (Ground 2 of the Amended Notice of Appeal).

The Respondents’ Brief settled by I.O. ETIM ESQ.,

is dated 29th April, 2019 filed on the 9th May, 2019 formulated 3 grounds of Appeal thus:
i. Whether on the basis of all the available evidence before the trial Court, the trial judge was right when he held that Appellants were most probable customary tenants and holds the land in dispute at the pleasure of the Respondents. (Ground 1 of the Amended Notice of Appeal).
ii. Whether from the face of the writ of summons and the Amended Statement, the Respondents’ suit was statute barred (Ground 2 of the Amended Notice of Appeal).
iii. Whether the omission to type a name under the signature in the process of the Court by the Respondents touches on the substantive jurisdiction of the lower Court and occasioned a miscarriage of justice. (Ground 4 of the Amended Notice of Appeal).

Upon a careful consideration of the Amended Notice of Appeal, the record of Appeal and the briefs of the respective parties wherein several issues have been set out for determination by the Court, I am inclined to adopt issues raised by the Appellant because there is a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court which must be determined from the onset because of its

fundamental nature. That way, the complaints of the Appellants would also be considered. The Appellant made the issue challenging jurisdiction the first issue while the Respondents’ counsel made it the third issue. I shall consider the said issues first before proceeding to other issues if the need arises.
ISSUE ONE:
Whether the Respondents had properly invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear and determine the suit when the initiating process was not properly signed by a legal practitioner known to law.

APPELLANTS’ SUBMISIONS
Proffering submissions on this issue the Appellants submitted that the Court below lacked the competence to determine the suit brought by the Respondents because it had no jurisdiction. The vitiating aspect of the suit is the contention that the writ of summons which is an initiating process was not signed by a named legal practitioner known to law and therefore, it is invalid. He referred to the writ of summons at page 16 of the record to submit that it was not endorsed by any named legal practitioner. They argued that on the said writ, there is a signature over and above the address of a law

firm; AKWAIFIOK LAW CHAMBERS 53 OGALE ROAD, OGALE ELEME, RIVERS STATE. That there was no name of a legal practitioner below the signature and Awaifiok law Chambers is not in the Roll of legal practitioners called to the Nigeria Bar. Furthermore, learned counsel submitted that even the signature was not at the appropriate place but at the portion reserved for the endorsement by the bailiff. Relied on BUHARI & ANOR. VS. ADEBAYO & ORS. (2014) LPELR-22521(CA); OKAFOR VS. NWEKE (2007) 3 SC (Pt. 11) 55; SLB CONSORTIUM VS. NNPC (2011) LPELR-3074(SC); CHIEF JOHN FRANCIS UDOEBOI & ORS VS. MICHAEL AKPAN UDOUSUA LPELR- 41227 (CA) to submit that it is improper and defective for an originating process to be signed by an unidentifiable person. He further argued that a Court must convince itself that it has jurisdiction before proceeding to determine the suit, citing MADUKOLU & ORS. VS. NKEMDILIM (1962) LPLER- 24023 (SC). Appellants submitted that the action as constituted did not meet the threshold of a competent suit and should be struck out.

In continuation of his submissions, the Appellants counsel referred the Court to the holding in the case of

SBL CONSORTIUM VS. NNPC (supra) where the apex Court emphasized the importance of a signature and how a counsel should sign processes. It referred to Section 2 and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 2004. Arguing further, Appellants citing SUNDAY IZI VS. THE STATE (2016) LPELR- 42064(CA) urged the Court not to embark on the futile exercise of searching for who signed the writ. They argued that an originating process must be competent to inure competence on the Court as any defect divest the Court of jurisdiction, citing DR. VICTOR IKPEAZU VS. OBASI UBA EKEAGBARA & ORS (2016) LPELR-40847(CA) and PMB LTD. VS. NDIC (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1261) 253; OKPE V FAN MILK PLC (2016) 68 NSCQR Pt. 1 and CHIJIKE AZUBUIKE VS. ALHAJI AHMAD HASSAN (2014) LPLER-23442(CA) to urge the Court to strike out the writ of summons.

RESPONDENTS SUBMISSIONS
The Respondents reacted to Appellants’ issue one under their issue three. They argued that the failure to type the name of the counsel that signed the writ of summons cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Court and the objection is misconceived and at best affect a procedural jurisdiction and not a substantive

jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the Respondents relied on the case of KOSSEN (NIG.) LTD. VS. SAVANNAH BANK (NIG) LTD (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 420) 439 for the difference between substantive and procedural jurisdiction and also the case of MOBIL PRODUCING NIG.UNLTD. VS. LASEPA & ORS (2002) 12 SC (Pt. 1) 26. They submitted that failure to put name of the counsel that signed the writ is a procedural irregularity which should not affect the validity of the writ because the substantive jurisdiction of the Court was not affected. They tried to distinguish the case of OKAFOR VS. NWEKE (supra) from the one under consideration and said when the name of a law firm appears under the signature, then it is taken that the firm signed but that it was not the case here and that OKAFOR VS. NWEKE (supra) was decided per incuriam and therefore cannot be binding on the Court. Furthermore, they argued that Section 2 and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act requires that a Legal Practitioner must have his name on the roll and non typing of the name underneath a signature followed by a name of the law firm implies that the law firm had signed the process and the law firm not being on the roll, the

process is declared invalid. They argued that the Court cannot follow the decision arrived at per incuriam, relied on THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE APOSTOLIC CHURCH, LAGOS AREA VS. RAHMAN AKINDELE (1967) NWLR 263 and COLE VS. MARTINS & ANOR. (1968) NMLR 217 which they urged us to follow. They contended that issue of jurisdiction did not arise and OKAFOR VS. NWEKE (supra) was not on jurisdiction and the issue was only stretched to a jurisdictional issue in SLB CONSORTIUM LTD. VS. NNPC (2011) 3 SCNJ 185. They submitted that the writ is valid because all the requirements are present and relying on SLB CONSORTIUM amounts to technicality. Furthermore, that the precedent of form of a writ of summons originates from the Court as prescribed by the rules and who is to sign is clear on the form and on the said page 16 of the record, the writ was issued by J.J. Etim Esq and no person can sign the writ. That the legalistic argument that the signature belongs to the law firm is untenable as the law firm cannot sign a writ. He compared the writ to an affidavit and the contention that the signature was where the bailiff was to sign cannot stand as bailiffs don’t

sign writ of summons.

The Respondents’ counsel argued that technical justice is of the past and its ghost should not control our judicial process. He referred to GUARANTEE TRUST BANK VS. INNOSON NIG. LTD. (2017) LPLER- 42368 (SC) and DAVID VS. JOLAYEMI (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1258) 320 to submit that the Court can overlook any irregularity in the interest of justice and furthermore, because it was not raised at the trial Court. On technicalities, he cited the case of ALHAJI BABA M. SALE VS. ALHAJI SHETIMA MONGUNO & ORS. (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 316. He urged the Court in the interest of public policy to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondents and order a retrial. Counsel relied on TAIYE OSHOBOJA VS. ALHAJI SURA KATU AMIDA & ORS (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1172) 188 to submit that the Court should sustain the writ of summons.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE:
The first issue raised by the Appellants is that of jurisdiction contending that the writ initiating the suit at the Court below was fundamentally defective thereby divesting the Court of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is very important in the adjudication process;

see APGA VS. ANYANWU (2014) LPELR-22182 (SC) where the apex Court said as follows:
“The law is by now well settled that jurisdiction is the lifeblood of any adjudication and where it is lacking it would render any proceedings, no matter how well conducted, liable to be set aside for being a nullity. Jurisdiction is so fundamental that once the Court’s jurisdiction to hear a matter is challenged, it must be dealt with and resolved first before any other step in the proceedings. It is because it is so fundamental that it can be raised at any time, in any manner and at any stage of the proceedings. In Petrojessica Enterprises Ltd. v. Leventis Technical Co. Ltd. (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 244) 675 this Court per Belgore, JSC (as he then was) held: “This importance of jurisdiction is the reason why it can be raised at any stage of a case, be it the trial, on appeal to Court of Appeal or to this Court; a fortiori the Court can suo motu raise it. It is desirable that preliminary objection be raised early on issue of jurisdiction; but once it is apparent to any party that the Court may not have jurisdiction it can be raised even viva voce as in this case. It is always in the interest

of justice to raise issue of jurisdiction so as to save time and cost and to avoid a trial in nullity.” Also in: Issac Obiuweubi VS. Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 465 @ 494 D- F per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC: “It is thus mandatory that Courts decide the issue of jurisdiction before proceeding to consider any other matter. See Bronik Motors Ltd.”

It is indubitable now that an initiating process confers jurisdiction and any defect in such a process also divest the court of jurisdiction, see LADOJA VS. AJIMOBI(2016) LPELR- 40658(SC) which held:
“It is expected as a matter of duty on the Court to have struck out the purported notices of Appeal which are deemed to constitute originating process. See Okafor VS. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt.1043) 521. Also the case of Okarika vs. Samuel (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt.1352)19 at 37 wherein this Court reaffirmed that “an initiating process whether writ of summons, originating summons or a notice of appeal must be valid to confer jurisdiction on a Court to adjudicate between parties on a subject matter in dispute between them …”Per OGUNBIYI, J.S.C. Consequently, where an originating process is

alleged to be fundamentally defective, the Court must resolve the issue at the onset.

Sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act. A legal practitioner who can validate a Court process must be a named legal practitioner whose name is on the Roll of Legal Practitioners in the Supreme Court of Nigeria and registered to practice as a Barrister and Solicitor in this country. The provisions of Sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act have received judicial interpretation, the import of which is now well settled, a process prepared and filed in a Court of law by a legal practitioner must be signed by a legal practitioner who must also be named on the face of the process, see OKAFOR VS. NWEKE (2007) 10 NWLR (PT 1043) 521; FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC VS. MAIWADA (2012) LPELR-9713(SC); SLB CONSORTIUM LTD. VS. NNPC (2011) 4 SCNJ 211; (2011) 9 NWLR (PT 1252) 317; (2011) LPELR-3074(SC).
The contention of the Appellant is that though there is a signature, there is no name of the person who signed, whether a legal practitioner or the party himself. He observed that the name under the signature is that of the law firm and the law firm is not a name on the roll of legal Practitioners. In answer, the Respondent submitted that the form used

as precedent does not provide for the name of a legal Practitioner and therefore the defect is a mere irregularity. He also submitted that the decision in OKAFOR VS. NWEKE (supra) was given per incuriam and referred to some authorities where the apex Court ignored the defect in an initiating process, proceeded to determine the appeal in the interest of justice. The fundamental fact evident here is that the Respondent admit there is a defect in the initiating process, which he posits is an irregularity. I have viewed page 16 of the record of appeal where the alleged defective page of the writ of summons is found and I find that there is a signature over the name of the law firm, I reproduce it here:
SIGNATURE
ADDRESS: AKWAIFIOK LAW CHAMBERS
53 OGALE ROAD, OGALE
ELEME.
RIVERS STATE.
There is no name of the counsel (person) who signed the writ. The holding in OKAFOR VS. NWEKE (supra) is apt and relevant because the facts are similar, it held:
“…The question that follows is whether J.H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO is a legal practitioner recognized by the law. From the submissions of both counsels, it is very clear that the

answer to that question is in the negative. In other words, both senior counsel agree that J.H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO is not a legal practitioner and therefore cannot practice as such by say, filing processes in the Courts of this country. It is in recognition of this fact that accounts for the argument of learned Senior Advocate for the applicants that to determine the actual person who signed the processes evidence would have to be adduced which would necessarily establish the fact that the signature on top of the inscription J.H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO. actually belongs to J.H.C. OKOLO SAN who is a legal practitioner in the roll. I had earlier stated that the law does not say that what should be in the roll should be the signature of the legal practitioner but his name. That apart, it is very clear that by looking at the documents, the signature which learned senior advocate claims to be his, really belongs to J.H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO. or was appended on its behalf since it was signed on top of that name. Since both counsel agree that J.H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO is not a legal practitioner recognized by the law, it follows that the said J.H.C. OKOLO SAN &

cannot legally sign and/or file any process in the courts and as such the motion on notice filed on 19th, December 2005, notice of cross appeal and applicants brief of argument in support of the said motion all signed and issued by the firm known and called J .H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO. are incompetent in law particularly as the said firm of J.H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO. is not a registered legal practitioner.” Per ONNOGHEN, J.S.C.
The Supreme Court restated clearly stated how best to sign an originating process in SLB CONSORTIUM LTD. VS. N.N.P.C (supra) where Rhodes-Vivour, JSC, said:
“What then is so important about the way counsel chooses to sign processes. Once it cannot be said who signed the process, it is incurably bad, and rules of Court that seem to provide a remedy are the Legal Practitioners Act). All processes filed in Court are to be signed as follows: First, the signature of counsel, which may be any contraption; Secondly, the name of counsel clearly written; Thirdly, who counsel represents. Fourthly, name and address of legal firm.”
The position above reiterates the principle that there must be strict compliance with the

law, as clearly spelt out in REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF APOSTOLIC CHURCH LAGOS VS. R. AKINDELE (1967) NWLR 263. The import of a void writ of summons cannot be said to be a mere technicality or irregularity which can be waived or brushed aside. It is an initiating process which must be competent as decided in MADUKOLU VS. NKEMDILIM (1962) LPELR-24023 (SC) which listed conditions when a Court can be said to be competent. One of the conditions is the case coming before the Court initiated by due process of law. The requirement of a named legal practitioner signing a writ of summons is a requirement of law and cannot be overlooked. The invitation to disregard Supreme Court decisions on the point and in the guise of doing substantial justice is rejected. Substantial justice is made up of due process and rule of law, there cannot be substantial justice without due process and the proceedings conducted in accordance with the law. That invitation should be addressed to the appropriate quarters because going by the principle of stare decisis, this Court is bound by decisions of the apex Court. In DADA VS. DOSUNMU (2006) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1010) Niki Tobi JSC (of blessed memory)

held thus:
“The role of the Court is to apply the principles of substantial justice according to law. The principles cannot be applied outside the law or in contradiction of the law…. where a rule of Court has clearly and unambiguously provided for a particular act or situation, the Courts have a duty to enforce the act or situation and here: the issue of doing substantial justice does not or should not arise. The party who failed to comply with the rule has himself to blame….” It is trite that this defect cannot be cured by other processes which were endorsed by the legal practitioner, the statement of claim in this case. In MUYIWA ODEJAYI & ANOR VS. HENLEY INDUSTRIES LTD. (2013) LPELR 20368 held:
“It is immaterial that the legal practitioner’s name was endorsed in other parts of the process in order to show that he issued the writ or process. What the law requires is that the process be signed or executed by the legal practitioner. The name of the legal practitioner without his signature does not satisfy the requirement of the law. It is trite that where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the Court should give same

its ordinary literal interpretation. This is often referred to as the literal rule. It is the most elementary rule of construction. See FIRST BANK VS. MAIWADA (2012) 51 NSCQR 155 at 172. The Respondent also contended that there was a name at another place on the writ of summons. The name has is also not under a signature and from whichever way one looks at it, the defect is irredeemable. A signed writ of summons without the name of counsel is totally worthless. The writ of summons originating this case fails to meet the basic requirements of the law thereby rendering it incompetent and incapable of activating the jurisdiction of the Court. In OLUWATUYI VS. OWOJUYIGBE (2015) All FWLR (Pt. 789) 1083 at 1097-1099, the Court held:
“The extant law with regards to the signing of initiating processes such as a writ of summons and the statement of claim as in the current circumstances is that they are to be signed by a legal practitioner recognized by law or a person entitled to practice as a Barrister and Solicitor. ….. My reasoning on this is that much as the Courts are laying emphasis more on substantial justice at the expense of technical justice, we

must not lose sight of the fact that we are enjoined to apply substantial justice according to law.” The writ of summons herein was signed and not endorsed by a known legal practitioner being the Claimant’s counsel, nor by the claimant himself as required by law and thus the statutory and procedural requirements were not complied with. This has regrettably and unfortunately resulted in fatal consequences. Put in another way, where a statute or Rule of Court stipulates that a particular thing must be done in a prescribed manner while initiating a suit or provides for a procedure for commencement of an action, failure to comply with such requirement renders any suit commenced otherwise incompetent for not having been initiated by due process of law. See OBASANJO VS. YUSUF (2004) 9 NWLR (Pt. 877) 144 at 221. The person signing is required to write his name in long hand and in a legible and readable manner in order to satisfy the requirement of law, see ADENEYE VS. YARO (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1342) 628 at 634. Since the initiating process in suit No.HU/273/2014 was signed without the name of a legal practitioner or the claimant as directed by Order 6 Rules 1 & 2 of the Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009

and in contravention of the Legal Practitioner’s Act, the suit was not initiated by due process. It is clearly incompetent and the trial Court was robbed of jurisdiction. As stated earlier in this judgment, where a Court is devoid of jurisdiction as in this case, any exercise of judicial power no matter how diligent, is a nullity and incapable of conferring legal benefits.

Flowing from above, the appeal is meritorious and succeeds on the jurisdictional issue. The judgment of the Court below delivered on the 14th October, 2016 is hereby set aside for want of jurisdiction. The writ that initiated the suit is incompetent and is hereby struck out.
Parties to bear their respective cost.

UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading before now the draft of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, YARGATA B. NIMPAR, JCA.
I adopt the reasoning and conclusion reached in allowing the appeal. I also allow the appeal,

Accordingly, the judgment Of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State, Uyo Judicial Division

delivered on 1st October, 2016 per I. E. Ukana, J. in Suit No. HU/273/2014 is hereby set aside and the Suit struck out.
Parties are to bear their costs

MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU, J.C.A.: The judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Yargata Nimpar, JCA was made available to me in a draft form. I find myself at one with her reasoning and the conclusion reached that this appeal is meritorious, I too allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the lower Court.

Appearances:

IMEH ATANG JNR, ESQ. For Appellant(s)

I.O. ETIM ESQ. For Respondent(s)