ENGR. IFEANYI EDUMUND DURU v. MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY & ORS
(2018)LCN/12444(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 4th day of May, 2018
CA/A/425/2012
RATIO
LAND LAW: DOCTRINE OF LIS PENDENS
“It ought to be noted, however, that in its application against any purchaser of such property, the doctrine of lis pendens is not founded on the equitable doctrine of notice, be that actual or constructive; but upon the fact that the law does not allow litigating parties, during the pendency of the litigation involving any property, rights in such property which is in dispute so as to prejudice any of the litigating parties. The doctrine, is designed to prevent the vendor from transferring any effective title to the purchaser by depriving the vendor of any rights over the property during the pendency of the litigation…For the doctrine of lis pendens to apply, it is necessary to establish that, (a) at the time of the sale of the property the suit regarding the dispute about the said property was already pending, (b) that the action was in respect of real property; it does not apply to personal property, (c) that the object of the action was to recover title to a specific real property; that is to say, an action in a subject-matter adverse to the owner in respect of some substantive right which is proprietary in nature and (d) that the other party had been served with the originating process in the pending action; these conditions are expected to coexist before the doctrine can successfully be invoked, see ALHAJI BUA V. DAUDA (2003) 13 NWLR (PT. 838) 657.” PER MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
TANI YUSUF HASSAN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
ENGR. IFEANYI EDUMUND DURU Appellant(s)
AND
1. MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY
2. FEDERAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
3. OBI NDUBISI Respondent(s)
MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This appeal is against the Judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; Coram Hon Justice Folasade Ojo, delivered on the 22nd day of June, 2012.
The Appellant as the Plaintiff claimed against Respondents/Defendants vide his Amended Statement of Claim dated 5th October 2010 before the trial Court as follows: –
1. A declaration that by virtue of the pendency of Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/810/2007 which Suit bothers on ownership of Plot No. 725 within Jabi District, Abuja, FCT, it is wrongful for the 1st and 2nd Defendants during the pendency of the Suit to purport to allocate or re-allocate or reinstate interest/title or in any manner whatsoever confer ownership of Plot No. 725 within Jabi District, Abuja FCT on the 3rd Defendant.
2. An order of Court setting aside all actions of the 1st and 2nd Defendants purporting to affect title to Plot No.725 within Jabi District, Abuja, FCT during the pendency of Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/810/2007 including 1st and 2nd Defendants purporting to allocate or re-allocate or reinstate interest/title or confer ownership of Plot No. 725 within Jabi District, Abuja, FCT on the 3rd Defendant, these actions being contrary to law and the doctrine of lis pendens.
3. The sum of N3,000,000.00 jointly and severally against the 1st and 2nd Defendants being cost of instituting and prosecuting this Suit.
The grouse of the Appellant was that during the pendency of a Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/810/2017 he instituted against the 1st and 2nd Respondents and one Ahmed Umar over the ownership of Plot No. 725 within Jabi District Abuja FCT, the 1st and 2nd Respondents allocated interest in the said land to the 3rd Respondent.
The Appellant therefore sought by the suit culminating in this appeal to set aside the said reinstatement of the 3rd Respondent’s interest on the land by the 1st and 2nd Respondent for being contrary to the law and the doctrine of lis pendens.
The 1st and 2nd Respondents entered appearance vide a leave granted them by the trial Court; their joint statement of defence out of time was filed on the 29th of January, 2010 while the 3rd Respondent vide a leave entered appearance on the 5th October, 2010.
The 3rd respondent did not file any pleadings by choice.
Dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court which dismissed his claims, the Appellant appealed to this Court vide a Notice of Appeal filed on the 12th day of July, 2012 on the following grounds shorn of their respective particulars:-
GROUND ONE:
The Honourable Lower Court erred in law when it failed to declare as wrongful and also failed to set aside the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ alienation, in favour of the 3rd Respondent, title to Plot No. 725 within Jabi District, Abuja FCT during the pendency of Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/810/2017 commenced by the Appellant against the 1st and 2nd Respondents and 1 other to determine title to the Plot.
GROUND TWO:
The Honourable Lower Court erred in law when it held as follows:
“It is significant to note that the Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/810/2007 has been concluded in favour of the Plaintiff was never pleaded. This in my view is a material fact which ought to he pleaded.”
GROUND THREE:
The Honourable Lower Court misdirected itself in law when it held as follows:
“The Plaintiff’s case as borne out of evidence is that the suit is still pending.
Counsel cannot in his address change this fact as established by the Plaintiff in his evidence and I so hold. In ONYEKWELU VS. ELF PETROLEUM (NIG.) LTD (2009) 5 NWLR PT. 1133 PG 181 AT 205-206 1. Tobi JSC held thus:
“It is elementary that a party must consistently make his case and not change like the weather clock in climatology.”
The judgment which the plaintiff’s counsel seek to introduce was delivered on the 15th May, 2010. The plaintiff filed an amended statement of claim dated 5th October, 2010 on the 11th October, 2010. He did not plead the fact that judgment was delivered but stated that the said suit was still pending. He is bound by his pleadings. The plaintiff has failed to establish that judgment has been delivered in his favour and I so hold.”
GROUND FOUR:
The Honourable Court below erred in law when it held as follows:
“The reliefs claimed by the plaintiff in this suit are premised on the action of the 1st and 2nd defendants on Plot 725 within Jabi District Abuja, FCT during the pendency of Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/810/2007. The success of the suit is therefore based on a successful plea of the doctrine of lispendens and I so hold.
Having failed to prove all the conditions for the success of the pleas, the plaintiff’s claim must fail. In the circumstances I find the plaintiff’s case not proved and is accordingly dismissed in its entirety.”
GROUND FIVE:
The Judgment of the Court below is against the weight of evidence.
Jeph C. Njikonye, Esq., of counsel for the Appellant distilled a lone issue for the determination of this appeal in the Amended Appellant’s Brief of Argument filed on the 11th day of June, 2014 and deemed properly filed on the 21st day of June, 2017, thus: –
Whether the Court below was not in error when it dismissed the appellant’s claims in totality.
Betty A. Umegbulem, Esq., of counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents also distilled a lone issue for the determination of this appeal in their Joint Brief of Argument filed on the 1st day of March, 2018; thus:-
Having regard to the facts of the case and the evidence adduced, whether the Honourable trial Court was not right to have found that the Appellant failed to successfully prove his claim of entitlement to the doctrine of lis pendens’.
Ugonna Igweneme, Esq., of counsel for the 3rd Respondent also distilled a lone issue for the determination of this appeal in the 3rd Respondent’s Brief of Argument filed on the 5th day of June, 2014 but deemed properly filed on the 21st day of June 2017; thus: –
Whether having regards to the pleadings and evidence placed before the Court below, the Court was right when it held that the Appellant failed to prove his case and consequently dismissed same.
Appellant’s Reply Brief to the 3rd Respondent was filed on the 23rd day of June, 2017.
3rd Respondent’s Notice of Preliminary Objection as contained on page ten (10) of the 3rd Respondent’s Brief of Argument is deemed abandoned for failure to argue same when the appeal came up for hearing on the 1st day of March, 2018.
The lone issue as formulated by each of the parties is fundamentally the same; the issue as formulated by the 3rd respondent is more apt, the appeal will be determined on that issue which is thus:
Whether having regards to the pleadings and evidence placed before the Court below, the Court was right when it held that the Appellant failed to prove his case and consequently dismissed same.
It is submitted for the appellant that the trial Court made findings of fact in favour of the appellant, which was not appealed, yet its conclusions were opposed to the findings therein; learned counsel referred this Court to page 250 of the record of appeal.
That the appellant’s suit is justifiable under the doctrine of lis pendens, as found by the lower Court; and having made that finding, the lower Court was in error to turn around and overrule itself in the same judgment; learned counsel referred this Court to EFP CO LTD V. NDIC (2007) 9 NWLR part 1039 page 216, OLORI MOTORS LTD V. UBN PLC (2006) 19 NWLR part 1013 page 146 and FUNDUK ENG LTD V. MCARTHUR (1996) 7 NWLR part 459.
Learned counsel further submitted that an examination of the appellant’s relief two of the Amended Statement of Claim reveals that the appellant did not only rely on lis pendens in seeking the setting aside of the alienation pendente lite, made by the 1st and 2nd respondents, because he also sought the setting aside of the alienation on the ground that it is contrary to law, he referred the Court to Section 6 (6) (a) and (b) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended and OBI V. INEC (2007) 45 WRN 1.
That the lower Court ought to have taken judicial notice of the judgment in FCT/HC/CV/810/2010 especially as it is the judgment of the same High Court of the FCT, without requiring proof.
That also a holistic reading of the four grounds of appeal shows that the appellant complained of the totality of the decision of the lower Court; and even the appellant’s omnibus ground of appeal alone, without more is sufficient to sustain the appeal; learned counsel to the appellant referred this Court to ABUBAKAR V. DANKWAMBO (2015) 18 NWLR part 1491 page 213 and DURUAKU V NWOKE (2015) 15 NWLR part 1488 page 417.
In response, it is submitted for the 1st and 2nd respondents that the doctrine of lis pendens imposes an enormous burden on the party invoking it, as it especially requires the co existence of the three conditions for it to be successful; that the conditions for its success are: a) that there is in fact an alienation pendent lite; b) that there has been a successful termination of the pending suit at the time the alienation was made; and c) that the alienation pendent lite has prejudiced or affected the other party; learned counsel referred this Court to MATHEW OKECHUKWU ENEKWE V. INTERNATIONAL MERCHANT BANK OF NIGER LTD & 2 ORS (2006) 19 NWLR part 149 page 171, DUNU V. OLADEJO (2004) 17 NWLR part 903 page 621 and ORONTI V. ONIGBANJO (2004) 17 part 903 page 601.
Learned counsel further submitted that it was established at trial that the 3rd respondent was allocated the land by the 1st and 2nd respondents long before the institution of the suit No FCT/CV/810/2007 and his interest was merely reinstated to status quo ante by the allocation in the official course of business of the 1st and 2nd respondents.
That what the 1st and 2nd respondents did was not alienation of the appellant’s purported interest on the land in dispute, but merely a reinstatement by way of regularization of the 3rd respondent’s interest; learned counsel referred this Court to MRS OLUFUNMILAYO AKIBOYE & ANOR V. ISHOLA ADEKO (2011) 6 NWLR part 1244 page 415.
That also the spirit of Exhibit 11 was merely to address and regularize an interest long granted, as such there was no alienation pendente rite or acquisition of fresh interest in the circumstances of this case.
Learned counsel further submitted that from the pleadings, the case of the appellant before the trial Court was that suit No FCT/HC/CV/810/2007 was still pending before the High Court presided by Hon. Justice Dodo; and that even if there was indeed alienation of interest in the plot of land in dispute, the alienation could not be said to be void ab initio, but would rather be subject to the outcome of the said pending suit; learned counsel referred the Court to ORONTI V. ONIGBANJO supra.
That as found by the trial Court from the pleadings and evidence, suit No. FCT/HC/CV/810/2007 had not terminated, but was still pending, as such the appellant failed to establish that the alleged alienation prejudiced him.
Learned counsel further submitted the appellant in one breathe stated in his pleadings that the suit was pending, and in another breathe contends in his final address that the pending suit had terminated; he referred the Court to ONYEKWELU V. ELF PETROLEUM NIG. LTD (2009) 5 NWLR part 1133 page 181; that the appellant is bound by his pleadings, and restricted to it, he cannot in his final address vary same.
It is submitted for the 3rd respondent that the appellant’s suit at the lower Court was a challenge of the reinstatement of the 3rd respondent’s interest by the 1st and 2nd respondents during the pendency of suit No FHC/HC/CV/810/2007.
That the fact that the appellant’s case was predicated on lis pendens is evident in the pleadings and evidence at trial, learned counsel referred the Court to ENYIBROS FOODS PROCESSING COMPANY LTD & ANOR V NIG. DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP & ANOR (2007) LPELR-1149-SC and ALH USMAN BUA V BASHIRU DAUDA (2003) LPELR-810-SC.
Learned counsel submitted that alienation of a property, during the pendency of a suit is not ab initio void, but hangs on the outcome of the pending suit; he referred the Court to OGUNSOLA V NICON (1991) 4 NWLR part 188 page 762, AKINBOYE V ADEKO (2011) 6 NWLR part 1244 page 415 and OLORI MOTORS CO LTD V UBN PLC (2006) 10 NWLR part 989 page 586.
That the three conditions necessary for the success of the invocation of the doctrine of lis pendens must coexist at the same time and the absence of any one of them will render the invocation of the doctrine unsuccessful.
On whether there was in fact alienation pendent lite, it is submitted for the 3rd respondent that what transpired was not a fresh acquisition, but mere regularization or allocation in the subject matter, but mere regularization of the 3rd respondent’s interest; and when the trial Court disagreed with that view, holding that there was alienation of the subject matter it was only in regard to the question whether the conditions for the invocation of the doctrine was satisfied.
That also on whether there was successful termination of the matter during the pendency of alienation thus affecting same, it is submitted that, it was necessary for the appellant to show that suit No FCT/HC/CV/810/2007 was concluded in his favour, and the appellant failed to establish that; learned counsel referred the Court to S.O IGBINOKPOGIE & ANOR V. GEORGE OGEDEGBE (2001) LPELR-1445-SC and ALH SAFINA AMINU & ORS V ISIAKA HASSAN & ORS (2014) LPELR-22008-SC.
Learned counsel further submitted that the appellant failed to lay proper foundation for the Court to take judicial notice of the said judgment, and the trial Court was right to have refused to take judicial notice of the judgment, because it was at variance with the pleadings; he referred this Court to GBANIYI OSAFILE & ANOR V. PAUL ODI & ANOR (1990)2 NWLR part 137 page 130.
On the question of whether the appellant was prejudiced by the alienation, it is submitted by learned counsel that the three conditions must coexist for a successful plea of the doctrine, and the appellant failed to establish that fact.
In response, it is submitted for the appellant in reply that the appellant’s suit was not based entirely on the doctrine of lis pendens, as it called for the setting aside of the alienation for being contrary to law also; and that the pleadings of the appellant and the reliefs sought make that clear; learned counsel to TITILOYE V OLUPO (1991) 7 NWLR part 205 page 519.
That also the appellant appealed the decision of the trial Court on the applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens, as the grounds show that the appellant complained of the totality of the decision of the trial Court, and that in any case the omnibus ground alone is sufficient to sustain the appeal, he referred this Court to ABUBAKAR V. DANKWAMBO (2015) 18 NWLR part 1491 page 213.
That also the appeal should be allowed to avoid conflict in the judgments of the lower Court.
RESOLUTION:
The appellant instituted the suit at the trial Court to challenge the 1st and 2nd respondents’ reinstatement of the 3rd respondent’s interest in Plot 725, during the pendency of suit No FCT/HC/CV/810/2007; this much is clear from paragraph 18 of the Amended Statement of Claim and paragraph 18 of the deposition in the Amended witness statement on oath, as well as the plaintiff’s reply to the 1st and 2nd defendant, where it is stated that the suit was ‘squarely predicated on the principle of lis pendens’.
It ought to be noted, however, that in its application against any purchaser of such property, the doctrine of lis pendens is not founded on the equitable doctrine of notice, be that actual or constructive; but upon the fact that the law does not allow litigating parties, during the pendency of the litigation involving any property, rights in such property which is in dispute so as to prejudice any of the litigating parties. The doctrine, is designed to prevent the vendor from transferring any effective title to the purchaser by depriving the vendor of any rights over the property during the pendency of the litigation.
That being so, the principle of Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet will apply to defeat any sale or transfer of such property made during the currency of the litigation; See IKEANYI V. ACB LTD (1991) 7 NWLR (PT. 205) 626 and BARCLAYS BANK OF NIGERIA LTD V. ASHIRU (1978) 6/7/SC 99 AT 124.
Where there is a conveyance or transfer of title in land, even though the alienation is done for the best consideration, if it is made pendente lite, the alienation will be caught by the doctrine of lis pendens, and will therefore be null and void; see OMEILE & ANOR V TOTAL NIG. LTD (2017) LPELR-42284-CA.
For the doctrine of lis pendens to apply, it is necessary to establish that, (a) at the time of the sale of the property the suit regarding the dispute about the said property was already pending, (b) that the action was in respect of real property; it does not apply to personal property, (c) that the object of the action was to recover title to a specific real property; that is to say, an action in a subject-matter adverse to the owner in respect of some substantive right which is proprietary in nature and (d) that the other party had been served with the originating process in the pending action; these conditions are expected to coexist before the doctrine can successfully be invoked, see ALHAJI BUA V. DAUDA (2003) 13 NWLR (PT. 838) 657.
The doctrine gives notice to any person by way of warning, that a particular property is the res of litigation and that a person who acquires any interest in such a situation ought to know that the interest will be subject to the decision of the Court on that property; essentially what this means is that a person who acquires interest in property pendente lite has bought litigation for himself, and should be prepared to sink or swim with the litigation.
The trial Court was right in this regard when it found at page 258 of the record of appeal, that:
“…such a sale does not automatically become void. It is merely voidable pending the outcome of the suit during which pendency it was alienated. Before such a sale would be set aside the action must have terminated in favour of the party relying on the doctrine…”
The trial Court was right when it also held at pages 14-15 of the record of appeal that where the doctrine is sought to be invoked, the conditions as earlier set out must coexist; bearing in mind, the fact that the 3rd respondent had argued that his interest on the land was merely reinstated, in rejecting this argument the trial Court rightly found, to its credit, that:
“…DW1’s evidence under cross-examination is that the 3rd defendant’s interest in the land was revoked before the commencement of the earlier suit. The status quo at the time of commencement of the earlier suit was that the 1st and 2nd defendants had allocated the land to Ahmed Umar, who donated his interest to the plaintiff. The 1st and 2nd defendants however upon discovering that there was a case of double allocation revoked the right of occupancy of the plaintiff’s predecessor in title and restored that of the 3rd defendant. That happened during the pendency of the earlier suit…” See page 254 of the record of appeal.
Be that as it may, one cannot help but agree with learned counsel for the 3rd respondent that this finding of the trial Court means that the appellant satisfied only one of the conditions necessary of the invocation of the doctrine of lis pendens; contrary to the contention of learned counsel to the appellant that the trial Court was in error to turn around to overrule itself; because having agreed with the appellant in the first instance, the trial Court proceeded to place the burden on the appellant to establish the remaining conditions for the successful invocation of the doctrine, especially as the requirement of the law is that all the conditions necessary for the invocation of the doctrine must as of necessity coexist at the same time; seeALHAJI BUA V. DAUDA SUPRA.
Moving on, that explains why the trial Court found also that it was imperative for the appellant to also establish that suit No FCT/HC/CV/810/2007 was concluded and judgment entered in his favour, and that based on the pleadings and evidence of the appellant, this condition was not satisfied.
This conclusion is unassailable, in view especially of the fact that the plaintiff in paragraph 14 of the Amended Statement of Claim, filed on the 5th of October, 2010 stated:
“Suit No FCT/HC/CV/2007 is still pending, before the High Court…”
And in paragraph 14 of the plaintiff’s witness statement on oath, which was adopted as the oral testimony it was stated:
“Suit No FCT/HC/CV/810/2007 is still pending…”
In response to the finding of the trial Court at pages 259 to 261 of the record of appeal, that the suit was not established to have been concluded in favour of the appellant; learned counsel for the appellant contends that the trial Court failed to take judicial notice of the judgment of the lower Court, attached to his reply brief, to establish that the pending suit was concluded in his favour, thus meeting another condition for the invocation of the doctrine of lis pendens in his opinion.
This contention cannot hold in the circumstances, not least because as rightly found by the trial Court, the fact of whether the suit in question was concluded in the appellant’s favour or not is a necessary condition for the invocation of the doctrine of lis pendens, and as a material fact, the conclusion of the suit in the appellant’s favour ought to have been pleaded and proved; see KOLAWOLE ORONTI V. ALH S.A. ONIBANJO supra.
Inviting the trial Court to take judicial notice of the judgment attached to the reply brief of the appellant, will, as suggested, in my considered opinion, amount to asking the trial Court to take into account unpleaded facts; this is unacceptable in view of the fact that parties are supposed to be bound by their pleadings, and that being so, anything not pleaded ought not be considered; see OGIAMIEN V. OGIAMIEN (1967) NMLR 245, GEORGE V DOMINION FLOUR MILLS LTD (1963) 1 ALL NLR 71 and ENANG V ADU (1981) 11-12 SC 25.
To take judicial notice of the judgment at this stage, by the means adopted by learned counsel to the appellant, would have amounted not only to amending the appellant’s case at a very late stage, a stage where the respondents would not have had an opportunity to respond, but also offended the principle of fair hearing. This is more so as the appellant in the course of the hearing amended his Writ of Summons and Statement on oath twice, and each time maintained that the suit was pending.
It ought to be stressed that address of counsel must be based on evidence on record before the trial Court and the legal submission of counsel ought not to be substituted for evidence on record. See OSUIGWE V. NWIHI (1995) 3 NWLR (PT. 386) 752, PRESIDENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LANDED PROPERTIES V. AYWILA & ANR (2017) LPELR-43204-CA and BAYO V. NJIDDA (2004) 8 NWLR part 876 page 544.
Learned counsel to the appellant also contends that the judgment annexed to his reply need not be pleaded, and evidence need not be led, before the trial Court can take judicial notice of same; that argument, with respect to learned counsel is stretching both law and logic too far, because the issue of judicial notice is not a matter of course, even by Section 122 of the Evidence Act, 2011 relied upon. This is so because the Section of the Evidence Act relied upon indeed allows for the Court to refuse to take judicial notice of a fact if it has reason not to. For the avoidance of doubt the section provides:
122(4) “if the Court is called upon by any person to take judicial notice of any fact, it may refuse to do so, unless and until such person produces any such book or document it may consider necessary to enable it do so.”
The trial Court gave the following reasons for refusing to take judicial notice of the judgment attached to the reply brief of the appellant:
“…while I agree with plaintiff’s counsel that judgment of the Court attached to his reply address may constitute case law, it cannot however by any stretch of imagination be relied upon in the circumstances as proof of material fact…the judgment was attached to establish a material fact which was not led and which is at variance with the pleadings…no such evidence was given at the trial.”; see page 260 of the record of appeal.
This finding of the trial Court cannot be faulted, because the appellant failed to establish the fact of the determination of the suit in question in his favour, and not only was proper foundation not laid, the way and manner it was introduced is to say the least unfair to the respondents.
It is also argued for the appellant that the said judgment constituted case law, and that if judicial notice is not taken, there is the likelihood of conflict between the earlier judgment of the lower Court sought to be introduced and the judgment of the trial Court appealed.
The judgment in question does not constitute case law, because its introduction was meant to prove suit FCT/HC/CV/810/2007 was determined in the appellant’s favour, and not as a judicial precedent; no legal principle was stated or urged upon the trial Court. It is also no excuse that the judgment in question came after the commencement of the suit before the trial Court, because facts that arose after the commencement of a suit cannot be introduced into a case that way; not even by way of amendment of pleadings, much less by way of reply address, the authority of GOWON V. IKE OKONGWU supra cited does not support the argument of learned counsel for the appellant in this regard; see OSAFILE V. ODI (1990) 2 NWLR part 137 page 130.
Furthermore, even if the contention of learned counsel to the appellant that he appealed the whole decision as contrary to law is accepted, that does not in itself establish the existence of any evidence in support of whether the appellant was indeed prejudiced by the alienation pendente lite, a condition precedent for the invocation of the doctrine.
It is for these reasons that I resolve the sole issue for determination in favour of the respondents, against the appellant.
Having resolved the sole issue for determination in favour of the respondents, against the appellant, the appeal fails for lack of merit, it is accordingly dismissed.
Judgment of the trial Court of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, delivered on the 22nd day of June 2012 is hereby affirmed.
Cost of N100,000.00 is awarded in favour of the 3rd respondent.
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my Learned brother, MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, JCA. I agree with the reasoning, conclusions and orders therein.
TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.: I had the advantage of reading in draft, the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Mohammed Mustapha, JCA.
I agree with the reasoning and conclusions. My brother has dealt with the sole issue in this appeal. I abide by the order as to costs.
Appearances:
J.C. Njokeonye, Esq. with him, I.A. Arotiowa, I.A. Nnanna and B. YusufFor Appellant(s)
Betty Umegbulem with him, B.O. Ogibeiwi and A. Abioye, for the 1st and 2nd Respondents.
Ugonna Igweneme, Esq. with him, C.S. Onah, Esq. for the 3rd RespondentFor Respondent(s)
