EMMANUEL ALUKO & ANOR V. AMIABLE INVESTMENT LTD (2012)

EMMANUEL ALUKO & ANOR V. AMIABLE INVESTMENT LTD

(2012)LCN/5645(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Thursday, the 8th day of November, 2012

CA/AK/32M/2010

RATIO

ORDER 7 RULE 10 OF THE COURT OF APPEAL RULES: REQUIREMENTS TO BE GRANTED

As already indicated at the outset of this ruling, Fabunmi, Esq, of counsel for the applicants, moved the court to grant the said application under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011, He cited CBN v Ahmed (2001) 7 SCM 85, 97 and 100, in support of his contention that the application has complied with the two requirements of the Rules (supra). He, also, prayed in aid the authority of Ifekandu v Uzoegwu [2008] 6 SCM 118, 125 for his supplication. On his part, J. Omirin, of counsel for the respondent, relying on Dike v Goodday Resources Ltd [2009] All FWLR (pt 485) 1728, 1734, contended that the reasons which the applicants adduced are not good and substantial enough. He, also, took the view that the grounds of appeal are not arguable, W.I.H. Ltd v ANAMCO Ltd (2009) All FWLR (pt 485) 1797, 1798.PER CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.C.A.

COURT: THE POWER OF THE COURT OF APPEAL TO EXTEND TIME WITHIN WHICH TO APPEAL IS STATUTORY IN NATURE
This court’s powers to extend time within which to appeal or to apply for leave to appeal are statutory, UNILAG v Aigoro (1984) 11 SC 152, 212; (1985) 1 NWLR (pt t) 143. While section 24(2) of the Court of Appeal Act prescribes the period within which to appeal against decisions of lower courts to the Court of Appeal, Order 7 Rule 10 (2) of the Rules of the Court of 2011 provides for the court’s exercise of its discretion to extend time within which to appeal, Ikenta Best (Nig) Ltd v AG, Rivers State (2008) All FWLR (pt 417) 1, 16.
The object of both provisions is to give the court the discretion to extend time with a view to avoiding injustice to the parties, UNILAG v Aigoro (supra) 195. By employing the precatory word “may” these provisions vest in the court the exercise of discretion. It must be emphasised here that though the discretion must be exercised in a judicial manner, that is, according to laid down principles, it is not a typically judicial function. As the apex court explained in UNILAG v Aigoro (supra) 216, it is a function which lies, awkwardly, between, clearly, judicial acts and, clearly, administrative acts and are referred to as judicial discretions.PER CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.C.A.

JUDICIAL DISCRETION: THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION DEPENDS ON THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH CASE

One immutable principle that runs through case law, both in England and Nigeria, is that the exercise of judicial discretion depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In effect, in such matters, no one case can be authority for another, see per Kay LJ IN Jenkins v Bushby (1891) 1 Ch 484,494 approvingly adopted in Odusote v Odusote (1971) 1 All NLR 219,222; UNILAG v Aigoro (supra) 221.PER CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.C.A.

EXTENSION OF TIME: THE PRINCIPLES GUIDING APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO APPEAL IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

The principles that have been laid down in the determination of applications of this nature are, truly, many and varied. In the first place, every such application must, conjunctively, surmount the twin conditions ordained in Order 7 Rule 10 (21 (supra), Alagbe v Abimbola (1978) 2 SC 89; Ibodo v Enarofia (1980) 5- 7 SC 43; Williams v Hope Rising Voluntary Funds Society (1982) 1 All NLR (pt1) 1; Doherty v. Doherty (1964) 1 All NLR 299; Yonwuren v Modern Signs Ltd (1985)1 NWLR (pt 1) 143; Mobil Oil (Nig) Ltd v Agadaigho (1988) 2 NWLR (pt 77) 385; Okere v Nkem (1992) 4 NWLR (pt 234) 132; Kotoye v Saraki (1995) 5 NWLR (pt 395) 256; Balogun v Afokilu (1994) 7 NWLR (pt 355) 206; F.H.A. v Abosede (1998) 2 NWLR (pt 537) 177; Shanu v Afribank Nig Plc (2000) 13 NWLR (pt 684) 392; Oloko v Ube (2001) 13 NWLR (pt 729). 161. The two conditions are conjunctive and not disjunctive, Yonwuren v Modern Signs (Nig) ltd (supra).
They must be present in the affidavit, Ikenta Best (Nig) Ltd v AG, Rivers State (supra) 26.
Although the length of time that elapsed between the date of the judgement and the filing of the application must be factored into the court’s decision, that notwithstanding, extension of time could still be granted if the delay is satisfactorily explained, Alagbe v Abimbola (1978) 2 SC 39; Ojora v Bakare (1976) 1 SC 47; Re: Adewunmi and Co (1988) 3 NWLR (pt 83) 483.PER CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.C.A.

APPLICATION: APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO APPEAL: FAILURE TO APPEAL WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME WILL BE GRANTED WHEN THERE IS A TRUE AND GENUINE MISTAKE OR ERROR OF JUDGMENT OF COUNSEL

Another factor which has regained currency is the fact of the true and genuine mistake or error of judgement of counsel. Thus, where it is satisfactorily established that the failure to appeal within the prescribed time is attributable to the above failings on the part of counsel, the application will be granted. However, the court must be satisfied that the excuse is availing having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Iroegbu v Okwordu (1990) 6 NWLR (pt 159) 643; (1990) 21 NSCC (pt 111) 377.
In such a situation, where it appears to the court that the delay was occasioned by the genuine mistake of counsel, it will be up to the respondent to show in what respect he would be prejudiced if the indulgence sought is granted, Ikenta Best (Nig) Ltd v AG, Rivers State (supra) 18. In all, where there is the possibility of a miscarriage of justice due to a catalogue of mistakes on the part of counsel for the applicant, an application for extension of time will be granted, Iroegbu v Okwordi (1990) 21 NSCC (pt 111) 377; NIWA v SPDC (supra) 1418.PER CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

1. EMMANUEL ALUKO
2. OLAGOKE GBADEGESIN Appellant(s)

AND

AMIABLE INVESTMENT LTD Respondent(s)

CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Lead Ruling): The appellants/applicants herein, by their Motion on Notice, filed in this court on November 28, 2011, entreated this court with supplications for the following orders:
1. An order for extension of time to apply for leave to appeal the judgement and Ruling of the Osun State High Court sitting at Ile-Ife [High Court 1] dated 9th day of July, 2007 and 3rd day of December, 2008, respectively, in Suit No HIF/12/99 between Emmanuel Aluko; Olagoke Gbadegesin v Amiable Investment Ltd;
2. Leave to appeal the said Judgement and Ruling of the Osun State High Court sitting at Ile-Ife [High Court 1];
3. An Order of extension of time within which the appellants/applicants can file Notice of Appeal against the Judgement and Ruling of the Osun State High Court sitting at Ile-Ife [High Court 1] dated 9th day of July, 2007 and 3rd day of December, 2008, respectively, in Suit No HIF/12/99 between Emmanuel Aluko; Olagoke Gbadegesin v Amiable Investment Ltd.
And for such further orders as the court may deem appropriate to make in the circumstance of the case.
Apart from the mandatory grounds, the application is accompanied by an eighteen paragraph affidavit annexed to which are three exhibits: exhibits ‘A’; ‘B’ and ‘C’. In vociferous opposition to the application, the respondent filed a counter affidavit of a whopping twenty paragraphs. Seven exhibits were attached to the said counter affidavit.

ARGUMENTS ON THE APPLICATION
When the application came up for hearing on October 8, 2012, Abayomi Fabunmi, Esq, of counsel for the applicants, moved the court to grant the said application under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011. He placed reliance on the grounds for the application; the averments in the affidavit, particularly, paragraphs 3-16 thereof and the said exhibits. Citing CBN v Ahmed (2001) 7 SCM 85, 97 and 100, he submitted that the application has complied with the two requirements for its grant, citing Ifekandu v Uzoegwu [2008] 6 SCM 118, 125.
J. Omirin, of counsel for the respondent, who, personally swore to the above counter affidavit, in vehement opposition to the application, referred to the twenty paragraph counter affidavit. He placed reliance on all the paragraphs and the exhibits, citing Dike v Good day Resources Ltd [2009] All FWLR (pt 485) 1728, 1734. He contended that the reasons which the applicants adduced were not good and substantial enough. On their part, the grounds of appeal were not arguable, W.I.H Ltd v ANAMCO Ltd (2009) All FWLR (pt 485) 1797, 1798.
He urged the court to dismiss the application. In his reply, Fabunmi argued that the right to appeal is a constitutional right which the court does not ordinarily deny. According to him, the applicants are complaining of fair hearing.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
From the averments in the affidavit and counter affidavit and the entries in the exhibits, the factual background of the forensic contest between the parties may be summed up as follows.
The lower court entered judgement against the applicants on July 9, 2007.
Sometime in January 2008, [about seven months after the said judgement], the respondent [as judgement creditor] filed a praecipe for Writ of execution of the judgement. On June 6, 2008, a Warrant of possession of the second applicant’s immoveable property, namely, his “apartment” [see, exhibit 006 attached to the respondent’s counter affidavit] was issued. By the said exhibit 006, “the defendant (sic) Mr [Emmanuel Aluko and Gbadegesin Olagoke] (sic) apartment was taken over and handed over to the plaintiff”.
Barely a week later, on June 15, 2008, a Notice of Attachment [Judgements Form 41] was issued “for the attachment and sale of the applicants’ movable (sic, moveable property] in execution of the judgement.” An “Inventoy” (sic, Inventory), dated June 13, 2008, showing the attached moveable property was, also, exhibited as part of the bundle of documents collectively marked exhibit 007.
On June 23, 2008, the applicants filed a motion in which they entreated the lower court for the following orders:
A. Stay of execution of the Writ of attachment shown in the inventory, copy attached as exhibit ‘A’;
B. Releasing the said properties contained in exhibit ‘A’ to the second defendant/applicant absolutely or subject to the directive of the court;
C. Permitting the second defendant/applicant to give security for safe keeping of the goods attached or in the alternative to abide by any order subject to the discretion of the court.
The grounds for the application were stated thus:
1. This Honourable court did not give judgement for the amount claimed (that is N848,569.92k) in the Notice of Attachment marked exhibit ‘B’;
2. There was no evidence before the court that the whole amount due, after its interests had been calculated was N848, 569. 92k;
3. The first and second defendants/applicants had no opportunity, during trial to agree, deny, oppose or contest the veracity of the figure/sum arrived at to be N848, 559. 92k by the respondent;
4. The plaintiff/respondent is a party interested and it is inequitable for him to recalculate the sum of N735,000. 00 adjudged by the court to the sum of N848, 569. 92k without the consent of the first and second defendants/applicants and/or with the finding of a reputed accountant appointed by the court.
[italics supplied].
The lower court, in its ruling of December 3, 2008, dismissed the application. It is this ruling [and the judgement of July 9,2007] that the applicants now desire to appeal against. Two weeks later, precisely, on December 17, 2008, the applicants, in CA/I/M 300/2008, approached the Ibadan Division of this Court [prior to the inauguration of this Division, appeals from Osun State lay at the Ibadan Division] with a similar application for stay of execution of the writ of attachment and/or sale of the second applicant’s items of moveable property.
This application was greeted with a preliminary objection. In his “Reply (sic) to affidavit in support of preliminary objection,” dated May 14, 2010, [exhibit 001 attached to the counter affidavit] the second applicant herein deposed inter alia :
2. I was in Court on 8/12/09 when my application in CA/I/M 300/08 was withdrawn after the Presiding Judge (sic) in the panel of Justices called attention of my Solicitor to various irregularities which rendered the application to be incompetent; subsequently the application was withdrawn and it was struck out;
3. My Solicitor, Prince F. E. O. Adewuyi, told me the following facts which I believe to be true:
a. That the application in Appeal No CA/I/M 300/08 was aimed against the attachment of goods owned by the first appellant/applicant in court;
b. That the said application is for stay of execution of attachment of goods and not for stay of execution of judgement dated 9/7/2007.
c. That my Solicitor believed that the said application seeking for stay of execution of attachment of goods has been brought under the provisions of Order 5 Rule 8 (1) of the Judgement (Enforcement) Rules Cap 148, Laws of Osun State, 2002…
4. …
5. That my Solicitor told me that this Honourable court frowned at the way the reliefs were recorded for consideration of the court, hence the need for a new application to avoid any further striking out order [italics supplied]
On December 8, 2009, the said Ibadan Division of this Court struck out that application. Exhibit 002 is the proceeding of that date evidencing the order of Uwa JCA which struck out the said application filed on December 17, 2008.
Following the above order of Uwa JCA striking out the application, the Judgement Creditor [respondent herein] ignited the machinery of execution of the attached moveable property. Auction notices were issued on June 28, 2011 and December, 2011 “for the sale of moveable property”. The auction sale was carried out and report thereof issued.
The respondent assembled and attached the documents relating to the said execution of the items of moveable property of the second applicant as exhibit 007. They are: the praecipe for Writ of Execution; Judgements Form 41 [Notice of Attachment] of items of moveable property; Inventory of the items of moveable property of the second applicant; Auction Notice for the sale of moveable property; letter conveying approval for the auction sale of the attached goods; Report on Auction Sales; the application for the payment of the proceeds of goods auctioned and Receipt for money paid out of court.
As shown above, by exhibit 005, the warrant of possession, “the defendant (sic) Mr [Emmanuel Aluko and Gbadegesin Olagoke] (sic) apartment was taken over and handed over to the plaintiff.” We searched in vain for the Judgement Creditor’s application on notice to the present applicants [as judgement debtors] for the leave of the lower court under the Judgement (Enforcement) Rules for the issuance of the said warrant of possession of the applicants’ immoveable property, Saleh v Monguno [2003] 1 NWLR (pt 801) 221; Leedo Presidential Motel Ltd v Bank of the North Ltd. (1998) 10 NWLR (pt 570) 353 at 381-383; Boyero v Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria Ltd (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 538) 509; Osunkwo v Ugbogbo (1966) NMLR L84 and Opubor v Demiruru (1961) All NLR 435. We could not find any.

THE MATERIAL AVERMENTS OF THE APPLICANTS
As shown above, this application, earnestly, implores this court to favour the applicants with the “Trinity prayers” so that they could challenge the judgement of the lower court of July 9,2007 and the ruling of December 3, 2008 on appeal. From our perusal of the material averments in the affidavits in support of this application and, in particular, the averments in the process titled “Reply (sic) to affidavit in support of preliminary objection,” we entertain no doubt that the applicants laid the entire blame for their inability to appeal within time on the way their counsel advocated their various applications.
In the above “Reply” dated May 14, 2010, [exhibit 001] (supra), the second applicant herein deposed inter alia:
4. I was in Court on 8/12/09 when my application in CA/I/M 300/08 was withdrawn after the Presiding Judge (sic) in the panel of Justices called attention of my Solicitor to various irregularities which rendered the application to be incompetent; subsequently the application was withdrawn and it was struck out;
5. My Solicitor, Prince F. E. O. Adewuyi, told me the following facts which I believe to be true:
d. That the application in Appeal No CA/I/M 300/08 was aimed against the attachment of goods owned by the first appellant/applicant in court;
e. That the said application is for stay of execution of attachment of goods and not for stay of execution of judgement dated 9/7/2007.
f. That my Solicitor believed that the said application seeking for stay of execution of attachment of goods has been brought under the provisions of Order 5 Rule 8 (1) of the Judgement (Enforcement) Rules Cap 148, Laws of Osun State, 2002…
4. …
5. That my Solicitor told me that this Honourable court frowned at the way the reliefs were recorded for consideration of the court, hence the need for a new application to avoid any further striking out order [italics supplied]
In paragraph 13 of the affidavit in support of this application, the deponent averred that:
…there had been several attempts made by my former counsel, Prince F. E. O. Adewuyi, to obtain an order of extension of time to file appeal in this case which did not yield result. The applications were either struck out or withdrawn for being incompetent at the Court of Appeal, Ibadan. In that regard, a lot of time was wasted.
[italics supplied]
Indeed, the lower court was so peeved that it employed the occasion of its ruling of December 3, 2008 , for remedial lessons on procedural jurisprudence.
Listen to the court:
Let me educate the defendants/applicants and their counsel, Prince Adewuyi, that I am not ready to review the judgement already delivered by me as that will not only be wrong and amount to re-opening the suit, to do so will amount to my assuming appellate jurisdiction over my judgement
A look at the particulars of the Grounds of Appeal in the Proposed Notice of Appeal, particularly, those on pages 4-5 of exhibit C attached to the application under consideration, will show that the crux of the applicants’ complaint is the alleged denial of their constitutional right to a hearing. They complained that the lower court was wrong in upholding the calculations which only the Principal Registrar of the lower court and the representative of the judgement creditor did. The court had affirmed that they “did the calculations and arrived at the sum of N848, 569,92k due to the plaintiff as contained in the writ of attachment….” They intend to contest the said ruling on the ground inter alia that they should have been invited for the purpose of the said calculations.
In their view, “the fact that the appellants were not invited had occasioned injustice because the sum arrived at is not acceptable to the applicants.” It was against this background that Fabunmi, in his reply, contended that the applicants were complaining of fair hearing. In short, the two main grounds on which this application was hinged are: the breach of the applicants’ right to fair hearing and the “sins of their counsel”: “sins” of their former counsel, Prince Adewuyi, whose several attempts to obtain an order of extension of time to file appeal in this case … did not yield results. The applications were either struck out or withdrawn for being incompetent. The question is whether these grounds are sufficient to earn them a favourable exercise of discretion.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF ORDER 7 RULE 10, COURT OF APPEAL RULES, 2011
As already indicated at the outset of this ruling, Fabunmi, Esq, of counsel for the applicants, moved the court to grant the said application under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011, He cited CBN v Ahmed (2001) 7 SCM 85, 97 and 100, in support of his contention that the application has complied with the two requirements of the Rules (supra). He, also, prayed in aid the authority of Ifekandu v Uzoegwu [2008] 6 SCM 118, 125 for his supplication. On his part, J. Omirin, of counsel for the respondent, relying on Dike v Goodday Resources Ltd [2009] All FWLR (pt 485) 1728, 1734, contended that the reasons which the applicants adduced are not good and substantial enough. He, also, took the view that the grounds of appeal are not arguable, W.I.H. Ltd v ANAMCO Ltd (2009) All FWLR (pt 485) 1797, 1798.
This court’s powers to extend time within which to appeal or to apply for leave to appeal are statutory, UNILAG v Aigoro (1984) 11 SC 152, 212; (1985) 1 NWLR (pt t) 143. While section 24(2) of the Court of Appeal Act prescribes the period within which to appeal against decisions of lower courts to the Court of Appeal, Order 7 Rule 10 (2) of the Rules of the Court of 2011 provides for the court’s exercise of its discretion to extend time within which to appeal, Ikenta Best (Nig) Ltd v AG, Rivers State (2008) All FWLR (pt 417) 1, 16.
The object of both provisions is to give the court the discretion to extend time with a view to avoiding injustice to the parties, UNILAG v Aigoro (supra) 195. By employing the precatory word “may” these provisions vest in the court the exercise of discretion. It must be emphasised here that though the discretion must be exercised in a judicial manner, that is, according to laid down principles, it is not a typically judicial function. As the apex court explained in UNILAG v Aigoro (supra) 216, it is a function which lies, awkwardly, between, clearly, judicial acts and, clearly, administrative acts and are referred to as judicial discretions.

As noted earlier, the exercise of judicial discretion depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In effect, in such matters, no one case can be authority for another, see per Kay LJ IN Jenkins v Bushby (1391) 1 Ch 484, 494 approvingly adopted in Odusote v Odusote (1971) 1 All NLR 219, 222; UNILAG v Aigoro (supra) 221. Put differently, in determining an application for extension of time, such as this, each case must be decided on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. The corollary is that the facts to be taken into consideration are inexhaustive, UNILAG v Olaniyan (NO 1) (1935) 1 NWLR (pt 1) 156; (2001) FWLR (pt 56) 808; CCB (Nig) Ltd v Ogwuru (1993) 3 NWLR (pt 284) 530.
In all, however, it has to be noted that an application seeking leave to appeal is not granted as a matter of course, Ogundimu v Kasunmu (2006) 41 WRN 1; ACB plc v Evulocha (2001) FWLR (pt 60) 1611, 1621; Williams v Hope Rising Voluntary Funds Society (2001) 34 WRN 171; (1982) 13 NSCC 36.

Although, Order 7 Rule 10 (2) (supra) prescribes that every application for enlargement of time within which to appeal shall be supported by, inter alia, “grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard”, it does not define what constitutes “good cause”.
However, case law has supplied a guide to the meaning of the phrase. In Ikenta Best (Nig) Ltd v A. G. Rivers State (supra) at 642, Tobi JSC, in his contributory judgement, defined good cause to mean “good reason”. His Lordship made a useful and insightful’ clarification which we are bound to emphasize here.
According to the distinguished jurist, the good reason is for the hearing of the appeal. It is not to vouch for the success of the appeal. The reason is simple: at the stage of considering an application for extension of time to appeal, the court is concerned with the strength of the grounds of appeal and not with the success of the appeal. In ANPP v Albishir (2010) 182 LRCN 34, Oguntade JSC approvingly endorsed Tobi JSC’s clarification as part of his reasoning in the leading judgement.

Now, as shown above, one of the two principal reasons adduced in support of this application is the catalogue of mistakes of the applicants’ former counsel, Prince Adewusi: mistakes that prompted their debriefing him. It cannot be gainsaid that the period between July 9, 2007 and now is a really long time. In our humble view, however, punishing the applicants because of the blunders of their former counsel, Prince Adewumi, may lead to the possibility of a miscarriage of justice, Iroegbu v Okwordi (1990) 21 NSCC (pt 111) 377; NIWA v SPDC (supra) 1418. Thus, where, as in this application, it is satisfactorily established that the failure to appeal within the prescribed time is attributable to the failings on the part of counsel, the application will be granted , Iroegbu v Okwordu (supra); NIWA v SPDC (supra) 1418.
Prince Adewumi’s mistakes were many indeed. At one point, the Ibadan Division of this court “frowned at the way [he couched] his reliefs for the consideration of the court.” Indeed, the Presiding Justice of the said Ibadan Division, on December 8, 2009, personally, called Adewumi’s attention “to various irregularities which rendered the application incompetent”. True, indeed, most of the applications the learned Prince filed for orders for extension of time were either struck out or withdrawn for being incompetent. As noted earlier, the lower court was so aghast at the sort of applications he [the learned prince] presented to it that it turned the occasion of its ruling to a unique, if unusual, forum for remedial lectures. The court, actually, “educated” him on the applicable procedure for the review of judgements. It is not clear, however, from the records whether the said Prince benefitted from that court’s thankless, albeit, unsolicited pedagogy!

The second ground relates to the alleged denial of the applicants’ right to fair hearing. The authorities on the effect of the breach of this right are so many that the law on this point could be said to be trite, indeed, Military Governor of Imo State v Nwauwa (1997) LPELR -SC.218/1994; S and D Construction Co Ltd v Ayoku (2011) LPELR-SC.12/2003; Awoniyi v The Registered Trustees of the Rosicrucian Order of AMORC (2000) 4 SC (pt 1) 103; Adeniran v NEPA (2002) 14 NWLR (pt 786) 30; Saleh v Monguno [2003] 1 NWLR (pt 801) 221; Bamgbo.se v UNILORIN [1999] 10 NWLR (pt 622) 270; Salu v Egeibon [1994] 6 NWLR (pt 384) 23; Adigun v AG, Oyo State [1997] 1 NWLR (pt 531) 678 etc. It is undeniable that a complaint bordering on the alleged breach of the said right is an arguable ground. That is, it is always a good cause or reason for hearing an appeal. We must not be understood as holding the view that the proposed appeal would succeed on that ground, Ikenna Best (Best) Nig Ltd v Ag, Rivers State (supra); Holman Bros (Nig) Ltd v Kigo (Nig) Ltd (supra). Such a view would not only be premature, it would be pre-emptive and prejudicial.
For the avoidance of any doubt, we maintain that, as at now, we are only concerned with the strength of the grounds of appeal and not with the success of the appeal, ANPP v Albishir (2010) 182 LRCN 34.

In all, for the reasons advanced in the preceding paragraphs, we hold that it would be in the interest of justice to favour the applicants with the trinity prayers sought in this application. Accordingly, we order as prayed. Application is granted in terms of the reliefs sought on the motion paper. They are granted fourteen days, to be reckoned from today, within which to consummate the filing of the relevant processes envisaged on the motion paper.

KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.C.A.: I have had the benefit of reading in draft the ruling just delivered by my learned brother, Chima Centus Nweze, JCA. I agree entirely with his reasoning and conclusion that the application has merit and ought to be allowed. I accordingly allow it in terms of the prayers as stated on the face of the motion paper. I abide by the consequential orders contained in the lead ruling.

CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA, J.C.A.: I have read before now the ruling just delivered by my learned brother C.C, Nweze JCA. I agree that it is in the interest of justice to grant the application. I also grant the application and I abide by the consequential orders in the lead ruling.

Appearances

Abayomi FabunmiFor Appellant

AND

O. J. OmirinFor Respondent