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EMEKA O. KANU v. SWEET ASUZU & ANOR (2015)

EMEKA O. KANU v. SWEET ASUZU & ANOR

(2015)LCN/7758(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 30th day of January, 2015

CA/OW/89/2010

RATIO

COURT: JURISDICTION; THE IMPORTANCE OF JURISDICTION TO A PROCEEDING

The Law is firmly settled that issue of jurisdiction is very fundamental to adjudication because if a Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate or entertain a matter the proceeding will be null and void and of no effect ab initio. The nature and importance of jurisdiction has been underscored and lucidly stated and settled by the apex Court and this Court in many cases.
In the case of AFRO CONTINENTAL (NIG.) LTD. & AROOR V. COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL INC. (2003) 5 NWLR (PART 813) 303 at 318 G – H to 319A KALGO, JSC had this to say:-
“It is well settled that jurisdiction is the body and Soul of every judicial proceedings before any Court or tribunal and without it all subsequent proceedings are fruitless, futile and a nullity because the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental to the proper hearing of a case.”
And in the recent case of ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION & ORS. V. PHILIP ODIGIE (2013) 17 NWLR (PART 1384) 607 at 622 G – H to 623 A – B this Court PER YAKUBU, JCA, said thus:
“The Paramount and quintessence of jurisdiction in an action in Court for adjudication is aptly captured, in the judicial words on marble by my Lord Bello, CJN (now of blessed memory) that jurisdiction is blood that gives life to the survival of an action in a Court of law and without jurisdiction; the action will be like animal that has been drained of its blood. It will cease to have life and any attempt to resuscitate it without infusing blood into it would be abortive exercise ……….. Therefore, jurisdiction is the green light that gives the Court, the authority to proceed with consideration and determination of the matter placed before it for adjudication.” When jurisdiction of a Court is challenged therefore, the issue must be promptly attended to by the Court seised of the matter so as to settle it one way or another. per. PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISION OF A STATUTE; WHETHER THE PROVISION OF CONSTITUTION OR OF STATUTE MUST BE CONSTRUED LITERALLY BY GIVING THE WORDS IN SUCH CONSTITUTION OR STATUTE THEIR ORDINARY GRAMMATICAL MEANINGS

Now, it has long been settled that the provisions of Constitution or of statute must be construed literally by giving the words in such Constitution or statute their ordinary grammatical meanings. Adjunct to this is that in ascertaining the real or true meaning or import of the provisions being construed or interpreted, the provisions of the Constitution or statute must be construed as a whole. See the case of JOLLY JEVORU NYAME VS. F.R.N. (2010) 7 NWLR (PART 193) 344 at 399 C – H Per ADEKEYE, JSC who held:
“In the interpretation of the provision of a statute or the Constitution where the language used is plain and unambiguous effect must of necessity be given to its plain and ordinary meaning. It is that clear and unambiguous language that best conveys the intention of the lawmaker. The lawmaker must be taken to have intended the meaning expressed in such clear and unambiguous language and the Court will not be at liberty to go outside the very provision in an attempt to ascertain the intendment and purpose of the provision. The obvious duty of the Court in such a situation therefore is not the determination of what the lawmaker meant, but the meaning of the plain language used which best expresses his intention. Sections 257(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and Section (4) of the Penal Code are both written in ordinary plain language which according to the literal approach best represent the intention of the lawmakers. Furthermore, it is the general principle of law governing the interpretation of our Constitution that it should be given an interpretation which would serve the interest of the Constitution and carry out its object and purpose. Its relevant provisions must be read together and not disjoint and where the words of any section are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their ordinary meaning unless this would lead to absurdity or be in conflict with other provisions of the Constitution. Effect should be given to every word.” per. PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.

COURT: JURISDICTION; THE EXTENT AND SCOPE OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND WHEN IS A COURT COMPETENT TO ENTERTAIN A CASE

It must be borne in mind that Courts are a creation of the Constitution or a statute. It is such constitution or the statute that must be scrutinized or examined to discover the scope and extent of jurisdiction committed to each of the Courts. See NYAME V. FRN SUPRA PAGE 393 G – H per ADEKEYE, JSC who also said:- “Courts are creature of the Constitution, Decrees, Acts, laws and Edicts and they cloak the Courts with the Powers and jurisdiction of adjudication. If the Constitution, Decrees Acts Laws and Edicts do not grant jurisdiction to a Court or tribunal, the Court and parties cannot by agreement endow it with jurisdiction. The jurisdiction is defined as the authority of a Court to exercise judicial power which is the totality of the powers a Court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hear a case.”A Court is competent to entertain a case when
(a) it is properly constituted as regards members and qualifications of the members of the bench and no member is disqualified for one reason or another and
b. The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising it jurisdiction and
c. The case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law and upon condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction MADUKOLU VS. NKEDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR Pg. 34; OLOVIODE vs. OYEBI (1984) 5 SC” per. PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.

COURT: JURISDICTION; THE JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURTS AND AREA COURTS OR CUSTOMARY COURTS ACCORDING TI THR LAND USE ACT

It is here necessary for me to bring to the fore the provisions of the Land Use Act contained in Sections 39 and 41 which all provide thus:

“39 JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURTS.
39(1) The High Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in respect of the following proceedings-
(a) Proceedings in respect of any Land the subject of a Statutory Right of Occupancy granted by the Governor or deemed to be granted by him under this Act and for the purposes of this paragraph proceedings includes proceedings for a declaration of title to a Statutory Right of Occupancy.

(b) Proceedings to determine any question as to the persons entitled to compensation payable for improvements of Land under this Act.

  1. All Laws, including rules of Court, regulating the practice and procedure of the High Court shall apply in respect of proceedings to which this Section relates and the Laws shall have effect with such modifications as would enable effect to be given to the provisions of this Section.

“41 Jurisdiction of Area Courts or Customary Courts etc.
An Area Court or Customary Court or other Court of equivalent jurisdiction in a State shall have jurisdiction in respect of proceedings in Respect of Customary Right of Occupancy granted by a Local Government under this Act. And for the purposes of this paragraph proceedings includes proceedings for a declaration of title to a Customary Right of Occupancy and all Laws including Rules of Court regulating practice and procedure of such Courts shall have effect with such modifications as would enable effect to be given to this Section” per. PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.

COURT; JURISDICTION; WHAT MUST EXIST TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT HAS JURISDICTION AND WHAT MUST CO-EXIST FOR THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT TO HAVE JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 230 OF THE I979 CONSTITUTION OR SECTION 251 OF THE 1999 CONSTITUTION

The judgment was delivered on 30th day of April, 2010 by Supreme Court.
I am afraid that is not the end of the matter. Other decisions of the Supreme Court that came after the decision in ADETAYO VS. ADEMOLA Supra now laid it down that in order to discover whether the Federal High Court has jurisdiction the Court determining the issue must ensure that two things co-exist. These are that:

(a) The parties, or a party must be the Federal Government or its agencies.
(b) Subject matter of the Litigation must arise from the administration, management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies. See the case of:
ISAAC OBIUWEUBI VS. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (2011) 7 NWLR (PART 1247) 465 at 492 C – H to 493 A – D per RHODES – VIVOUR, JSC who said:

“Section 251(1)(p)(q)(r) of the 1999 Constitution is impari materia with the above. The provisions vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in Civil causes and matters, arising from the administration, management and control of the Federal Government and its agencies, the operation and interpretation of the Constitution as it affects the Federal Government and its agencies as well as any action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decisions by the Federal Government and its agencies.
For the Federal High Court to have jurisdiction under section 230 of the 1979 Constitution or Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution the following must co-exist.

(a) The parties, or a party must be the Federal Government or its agencies;
(b) Subject matter of the litigation.
That is to say jurisdiction is the combination of parties and subject matter. The words used in this piece of legislation are plain as plain can be and have been interpreted by this Court on several occasions. See: N.E.P.A. v. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) p. 79; Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdul-Raheem & 3 Ors. (2009) 5 – 6 SC (Pt. 11) p.57; (2009) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 83. per. PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.

COURT: JURISDICTION; THE DETERMINATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT

I am firmly of the view that as from the 17th of November, 1993 the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction if the matter is a civil matter arising from the administration, management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
The matter must arise from the operation and interpretation of the Constitution.
Finally the matter must arise from any action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decisions by the Federal Government, or any of its agencies.
The suit has to do with the administration or management and control of the Federal Government. The respondent is a Federal Agency and the appellant is/was its employee. The termination of the appellant’s appointment is on administrative action by an agency of the Federal Government, the respondent.
See also:
DR. OJU TAIWO OLORUNTOBA & ORS. VS. PROFESSOR S. O. ABDUL-RAHEEM & ORS. (2009) 5 MJSC (Pt.11) 1 at 35 A – C where the Supreme Court said: “In the determination of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in respect of Section 251(1) of the Constitution, the Court must carefully examine the facts of the case to see whether they justify the application of that section. In the case of Trade Bank Plc. V. Benilux (Nigeria) Ltd. (2003) 9 NWLR Pt. 825 page 416, the Supreme Court held that “It is only on careful examination of the pleadings filed by the parties in a cause or matter namely the statement of claim not the defence that the Court can ascertain whether or not the Federal High Court have exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Section 251(1) (p)(q)(r) of the 1999 Constitution.” Section 251(1)(p)(q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution provides that:-
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by the Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil cause or matter relating to:
(p) The administrative or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
(q) Subject to the provision of this Constitution, the operation and interpretation of this Constitution in so far as it affects the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
(r) Any action or proceeds for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
The community reading of the foregoing provision reproduced above is that the Federal High Court is vested with the power to enter into adjudication of any action or proceedings seeking declaratory or Injunctive Reliefs which is the fulcrum of the cause of action of the Appellants.
Section 251(1) creates a situation whereupon by party jurisdiction-one of the parties must be a Federal Government Agency and by subject-matter jurisdiction it must be an action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies.” (Underlined mine). per. PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.

COURT: JURISDICTION; THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE FERAL HIGH COURT IN ANY ACTION OR SUIT HAVING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS AGENCIES AS DEFENDANT OR PARTIES

It is also no longer in doubt that the Supreme Court has fully reaffirmed and reiterated its decision in NEPA VS. Edegbero Supra that any action or Suit having the Federal Government or any of its agencies as defendant or parties will deprive the State High Court of Jurisdiction. Only the Federal High Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in such matter irrespective of the subject matter of the action. See the case of:
BENSON AGBULE VS. WARRI REFINERY & PETROCHEMICAL CO. LTD. (2013) 6 NWLR (PART 1350) 318 delivered on 14th December, 2012 where at page 348 F – H per OGUNBIYI, JSC who said:
“On a gruesome and careful determination of the case NEPA V. Edegbero (2003) 1 MJSC 69; (2002) 18 NWLR (pt. 798) 79, this Court per Ogundare, JSC while interpreting the Constitutional enactment as provided in paragraphs (q), (r) and (s) of section 230 (1), held the following pronouncement at pages 80 – 81 of the report and said:-
“From what I have said earlier in this judgment the aim of paragraphs (q), (r) and (s) of sub section 230 was to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in matters in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies was a party. A State High Court would not long have jurisdiction in such matters notwithstanding the nature of the claim in the action”
And at pages 351 H to 352 A – E his Lordship of the Supreme Court held reiterating decision in Edegbero’s case thus:
“The principle in the case of NEPA V. Edegbero has also been applied with affirmative approval in the later case of Olutola V. University of IIorin (2005) 3 MJSC 151 at Pp. 173 – 174; (2004) 18 NWLR (pt. 905) 416 wherein this court per Ejiwunmi, J.S.C. held and said:-
“In the case at hand, it is not in doubt that Decree No. 107 of 1993 had removed the jurisdiction of State High Courts to hear and determine causes and matters including declaratory actions against the Federal Government or its agencies.” per. PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.

Justices

RAPHAEL CHIKWE AGBO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

PETER OLABISI IGE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

FREDERICK O. OHO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

EMEKA O. KANUAppellant(s)

AND

1. SWEET ASUZU
2. NIGERIA RAILWAY CORPORATIONRespondent

PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the Judgment of Abia State High Court, Aba Division contained in the Judgment of NWANOSIKE, J. delivered on 30th day of March, 2009.
The precursor to this appeal was the issuance of Writ of Summons at the instance of the Appellant on 3rd day of March, 2008 against the Respondents as Defendants at the said Division of the Court below claiming against the said Respondents jointly and severally as follows:

“1. A declaration that the Temporary Occupancy Licence dated 13/9/93 granted to the Plaintiff’s predecessor-in-title and acquired by the Plaintiff by a Transfer receipt dated 10th November, 1993, is valid and subsisting and has not been revoked.

2. A declaration that the Plaintiff is to the exclusion of every other person the Lawful Licensee of that piece or parcel of Land situate at Aba Railway Station measuring 55M x 33M and more particularly shown on Plan No. EB 884 attached to a TOL dated to the Plaintiff’s predecessor-in-title Mr. James N. Chigbundu.

3. An Order of perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendants, their Servants, Workers, Privies and Agents from further trespassing on the Plaintiff’s Land.

4. N100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) as general damages against the Defendants for their acts of trespass on the Plaintiff’s Land.”

The said reliefs were replicated in paragraph 13 of the Statement of Claim that accompanied the aforesaid Writ of Summons.

By a Motion on Notice dated the 13th day of October, 2008 filed on the same date the 1st Defendant now 1st Respondent to this appeal sought for:

“(1) An Order Dismissing or striking out this Suit for want of jurisdiction in that the proper defendants are not before the Court.

(2) An Order Dismissing this Suit for want of party jurisdiction, the 2nd defendant being an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria AND OR.

(3) An Order striking out the names of the Defendants as been improperly joined.”

The Motion was supported by a – 12 paragraph Affidavit and Exhibits attached. There was a Counter Affidavit from the Plaintiff now Appellant.
The application was duly heard and the Learned Trial Judge delivered his Judgment on the application on 30th March, 2009 and held as follows:

“And applying the above cases to the present one, the second defendant was created by statute to carry out its functions as a Railway Corporation in line with Item No. 55 of the second schedule, part 1 of the Exclusive Legislative List of the 1999 Constitution and is therefore an agency of the Federal Government and covered by Section 251(P) and or (r) of the said Constitution. I therefore hold that the 2nd defendant is an agency of the Federal Government and this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit in which it is a party.
Mr. Agor has argued that this being a Land matter, this Court has jurisdiction over the Suit because the subject matter was within its jurisdiction. I do not however agree with that argument while the Land is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, it is within the premises of the 2nd defendants and therefore, in their possession. Besides, the Claim in the Suit is for a declaration and an injunction, and therefore covered by Section 251(r) of the said Constitution – see the Court of Appeal in N.D.I.C. VS. Nasarawa State (2008) 29 W.R.N. 61 at 90. In Conclusion, I hold that Court has no jurisdiction in the Suit because of the presence of the second defendant in the Suit. Suit is accordingly struck out. I make no order as to costs.”

Aggrieved by the decision of the Learned Trial Judge, the Appellant lodged this appeal against the Judgment of the Court below. The Appellant’s Notice of Appeal dated the 15th day of April, 2009 and filed on 17th day of April, 2009, contains one ground of appeal which reads thus:

“ERROR IN LAW
The Learned Trial Judge erred in Law when he held that the High Court of a State lacks jurisdiction to try a Land matter where the Federal Government or any Federal Government Agency is a party to the Suit.

PARTICULARS OF ERROR
(1) Declaration of title to Land is not one of the causes of action which is covered by Section 251 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
(2) The Federal High Court only has exclusive jurisdiction to try matters listed in Section 251 (1) (a) – (s) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
(3) It is the subject matter of a Suit that determines the Court that has jurisdiction to try it and not parties.”

The Appellant filed his Brief of Argument dated 23rd April, 2012 on 24th day of April, 2012. The Respondents’ Brief of Argument was filed on 17th day of May, 2012 dated same date. The Appellant filed Appellant’s Reply Brief of Argument dated 18th day of May, 2012 on 24th day of May, 2012. The Appeal was heard on 18th day of November, 2014 when the Learned Counsel adopted and relied on their respective Brief of Arguments.

The Appellant formulated one (1) issue for the determination of this appeal namely:-

“Whether the trial Court was right when it held that the High Court of Abia State lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine Land matters where a Federal Government Agency is a party to the Suit.”

Though the Respondents also distilled a lone issue, the same was couched differently thus:

“Whether in the circumstances of this case as revealed by the presence of the 1st Respondent (sic) and the claims or relief sought by the Appellant, the Learned trial Judge was wrong to decline jurisdiction.”

This appeal will be determined on the issue formulated by the Appellant viz:

“WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT, WHEN IT HELD THAT THE HIGH COURT OF ABIA STATE LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DETERMINE LAND MATTERS WHERE A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY IS A PARTY TO THE SUIT.”

The Learned Counsel to the Appellant George Ukalegbu Esq. submitted that the decision of the Learned trial Judge is erroneous and does not represent the state of the Law on the competence or jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to hear and determine Land matters where any Federal Government Agency is a party. That Section 251(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 has provided for situation in which Federal High Court can exercise jurisdiction. He reproduced the said section and cited the case of MADUKOLU VS. NKEMDILIM (2001) 46 WRN 1 at 13 per Bairamian F.J to contend that in any action where Federal Government or any of its Agencies is a party the Court must consider the parties in Litigation as well as the subject matter which he opined are endorsed on Plaintiff’s and Statement of Claim. That a Federal Agent is in a matter will not of its own confer jurisdiction on the Federal High court. He relied on the cases of J.O. MADUAFOKWA VS. ABIA STATE GOVERNMENT & ORS. (2008) 33 WRN 37 at 58CA and O. F. OLASIPO V. NIGERIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE BOARD (2009) 12 NWLR (PT.1156) 563CA; OLUTOLA V. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (2004) 18 NWLR (PT. 905) 416 SC; Onuorah vs. K. R. P. CO. LTD., (2005) 6 NWLR (PT. 921) 393. OMOTESHO V. ABDULLAHI (2008) 2 NWLR (PT. 1072) 526 at 546 – 547. ADELEKUN VS. ECU – LINE N (2006) 31 WRN 171; and MINISTRY OF WORKS VS. THOMAS NIG. LTD. (2001) 48 WRN 119.

That the Suit here has to do with Land situate in Abia in Abia State that the Court that has jurisdiction over land matters in Nigeria is either a State High Court or other Court of equivalent jurisdiction where the Land is situate in a Rural Area. The Learned Counsel to the Appellant relied on Sections 39 and 41 of Land Use Act and stated that Section 51 of Land Use Act defines High Court of State. That even where Federal Government or any of its agencies are parties that there are Legion of authorities showing the State High Court as the one with jurisdiction to try Land matters. He relied on the following cases viz:
1. OKOROMA V. UBA (1999) 1 NWLR (Pt. 587) 357 at 378.
2. COSMOS EZUKWU VS. PETER UKACHUKWU & ANOR. (2000) 1 NWLR (PT. 642) 657.
3. OMOTESHO VS. ABDULLAHI (2008) 2 NWLR PT. 1072 526 at 588 per OGUNBIYI, JCA.
4. ACHEBE V. NWOSU (2003) 7 NWLR (PT. 818) 103.
5. OLADIPO VS. NCSB (2009) 12 NWLR (PT. 1156) 563CA.
6. N.I.M.R. VS. AKIN OLUGBADE (2008) 5 NWLR (PART 1079) 68.
7. ERHUMWUNSE VS. EHANIRE (2003) 13 NWLR (PT. 873) 353 SC.

That it is not the intention of Section 251 of 1999 Constitution that any Suit having Federal Government or its agency as party can only be tried at the Federal High Court:- He relied on OMOSOWAN VS. CHIEDOZIE (1998) 9 NWLR (PT. 566) 477 at 484 per AKPABIO JCA.
That the case of NDIC VS. AG NASARAWA Supra relied upon by the trial Court is inapplicable. That the case is not a Land matter as in this case and that the said decision has been overtaken by the cases already relied upon by the Appellant. This Court is urged to resolve the sole issue in favour of the Appellant. That the appeal be allowed and the case remitted to Court below for trial de novo before another Judge.
In his own argument, the Learned Counsel to the Respondent Ogbo Emekwa Esq. contended that the Learned Trial Judge was right to decline jurisdiction to entertain Appellants Suit for the following reasons viz:

1. That the 2nd Defendant/Respondent is an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria relying on NIPOST VS. ADEPOJU (2003) 5 NWLR (Pt. 813) 224 and item 55 of 2nd schedule part 1 of the Exclusive test in the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria.

2. That being Agent of Federal Government Section 251(p) and (r) of the said Constitution of the jurisdiction oust the Lower Court’s jurisdiction to entertain Suit involving 2nd Respondent. He relied on the Supreme Court decision of NEPA V. EDEGBERO (2003) 9 WRN 1 at 17 and NDIC VS. A.G. NASARAWA (2008) 28 WRN 61 at 90.

3. That the Land the subject matter of the Suit was owned and situate in the premises of 2nd Respondent and that it is in its premises. He also relied on paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Appellant’s Statement of Claim which Learned Respondent’s Counsel posited as admitting those facts. That it would have been a breach of Section 251 (p) and (r) of 1999 Constitution for the Lower Court to have assumed jurisdiction since the matter has to do with and questioned administrative control and activities of 2nd Respondent.

(3a) That the Land is dispute does not fall within Section 39 and 41 of the Land Use Act as same Statutorily belonged to the 2nd Respondent and that any Suit which seeks to challenge or question validity or invalidity of conduct or actions of 2nd Respondent relating to the Land in dispute is caught by provisions of Section 251 of the Land Use Act. That that was the purport of decision of this Court in OLADIPO V. NCSB (2009) 12 NWLR (PT. 1156) 563 relied upon heavily, according to Respondents by Appellant’s Counsel.

4. That the Federal High Court is further equipped to deal with Land matters pursuant to Order 3 Rule 3 Sub Rule 3 of the Federal High Court Rules 2009.

In Conclusion he urged this Court to uphold the decision of the Lower Court declining jurisdiction and to dismiss the appeal.
The Appellant filed Appellant Reply Brief as aforesaid and submitted that a Land whether or not in possession of the Federal Government or its Agency is not covered by Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution. He relied on the decisions of this Court in the cases of N.I.M.R. V.  N.U.R.T.W. (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1208) 328 and F.M.B.N. VS. LAGOS STATE GOVERNMENT (2010) 5 NWLR (PT.1188) 570 at 601. That the Supreme Court has departed from its decision in NEPA V. EDEGBERO Supra in the case ONUORAH VS. KADUNA REFINERY & Petrochemical Ltd., (2005) 6 NWLR (PART 92) 393 and NNPC VS. SLB CONSORTIUM LTD. (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1113) 297.

Appellant in the final analysis urged this Court to hold that a State High Court and NOT a Federal High Court has jurisdiction to deal with the Appellant’s action/Suit.

The Law is firmly settled that issue of jurisdiction is very fundamental to adjudication because if a Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate or entertain a matter the proceeding will be null and void and of no effect ab initio. The nature and importance of jurisdiction has been underscored and lucidly stated and settled by the apex Court and this Court in many cases.
In the case of AFRO CONTINENTAL (NIG.) LTD. & AROOR V. COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL INC. (2003) 5 NWLR (PART 813) 303 at 318 G – H to 319A KALGO, JSC had this to say:-
“It is well settled that jurisdiction is the body and Soul of every judicial proceedings before any Court or tribunal and without it all subsequent proceedings are fruitless, futile and a nullity because the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental to the proper hearing of a case.”
And in the recent case of ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION & ORS. V. PHILIP ODIGIE (2013) 17 NWLR (PART 1384) 607 at 622 G – H to 623 A – B this Court PER YAKUBU, JCA, said thus:
“The Paramount and quintessence of jurisdiction in an action in Court for adjudication is aptly captured, in the judicial words on marble by my Lord Bello, CJN (now of blessed memory) that jurisdiction is blood that gives life to the survival of an action in a Court of law and without jurisdiction; the action will be like animal that has been drained of its blood. It will cease to have life and any attempt to resuscitate it without infusing blood into it would be abortive exercise ……….. Therefore, jurisdiction is the green light that gives the Court, the authority to proceed with consideration and determination of the matter placed before it for adjudication.”

When jurisdiction of a Court is challenged therefore, the issue must be promptly attended to by the Court seised of the matter so as to settle it one way or another.
The issue for determination in this appeal vividly revolves around the real import, meaning and interpretation of Section 251(1)(p)(q)(r) and (s) of the 1999 Constitution as amended which no doubt have always posed recondite or difficult issue of jurisdiction as between the State High Courts and Federal High Court in the Federation.
In order to decipher or determine which of the two Courts has or is endowed with jurisdiction recourse must be had to the endorsement on the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim. See
1. PDP VS. TIMIPRE SYLVA & ORS. (2012) 13 NWLR (PART 1316) 85 at 127 E – F Per RHODES – VIVOUR, JSC who held that:
“Jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a Suit is resolved by scrupulous examination of the Writ of Summons, the Statement of Claim and the reliefs claimed. No other document should be examined.”
2. DR. TAIWO OLORUNTOBA-OJU & ORS. VS. PRO. P.A. DOPAMU & ORS. (2008) NWLR (PART 1085) 1 at 22H to 23 A per OGUNTADE, JSC.
I have earlier on in this judgment reproduced the reliefs laid out on the Writ of Summons. The entire provisions of 251 of the Constitution read thus:-

“251(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters-
(a) Relating to the revenue of the Government of the Federation in which the said Government or any organ thereof or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the said Government is a party;
(b) Connected with or pertaining to the taxation of companies and other bodies established or carrying on business in Nigeria and all other persons subject to Federal taxation.
(c) Connected with or pertaining to customs and excise duties and export duties, including any claim by or against the Nigeria Customs Service or any member or officer thereof, arising from the performance of any duty imposed under any regulation relating to customs and excise duties and export duties;
(d) Connected with or pertaining to banking, bands, other financial institutions, including any action between one bank and another, any action by or against the Central Bank of Nigeria arising from banking foreign exchange, coinage, legal tender, bills of exchange, letters of credit, promissory notes and other fiscal measures. Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to any dispute between an individual customer and his bank in respect of transactions between the individual customer and the bank;
(e) Arising from the operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act or any other enactment replacing that Act or regulating the operation of companies incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act;
(f) Any Federal enactment relating to copyright, patent, designs, trade marks and passing-off, industrial designs and merchandise marks business names, commercial and industrial monopolies, combines and trusts, standards of goods and commodities and industrial standards;
(g) Any admiralty jurisdiction, including shipping and navigation on the River Niger or River Benue and their effluents and on such other inland waterway as may be designated by any enactment to be international waterway, all Federal ports, (including the constitution and powers of the port, authorities for Federal ports) and carriage by sea;
(h) Diplomatic, consular and trade representation,
(i) Citizenship, naturalization and aliens, deportation of persons who are not citizens of Nigeria, extradition, immigration into and emigration from Nigeria, passports and visas;
(j) Bankruptcy and insolvency;
(k) Aviation and safety of aircraft;
(l) Arms, ammunition and explosives;
(m) Drugs and poisons;
(n) Mines and minerals (including oil fields, oil mining, Geological surveys and natural gas).
(o) Weights and measures;
(p) The administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies;
(q) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the operation and interpretation of this Constitution in so far as it affects the Federal Government or any of its agencies;
(r) Any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies; and
(s) Such other jurisdiction civil or criminal and whether to the exclusion of any other Court or not as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly.”

The above provisions of the Constitution are a replica of Section 230(1)(a),(p),(q),(r) and (s) of 1979 Constitution of Nigeria. More often than not their interpretation have generated a lot of disputes and controversies as to correct interpretation of the Section particularly as to whether a State High Court shares concurrent jurisdiction on matters enumerated in Section 251(1)(p),(q),(r) and (s) with the Federal High Court or whether it is the Federal High Court that has exclusive jurisdiction in any matter in which an agency of the Federal Government of the Federation is a party irrespective of the context and content of the reliefs claimed or the subject matter of such action.
The Learned Counsel to the Appellant held on to Sections 39 and 41 of the Land Use Act as concerning jurisdiction in Land matters vested in the State High Court irrespective of whether the Federal Government or any of its Agencies is a Party to such action or proceedings and not the Federal High Court.

Now, it has long been settled that the provisions of Constitution or of statute must be construed literally by giving the words in such Constitution or statute their ordinary grammatical meanings. Adjunct to this is that in ascertaining the real or true meaning or import of the provisions being construed or interpreted, the provisions of the Constitution or statute must be construed as a whole. See the case of JOLLY JEVORU NYAME VS. F.R.N. (2010) 7 NWLR (PART 193) 344 at 399 C – H Per ADEKEYE, JSC who held:
“In the interpretation of the provision of a statute or the Constitution where the language used is plain and unambiguous effect must of necessity be given to its plain and ordinary meaning. It is that clear and unambiguous language that best conveys the intention of the lawmaker. The lawmaker must be taken to have intended the meaning expressed in such clear and unambiguous language and the Court will not be at liberty to go outside the very provision in an attempt to ascertain the intendment and purpose of the provision. The obvious duty of the Court in such a situation therefore is not the determination of what the lawmaker meant, but the meaning of the plain language used which best expresses his intention. Sections 257(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and Section (4) of the Penal Code are both written in ordinary plain language which according to the literal approach best represent the intention of the lawmakers. Furthermore, it is the general principle of law governing the interpretation of our Constitution that it should be given an interpretation which would serve the interest of the Constitution and carry out its object and purpose. Its relevant provisions must be read together and not disjoint and where the words of any section are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their ordinary meaning unless this would lead to absurdity or be in conflict with other provisions of the Constitution. Effect should be given to every word.”

It must be borne in mind that Courts are a creation of the Constitution or a statute. It is such constitution or the statute that must be scrutinized or examined to discover the scope and extent of jurisdiction committed to each of the Courts. See NYAME V. FRN SUPRA PAGE 393 G – H per ADEKEYE, JSC who also said:-

“Courts are creature of the Constitution, Decrees, Acts, laws and Edicts and they cloak the Courts with the Powers and jurisdiction of adjudication. If the Constitution, Decrees Acts Laws and Edicts do not grant jurisdiction to a Court or tribunal, the Court and parties cannot by agreement endow it with jurisdiction. The jurisdiction is defined as the authority of a Court to exercise judicial power which is the totality of the powers a Court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hear a case.

“A Court is competent to entertain a case when
(a) it is properly constituted as regards members and qualifications of the members of the bench and no member is disqualified for one reason or another and
b. The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising it jurisdiction and
c. The case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law and upon condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction MADUKOLU VS. NKEDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR Pg. 34; OLOVIODE vs. OYEBI (1984) 5 SC”

It is here necessary for me to bring to the fore the provisions of the Land Use Act contained in Sections 39 and 41 which all provide thus:

“39 JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURTS.
39(1) The High Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in respect of the following proceedings-
(a) Proceedings in respect of any Land the subject of a Statutory Right of Occupancy granted by the Governor or deemed to be granted by him under this Act and for the purposes of this paragraph proceedings includes proceedings for a declaration of title to a Statutory Right of Occupancy.

(b) Proceedings to determine any question as to the persons entitled to compensation payable for improvements of Land under this Act.

2. All Laws, including rules of Court, regulating the practice and procedure of the High Court shall apply in respect of proceedings to which this Section relates and the Laws shall have effect with such modifications as would enable effect to be given to the provisions of this Section.

“41 Jurisdiction of Area Courts or Customary Courts etc.
An Area Court or Customary Court or other Court of equivalent jurisdiction in a State shall have jurisdiction in respect of proceedings in Respect of Customary Right of Occupancy granted by a Local Government under this Act. And for the purposes of this paragraph proceedings includes proceedings for a declaration of title to a Customary Right of Occupancy and all Laws including Rules of Court regulating practice and procedure of such Courts shall have effect with such modifications as would enable effect to be given to this Section”

The parties to the action and by extension this appeal are all at one that Nigerian Railway Corporation is an Agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria even as adjudged by the Learned trial Judge. This is a Suit/action in which the Appellant herein is asserting the validity and existence of a Temporary Occupation Licence dated 13/9/93 granted to the Plaintiff’s predecessor-in-title one James N. Chigbundu by the Nigerian Railway Corporation. The Appellant had also pleaded in paragraph 11 of the Statement of Claim that the 1st Defendant “Claimed that it was 2nd Defendant that leased” the Land in dispute to him even though the grant to the Plaintiff has not been revoked. The Appellant also pleaded that the Land in dispute or the radical title in the Land in dispute resides with the 2nd Respondent who granted Temporary Occupation of the Land to the person the Appellant referred to as his predecessor-in-title.
In the case of NEPA VS. MRS. B. EDEGBERO & ORS. (2002) 18 NWLR (PART 798) 79 at 95 – 97 the Supreme Court of Nigeria per OGUNDARE, JSC, held thus:
“It is not in dispute that the defendant-NEPA-is a Federal Government Agency, the two courts below made a finding of fact to this effect and this has not been challenged by the plaintiffs. It is also not disputed that the cause of action in this matter arose out of the administrative action or decision of the defendant. The action is for a declaration and an injunction and the principal purpose of it is to nullify the decision of the defendant terminating the appointments of the plaintiffs and others. In the light of all these, therefore, the action on hand came squarely within the provision of Section 230(1) (s) of the 1979 Constitution. It would appear on the surface, therefore, that the action would be one within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. I have myself read the proviso to paragraphs (q), (r) and (s) of sub-section (1) of Section 230 all over again: I can find no such exception in it that would lead me to find to the contrary. A careful reading of paragraphs (q), (r) and (s) reveals that the intention of the lawmakers was to take away from the jurisdiction of the State High Court and confer same exclusively on the Federal High Court actions in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party. While paragraph (s) talked of actions for declaration or injunction, the proviso extended this to actions for damages, injunction or specific performance. It did not say as the learned trial Judge, with profound respect, appear to read into it that action for damages, injunction or specific performance against the Federal Government or any of its agencies could still come before a State High Court. I am of the view that the learned trial Judge was in error in his interpretation of the purport of the proviso.
Their Lordships of the Court of Appeal were equally in error to affirm the decision of the Learned trial Judge. They based their own conclusion on the cases Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (Liquidator of United Commercial Bank Ltd.) V. Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria Ltd. (1997) 2 NWLR 735 at 756; Ona V. Atanda (2000) 5 NWLR 244 and Egbuonu V. Borno Radio (1997) 12 SCNJ 99; (1997) 12 NWLR 29. With profound respect to their Lordships of the Court below they wrongly applied these cases to the matter before them in the Federal Mortgage Bank case what came up for decision is the interpretation of the proviso to paragraph (d) of Section 230(1) of the 1979 Constitution. That paragraph read:

b. banking, banks, other financial institutions, including any action between bank and other, any action by or against the Central Bank of Nigeria arising from banking, foreign exchange, coinage, legal tender, bills of exchange, letter of credit, promissory note and other fiscal measures. Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to any dispute between an individual customer and his bank in respect of transactions between the individual customer and the bank;”

The Court of Appeal sitting as a full court held that by proviso above an action between a bank acting as a customer to another bank and that latter bank could come before a State High Court. That decision was affirmed by this Court in Federal Mortgage Bank of (Nig.) V. NDIC (1999) 2 NWLR 333. That is not the issue arising in the instant case. In Una V. Atanda (Supra) the issue in that case was quite different to the issues in the present case. If anything, the dictum of Akintan, JCA on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court ought to have informed their Lordships to arrive at a conclusion in the instant action different to what they decided. Incidentally the three Justices that presided over the instant case were members of the full Court of the Court of Appeal that decided Ona V. Atanda (Supra). Indeed if there was anything relevant in that case to the instant case, it was wrongly applied. Akintan, JCA who read the lead judgment of the Court of Appeal in that case had this to say at pages 269 – 270 of the report:
“The point which must be made clear is that all the decisions in question are in respect of the interpretation to be given to the provisions of sections 39 and 41 of the Land Use Act. But since it has been clearly shown above that the provisions of the Land Use Act requiring the State Governor to delaminate portions of the Lands in a State as urban as against non-urban areas are inapplicable in the Federal Capital Territory, the division of jurisdiction between the High Court and the Area Court/Customary Court in the Federal Capital Territory will therefore not arise. It follows therefore that the appropriate court having jurisdiction in land matters in the Federal Capital Territory is the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory by virtue of Section 236 of the 1979 Constitution since it has been shown that there is no Customary Right of Occupancy in the Federal Capital Territory and that Section 41of the Land Use Act is also inapplicable in the Territory. The jurisdiction of that court however, is subject to the provisions of section 230(1) (q) and (r) of Decree No. 107 of 1993 (now Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution) whereby the High court would assume jurisdiction where the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies is a party to the action. “(italics are mine for emphasis).
Equally if their Lordships had correctly applied the above dictum to the instant case which dictum in my respectful view, is a correct statement of the law, they would have held that the State High Court had no jurisdiction in the instant case….

From what I have said earlier in this judgment the aim of paragraphs (q), (r) and (s) of sub-section (1) of Section 230 was to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in matters in which the Federal Government or any of its agents was a party. A State High Court would no longer have jurisdiction in such matters notwithstanding the nature of the claim in the action. I agree entirely with the submission of the learned counsel for the defendant that the two courts below were in error in holding that the State High Court had jurisdiction in this matter. There is nothing in the proviso to those paragraphs that could be said to have whittled down the objective of the law.” (underlined mine).

There was however what appears to be a slight departure from the decision of NEPA VS. EDEGBERO Supra in the case of FELIX ONUORAH VS. K.R.P.C. LTD. (2005) 6 NWLR (PART 921) 393 at 404 – 405 where AKINTAN JSC had this to say:
“The main question to be resolved in this appeal is whether the Federal High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim. It is settled law that jurisdiction of a court is determined by the Plaintiff’s claim as endorsed in the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim: See: Tukur V. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517; Orthopedic Hospitals Management Board V. Garba (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 788) 538 at 563. Thus in this case, the appellant’s claim, already set out above, is the one that should be the focus of attention in determining whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is clearly not the rules of court that vest jurisdiction in the court but rather the statute creating the court. Thus, in the instant case, the determining the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court and the State High Court, it is the relevant provisions of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic, as amended by Decree No. 107 of 1993 that would be applicable since the appellant’s action was commenced and in fact judgment was delivered before the 1999 Constitution came into force. Section 230(1) (q), (r) and (s) of Decree No. 107 of 1993 which extended the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court also sets out a proviso after subsection (s). It is that: “nothing in the provisions of paragraphs (q), (r) and (s) of this subsection shall prevent a person from seeking redress against the Federal Government or any of its agencies in an action for damages, injunction or specific performance where the action is based on any enactment, law or equity.”
A close examination of the additional jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court in the Section and by the 1979 Constitution clearly shows that the court was not conferred with jurisdiction to entertain claims founded on contract as in the instant case. In other words, section 230(1) provides a limitation to the general and all embracing jurisdiction of the State High Court because the items listed under the said section 230(1) can only, be determined exclusively but the Federal High Court. All other items not included in the list would therefore still be within the jurisdiction of the State High Court. In the instant case, since disputes founded on contract are not among those, included in the additional jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court, that Court therefore had no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim. The Lower Court therefore acted rightly in its decision that the Federal High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim: See Seven-up Bottling Co. Ltd. V. Abiola & Sons Bottling Co. Ltd. (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 730) 469; and Trade Bank Plc. V. Benilux (Nig.) Ltd. (2003) 9 NWLR (pt.825) 416 at 430 & 431.” (underlined mine).

While the case of NEPA V. Edegbero Supra made it clear that the State High Courts have no jurisdiction in any matter in which the Federal Government or its Agency is a party the above case – Onuorah Vs. K.R.P.C. LTD. Supra appears to give jurisdiction to a State High Court where the subject matter of the action borders on contractual relation.
Now as to the vex issue whether the Federal High Court has jurisdiction in Land matters the position taken by the Appellant appears to have been heavily supported by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of JOSIAH AYODELE ADETAYO & ORS. VS. KUNLE ADEMOLA & ORS. (2010) 6 SCM 1 at 16B -18A-B where MAHMUD MOHAMMED JSC who read the leading judgment firmly held thus:

“Close examination of the entire provision of the 1999 Constitution prescribing the jurisdiction of Federal High Court to the exclusion of all other courts, there is nothing therein specifically conferring jurisdiction in that court in causes or matters concerning land disputes. Although the section also indicated that the National Assembly may confer additional jurisdiction to the Court to entertain causes and matters on land disputes. If any such additional jurisdiction had been given, the most relevant statute to examine in search for it in any view, is the Land Use Act because jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to entertain land matters cannot be inferred by implication in the construction of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution the meaning of which is quite clear and plain as no causes or matters in land dispute are mentioned therein.
Since the provisions of Section 251(1) (r) of the 1999 Constitution are not helpful in tracing any jurisdiction in land matters to the Federal High Court as jurisdiction of Court is derived from statutes conferring the jurisdiction, I decide to examine the provisions of the Land Use Act 1978 which was promulgated specially and specifically to deal with the control and management of land in Nigeria. The Court conferred with jurisdiction to entertain disputes between Nigerians in exercising their rights to acquire and use land under the Act are clearly specified therein. The relevant Sections in this respect are sections in this respect are Sections 39, 41 and 42 respectively which states-

“JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURTS AND OTHER COURTS

Jurisdiction of High Courts
The High Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the following proceedings:
(a) Proceedings in respect of any land the subject of the Statutory Right of Occupancy granted by the Governor or deemed to be granted by him under this Act; and for the purpose of this paragraph, proceedings includes proceedings for a declaration of title to a Statutory Right of Occupancy;

(b) Proceedings to determine any question as to those entitled to compensation payable for improvements on land under the Act.

(2) All Laws, including rules of court, regulating the practice and procedure of the High Court shall apply in respect of proceedings to which this Section relates and the laws shall have effect with such modifications as would enable effect to be given to the provisions of this section.

Jurisdiction of Area Courts of Customary Courts etc.

An Area Court or Customary Court or other Court of Equivalent jurisdiction in a state shall have jurisdiction in respect of proceedings in respect of a Customary Right of Occupancy granted by a Local Government under this Act; and for the purpose of this paragraph “proceedings” includes;

Proceedings for a declaration of title to a Customary Right of Occupancy and all laws including rules of Court regulating practice and procedure of such courts shall have effect with such modifications as would enable effect be given to this section.

(1) Proceedings for the recovery of rent payable in respect of any Certificate of Occupancy may be taken before a Magistrate’s Court of competent jurisdiction by and in the name of the Chief Land Officer or by and in the name of any other officer appointed by the Governor in that behalf.

(2) Proceedings for the recovery of rent payable in respect of any Customary Right of Occupancy may be taken by and in the name of the Local Government concerned in the Area Court or Customary Court of equivalent jurisdiction.”

It is quite clear from the provisions of the above sections of the Land Use Act with specific powers and jurisdiction in respect of land matters specified therein conferred on State High Court is not one of the Courts conferred with jurisdiction to entertain any dispute in the land matters. Infact the purpose of which Section 39, 41 and 42 of the Land Use Act are designed to serve are very clear. While Section 39 excludes Area Courts and Customary Court from exercising jurisdiction in respect of land the subject of Statutory Right of Occupancy. Section 41 redefines the jurisdiction of the Courts referred to therein so as to ensure that Courts, such as the Customary Courts in Southern State of this Country which had previously been exercising concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court without distinction by classification of land, have their jurisdiction limited as stated therein. In other words while the State High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over lands in Urban Areas by virtue of Section 39(1) of the Land Use Act, that Courts shares jurisdiction with only the Area Courts and Customary Courts or other Courts of equivalent jurisdiction by virtue of both the jurisdiction of the State High Court under Section 272 of the 1999 Constitution and the jurisdiction conferred on the Area Courts and Customary Courts by virtue of Section 41 of the Act. As there is nothing in these Section 39, 41 and 42 of the Land Use Act that conferred jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to entertain land causes or matters, I entirely agree with the court below that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to hear and entertain any dispute declaration of the title to Land.”

The judgment was delivered on 30th day of April, 2010 by Supreme Court.
I am afraid that is not the end of the matter. Other decisions of the Supreme Court that came after the decision in ADETAYO VS. ADEMOLA Supra now laid it down that in order to discover whether the Federal High Court has jurisdiction the Court determining the issue must ensure that two things co-exist. These are that:

(a) The parties, or a party must be the Federal Government or its agencies.
(b) Subject matter of the Litigation must arise from the administration, management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies. See the case of:
ISAAC OBIUWEUBI VS. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (2011) 7 NWLR (PART 1247) 465 at 492 C – H to 493 A – D per RHODES – VIVOUR, JSC who said:

“Section 251(1)(p)(q)(r) of the 1999 Constitution is impari materia with the above. The provisions vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in Civil causes and matters, arising from the administration, management and control of the Federal Government and its agencies, the operation and interpretation of the Constitution as it affects the Federal Government and its agencies as well as any action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decisions by the Federal Government and its agencies.
For the Federal High Court to have jurisdiction under section 230 of the 1979 Constitution or Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution the following must co-exist.

(a) The parties, or a party must be the Federal Government or its agencies;
(b) Subject matter of the litigation.
That is to say jurisdiction is the combination of parties and subject matter. The words used in this piece of legislation are plain as plain can be and have been interpreted by this Court on several occasions. See: N.E.P.A. v. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) p. 79; Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdul-Raheem & 3 Ors. (2009) 5 – 6 SC (Pt. 11) p.57; (2009) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 83.
In this appeal it is not in dispute that the respondent, the Central Bank of Nigeria is an agency of the Federal Government. Any lingering doubt of that fact is put to rest by the provisions of Section 39 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act, Cap. 47. Laws of matter of the litigation, the matter must arise from the administration, management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies, from the operation and interpretation of the Constitution and from any action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decisions by the Federal Government, or any of its agencies.”

I am firmly of the view that as from the 17th of November, 1993 the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction if the matter is a civil matter arising from the administration, management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
The matter must arise from the operation and interpretation of the Constitution.
Finally the matter must arise from any action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decisions by the Federal Government, or any of its agencies.
The suit has to do with the administration or management and control of the Federal Government. The respondent is a Federal Agency and the appellant is/was its employee. The termination of the appellant’s appointment is on administrative action by an agency of the Federal Government, the respondent.
See also:
DR. OJU TAIWO OLORUNTOBA & ORS. VS. PROFESSOR S. O. ABDUL-RAHEEM & ORS. (2009) 5 MJSC (Pt.11) 1 at 35 A – C where the Supreme Court said:

“In the determination of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in respect of Section 251(1) of the Constitution, the Court must carefully examine the facts of the case to see whether they justify the application of that section. In the case of Trade Bank Plc. V. Benilux (Nigeria) Ltd. (2003) 9 NWLR Pt. 825 page 416, the Supreme Court held that “It is only on careful examination of the pleadings filed by the parties in a cause or matter namely the statement of claim not the defence that the Court can ascertain whether or not the Federal High Court have exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Section 251(1) (p)(q)(r) of the 1999 Constitution.”

Section 251(1)(p)(q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution provides that:-
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by the Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil cause or matter relating to:
(p) The administrative or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
(q) Subject to the provision of this Constitution, the operation and interpretation of this Constitution in so far as it affects the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
(r) Any action or proceeds for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
The community reading of the foregoing provision reproduced above is that the Federal High Court is vested with the power to enter into adjudication of any action or proceedings seeking declaratory or Injunctive Reliefs which is the fulcrum of the cause of action of the Appellants.
Section 251(1) creates a situation whereupon by party jurisdiction-one of the parties must be a Federal Government Agency and by subject-matter jurisdiction it must be an action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies.”
(Underlined mine).

My firm view on the settled principles of Law and interpretation  of section 251(1) (p)(q)(r) of the 1999 Constitution is that the parties and the subject matter of the Appellant’s Suit/action and the reliefs sought in paragraph 13(1)(2)(3) and 4 of the Appellant’s Statement of Claim are all matters and or reliefs falling squarely and within the penumbra of Section 251(1)(p) and (r) of the aforesaid 1999 Constitution as amended or altered. What the Appellant is challenging is the proprietary or otherwise of the right of the 2nd Respondent, the Nigerian Railway Corporation which is an Agency of the Federal Government concerning its decision or action in lease or granting a lease of the Land in dispute to someone else aside from the Appellant. In other words the Suit is questioning the administrative action of the 2nd Respondent.

It is also no longer in doubt that the Supreme Court has fully reaffirmed and reiterated its decision in NEPA VS. Edegbero Supra that any action or Suit having the Federal Government or any of its agencies as defendant or parties will deprive the State High Court of Jurisdiction. Only the Federal High Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in such matter irrespective of the subject matter of the action. See the case of:
BENSON AGBULE VS. WARRI REFINERY & PETROCHEMICAL CO. LTD. (2013) 6 NWLR (PART 1350) 318 delivered on 14th December, 2012 where at page 348 F – H per OGUNBIYI, JSC who said:
“On a gruesome and careful determination of the case NEPA V. Edegbero (2003) 1 MJSC 69; (2002) 18 NWLR (pt. 798) 79, this Court per Ogundare, JSC while interpreting the Constitutional enactment as provided in paragraphs (q), (r) and (s) of section 230 (1), held the following pronouncement at pages 80 – 81 of the report and said:-
“From what I have said earlier in this judgment the aim of paragraphs (q), (r) and (s) of sub section 230 was to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in matters in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies was a party. A State High Court would not long have jurisdiction in such matters notwithstanding the nature of the claim in the action”
And at pages 351 H to 352 A – E his Lordship of the Supreme Court held reiterating decision in Edegbero’s case thus:
“The principle in the case of NEPA V. Edegbero has also been applied with affirmative approval in the later case of Olutola V. University of IIorin (2005) 3 MJSC 151 at Pp. 173 – 174; (2004) 18 NWLR (pt. 905) 416 wherein this court per Ejiwunmi, J.S.C. held and said:-
“In the case at hand, it is not in doubt that Decree No. 107 of 1993 had removed the jurisdiction of State High Courts to hear and determine causes and matters including declaratory actions against the Federal Government or its agencies.”

From the foregoing conclusion, the questions as to parties and subject matter are seen to be of paramount significance. With the question of parties having been settled therefore the subject matter of consideration does not in my view also pose any difficulty especially having regard to the reliefs sought by the appellant which same are also similar to the ones claimed by the respondents in the case of NEPA V. Edegbero (Supra). It has been clearly pronounced by this court per Ogundare, JSC in the same case as stated supra that the aim of sub paragraphs (q), (r) and (s) to section 230 (1) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree No. 107 of 1993 was to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in matters in which the Federal Government or any it its agencies was a party; the consequential effect is that the State High Court would no longer have jurisdiction in such matters notwithstanding the nature of the claim in the action.” (Underlined mine).

It must be noted that CHUKWUMA -ENEH JSC who was on the Panel express misgiving or hardship the decision may pose in Land matters but his Lordship agreed with the leading judgment. His Lordship pondered and said on page 357 E – F of the report thus:

“The cited case has held that section 230(1) paragraphs (q) (r) and (s) has vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in matters involving the Federal Government and its agencies. Unarguably the respondent defendant is an agency of the Federal Government. The difficulty with this decision is that it has not given due consideration to the nature of the subject -matter of a case as exemplified in Land cases between individuals and agencies of the Federal Government. And in that regard it has raised more difficult problems for the Courts vis-a-vis when a Court is competent to deal with a matter as expounded in Madukolu v. Nkemdilims (1962) 1 ANLR 587; (1962) 2 SCNLR 341.”
Any lingering doubt about the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in any matter where Federal Government or any of its Agencies is a party and the subject matter falls within the precincts of Section 251 (1) (p)(q)(r) and (s) of the 1999 Constitution as amended and has to do with any matter, subject or issues pertaining to or relating to administration or management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies has in my humble view been cleared or laid to rest in the recent cases of CHIEF M. A. INEGBEDION VS. DR. SELO – OJEMEN & ANOR. (2013) 8 NWLR (PART 1356) 211 delivered on 18-1-2013 wherein at 226 F – A the Supreme Court of Nigeria per. ALAGOA, JSC reaffirmed the settled position reached in NEPA v. Edegbero Supra. Thus;
“The question having now been settled that the 2nd Respondent Otibhor Okhae Teaching Hospital Irrua is an agency of the Federal Government, the next relevant question is whether the Appellant’s claim relates to the administration or management and control of the 2nd Respondent. Paragraph 25 of the Statement of Claim is a claim in aggravated and/or exemplary damages for defamation, negligence and breach of Doctor/Patient Confidence which undoubtedly relates to the administration or management of the Oribhor Okhae Teaching Hospital, Irrua sued as the 2nd defendant in the Trial Court and is 2nd Respondent in this appeal and in the Lower Court. The effect of paragraphs (p), (q) and (r) of Section 251 “(1) of the 1999 Constitution is to vest exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court over all civil causes and matters in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party. See the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party. See NEPA V. Edegbero (2002) 103 LRCN 2280 AT 2281 – 2282. The proviso to section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution does not in any way detract from the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court by virtue of Section 251 (1) (p) and (r). Consequently the proviso cannot apply.

From the foregoing, the sole issue for determination must be resolved in favour of the Respondents against the Appellant and it is hereby so resolved. The Appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. The Judgment of the Court of Appeal Benin Division delivered on the 27th February, 2004 upholding the ruling of Amaize J. of the Ekpoma High Court, Edo State delivered on the 13th May, 2002 is hereby affirmed. Parties are however to bear their own costs”.
(Underlined mine)

In his own Judgment in the said case my Noble Lord who presided over the matter, I. T. Muhammad, JSC held on page 227 C – E put it in the following pungent manner viz:
“I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Alagoa, JSC. I am in agreement with him that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter as one of the parties that is, the 2nd Respondent is an Agency of the Federal Government. The law is unequivocally stated by the 1999 Constitution (as amended) in section 251 (1) (p), (q), (r) and by this Court that where in matter, one of the parties is the Federal Government or any of its Agencies, it is only the Federal High Court that has exclusive jurisdiction. A State High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain such a matter.
See National Electric Power Authority V. Edegbero 1 2002 118 NWLR (PART 789) 79.”
(Underlined mine)

The settled position of the Law is that where there are two conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court the Lower Court or Courts is or are bound by the latter decision and must follow it.
See: CYRIL O. OSAKUE VS. FEDERAL COLLEGE OF EDUCATION (TECHNICAL ASABA & ORS. (2010) 5 SCM 185 at 203 B – F per OGBUAGU JSC who said:
“The amendment on section 230 of the 1979 Constitution, conferred additional jurisdiction on the Federal High Court which is exclusive to it hence by the opening words in section 230(1), it states or uses the words.
“notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly or a Decree, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters arising.”

This is in spite of the proviso thereto. In other words, the aim of paragraphs (1), (r) and (s) of sub-section (1) of section 230, was to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in matters, notwithstanding the nature of the claim in the action. While paragraph(s) talks of actions for declaration or injunction, the proviso extended this to actions for damages, injunction or specific performance.
It is now settled that where there are two conflicting judgments of this court, the lower court or courts, is or are bound by the latter decision and must follow and apply it. See the case of Chief Okpozo V. Bendel Newspaper Corporation & Anor. (1990) 5 NWLR (PT. 153) 652 @ 661, 663 C.A.
As for hierarchy of the courts, it is now settled that the ratio decidendi of a case, is the reason for the decision, the principle of the decision.  A court lower in the judicial hierarchy is bound by the ratio decidendi of a higher court not necessarily the Obiter dictum.”
(underline mine).”
I am of the view that the decision of the apex court in the Land in INEGBEDION VS. SELO OJEMEN renders the judgment of the Lower Court valid and cannot be faulted.
In the result the Appellant’s appeal lacks merit. The Appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed.
In view of the recondite point of Law involved it will be in consonance with justice for parties to bear their costs.

RAPHAEL CHIKWE AGBO, J.C.A.: I agree.

FREDERICK O. OHO, J.C.A.: I have been privileged to read in advance the judgment just delivered by my learned Brother, P.O. Ige, JCA with which I entirely agree. For the same reasons given in the said judgment, I will also dismiss the Appeal.
No orders as to cost.
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Appearances

G. E. Ukaegbu Esq. and C. I. Kalu Esq.For Appellant

 

AND

Respondents not represented in courtFor Respondent