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ELIZABETH UTIBE BASSEY-vs-UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR TEACHING

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT CALABAR

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HONOURABLE JUSTICE E. N AGBAKOBA

 

DATED 3RD MARCH,  2016                                               SUIT NO: NICN/CA/61/2015

BETWEEN:

ELIZABETH UTIBE BASSEY                                                                  CLAIMANT

AND:

UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR TEACHING HOSPITAL                     DEFENDANT

REPRESENTATION:

  1. ONYEKWERE for the claimant

CHIEF OROK IRONBAR for the defendant with DEBORAH UNDIE

J U D G E M E N T

The claimant, by a General Form of Complaint filed on 24th November, 2015 accompanied by  the Statement of Facts, Claimant’ Written Statement on Oath, List of Witnesses and List of Documents, approached the Court for the following reliefs:

  1. A declaration that the termination of the claimant’s appointment with the defendant is grossly irregular, callous, unlawful, null and void same not having followed due process.
  2. An Order of Court reinstating the claimant and restoring her to her position prior to the issuance of letter of termination to her.
  3. An Order directing the defendant to pay to the claimant her arrears of salary from the date of purported termination to the determination of this suit at the rate of Fifty One Thousand, Fifty Four Naira Sixty Five Kobo (#51,054.65) per month.
  4. An Order directing the defendant to pay the cost of litigation at Five Hundred Thousand naira (#500,000.00) only.
  5. An Order of General Damages for the trauma and hardship suffered by the claimant for the wrongful termination of her appointment to the tune of Ten Million (#10,000,000.00) only.
  6. An Order compelling the defendant to pay claimant’s office kilometer claims for seven (7) months from February, 2015 to August, 2015 at the rate of Ten Thousand Naira (#10,000.00) only amounting to Seventy Thousand Naira (#70,000.00) only.
  7. An Order of General Damages to the tune of Ten Million in favour of the claimant.

 

 

Claimant’s Case

The Claimant was an employee of the defendant since April, 2006 when she was offered an appointment through a letter of Appointment dated 3rd April, 2006 and that following her employment she worked in the Catering Department of the defendant before she was transferred/posted to the Accounts Department where she worked in the Obstetrics and Gynecology revenue Unit till 2014 when she was transferred/posted out again. Claimant averred that her employment has a statutory flavor and as such, the termination of her employment must follow laid down rules as provided by extant laws establishing the defendant. Furthermore, that being a senior staff of the defendant, a proper constituted Board of the defendant has the power to approve the termination of her appointment. But that there has not been any such Board in place in the defendant’s hospital since May, 2015.She averred that on 2nd October, 2013, she was invited by an Investigative Panel set up by the defendant on an allegation of financial impropriety alongside other members of staff and that till date, nothing was communicated to her either verbally or in writing as to the outcome of the Panel’s report.

Claimant stated that the termination of her employment is grossly irregular, callous, unlawful, null and void same not having followed due process, stating that it will service the cause of justice for the Court to order her reinstatement and payment of arrears of salaries from the date of termination of her appointment to her reinstatement.

The defendants filed their STATEMENT OF DEFENCE filed on 11th March, 2016.

The Defendants deny that claimant served the defendant without blemish when sometime in 2013, she was indicted for financial impropriety. Arguing that claimant cannot require the defendant to produce the copy of a query issued her in 2015, receipted and replied to by here on 6th April, 2015. The Defendant admitted that the claimant was served a letter of invitation for a chat with a panel of investigation dated 14th July, 2015 but deny that copies of the relevant documents in issue were not shown to her.

The defendants maintain that the Internal Audit Report of July, 2013 and recommendations of the Investigation Panel, two separate panels all indicted the claimant.

The claimant reacted by filing a REPLY TO STATEMENT OF DEFENCE 22nd September, 2016.

Wherein the Claimant in reaction averred that the termination of her appointment did not follow due process. And that she was never indicted over the query issued to her. Arguing that whether a reason is stated in the termination letter or not, it did not follow due process having not emanated from the proper authority and proper authority being a properly constituted Board. And that she never committed any act of impropriety as none was found against her and that there was neither an audit report nor any reason for the termination of her employment.

The Claimant stated that she was promoted severally as a result of which she rose from the junior to senior cadre of employment i.e. level 3 to 6 denying paragraph 15 of the Statement of Defense and that it is the duty of the defendant to constantly upgrade the performance of her staff through training both internal and external.

The claimant stated that the termination of her appointment was irregular, unlawful, null and void and of no effect whatsoever same not having followed due process and that her action is not statute barred and that she is entitled to all the reliefs sought.

At the trial the claimant testified as CW, adopted her written statements on oath of 24th November 2015 and 30th August 2015 which were marked Exhibit C1 and Exhibit C2 respectively proceeded to tender seven (7) exhibits. During cross examination the claimant as CW, testified that she accepted the offer of employment Exhibit C3 in writing and that she received one month salary in lieu of notice, and that during her employment she was given two queries to which she responded she appeared twice before the investigation panels and she appealed against the letter of termination. She further testified that there had been no board in the defendant’s institution as the last one was dissolved in May 2015.

The defendants called one witness Ededet Eyoma Bassey, the Human Resources Director / Legal Adviser with the defendants, who testified as DW, adopted his written statement on oath which was marked as Exhibit D1 and tendered  five (5) other exhibits. During cross examination DW testified that he was the head of Human Resources employed in November 2014, very familiar with the claimants records, familiar with the issues of procedure of the defendant and that his evidence was not  based on first hand evidence. He further testified that the defendants had one Board, to which the Management reported and in the absence of the Board it would report to the Ministry. He also testified that by Exhibit C2, it was the Board of Management that was empowered to terminate the claimant and if there were no board the Ministry could terminate through its agents. And at the time of issuing Exhibit C3 there was no board in place and that the Ministry of Health as directed by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  He answered in the negative the question that the Federal Ministry of Health takes over the function of the Board and that the Ministry oversees and that it could only direct the defendants. And that anyone working under the defendants employment was a Public  servant and issues of effecting discipline are governed by the Public Service and where there is an absence of a Board the letter of termination are signed by the implementing person;- the Head of Human Resource Management. He also testified that the claimant was on Grade level 06 and Assistant Executive Officer, and that the claimant had never worked under DW’s direct supervision because the claimant was an accountant, was indicted by two panels tendering Exhibit D3-D3(31) and Exhibit D4- D4(51) after he was queried . And                                                                                                                in response to the question that DW signed C4 as Deputy Director, and that he authorized the queries, and further testified that the defendants have only one Board; the Board of Management  and that the claimant’s appointment was given by the Board of Management. DW testified that it was the Board that terminated the claimant, that in July 2015 the Commander in chief dissolved all the Boards and the Ministries took over, and by that direction the process was laid down. DW went on to tender the report of the Audit Panel and the Report of the Recommendation of the Investigation Committee which were marked Exhibits D9 and Exhibit D10 respectively.

At the end of trial the parties were directed to file their final written addresses.

The DEFENDANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS was dated 31st October, 2016 and filed on 1st November, 2016. Wherein the defendants raised two (2) ISSUES:

  1. Whether the claimant has presented a case strong enough to entitle her to judgment.
  2. Whether claimant’s employment was properly terminated.

The Learned Counsel to the defendants submitted that having known the state of the pleadings, the procedural law is that he who alleges proves and that pleadings do not constitute evidence. SEC. 131 (1) of the EVIDENCE ACT, 2011; YAHAYA v. DANKWABO (2016) 7 NWLR (PT. 1511) 284; WAZIRI v. GEIDAM & ORS. (2016) 2 MJSC (PT. 111) 83 @ 124, PARAS. F-G, Coram, Peter-Odili, JSC.  Pointing out that if only the Board that can terminate claimant’s employment as she averred in her Statement of Facts, where was that proved on record? OLORUNTOBA-OJU v. ABDUL-RAHEEM (2009) 13 NWLR (PT. 1157) 83 @ 136, PARAS. F-H; ZIIDEEH v. RIVERS STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2007) 4 MJSC 150.

Defence Counsel submitted that being a contract of employment, it is the only contract before the Court that must be complied with i.e. Exhibit C3. IDONIBOYE OBU v. NNPC (2003) 2 NWLR (PT. 805) 589; (2003) 4 MJSC 131. He submitted that whether the reports of investigation were communicated to claimant or not does not stop the defendant from terminating her employment. AJAYI v. TEXACO NIG. LTD. & 2 ORS. (1987) 9-11 SC 1 @ 6. It is counsel’s contention that the fact that claimant responded to the queries means that she was afforded fair hearing. IMONIKHE v. UNITY BANK PLC (2011) 12 NWLR (PT. 1262) 624 @ 648, PARA. F Coram Rhodes-Vivour, JSCOLATUNBOSUN v. NISER COUNCIL (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 80) 25.

Defendant’s Counsel submitted that by Public Service Rules under Paragraph 030402 and Chapter 3 Sec. 4 Paragraph 030407 (a), “claimant was even lucky not to have been dismissed out rightly”. He submitted that it is not necessary nor a requirement under the extant laws that before an employer summarily dismisses his employee from his service, the employee must be tried before a court of law where the accusation against the employee is for gross misconduct involving honesty bordering on criminality. S.B. OLANREWAJU v. AFRIBANK PLC (2001) FWLR (PT. 72) 2008. Arguing that the claimant as part of the failure of her case provided no proof or reference to the law allowing her to be reinstated when the law is that an employee cannot be forced upon an unwilling employer. OYEDELE v. IFE U.T.H. (1990) 6 NWLR (PT. 155) 194 C.A.; IWUCHUKWU v. NWOSU (1994) 7 NWLR (PT. 357) 379.

#The CLAIMANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS filed on 22nd November, 2016 and dated same day. The claimant raised for determination the following two (2) ISSUES

  1. Whether the termination of claimant’s appointment followed due process as laid down by Sec. 9 (1) of the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, Cap. U15, LFN, 2010.
  2. Whether by the provision of extent law governing the removal and discipline of senior staff of the defendant (i.e.) Sec. 9 1) of the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, Cap. U15, LFN, 2010, it is not established that the claimant’s employment has a statutory flavor.

ON ISSUE 1

Whether the termination of claimant’s appointment followed due process as laid down by Sec. 9 (1) of the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, Cap. U15, LFN, 2010.

Learned Counsel to the claimant Rueben Onyekwelu Esq. submitted that Sec. 10 (3) of the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, provides a dividing line between the discipline of an erring senior staff who can only be dismissed or terminated on the direction of the Board and his/her junior counterpart who may  be disciplined (dismissed or terminated) by the Chief Medical Director (Management) without recourse to the Board. He submitted that Sec. 9 (1) of the Act is the statutory laid down procedure to discipline the claimant and that facts admitted need no further proof. ODUNZE v. NWOSU (2007) 31 NSCQR 378; NASI v. UBA (2005) 23 NSCQR 127 @ 130; ADUSEI v. ADEBAYO (2012) 49.3 NSCQR 1492 @ 1494; JOLASUN v. BAMGBOYE (2010) 44 NSCQR 94. Contending that the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, Cap. U15, LFN, 2010 is not a piece of evidence in the mold of what the defendant is trying to categorize as requiring tendering in open court, but a statutory provision which the court should take judicial notice of as provided by Sec. 122 (1) of Evidence Act, 2011. AG. FED. V. ABIA STATE (2002) FWLR (PT. 102) 1, per Uwais, CJN. He further submitted that all that is required is to plead that the party is relying on a statute as the claimant has done in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Statement of Facts. BENDEL NEWSPAPERS CORPORATION v. OKAFOR (1993) 4 NWLR (PT. 289) 617; MAKANJUOLA v. BALOGUN (1989) 3 NWLR (PT. 108) 192; A.G BENDEL STATE v. A.G. FEDERATION (2001) FWLR (PT. 65) 448.

ON ISSUE 2

Whether by the provision of extent law governing the removal and discipline of senior staff of the defendant (i.e.) Sec. 9 1) of the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, Cap. U15, LFN, 2010, it is not established that the claimant’s employment has a statutory flavor.

Learned Claimant’s Counsel submitted that termination of any employment enjoying statutory flavor must follow the process as prescribed by statute. LAGOS UNIVERSITY TEACHING (HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT BOARD) v. MRS. OLANIKE BETTY ONI (2007) 4 FWLR 6987 @ 7028. He urged the Court to hold that this clause reinforces and is a strong reminder to the Board and Management that there are laid down procedure as provided by the Act in discipline of employees. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA v. IGWILO (2007) 5 KLR (PT. 235-236) 2275 @ 2277. Submitting that where an employee’s service is protected by statute (as in the present case) and his employment is wrongfully terminated, he would be entitled to reinstatement to his office and in addition, damages representing his salaries during the period of his purported dismissal. SHITTA BAY v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION (1981) 1 S.C. 40; UDO v. CROSS RIVER NEWSPAPAER CORPORATION (2001) 14 NWLR (PT. 732) 116; OLANIYAN v. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 9) 599; Galinje, JCA in REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF C & S v. IJAODOLA (2007) FWLR (PT. 389) 5921 @ 5925.

To the claimant, the defendant has not discharged the burden placed on her by reason of the provision of Sec. 133 (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011 and that the defendant has also failed to show that even the alternative route provided by the so called presidential directive was communicated to the management through circular or memo, or that any directives was received from the mother Ministry by positive evidence as required in the presidential directive. ALAO v. KURE (2000) FWLR (PT. 6) 889; OYOVBIARE v. OMAMURHONU (2001) FWLR (PT. 68) 1129.

It is Claimant’s counsel’s submission that where a public servant is accused of a misconduct bothering on criminality, the law is that he must first be charged before a regular court to prove his or her guilt or innocence as the case may be. NIGERIAN TELECOMMUNICATION LIMITED v. AWALA (2001) 45 WRN 146; LAOYE v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (1989) 2 NWLR (PT. 106) 652; GEIDAM v. NATIONAL ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY (2001) 2 NWLR (PT. 696) 45. He urged the Court to hold that any indictment flowing or contained in Exhibit D12 is a travesty and lacking in substance. SOKEFUN v. AKINYEMI (1980) FEDERATION OF NLR 184.

Counsel to the claimant also submitted that a successful party in a litigation is entitled to costs unless there are special reasons why he should be deprived of his entitlements as held in the case of NNPC v. CLIFCO (2011) 46 NCQR 114 @ 120; SHENA SECURITY LIMITED v. AFRO PAK (2008) 34.2 NSCQR 1287 @ 1291; REYNOLDS CO. LTD. V. ROCKONOH CO. LTD. (2005) 22 NSCQR 1005 @ 1010, per G.A. Oguntade, JSC.

The defendants then filed a REPLY TO CLAIMANT’S FINAL ADDRESS on 25th November, 2016 and dated 24th November, 2016 responding directly to the issues raised by the claimant.

ON ISSUE 1

Defendant’s Counsel argued that Sec. 9 (1) of the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, Cap. U15 relied on by claimant refers to the removal and discipline of clinical, administrative and technical staff, which does not include claimant who was employed by her own letter of appointment tendered as Exhibit C3 as Catering Assistant. Furthermore, that she led no evidence to prove that she fell into any of the 3 categories and that the Court cannot be left to decide on conjecture.

ON ISSUE 2

Counsel to the defendant submitted that it is not true as argued by claimant in paragraph 5.6 – lines 7-8, that “The Minister however exercises control (sic) of parastatal at policy level through the Board of the parastatal only”. This is so because, by Sec. 17 of the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, the Minister is empowered to give to the Board directors of a general character…, etc., that the Minister is not restricted strictly to matters on policy.

The Court’s Decision

I have carefully summarized the evidence of both sides, the arguments of opposing counsel and having carefully reviewed all the authorities cited, read through all the relevant processes and digested the contention of the parties and their written submission are herewith incorporated in this Judgement and specific mention would be made to them where the need arises. The issue for determination in this suit to my mind is whether the claimant in this suit is entitled to the reliefs sought.

Before I delve into the merits of this issue I shall address the objection raised by the claimant during trial that the defendant’s exhibit were all photocopies

In the instant case the claimant did not further raise this objection in his final address as directed by the court depriving the court from addressing the particulars of his objection be that as it may; the procedure in this court made possible by the case of KURT SEVERINSEN V. EMERGING MARKETS TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES LIMITED [2012] 27 NLLR (PT. 78) 374, and Section 12(2) to the effect that this court is flexible and informal and with the result that all frontloaded documents are deemed admitted unless expressly objected to and when the objection is raised the party is at liberty to argue his objection in his final address. The purport of the claimant’s objection I find is that the defendants tendered documents without appropriate or giving any foundation. Now bearing in mind that the whole purpose of the court is to accomplish substantial justice and not be derailed by technicalities as well as considering the pronouncement of the Supreme Court of India in NTF Mills Ltd v. The 2nd Punjab Tribunal, AIR 1957 SC 329, that “the Industrial Courts are to adjudicate on the disputes between employers and their workmen, etc. and in the course of such adjudication they must determine the ‘rights’ and ‘wrong’ of the claim made, and in so doing they are undoubtedly free to apply the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, keeping in view the further principle that their jurisdiction is invoked not for the enforcement of mere contractual rights but for preventing labour practices regarded as unfair and for restoring industrial peace on the basis of collective bargaining. The process does not cease to be judicial by reason of that elasticity or by reason of the application of the principles of justice, equity and good conscience” and bearing in mind that by Order 19 Rule 9(ii) of the NIC Rules 2007 provides that “Documentary evidence shall be put in and may be read or taken as read by consent”. None of the frontloaded documents either by the claimant or defendant was specifically objected to by the defendant. As I indicated earlier, they are deemed admitted.  And considering that the claimant failed to raise the specifics of their objection in their final address all that is left is for the court to their evidential value, anything else would be giving in to undue technicality which the interest of justice I find dies not support.

All in all I find that all the defendants exhibit D were rightly admitted.

Now to the merit of this suit.

The reliefs of the claimant are as follows;

  1. A declaration that the termination of the claimant’s appointment with the defendant is grossly irregular, callous, unlawful, null and void same not having followed due process.
  2. An Order of Court reinstating the claimant and restoring her to her position prior to the issuance of letter of termination to her.
  3. An Order directing the defendant to pay to the claimant her arrears of salary from the date of purported termination to the determination of this suit at the rate of Fifty One Thousand, Fifty Four Naira Sixty Five Kobo (#51,054.65) per month.
  4. An Order directing the defendant to pay the cost of litigation at Five Hundred Thousand naira (#500,000.00) only.
  5. An Order of General Damages for the trauma and hardship suffered by the claimant for the wrongful termination of her appointment to the tune of Ten Million (#10,000,000.00) only.
  6. An Order compelling the defendant to pay claimant’s office kilometer claims for seven (7) months from February, 2015 to August, 2015 at the rate of Ten Thousand Naira (#10,000.00) only amounting to Seventy Thousand Naira (#70,000.00) only.
  7. An Order of General Damages to the tune of Ten Million in flavour of the claimant.

Reliefs 1- 3 are for a declaration that the claimants termination was grossly irregular, callous, unlawful, null and void same not having followed due process and an order reinstating her to her appointment with all due salaries and allowances from the date of the purported termination until the date of this judgment/

While reliefs 4 and 5 are for reimbursement of legal cost incurred by the claimant and damages for trauma and hardship following an unlawful termination.

Relief 6, is for Kilometre allowance while Relief 7 Is for another claimant of N10m in General damage.

In determining these reliefs the Court is required to ascertain the employment status of the claimant so as to ensure she received her due under the law.

The Supreme Court in the case of LONGE Vs. FBN LTS [2010] LPELR 1793 SC held that “….there are three categories of employment

(a)    Purely Master and Servant relationship

(b)   Servants who hold their office at the pleasure of the employer

(c)    Employment with statutory flavour….”

The defendants have argued that the claimant’s appointment was not statutory and the relationship, purely a master and servant one devoid of any special characterizations. While it is the claimants Counsel’s contention that the claimant is a senior staff of the defendants and that her employment has statutory flavour, the defendants went further to argue that the claimant has not shown the court how she qualifies as Clinical, administrative or Technical staff and that  the claimant has not put forward any legal requirement to prove that fact.

It is on record that the claimant was employed in 2006 and terminated in 2015, meaning that the claimant had worked for 9 years plus. The claimant has not put forward any proof of her confirmation, Exhibit C3, provides for a two year probationary period. Now This court has held that in a situation when an employee is allowed to continue in employment beyond the period of confirmation without let from the employer such an employer is precluded from continuing to treat such an employee as an unconfirmed staff, see the cases of TOTAL (NIG.) PLC V. ONUOHA [2001] 11 NWLR (PT. 725) 634 and OBAFEMI AWOLOWO UNIVERSITY V. ONABANJO [1991] 5 NWLR (PT. 193) 549 CA. This is not one of the reliefs sought by the claimant albeit and by SUIT NO: NICN/IB/88/2013 DR. OLADELE OSOSANYA Vs. GOVERNING COUNCIL OF FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE, ABEOKUTA & 3 ORS. DATED:  13th   NOVEMBER, 2014 “An unconfirmed staff cannot claim the benefits that inure in a statutory employment” see also MOHAMMED M. ALHASSAN V. AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA & ORS  [2009] LPELR 8138 CA, IGWILO VS. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (2007) 14 NWLR (PT. 1054) 393.

The claimant had pleaded that she was a Senior staff, she had put forward no evidence to the effect that she had been promoted or confirmed .See the unreported case of NICN /121/AK/2013 ABODURIN MOSES OLA & 31 ORS Vs. GOVERNING BOARD RUFUS GIWA PLOYTHECHNIC OWO & ANORS (unreported) delivered 29th September 2014 where this court held that failure to present evidence of advancement in employment left the court no alternative than to treat the claimant as if he were still at his entry level. In the instant case the claimant did not even prove that level 07 was a senior service post in the defendant.

 

Be that as it may be the law requires the court to determine the nature of the claimant’s employment. The position of the law is “that an employment is said to have statutory flavour if the employment is directly governed or regulated by statute or a section(s) of a statute delegates power to an authority or body to make regulations or conditions of service as the case may be”, UJAM V. IMT [2007] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1019) 470 at 492 B – C. Or where a set of prescribed “Rules govern the service” see Uwa JCA in FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTRE IDO EKITI & ANOR Vs. ISAAC OLUKAYIDE OLAJIDE [2011] LPELR 4150 CA para C

In SULIEMAN ADAMU Vs.  MOHAMMMAD SANI TAKORI & ORS [2009] LPELR 3593 CA  Jega JCA held that it is clear that the sole determining factor in determining a public servant is the mode of  appointment  referring to DADA Vs. ADEYEYE [2006] 6 NWLR (Pt. 920) 1 at p 19-20.

In determining whether the respondent’s appointment is statutorily flavoured or not …..the courts have held that recourse should be had to the contends of the letter of appointment FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTRE IDO EKITI & ORS. Vs. OMIDIORA KOLAWOLE O. [2011] LPELR 4149 CA page 15 para B.

In the instant case the claimant has tendered Exhibit

UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR TEACHING HOSPITAL

P.M.B. 1278

CALBAR, NIGERIA

MRS. ELIZABETYH UTIBE BASSEY                                                                3rd April 2006

6 UNICAL LANE CAL.

Dear Sir/ Madam

 

OFFER OF APPOINTMENT

I am pleased on Behalf of the Board of Management of the above Teaching Hospital to offer you the post of CATERING ASSISTANT at the Hospital on a commencement salary of N715372 per annum in the salary CONHESS/CONMESS 3/1 with effect from the date of your assumption of duty.

  1. This offer of appointment is subject to your being passed mentally fit for service with the Teaching Hospital.
  2. This appointment will except where your services are transferred after a previous confirmation, be on probation for two years or for longer period as may be deemed advisable after which it will be confirmed one pensionable grounds.
  3. Within the probationary period, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Head of Department in which you are serving that you are not qualified for efficient service, or unsuitable in other ways, your appointment may be terminated at anytime by one months’ notice in writing or by payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice  without any compensation.
  4. Unless you are dismissed and provided you are not on any bond to serve the Hospital for a period either party may terminate your employment by a month’s notice in writing or with the consent in writing of your Head of Department by the payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice.
  5. The duties of the post shall include the usual duties of this office in which you are engaged, and any other suitable duty the Board may call upon you to perform. You shall not either directly or indirectly engage in or be concerned with any other service or business whatsoever or receive commissions or profit of any kind but shall devote the whole of your time and attention to the service of the Board and shall use your utmost exertion to promote the interest of the Teaching Hospital. You shall conform to the rules and regulations of the Board in so far as the same are applicable
  6. You will be subject in all respects to all the conditions of service from time to time by the Board of Management. These conditions are usually those comparable to posts in the Federal Public Service of Nigeria
  7. If you are prepared to accept this offer, I shall be glad if you do so in writing and at the same time indicate the date upon which you would be prepares to assume duty. This offer of appointment will lapse if not taken within one month.

Yours faithfully

(Signed

ANTIGHA BASSEY ACIPM AMNIM

For: Director of Administration

 

The claimant tendered no other document in furtherance of the nature of her appointment neither did she tender the rules and regulation of the Board if any.

The claimant had pleaded that her appointment was governed by the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, Cap. U15, LFN, 2010. Cap 463 LFN 2004

In the case of JOSEPH & ORS v. KWARA STATE POLYTECHNIC & ORS (2013) LPELR-21398(CA) it was held following the Supreme Court in the case of FAKUADE V. O.A.U.T.H (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 291) 47 at 63; (1993) 6 SCNJ 35 at 44.  that “the fact that the Respondent is the creation of statute does not elevate all its employees to that status or that the status of master and servant is no longer existent or that their employment or determination of their appointment must necessarily have a statutory flavor.