EJEH v. ALI & ORS (2022)

EJEH v. ALI & ORS

(2022)LCN/16448(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Tuesday, May 24, 2022

CA/ABJ/CV/508/2020

Before Our Lordships:

Peter Olabisi Ige Justice of the Court of Appeal

Biobele Abraham Georgewill Justice of the Court of Appeal

Danlami Zama Senchi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

AIR VICE MARSHAL EMMMANUEL EJEH (RTD) APPELANT(S)

And

1. CHIEF GEORGE ALI 2. SIMON ALI 3. PIUS MONDAY ALI 4. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE 5. DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO:

POSITION OF LAW ON FAILURE TO SERVE A NOTICE OF APPEAL ON A PARTY

It follows therefore, failure to serve a Notice of Appeal on a party directly affected by the appeal is fatal and would render any proceedings founded thereon a nullity. See Order 2 Rule 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021. See also NUT Taraba State V. Habu (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1642) 381 AT pp. 393 – 394, Ihedioha V. Okorocha (2016) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1492) 147 AT Pp. 176 – 177. BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

WHETHER ADDRESS OF A RESPONDENT ON A NOTICE OF APPEAL IS FUNDAMENTAL

It is the law that where a Notice of Appeal does not have endorsed on it the address where a Respondent could be served personally, it is fundamentally and incurably defective and renders such a Notice of Appeal as well as the appeal itself grossly incompetent. See also Ihedioha & Ors V. Okorocha & Anor (2016) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1492) 147, Adegbola V. Osiyi & Ors (2017) LPELR – 42471 (SC). BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

POSITION OF LAW ON AN ALLEGED BREACH OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

My Lords, from the express and succinct provisions of Section 46(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and Order II Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, any person who alleges that any of the Fundamental Rights provided for in the Constitution or African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act and to which he is entitled, has been, is being, or is likely to be infringed, may apply to the Court in the State where the infringement occurs or is likely to occur, for redress. BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

WHETHER A JOINT APPLICATION FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IS COMPETENT

In law, a joint application for the enforcement of fundamental right as enshrined in Chapter IV of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) is competent. It is also help to avoid multiplicity of actions over the same cause of action. ……See Finamedia Global Services Ltd V. Onwero (Nig) Ltd & Ors (2020) LPELR – 51149 (CA). See also Maitagaran & Anor V. Dankoli & Anor (2020) LPELR – 52025(CA), Uzoukwu V. Ezeonu 2 (1991) 6 NWLR (PT 200) 708 AT 761, Ihejiobi Vs Ihejiobi (2013) LPELR – 21957(CA), Ubochi V. Ekpo (2014) LPELR 23523(CA), Orkater V. Ekpo (2014) LPELR 23525(CA), Government of Enugu State of Nigeria & Ors V. Onya & Ors (2021) LPELR – 52688 (CA). BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

POSITION OF LAW ON THE DUTY OF POLICE ON DEBT RECOVERY

My Lords, it is not and have never been the duty of the Police, as represented by the 4th – 5th Respondents, to either directly or acting under the guise of any subterfuge to facilitate and or collect or aid the recovery of debt owed a citizen by another. The law Courts are there and well equipped for the citizen to ventilate his civil grievances against another without resort to the Police as a form of self-help in a purely civil matter. It is wrong and it has been widely and constantly deprecated by the Courts. ……….See Dr. Nwafor V. EFCC (2021) LPELR – 52949(CA), per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA. See also Olusegun & Anor V. EFCC & Ors (2018) LPELR – 45825 (CA), per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA, Imoh & Anor V. EFCC & Anor (2018) LPELR – 46579 (CA), per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA; EFCC V. Diamond Bank Plc & Ors (2018) LPELR – 44217(SC). BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

WHETHER THE ACT OF POLICE IN THE ORDINARY DUTY OF THEIR POWER WILL CONSTITUTE BREACH OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

……the trite position of the law that whenever and or where the Police acts properly in the due exercise of the powers conferred upon it by law an arrest made thereon cannot constitute a breach of fundamental rights. BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

POSITION OF LAW ON AWARD FOR BREACH OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Thus, it is the law that for every proven act of infringement of the fundamental right of the citizen the consequences should be an award of damages against the violator. Indeed, the time has come, and I feel so strongly about this, for such damages to be exemplary in character for the purpose of making the breach of the fundamental right of the citizen very unattractive and an unenviable venture. See Inspector General of Police & Ors V. Peter O. Ikpila & Anor (2015) LPELR – 40630 (CA) Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA. See also Jim – Jaja V. COP, Rivers State (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 225 AT pp. 244 – 245, Igweokolo V. Akpoyibo & Ors (2017) LPELR – 41882 (CA), Dasuki V. Director, General State Security & Ors (2019) LPELR – 48113(CA), Okonkwo V. Ogbogu (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 489) 420 AT p. 435. BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

POSITION OF LAW ON ILLEGAL DETENTION BY POLICE

BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Coram: O. O. Goodluck J, (as he then was) in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/1952/2018: George Ali & Ors V. Inspector General of Police & Ors delivered on 29/1/2020. The claims of the 1st – 3rd Respondents were granted against the Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents.

The Notice of Appeal was filed on 3/7//2020 but was deemed as properly filed on 6/12/2022 on four grounds of appeal. See pages 119 – 124 of the Record of Appeal. The Record of Appeal was compiled and transmitted to this Court on 7/7/2020. The 1st – 3rd Respondents’ Motion on Notice seeking to strike out the Notice of Appeal was filed on 22/6/2021. The 4th – 5th Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Contend was filed on 16/12/2020. The 1st – 3rd Respondents’ Notice of Preliminary Objection to the 4th – 5th Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Contend was filed on 22/6/2021. The 4th – 5th Respondents’ Reply on point of law to 1st – 3rd Notice of Preliminary Objection was filed on 6/12/2021. The parties filed and exchange their respective briefs, which were duly adopted as their arguments at the hearing of this appeal on 21/3/2022. The Appellant was represented by T. J. Aondo Esq., appearing with C.J. Odom Esq. The 1st – 3rd Respondents were represented by Onyinye Princess James Esq, appearing with Feranmi Tehinse Esq. The 4th – 5th Respondents were represented by Joseph Nwadike Esq.

By an Originating Motion on Notice filed on 31/5/2018 by the 1st – 3rd Respondents as Applicants against the Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents as Respondents before the lower below, claiming the following reliefs, to wit:
1. An order of injunction restraining the Respondents, by themselves, their agents, officials and privies, however called from harassing or further harassment, threatening or further threatening, intimidating, unlawfully arresting and/or unlawfully detaining, depriving the applicants in any manner whatsoever as to disturb and impede the liberty or peaceful, and lawful movement and activities of the Applicants in respect of this matter.
2. The sum of N100,000,000.00 only general damages jointly and severally against the Respondents for the unlawful threats, and continues harassments which has greatly affected the Applicants psychologically. See pages of the Record of Appeal.

BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS
The 1st – 3rd Respondents as Applicants before the lower Court had sought the enforcement of the fundamental right to personal liberty against the Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents as Respondents. They alleged that sometimes in 2017 the Appellant instigated the 4th – 5th Respondents to arrest and detain the 1st Respondents over a 2007 failed loan transaction of USD100,000.00 between the Appellant and one Anthony Ali, a younger brother to the 1st Respondent, despite the payment of N5,000,000.00 to the Appellant through the efforts of the 2nd Respondent. The 4th – 5th Respondents had threatened to further arrest and detain the 1st Respondent as well the 2nd – 3rd Respondents over a purely loan transaction none of them were privy to and were bent on carrying out their threat at the behest of the Appellant and would do so unless they are timely stopped by the Court.

The Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents as Respondents before the lower Court denied the allegations and maintained that the Police acted in the due discharge of their statutory duty of investigation, detection and prevention of crime when on the reasonable suspicion arising from the complaint of the Appellant on 14/8/2017 against the 1st Respondent over a fraudulent collection of USD100,000.00 from the Appellant and criminal breach of trust, the 1st Respondent was arrested, interrogated and promptly released on bail. They denied that they ever threatened either to re-arrest the 1st Respondent or to arrest the 2nd – 3rd Respondents. The 1st – 3rd Respondent had in acceptance of their criminal activities already refunded to the Appellant the sum of N5,000,000.00 and despite repeated demands had refused to pay the balance due to the Appellant, who had to petition the Police against the 1st – 3rd Respondents after repeated calls for the refund his money.

At the lower Court, the parties filed and exchanged Affidavit, Counter-Affidavits, Further Affidavits and written addresses, which were duly adopted at the hearing of the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ Originating Motion on Notice. On 29/1/2020, the lower Court delivered its judgment granting most of the claims of the 1st – 3rd Respondents against the Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents, hence this appeal. See pages 1 – 33, 34 – 43, 44 – 46, 47 – 62, 63 – 65, 66 – 78, 83 – 94, 104 – 118 and 119 – 124 of the Record of Appeal.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
In the Appellant’s brief, three issues were distilled as arising for determination from the four grounds of appeal, namely:
1. Whether the invitation of the 1st Respondent by the officers of the 4th – 5th Respondents to their office, his interrogation and subsequent release on bail on the same day amounted to violation of the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ right to personal liberty? (Distilled from Ground 3)
2. Whether the lower Court was not wrong when it awarded the sum of N3,000,000.00 against the Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents for violation of the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ fundamental rights despite the fact that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ Suit? (Distilled from Grounds 1 and 2)
3. Whether the lower Court was right when it held that the 4th – 5th Respondents acted as debt recovery agents for and on behalf of the Appellant? (Distilled from Ground 4)

In the 1st – 3rd Respondent’s brief, four issues were distilled as arising for determination in this appeal, namely:
1. Whether the lower Court was correct when it held that the act of arresting and transferring the 1st – 3rd Respondent to Abuja on a matter that was purely civil in nature amounted to the violation of the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ rights as guaranteed by Section 35 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)? (Distilled from Ground 3).
2. Whether the lower Court had jurisdiction to entertain a joint application for the enforcement of fundamental rights of the 1st – 3rd Respondents? (Distilled from Ground 1).
3. Whether the lower Court was wrong in the assessment of damages in favor of the 1st – 3rd Respondents for violation of the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ fundamental Rights? (Distilled from Ground 2)
4. Whether the lower Court was right when it held that the 4th and 5th Respondents acted as debt recovery agents for and on behalf of the Appellant? (Distilled from Ground 4)

In the 4th – 5th Respondents’ brief, five issues were distilled as arising for determination in this appeal, to wit:
1. Whether the 5th Respondent is a juristic person and has no constitutional status to be sued as a person under our laws?
2. Whether the suit of the 1st to 3rd Respondents at the Court below amounts to abuse of Court process on the grounds of non-joinder of necessary party, hence the suit is wanting in bona-fide, frivolous and vexatious by reason of non-disclosure of reasonable cause of action?
3. Whether the Police can be invited where a civil matter has element of criminality as per the proviso in Section 1 (c) of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act CAP ‘A6’ Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2006
4. Whether a Court of Law can issue a judicial fiat or make any order or entertain any proceeding geared towards preventing the Law Enforcement Agencies from the exercise of their statutory powers, to wit; investigation of crime?
5. Whether the 1st to 3rd Respondents being accused of felony cannot hide under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria to exculpate themselves by alleging at the Court below that her liberty is been curtailed or rights violated?

I have taken time to consider the depositions in the affidavit, counter-affidavit and further affidavit as well as the documentary Exhibits as in the Record of Appeal. I have also considered the submissions of learned counsel to the parties in their respective briefs in the light of the findings and decisions reached in the judgment of the lower Court. I am of the firm view that the apt issues arising for determination in this appeal are the three issues as distilled in the Appellant’s brief, a consideration of which would involve a consideration of the four issues as distilled in the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ brief as well as the five whooping issues distilled in the 4th – 5th Respondents’ brief. However, I shall consider all the three issues together and resolve them in one fell swoop.

But first, there is the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ Motion on Notice challenging the competence of the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, which being an issue touching on jurisdiction shall be considered and resolved one way or the other before proceeding, if need be, to consider the appeal on its merit. There is also the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ preliminary objection to the 4th – 5th Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Contend, which I shall also consider and resolve one way or the other before proceeding, if need be, to consider the 4th – 5th Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Contend along with the main appeal on its merit. However, I shall commence with the latter, the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ preliminary objection to the competence of the 4th – 5th Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Contend.

1ST – 3RD RESPONDENTS’ OBJECTION TO THE COMPETENCE OF THE 4TH – 5TH RESPONDENTS’ NOTICE OF INTENTION TO CONTEND
By a Notice of Intention filed on 26/12/2021, the 4th – 5th Respondents had sought to contend that decision of the lower Court be varied on the grounds that the 5th Respondent is not a juristic person and has no constitutional status to be sued as a person under our laws; That the suit amounted to abuse of Court process for non-joinder of necessary party, and thereby wanting in bona – fide; is frivolous and vexatious for not disclosing any reasonable cause of action, is incompetent and robs the lower Court of its jurisdiction; That the Police can be invited where a Civil matter has element of criminality, and that no Court of law can prevent the law enforcement agencies from the exercise of their statutory powers.

It is against the above Notice of Intention to Contend that the 1st – 3rd Respondents had by a Notice of Objection filed on 22/6/2021 challenged the competence of the 4th – 5th Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Contend on the grounds that there was no Notice of Cross-Appeal by the 4th – 5th Respondents, and that in law a Respondent’s Notice is not an avenue to raise fresh issues not considered by the lower Court and without the leave of Court.

1ST – 3RD RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
In his submissions, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the 1st – 3rd Respondents had submitted inter alia that by virtue of the Rules of this Court a Respondent who has not filed a Cross-Appeal cannot without the leave of Court raise fresh issues not considered by the lower Court since a Respondent’s Notice is not an avenue to raise without leave issues that were not considered by the lower Court and contended that in law the 4th – 5th Respondents are not permitted to base their Notice of Intention to Contend on any ground not supported by the proceedings and judgment of the lower Court and urged the Court to hold that none of the grounds relied upon by the 4th – 5th Respondents for their Notice of Intention to Contend arose from the proceedings and judgment of the lower Court and no leave having been first sought and obtained rendered the 4th – 5th Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Contend incompetent and thus liable to be struck out and should accordingly, be struck out. Counsel referred to Order 9 Rule 3 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016 and relied on Touton SA V. Grimaldi Compagnia Di Naviga Zioni SPA & Ors (2010) LPELR – 5033 (CA), Alade & Ors V. Ogundele & Anor (2013) LPELR – 21382(CA).

4TH – 5TH RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL REPLY SUBMISSIONS
In his reply submissions, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the 4th – 5th Respondents had submitted inter alia that by the proviso to the provisions of Order 9 Rule 3 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016 the leave of Court is only required when there is No Notice Intention to Contend and contended that the 4th – 5th Respondent complied with the provisions of the above Rules of this Court vide their Notice of Intention of Contend filed on 13/12/2020 that the decision of the lower Court delivered on 25/1/2020 be varied on several stated grounds and urged the Court to hold in law an issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and thereby rendered the 4th – 5th Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Contend, raising issues of jurisdiction, competent and to dismiss the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ objection and to proceed to determine the 4th – 5th Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Contend challenging the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the 1st – 3rd Respondent’s Suit. Counsel referred to Order 9 Rules 1 – 3 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016; Section 1 (c) of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act CAP A6 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2006 and relied on All Progressive Grand Alliance V. Senator Christiana & 2 Ors (2014) NSCQR (Vol. 57) 364 AT p. 405, Utih V. Onoyivwe (1991) 1 SCJN 25 AT p. 49, Okolo V. UBN Ltd (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 859) 87 AT p. 108, Nokoprise Int’l Anor V. Dobest Trading Corporation & Anor (1997) NWLR (Pt. 520) 334 AT P. 335, Kabo Air Ltd V. Oladipo (1999) LPELR – 632717 (CA), Nkwocha V. MTN Nigeria Communication Ltd (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1099) 439, Amechi V. Okoye (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1101) 546, DideV. Seleiletimibi (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1110) 221, Raymond S. Dongtoe V. Civil Service Commission (2001) NSCQLR (Vol. 6) 328.

RULING ON THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF THE 1ST – 3RD RESPONDENTS TO THE COMPETENCE OF THE 4TH – 5TH RESPONDENTS’ NOTICE OF INTENTION TO CONTEND
My Lords, the crux of the objection by the 1st – 3rd Respondents to the 4th – 5th Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Contend is the question whether or not under the Rules of this Court the 4th – 5th Respondents who neither filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal nor sought and obtained the leave of this Court can seek to set aside the judgment of the lower Court simply by means of or by virtue of a Respondent’s Notice to Contend that the judgment of the lower Court be varied on grounds other than the grounds relied upon in the judgment of the lower Court?

The learned counsel for the 1st – 3rd Respondents had, by their objection to the competence of the 4th – 5th Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Contend, vehemently contended that the purpose of the 4th – 5th Notice of Intention to Contend being to set aside the judgment of the lower Court and not to affirm it on other grounds rendered the said 4th – 5th Respondent’s Notice of Intention to Contend incompetent being not in line with the purpose of a Respondent’s Notice of intention to Contend as provided by the relevant Rules of this Court and thus, liable to be struck out and should be so struck out. The learned counsel for the 4th – 5th Respondents had with equal vehemence contended that since their Notice of Intention to Contend is rooted on the issue of the incompetence of the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ Suit and therefore, challenging the jurisdiction of the lower Court it is competent to be determined on the merit.

Now, in law a Respondent’s Notice of Intention to Contend seeking to set aside the judgment of the lower Court and not to affirm the same but on grounds other than the grounds relied upon in the judgment of the lower Court is, in my view and I so hold, not a Respondent’s Notice of Intention to Contend properly so called and as provided for by the provisions of Order 9 Rule 3 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021 relied upon by the 4th – 5th Respondents. Thus, a Respondent’s Notice of Intention to Contend that the judgment of the lower Court be set aside in its entirety against a Respondent and not affirmed on grounds other than the grounds relied upon in the judgment of the lower Court not a Respondent’s Notice of Intention to Contend but in law and in reality a Cross-Appeal for which such Respondent is obliged by law to file either his own Notice of Appeal or a Notice of Cross-Appeal to seek to set aside the judgment of the lower Court. A Respondent to an appeal cannot accomplish this purpose of setting aside the judgment of the lower Court by a mere Respondent’s Notice of Intention to Contend purportedly to vary grounds for the judgment of the lower Court whilst in reality rather praying for the setting aside of the judgment of the lower Court in its entirety against the Respondent.

It would appear, and I believe it is correct, that a Respondent’s Notice of Intention to Contend presupposes the correctness of the judgment of the lower Court and only seeks to affirm the judgment of the lower Court on grounds other than the grounds relied upon in the judgment of the lower Court, but which such other grounds must be seen and supported by Record of Appeal. It is therefore, the law that the clear purpose of a Respondent’s Notice of Intention to Contend by virtue of Order 9 Rules 1, 2 and 3 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021 is that the judgment or decision of the lower Court appealed against should be affirmed on grounds other than those relied upon by the lower Court in reaching the judgment or decision appealed against. Thus, it is not a carte blank or an open cheque on which a Respondent could raise every conceivable and or even inconceivable contentions as he so wishes, since in law the grounds sought to be relied upon by the Respondent must be apparent on the face of the printed Record of Appeal, having regards to the facts of the case, the applicable law and the judgment appealed against. See Order 9 Rules 1, 2 and 3 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021. See also Gwede V. INEC & Ors (2015) All FWLR (Pt. 767) 615 AT pp. 644 – 645, where the Supreme Court per Onnoghen, JSC, (as he then was but later CJN) had admirably captured the real essence of a Respondent’s Notice inter alia thus:
“The purposes/subject/intention of a Respondent’s Notice is that the judgment of the lower Court be confirmed on grounds other than those relied upon by that Court in reaching the decision on appeal. The grounds relied upon in the Respondent’s Notice must be apparent on the record having regards to the facts of the case, the law applicable thereto and the judgment on appeal. A Respondent’s Notice is therefore, not an open cheque…”
My Lords, I cannot therefore, but agree completely with the apt and unassailable submissions by learned counsel for the 1st – 3rd Respondents, which submissions represent the correct position of the law, that a Respondent, such as the 4th – 5th Respondents, who has not filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal cannot without the leave of Court raise fresh issues not considered by the lower Court and thus not contained in the judgment of the lower Court. A Respondent’s Notice of Intention to Contend pursuant to Order 9 Rules 1, 2 and 3 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021 is not an avenue to raise, without leave of the Court, issues that were not considered by the lower Court and or not covered by the grounds relied upon therein, and therefore, the counsel for the 1st – 3rd Respondents was right and on very firm ground when he contended that the 4th – 5th Respondents are in law not permitted to base their Notice of Intention to Contend on any ground not supported by and on the face of the printed Record of Appeal and the judgment of the lower Court.
Indeed, and in truth none of the grounds relied upon by the 4th – 5th Respondents in support of their Notice of Intention to Contend arose from the proceedings and judgment of the lower Court. Thus, the mere filing of a Notice of Intention to contend which does not translate into leave of this Court to raise and argue grounds not covered by the Notice of Intention to Contend, except with the leave of this Court first sought and obtained.
However, I am unable to accede to the other vehement contention of learned counsel for the 1st – 3rd Respondents that the 4th – 5th Respondents, notwithstanding the filing of their Notice of Intention to Contend and relying on several grounds thereon other than the grounds relied upon in the judgment of the lower Court, required the leave of Court to argue any or all of the grounds as clearly set out in their Notice of Intention to Contend. See Order 9 Rule 3 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021. See also Touton SA V. Grimaldi Compagnia Di Naviga Zioni SPA & Ors (2010) LPELR – 5033 (CA), where this Court per Inyang Okoro JCA (as he then was but now JSC) had stated inter alia thus:
“In a Respondents’ Notice, a Respondent acknowledges that the lower Court came to the right conclusion but for the wrong reason, and therefore seeks an affirmation of the Judgment or decision of the lower Court on grounds other than those relied upon by the lower Court. It is not an opportunity to raise fresh issues which had not come up for consideration before the lower Court.”

On the whole therefore, where a Respondent does not agree with the judgment of the lower Court and intends to set it aside, he can only do so by challenging the judgment of the lower Court by means of either a Notice of Appeal of his own against the said judgment or by a Notice of Cross-Appeal, but not, and indeed never, by filing a mere Respondent’s Notice of Intention to Contend pursuant to Order 9 Rules 1, 2 and 3 of the Court of Appeal Rules.

In the light of the above findings, I hold that, though no leave was required by the 4th – 5th Respondents to raise any grounds touching on jurisdiction as set out in their Respondents’ Notice, but in law the 4th – 5th Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Contend seeking to set aside the judgment of the lower Court, in the absence of any Notice of Cross-Appeal in this appeal, is grossly incompetent and negates the very essence of the provisions of Order 9 Rules 1, 2 and 3 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021, and therefore, liable to be struck out. I therefore, cannot but, and do hereby, uphold the objection by the 1st – 3rd Respondents challenging the competence of the 4th – 5th Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Contend for being meritorious. Consequently, the 4th – 5th Respondents’ Notice of Intention to Contend, having been found to be incompetent, is hereby struck out.

1ST – 3RD RESPONDENTS’ MOTION ON NOTICE CHALLENGING THE COMPETENCE OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
The 1st – 3rd Respondents are challenging the competence of this appeal on ground of non-service of the Notice of Appeal on the 1st – 3rd Respondents and seeking the Order of this Court striking out of the appeal for being incompetent in that the Notice of Appeal filed on 24/6/2020 was served on Greenfield Chambers of No. 30 Chuba Okadigbo Street Apo Abuja rather on the 1st – 3rd Respondents as required by law by virtue of Order 2 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021.

1ST – 3RD RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
In his submissions, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the 1st – 3rd Respondents had submitted inter alia that the 1st – 3rd Respondents, being parties affected by the appeal filed by the Appellant, were by law required to be served with the Notice of Appeal and contended that the service of the Notice of Appeal, being an originating process, on the Law Firm of Chief Emeka Obegolu, the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ Solicitors before the lower Court rather than on the 1st – 3rd Respondents rendered the Notice of Appeal and the entire appeal incompetent for failure of service of the Notice of Appeal as required by law and urged the Court to so hold and to strike out the Appeal for being incompetent since in law service of originating process on parties affected by is fundamental and mandatory and thus, failure to serve the Notice of Appeal on the 1st – 3rd Respondents was fatal to the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine the appeal on the merit. Counsel relied on Abiodun V. FRN (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 126 AT p. 142, SPDCN LTD V. Agbara (2016) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1496) 353, SPDCN LTD V. Ekosi (2016) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1496) 278. See Nwankwo V. Yar’adua (2011) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1263)125, Onochie V. Odogwu (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 975) 65.

It was also submitted that in law that where a Notice of Appeal does not have endorsed on it the address where a Respondent could be served personally, it is fundamentally and incurably defective and renders such a Notice of Appeal as well as the appeal itself grossly incompetent and contended that the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal having not been endorsed with the address of service of the 1st – 3rd Respondents was incurably defective and thus, incompetent and liable to be struck out and urged the Court to so hold and to strike out the appeal for being incompetent and thus robbing the Court of its jurisdiction. Counsel referred to Order 2 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021 and relied on Ihedioha & Ors V. Okorocha & Anor (2016) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1492) 147, Adegbola V. Osiyi & Ors (2017) LPELR – 42471 (SC), Odua Investment Co. Ltd V J.T Talabi (1991) I NWLR (PT 170) 761. See also Kida V. Ogunmola (2006) 6 SCNJ 165 AT P. 174, Auto Import Export V. Adebayo (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 799) 554; Madukolu & Ors V. Nkemdilim (1962) LPELR – 24023 (SC). See Popoola V Babatunde(2012) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1299) 302.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL REPLY SUBMISSIONS
In his reply submissions, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the Appellant had submitted inter alia that by the proviso to Order 2 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021 there is an exception to the general rule of ‘personal service’ and which covers the mode of service of the Notice of Appeal on the 1st – 3rd Respondents through their Solicitors and contended that the mode of communication and service of the Notice of Appeal on the 1st – 3rd Respondents complied with the proviso to the provisions of Order 2 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021 in situations where personal service may not be possible, difficult or even effected irregularly and urged the Court to hold that the Notice of Appeal having been duly communicated to the 1st – 3rd Respondents, who had proceeded to file their brief on 22/6/2021 and are thereby deemed to have waived their rights to personal service, their objection on ground of lack of personal service lacks merit and should be dismissed. Counsel relied on Mmaduagwu & Anor V. Ifeanyi & Ors (2016) LPELR – 41012 (CA), Uwemedimo V. Mobil Producing (Nig) Unltd(2019) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1685) 1 AT p. 19 D and Aondoakaa V. Obot (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1508) 280 AT pp. 315 – 316.

RULING ON 1ST – 3RD RESPONDENTS’ MOTION ON NOTICE CHALLENGING THE COMPETENCE OF THE APPELLANT’S NOTICE OF APPEAL
My Lords, the primacy, or should I say, the primary place, of service of process, more particularly, originating process in the adjudicatory process cannot be overemphasized. It is a cardinal requirement of our procedural law that has dovetailed over the years into threshold issue of jurisdiction and competent. Thus, without service, proper service at that, where service of process is required, any proceeding founded thereon is a nullity.

In appellate litigation, the Notice of Appeal is indisputably the originating process. Its service personally on all the parties directly affected by the appeal is sine qua non unless there is an Order of Court for substituted service of the Notice of Appeal. It follows therefore, failure to serve a Notice of Appeal on a party directly affected by the appeal is fatal and would render any proceedings founded thereon a nullity. See Order 2 Rule 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021. See also NUT Taraba State V. Habu (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1642) 381 AT pp. 393 – 394, Ihedioha V. Okorocha (2016) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1492) 147 AT Pp. 176 – 177.
I have taken time to go through the entire Record of Appeal to see if there is any proof of any ‘personal’ service of the Notice of Appeal on the 1st – 3rd Respondents, who undoubtedly are the principal parties affected by the appeal, being the Applicants before the lower Court and in whose favor the judgment appealed against was entered by the lower Court against the Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents as Respondents. I can see no proof of any ‘personal’ service of the Notice of Appeal on the 1st – 3rd Respondents. This is understandably and undoubtedly so because even on the face of the Notice of Appeal, the address for service as endorsed therein was the Law Firm of the Solicitors to the 1st – 3rd Respondents before the lower Court, as if there was any legal obligation on the 1st – 3rd Respondents to retain the Solicitors who represented them before the lower Court to also represent them in the appeal, when ordinarily the authority of their Solicitors to represent the 1st – 3rd Respondents, unless renewed by them, terminates at the conclusion of the matter before the lower Court. See Order 2 Rule 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021. See also Ihedioha & Ors V. Okorocha & Anor (2016) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1492) 147, Adegbola V. Osiyi & Ors (2017) LPELR – 42471 (SC), Odua Investment Co. Ltd V. J.T Talabi (1991) I NWLR (PT 170) 761.
In other words, an Appellant cannot by a mere ‘Notice of Appeal’ impose on a Respondent the counsel who represented him at the lower Court as his counsel for the appeal, that choice belongs entirely to the Respondent and cannot be curtailed under the guise of any subterfuge by an Appellant seeking solace under the proviso to Order 2 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021. However, I can see, and indeed the learned counsel for the Appellant had also readily conceded that, the only service of the Notice of Appeal was on the Solicitors to the 1st – 3rd Respondents as Applicants before the lower Court rather than personally on each of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents as required by law vide Order 2 Rules 1 and 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021. There is therefore, in my finding, and I so hold, no service of the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, which can be found at pages 119 -125 of the Record of Appeal, on the 1st – 3rd Respondents as required by law.
My Lords, I cannot but agree completely with the apt and unassailable submission by the learned counsel for the 1st – 3rd Respondents that in law the admitted but purported service of the Notice of Appeal, being an originating process, on the Law Firm of Chief Emeka Obegolu, the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ Solicitors before the lower Court rather than on the 1st – 3rd Respondents neither amounted to nor constituted proper and valid service of the Notice of Appeal on the 1st – 3rd Respondents. In law, service of originating process, such as a Notice of Appeal, on parties affected by it is fundamental and mandatory. This failure therefore, to serve the Notice of Appeal on the 1st – 3rd Respondents was fatal to the competence of this appeal and thereby robbed this Court of any jurisdictional competence to proceed to determine this Appeal on the merit. See Ihedioha & Ors V. Okorocha & Anor (2016) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1492) 147, where the Supreme Court had pronounced inter alia thus:
“A Notice of Appeal being an originating process, is fundamental to jurisdiction and must be served personally on the respondents unless otherwise directed or ordered by the Court or exempted by the provisions of the law. If a Notice of Appeal is not served on the parties affected as respondents to the appeal, the appellate Court cannot assume jurisdiction over the appeal.”
See also Adegbola V. Osiyi & Ors (2017) LPELR – 42471 (SC), where the Supreme Court had opined inter alia thus:
“The Notice of Appeal is the foundation of the appeal, non-service of the notice if established, goes to the root of the appeal. The defect is not a mere irregularity as being fundamental, it robs the appellate Court the jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal… service of an originating process, which is the Notice of Appeal, is a sine qua non for a Court to assume jurisdiction over a case.”
It is the law that where a Notice of Appeal does not have endorsed on it the address where a Respondent could be served personally, it is fundamentally and incurably defective and renders such a Notice of Appeal as well as the appeal itself grossly incompetent. See also Ihedioha & Ors V. Okorocha & Anor (2016) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1492) 147, Adegbola V. Osiyi & Ors (2017) LPELR – 42471 (SC).
Now, by Order 2 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021, it is provided thus:
“Every Notice of Appeal shall, subject to the provisions of Order 2 Rules 7, 8 and 9, be served personally; Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the notice of appeal has in fact been communicated to the Respondent, no objection to the hearing of the appeal shall lie on the ground that the notice of appeal was not served personally.”

My Lords, by the use of the word ‘shall’ in the above provision, it connotes and requires mandatory compliance since in law the word ‘shall’ is usually used to express a command or what is legally mandatory and must therefore, be strictly obeyed to the letters. Order 2 Rules 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021 unequivocally and expressly provides that the primary mode of service of the Notice of Appeal on a Respondent shall be ‘personal’. It follows therefore, that failure to do so, except where leave is granted to the contrary or this Court is satisfied, of which I am not in any way satisfied in this appeal, that service had been properly effected on the 1st – 3rd Respondents, would rob this Court of the requisite competence to determine this appeal on the merit. This is so because in the proved circumstances of the purported service of the Notice of Appeal on the 1st – 3rd Respondents, the conditions precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court in this Appeal has not been fulfilled as required by law. See Nwankwo V. Yar’adua (2011) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1263)125, Onochie V. Odogwu (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 975) 65, Odua Investment Co. Ltd V J.T Talabi (1991) I NWLR (PT 170) 761, Kida V. Ogunmola (2006) 6 SCNJ 165 AT p. 171, Auto Import Export V. Adebayo (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 799) 554 and Madukolu & Ors V. Nkemdilim (1962) LPELR – 24023 (SC).
It is no longer in any doubt that in law ‘Rules of Court’ are meant to be obeyed. They are not made to be toyed with or just for the mere fun of it. Thus, each level of Courts has its own set of given ‘Rules’ to regulate its proceedings and therefore, both the parties, who appear before it, as well as the Court are bound by the Rules of the Courts. The parties either by themselves or through their counsel must therefore, take time to carefully study the ‘Rules of the Courts and approach the Courts in line with the laid down rules in order to avoid chaos in the judicial process. Therefore, where a Court insist, as in the instant appeal, that its relevant and applicable ‘Rules’ must be obeyed by the parties that should not be equated with leaning unduly on mere technicality over and above substantial justice. See Popoola V Babatunde(2012) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1299) 302.

In the light of all I have stated and found as above, I hold that the preliminary objection of the 1st – 3rd Respondents challenging the competence of the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal on grounds of non-service on the 1st – 3rd Respondents as required by law has merit and ought to be upheld. Consequently, the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal filed on 24/6/2020 is hereby struck out for being incurably defective. Having struck out the Notice of Appeal for being incompetent, this appeal is also liable to be struck out. Consequently, this appeal is hereby struck out for being incompetent.

Be the above as it may, this Court is only but the penultimate Court in the hierarchy of Courts in the land, and we have been enjoined, or rather admonished by the Apex Court to ensure that we consider all issues presented before us by the parties. I shall therefore, in deference to the admonition of the Apex Court proceed to consider the merit of this appeal.

ISSUES ONE, TWO AND THREE
(TAKEN TOGETHER)
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
In his submissions on issues one, two and three, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the Appellant had submitted inter alia that the entire basis on which the 1st – 3rd Respondents had rushed before the lower Court was the sudden rumors of arrest of the 1st Respondent and the 2nd – 3rd Respondents from weddings and other fora and contended that in law these facts and circumstances relied upon by the 1st – 3rd Respondents do not qualify as violation of their fundamental right to personal liberty by the 4th – 5th Respondents and urged the Court to hold that in law an invitation extended to a citizen by the Police upon reasonable suspicion of his involvement in the commission of a crime and his subsequent arrest, interrogation and bail granted to him on the same day would not constitute a violation of his rights as was perversely held by the lower Court and to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the lower Court and dismiss the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ suit for lacking n merit. Counsel referred to Sections 35(1)(c) and 46(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended); Section 4 of the Police Act, and relied on Eze V. IGP (2017) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1554) 44 AT pp. 74 -75, Atakpa V. Ebetor (2015) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1447) 549 AT p. 575, AG. Anambra State V. Uba (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt. 947) 44 AT p. 67, Diamond Bank Plc V. Opara (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 92 AT p. 110.

It was also submitted from the endorsement of the names of the parties in the Originating Motion of the 1st – 3rd Respondents it is obvious that they sued as Joint Applicants and contended that in law a joint application for the enforcement of fundamental right is incompetent and urged the Court to hold that the 1st – 3rd Respondents Joint Application for the enforcement of their individual rights to personal liberty was incompetent and thus, liable to be struck out and to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the lower Court without jurisdiction and to strike out the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ Suit for being incompetent. Counsel referred to Order II Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009; Section 46(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and relied on Opara V. SPDCN Limited (2015) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1479) 307 AT p. 350, Reg. Trustees of Faith Tabernacle Congregation Church, Nigeria V. ikwechegh(2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 683) 1, Madukolu V. Nkemdilim (1962) NSCC (Vol. 2) 374 AT p. 379, Uwagba V. FRN (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt.1163) 91 AT pp. 107 – 108, Oladipo V. NCSB (2009) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1156) 563 AT p. 590, FBN. V. AG. Federation (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 121 AT p. 159.

It was further submitted that from the succinct facts and circumstances as relied upon by the 1st – 3rd Respondents, it was perverse for the lower Court to hold that the 4th – 5th Respondents acted as debt recovery agents for the Appellant and contended that there was nowhere in the Affidavits of the 1st – 3rd Respondents where such facts were either deposed to or even alluded to by the parties and urged the Court to hold that there was nowhere the bail of the 1st Respondent was made conditional upon the refund or payment of the money loaned to his younger brother by the Appellant to warrant the perverse finding of the lower Court amounting to setting up a different case for the parties and to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the lower Court and dismiss the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ Suit for lacking in merit. Counsel referred to paragraphs 27 – 34 of the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ Affidavit in Support and relied on Ogundele V. Agiri (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 219 AT p. 253.
1ST – 3RD RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
In his submissions on his issues one, two, three and four, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the 1st – 3rd Respondents had submitted inter alia that from the copious affidavit evidence of the 1st – 3rd Respondents, it was clearly established that in pursuance of the plans of the Appellant to get the 4th – 5th Respondents to interfere in a purely civil matter of loan default between the Appellant and the younger brother to the 1st Respondent and despite the order of the lower Court made on 21/6/2018 and duly served on 26/6/2018 restraining the 4th – 5th Respondents from arresting the 1st Respondent, the 4th – 5th Respondents in flagrant disobedience of the Order went ahead and arrested the 1st Respondent on the 29/6/2018 and forced him down to the Force Headquarters, Abuja where he was detained from 29/6/2018- 5/2018.

It was also submitted that the 4th – 5th Respondents acting on the instigation of the Appellant had despite the release of the 1st Respondent on bail continued to threaten to arrest and detain the 1st – 3rd Respondents over a purely civil loan transaction between the Appellant and the younger brother of the 1st Respondent, who neither stood as guarantor nor surety to his younger brother in the said loan transaction and contended that the actions of the 4th – 5th Respondents at the behest of the Appellant bordering on debt recovery was contrary to the duties of the Police and amounted clearly to a brazen infringement of the fundamental right to personal liberty of the 1st – 3rd Respondents as rightly found by the lower Court and urged the Court to so hold and to dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit and affirm the correct judgment of the lower Court. Counsel referred to Sections 35(1) and 46(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), and relied on Kalu V. FRN & ORS (2012) LPELR -9287(CA).

It was also further submitted that an application for the enforcement of fundamental right pursuant to the provisions of Section 46 (1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), Order II Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right Ratification and Enforcement Act does not become incompetent because it was commenced by more than one applicant and contended that in law, joint application for the enforcement of fundamental right as enshrined in Chapter IV of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) is competent as it avoids multiplicity of actions over the same cause of action and urged the Court to so hold and to discountenance the erroneous and misconceived contentions to the contrary by the learned counsel for the Appellant and to dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit. Counsel relied on Finamedia Global Services Ltd V. Onwero (Nig) Ltd & Ors (2020) LPELR – 51149 (CA), Maitagaran & Anor V. Dankoli & Anor (2020) LPELR – 52025(CA), Uzoukwu Vs Ezeonu 2 (1991) 6 NWLR (PT 200) 708 AT 761, Ihejiobi Vs Ihejiobi (2013) LPELR 21957(CA), Ubochi V. Ekpo (2014) LPELR 23523(CA), Orkater V. Ekpo (2014) LPELR 23525(CA), Government of Enugu State of Nigeria & Ors V. Onya & Ors (2021) LPELR – 52688 (CA).

It was also submitted that the lower Court was on firmer ground and acted in consonance with the correct principles of law on award of damages in fundamental right proceedings when it awarded the sum of N3, 000, 000. 00 as damages against the Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents in the light of the proved facts and circumstances of the unwarranted interference by the 4th – 5th Respondents into a purely civil loan transaction between the Appellant and the younger brother of the 1st Respondent leading to the actual breach of the 1st Respondent’s right to personal liberty and threatened breach of the 2nd – 3rd Respondent’s right to personal liberty and urged the Court to so hold and to dismiss the appeal and affirm the award of damages against the Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents. Counsel referred to Section 35(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), and relied on Dasuki V. Director, General State Security & Ors (2019) LPELR – 48113(CA).

4TH – 5TH RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
I have taken time to review the submissions of learned counsel for the 4th – 5th Respondents on his issues one, two, three, four and five respectively. However, notwithstanding the alignment of the 4th – 5th Respondents with and sympathy for the Appellant, they cannot in law be allowed to play the role of attacking the judgment of the lower Court as they attempted to play by their submissions in support of the Appeal by urging this Court to set aside the ruling of the lower Court whilst being and remaining simply the 4th – 5th Respondents and not as Cross-Appellants.
In law, the 4th – 5th Respondents can only attack the judgment of the lower Court if they come by way of a Cross-Appeal, failing which their traditional duty and primary role as the 4th – 5th Respondents was to either defend the judgment of the lower Court and if they do not feel up to doing so then to hold their peace and let the Appellant and the 1st – 3rd Respondents slug it out according to law. See Eliochin Nig. Ltd & Ors V. Victor Ngozi Mbadiwe (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 14) 47. See also Adefulu V. Oyesile (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 122) 377.
Based on the settled position of the law as above, and having reviewed the totality of the 4th – 5th Respondents’ brief merely and solely attacking the judgment appealed against and praying that it be set aside, whilst being the 4th – 5th Respondents and without any Notice of Cross-Appeal, I hold that the 4th – 5th Respondents’ brief, being contrary to and against the grains of the law on the traditional and primary role of a Respondent, ought to be discountenanced and it accordingly hereby so discountenanced as going to no issue in this appeal.

Be the above as it may, it was submitted by learned counsel for the 4th – 5th Respondent inter alia that in law the Police cannot be penalized by a Court for an investigation and arrest on genuine complaint being one of the law enforcement agents of the Federal Government of Nigeria created and empowered by law to so do and contended that it was in keeping with their powers and duties under the law and on the genuine complaint of the Appellant, a law abiding citizen, against the criminal activities of the 1st – 3rd Respondents that the 4th – 5th Respondents simply carried out their duties and functions as enshrined in the law in their interface with the 1st – 3rd Respondents without breaching any of their constitutionally enshrined rights contrary to the perverse findings by the lower Court and urged the Court to so hold and to allow the appeal and set aside the perverse judgment of the lower Court. Counsel referred to Section 214 (1) and 214 (2) (b) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended); Section 4 of the Police Act and relied on Fawehinmi V. IGP (2002) 98 LRCN 169, Adebo V. Omishola (2005) 2 NWLR (Pt. 909) 149 @ p. 175, Dosomah V. Commissioner of Police Edo State (2004) LPELR – 24497 (CA); Ajoku V. Economic & Financial Crimes Commission & Ors (2018) LPELR – 46692 (CA) and Dokubo Asari V. FRN (2007) 152 LRCN 116 @ p. 124.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL REPLY SUBMISSIONS TO 1ST – 3RD RESPONDENTS
In his reply submissions, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the Appellant, safe raising some challenges to some of the issues for determination as distilled in the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ brief as not arising from any of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal and thus incompetent, had virtually rehashed and reiterated his earlier submissions and basically re-argued his appeal under the guise of a reply brief. The reply brief, it must be reiterated is not and cannot be an avenue for an Appellant to re-argue his appeal or merely to have a second bite at the cherry. The reply brief is for the serious business of answering to new points or fresh issues raised in the Respondent’s brief, which were not covered by the submissions in the Appellant’s brief. It need not and ought not to be filed just as a matter of course even where there is nothing new or fresh in the Respondent’s brief to respond to by the Appellant. The Appellant’s reply brief is clearly not in consonance with the clear provisions and the intendment of Order 19 Rules 5 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021. See Edo State House of Assembly & Ors V. Igbinedion & Ors (2021) LPELR – 55990 (CA) @ pp. 55 – 57, per Sir Biobele Abraham Geoergewill JCA. See also Olafisoye V. FRN 2004 1SC Pt. 11 27, Ikine V. Edjerode (2001) 12 SC (Pt. 11) 94, Longe V. FBN (2010) 2 – 3 SC 61, Registered Trustees, Ikoyi Club 1938 V. Mr. Timothy Ikujuni (2019) LPELR – 47373 (CA).

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES ONE, TWO, THREE AND FOUR
My Lords, a consideration of issues one, two and three would, in my view, involve the interpretation and application of several and diverse provisions of relevant and or enabling enactments as well as the evaluation of evidence and findings reached by the lower Court in the judgment appealed against to see whether or not there was proper evaluation of the evidence and correct findings reached therein?

I have reviewed the entirety of the facts relied upon by the parties and as joined by them in their affidavit and counter-affidavit evidence, which I have earlier briefly set out in this judgment, and as can be seen in the Record of Appeal. See pages 1 – 33 of the Record of Appeal for the Affidavit of the 1st Respondent in support of the claims of the 1st – 3rd Respondents. See also pages 47 – 50 of the Record of Appeal for the initial joint counter – affidavit of the Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents deposed to by one Inspector Joshua Yohanna. See further pages 63 – 64 of the Record of Appeal for the Further – Affidavit of the 1st – 3rd Respondents deposed to by one Salihu Omeiza, a Litigation Assistant in the law firm of the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ Solicitors. See also pages 88 – 89 of the Record of Appeal for the Counter-Affidavit of the Appellant, a Retired Vice Marshall of the Nigerian Air Force.

It was on the above state of affidavit, counter-affidavit and further affidavit as well as the Documentary Exhibits relied upon by the parties, that the lower Court had in its judgment delivered on 29/1/2020 found in favor of the 1st – 3rd Respondents against the Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents and awarded the sum of N3,000,000.00 as damages in favor of the 1st – 3rd Respondents against the Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents. See pages 104 – 118 of the Record of Appeal.

My Lords, on the affidavit and counter-affidavit evidence of the parties, it seems very clear to me, and I so find as facts duly established, that none of the 1st – 3rd Respondents was either party or privy to the 2007 loan transaction in the sum of USD100,000.00 between the Appellant and one Anthony Ali, a younger brother to the 1st Respondent. It was also clearly established that none of the 1st – 3rd Respondents stood either as guarantor or surety to Anthony Ali in his loan transaction with the Appellant, the truth of which fact the Appellant never denied.

So, if none of the 1st – 3rd Respondents neither was involved nor played any role or part in the 2007 loan transaction between the Appellant and Anthony Ali, a full – grown adult residing in the United States, does the fact that he is related to all or any of the 1st – 3rd Respondents render them liable to account for and refund the said loan to the Appellant by reason of the failure of Anthony Ali to discharge his own obligations under the said loan transaction to the Appellant” I think not!

Now, if none of the 1st – 3rd Respondents was under any legal duty to be held accountable for the repayment of the loan to the Appellant, was the invitation, arrest and detention of the 1st Respondent, a fact not even denied by the Appellant and the 4th-5th Respondents justified in law? Also was the threat to arrest and detain the 2nd – 3rd Respondents, fact so glibly denied by the 4th – 5th Respondents but correctly found to have been established by the lower Court, justified in law?

Interestingly, both the Appellant and the 1st – 3rd Respondents were ad idem that the transaction between the Appellant and Anthony Ali in 2007 was a loan transaction, and was purely civil in nature. This much can be seen in contents of the letter of complaint written by the Appellant to Elders and Clan Head of the 1st Respondent’s community as annexed as Exhibit B to the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ affidavit. See pages 11 – 18 of the Record of Appeal. Thus, the Appellant left no one in doubt that it was after the series of and repeated demands for the repayment of his loan that he invited the 4th – 5th Respondents to intervene and that consequently, the sum of N5,000,000.00 was repaid to him by the 1st – 3rd Respondents after ‘series of pressures’ put on them by the 4th – 5th Respondents.

Curiously, and regrettably, all these intervention by the 4th – 5th Respondents by way of invitations, arrest and detention of the 1st Respondent, threats of his rearrest and arrest of the 2nd – 3rd Respondents and pressuring the 1st – 3rd Respondents into paying the sum of N5,000,000.00 to the Appellant were all done despite the subsistence of a valid order of the lower Court issued against the 4th – 5th Respondents on 21/6/2018 and duly served on them on 26/6/2018 and restraining them from arresting the 1st Respondent. Yet, the 4th – 5th Respondents had in flagrant disobedience of the said Order of the lower Court proceeded to arrested the 1st Respondent on 29/6/2018, and forcing him down to the Police Force Headquarters, Abuja where he was detained on 29/6/2018 and released later on bail.

My Lords, before resolving the issue whether or not the actions of the 4th – 5th Respondents established to have been carried out at the behest of the Appellant was justified or amounted to a breach of the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ rights to personal liberty as guaranteed to them by Section 35(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), I intend to first consider and resolve the issue of whether or not the joint application by the 1st – 3rd Respondents for the enforcement and or securing the enforcement of their fundamental right to personal liberty was in law competent or incompetent? Now, by Section 46(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), it is provided thus:
“Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress.”
By Order II Rules 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, it is provided thus:
“Any person who alleges that any of the Fundamental Rights provided for in the Constitution or African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act and to which he is entitled, has being, is being or is likely to be infringed, may apply to the Court in the State where the infringement occurs or is likely to occur for redress.”
By paragraph 3 (c) of the Preamble to the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, which is the Rules made pursuant to Section 46 (3) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), it is provided thus:
“The Court shall encourage and welcome public interest litigations in the human rights field and no human rights case may be dismissed or struck out for want of locus standi. In particular, human rights activists, advocates or groups as well as any non-governmental organizations, may institute human rights application on behalf of any potential applicant. In human rights litigation, the applicant may include any of the following: (i) Anyone acting in his own interest; (ii) Anyone acting on behalf of another person; (iii) Anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of a group or class of persons; (iv) Anyone acting in the public interest; and (v) Association acting in the interest of its members or other individuals or groups.”
By Section 14 of the Interpretation Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, provides inter alia thus:
“In an enactment – (a) … (b) words in the singular include the plural and words in the plural include the singular.”
My Lords, from the express and succinct provisions of Section 46(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and Order II Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, any person who alleges that any of the Fundamental Rights provided for in the Constitution or African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act and to which he is entitled, has been, is being, or is likely to be infringed, may apply to the Court in the State where the infringement occurs or is likely to occur, for redress.
There is now no longer any dispute in law that the use of the singular in an enactment also includes the plural by virtue of the operation of the Interpretation Act 2004. I have looked at and considered the succinct provisions of Section 46(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), particularly in relation to the use of the word ‘any person’ therein and considered the divergent submissions of counsel for the parties on its effect on the joint application filed by the 1st – 3rd Respondents to challenge the alleged violation of their fundamental rights to personal liberty by the 4th – 5th Respondents at the instigation of the Appellant, and I am of the view that in law the use of the word ‘any person, even though expressed in the singular, admits of the plural, and therefore admits of more than one person. See Section 14 of the Interpretation Act 2004. See also Udeh V. The State (1999) LPELR-3292(SC), where the Supreme Court had per Iguh JSC, stated inter alia thus:
“It is thus clear, on the application of Section 14(b) of the Interpretation Act, that no violence can be done to the provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act if the word ‘persons’ is read into the word ‘person’ therein used.”
Thus, the words ‘any person’ as used in both the provisions of Section 46(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and Order II Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 includes the plural, and therefore, permits of application for enforcement of any of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) by one or more jointly. It follows therefore, that an application for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights pursuant to the provisions of Section 46 (1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), Order II Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right Ratification and Enforcement Act does not become incompetent because it was commenced by more than one Applicant.
In law, a joint application for the enforcement of fundamental right as enshrined in Chapter IV of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) is competent. It is also help to avoid multiplicity of actions over the same cause of action. I cannot therefore, but agree with the apt submissions of learned counsel for the 1st – 3rd Respondents that the challenge to the competence of the joint application of the 1st – 3rd Respondents for the enforcement of their fundamental right to personal liberty, arising in my view from the same transactions and set of facts and circumstances, was dead on arrival. It lacks merit and it is hereby overruled and this issue is hereby resolved against the Appellant in favor of the 1st – 3rd Respondents. See Finamedia Global Services Ltd V. Onwero (Nig) Ltd & Ors (2020) LPELR – 51149 (CA). See also Maitagaran & Anor V. Dankoli & Anor (2020) LPELR – 52025(CA), Uzoukwu V. Ezeonu 2 (1991) 6 NWLR (PT 200) 708 AT 761, Ihejiobi Vs Ihejiobi (2013) LPELR – 21957(CA), Ubochi V. Ekpo (2014) LPELR 23523(CA), Orkater V. Ekpo (2014) LPELR 23525(CA), Government of Enugu State of Nigeria & Ors V. Onya & Ors (2021) LPELR – 52688 (CA).

Now, the parties from their affidavit and counter-affidavit evidence are ad idem that whilst the 1st Respondent was invited, arrested, interrogated, detained by the 4th – 5th Respondents and released on bail to the 3rd Respondent as surety, the 2nd – 3rd Respondents were neither arrested nor detained by the 4th – 5th Respondents. The learned counsel for the Appellant had submitted, and very forcefully too, that the case of the 2nd – 3rd Respondents, who were not any time arrested by the 4th – 5th Respondents, ought to have failed outrightly since there was no breach of their fundamental right to personal liberty by the Police to sustain their claim for the enforcement of their fundamental right to personal liberty. However, it was also submitted, and very forcefully too, by learned counsel for the 1st – 3rd Respondents that on the proved evidence of constant threats of arrest of the 2nd – 3rd Respondents by the 4th – 5th Respondents, they were entitled to their claim to secure the enforcement of their right to personal liberty from being actually breached by the Police. These, no doubt, are very interesting arguments from the parties!

I have taken a closer look at the succinct provisions of Section 46(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and Order II Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, and immediately apparent to me from these provisions is the settled position of the law that, unlike in other civil actions in which the remedy is attached to the wrong done, in actions for enforcement of fundamental right as guaranteed in Chapter IV of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), which is the basic law of the land, a breach need not have occurred or taken place before an application can be commenced to secure the protection and or enforcement of the fundamental right of the citizen from being breached. Thus, in fundamental rights enforcement, the mere likelihood of arrest would suffice to ground an action. See Section 46 (1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). See also Order II Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right Ratification and Enforcement Act.

On the established and proved facts of this case therefore, on the strength of the affidavit evidence of the 1st – 3rd Respondents, which I find were in very many material particulars neither effectively traversed nor effectively denied by the Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents as required by law, the lower Court was right when it found as fact that the 4th – 5th Respondents acting on the instigation of and at the behest of the Appellant had without any lawful justification interfere, meddled and intervened in a purely civil transaction bordering on loan between the Appellant and one Anthony Ali and in the result flagrantly breached the right of the 1st Respondent to his personal liberty and threatened with real likelihood of breaching the right of the 2nd – 3rd Respondents to their personal liberty and would have actually breached their right to personal liberty unless lawfully restrained by the Court by due process of law.

Honestly, shorn of the disguise of discharging their duty as enshrined in Section 4 of the Police Act, what the 4th – 5th Respondents, did under the subterfuge of carrying out its duty, was to embark on the business of debt recovery at the behest of the Appellant clearly contrary to the duties of the Police under Section 4 of the Police Act and thus, amounted clearly to a brazen infringement of the fundamental right to personal liberty of the 1st – 3rd Respondents as was rightly found by the lower Court. See Sections 35(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), which provides thus:
“Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure permitted by law.”
My Lords, it is not and have never been the duty of the Police, as represented by the 4th – 5th Respondents, to either directly or acting under the guise of any subterfuge to facilitate and or collect or aid the recovery of debt owed a citizen by another. The law Courts are there and well equipped for the citizen to ventilate his civil grievances against another without resort to the Police as a form of self-help in a purely civil matter. It is wrong and it has been widely and constantly deprecated by the Courts. I do so once again and deprecate the 4th – 5th Respondents and enjoin them to refrain from such unwarranted actions against the civil rights of the citizen by attempting to criminalize every form of civil life of the citizenry. See Dr. Nwafor V. EFCC (2021) LPELR – 52949(CA), per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA. See also Olusegun & Anor V. EFCC & Ors (2018) LPELR – 45825 (CA), per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA, Imoh & Anor V. EFCC & Anor (2018) LPELR – 46579 (CA), per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA; EFCC V. Diamond Bank Plc & Ors (2018) LPELR – 44217(SC).

In coming to the above conclusion, I am not unmindful of the trite position of the law that whenever and or where the Police acts properly in the due exercise of the powers conferred upon it by law an arrest made thereon cannot constitute a breach of fundamental rights. Thus, if a citizen is arrested by the Police in the legitimate exercise of their duty on grounds of reasonable suspicion of his having committed an offence, such a citizen cannot succeed in an action against the Police for an alleged breach of his fundamental rights. See Section 4 of the Police Act, which provides thus:
“The Police shall be employed for the prevention and detection of crime, the preservation of law and order, the protection of life and property and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged, and shall perform such military duties within or outside Nigeria as may be required of them by, or under the authority of this or any other Act.”
See also Eze V. IGP (2017) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1554) 44 AT pp. 74 – 75, Dr. Nwafor V. EFCC (2021) LPELR – 52949(CA), per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA; Kareem Olatinwo V. The State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 126, Atakpa V. Ebetor (2015) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1447) 549 AT p. 575, AG. Anambra State V. Uba (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt. 947) 44 AT p. 67, Diamond Bank Plc V. Opara (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 92 AT p. 110.

Having held firmly that the lower Court was right when it found as fact that the 4th – 5th Respondents acted contrary to their duty and flagrantly breached the rights of the 1st – 3rd Respondents to their personal liberty as guaranteed by Section 35 (1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), the only issue left is whether or not the lower Court was right when it awarded the sum of N3,000,000.00 as damages against the Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents in favor of the 1st – 3rd Respondents?

I have taken time to review and evaluate the facts and circumstances leading to the flagrant breach and threatened breach of the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ rights to personal liberty as guaranteed to them by Section 35(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), most especially the fact of lack of any criminality in the purely civil loan transaction to warrant the grossly unlawful actions of the 4th – 5th Respondents against the 1st – 3rd Respondents, at the active instigation and behest of the Appellant. Now, by Section 35(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), it is expressly provided thus:
“Any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained shall be entitled to compensation and public apology from the appropriate authority.”
Thus, it is the law that for every proven act of infringement of the fundamental right of the citizen the consequences should be an award of damages against the violator. Indeed, the time has come, and I feel so strongly about this, for such damages to be exemplary in character for the purpose of making the breach of the fundamental right of the citizen very unattractive and an unenviable venture. See Inspector General of Police & Ors V. Peter O. Ikpila & Anor (2015) LPELR – 40630 (CA) Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA. See also Jim – Jaja V. COP, Rivers State (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 225 @ pp. 244 – 245, Igweokolo V. Akpoyibo & Ors (2017) LPELR – 41882 (CA), Dasuki V. Director, General State Security & Ors (2019) LPELR – 48113(CA), Okonkwo V. Ogbogu (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 489) 420 AT p. 435.

My Lords, the 1st Respondent is a Second-Class Chief in Benue State and a retired Senior Officer of the Department of State Services. He was neither a Guarantor nor Surety one Anthony Ali, his younger brother who was involved in the loan transaction with the Appellant. I think and I so hold that the 1st Respondent is entitled to exemplary damages for his unlawful arrest and detention over a purely civil loan transaction that he neither had any personal connection nor played any role in. However, for the 2nd – 3rd Respondents, against whom it is common ground there was neither any arrest nor detention, I think and I so hold that nominal damages would suffice.

The 1st – 3rd Respondents claimed the sum of N100,000,000.00 as damages but the lower Court granted only the sum of N3,000,000.00 as damages. I think such an amount in damages of N3,000,000.00 only for the brazen breach of the right to personal liberty of the 1st Respondent and the grave threatened breach of the right to personal liberty of the 2nd – 3rd Respondents is neither too high nor unreasonable for which this Court ought to interfere with. I therefore, cannot but accept it as proper and in consonance with the correct principles on award of damages in proceedings for the enforcement of fundamental right of the citizen and I do hereby affirm it. In Inspector General of Police & Ors V. Peter O. Ikpila & Anor (2015) LPELR – 40630 (CA), this Court per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA, had ruminated on the need to deprecate and curb abuses of the fundamental rights of the citizens by law enforcement agents of the State and stated inter alia thus:
“My Lords, I have always hoped that the time will come and now is the time for the Courts in this country, as even aptly called for by the Court below, to rise up in one accord and with one voice clearly and in unmistaken terms in all appropriate cases to not only condemn and deprecate abuses of the fundamental rights of the citizen but also to make abuse of these rights by agents of the State and or individuals or organisations very unattractive by awarding exemplary damages in deserving cases.”

In the light of all I have stated and found as above, issues one, two and three are hereby resolved against the Appellant in favour of the 1st – 3rd Respondents.

On the whole therefore, having resolved issues one, two and three against the Appellant in favour of the 1st – 3rd Respondents, I hold that this appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. Consequently, this appeal is hereby dismissed.

In the result, the judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Coram: O. O. Goodluck J, (as he then was) in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/1952/2018: George Ali & Ors V. Inspector General of Police & Ors delivered on 29/1/2020 granting some of the claims of the 1st – 3rd Respondents against the Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents is hereby affirmed.

There shall be cost of N200,000.00 against the Appellant in favour of the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ only.

PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.: I have read in draft the leading judgment of my learned brother, GEORGEWILL, JCA and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion and the consequential order made therein as to costs in the leading judgment.

Once a person who is arrested or detained beyond the time or limit provided in the provisions of the aforesaid Constitution is able to discharge the onus of proof cast upon him he is automatically entitled to compensation as provided for under the Constitution. See JIM-JAJA V C.O.P RIVERS STATE & OR (2013) 6 NWLR (PT 1350) 225 AT 244 F – H TO 245 A per NGWUTA, JSC (of blessed memory) who said:-
“The chapter referred to in the provision reproduced above is Chapter IV dealing with Fundamental Rights. Section 35 (1) guarantees to every person his/her personal liberty. The appellant’s case does not fall within the exceptions numbered (a)-(f) in Section 46 (2) of the Constitution. The respondents did not attempt to bring their case within any of the exceptions. Section 35 (6) provides:
“S. 35(6): Any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained shall be entitled to compensation and public apology from the appropriate authority or person …”
A community reading of Section 35 (6) and 46 (2) of the Constitution (supra) will give effect to the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium. By Section 35 and 46 of the Constitution, fundamental right matters are placed on a higher pedestal than ordinary civil matters in which a claim for damages resulting from a proven injury has to be made specifically and proved. Once the appellant proved the violation of his fundamental right by the respondents, damages in form of compensation and even apology should have followed.”
Unlawful detention constitutes a breach of ones right to personal liberty as guaranteed under Section 35(1) of the Constitution. The same Constitution has provided under Section 35(6) thus-.-
“35(6): Any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained shall be entitled to compensation and public apology from the appropriate authority or person.”
A victim of violation or infringements of Fundamental Rights by any authority or person does not need to plead or claim specifically an amount in general damages or exemplary damages or punitive damages before he could be given or awarded in his favour against the person or authority that is adjudged guilty of violating a person’s fundamental rights. It is at the discretion of the trial Judge exercising his discretion judicially and judiciously to award to the victim of violation of human rights an amount of damages as compensation to assuage the damages suffered by the victim for the entire duration or time such a victim is detained or arrested by any authority or person. The compensation in terms of damages must be commensurate to the deprivation of personal liberty suffered which is contrary to the Constitution and not permitted by law.

The victim is entitled to compensation in form of damages that will serve a deterrent.

I agree with the lead judgment also that judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Coram: O. O. GOODLUCK – (as he then was) in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/1952/2018 granting some of the claims of the 1st – 3rd Respondents against the Appellant and the 4th – 5th Respondents is accordingly hereby affirmed.

I also abide with order as made on costs by my learned brother in the lead judgment.

DANLAMI ZAMA SENCHI, J.C.A.: I participated in the conference of Justices that heard this appeal. The issues on Public Interest Litigation raised during the conference was aptly captured and extensively dealt with in the lead judgment of my learned brother, SIR BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, JCA just delivered. I agree and subscribe to the finding and conclusion reached in the lead judgment that this appeal lacks merit, and I dismiss it as well.

The decision of the trial Court in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/1952/2020 delivered on the 29th day of January, 2020 is hereby affirmed.

I abide by the order as to cost in the lead judgment as mine.

Appearances:

T.J. Aondo, Esq., with him, C. J. Odom, Esq. For Appellant(s)

Onyinye Princess James, Esq., with him, Feranmi Tehinse, Esq. – for 1st – 3rd Respondents
Joseph Nwadike, Esq. – for 4th – 5th Respondents For Respondent(s)

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