EFCC v. GLOBAL FORMWORK (NIG) LTD & ORS (2020)

EFCC v. GLOBAL FORMWORK (NIG) LTD & ORS

(2020)LCN/14769(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, November 20, 2020

CA/L/1002/2011

RATIO

APPEAL: ATTITUDE OF THE COURT TO PROLIFERATION OF ISSUES

An issue for determination may encompass more than one ground of appeal. But on no account should a ground of appeal be argued under more than one issue for determination. The single ground of appeal argued under the first issue for determination therefore should not have been argued under the second issue for determination. It is on that basis that the second issue for determination would be and is hereby struck out vide the case (supra) cited by the 1st respondent read with the cases of John Shoy Int’l Ltd. V. F.H.A. (2016) 14 NWLR (pt. 1533) 427, S.P.D.C.N. Ltd. V. Reg., Bus Premises Abia State (2016) 2 NWLR (pt. 1496) 326. PER SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.

WORDS AND PHRASES: MEANING OF THE PHRASE “CAUTION”

The phrase ‘caution’ is an English word. It has to be given its grammatical or ordinary/literal meaning assigned to it by an English Dictionary vide the cases (supra) cited by the appellant read with the cases of Nyesom v. Peterside (2016) 7 NWLR (pt. 1512) 452, Mabamije v. Otto (2016) 13 NWLR (pt. 1529 171, Elelu-Habeeb v. A. – G., Fed. (2012) 13 NWLR (pt. 1318) 423, to the effect that, unambiguous words used in a piece of legislation should be given their natural or ordinary meaning as can be found in an English Dictionary.
Accordingly, I agree with the appellant that the literal meaning of the word ‘caution’, standing alone, is no more than to advise another to be prudent or to warn another to take heed or to be aware vide Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, International Edition, page 212. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (sixth edition) page 172, also defines the phrase ‘caution’ as meaning to give formal warning or piece of advice about a possible danger or risk. While the phrase ‘freeze’ is said to mean, among other things, to make or hold motionless or in position vide Webster (supra) at 504.
Words would derive colour and impact from the context in which the words are used especially where they are followed by other qualifying words. PER SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.

APPEAL: CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE AN APPELLATE COURT WILL REVERSE THE HOLDING OF A TRIAL COURT

It is trite that an appellate Court would not reverse the holding of a trial Court unless the trial Court arrived at a wrong decision in the case vide the cases of Abbas v. The People of Lagos State (2019) 16 NWLR (pt. 1698) 213, Mainstreet Bank Capital Ltd. and Anor. v. Nigerian Reinsurance Corporation Plc (2018) 14 NWLR (pt. 1640) 423 following State v. Ogbubunjo (2001) 2 NWLR (pt. 698) 576, Ndayako v. Dantoro (2004) 13 NWLR (pt. 889) 187, Abaye v. Ofili (1986) 1 NWLR (pt. 15) 134, Ukejianya v. Uchendu (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 45 at 46 to the effect that, what an appellate Court has to decide is, whether the decision of the trial Court is right; not whether the reasons were and that it is only if the misdirection had caused the trial Court to come to a wrong decision that it would be material. PER SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.
LEGISLATION: PURPOSE OF SECTIONS 6 AND 46 OF THE EFCC ACT

Now Sections 6 and 46 of the EFCC Act empower the appellant to enforce the provisions of the Act with respect to economic and financial crimes which has the expansive definition in Section 46 thereof to mean the non-violent criminal and illicit activity committed with the objectives of earning wealth illegally thereby violating extant enactments governing the economic activities of government and its administration and includes any form of fraud, narcotic drug trafficking, money laundering, embezzlement, bribery, looting and any form of corrupt practices, illegal arms deal, smuggling, human trafficking and child labour, illegal oil bunkering and illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange malpractices including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual property and piracy, open market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes and smuggling of prohibited goods etc.
Sections 6, 7 and 34(1) thereof, in particular, lavishly provide as follows –
“6. The Commission shall be responsible for –
(a) the enforcement and the due administration of the provisions of this Act;
(b)the investigation of all financial crimes including advance fee fraud, money laundering counterfeiting, illegal charge transfers, futures market fraud, fraudulent encashment of negotiable instruments, computer credit card fraud, contract scam, etc;
(c) the co-ordination and enforcement of all economic and financial crimes laws and enforcement functions conferred on any other person or authority;
(d) the adoption of measures to identify, trace, freeze confiscate or seize proceeds derived from terrorist activities, economic and financial crime related offences or the properties the value of which corresponds to such proceeds;
(e) the adoption of measures to eradicate the commission of economic and financial crimes;
(f) the adoption of measures which include co-ordinated preventive and regulatory actions, introduction and maintenance of investigative and control techniques on the prevention of economic and financial related crimes.
(g) the facilitation of rapid exchange of scientific and technical information and the conduct of joint operations geared towards the eradication of economic and financial crimes;
(h) the examination and investigation of all reported cases of economic and financial crimes with a view to identifying individuals, corporate bodies or groups involved;
(i) the determination of the extent of financial loss and such other losses by government private individuals or organisations;
(j) collaborating with government bodies both within and outside Nigeria carrying on functions wholly or in part analogous with those of the Commission concerning –
(i) the identification, determination of the whereabouts and activities of persons suspected of being involved in economic and financial crimes,
(ii) the movement of proceeds or properties derived from the commission or economic and financial and other related crimes,
(iii) the exchange of personnel or other experts,
(iv) the establishment and maintenance of a system for monitoring international economic and financial crimes in order to identify suspicious transactions and persons involved,
(v) maintaining data, statistics, records and reports on persons, organisations, proceeds, properties, documents or other items or assets involved in economic and financial crimes,
(vi) undertaking research and similar works with a view to determining the manifestation, extent, magnitude and effects of economic and financial crimes and advising government on appropriate intervention ‘measures for combating same,
(vii) dealing with matters connected with extradition, deportation and mutual legal or other assistance between Nigeria and any other country involving economic and financial crimes;
(viii) the collection of all reports relating to suspicious financial transactions, analyse and disseminate to all relevant government agencies;
(ix) taking charge of, supervising, controlling, co-ordinating all the responsibilities, functions and activities relating to the current investigation and prosecution of al/ offences connected with or relating to economic and financial crimes;
(x) the co-ordination of all existing, economic and financial crimes investigating units in Nigeria;
(xi) maintaining a liaison with the office of the Attorney-General of the Federation, the Nigerian Customs Services, the Immigration and Prison Service Board, the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, all government security and law enforcement agencies and such other financial supervisory institutions involved in he eradication of economic and financial crimes;
(xii) carrying out and sustaining rigorous public enlightenment campaign against economic and financial crimes within and outside Nigeria; and
(xiii) carrying out such other activities as are necessary or expedient for the full discharge of all or any of the functions conferred on it under the Act.
7-(1) The Commission has power to –
(a) cause investigations to be conducted as to whether any person, corporate body or organization has committed an offence under this Act or other law relating to economic and financial crimes;
(b) cause investigations to be conducted into the properties of any person if it appears to the Commission that the person’s life style and extent of the properties are not justified by his source of income.
(2) In addition to the powers conferred on the Commission by this Act, the Commission shall be the co-ordinating agency for the enforcement of the provisions of
(a) the Money Laundering Act 2004; 2003 No. 7, 1995 No. 13.
(b) the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 1995;
(c) the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debit and Financial Mal-practices in Banks) Act, as amended;
(d) the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 1991, as amended;

(e) Miscellaneous Offences Act; and if any other law or regulation relating to economic and financial crimes, including the Criminal Code and Penal Code.
34.-(I) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment or law, the Chairman of the Commission or any officer authorised by him may, if satisfied that the money in the account of a person is made through the commission of an offence under this Act and or any of the enactments specified under Section 7 (2)(a) –
(f) of this Act, apply to the Court ex-parte for power to issue an order as specified in Form B of the Schedule to this Act, addressed to the manager of the bank or any persons in control of the financial institution or designated non-financial institution where the account is or believed by him to be or he head office of the bank, other financial institution or designated non-financial institution to freeze the account.”
Section 6(d) of the Act (supra) for example, authorises the appellant to adopt measures to identify, trace and freeze accounts, connected with or related to economic and financial crimes. Section 28 of the Act authorises the appellant to apply, ex parte, to the Federal High Court or High Court of a State for interim attachment of the property of a person arrested for economic or financial crime. See Felimon Enterprises Ltd. v. Chairman, EFCC 7 NWLR (pt. 1617) 56 following A. – G. Ondo State v. A. G., Federation 9 NWLR (pt. 772) 222 at 420.
I agree by way of emphasis that the Court does not possess the powers to issue an order restraining the appellant from enforcing the provisions of the Act vide Hassan and Ors. v. EFCC and Ors. (2014) 1 NWLR (pt. 1389) 479, Kalu v. F.R.N. (2016) 9 NWLR (pt. 1516) 1, Danfulani v. EFCC (2016) 1 NWLR (pt. 1493) 223. PER SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.
ACTION: WHEN WILL A SUIT BE SAID TO BE ACADEMIC

A suit is said to be academic or speculative when it is merely theoretical, empty or of no practical utilitarian value and/or is not related to reality or to the practical situation of human nature and/or would not require any answer or adjudication by a Court in the sense that it is hypothetical or moot or does not relate to the live issues in the litigation because it is spent and would not inure any right or benefit to the successful party vide Odedo v. INEC (2008) 17 NWLR (pt. 1117) 554 at 600, Plateau State v. A. – G., Federation (2006) 3 NWLR (pt. 967) 346 at 419, Tanimola v. S. & Mapping Geodata Limited (1995) 6 NWLR (pt. 403) 617, Nwobosi v. A.C.B. Ltd. (1995) 6 NWLR (pt. 404) 658, Ogbonna v. President F.R.N. (1997) 5 NWLR (pt. 504) 281, Ndulue v. Ibezim (2002) 12 NWLR (pt. 780) 139 and C.P.C. v. I.N.E.C. (2011) 18 NWLR (pt. 1279) 493 at 556, Dahiru v. A.P.C. (2017) 4 NWLR (pt. 1555) 218 at 244. PER SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Joseph Shagbaor Ikyegh Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ugochukwu Anthony Ogakwu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Gabriel Omoniyi Kolawole Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION (EFCC) APPELANT(S)

And

1. GLOBAL FORMWORK NIGERIA LTD 2. OCEANIC BANK INTERNATIONAL PLC 3. GUARANTEE TRUST BANK PLC RESPONDENT(S)

JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appeal is from the judgment of the Federal High Court (the Court below) by which it held that the appellant lacked the statutory powers to freeze all or any banking operations in respect of the funds lodged or belonging to the 1st respondent at any of the 2nd – 3rd respondents’ banks without either the disclosure of any criminal allegation(s) against the 1st respondent and/or in the absence of any formal order of the Court obtained in that regard; also, that the appellant is not empowered by law to impound/freeze the funds so deposited and/or belonging to the 1st respondent without the formal service of such order of the Court on the 1st respondent, and in derogation of its contractual rights to free access to the said funds; and that having regard to the aforesaid circumstances, the 2nd – 3rd respondents were not bound in law to obey/comply with such order/directives from the appellant without the disclosure of any reasonable grounds by the appellant of any alleged criminal offence(s) against the 1st respondent in relation to the aforesaid accounts.

In outline, the 1st respondent initiated the action by originating summons at the Court below seeking, in the main, a determination whether the freezing order(s) purportedly imposed by the appellant on the various bank accounts held by the 1st respondent in the 2nd – 3rd respondents banking institutions can be justified in law. The parties (1st respondent and the appellant) filed and exchanged affidavit evidence in respect of the action. The crux of the case was that the appellant had issued a caution on the 2nd and 3rd respondents in respect of the 1st respondent’s bank accounts which notice the 1st respondent equated to freezing orders precluding it from operating its bank accounts domiciled with the 2nd – 3rd respondents.

Upon address by the appellant and the 1st respondent on the invitation of the Court below, the Court below held that all counsel agreed that in banking terms “caution” means inability to operate the account, by which the Court below resolved the case against the appellant as afore-stated which prompted the appellant to file a notice of appeal challenging the said decision vide pages 235 – 237 of the record of appeal (the record).

The appellant’s brief was filed on 03.06.13. It was argued in the brief that the Court below was wrong to equate the meaning of the word ‘caution’ with the freezing order intended by Section 34 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act, 2004, when the ordinary meaning of the word which the court below was bound by rules of interpretation of words by assigning ordinary dictionary meaning to them is to the effect that the word ‘caution’ simply means the quality of being careful to avoid danger or risk, or carefulness, or concern for safety which should have been the meaning the Court below was bound to attach to Exhibits A and 001 bearing the word caution vide The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, New Edition, for Advanced Learners, page 256, Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language, International Edition, read with the cases of Solicitor-General, Western Nigeria v. Dr. Adebonojo (1971) 1 ANLR 181 at 192, Northern Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Wuraola (1969) NSCC 23 at 45 – 50.

The appellant contended that the Court below unduly restricted itself to Section 34(1) of the EFCC Act when it was bound by rules

of interpretation to read and construe the whole enactment particularly Section 6(e) and (f) thereof vis-a-vis Exhibits A and 001 which speak for themselves; that as the entire enactment had laid down the procedure for the implementation of its provisions, that procedure alone must be followed that the issuance of the directive (caution) was part of the investigative measures the appellant had to adopt for the exercise of its powers under the EFCC Act, therefore, the appellant urged that the Court below was wrong to grant the reliefs (supra) sought by the 1st respondent which wrongly shielded the 1st respondent against exercise of the statutory powers of the appellant, so further urged the appellant placing reliance on cases of Bello v. A. – G., Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (pt. 45) 828 at 871, Buhari v. Yusuf (2003) 14 NWLR (pt. 841) 446 at 545, Fawehinmi v. IGP (2002) 7 NWLR (pt. 767) 606 at 686 – 687, Bamidele v. Commissioner for Local Government (1994) 2 NWLR (pt. 329) 568 at 583, Nnewi and Sons v. COP (2000) HRLR 156 at 164, Okereke v. Yar’Adua (2008) 12 NWLR (pt. 1100) 95 at 127, C.C.B. Plc v. A. – G., Anambra State (1992) 10 SCNJ 137 at 163,

– G., Anambra State v. Chief Chris Uba (2005) 15 NWLR (pt. 947) 44 at 67.The appellant contended that the affidavit evidence of the 1st respondent particularly paragraphs 16, 21 and 22 thereof did not place sufficient materials to entitle the 1st respondent to succeed on the reliefs sought in that the cheque was not exhibited, nor were the names, place and designation of the person who issued/signed the said cheques stated; nor was it alleged in the affidavit that the appellant impounded or seized the cheque; nor was the amount on the cheque disclosed; nor was the beneficiary of the cheque mentioned; nor was the amount standing to the credit or debit of the 1st respondent in the said banks mentioned; nor were the bank statements exhibited; nor were the signatories to the accounts in question mentioned, showing no material evidence was adduced to support the deposition in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the 1st respondent’s affidavit; consequently, it was argued that the action was speculative and based on conjectures and should have been dismissed by the Court below, citing in support thereof the cases of Alao v. Kure (2000) 9 NWLR (pt. 672) 423 at 440,

Plateau State v. A. – G., Federation (2006) 6 NWLR (pt. 697) 346 at 419 read with Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act, upon which the appellant urged that the appeal should be allowed and the decision of the Court below set aside.

Only the 1st respondent filed brief of argument. The said brief was filed on 26.08.13. The 1st respondent raised and argued a preliminary objection in the brief to the effect that since issue (b) of the appellant’s issues for determination was not tied to any ground of the notice of appeal containing the sole ground which is the foundation of the appeal it was wrongly argued under the two issues for determination vide Odunze v. Nwosu (2007) 5 – 6 SC 40 at 58 – 59, Adeleke and Anor. v. Oyo State House of Assembly (2006) 52 WRN 173, First Bank of Nigeria Plc. V. T.S.A. Industries Ltd. (2007) 17 WRN 40 at 78.

The 1st respondent referred to page 143 of the record of appeal (the record) containing Exhibit B where the appellant had issued the caution followed with an order to apprehend on sight, the operators of the accounts and to paragraphs 13 and 15 of the 2nd defendant’s affidavit at the Court below as well as the 3rd defendant’s

affidavit at the Court below which according to the 1st respondent, all indicated that the ‘caution’ issued operated as a freezing order, as the 1st respondent, could not operate and/or have free access to the said bank accounts and that the Court below arrived at a correct decision in the matter when it held in its judgment contained in page 230 of the record that the ‘caution’ amounts to a ‘freezing order’ which was issued without Court order and was thus ultra-vires the powers of the appellant vide the case of Eluemunoh v. Obidigwe (2012) WRN 36 at 56; upon which the 1st respondent urged that the appeal should be dismissed.

NWLR (pt. 1533) 427, S.P.D.C.N. Ltd. V. Reg., Bus Premises Abia State (2016) 2 NWLR (pt. 1496) 326.

hold motionless or in position vide Webster (supra) at 504.
Words would derive colour and impact from the context in which the words are used especially where they are followed by other qualifying words. In this case, the word ‘caution’ was used alongside other words in Exhibit B contained in page 143 of the record which, for ease of reference, I copy below –
“This Commission is investigating a cause of Conspiracy and Money Laundering in which the above mentioned accounts featured.
2. In view of the above, you are requested to kindly furnish the following information:
a. The Account Opening package of both Domiciliary and Naira Accounts.
b. The Statements of Account from inception to date.
c. All correspondence between the customer and the Bank.
d. And any other information that may assist investigation.
3. You are also requested to place caution on the accounts and apprehend on sight the operators of the accounts.” (My emphasis).
The letter, Exhibit B, (supra) was written by the appellant to the 2nd respondent with respect to the bank accounts of the 1st respondent with the 2nd respondent. The same

letter was written to and served on the 3rd respondent with respect to the bank accounts operated by the 1st respondent with the 3rd respondent vide page 194 of the record.
The record indicated in page 220 thereof, that Mr. Okpe, who appeared as learned counsel for the appellant who was the 1st defendant at the Court below, offered his definition of the phrase ‘caution’ to mean to exercise care but not to stop payment which is freezing vide page 223 of the record; while Mr. Lorgilim of learned counsel for the 2nd defendant at the Court below, now the 2nd respondent stated that the word ‘caution’ means to exercise unusual care vide page 223 of the record; whereas, Mr. Adeniji of learned counsel for the 4th defendant at the Court below, now the 3rd respondent, stated in page 223 of the record that caution in respect of an account in banking terms is the inability to operate the account, whilst Mr. Okolo, learned senior counsel for the plaintiff at the Court below, now the 1st respondent, stated in page 223 of the record that the word caution means do not go near which by the action of the appellant showed it meant freezing the bank accounts operated by

the 1st respondent with the 2nd and 3rd respondents’ banks.
The Court below held in part of its judgment contained in page 228 of the record that all learned counsel had addressed it to the effect that the word ‘caution’ in banking terms means inability to operate the account. I agree with the appellant that the said holding was a misdirection vis-a-vis or having regard to the varying interpretation (supra) learned counsel on all sides of the divide gave to the word ‘caution’.
The question is whether the misdirection (supra), hindered the Court below from arriving at a correct or right decision in the case. It is trite that an appellate Court would not reverse the holding of a trial Court unless the trial Court arrived at a wrong decision in the case vide the cases of Abbas v. The People of Lagos State (2019) 16 NWLR (pt. 1698) 213, Mainstreet Bank Capital Ltd. and Anor. v. Nigerian Reinsurance Corporation Plc (2018) 14 NWLR (pt. 1640) 423 following State v. Ogbubunjo (2001) 2 NWLR (pt. 698) 576, Ndayako v. Dantoro (2004) 13 NWLR (pt. 889) 187, Abaye v. Ofili (1986) 1 NWLR (pt. 15) 134, Ukejianya v. Uchendu (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 45 at 46 to the effect

that, what an appellate Court has to decide is, whether the decision of the trial Court is right; not whether the reasons were and that it is only if the misdirection had caused the trial Court to come to a wrong decision that it would be material.
The Court below considered the affidavit evidence and the written submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and resolved that the word ‘caution’ as used and deployed by the appellant within the context used in the case tantamounts to freezing the accounts of the 1st respondent with the 2nd and 3rd respondents’ banks contrary to the statutory powers of the appellant.
Exhibit B (supra) not only placed caution on the bank accounts of the 1st respondent with the 2nd and 3rd respondents but reinforced it with the coercive directive that, anyone seen operating the bank accounts, should be apprehended. An account that is free to draw from or gives access to the drawer and drawee, would not be hedged and hemmed in by such directive. It shows that the accounts of the 1st respondent with the 2nd and 3rd respondents were kept inoperative by the said rider to the ‘caution’ which

practically speaking tantamounts to the freezing of the said accounts. The Court below was accordingly right to hold that Exhibit B amounts to freezing the accounts of the 1st respondent with the 2nd and 3rd respondents.
The case of Onayemi v. Idowu (2008) 9 NWLR (pt. 1092) 306 also goes on to define the phrase ‘caution’ as to warn, exhort, to take heed, or to give notice of danger. There, the Court (Ibadan Division), stated with respect to the effect of caution posted or placed on real property per the lead judgment prepared by His Lordship, Aka’ahs J.C.A., (later J.S.C., now on meritorious retirement) and concurred in by His Lordship Muhammad, J.C.A. (now J.S.C.) and His Lordship, Uwa, J.C.A., that caution placed on property would put an encumbrance on the property and forestall its alienation and that the caution had to be removed before further action could be taken in respect of the property.
Now Sections 6 and 46 of the EFCC Act empower the appellant to enforce the provisions of the Act with respect to economic and financial crimes which has the expansive definition in Section 46 thereof to mean the non-violent criminal and illicit activity

committed with the objectives of earning wealth illegally thereby violating extant enactments governing the economic activities of government and its administration and includes any form of fraud, narcotic drug trafficking, money laundering, embezzlement, bribery, looting and any form of corrupt practices, illegal arms deal, smuggling, human trafficking and child labour, illegal oil bunkering and illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange malpractices including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual property and piracy, open market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes and smuggling of prohibited goods etc.
Sections 6, 7 and 34(1) thereof, in particular, lavishly provide as follows –
“6. The Commission shall be responsible for –
(a) the enforcement and the due administration of the provisions of this Act;
(b)the investigation of all financial crimes including advance fee fraud, money laundering counterfeiting, illegal charge transfers, futures market fraud, fraudulent encashment of negotiable instruments, computer credit card fraud, contract scam, etc;
(c) the co-ordination and enforcement of all economic and

financial crimes laws and enforcement functions conferred on any other person or authority;
(d) the adoption of measures to identify, trace, freeze confiscate or seize proceeds derived from terrorist activities, economic and financial crime related offences or the properties the value of which corresponds to such proceeds;
(e) the adoption of measures to eradicate the commission of economic and financial crimes;
(f) the adoption of measures which include co-ordinated preventive and regulatory actions, introduction and maintenance of investigative and control techniques on the prevention of economic and financial related crimes.
(g) the facilitation of rapid exchange of scientific and technical information and the conduct of joint operations geared towards the eradication of economic and financial crimes;
(h) the examination and investigation of all reported cases of economic and financial crimes with a view to identifying individuals, corporate bodies or groups involved;
(i) the determination of the extent of financial loss and such other losses by government private individuals or organisations;
(j) collaborating with

government bodies both within and outside Nigeria carrying on functions wholly or in part analogous with those of the Commission concerning –
(i) the identification, determination of the whereabouts and activities of persons suspected of being involved in economic and financial crimes,
(ii) the movement of proceeds or properties derived from the commission or economic and financial and other related crimes,
(iii) the exchange of personnel or other experts,
(iv) the establishment and maintenance of a system for monitoring international economic and financial crimes in order to identify suspicious transactions and persons involved,
(v) maintaining data, statistics, records and reports on persons, organisations, proceeds, properties, documents or other items or assets involved in economic and financial crimes,
(vi) undertaking research and similar works with a view to determining the manifestation, extent, magnitude and effects of economic and financial crimes and advising government on appropriate intervention ‘measures for combating same,
(vii) dealing with matters connected with extradition, deportation and

mutual legal or other assistance between Nigeria and any other country involving economic and financial crimes;
(viii) the collection of all reports relating to suspicious financial transactions, analyse and disseminate to all relevant government agencies;
(ix) taking charge of, supervising, controlling, co-ordinating all the responsibilities, functions and activities relating to the current investigation and prosecution of al/ offences connected with or relating to economic and financial crimes;
(x) the co-ordination of all existing, economic and financial crimes investigating units in Nigeria;
(xi) maintaining a liaison with the office of the Attorney-General of the Federation, the Nigerian Customs Services, the Immigration and Prison Service Board, the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, all government security and law enforcement agencies and such other financial supervisory institutions involved in he eradication of economic and financial crimes;
(xii) carrying out and sustaining rigorous public enlightenment campaign against economic and

financial crimes within and outside Nigeria; and
(xiii) carrying out such other activities as are necessary or expedient for the full discharge of all or any of the functions conferred on it under the Act.
7-(1) The Commission has power to –
(a) cause investigations to be conducted as to whether any person, corporate body or organization has committed an offence under this Act or other law relating to economic and financial crimes;
(b) cause investigations to be conducted into the properties of any person if it appears to the Commission that the person’s life style and extent of the properties are not justified by his source of income.
(2) In addition to the powers conferred on the Commission by this Act, the Commission shall be the co-ordinating agency for the enforcement of the provisions of
(a) the Money Laundering Act 2004; 2003 No. 7, 1995 No. 13.
(b) the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 1995;
(c) the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debit and Financial Mal-practices in Banks) Act, as amended;
(d) the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 1991, as amended;

parte, to the Federal High Court or High Court of a State for interim attachment of the property of a person arrested for economic or financial crime. See Felimon Enterprises Ltd. v. Chairman, EFCC 7 NWLR (pt. 1617) 56 following A. – G. Ondo State v. A. G., Federation 9 NWLR (pt. 772) 222 at 420.
I agree by way of emphasis that the Court does not possess the powers to issue an order restraining the appellant from enforcing the provisions of the Act vide Hassan and Ors. v. EFCC and Ors. (2014) 1 NWLR (pt. 1389) 479, Kalu v. F.R.N. (2016) 9 NWLR (pt. 1516) 1, Danfulani v. EFCC (2016) 1 NWLR (pt. 1493) 223.
The appellant, however, has to follow due process in enforcing its mandate under the provisions of the EFCC Act vide S.P.D.C. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Agbara (2019) 6 NWLR (pt. 1668) 311 at 326. The appellant had stated in paragraph 6(h) of its counter affidavit in opposition to the originating action at the Court below that it was investigating the loan/credit facility of N1,476,584,724.83 granted the 1st respondent by the Intercontinental Bank Plc. The appellant went on to depose in paragraph 6(i) thereof that it discovered in the course of investigation that

the said money was converted by the 1st respondent which gave rise to the 1st respondent’s indebtedness to the Intercontinental Bank Plc and which money was traced to the 1st respondent’s account with the 2nd and 3rd respondents who were the 2nd and 4th respondents as well as the 3rd defendant, Stanbic I.B.T.C. Bank Plc, whose name was withdrawn and struck out at the Court below.
The appellant was thus investigating an alleged economic or financial crime against the 1st respondent at the material time. The next statutory step was for the appellant to apply and obtain an ex parte order attaching or freezing the affected bank accounts of the 1st respondent with the 2nd and 3rd respondents under Sections 26 and 34(1) of the EFCC Act by satisfactorily showing prima facie, or at first sight, or on the first appearance, or on the surface, or so far as it can be judged from the first disclosure that the monies in the bank accounts were likely proceeds of the commission of crime and may ultimately be liable to forfeiture vide Felimon Ent. Ltd. V. Chairman, E.F.C.C. and Ors. (supra) following Trade Bank Plc v. Chami (2003) 13 NWLR (pt. 836) 198, Shatta v. F.R.N.

(2009) 10 NWLR (pt. 1149) 411, Onagoruwa v. State (1993) 7 NWLR (pt. 303) 49.
The appellant did not apply for the ex parte order to attach or to freeze the bank accounts of the 1st respondent with the 2nd and 3rd respondents, so an ex parte order was not obtained as required by either Section 26 or Section 34(1) of the EFCC Act. Nor does the Act provide for caution as one of the measures to enforce the mandate of the appellant under the provisions of the said Act. There is, therefore, no stop-gap or middle-of-the road measure than the ex parte process of interim attachment or interim freezing as the recognized statutory weapon to prevent the proceeds of economic and financial crime vanishing and/or disappearing while the appellant is on the heels of the alleged perpetrator(s) of the economic or financial crime videG.T.B. Plc v. Adedamola and Ors. (2019) 5 NWLR (pt. 1664) 30 at 43 read with Section 34(1) of the EFCC Act.
I am of the considered opinion that the 1st respondent did not need any other form of evidence, facts or materials to add to Exhibit B for the purpose of the said originating action at the Court below. In other words, Exhibit

B alone sufficed to sustain the action at the Court below. A suit is said to be academic or speculative when it is merely theoretical, empty or of no practical utilitarian value and/or is not related to reality or to the practical situation of human nature and/or would not require any answer or adjudication by a Court in the sense that it is hypothetical or moot or does not relate to the live issues in the litigation because it is spent and would not inure any right or benefit to the successful party vide Odedo v. INEC (2008) 17 NWLR (pt. 1117) 554 at 600, Plateau State v. A. – G., Federation (2006) 3 NWLR (pt. 967) 346 at 419, Tanimola v. S. & Mapping Geodata Limited (1995) 6 NWLR (pt. 403) 617, Nwobosi v. A.C.B. Ltd. (1995) 6 NWLR (pt. 404) 658, Ogbonna v. President F.R.N. (1997) 5 NWLR (pt. 504) 281, Ndulue v. Ibezim (2002) 12 NWLR (pt. 780) 139 and C.P.C. v. I.N.E.C. (2011) 18 NWLR (pt. 1279) 493 at 556, Dahiru v. A.P.C. (2017) 4 NWLR (pt. 1555) 218 at 244.
Here there was a live contest whether the caution followed with the coercive directive of arresting or apprehending anybody that operated the bank accounts of the 1st respondent with the 2nd

and 3rd respondents on which the caution was placed as contained in Exhibit B (supra) was within the statutory powers of the appellant, therefore the consequences of an answer in the negative by the Court that the appellant lacked the statutory powers to issue Exhibit B in the intimidating manner it was couched would lead to an order of the Court quashing the letter, Exhibit B, and unfreezing the 1st respondent’s said bank accounts for normal and unhindered operation by the 1st respondent. So the suit was not academic or speculative. It dealt with a material and topical issue, in my view.
Consequently, I agree with the Court below that Exhibit B (supra) amounts to placing restraint on the operation of the bank accounts of the 1st respondent with the 2nd – 3rd respondents and/or tantamounts to the freezing of the bank accounts of the 1st respondent with the 2nd – 3rd respondents by the appellant without an ex parte order issued by a Court, contrary to Section 34(1) of the EFCC and was thus wrongful videG.T.B Plc. v. Adedamola and Ors. (supra) at 43.

In the result, I find no substance in the appeal and hereby dismiss it and affirm the decision

of the Court below (Nyako, J). Parties to bear their costs.

UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.: I was privileged to have read in draft the leading judgment of my learned brother, Joseph Shagbaor Ikyegh, JCA, which has just been delivered.

Having also read the Records of Appeal and briefs of argument filed and exchanged by the parties, I find that the reasoning and conclusion in the leading judgment are in accord with my views.

Accordingly, based on the same reasoning and conclusion which I adopt as mine, I equally join in dismissing the appeal on the same terms as set out in the leading judgment.

GABRIEL OMONIYI KOLAWOLE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege to read in the draft, the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, JCA wherein the appeal was dismissed as it lacks merit.
I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached therein and I adopt same as mine.

For emphasis, I am persuaded too, that the “caution” placed by the Appellant on the bank accounts of the 1st Respondent with the 2nd and 3rd Respondents – banks, vide

“Exhibit B” indeed effectively operated as a “freezing order”. The 1st Respondent was thereby disabled by this action of the Appellant from operating its accounts. The said directive issued by the Appellant without the Court order, was ultra-vires the powers of the Appellant in the light of the provisions of Sections 6, 7 and 34(1) of the EFCC ACT, (supra) which the lead judgment cited because, such brazen act is illegal and void. See: GTB V ADEDAMOLA (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt 1664) 301.

For this reason and the more comprehensive and explicit reasoning of my learned brother, JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, JCA in the lead judgment, I too find the appeal as lacking in merit and deserves to be dismissed. I too dismiss it.

I abide by the consequential order made in the lead judgment as to cost.
Appeal is dismissed.

Appearances:

Unrepresented For Appellant(s)

Mr. F. A. Dalmeida for 1st Respondent.
Mr. D. Taiwo for 2nd Respondent.
T. T. Bello Esqr. for 3rd Respondent.
For Respondent(s)