ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION & ORS V. PHILP ODIGIE (2012)

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION & ORS V. PHILP ODIGIE

(2012)LCN/5663(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Thursday, the 15th day of November, 2012

CA/B/245/2007

RATIO

FEDERAL HIGH COURT: THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT IS CREATED BY STATUTE

The Federal High Court, being a superior court of record, just like other superior courts of record in Nigeria, are creatures of the 1999 Constitution which conferred jurisdiction and extent of its adjudicatory powers on it. For, “there is no doubt that courts are creature of statutes and it is the statutes that created a particular court that will also confer on it its jurisdiction. They may be extended, not by the courts, but by the legislature, for it is part of interpretation functions of the courts to expound the jurisdiction of the court but not to expand it.” per Abudullahi, JCA (as he then was) in GOVT. OF KWARA STATE v. GAFAR (1997) NWLR (pt. 511) 51 AT 63 – 64.PER TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A

COURTS: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF A COURT

Now, it is trite that a court can only assume jurisdiction over a matter where the cause of action arose from within its territorial jurisdiction.PER TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A

CAUSE OF ACTION: FROM WHERE DOES IT ARISE

A cause of action may arise from a single act of the defendant and it could also be a series of actions at the instance of a defendant against the claimant which invariably culminates or matures into an actionable wrong. Hence, it is said to be the factual situation which gives a person a right to judicial relief. It also “means all those things necessary to give a right of action whether they are to be done by the defendant or a third person; that is every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed and which the defendant would have a right to traverse.” See Fred Egbe V. The Hon. Justice J.A. Adefarasin (1987) 1 SC 1 at 37; E. Amodu v. Dr. J. Amode & Anor. (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 356 at 367; Nosiru Bello V. Attorney General, Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR 828.PER TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A

CAUSE OF ACTION: HOW IT IS DETERMINED

JURISDICTION: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The authorities of Turkur V. Government of Gongola State; Mil. Admin of Benue State V. Abayilo; Mil. Admin of Taraba State V. Jen (2001) 1 NWLR (pt. 694) 416 and Inah V. Ukoi (supra) all relied upon by the appellants are in apposite to the facts of this present case. The aforementioned cases were decided in respect of the territorial jurisdiction of one state vis-a-vis another State in Nigeria. And it is common place knowledge that each State in Nigeria has a territorial border, such that a complaint of a breach of a fundamental right in one state cannot be litigated upon in another state. However, as I have earlier demonstrated in this judgment, the breach of the respondent’s fundamental right first arose in Benin City, subsequent to the continued breach of the same guaranteed rights in Abuja. The situation was not that the arrest and detention of the respondent all took place in Abuja from 24th November, 2004 to 8th December, 2004 and the application in respect of the same breaches was filed at and determined by the Federal High Court, Benin City.PER TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A

JUSTICES

GEORGE OLADEINDE SHOREMI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

TUNDE OYEBANJI AWOTOYE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

1. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION
2. INSPECTOR IDRIS
3. SERGEANT SANI
4. CSP ILIYASU YAKUBU Appellant(s)

AND

PHILP ODIGIE Respondent(s)

TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Respondent along with his company – Philovia & Jason Engineering Co. Ltd, had filed an action against Nassertex Brothers and Sons Ltd. & Another for trespass on the former’s plot of land at Abuja, at the Federal Capital Territory High Court of Justice, Abuja. Another Company – Gastex Enterprises Ltd. was joined later as a party in the said action which had started to hearing.
However, while the suit was pending at the court aforementioned, the appellants, at the instance of Gastex Enterprises Ltd, arrested the respondent and detained him in Benin City from 24th November, 2004 to 25th November, 2004 before taking him to Abuja where he continued in the detention cell of the appellants up to 8th December, 2004 when he was released by the appellants.
In consequence of the above, the respondent, filed an application at the Federal High Court, Benin City, alleging a breach of his fundamental rights in respect of his arrest in Benin City on 24th November, 2004 in his residence at 10:30 pm and also his detention in Appellants’ cell at Aso villa, Abuja from 25th November, 2004 to 8th December, 2005 – which allegedly infringed on the respondent’s right to personal liberty and freedom of movement guaranteed under sections 35(1) and 41(1) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as emended). He also claimed the sum of N1, 000,000.00 only as general, special and exemplary damages for the infraction of his constitutionally guaranteed rights aforementioned.
The trial court, after hearing both parties, entered judgment for the respondent and awarded the sum of N100, 000,000.00 only to the respondent. He further ordered that neither the respondent nor any member of his family and staff should be arrested again by the appellants, in respect of this matter, pending the determination of the civil land matter at the Federal Capital Territory High Court, Abuja.
This appeal is against the judgment of C.V. Nwokorie, J., of the Federal High Court, Benin City, dated 9th December, 2005. The appeal is erected on five (5) grounds of appeal.
The appellants filed their brief of argument on 22nd March, 2010 and therein, three issues were formulated for determination, thus:-
ISSUE 1
“Whether the Federal High Court sitting at Benin City, Edo State had jurisdiction to entertain the Application for the enforcement of the fundamental right of the Respondent who was detained in the office of the Appellant at Abuja outside Benin City.
ISSUE 2
Assuming but without conceding that the Lower Court had jurisdiction to entertain the Application, whether the Lower Court used any parameter in arriving at N1, 000,000.00 as general damages against the Appellant in favour of the Respondent.
ISSUE 3
Whether the Lower Court was right to stop the performance of a statutory duty as to put a bar to preferring criminal charge when a case is still under investigation by the commission.”
The respondent’s brief of argument dated and filed on 19th August, 2010 was deemed filed on same date. In it, three issues were distilled for determination, to wit:
i. “Whether the Federal High Court sitting at Benin City has the jurisdiction to entertain the Respondent’s action bearing in mind the fact that the arrest and initial detention took place in Benin City.
ii. Whether the award of the sum of N1, 000,000.00 (one million naira) as damages against the Appellants was proper.
iii. Whether a statutory body like the 1st Appellant can use its performance of its statutory duty as a jurisdiction for the violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizen”.
At the hearing of the appeal on 17th October, 2012, each learned counsel for the respective parties adopted and relied upon their briefs of argument as their submissions on the appeal.
Appellants’ issues 1 and 2 are the same with respondent’s issues i and ii. Each of the parties’ issues 3 are different and stand on their own. I shall adopt appellants’ issues 1 and 2 which covers respondent’s issues i and ii.
I intend to consider appellants’ issue 1 first, then appellants’ and respondent’s issue 2 & ii respectively; appellants’ issue 3 and respondent’s issue iii.
Arguing issue 1, Steve Ehi Odiase, Esq., learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that even though the respondent was arrested in Benin City, his detention was at Abuja, and by virtue of Section 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria both the arrest and detention of the respondent were lawful and reasonable by virtue of Sections 6 and 7 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act. Furthermore, learned counsel submitted that the Federal High Court Benin City was not the forum proper for the conduct of the proceedings in the case and that the “court” contemplated in Section 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution aforesaid, is the Federal High Court in the place where the alleged infringement occurred and that in the circumstances of this case, it is the Federal High Court Abuja which had the jurisdiction to entertain the respondent’s application. He referred to Turkur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (pt. 117) 517; Mil. Adm. Benue State v. Abayilo (2001) 5 NWLR (pt. 705) 19 at 34; Mil. Adm. of Taraba State v. Jen (2001) 1 NWLR (pt. 694) 416; Inah v. Ukoi (2001) 9 NWLR (pt.773) 563; Faloye v. Omoseni (2001) 9 NWLR (pt. 717) 190. He submitted further that even though the question of jurisdiction was not raised and argued at the trial court, it can be raised for the first time in this court, with or without the leave of court sought and obtained. He relied on Gaji V. Paye (2003) 8 NWLR (pt. 823) 538; Obiako v. The State (2003) 10 NWLR (pt. 776) 612, and urged that the appeal be allowed.
M.O. Okhuarobo, Esq., learned counsel to the respondent arguing this issue, submitted that in order to determine whether or not a trial court has jurisdiction to entertain any matter, it is only the statement of claim of the plaintiff that is considered. He referred to Gafar v. Government of Kwara State (2007) 4 NWLR (pt. 1024) 404 at 411; First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Abraham (2008) 18 NWLR (pt. 1118) 172 at 189, 197 & 199. And that where the action was commenced by way of an originating summons, it is the relief sought and the affidavit in support of the application that are considered. He referred to Nashtex International Ltd. v. Habib (Nig) Bank Ltd & Anor. (2007) 17 NWLR (pt. 1063) 308 at 324- 325.
Learned counsel submitted that from the application and the affidavit in support thereof at the instance of the respondent at the trial court, he was arrested in Benin City and detained from 24th- 25th November, 2004 at Ugbor Police station in Benin City. And that the fact of the continued detention of the respondent at Abuja, does not divest the Federal High Court Benin City of the jurisdiction to entertain and determine the respondent’s application.
Mr. Okhuarobo, further submitted that the authorities of Turkur V. Gov. of Gongola State; Mil. Admin. of Benue State V. Abayilo; Mil. Admin. of Taraba State V. Jen and Inah V. Ukoi (supra) all relied upon by the appellants are in apposite and irrelevant. He contended that where, as in the circumstance of this case, a cause of action touched more than one scene, the respondent/applicant had a discretion to bring his application in Benin City or Abuja, instead of splitting one cause of action and proliferate them in different courts. He urged that this issue be resolved for the respondent.
Jurisdiction irrefutably is of such paramount importance in any adjudication in the court, hence it is the law that it can be raised at any stage, even at the appellate court by either party or even by the court suo motu. The reason is not far-fetched. It is because; jurisdiction is the soul in any action. Indeed it is the blood in any action in court, thus just as blood is critical to the survival of any animal and the lack of which leads to the demise of the animal, in the same way, an action in court which is bereft of jurisdiction, dies automatically. Therefore, just as the life of the flesh is in the blood so also is jurisdiction, the vires which propels an action in court.
The paramountcy and quintessence of jurisdiction in an action in court for adjudication is aptly captured, in the judicial words on marble by my Lord Bello, CJN (Now of blessed memory) that:
“Jurisdiction is blood that gives life to the survival of an action in a court of law and without jurisdiction; the action will be like an animal that has been drained of its blood. It will cease to have life and any attempt to resuscitate it without infusing blood into it would be an abortive exercise.”
See Chief Utuedo Utih & Ors V. Jacob Onoyivwe & Ors (1991) 1 SCNJ 25 at 49; Okoye & Ors V. Nigerian Construction & Furniture Co. Ltd. (1991) 7 SCNJ (pt. 11) 365 at 381 – 382; Attorney General, Anambra State & Ors. V. Attorney-General of the Federation & Ors (1993) 7 SCNJ (pt. 11) 245 at 291.
Therefore, jurisdiction is the green light that gives the court, the authority to proceed with the consideration and determination of the matter placed before it for adjudication.

An issue or objection touching on the jurisdiction of a court to entertain a matter is clearly a matter of law because it touches on the competence of the court to entertain the matter placed before it for determination. Hence, where there is an issue or ground of appeal as in this matter touching on the competence of the trial Judge’s determination of the respondent’s application, this court has a duty to first resolve that issue before proceeding further to consider other grounds of appeal and the issues distilled from them.
Undoubtedly, in the circumstances of the present case, Section 46(1) and section 251 (1) (r) and (s) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) invested the Federal High Court to assume jurisdiction in the type of application which the respondent filed at the Federal High Court, Benin City. The said sections 46(1) and 251 (1) (r) & (s) of the 1999 constitution, for ease of reference, provide, to wit:
“S. 46 – (1) Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that state for redress.
Subject to the provisions of this constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of the provisions of this section and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement within that state of any right to which the person who makes the application may be entitled under this chapter.”
“251 – (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters.
(r) any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies and
(s) such other jurisdiction civil or criminal and whether to the exclusion of any other court or not as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly:
Provided that nothing in the provisions of paragraphs (p), (q) and (r) of this subsection shall prevent a person from seeking redress against the Federal Government or any of its agencies in an action for damages, injunction or specific performance where the action is based on any enactment, law or equity”
Indisputably, the 1st appellant is an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria whilst the 2nd – 4th appellants are in the employment of the 1st appellant. It is the action(s) of the appellants whereby the respondent was arrested and detained from 24th November, 2004 to 8th December, 2004 that was the subject of the respondent’s action at the Federal High Court, Benin City.

Now, it is trite that a court can only assume jurisdiction over a matter where the cause of action arose from within its territorial jurisdiction.

A cause of action and when it commences is determined only on a perusal of the plaintiff’s action or claim. See Attorney General, Kwara State & ors. V. Raimi Olawale (1993) 1 SCNJ 208 at 221, Ogbimi V. Ololo (1993) 7 SCNJ (pt. II) 441 at 454.
It is unarguable that upon a careful perusal of the respondent’s application for the enforcement of his fundamental right under sections 35(1) and 46(1) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), the respondent was arrested from his residence at Benin City at about 10:30pm on 24th November, 2004 and taken into custody at Ugbor Police cell at the instance of the appellants. Furthermore, it is undenied that the respondent was taken from Benin City by the appellants to Abuja where he was held in custody at the appellants’ cell from 25th November, 2004 to 8th December, 2004. Therefore, the cause of action in the circumstances arose from the arrest and detention of the respondent on 24th November, 2004 in Benin City, subsequent to his further detention in Abuja from 25th November, 2004 to 8th December, 2004.
In the light of the above, it cannot be seriously contended that the trial Federal High Court, Benin City, had no jurisdiction to have entertained and determined the respondent’s application for the enforcement of his fundamental rights. I am afraid; the submission of the learned counsel to the appellants on the issue is bereft of merits.
The authorities of Turkur V. Government of Gongola State; Mil. Admin of Benue State V. Abayilo; Mil. Admin of Taraba State V. Jen (2001) 1 NWLR (pt. 694) 416 and Inah V. Ukoi (supra) all relied upon by the appellants are in apposite to the facts of this present case. The aforementioned cases were decided in respect of the territorial jurisdiction of one state vis-a-vis another State in Nigeria. And it is common place knowledge that each State in Nigeria has a territorial border, such that a complaint of a breach of a fundamental right in one state cannot be litigated upon in another state. However, as I have earlier demonstrated in this judgment, the breach of the respondent’s fundamental right first arose in Benin City, subsequent to the continued breach of the same guaranteed rights in Abuja. The situation was not that the arrest and detention of the respondent all took place in Abuja from 24th November, 2004 to 8th December, 2004 and the application in respect of the same breaches was filed at and determined by the Federal High Court, Benin City.
In sum, I resolve issue 1 in favour of the respondent.
Arguing issue 2, learned counsel to the appellants, submitted that there was no basis for the award of N1, 000,000.00 as compensation or exemplary damages by the learned trial Judge in favour of the respondent. He referred to Albasma (Nig) Ltd. V. Salami (1988) 4 NWLR (pt. 546) 448; Odiba V. Azege (1998) 9 NWLR (pt. 566) 370 at 384; C.C.B. Ltd. V. Nwokocha (1989) 9 NWLR (pt. 564) 98 at 121; and insisted that before an assessment of damages, there must be some evidence which could guide the court to arrive at a fair award of damages.
On his part, learned counsel to the respondent submitted that the award of N1, 000, 000. 00 compensation for the violation of his fundamental rights was not arbitrary as the trial court took into account necessary factors before he made the compensatory award. He referred to G.O.K. Ajayi V. Attorney General of the Federation (1998) 1 H.R.L.R. 373 at 388 – 389 where it was held that:
“In fixing an amount for the infringement of fundamental rights the following are relevant factors to consider.
(a) the frequency of the type of violation in recent times;
(b) the continually depreciating value of Naira.
(c) the motivation for the violation;
(d) the status of the applicant;
(e) the underserved embarrassment meted out to the applicant including pecuniary losses; and
(f) the conduct of the parties generally particularly that of the Respondent.”
The learned trial Judge in his judgment found “that the 1st Respondent clearly went outside the purview of its powers in this matter because there is nothing to show that the alleged complaint against the Applicant leading to his said arrest and detention constitute a financial or economic crime.” Thus, he declared that:
“The arrest of the Applicant by the Respondents (2nd and 3rd) on the orders of the 4th Respondent at 10.30pm on 24/11/2004 at the applicant’s residence in Benin City, being without probable or reasonable cause, constitutes a veritable violation of his fundamental right to personal liberty and freedom of movement guaranteed by sections 35(1) and 41(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, especially in view of Applicant’s subsequent wrongful detention at 1st Respondent’s detention camp in Aso Villa Abuja between 25/11/2004 and 8/12/2004.”
It was in consequence of the above finding that the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that:
“appropriate damages must flow automatically to compensate him for injuries suffered because of the said constitutional breaches which I assess at the token and symbolic sum of N1, 000,000.00 (One Million Naira) only.”
The mandatory relief claimed by the respondent in his application was for:
“The sum of N100, 000,000.00 (one Hundred Million Naira only) being general, special and exemplary damages for the violation of applicant’s constitution protected rights herein made the subject matter of this suit.”
Unarguably, the basic object of the award of damages to a claimant is to compensate him for the damages, loss or injury he had suffered as a result of the action or default of the defendant. The guiding principle has always been that the plaintiff /claimant/applicant must be put in the position; he would have been, if the defendant had not caused him to suffer the injury or loss he is being compensated for on the maxim – restitutio in interregnum. See NEPA v. Alli (1992) 9 NWLR (pt. 259) 279; Ijebu-Ode Local Government v. Adedeji Balogun (1991) 1 SCNJ 1 at 18 or (1991) 1 NWLR (pt. 166) 136; and more recently in Jauro Shukka & ors v. Alhaji B. Abubakar (2012) 4 NWLR (pt. 1291) 497 at 525, wherein I said that in assessment of damages, which is at the discretion of the trial Judge, he is “limited only by prudence, caution and remoteness of the damage.”
Upon a calm consideration of the award of N1, 000,000.00 (One Million Naira only) as a token and symbolic damage in favour of the respondent, I do not think that the learned trial judge was imprudent in the assessment of the damages, in the circumstances of this case. I am of the considered opinion that damages automatically flowed from the wrongful and unreasonable conduct and misuse of the powers of the 1st Respondent and its staffers – the 2nd, 3rd and 4th appellants against the respondent. I do not think that the appellants would reasonably have expected the learned trial judge to have just pitied the respondent and no more, for having been arrested and unlawfully incarcerated for 14 odd days, for no just cause at the instance of the appellants. That to my mind would have been very unconscionable!
I have no reason to tamper with the discretion of the learned trial judge in the assessment and award of N1m damages against the appellants and in favour of the respondent. Therefore, I resolve this issue in favour of the respondent.
Arguing issue 3, learned counsel to the appellants submitted that the appellants’ act of arresting and detaining the respondent was lawful and reasonable by virtue of the appellant’s powers under its Establishment Act and Section 15 (5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He referred to Amaechi v. INEC (2008) 1 MJSC 14. Furthermore, learned counsel submitted that the trial court awarded a relief to the respondent which he did not claim. Hence, the learned trial judge ought not to have made an order which covered the respondent’s family and staff. He referred to Osolu V. Osolu (2003) 11 NWLR (pt. 608) 631; State v. Oladimeji (2003) 14 NWLR (pt. 859) 57 at 61; Shitta-Bey v. Federal Republic Service Commission (1991) 1 SC 40; Ebba V. Ogodo (1984) 1 SCNLR 372; Saude V. Audullahi (1989) 4 NWLR (pt. 116) 387.
In concluding his submissions, learned counsel insisted that there is no time bar in criminal process.”
Learned counsel for the appellants at the onset of his submissions at paragraph 3.32, page 9 of his brief of argument indicated that issue 3 arose from grounds 4 and 5 of the notice of appeal. It is expedient to reproduce the said grounds of appeal, to wit:
“GROUND FOUR
The learned trial judge erred in taw when he ordered the Appellant not to re-arrest, detain or charge the
Respondent to any court pending the determination of civil suit no. FHC/HC/691/2000 between PHILOVIA & JASON ENGINEERING CO. LTD V. NASSERTEX BROTHERS & SONS LTD still pending before Hon. Justice S.D. Bage of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja.
PARTICULARS
1. It is now settled law that criminal prosecution can go pari pasu with civil action before a court of competent jurisdiction.
2. It is now settled law that a court cannot injunct the performance of statutory duty of investigation; or prosecution.
3. The statutory powers of the Appellants provided for under section 6 and 7 of the EFCC Act 2004 ought to be read together with section 35(1) (c) of the constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
4. The Appellants have statutory powers to arrest, detain and prosecute Respondent upon a reasonable suspicion of his commission of Economic and Financial Crime and same cannot dependent on conclusion of any ancillary civil action nor can they be taken away by injunctive order of the court.
GROUND FIVE
The learned trial Judge erred in law when she extended the tenor of the orders contained in the Judgment to include family members and staff of the Respondent, who were neither parties nor sought any relief under the suit before the lower court.
PARTICULARS
1. The court is not a Father Christmas and cannot grant reliefs not sought for.
2. The family members and staff of the Respondent were not parties to the suit before the lower court and ipso facto cannot be affected by or enjoy the tenor of the judgment of the lower court arising therefrom.”
It is clear to me that the purport of ground 4 read together with its particulars is a complaint against the order of the trial court barring a re-arrest of the respondent pending the determination of a civil suit NO. FHC/HC/691/2000 between PHILOVIA & JASON ENGINEERING CO. LTD. V. NASSERTEX BROTHERS & SONS LTD., still pending before Hon. Justice S.D. Bage, J., (as he then was) at the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
It is clear to me also that ground 5 read together with its particulars; evince a complaint in respect of the extension of the learned trial judge’s order of no further arrest of the respondent aforesaid underground 4, to include members of the respondent’s family and his staff.
In arguing issue 3, learned counsel, did not limit his submissions to the main complaint in grounds 4 and 5. He forayed into the lawfulness of the arrest of the respondent without a warrant of arrest and the rightfulness of the powers of the 1st appellant under sections 5, 6, 12, 25 (1) (2) (3) and 27(1) (3) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004; citing the authorities of Dokubo-Asari v. FRN (2007) 9 NJSC 160 at 164; A.G.F & 35 ors (2002) 7 NJSC at pp.7 – 12. He also referred to section 15(5) and items 50 (a) exclusive legislative list of the 1999 CFRN.
I am of the considered opinion that the submissions of learned counsel to the appellants in respect of the lawfulness of the respondent’s arrest on 24th November, 2004 at Benin City, without a warrant of arrest, was not founded upon by the learned trial judge. Furthermore, issue 3 by the appellants did not say anything touching on the lawfulness or otherwise of the arrest of the respondent. Therefore, the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants in justification of the arrest of the respondent without a warrant of arrest go to no issue and so it is discountenanced by me.
I am of the firm and considered opinion too that the submissions of learned counsel to the appellants bordering on the powers of the 1st appellant and the rightness/lawfulness of the exercise of that power to prosecute the respondent, did not arise from issue 3. So, those submissions also go to no issue and they are discountenanced by me. For it is the law that an issue for determination, which arises from a ground of appeal, must be an attack on the finding and/or decision of the trial court. See Chief Monday Edet v. Independence National Electoral commission & 2 ors. (2011) 1 SCNJ 179 at 208; Alfa Distillers Food & Processing Industry v. National Inland waterways Authority (2012) 8 WRN 63 at 81 – 82; NNPC v. CLIFCO Nig. Ltd. (2011) 4 SCNJ 107.
I have demonstrated that the learned trial judge did not make any finding in respect of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the arrest of the respondent without a warrant of arrest and this was not the target of issue 3. See Khaled Barakat Chami v. United Bank for Africa, Plc. (2010) 2 SCNJ 23 or (2010) 18 WRN 1, Chief Ufikairo Monday Edet v. Independent National Electoral Commission & 2 ors (2011) 1 SCNJ 179 at 208; Alfa Distillers Food and processing Industries v. National Inland waterways Authority (2012) 8 WRN 63 at 81- 82; NDIC v. SBN (2003) 1 NWLR (pt. 801) 311; Jumbo V. Brayanko Int. Ltd (1995) 6 NWLR (pt. 403) 545; Oredoyin V. Arowolo (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 114) 172 or (1989) 20 NSCC (pt. 3) 64 or (1999) 7 SC (pt. II) 1.
For the avoidance of any lingering doubt, the learned trial judge found that the arrest and detention of the respondent was unreasonable and also unlawful for the fact that the 1st appellant “clearly went outside the purview of its powers in this matter because there is nothing to show that the alleged complaint against the Applicant leading to his said arrest and detention constitute a financial or economic crime.” There is no doubt that grounds 4 and 5 of the notice of appeal did not constitute an attack on this specific finding of the learned trial judge nor was issue 3 targeted at the said finding because it is an offshoot of grounds 4 and 5 which in the first place did not attack that finding of the learned trial judge. I wonder therefore why the learned counsel for the appellants laboured to argue in respect of a finding which he did not consider expedient to have appealed against when he was drawing up his grounds of appeal. It is late in the day to do so in this court, without any leave sought and obtained from the court.
I have considered issue 3 vis-a-vis grounds 4 and 5. I am satisfied that the complaint by the appellants regarding the learned trial judge’s order that the respondent should be re-arrested in connection with this matter pending the determination of the then ongoing Suit No. FHC/HC/691/2000, PHILOVIA & JASON ENGINEERING CO. LTD v. NASSERTEX BROTHERS & SONS LTD & ANOR, at the Federal Capital Territory High Court of Justice, Abuja was not an absolute order. The proceedings in the said suit was to determine the land dispute between the parties therein and it is not in dispute that the arrest and detention of the respondent by the appellants was in connection with the same land dispute and the respondent is the Managing Director of the plaintiff – Philova & Jason Engineering Co. Ltd, in the aforementioned suit No. FHC/HC/691/2000. Therefore, it was reasonable for the ownership of that land to have been determined first, before any further arrest was made in relation to it.
Regarding the extension of the learned trial judge’s order of non-arrest of the respondent’s family and members of staff of his company, it is no more than a consequential order which the learned trial judge had the discretionary power to make. This is against the backdrop of the fact that, the respondent, having been humiliatingly invaded in his home and seized/arrested therefrom at 10.30pm on 24th November, 2004 by the appellants, it was fair and reasonable for the learned trial judge to have made an order to protect the respondent’s family from another Gestapo fashion-like operation/attack by the appellants, on them.
I repeat the same thing in respect of the members of staff of the respondent’s company – Philovia & Jason Engineering Co. Ltd. Perhaps, I should reiterate what I said in respect of the discretionary power of courts to make consequential orders, in SENATOR DAHIRU GOSSOL V. ALHAJI ABUBAKAR TUTARE & 2 ORS (2012) 7 WRN 118 at 177 lines 25-47, inter alia:
“Even if a relief is not specifically asked for, situations have arisen in which the courts have allowed consequential orders to be made, where that order is inevitably consequential, necessarily flowing naturally and directly from the substantive order made, then it can be granted without it having been asked for by any of the parties to the suit. Such an order is necessary so as to, for instance:
(a) Give effect to the judgment delivered;
(b) Make meaningful an order granted; or
(c) put an end to litigation by avoiding future action.”
Further see Buwanhot V. Buwanhot (2009) 16 NWLR (pt. 1166) 22.
I therefore resolve issue 3 against the appellants.
I have perused the respondent’s issue iii in respect of whether the 1st appellant being a statutory body can in the performance of its statutory duties, justify a violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizens. I am to say that even though the respondent has the right to formulate his own issue for determination in an appeal, such an issue must be founded and predicated on a ground of appeal by the appellants. Hence, where an issue is not properly raised and anchored on a ground of appeal, the appellate court has no business in wasting precious judicial time in considering it. See KHALED CHAMI v. UBA, PLC (2010) 2 SCNJ 23 AT 36.
In the circumstance of the appellants, grounds of appeal, I am unable to situate respondent’s issue iii, in any of the grounds of appeal. Respondent’s issue iii came from the moon. It is raised in vacuo. It is incompetent. See KHALED CHAMI V. UBA, PLC (supra).
I therefore discountenance issue iii by the respondent.
I should make a footnote on this appeal because the application of the respondent at the court below manifestly exposed the overzealousness of some officers of the Economic and Financial Crimes commission (EFCC). The dreadedness of the name or acronym – EFCC is in respect of its onslaught on the hydra-headed evil called corruption and those who feed fat on it. That should and ought to remain the main focus of the commission. Therefore, where some overzealous officers of the commission veer into matters which do not attack and bite those who are financially corrupt, the integrity and credibility of the commission, is called to question as demonstrated in this matter where through judicial intervention, the commission is enjoined/admonished to re-direct its focus on its main brief!
In the end, I am satisfied that the appellants, appeal failed on all grounds of appeal and issues canvassed and ventilated therein. The appeal is fluffy and lacking in merits. I dismiss it, accordingly. The judgment of Nwokorie, J., of the Federal High Court, Benin City, dated 9th December, 2005 is hereby affirmed.
I award costs of N50, 000.00 in favour of the respondent.

GEORGE OLADEINDE SHOREMI, J.C.A: I have read in draft the judgment of my learned brother, Tom Shaibu Yakubu JCA. I am in agreement with the reasoning and decision therein.
I agree with him that the agents of EFCC involved in the matter were overzealous in the performance of their duties. The action of EFCC officials in this matter is not contained in the Act establishing that body. The trial court’s judgment is not perversed. The appeal is therefore unmeritorious and it is dismissed by me. I abide by the cost awarded.

TUNDE OYEBANJI AWOTOYE, J.C.A: I had the privilege of reading the draft of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU JCA.
I am in total agreement with the reasoning and conclusion therein. The Appellants’ appeal is lacking in merit. I also dismiss it with N50, 000 cost in favour of the Respondent.

Appearances

Steve Ehi Odiase, Esq.For Appellant

AND

M.O. Okhuarobo Esq.For Respondent