ECO INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC v. NIGERIA UNION LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, JALINGO LGC & ANOR (2014)

ECO INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC v. NIGERIA UNION LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, JALINGO LGC & ANOR

(2014)LCN/7220(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 23rd day of May, 2014

CA/YL/12/2012

RATIO

POSITION OF THE LAW ON FILING A NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

WHETHER EVIDENCE ADMITTED CAN BE PROVEN FURTHER.

The law is trite that what has been admitted needs no further proof. See section 20 and 123 of the Evidence Act 2011 and the following cases: E.M.H. V Comet Shipping Agencies (2009) ALL FWLR (pt. 483) 1260, Ekpemupolo V Edremoda (2009) ALL FWLR (pt. 473) 1220, Salawu V Yusuf (2007) ALL FWLR (pt. 384) 230, Okposin V Assam (2005) ALL FWLR (pt. 282) 1863, Taiwo V Adegboro (2011) ALL FWLR (pt. 584) 52 at 67, Din V A. N. N. Ltd (1990) 5 SCNJ 209. per ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.

EFFECT OF AN ADMISSION OF A PARTY IN EVIDENCE

An admission of a party in law is the best evidence, in the sense that the opposing party need not make any strenuous effort to prove the admitted facts. Thus, a court of law is entitled to give judgment based on an admission by a party if the admission is relevant to the facts in issue. In civil cases, admission by a party is evidence of the facts asserted against him. Unless explanations are given which satisfy the court that admissions should not be so regarded, due probative weight should be given to them as such. See: Our Line Ltd V SCC Nig. Ltd (2009) 7 SCNJ 358; Salawu V Yusuf (2007) 5 SCNJ 354.per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.

WHETHER A COURT OF LAW CAN RAISE SUO MOTU A DEFENSE NOT RAISED BY A PARTY TO A SUIT.

It is trite that a court of law cannot set up a defence not raised by a party to a suit. See Victino Fixed Odds Ltd V Ojo (2010) 185 LRCN 166, Chabasaya V C. B. N. (2009) ALL FWLR (pt. 481) 939, Obajimi V Adedbi (2008) 3 NWLR (pt.1075) 1, Buhari V Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (pt. 941) 1, Durosaro V Ayorinde (2008) 3 NWLR (pt.1075) 1, Ibori V Agbi (2004) ALL FWLR (pt.202) 1799, Ogundele & Anor V Agiri (2009) 18 NWLR (pt.1173) 219, (2009) 12 SC (pt.1) 13. per ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ADAMU JAURO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

ECO INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC Appellant(s)

AND

1. NIGERIA UNION LOCAL GOVT. EMPLOYEES, JALINGO L.G.C.
2. JALINGO LOCAL GOVT. COUNCIL Respondent(s)

ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appeal herein is against the judgment of the Taraba State High Court of Justice, delivered on 7th July, 2011 in suit No. TRSJ/147M/2012.

The facts culminating in this appeal can be neatly compressed as follows: The 1st respondent applied for and was granted a term loan facility by the appellant vide a letter dated 6th November, 2007. The loan was for N35,000,000.00 to be disbursed to the members of the 1st respondent for the purpose of investing it in agricultural produce. The loan was guaranteed by a letter of irrevocable standing payment order given by the 2nd respondent for a monthly deduction of N2,482,209.44 from the subvention account of the 2nd respondent for 16 months to service the loan. By the same letter, the 2nd respondent guaranteed a continuous domiciliation of its subvention account with the appellant throughout the tenure of the loan. Repayment of the loan was however not effected within the stipulated time and as at 25th January, 2011, the unpaid outstanding balance was N14,359,759.38.

Consequent upon the foregoing, the appellant as plaintiff instituted an action under the undefended list procedure against the 1st and 2nd respondents and claimed for the following reliefs:
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“1. The sum of N14,359,759.38 (Fourteen Million, Three Hundred and Fifty Nine Thousand, Seven Hundred and Fifty Nine Naira and Thirty Eight Kobo), being debt owed to the plaintiff by the defendants from a term loan facility granted to the defendants by the plaintiff.

2. 19% compound interest per annum and 1% default fee per Month on the N14,359,759.38 (Fourteen Million, Three Hundred and Fifty Nine Thousand, Seven Hundred and Fifty Eight Naira and Thirty Eight Kobo), debt beginning from 26th January, 2011 till the date the debt is fully repaid to the plaintiff.

3. Cost of litigation.”

The two defendants were served the originating processes but none of them filed any response by way of notice of intention to defend the action with an affidavit disclosing a defence on the merit. With this development, the appellant as plaintiff applied for judgment pursuant to Order 22 Rule 4 of the Taraba State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1997. In a judgment delivered on the 7th July, 2011 the Lower Court entered judgment in favour of the plaintiff now appellant against the 1st defendant as follows:
“on the whole, judgment is hereby entered for the plaintiff as per writ of summons pursuant to Order 22 Rules 4 of the Rules of this court as follows:
1. In the sum of N14,359,759.38 owed to the plaintiff by the 1st defendant/respondent balance from a term loan facility granted to the 1st defendant by the plaintiff.
2. 19% interest per annum and 1 default fee per month on the said sum from judgment until final liquidation of the said sum.”
The Lower Court however exculpated the 2nd defendant from any liability in the following words:
“…..there is no facts to the effect that the second Respondent/Defendant’s account is no more domiciled with the applicant/plaintiff, then the second Respondent/Defendant cannot be jointly liable for default of repaying the loan benefitted by the first Respondent/Defendant”
See page 16 lines 13 to 17 of the record.

Peeved and distressed by the aforementioned portion of the judgment exculpating the 2nd defendant from liability, the plaintiff challenged same vide a notice of appeal dated and filed 6th September, 2011. The said notice of appeal was amended by order of court made on 12th November, 2013. The amended notice of appeal is anchored and predicated upon a solitary ground of appeal. The plaintiff in the Lower Court will hereinafter be referred to as the appellant, while the 1st and 2nd defendants as 1st and 2nd respondents, respectively. In strict compliance with the Rules of Court parties filed and exchanged their respective briefs of argument. The appellant’s brief of argument filed 20th November, 2013 but deemed filed on 15th April, 2014. The Appellant’s Reply brief was filed on 15th April, 2014. The Respondents brief of argument settled by I. A. Jalo Esq. was filed on 9th April, 2014 but deemed properly filed on 15th April, 2014.

On the date slated for hearing the appeal, namely 15th April 2014, the respondent intimated the court of having raised a preliminary objection in the respondents brief. Consequently the respondents sought leave of court, which was duly granted to argue the preliminary objection before the hearing of the appeal. Mr. A. I. Umar for the respondents stated that the preliminary objection is contained on pages 3 to 5 of the respondents brief filed on 9th February, 2014, while arguments in support thereof are on pages 6 to 10. Learned Counsel adopted the preliminary objection and argument in respect of same and urged the court to uphold it and strike out the appeal.

Mr. J. A. Oguche for the appellant stated that the appellant’s response to the preliminary objection is contained on pages 3 to 19 of the appellant’s reply brief. Learned Counsel adopted the relevant pages of the reply brief as his response to the preliminary objection and urged the court to dismiss same for being frivolous, lacking in merit and a misapprehension of the law. Learned counsel posited that the appeal is against the final judgment of the Lower Court sitting as a court of first instance. As for the main appeal, learned counsel adopted the appellant’s brief of argument and the remaining pages of the reply brief as his argument in the appeal and urged that the appeal be allowed. Learned counsel prayed that the portion of the judgment exculpating the 2nd respondent from liability in the loan transaction be set aside. Mr. A. I. Umar for the respondents, adopted pages 10 to 18 of the respondents brief as his response to the appeal and urged the court to dismiss the appeal with substantial costs.

The appellant distilled a lone issue for determination on page 5 of the appellant’s brief as follows:
“WHETHER regard being had to the unassailable evidence adduced by the appellant before the trial Court establishing 2nd respondent’s liability as guarantor to the 1st respondent in a loan transaction between the appellant and the 1st respondent, the learned trial Judge was not in error to have exculpated 2nd respondent of liability in the said loan transaction which she duly guaranteed.”

The respondents on the other hand, also nominated a single issue for determination on page 10 of their brief of argument, namely:
“Whether in the circumstances of this case, the court below was not right when it exculpated the 2nd respondent from liability.”

The respondents having raised a preliminary objection, same will be considered first. The rationale for the preferential treatment accorded to preliminary objection, is because it is a challenge to the hearing of the appeal and where it succeeds there will be no need to go into the merits of the appeal. See Galadima V Tambai (2002) 11 NWLR (pt.677) 1, Onyemeh V Egbuchulam (1996) 5 NWLR (pt.448) 255, A. G. Federation V ANPP (2003) 18 NWLR (pt. 851) 182, Osun State Govt. V Dalami (2003) 7 NWLR (Pt.818) 72, Nwannata V Esumi (1998) 8 NWLR (pt. 563, Tambo Leather Works Ltd V Abbey (1998) 12 NWLR (pt.579) 548, Skymit Motors Ltd V UBA Plc (2014) ALL FWLR (pt.721) 1547 at 1559, Goji V Ewete (2001) 15 NWLR (pt.736) 273, Onyekwuluje V Animahaun (1996) 3 NWLR (pt.439) 637, NNB Plc V Imonikhe (2002) 5 NWL (pt.760) 294, Uba V Yawe (2000) 8 NWLR (pt.670) 739.

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
The notice and grounds in support of the preliminary objection are captured on pages 3 to 4 of the respondents brief as follows:
“By way of preliminary objection, the respondent shall at hearing of this appeal contend that;
i. The lone ground of appeal and it particulars are incompetent.
ii. The appellant’s brief of argument having been framed from an incompetent ground of appeal is also incompetent.
iii. The relief sought is incompetent.

GROUNDS OF OBJECTION
1. The lone ground of appeal does not involve question of law alone.
2. The appellant requires leave to file this appeal.
3. The requisite leave to file this appeal was neither sought nor obtained.
4. None compliance with the provision of Section 242(1) of 1999 Constitution Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended.”

The respondents proceeded to itemize what they termed particulars of incompetence on pages 4 and 5 of their brief of argument. The cumulative effect of the argument proffered by the respondents is to the effect that the lone ground of appeal does not amount to an error in law but a finding based on facts adduced in evidence. The respondents posited that whether or not there was such evidence of facts to support the finding of the Lower Court that the plaintiff/appellant has established his claim is a question of fact or mixed law and fact, but not question of law alone. In support, reference was made to the following cases: Obatoyinbo V Oshatoba (1996) 5 SCNJ 1 at 2 – 3 ratios 1 to 10, IKKO Kashadadi V Ingila Sarkin Noma (2007) 13 NWLR (pt.1052) 510, Faith Ent. Ltd V B.A.S.F. Nig. Ltd (2010) 184 LRCN 140 at 144 ratio 2.
The respondents submitted that where a ground of appeal involves question of fact or mixed law and fact, the leave of court must be first sought and obtained and where the required leave is not obtained it renders the ground of appeal incompetent and liable to be struck out. In support reference was made to Section 241(1) (b) and 242 (1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended and the case of Faith Ent. Ltd V. B.A.S.F. Nig Ltd (supra). The respondents contended that the ground of appeal is not in conformity with the provisions of the constitution, hence incompetent and any issue formulated from an incompetent ground of appeal is also incompetent. In support, reference was made to the following cases: Nfor V Ashaka Cement Co. Ltd (1994) 1 NWLR (pt. 319) 222, Yisi Nig. Ltd V Trade Bank Plc (2013) 219 LRCN 2 at 160 ratio 2. The respondents urged the court to uphold the objection, strike out the lone ground of appeal and the issue distilled therefrom and the appeal itself for want of competence as no leave was sought and obtained before filing the appeal.

The appellant raised two preliminary issues as to the competence of the respondent’s brief, before responding to the preliminary objection. The first issue is that though the respondents brief was signed, there was no indication as to which of the three counsel listed, signed the brief. Based on the foregoing, the appellant posited that a brief of argument not signed by a legal practitioner is incompetent and ought to be discountenanced. In support, reference was made to the case of Archobode Engineering Ltd V Water Resources Hydro Technique & Anor (1985) 3 NWLR (pt. 12) 300. The second issue raised by the appellant was the failure of the respondents to tie their lone issue for determination to the ground of appeal. The appellant contended that the aforementioned defects have affected the competence of the lone issue for determination and the arguments canvassed thereunder and same should be struck out. In support, reference was made to the following cases: Aremu V University of Ilorin (2008) ALL FWLR (pt. 411) 941 at 947 ratio 5, N. H. Int’l S. A. V Nicon Hotels Ltd (2007) 15 NWLR (pt. 1056) 1 at 22 – 23 H – A.

On the preliminary objection, the appellant submitted that same is incompetent there being no notice to that effect but only raised in the respondents brief. In support, reference was made to Order 10 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2011 and the following cases: Ugwu V. Ararume (2007) 6 SC (pt. 1280) 169 at 200 B-E, Mohmammed V Abdulkadir (2008)4 NWLR (pt.1076) 111 at 141 E -H, Anukam V Anukam (2008) 5 NWLR (pt. 1081) 455 at 478 G – H, Unity Bank Plc V Bouari (2008) 7 NWLR (pt.1086) 372 at 399 – 400 H – B. Based on the foregoing, the appellant urged that the preliminary objection be struck out for being incompetent.
On the merit of the objection, the appellant stated that the judgment being appealed against, is a final judgment of the trial high court sitting as a court of first instance. It was submitted that by virtue of Section 241(1) (a) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), that appeal is as of right and no leave of court is required, hence the preliminary objection is misconceived. In support, reference was made to the case of Nitel Plc V Gambo Amark Ayu (2008) ALL FWLR (pt.411) 904 at 906 ratio 2. The appellant urged that the preliminary objection be dismissed and the court should not be bugged down by technicalities but should do substantial justice by determining the appeal on the merit. In support, reference was made to the case of Akpan V Bob (2010) 17 NWLR (pt. 1223) 421 at 478 – 479 H – C.

I will start with the two preliminary issues raised by the appellant as to the competence of the respondents brief. On the issue of whether the brief was signed by counsel, there are three names of counsel endorsed on the brief and a signature appended on top of the names. The appellant is not disputing the three names endorsed on the brief as names of legal practitioners. The complaint of the appellant is that he doesn’t know which one amongst the three legal practitioners that signed the brief. The important thing is that all the three names are names of legal practitioners known to law, called to the Nigerian Bar and whose names are on the roll of legal practitioners. There is also a signature appended on top of their names. See section 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act and Okafor V Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (pt. 1043) 521. The respondents brief was duly signed by counsel and therefore competent.

On the issue of failure to tie the lone issue for determination to the ground of appeal. This objection, with all respect to the learned counsel for the appellant, to my mind appears technical and mischievious. The appeal is anchored and predicated on ONLY one ground of appeal. The respondent formulated a lone issue for determination. The position would have been different if there are several grounds of appeal. The appellant has not pretended or claimed that the lone issue for determination formulated by the respondents has no bearing or does not arise from the only ground of appeal filed. To my mind the issue raised herein is of no moment and same as hereby discountenanced as lacking in substance.

The next issue is the objection raised by the appellant to the competence of the preliminary objection, on the ground that it was only raised in the respondents brief without filing a formal notice of preliminary objection. The appellant contended that the failure to file a notice of preliminary objection in line with Order 10 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2011, renders the preliminary objection incompetent and liable to be struck out. The essence of filing a notice of preliminary objection is to notify the appellant of the objection before the hearing of his appeal in order to enable him prepare to meet the objection at the hearing of the appeal. See Tiza & Anor V Begha (2005) ALL FWLR (pt.272) 200 at 210. The notice of the objection is to be filed three clear days to the hearing of the appeal. See Nortex (Nig) Ltd V Franc Tools Co. Ltd (1997) 4 NWLR (pt. 501) 603 at 606.

The law as to the filing of a notice of preliminary objection has for long advanced. The position of the law from the pronouncements of the apex court is to the effect that, a notice of preliminary objection as to the competence of an appeal may validly be raised in the respondents brief. It is therefore settled that where a preliminary objection is incorporated in a brief of argument and the requisite three clear days notice given, the formal filing of a notice of preliminary objection is unnecessary. Therefore, the failure to file a notice of preliminary objection will not render the notice in a respondent’s brief ineffective. See Ajide V Kelani (1985) 3 NWLR (pt. 12) 248, Onwuka V Ononuju (2008) 4 SC (pt. 11) 188, Agbaka V Amadi (1998) 11 NWLR (pt. 572) 16, Magit V University of Agriculture Makurdi (2005) 19 NWLR (pt. 959) 211, Bosiec V Kachalla (2006) 1 NWLR (pt. 962) 587, C.S.S. Bookshop Ltd V R. T. M. C. R. S (2006) 11 NWLR (pt. 992) 530 at 556, Oforkire V Maduike (2003) 5 NWLR (pt. 812) 166, Salami V Mohammed (2000) 9 NWLR (pt.673) 469, Maigoro V Garba (1999) 10 NWLR (pt. 624) 555, Fawehinmi V NBA No.1 (1989) 2 NWLR (pt. 105) 494 at 515 – 516, Yusuf V Union Bank of Nigeria (1996) 6 NWLR (pt.457) 632, Ogidi V Egba (1999) 10 NWLR (pt. 621) 42 at 71, Auto Import Export V Adebayo (2003) 7 WRN 1 at 17, Okwuagbala V Ikwueme (2010) 19 NWLR (pt. 1226) 54, Ubah V Okafor (2013) 43 WRN 150. Consequent upon the foregoing, the preliminary objection raised in the respondent’s brief of argument is competent, notwithstanding the fact that the respondents did not file a formal notice of preliminary objection separately. This objection also is lacking in substance and is hereby discountenanced.
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A consideration of the preliminary objection on the merit will now be made. The contention of the respondents is that the lone ground of appeal is a ground of fact or mixed law and fact which requires leave of court before filing. In the instant case, the respondents posited that leave having not been sought and obtained before filing the appeal, the instant appeal is incompetent. I have meticulously studied the judgment now on appeal, it is a final judgment of the Adamawa State High Court of Justice, sitting as a court of first instance. At this juncture, it is necessary to refer to Section 241(1) (a) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, which is hereby reproduced thus
“241(1) An appeal shall lie from decisions of the Federal High Court or a High Court to the Court of Appeal as of right in the following cases-
(a) Final decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the Federal High Court or High Court sitting at first instance;”
The above reproduced constitutional provision is very clear to the effect that appeal is as of right from any final decision of the Federal High Court or High Court sitting at first instance in any civil or criminal proceedings. By the aforementioned constitutional provision, appeal is as of right to this court by any dissatisfied party on any ground of appeal be it pure law, mixed law and fact, or fact. See Aqua Ltd V Ondo State Sport Council (1988) 4 NWLR (pt. 91) 622, F. H. A. V Kalejaye (2011) ALL FWLR (pt 562) 1633, Nitel Plc V Ayu (2008) ALL FWLR (pt. 411) 904 at 906, Mu’azu V Bani Musa Holdings Ltd (2011) ALL FWLR (pt. 594) 172, Kwara State Min. of Health V Mili Elect. Ent. (2011) ALL FWLR (pt. 602) 1757, Kano Textile Printers Plc V Gloede (2002) 7 WRN 78. The instant appeal being against final decision of the High Court of Adamawa State sitting as a court of first instance no leave is required, irrespective of whether the ground of appeal is of law, mixed law and fact, or fact. Consequent upon the foregoing, the preliminary objection is grossly lacking in merit and substance, same is hereby dismissed.

Having disposed the preliminary objection the coast is now clear for the main appeal.

MAIN APPEAL
The appeal as earlier indicated is predicated on a single ground of appeal and a lone issue for determination distilled therefrom by both parties to the appeal. The lone issue as formulated by the appellant appears all encompassing, hence it will be adopted for the resolution of the appeal. The grouse of the appellant with the judgment now on appeal, is that the Lower Court was wrong in exculpating the 2nd respondent from liability on the loan granted to the 1st respondent. The grudges of the appellant are borne out of the fact that the 2nd respondent guaranteed the loan by letter of irrevocable standing Order exhibit B and even admitted liability for the loan in exhibit E, wherein it requested for interest waiver and a restructuring of the repayment period.

The appellant contended that by paragraph 9 of the affidavit in support of their application to place the suit under the Undefended List, it was averred that the 2nd respondent guaranteed the loan. The appellant made a special reference to exhibit B. The appellant submitted that the liability of the guarantor becomes due and matured immediately the debtor/borrower becomes unable to pay his outstanding debt. The appellant posited that the guarantor’s liability is then said to have crystallized. In support, reference was made to the following cases: Auto Import Export V Adebayo (2006) ALL FWLR (pt. 296) 912 at 925 ratio 9, Nwankwo & Anor V EDCS (2007) 151 LRCN 148 at 152 – 153. The appellant stated that it is not in dispute that the 1st respondent failed to repay the outstanding balance of N14, 359,753.38 out of the N35,000,000.00 granted as loan.

The appellant made a reference to Exhibit E which was in response to the appellant’s letter exhibit D2. The appellant contended that exhibit E had expressly admitted the liability of the 2nd respondent with respect to the sum of money claimed by the appellant, in the suit, thus obviating the need for further proof of same. The appellant made reference to Section 75 of the Evidence Act, to the effect that what is admitted needs no further proof. In support reference was made to the following cases: F. M. H. V Comet Shipping Agencies (2009) ALL FWLR (pt. 483) 1260 at 1266 ratio 14, Ekpemupolo V Edremoda (2009) ALL FWLR (pt. 473) 1220 at 1228 ratio 11, Salawu V Yusuf (2007) ALL FWLR (pt. 384) 230 at 236 ratio 4, Okposin V Assam (2005) ALL FWLR (pt. 282) 1863 at 1879 ratio 5.

The appellant posited that it is on record that upon service of the processes of the trial court the 2nd respondent willfully neglected to controvert the claim contained therein. The appellant submitted that by not defending the suit or controvert the facts contained in the affidavit in support of the appellant’s application, the respondents (particularly 2nd respondent) had admitted the claim of the appellant. The appellant argued that in the Lower Court, it never raised the issue of continuous domiciliation of 2nd respondents account with the appellant as an issue for determination and neither was it a defence raised by the respondents. The appellant submitted that exhibits B and E, never made a continuous domiciliation of the 2nd respondent’s account a condition precedent to the liability of the 2nd respondent in the event of default in repaying the loan by 1st respondent. The appellant posited that the Lower Court introduced the issue suo motu and proceeded to determine the liability of the 2nd respondent on same without affording appellant opportunity of being heard on that point.
The appellant submitted that raising the issue of domiciliation suo motu is perverse, same having not been borne out from the processes filed by the appellant as well as the evidence adduced at the trial hence liable to be set aside. In support, reference was made to the following cases: Buhari V Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (pt941) 1, Durosaro V Ayorinde (2005) 8 NWLR (pt. 927) 407, Obajimi V Adedbi (2008) 3 NWLR (pt.1075) 1 at 19, Savannah Bank Plc V C. B. N. (2009) ALL FWLR (pt. 481) 939 at 948 ratio 5, KuforijiÂ Â V Y. B. Ltd (1981) 6 – 7 SC 25 at 46, Ondwhan & Anor V Iserhifin (1976) NWLR 263 at 265. The appellant posited that what the trial court did by raising the issue of domiciliation of account, amounted to setting up a defence for the 2nd respondent which is not borne out by the evidence. In support reference was made to the following cases: Victino Fixed Odds Ltd V Ojo & Ors (2010) 185 LRCN 166, Chabasaya V Anwasi (2010) 184 LRCN 1. The appellant concluded that by raising the issue suo motu the lower court did cloistered justice which courts have been severally admonished not to embark upon. In support, reference was made to the case of Ogundele & Anor V Agiri (2010) 180 LRCN 138. The appellant submitted that the acceptable procedure is for the court to invite parties to address it on the issue before pronouncing its decision on it, otherwise the decision will be set aside on appeal. In support, reference was made to the case of Ibori V Agbi (2004) ALL FWLR (pt. 202) 1799. The appellant urged the court to set aside that part of the judgment of the Lower Court which exculpated the 2nd respondent from liability, for being perverse.
The respondents started by stating that civil suits are decided on preponderance of evidence and balance of probabilities. In support reference was made to the case of Eya & Ors V Olapade & Ors (2011) 199 LRCN 93 at 99 ratio 6. The respondents contended that even where no defence was raised or counter affidavit filed, the evidence in the affidavit must be evaluated. In support, reference was made to the case of R. Benkay (Nig) Ltd V Cadbury (Nig) Ltd (2012) 208) LRCN 57 at 64 – 65. The respondents submitted that by exhibit A, the loan facility was granted to the 1st respondent and not the second respondent. The respondents contended that the 2nd respondent having guaranteed domiciliation of its account with the appellant does not make it responsible for the loan. The respondents made further reference to exhibit A, particularly the first paragraph of page 2 to the effect that repayment of the loan is by direct deduction from subvention account of the 2nd respondent i.e. Jalingo LGC, domiciled with the appellant.
The respondents posited that if there is any breach of exhibit B it was by the appellant, who failed to deduct the monies from the subvention account. The respondents argued that the failure to repay the loan if any was caused by the appellant, hence the appellant cannot be heard to complain. The respondents further submitted that the case of Auto Import Export V Adebayo (supra) is distinguishable from the instant case. The respondents therefore urged the court to dismiss the appeal.
In a short reply, it was argued that the contention of the respondents to the effect that it was the appellant that was in breach of exhibit B is incompetent. The appellant submitted that the aforementioned contention of the respondents is outside the lone issue for determination and does not arise from judgment being appealed against. The appellant argued that it is now settled that parties are bound by the issues formulated for determination and those dealt with in the judgment. In support, reference was made to the case of Udoudom V Reg. Trustees Q. I. C. (2012) 5 NWLR (pt. 1294) 469 at 471 ratio 1. The appellant urged the court to allow the appeal.

The case now on appeal was filed before the Lower Court under the Undefended List Procedure. The facts of the case have been stated in the introductory part of this judgment, suffice it to say that it was a story of a loan that went sour. The appellant granted the 1st respondent a term loan of N35,000,000 vide exhibit A. The repayment of the loan was to be made by a direct deduction from Jalingo LGC’s subvention account domiciled with the appellant/bank. The 2nd respondent gave a letter of irrevocable standing payment order dated 23rd October, 2007 as a collateral for the loan which has been annexed to the originating processes as exhibit B, for ease of reference exhibit B is hereby reproduced, thus:
“OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
JALINGO LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL
TARABA STATE OF NIGERIA
October, 23, 2007
The Manager,
Oceanic Bank Int’l Plc
Jalingo Branch.

IRREVOCABLE STANDING PAYMENT ORDER
We hereby issue this irrevocable standing payment order for the sum of two million four hundred and eighty two thousand, two hundred and nine naira, forty-four kobo only (N2, 482, 209.44) to be deducted monthly for the next 16 months to service the loan facility amounted (sic) to thirty-five million naira (N35,000,000.00) only.
2. Please, note that continuous domiciliation of Jalingo Local Government Account with Oceanic Bank International Plc, Jalingo branch is hereby guaranteed throughout the tenure of this loan.

Mr. Nuhu IratsiÂ Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Alh. Haruna Musa
SecretaryÂ Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Treasurer

Hon. Alh. Salejo Moh’d Lanburam
Chairman”

Upon failure to repay the loan in full, identical letters of demand were sent to the two respondents for the outstanding amount of N14,359,758.38. The letter of demand sent to the 2nd respondent was dated 9th February, 2011 and attached as exhibit D2. It is hereby reproduced as follows:

“J. N. OKEZIE & ASSOCIATES
Legal Practitioners, Corporate and Property Consultants
(JOY CHAMBERS).

9th February, 2011

The Secretary,
Jalingo Local Government Council,
Taraba State.
Sir,

RE: DEMAND FOR IMMEDIATE PAYMENT OF N14,359,758.38 DEBT TO OUR CLIENT
We are solicitors for Oceanic Bank PLC (herein after referred to as “our client”) and we write this letter on their instruction.
Our instruction is that sometimes in the year 2007, your Local Government issued an irrevocable standing payment order in favour of our client wherein you guaranteed to the N35,000,000.00 Nigeria Union of Local Government Employees Jalingo Branch Taraba State took from our client is paid off, you reneged on your undertaking till date.
Presently, your indebtedness to our client stands in the tune of N14, 359, 758. 38.
TAKE NOTICE that if within 30 clear days from the date of your receipt of this letter you fail, refuse and or neglect to pay the aforementioned sum of money into our client’s coffers we shall take legal action against you and recover the sum in full.
A stitch in time saves nine.
Yours faithfully
J. N. OKEZIE & ASSOCIATE

John Okezie, Esq.”

The 2nd respondent replied exhibit D2 vide a letter dated 14th March, 2011 which was also attached as exhibit E, and same is hereby reproduced hereunder.

“JALINGO LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TARABA STATE OF NIGERIA
Our Ref: ………………………….Â Â Â Â Â Â Department:……………….
Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â 14th March, 2011
Your Ref: …………………………Â Â Â Â Â Â Date:…………………………..
J. N. Okezie & Associates
New Block No.1
Hammaruwa Way, Opposite NIPOST Shop
P. O. Box 135
Jalingo.

RE:DEMAND FOR IMMEDIATE PAYMENT OF N14, 359, 758.38 DEBT TO OCEANIC BANK
We write to acknowledge the receipt of your letter on the subject captioned above, dated 9th February, 2011.

2. We first of all, wish to register our apology and regret, over our inability to liquidate the said debt within the agreed period of repayment. We are not unmindful of what this might have caused your client.

3. The Council wish to use this medium to register her prayers as follows:-

i. That the interest on the principal amount be waved off.
ii. That the Bank should stop further calculation of interest on the amount.
iii. That the balance of the principal amount be restructured, to be repaid in ten months period, commencing from the month of March, 2011.
4. Kindly consider our lean financial position, and grant the above prayers, to facilitate early commencement of liquidation of the said dept.
5. thanks for your usual understanding please.

Hon. Hassan Bappa
Chairman C.T.C
Jalingo Local Government.”

Upon the service of the originating processes under the undefended List procedure on the two respondents, none of them filed a defence or notice of intention to defend the action with an accompanying affidavit. The facts contained in the affidavit of the appellant having not been countered are deemed admitted as true, and the 2nd respondent has admitted the appellants claim against it. The appellant averred in paragraph 9 of the affidavit, that the second respondent guaranteed the loan granted to the 1st respondent. Exhibit B is the guarantee made by the 2nd respondent to the loan. The apex court in Auto Import and Export V Adebayo (supra) re-stated the liability of guarantors of loans on pages 923 as follows:
“It would in my view amount to a monumental failure of justice to allow the 3rd respondent who guaranteed the repayment of the credit granted by the plaintiff to the Nigerian buyer to walk away free from liability while the debt, the repayment of which it guaranteed remained unpaid.”

See Nwankwo & Anor V EDCS (2007) 151 LRCN 148.

A quick revisit will now be made to exhibit E. A calm perusal of exhibit E, shows that the 2nd respondent had expressly and in clear and unambiguous terms admitted its liability to the appellant, with regards to the sum of money claimed in the suit. The law is trite that what has been admitted needs no further proof. See section 20 and 123 of the Evidence Act 2011 and the following cases: E.M.H. V Comet Shipping Agencies (2009) ALL FWLR (pt. 483) 1260, Ekpemupolo V Edremoda (2009) ALL FWLR (pt. 473) 1220, Salawu V Yusuf (2007) ALL FWLR (pt. 384) 230, Okposin V Assam (2005) ALL FWLR (pt. 282) 1863, Taiwo V Adegboro (2011) ALL FWLR (pt. 584) 52 at 67, Din V A. N. N. Ltd (1990) 5 SCNJ 209.

The Undefended List Procedure is normally an abridged kind of procedure that is fought on affidavit evidence. The defendants now respondents were served all the originating processes in this suit. None of the defendants now respondents filed anything by way of defence or notice of intention to defend the action. The respondents by their failure to deliver notice of intention to defend with an affidavit disclosing a defence on the merit as envisaged by Order 22 Rule 3 (1) of the Taraba State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1997, the Lower Court is left with no option than to proceed to judgment under Order 22 Rule 4 of the said Rules, which provides thus:
“Where any defendant neglects to deliver the notice of defence and affidavit prescribed by rule 3(1) or is not given leave to defend by the Court, the suit shall be heard as an undefended suit, and judgment given thereon, without calling upon the plaintiff to summon witnesses before the court to prove his case formally.”
See Diamond Bank V G. S. M. Agro- Allied Ltd (1999) 8 NWLR (pt. 616) 558 at 559, Ben Thomas Hotel Ltd V Sebi Furniture Co. Ltd (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt.123) 523, U. T. C. V Pamotei (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.62) 737, Franchal (Nig) Ltd V N. A. B. Ltd (1995) 8 NWLR (pt. 412) 126, Alale V Olu (2001) 7 NWLR (pt. 711) 119 at 128 – 129.

Curiously however, with the overwhelming evidence against the 2nd respondent staring the court in the face and its failure to file a notice of intention to defend, the Lower Court gave judgment against the 1st respondent and exculpated the 2nd respondent in the following words:
“From the foregoing, I hold that hence there is no facts to the effect that the 2nd respondent/defendants account is no more domiciled with the application/plaintiff, then the 2nd respondent/defendant cannot be jointly liable for default of repayment of the loan benefited by the 1st respondent/defendant.”

The above finding made by the trial court in exculpating the 2nd respondents was neither raised as a defence nor supported by evidence, hence perverse. It is trite that a court of law cannot set up a defence not raised by a party to a suit. See Victino Fixed Odds Ltd V Ojo (2010) 185 LRCN 166, Chabasaya V C. B. N. (2009) ALL FWLR (pt. 481) 939, Obajimi V Adedbi (2008) 3 NWLR (pt.1075) 1, Buhari V Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (pt. 941) 1, Durosaro V Ayorinde (2008) 3 NWLR (pt.1075) 1, Ibori V Agbi (2004) ALL FWLR (pt.202) 1799, Ogundele & Anor V Agiri (2009) 18 NWLR (pt.1173) 219, (2009) 12 SC (pt.1) 13.

Furthermore, where a court raises an issues suo motu parties should be invited to address it before pronouncing on same, otherwise it will amount to a breach fair hearing. See Oje v. Babalola (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt.185) 267 at 280, Abbas v. Solomon (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt.735) 144.The respondents devoted substantial part of their brief to the preliminary objection and the only point raised in the response to the appeal was that it was the appellant that was in breach of exhibit B. On the point raised, I am in complete agreement with the appellant that the point is neither covered by the lone issue for determination nor arising from the judgment now on appeal. The said point is accordingly discountenanced.

Consequent upon the foregoing, the finding exculpating the 2nd respondent is hereby set aside for being perverse and in breach of fair hearing. The 2nd respondent having also not defended the action is jointly liable for the loan along with the 1st respondent. The appeal is therefore meritorious and is hereby allowed. The part of the judgment of the Lower Court exculpating the 2nd respondent from liability is hereby set aside. The 2nd respondent is jointly liable for the loan along with the 1st respondent. There will be no order as to costs.

JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.: I have read before now the Judgment of my lord, Jauro, JCA, just delivered in this Appeal and I agree with his conclusion that this Appeal is loaded with merit. I merely want to add a few words in further agreement.

The purpose of an undefended list procedure is to enable a plaintiff to obtain quick judgment in clear cases where the defendant has no defence to the claim of debt or liquidated sum by the plaintiff.

On the other hand, the object of the affidavit of the defendant is that of disclosing the ground for asking the court to be allowed in to defend the action. It is to disclose or show a dispute between the parties which would need to be tried. See: Imoniyame Holdings V Soneb Enterprises Ltd (2010) 1 SCNJ 303. Where, as in the instant case, the Defendants failed to file such an affidavit, it is crystal clear even to the most obtuse observer that they did not dispute the claim as they had no defence to the action. Indeed, from the Exhibit …, they explicitly, overtly and unambiguously admitted the claim.

In an action filed on the Undefended List, where a defendant wants to defend the action, the only issue for consideration is whether the defendant has disclosed a defence to justify transferring the matter to the General Cause List or not.

In such nature of cases, where the plaintiff claims repayment of a loan, the only defences open to a defendant(s) (debtor and guarantor) are two, viz:
1. That the defendant had refunded the entire loan by the production of receipts, bank tellers or any other document showing that the debt was totally repaid; or
2. That he never borrowed the money in the first place, he never applied for the loan or debt, he never obtained any money and that any purported application for the loan or receipt for the loan or receipt for the loan issued by him is a forgery.
See: Okoli V Morecab Finance Nig. Ltd (2007) 5 SCNJ 25.

In the instant case, neither of the Defendants responded in any way to the claim of the Plaintiff at the Lower Court, much less file a Notice of intention to defend the suit, accompanied by an affidavit disclosing a defence on the merit. This is in spite of the ample documentary evidence exhibited to the affidavit, particularly Exhibit B, a document written by the 2nd Respondent to the Appellant titled “Irrevocable Standing Order”, and Exhibit E, another letter by the 2nd Respondent admitting liability and requesting from the Appellant, among other things, more time within which to repay the balance outstanding on the principal amount of the loan. In the Exhibit E, the 2nd Respondent clearly and without any inhibition admitted in express terms that she guaranteed the loan of the 1st Defendant (1st Respondent) and went further to both seek an interest waiver and more time within which to off-set the loan. Therefore, based on the undisputed facts of the case, the learned trial Judge ought to have entered Judgment unreservedly against both Defendants without much ado.

In view of the failure of the Respondents to file the necessary processes disclosing any defence they may have had on the merit, it became obvious that the necessary facts to support any defence at all was not before the trial Court. Following on the heels of the failure of the Respondents to file an affidavit in response to the affidavit of the Plaintiff, disclosing a defence on the merit, as required by the Rules of Court, the affidavit of the Plaintiff, which is unchallenged, is deemed admitted as being correct and the Lower Court was at all times at liberty to accept it as true and correct. See: Henry Stephens Engineering Ltd V SA Yakubu (Nig) Ltd (2009) 5 SCNJ 201.

It is necessary at this point to re-state the position of the law that is long since trite that affidavit evidence which is neither challenged nor debunked remains good and reliable evidence which ought to be relied upon by a court. See: The Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners of Nigeria V Medical & Health Workers Union of Nigeria (2008) 1 SCNJ 348; AG Plateau State v. AG Nassarawa State (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt.930) 421.
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The issue raised by the learned trial Judge suo motu in his Judgment, with all due deference, amounted to nothing but conjecture and speculation on his part, and even worse, a descent into the arena where he stood the risk of being bloodied by the warring parties. Whether the 2nd Respondent’s account was still domiciled with the Appellant Bank was never an issue before him as it was never raised in the processes of the Appellant, nor was there any input on this phantom issue from the Respondents since they most studiously ignored the suit at the Lower Court from the start to the finish. I must observe that courts are enjoined not to speculate on any possibilities not supported by the evidence before them. See Uwagboe V State (2008) 4 SCNJ 459. The enormity of this issue was highlighted by the learned Justices of the Supreme Court in the case of Victino Fixed Odds Ltd V Ojo (2010) 3 SCNJ 112. Fabiyi, JSC, who delivered the lead Judgment, had this to say on this issue at page 122 of the Report:
“There is no doubt that the trial Judge descended into the arena when he suo motu, in his Judgment, raised the issue of the composition of the Arbitration Panel … and resolved them in favour of the appellant without affording the respondents’ counsel the opportunity to address him on the point. The trial Judge had no duty to bridge the yawning gap in the case of a party to the proceedings. See: Ajuwon V Akanni (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt. 316) 182; Salubi V Nwariaku (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 505) 442. Even then, it is manifest from the record that the issue taken suo motu by the trial Judge was not part of the grounds upon which the order for certiorari was sought to quash the decision of the Arbitration Panel. There was therefore a fundamental misdirection by the trial Judge who made out a case in favour of the Appellant without hearing the Respondents on the issue. It was not his business to do so. See Olorunfemi V Asho (1999) 1 NWLR (Pt. 585) 1 at 9; (1999) 1 SCNJ 1. It is trite that a court should not set up for the parties a case which is different from the one set up by the parties themselves in their pleadings and/or evidence. See Oniah V Onyyiah (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 99) 514; Ojo-Osagie V Adonri (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 349) 131. It is certain to me that the trial Court crossed the line in jumping into the arena by raking up the vital point discussed above suo motu without hearing the respondents. The court below was perfectly right in setting aside the null decision of the trial court.”Â Â
The respected Jurist, Oguntade, JSC, added his weighty voice to this serious lapse of the trial Judge which was fraught with many vices, in the following words at page 123 of the Report:
“In Hambe V Hueze (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt. 703) 372 ay 388, this Court observed:
“Generally, an appellate court cannot suo motu raise issues at the Judgment stage which the parties did not raise without the risk of stepping into the arena of conflict. Nevertheless, the appellate court, in its discretion, in special circumstances involving issues of a fundamental nature, may raise issues on its own part. In such circumstances, the court cannot found its decision on such new issues without first affording both parties or their counsel opportunity to address the court on the new issues. Therefore an appellate court must be wrong to raise issues not raised and fully contested by the parties in the trial otherwise it may fall into the error of making a case that the parties themselves neither contemplated nor contested. In the instant case, the procedure adopted by the Court of Appeal in raising an issue and disposing of same in its Judgment without affording the Appellants the opportunity of reacting to that issue smacked of lack of fair hearing. It runs foul of the principle of audi alterem partem.”
It is wrong for a court to give a decision on a point of which opportunity was not afforded counsel to argue at the hearing and particularly a point which throughout the hearing was not raised.”
It is in the light of this that I hold the view that the issue raised suo motu by the Lower Court in its Judgment, without affording the parties an opportunity to address the court on it, is very speculative in the extreme and therefore dangerous. I need say nothing more on that.

Furthermore, the letter written by the 2nd Respondent admitting the claim of the Appellant, Exhibit E, which was always before the Lower Court, constituted an unequivocal admission of liability on the loan. In spite of the fact that the 2nd Respondent was aware of this letter presented to the trial Court, she neither denied it, nor did she dispute it nor did she, in any way, cast aspersions on its authenticity. The learned trial Judge therefore fell into grave error when it purported to speculate a case for a party who, not only refused to defend the action, but candidly admitted his liability in writing. An admission of a party in law is the best evidence, in the sense that the opposing party need not make any strenuous effort to prove the admitted facts. Thus, a court of law is entitled to give judgment based on an admission by a party if the admission is relevant to the facts in issue. In civil cases, admission by a party is evidence of the facts asserted against him. Unless explanations are given which satisfy the court that admissions should not be so regarded, due probative weight should be given to them as such. See: Our Line Ltd V SCC Nig. Ltd (2009) 7 SCNJ 358; Salawu V Yusuf (2007) 5 SCNJ 354.

In sum, I agree with my learned brother, Jauro, JCA, that the Appeal is meritorious. I allow it and abide by all the orders made in the lead Judgment, inclusive of the order as to costs.
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BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A: I agree entirely with the judgment of my learned brother, Adamu Jauro, JCA just delivered.Â Â It has dealt both extensively and exhaustively with all the germane issues canvassed in this appeal. I only wish to make the following comments:

By the procedure under the undefended list, where a Defendant, as in the instant appeal the Respondents, fails or neglects or refuses to file a notice of intention to defend, the resultant duty on the Court below was to proceed to enter judgment against the Respondents.

However, it is of crucial importance to point it out at once that where the case of a Plaintiff under the undefended list procedure as put forward by him in his supporting affidavit does not prove any legitimate claim against a Defendant, it does not matter that such a Defendant did not file any notice of intention to defend, the Court is under no duty to enter judgment against such a Defendant against whom the Plaintiff has not proved anything on legally admissible evidence. See Benkay Nig. Ltd. V Cadbury Nig. Ltd (2012) LRCN 57 @ Pp. 64 – 65.

In the instant appeal, the Appellant as Plaintiff in the Court below had relied on both affidavit and documentary evidence in proof of its claims against the Respondents, out of which the Court below had in its judgment appealed against exculpated the 2nd Respondent of any liability to the Appellant.

Now, on the face of Exhibit E dated 14/3/2011 in which the 2nd Respondent clearly and unequivocally admitted its liability to the Appellant for the liquidation of the outstanding balance on the loan advanced to the 1st Respondent by the Appellant, can the exculpation of the 2nd Respondent from liability to the Appellant by the Court below be justified in law and on the facts? I certainly do not think so.
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In my view therefore, on the face of the clear and unambiguous admission of liability by the 2nd Respondent for the payment of the outstanding balance on the loan granted to the 1st Respondent by the Appellant as in Exhibit E, which Exhibit was legally before the Court below, it is clear and I so firmly hold that the finding of the Court below that the 2nd Respondent was not liable to the Appellant merely because the domiciliation of the Jalingo Local Government Council Account with the Appellant was not proved to have ceased was clearly perverse. It was clearly contrary to the proved evidence by way of the explicit and express contents of Exhibit E, which contents was not in any way denied by the 2nd Respondent in the entire proceedings before the Court below, having not filed any notice of its intention to defend the claims against it by the Appellant. See Kuforiji V. YB Ltd. (1981) 6 – 7 SC 25 @ P. 46.
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The law is and has always been that what is admitted needs no further proof and this is so because in the adversorial system of administration of justice in operation in our civil jurisprudence, admission is perhaps one of the best form of evidence in favour of the party whose facts or claim is admitted by the other party. See Sections 20 and 123 of the Evidence Act 2011; see also FMH V. Commet Shipping Agencies (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 483) 1260Â Â @ P. 1266;Â Â Salawu V. Yusuf (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 384) 230 @ P.236.
In law therefore, with the express admission of liability by the 2nd Respondent as contained in Exhibit E, there was in my finding no further duty on the Appellant to prove the 2nd Respondent’s indebtedness to the Appellant. An admission against self interest as in Exhibit E completely and sufficiently in my finding discharges the minimal onus of proof on the Appellant in the face of the unchallenged affidavit and documentary evidence relied upon by the Appellant in the proceedings before the Court below. See Adike v. Obiareri (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt.758) 537; FCE Ltd. v. Anyanwu (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt.501) 533, Onyege v. Ebere (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt.889) 26.

In law, Exhibit E having remained unchallenged, unimpugned and uncontroverted by the 2nd Respondent, despite being given the opportunity to do so by the due service of all the Court’s processes on it by the Appellant, it is good evidence on which the court below ought to have acted upon to find in favour of the Appellant against the 2nd Respondent. See Cameroon Airlines v. Mike Otutuizu (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt.929) 202 @ p.207; CBN v. Okojie (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt.882) 488 @ p.515; Maduga v. Bai (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.62) 635; Agagu v. Dawodu (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt.160) 65; Military Gov. of Lagos State v. Adeyiga (2001) FWLR (Pt.83) 2137 @ p.2155.

It is in the light of the above and the fuller reasons eloquently given in the lead judgment by my learned brother, Adamu Jauro, JCA that I too hereby allow this appeal. I abide by all the consequential orders made therein in the lead judgment including the order as to cost.

Appearances

Mr. J. O. OgucheFor Appellant

AND

Mr. A. I. Umar Holding the brief of Mr. I. A. JaloFor Respondent