DUKKU ISHAYA & ANOR v. THE STATE
(2013)LCN/6060(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Tuesday, the 26th day of March, 2013
CA/S/30/C/2010
RATIO
“It is the duty of a defence counsel with respect to objection to admissibility of a confessional statement to raise objection to the statement not voluntarily made. See R v IGWE (1960) 5 FSC 55, UCHE OBIODIOZO & 2 ORS V THE STATE SCNLR 158, OKARO H v THE STATE (1990) 1 SC 169” Per AWOTOYE, J.C.A.
WITNESSES: WHETHER THE PROSECUTION IS BOUND TO CALL A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF WITNESSES
“The prosecution is only bound to call such number of witnesses sufficient to prove its case. According to Wali JSC in AKPAN V THE STATE (1991) 5 SCNJ 1 at 14. “With the evidence adduced by the prosecution it is my view that this case was proved beyond reasonable doubt even with the testimony of the witness not called. The prosecution’s duty is only to call such number of witnesses sufficient to prove their case. They are not obliged to call all the witnesses named in the proof of evidence.” Per AWOTOYE, J.C.A.
“An accused person can be convicted on his confessional statement alone where the confession is consistent with other ascertained facts which have been proved. See AKPAN V THE STATE (1992) 7 SCNJ 22.” Per AWOTOYE, J.C.A.
“Alibi is a defence by which an accused person alleges that at the time when the offence with which he was charged was committed he was elsewhere. Notice of intention to raise the defence of alibi must be given and this ought normally be given at the first possible opportunity by a suspect in answer to a charge by the police at the investigation stage to enable the truth or falsity of the allegation to be established. See Ozaki and 1 other vs. The State (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt.124) p.92 and Adio vs. The State (1986) 3 NWLR (pt. 31) 714.” Per ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
TIJJANI ABDULLAHI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
TUNDE O. AWOTOYE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
DUKKU ISHAYA & ANOR Appellant(s)
AND
THE STATE Respondent(s)
TUNDE O. AWOTOYE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is the judgment in respect of the appeal of the 1st and 2nd accused in charge No KB/ZR/HC/IC/2003 against the judgment of Hon Justice I Bashar of Kebbi State High Court delivered on 10/3/2004.
The charge against the accused persons was as follows:-
“That you Dukku Ishaya and Gomo Doro on or about the 12th day of November 2001 at Rikoto District of Zuru Local Government Area, within the Zuru Judicial Division committed culpable homicide punishable with death to wit: stabbing Huce Dondo with a knife on the neck which resulted to his death and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 221(b) of the Penal Code”
The learned trial Judge, after hearing both parties and their respective witnesses gave judgment inter alia thus:
“It is my duty to examine the facts before me with a view of finding what defences if any are available to the accused after a careful examination; I am unable to find any defence opened to the accused. In judgment I find the case against the accused proved beyond reasonable doubt. Accused are found guilty as charged and are convicted accordingly.”
Dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial court, the accused persons filed joint notice of appeal dated 20/5/2009.
The grounds of appeal as contained in the notice of appeal are:
“GROUND 1
The learned trial judge erred in law when he rejected the defence of alibi raised by the accused persons.
GROUND 2
The learned Trial judge erred in law when he convicted the two accused persons and sentenced them to death when there was no direct and positive evidence of who inflicted the injury that subsequently led to the death of the deceased.
Ground 3
The learned trial judge erred in law by holding that the statements of the accused persons Exhibits A-A1 and B-B1 were rightly admitted in evidence which thereby occasioned miscarriage of justice.
GROUND 4
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that “I have carefully perused and examined the statement of the 1st accused person and found that corroborated of the death of the deceased, the confession was positive, direct and voluntary and was consistent with the independent evidence offered by the prosecution. I therefore find it satisfactory” which thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
GROUND 5
The learned trial judge erred in law by relying on circumstantial evidence to conclude that the 2nd accused participated in the alleged crime.”
The accused persons (now appellants) however filed separate briefs of argument on 1/3/2011 but joint reply brief on 22/11/2011.
In the first appellant’s brief settled by Adekola Mustapha, appellant’s counsel, three issues were formulated for determination to wit:
ISSUE NO 1
Did the learned trial judge give adequate consideration to defense of Alibi raised by the appellant?
ISSUE NO 2
Whether in the circumstance of this case, the learned trial judge was right to admit Exhibits A & A1 as confessional statements volunteered by the accused person and convicted him on the strength of the statement not corroborated by independent evidence (Grounds 3 & 4).
ISSUE NO 3
Whether the prosecution proved the case against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt to justify the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants (Ground 2).
On issue No 1, learned appellant’s counsel submitted that the learned trial judge did not give adequate consideration to the defense of alibi raised by the appellant.
He referred to the evidence of the appellant and submitted that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. He relied on EZEFUDU V STATE (2001) 17 NWLR (PT 741) 82 at 116-117. He submitted, relying on USUFU V STATE (2007) 1 NWLR (PT 1020) 94 at 120, that the learned trial judge failed to consider all the evidences before him before arriving at his decision.
Learned counsel stated that there was no other positive evidence strong enough to justify the rejection of the defense of alibi of the accused.
He submitted further that since the incident was alleged to have been taken place in the night during a funeral ceremony of a traditionalist attended by a large group of people, the prosecution ought to have procured an independent witness who was present and who saw the appellants when they committed the offence.
He urged the court to resolve the issue in favour of the appellants. On issue No 2, learned appellant’s counsel submitted that the statements obtained from the accused in the circumstance they were taken could not be taken to have established the truth. He cited Sec 28 of the Evidence Act and SANUSI V THE STATE (1984) 10 SC 166 at 199, DIBIE V STATE (2007) 9 NWLR (PT 1036) 30, and AKPAN V THE STATE (2001) 15 NWLR (PT 737) 745.
He submitted that the court was enjoined to have some evidence outside the confessional statement which would make it probable that the confession was true. He cited EFFIOG V STATE (1998) 8 NWLR (PT 562) 362.
On the evidence of PW1, learned counsel submitted that there was no evidence to show that PW1 knew the accused before the incident.
He urged the court to resolve the issue in favour of the appellant.
On issue No 3, Mr Adekola Mustapha learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the onus was on the prosecution throughout the criminal proceeding to establish the guilt of the accused person beyond all reasonable doubt. He relied on NDIDI V STATE (2005) 17 NWLR (PT 1038) 30.
Learned counsel referred to the evidence against the accused person which are prosecution witnesses 1 and 2 and Exhibits A and A1. He submitted that once a shadow of reasonable doubt was cast on the mind of the court on the probability of the accused committing the alleged act, he must be discharged and acquitted. He cited OLALEKAN V STATE (2001) 18 NWLR (PT. 746) 793.
He stated that there was a common ground that fight ensued which resulted into the death of the deceased but the prosecution did not lead evidence to show who and who were at the scene of the fight.
He stated further that it was not in dispute that somebody died nor was it in dispute that the act of stabbing was done by somebody but the identity of the person was not known.
He submitted that this was fatal to the prosecution’s case. He cited OLALEKAN V THE STATE (2001) 18 NWLR (PT 746) 793 at 823.
He urged the court to resolve the issue in favour of the appellant.
As aforestated, learned counsel filed a separate 2nd appellant’s brief. In the said brief, learned counsel formulated 4 issues for determination. He formulated and the 3 issues earlier formulated in the 1st appellant’s brief and additionally issue No 4 in the 2nd appellant’s brief. Learned counsel’s arguments on the issues 1, 2 and 4 in the two briefs of argument are the same.
Issue No 3 is however different. Issue No 3 in the 2nd appellant’s brief reads:
“Was the learned trial judge to convict the 2nd appellant of the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death merely on the basis of his presence at the scene of the crime?
(GROUND 4).”
Learned counsel on this issue submitted that there was no evidence as to which of the accused stabbed the deceased and there was no case of conspiracy against them.
He referred to the statement of the 2nd accused which was to the effect that there was a fight between the 1st accused and the deceased and that it was he and Rabuda who tried to separate them and also that it was Rabuda who removed the knife.
He submitted that it was not enough if the prosecution proved that the accused or one of the accused probably committed the crime, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt that one of the accused committed the offence or that both of them jointly did the act.
He argued further that the prosecution failed to identify who caused the death of the deceased.
He urged the court to hold that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and allow the appeal and enter an order of acquittal in favour of the accused.
The respondent’s brief of argument was settled by Kabiru Aliyu, the Assistant Director of Public Prosecution, Ministry of Justice, Kebbi State. He adopted all the issues formulated for determination by the appellants. On issue No 1, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the accused did not let the police know at the earliest opportunity where and with whom he was at the material time. He relied on AKPAN V THE STATE (1986) 3 NWLR (PT 29) 258; ADIO V THE STATE (1986) 3 NWLR (PT 31). He then submitted where the accused failed to disclose this to the police the police was not obliged to investigate his defense of alibi.
Learned counsel stated further that the issue of alibi was not raised by the appellants until when they testified in the witness box. He submitted that the trial judge gave adequate consideration to the defense of alibi raised by the appellants. He urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the respondent.
On issue No 2, learned respondent’s counsel submitted that since no objection was raised to the admission of the confessional statements as exhibits when sought to be tendered the learned trial judge rightly admitted them.
On issue No 3, learned counsel referred to the statements of the appellants where they asserted that they both met each of them fighting the deceased and the evidence of PW1 that he saw both of them pursuing the deceased.
He therefore submitted that it was the combined act of the appellants that caused the death of the deceased.
He urged the court to hold that the learned trial judge was right in convicting the 2nd appellant.
On issue 4, learned counsel submitted that a court could convict based on the confessional statement of an accused person made voluntarily and which was direct and positive. He stated that Exhibits A, B and B1 in the record of proceedings had all the above requirements and was rightly used by the learned trial Judge. He cited ABDULLAHI V STATE (2008) 3 NCC 549 at 551.
He urged the court to dismiss the appeal.
I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel on both sides as well as the contents of the record of appeal.
I have also carefully considered the issues formulated by learned counsel on both sides for determination.
I am of the respectful view that the following issue embraces all the issues formulated in all the briefs.
“Whether the prosecution proved the case against the accused person beyond reasonable doubt to justify the conviction and sentence imposed on him”
I shall determine this appeal in the light of the above sole issue. The prosecution at the court below called two witnesses. PW1 was Bawa Kana. He gave evidence inter alia thus:
“I know the accused persons. I know Hucee Dodo, my brother. He was killed on 12/11/2011. I was in Rikoto for traditional rights celebrations.
The deceased came and told me that I should help him Dukku & Dawa killed him. I observed that he was stabbed around 2 am. I lit my touch light and I identified them, they ran away, I told my mother, Huce was men behind me, the deceased was about to go home, he fell down, I went and told my mother, we found the deceased lying on the ground, he is dead, we told our village head, who in turn told the Emir and he told the police, the police brought a vehicle and we conveyed the corpse to the police station; from police station to the hospital general here in Zuru; we went to the police station again.
I was handed over the body for burial, we buried the corpse.”
The PW2 was Inspector Abdullahi Maidawa who claimed to have voluntarily taken the statements of the accused. When the 1st accused was confronted with the statement, he answered “Yes it is the one”.
The counsel for the 1st accused however objected to the additional statement. The 2nd accused did not object to his statement. Their respective statements were admitted as Exhibits A1 and B1 respectively.
The police officer who obtained statement from the accused persons was cross-examined by learned counsel. He answered thus:
“I did not see any weapon there, I will, each of the accused was saying it was his co-accused and the deceased fighting. I called Rabunda but he told me that he was not at the scene when the fight took place.
I got my witness through information.”
It must be stated here that the evidence of the 2nd PW on the voluntariness of the respective statements of the accused persons was not challenged under cross-examination.
After close of prosecution’s case, each of the accused gave evidence in defense of himself.
The 1st accused gave evidence. He knew the 2nd accused. He also knew the deceased. He absolutely denied the incident. He gave evidence as follows:
“My name is Dukku Ishaya, I live at Ganyale Village, Presently, I am remanded in prison at Zuru. Before my arrest, I was farmer. I know the 2nd accused person, I know Huche Dondon. I did no stab Huche Dondon. I have never been arraigned talk less of conviction before any court of law. It is not true that we were not in good terms with the deceased before his death. It is not true that there was serious disagreement between our house and that of the deceased. We don’t have any relationship with the deceased. We only lived in the same village. There was no transaction whatsoever between me and the deceased. When I was sitting at home, I saw one Dake, Emir’s messenger, came and met me, he said they were looking for me, our District head sent him, I asked him what happened, he told me that we fought. I told him I was not at the scene of the fight, he said since he never heard I fight with anybody, I should escort him to defend myself, I asked my junior brother to call my uncle to escort me, he came, we were brought to the police station and went back police asked me if I know Huce, I replied Yes, they asked me what happened to him, I said I don’t know, he told me not to look down on them, they said I was the one who stabbed Huche, I told them I was not at the scene of the fight. I was slapped by the police. He showed me a pistol and asked me to tell them the truth. I was beaten, I fell down on the bench, I was under torture at police station. I did not give any statement to the police. I did not say it was the 2nd accused who stabbed Huche. I did not see the 2nd accused at the police station, it is not true whoever came and gave evidence that I fought with Huche.”
The 2nd accused, Gomo Doro, also gave evidence as follows:
“My name is Gomo Doro, I was formerly a farmer, I live at Bura Danko/Wasagu Local Govt. Area before my arrest, I know Ishaya Dukku. I know Huche, I married from their family. I am still married to her Dada, the 1st accused is my senior brother close relation. It is not true that I stabbed Huche. It is not true that Huche was not in support of my marriage with his relation. There was no misunderstanding between me and Huche and between our families. I was going to Rikoto when they arrested me and brought me to police station, they interrogated me, I said I know nothing, they beat me but I did not tell them I know anything pertaining to the killing. The police said they were suspecting me. I did not give any statement to the police. I was not at the scene. I did not see Dukku at the police station, at times, I spent up to a year without seeing him. By the time I was arrested, I did not know where Huche was. I was arrested in the morning.”
Under cross-examination, he said;
“I am Gomo Doro, there is nobody, I am only hearing that name. On the day in question, I was in my house when I heard ceremony at Dandare’s house is a little far away. I just decided not to go there. I know Bawa Kana Rabuda. I know him for long. He can identify me but a times somebody can resemble somebody. I did not attend the ceremony. The 1st accused and the deceased did not fight, I did not stab Huche, he did not see me, he just said so.”
The defense called a medical doctor, Dr Salisu Ahmed Abdullahi. His evidence confirmed that the victim died.
It is also necessary to quote the statements of the accused persons for clarity’s sake. 1st accused stated in his statement thus:
“I of the above name and address wish to state as follows:- On the 12/11/2001 at Night time at about 0300hrs I was in funeral ceremony at Dandare’s House at Rikoto hill I went out behind house of Dandare I meet Huche Yage and Gomo Doro then fighting each other I separate them after I separate them I told Gomo that anybody abuse your father he don’t know the volued of his own then Huche told me that he don’t want stupidness. Then Rabuda slape me I feld down he removed my knife and stabbed his junior brother Huche when I had Huche crying I saw people running I understand that it is that knife he stabbed Huche I also ran away, the knife is with Rabuda because he is the person who removed the knife with me the time Huche was fighting with Gomo Doro Dabo Tuku also slape Huche I ran away and leave them until the following day Dabo told me that Huche has dead.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT
Dukku Ishaya has made additional statement that I am the person who stabbed Huche with my knife but not intentionally is by mistake”
The statement of the 2nd accused also reads thus:
“I of the above name and address wish to state as follows:- on the 12/11/2001 I was funeral ceremony at Rikoto hill Zuru, I went out behind the road at about 0300hrs I saw Huche and Duku their fighting Rabuda separate them but they over power him I help Rabuda to separate them after separating them Duku Ishaya removed his knife and stabbed Huche then Huche shout and call his senior brother Rabuda Duku has stabbed me with knife as I had that I ran away, I went to the House of Biti Junior Brother to my father then he took me to District Head of Rikoto’s house. The District Head took me to police station Zuru. That is all my statement.”
The learned trial judge considered all the above before finding the two accused guilty. Did the prosecution prove its case as required by law? And was the judgment of the lower court right?
I will first discuss the issue of statements of the accused persons which they retracted.
An accused person can be convicted on his confessional statement alone where the confession is consistent with other ascertained facts which have been proved. See AKPAN V THE STATE (1992) 7 SCNJ 22.
It is the duty of a defence counsel with respect to objection to admissibility of a confessional statement to raise objection to the statement not voluntarily made. See R v IGWE (1960) 5 FSC 55, UCHE OBIODIOZO & 2 ORS V THE STATE SCNLR 158, OKARO H v THE STATE (1990) 1 SC 169
I want to view the submission of counsel on the statements in the light of the above principles of law.
The accused persons (appellants) were legally represented at the lower court. The IPO gave evidence on how the two statements were obtained. He tendered the statements and they were admitted without objection from defense counsel. After his examination in chief, his evidence to the effect that the statements were voluntarily made by the accused persons was also not challenged under cross-examination such unchallenged evidence is in law deemed to be true. See LSDPC V NL & NL & SF LTD (1992) (PT 243) 620, AMADI V NWOSU (1992) 6SCNJ 59, OKOSI V STATE (1989) 1 NWLR (PT 100) page 642 at 657.
To my mind, it is too late in the day, after the close of prosecution’s case, for an accused to start to retract a statement which he had opportunity to challenge when it was being tendered and when the prosecution’s case was on.
A prompt and timely challenge would have enabled the trial court to assess the demeanour of the prosecution witness and compare with that of the accused and thereby form an opinion on the truthfulness or otherwise of the accused’s case. I must add however that the statement of 2nd accused is not confessional.
It seems to me that the evidence of the 1st accused person on the process of obtaining the statements is an after thought and the lower court was right to have discountenanced it.
On the defence of alibi in respect of learned counsel for the accused made heavy weather of, the principles of law are settled. In OBAKPOLOR V THE STATE (1991) 1SC (PT 1) 35, Akpata JSC had this to say in proof of the defence of alibi:
‘It is no proof of alibi for an accused person merely to assert as in this case, that he was not at the scene of crime and could not have been there because he was elsewhere. He must lead credible evidence. The evidential burden of adducing evidence to support a defense of alibi is on the accused person raising such defense because the facts are upon which the defence of alibi rests are facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused person raising such defence.”
How did the 1st accused person raise his defense of alibi? This can be gathered from the judgment of the learned trial judge on pages 51-52 of record of appeal as follows:
“During the police investigation, 2nd Accused gave extra judicial statements which appears to be confessional but they did not raise the defense of alibi PW1, eye witness, gave positive and direct evidence of the involvement of the accused in the murder of the deceased and yet defence of alibi was not raised nor was he cross-examined effectively on that. It is also significant to note that the accused in raising the defense of alibi said he was not at the scene, and he failed to show anything contrary to what PW1 said, he was supposed to give an account of where he was at that material time. Alibi is a radical; the facts of alibi are particularly within the accused knowledge and such witnesses as may be available. He has the onus therefore to disclose such facts with necessary details and particulars at the earliest opportunity so as to put the burden on the police to check on them and deal with them with some finality, if he does not, as in this case, the police cannot be expected to produce facts which as peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused persons. More so accused counsel deliberately discarded no defense of alibi. In the result I am not convinced. Prosecution adduces sufficient and accepted evidence to fix the accused at the scene of the crime therefore, defense of alibi is physically demolished and I hereby rejected it accordingly. See the case of AKPAN & ORS V STATE 10 NSCQR pg 722.”
I am convinced that the above finding of the learned trial judge is unimpeachable. The 1st accused person did not disclose any particulars of his whereabouts to enable the prosecution investigate their truthfulness.
The question that remains to be considered is whether or not the two accused were jointly guilty of the charge.
The evidence of PW1, Bawa Kana, which the learned trial Judge obviously believed, is very instructive. It is clear that he claimed to have seen the 1st accused and one Dawa. Who was Dawa? The deceased told him Dukku and Dawa killed him. Who was that Dawa?
I have searched through the record of appeal. I am not in doubt that the 1st accused was Dukku but I am in serious doubt that 2nd accused was Dawa.
What evidence then remains against the 2nd accused? He did not confess to have killed the deceased in his statement neither did he say so in his evidence.
I am absolutely certain that there is no scintilla of evidence on record to link the 2nd accused with the death of the deceased. I must state with due respect that the learned trial judge misdirected himself on the facts when he found that the deceased was pursued by the 1st and 2nd accused persons. He held thus:
“In a nutshell, the case of the prosecution is that on the 12/10/2001 there was a funeral ceremony of the traditionalist at Rikoto Hill, Zuru at about 0200hrs fighting ensued between the accused persons and the deceased, after they were separated accused stabbed the deceased with knife, deceased ran home, he was pursued by the 1st and 2nd accused, deceased fell down on the road before reaching home and died.”
This finding cannot find any support from the record. This is a substantial error on the part of the learned trial judge which has led to miscarriage of justice. True, it is not every error in a case that will result in an appeal being allowed. But when the error is substantial and has occasioned miscarriage of justice as in this case an appellate court is bound to interfere. See NWAEZE V THE STATE (1996) 2 NWLR (PT 428) 1.
I shall therefore interfere on behalf of the 2nd accused in the above respect.
It had been contended that the failure of the prosecution to call Rabuda as witness was fatal to the prosecution’s case. I respectfully disagree. The IPO, explained under cross examination that Rabuda told him that he was not at the scene when the fight took place. The prosecution is only bound to call such number of witnesses sufficient to prove its case. According to Wali JSC in AKPAN V THE STATE (1991) 5 SCNJ 1 at 14.
“With the evidence adduced by the prosecution it is my view that this case was proved beyond reasonable doubt even with the testimony of the witness not called. The prosecution’s duty is only to call such number of witnesses sufficient to prove their case. They are not obliged to call all the witnesses named in the proof of evidence”.
There is no doubt that Rabuda was not a necessary witness for the prosecution. The failure of the prosecution to call him was therefore not fatal. In the light of the above, I resolve the sole issue as formulated against the 1st appellant but in favour of the 2nd appellant.
I hold that the verdict of the learned trial Judge on the 1st accused was unassailable. I find the conviction of the 2nd accused erroneous.
This appeal succeeds in part.
I set aside the judgment, conviction and sentence of the 2nd accused (appellant) by the trial court and I order that the 2nd accused is discharged and acquitted after finding him not guilty of the charge.
However, I affirm the judgment, conviction and sentence of the 1st accused by the trial court as I hold that his appeal lacks merit.
The appeal of the 1st accused, in the light of the above is dismissed while that of the 2nd accused is allowed.
TIJJANI ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the leading judgment of my learned brother, T. O. Awotoye, JCA just delivered and I entirely agree with his reasoning and conclusions arrived thereat.
Alibi is a defence by which an accused person alleges that at the time when the offence with which he was charged was committed he was elsewhere. Notice of intention to raise the defence of alibi must be given and this ought normally be given at the first possible opportunity by a suspect in answer to a charge by the police at the investigation stage to enable the truth or falsity of the allegation to be established. See Ozaki and 1 other vs. The State (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt.124) p.92 and Adio vs. The State (1986) 3 NWLR (pt. 31) 714.
In view of the foregoing, I am in complete agreement with my noble Lord that the defence of alibi is of no moment in this case for it was not raised timeously and it was rightly rejected by the learned trial judge.
For this reason and the more detailed ones ably marshalled out by my lordship, I too allow the appeal in part and abide by all the consequential orders therein contained.
JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading before now in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother Tunde O. Awotoye JCA. He has exhaustively and admirably dealt with all the issues in this appeal. I have nothing more to add. I too find the 2nd Appellant not guilty of the charge. I hereby set aside his conviction and sentence. He is accordingly discharged and acquitted.
However, the judgment, conviction and sentence of the 1st Appellant are affirmed by me as his appeal lacks merit.
The appeal of the 1st Appellant is dismissed while that of the 2nd Appellant is allowed.
Appearances
Adekola Mustapha Esq.For Appellant
AND
Kabiru Aliyu Esq.For Respondent
