DOGGI CONTINENTAL CO. LTD v. UNITY BANK PLC (2020)

DOGGI CONTINENTAL CO. LTD v. UNITY BANK PLC

(2020)LCN/14051CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, March 20, 2020

CA/A/291/2009

Before Our Lordships:

Stephen Jonah Adah Justice of the Court of Appeal

Peter Olabisi Ige Justice of the Court of Appeal

Mohammed Baba Idris Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

DOGGI CONTINENTAL COMPANY LIMITED APPELANT(S)

And

UNITY BANK PLC RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

INTERPRETATION OF ORDER 4 RULE 3 OF THE HIGH COURT OF ANAMBRA STATE (CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES, 1988)

In interpreting a similar provision i.e. Order 4 Rule 3 of the High Court of Anambra State (Civil Procedure Rules, 1988, the Supreme Court held in the case of Okafor V. Ezenwa (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt 784) page 319 at 335 – 336, paragraphs C – A that:
“…An action upon a breach of contract may be commenced and determined in any one of the following three places, namely:
(a) Where the contract was made; or
(b) Where the contract ought to have been performed; or
(c) Where the defendant resides.
Thus, a Plaintiff suing for a breach of contract is entitled to take advantage of any of the alternatives and rely on it to choose the venue convenient for him. PER IDRIS, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT AN OFFEROR MAY PRESCRIBE AND DIRECT THE METHOD BY WHICH AN ACCEPTANCE OF AN OFFER MAY BE COMMUNICATED

It is the law that an offeror may prescribe and direct the method by which acceptance of an offer may be communicated. Whether some particular mode has been proposed depends upon the inference to be drawn from the circumstances: see KENNEDY V. THOMASSEN (1929) 1 Ch. 426; HOLWELL SECURITIES LTD V. HUGHES (1974) 1 ALL ER 161. A contract is made when and where acceptance is given unless a different intention can be gathered from the document or documents supporting the contract. The acceptance which is a final expression of consent to the terms of the offer must be positive and must correspond with the terms of the offer, and this may be ascertained from the words, writing or conduct of the offeree: see MAJEKODUNMI V. NATIONAL BANK OF NIGERIA LTD (1978) 3 S.C. 119 AT 127; OKUBULE V. OYAGBOLA (1990) 4 NWLR (PT. 147) 723 AT 741 – 742 S.C. PER IDRIS, J.C.A.

WHETHER A COURT IN ONE STATE HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DETERMINE A MATTER WHICH LIES EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF A COURT IN ANOTHER STATE

A Court in one State cannot have jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter which lies exclusively within the jurisdiction of a Court in another State.
The Constitution of 1979 recognises that a High Court is created for each State of the Federation: see Section 234(1). The judicial powers of a State are vested in the High Court and other Courts established for that State: see Section 6 (2). By Section 236 (2), the High Court of a State shall have jurisdiction over “proceedings which originate in the High Court of a State and those which are brought before the High Court to be dealt with by the Court in the exercise of its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction.” This was generally the position of the law even before the 1979 Constitution.”
See also NDAEYO VS. OGUNNAYA (1977) 11 NSCC 5; ORIENT BANK (NIG.) PLC VS. BILANTE INT. LTD (1997) 8 NWLR (PT. 515) 37. PER IDRIS, J.C.A.

MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an interlocutory appeal against the ruling of the High Court of the Federal Capital No. 1 presided over by Honourable Justice L. H. Gummi, Chief Judge of the Federal Capital delivered on 26th November, 2007 against the Appellant’s preliminary objection dated 14th May, 2007 brought against the jurisdiction of the Court. The Objection which was based on two grounds being that the suit was incompetent and that the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit, was dismissed.

The facts of the case are that the Respondent herein, Plaintiff at trial is a banker with head office at Plot 785, Herbert Macaulay Way, Central Business District, Abuja. The Appellant herein, Defendant at trial is a Company registered under the Company and Allied Matters Act, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1990 as amended with head office at No. 1 Federal Government College Road, Tungan-Goro, Chanchaga, Minna, Niger State.

It was the case of the Respondent at trial that the Appellant was one of her customers at Minna Branch, with current account No.505589, which the Appellant had operated for a long time.

According to the Respondent, the Appellant applied to the said Minna Branch for and was granted a term loan of the sum of N25 million and an overdraft facility of the sum of N5 million at 26% interest per annum, subject to periodic review without prior notice.

The purpose of the loan was to serve as working capital and to enable the Appellant complete their multi-purpose bakery project at Katempe District, F.C.T., Abuja.

The collateral for the facility was a deed of legal mortgage over landed property situated on plot No. 1174 at Katempe District, F.C.T., Abuja covered by C of O No. FCT/ABU/OY/8821. The tenure of the facility was 20 (twenty) months commencing upon full draw down.

The Respondent alleged that the Appellant drew down the loan fully through her account No. 505589 domiciled at Minna Branch but reneged from repaying it on the due date, and filed this suit at Abuja seeking to recover the said loan capital with accrued interest.

Upon receipt of the writ of summons in the suit, the Appellant filed a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the Federal Capital Territory High Court

to hear the suit as according to the Appellant the loan transaction took place at Minna, Niger State and the suit ought to have been filed at Niger State High Court, Minna.

The Respondent filed a counter affidavit and a written address in which she argued that because the purpose of the loan was the establishment of bakery at Abuja and also because the collateral for the facility was also located at Abuja, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory had jurisdiction over the suit.

In its ruling, the Honourable High Court Judge No. 1 FCT High Court, Abuja referred to Order 9 Rule 3 and 4 of the FCT High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2004 and in interpreting the said rules held that since the loan contract was entered into at Minna, the FCT High Court has no jurisdiction. The Court however went further to say that, based on the purpose of the loan which was to enable the Appellant/Customer fully complete their multipurpose bakery project at Katempe District, FCT Abuja, the loan contract thereby ought to have been executed and performed at the Federal Capital Territory Abuja and because of this, the Court has jurisdiction.

The Court relied on the case of OKAFOR VS. EZENWA (2002) 13 NWLR (PT. 784) PG 319 AT 335 – 336, PARAGRAPH C – A to support this decision. It is against this second arm of the ruling that the Appellant has filed this appeal.

The parties filed and exchanged their respective briefs. The brief for the Appellant which was filed on the 19th of November, 2013 was deemed filed on 25th March, 2014. In the said brief, these issues were formulated for determination:-
ISSUE NO. 1
Whether the purpose for a bank loan contract is part of the consideration in determining the place for institution of action for the recovery of the loan by a banker from his customer upon default.
ISSUE NO. 2
Whether a finding that the Appellant does not reside and carry on business at the FCT, Abuja will not affect the place where the Contract of the loan ought to be executed or performed.
ISSUE NO. 3
Whether the Honourable Lower Court Judge was correct in dismissing the preliminary objection.

Learned counsel for the Appellant whilst arguing the above issues contended that the purpose for a bank loan contract is not part of the consideration in

determining the place for institution of action for the recovery of a loan by a banker from his customer upon default, and submitted that the finding by the trial Court that the Appellant did not reside and carry on business at the FCT, Abuja should affect the place where the contract of the loan ought to be executed or performed.

Learned counsel for the Appellant argued that the lower Court was not correct in dismissing the preliminary objection. Counsel urged this Court to allow the appeal and strike out the suit for lack of jurisdiction. These authorities were relied on:
1. BABINGTON-ASHAYE VS. E.M.A.G. ENT. (NIG) LTD REPORTED IN (2011) 10 NWLR (PT. 1256) PG 479 AT PG 523 PARA C – E.
2. HIGH COURT CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES ABUJA, 2004.
3. EMMAN N. OKAFOR VS. JOHN NWOYE EZENWA REPORTED IN (2002) 13 NWLR (PT. 784) PG 319 AT 335 – 336 PARA C – A.
4. THE EVIDENCE ACT, 2011.
5. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC VS. INTEGRATED TIMBER & PLYWOOD PRODUCTS LIMITED REPORTED IN (2002) 12 NWLR (PT. 680) PG 99 AT PG 110 PARA B – C.
6. THE LAW OF BANKING, WRITTEN BY EMEKA CHIANU, 1ST EDITION PUBLISHED IN 1995, CHAPTER 13 PAGE 202.

BABINGTON-ASHAYE VS. E.M.A.G. ENT. (NIG) LTD CITED SUPRA AT 520 PARA A – B.
8. THOMAS CHUKWUMA VS. CHIEF NWUKOR & FIRST BANK NIGERIA LIMITED REPORTED IN (2002) 14 NWLR (PT. 733) PAGE 669 AT PG 682 – 686.
9. NDIONYEMA H. NWANKWO & ANOR VS. MRS. ANN C. ONONOEZE-MADU & 2 ORS REPORTED IN (2005) 4 NWLR (PT. 916) PAGE 470 AT PAGE 482 PARA B – D.

The Respondent formulated one issue for determination in the brief filed. The issue formulated was:-
Whether it was proper for the trial judge to have dismissed the Appellant’s preliminary objection and assumed jurisdiction over the suit?

Learned counsel for the Respondent rightly stated that it is a fact that the Bank loan, subject-matter of this suit was granted by the Respondent to the Appellant at the Minna Branch of the Respondent, and the loan facility was to be performed in Abuja, Federal Capital Territory, for the completion of the Appellant’s Multi Purpose Bakery at Plot 1174, Katampe District, Abuja.

Court further stated rightly that it is a fact that the Appellant does business at the said Plot 1174, Katampe District, Abuja,

where the Bakery is situate, within the jurisdiction of the trial Court and reference was made to Exhibit A to the Appellant’s preliminary objection.

Learned counsel to the Respondent then submitted that the trial Chief Judge properly applied Order 9 Rule 3 of the High Court, Federal Capital Territory Rules, 2004, and the Supreme Court decision in OKAFOR VS. EZENWA (SUPRA), in dismissing the preliminary objection.

He further submitted that the entire appeal is incompetent and should be dismissed. These authorities were relied on:-
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
1. AKINFOLARIN VS. AKINOLA (1988) 3 NWLR 235.
2. ARAY LIMITED & ORS VS. AIRLINE MANAGEMENT SUPPORT LTD (2003) unreported Judgment dated 28th February, 2003, pages 15 – 17.
3. EGBO VS. LAGUMA (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 89) 109 AT 126 – 127.
4. MAIGORO VS. GARBA (1999) 10 NWLR (PT. 624) 555 AT 573.
5. MARTIN NIGERIA LTD VS. UPL (1992) 1 NWLR (PT. 217) 322 AT 331.
6. OGBECHIE VS. ONOCHIE (NO. 1) (1986) 2 NWLR (PT. 23) 484 AT 491.
7. OJEME VS. PUNCH NIGERIA LTD (1996) 1 NWLR (PT. 427) 701 AT 708 – 709.
8. OKAFOR VS. EZENWA (2002) 13 NWLR (PT. 784) 319 AT 335 – 336 (C – D).

OKPALA VS. IBEME (1989) 2 NWLR 208.
10. ONIFADE VS. OLAYIWOLA (1992) 21 NSCC (PT. 111) 421 AT 431.
11. OWENA BANK PLC VS. OLATUNJI (1999) 13 NWLR (PT. 634) 218 AT 231.
12. MOMODU VS. MOMOH (1991) 1 NWLR (PT. 169) 608 AT 620 – 621.

STATUTES
ORDER 9 RULE 3, OF THE HIGH COURT, FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY, ABUJA, RULES.

I have read the briefs filed by the parties herein and I am of the view that the sole issue formulated by the Respondent will resolve the issue to be dealt with in this appeal. The issue is whether it was proper for the trial judge to have dismissed the Appellant’s preliminary objection and assumed jurisdiction over the suit.

In resolving the above issue, the learned trial judge held at pages 55 – 61 as follows:-
“From the facts in this case, the Plaintiff/Respondent Bank which was then Bank of the North, on 20th March, 2000 through its Minna Branch in Niger State, granted a loan facility of N25,000,000 to the Defendant/Applicant.
The Plaintiff/Respondent alleged that the Defendant/Applicant has defaulted in repaying the loan facility, hence this action to recover same.

The Defendants/Applicant, however, brought this preliminary objection against the hearing of the Plaintiff’s suit on the grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain same since the transaction that gave rise to the loan facility the subject matter in this suit took place in Minna, Niger State, the proper forum for the matter to be determined is Minna Niger State and not Abuja. It is alleged in paragraphs 2(b), (d), (e), (g), (h), (i) and (j) of the affidavit in support of the preliminary objection that the defendant does not reside in Abuja and no part of the transaction was performed or ought to be performed in Abuja.
Paragraph 2 (f) of the same affidavit also discloses that the Defendant/Applicant resides and carries on business at No. 1 Federal Government College Road, Tungan-Goro, Chanchaga, Minna Niger State within the territorial jurisdiction of Niger State High Court.
The Plaintiff in paragraph 5 of its counter affidavit admitted the fact that the said loan facility was granted to the Defendant/Applicant at Bank of the North Limited, Minna Branch, but further added in

paragraph 7 therein that the collateral for the loan facility is plot 1174 Katampe District where the project for which the facility was obtained is situate.
The Plaintiff in paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit also averred that the Managing Director of the Defendant company resides in Abuja, and carries out all businesses in respect of the Defendant company at plot 1174, Katampe District, Abuja within the jurisdiction of this Court.
At this point, it is necessary to examine the provisions Order 9 Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of this court, 2004, which for emphasis are reproduced hereunder verbatim thus: Order 9 Rule 3:
“3. All suits for specific performance, or breach of contract, shall, where the contract ought to have been performed, or where the Defendant resides or carries on business in the Federal Capital Territory, be commenced and determined in the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.”
“4 (1) All other suits shall where the Defendant resides or carries on business or where the cause of action arose in the Federal Capital Territory, be commenced and determined in the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.”

“(2) where there are more Defendants than one, resident in different judicial divisions, the suit may commence in any of them, subject to an Order the Court may make, on the application of any of the parties, or on its own motion, as to the most convenient arrangement for the trial of the suit.”
From the clear wordings of Order 9 Rule 3 of the Rules of this Court, an action for alleged breach of contract such as the instant one shall be commenced where the contract ought to have been performed, or where the Defendant resides or carries on business within the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, while under Order 9 Rule 4 (1) all other actions shall be commenced where the Defendant resides or carries on business or where the cause of action arose in the Federal capital Territory, Abuja.
The question here is has the Plaintiff/Respondent proved the fact that the Defendant resides and carries on business within jurisdiction of this Court?
It is not at all in dispute that the loan facility that gave rise to this action was applied for and obtained by the Defendant in the Plaintiff Bank Branch in Minna Niger State.

But the Defendant/Applicant denies that it resides and carries on business within the jurisdiction of this Court. Since the burden of proving otherwise now shifts to the Plaintiff/Respondent, in accordance with Section 135 of the Evidence Act, Cap 112 LFN 1990, I am of the view that the Plaintiff/Applicant has failed to establish that the Defendant/Applicant resides or carries on business within the jurisdiction of this Court. Even Exhibit ‘A’ annexed to the counter affidavit indicating that the Defendant/Applicant has an address at plot 1174 Katampe District, Abuja within the jurisdiction of this Court is not in my opinion conclusive proof that the Defendant resides or carries on business within jurisdiction of this Court or that the Defendant/Applicant has its corporate office at the above stated address.
The Plaintiff should have annexed some document from the Corporate Affairs Commission to show that the Plaintiff’s Corporate or registered office is within the jurisdiction of this Court as averred in paragraph 3 of the Plaintiff’s particulars of claim. In the fact of exhibits A and B annexed to the affidavit in support of the

writ of summons which clearly, indicate that the Defendant/Applicant’s address is at Tungan Goro Chanchaga Niger State. I am unable to hold that the Defendant’s corporate office is in Abuja within the jurisdiction of this Court.
It is also my considered view that the mere fact that the collateral for the loan facility is located at plot 1174, Katampe District Abuja within the jurisdiction of this Court, as contended by the Plaintiff, does not confer jurisdiction on this Court in respect of this matter since it is not one of the requirements contemplated by Order 9 Rule 3 and 4 of the Rules of this Court or any other law.
However, one pertinent point to note is the issue of fact raised in paragraph 4 of the affidavit in support of the writ of summons which states as follows:
“4. That the term loan of N25,000,000.00 was to enable the Defendant fully complete its multi-purpose Bakery project at Katampe District, Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
See also paragraph 6 of the Plaintiff/Respondent’s counter affidavit where it is stated that:
“6. That the project for which the facility was granted is at plot 1174,

Katampe District, Abuja, within the jurisdiction of this Court.”
The above two respective averments indicate that the execution of the project for which the loan facility was granted to the Defendant/Applicant was to be performed in Abuja within the jurisdiction of this Court.
The Defendant seem to dispute this averments by deposing in paragraph 2(i) of the affidavit in support of the preliminary objection thus:
“2(i) “that no part of this transaction was performed or ought to be performed at Abuja.”
It is quite apparent from Exhibit ‘A’ annexed to both the affidavit in support of the Plaintiff’s claim and the affidavit in support of the preliminary objection that the loan facility in question was to enable the Defendant/Applicant complete its Bakery project at Katampe District, Abuja. In paragraph 3 (i) and (ii) of the said Exhibit ‘A’, the purpose for which the loan facility was granted to the Defendant/Applicant is clearly stated thus:
“PURPOSE (i) To enable the customer fully complete their multi purpose bakery project at Katampe District F.C.T. Abuja.”
(ii) To serve as the working capital.”

It is therefore my firm view that it is beyond any doubt that the contract in respect of which the loan facility was granted was to be executed or performed in Katampe District, Abuja well within the jurisdiction of this Court as contemplated under Order 9 Rule 3 of the Rules of this Court.
In interpreting a similar provision i.e. Order 4 Rule 3 of the High Court of Anambra State (Civil Procedure Rules, 1988, the Supreme Court held in the case of Okafor V. Ezenwa (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt 784) page 319 at 335 – 336, paragraphs C – A that:
“…An action upon a breach of contract may be commenced and determined in any one of the following three places, namely:
(a) Where the contract was made; or
(b) Where the contract ought to have been performed; or
(c) Where the defendant resides.
Thus, a Plaintiff suing for a breach of contract is entitled to take advantage of any of the alternatives and rely on it to choose the venue convenient for him.
From this judicial decision, I am of the humble view that although the contract that gave rise to the loan facility was entered in Minna Niger State

and the loan facility granted at the Minna branch of the Plaintiff Bank, by the express terms of Exhibit ‘A’ herein, part of the contract was clearly to be performed or executed at Katampe District, Abuja within the jurisdiction of this Court.
I have therefore come to the conclusion that this Court has the territorial jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit.
Accordingly, the notice of preliminary objection hereby fails and I dismiss same for lacking in merit.”

The learned trial judge captured the facts of the case correctly in my view, and correctly interpreted the provisions of Order 9 Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of the FCT High Court, 2004. However, in applying the law to the facts of the case, the learned trial judge erred in law in assuming jurisdiction because “the contract in respect of which the loan facility was granted was to be executed or performed in Katampe District, Abuja well within the jurisdiction of this Court as contemplated under Order 9 Rule 3 of the Rules of this Court.”
The learned trial judge thought that because the loan facility in question was to enable the

Respondent complete its bakery project at Katampe District, Abuja, then the FCT High Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the matter. As far as the learned trial judge was concerned, a part of the contract was clearly to be performed at Abuja, and for that reason, the trial Court dismissed the objection. With due respect to the learned trial chief judge, this is a wrong application of the law to the facts.
The “purpose” for which a loan facility is given, generally, has no relevance in the determining “where a contract ought to have been performed” for the purpose of ascertaining the territorial jurisdiction of a Court of law, especially where the bank is only a lender and nothing more, as in this case.
There is no dispute that the account of the Appellant is domiciled in Minna, Niger State where the loan transaction took place. There is also no dispute that the Appellant repaid certain sums into the same account in its attempt to liquidate the loan, but had not fully liquidated the loan. In the circumstances, from the state of the facts, it is clear that the contract is to be performed in Minna. This is because the loan

will be received and repaid through the Appellant’s account with the Minna branch of the Respondent bank.
The case of ANON LODGE HOTELS LTD VS. MERCANTILE BANK OF NIGERIA LTD (1993) 3 NWLR (PT. 284) 721 CA can offer a good explanation. The 1st Appellant applied for a loan from the Port Harcourt branch of the Respondent bank. The letter of approval requested the 1st Appellant to undertake to the terms that “an undertaking to pass all your proceeds of sales and business taking through your account with the Bank.” When the Appellants defaulted in repaying the loan, the Respondent instituted an action to recover the principal sum and interests. The action was commenced at the High Court of Cross River State where the headquarters of the Respondent bank is situate. The Appellants raised a preliminary objection contending that the High Court of Cross River State lacked jurisdiction. The preliminary objection was dismissed, whereupon the Appellants appealed. The Justices of the Court of Appeal were unanimous in holding that the appeal had merit.
Justice Uwaifo, (JCA as he then was) held in the lead judgment, inter alia:-

“I think only one issue can be made out of the issues raised by the Appellants. It is simply: whether from the facts and circumstances made known from the documents before the Court, it is Calabar High Court of the Cross River State or Port Harcourt High Court of the Rivers State that has jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit.
The 1st Defendant company had an account with the Port Harcourt branch of the Plaintiff bank. The 2nd Defendant is the Managing Director of that company. The company applied in August, 1977 for a loan of N3,500,000.00 to build a hotel. The application was made to the Port Harcourt branch of the Plaintiff bank. The branch replied that their head office in Calabar instructed that the Central Bank of Nigeria by law permitted them to lend between N600,000.00 and N700,000.00 to any single individual. The 1st Defendant in October, 1977 therefore applied for N700,000.00 also to the Port Harcourt branch. Negotiations were protracted. The head office of the Plaintiff bank, Knight Frank & Rutley (Nigeria), – estate valuers – and the Ministry of Lands & Survey, Port Harcourt were involved at different stages.
In the end, by a letter dated 8 January, 1979,

the Port Harcourt branch of the Plaintiff bank conveyed approval for an overdraft of N700,000.00 to the 1st Defendant through its address in Port Harcourt.
This document was marked exhibit E in the affidavit in support of the motion by the Defendants objecting to the jurisdiction of the Calabar High Court. It is clearly the contract document between the plaintiff bank and the 1st Defendant in regard to the overdraft facility. It contains the offer and the acceptance. It was concluded in Port Harcourt. The offer directed the mode of indicating the acceptance, and the 1st Defendant complied with it.
It is the law that an offeror may prescribe and direct the method by which acceptance of an offer may be communicated. Whether some particular mode has been proposed depends upon the inference to be drawn from the circumstances: see KENNEDY V. THOMASSEN (1929) 1 Ch. 426; HOLWELL SECURITIES LTD V. HUGHES (1974) 1 ALL ER 161. A contract is made when and where acceptance is given unless a different intention can be gathered from the document or documents supporting the contract. The acceptance which is a final expression of

consent to the terms of the offer must be positive and must correspond with the terms of the offer, and this may be ascertained from the words, writing or conduct of the offeree: see MAJEKODUNMI V. NATIONAL BANK OF NIGERIA LTD (1978) 3 S.C. 119 AT 127; OKUBULE V. OYAGBOLA (1990) 4 NWLR (PT. 147) 723 AT 741 – 742 S.C. The document, exhibit E fulfils the conditions of not only a valid contract but also prescribes that the contract is to be performed in Port Harcourt. This is because the loan will be received and repaid through the 1st Defendant’s account with the Port Harcourt branch of the Plaintiff bank.
From the above, what gives a Court jurisdiction depends on one of three alternatives, namely (a) where the contract was made, or (b) where the contract ought to have been performed or (c) where the Defendant or one of the Defendants resides. The issue raised in the present case is that of territorial jurisdiction as between one State and another. A Court in one State cannot have jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter which lies exclusively within the jurisdiction of a Court in another State.
The Constitution of 1979 recognises that a High Court is created for each State of the Federation: see Section 234(1).

The judicial powers of a State are vested in the High Court and other Courts established for that State: see Section 6 (2). By Section 236 (2), the High Court of a State shall have jurisdiction over “proceedings which originate in the High Court of a State and those which are brought before the High Court to be dealt with by the Court in the exercise of its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction.” This was generally the position of the law even before the 1979 Constitution.”
See also NDAEYO VS. OGUNNAYA (1977) 11 NSCC 5; ORIENT BANK (NIG.) PLC VS. BILANTE INT. LTD (1997) 8 NWLR (PT. 515) 37.
On the whole, I hold that the appeal is meritorious and it is allowed. The judgment of the learned trial judge is hereby set aside and an order is made striking out Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/710/2007 for lack of jurisdiction.
No order as to cost.

STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A.: I had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Mohammed Baba Idris, JCA.

I agree with the reasoning and conclusion that the appeal is meritorious and it is allowed.

I abide by the consequential orders as made in the lead judgment.

PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.: I agree

Appearances:

A. Iroagalachi, Esq., with him, V. C. Iroagalachi, Esq. and F. C. Uzowuru, Esq. For Appellant(s)
Mando, Esq., with him, M. Bello, Esq., N. Hamman and A. Naheed, Esq. For Respondent(s)