DESTINY AKARAKA NWAGWU & ANOR v. UZODIKE AERON & ORS
(2019)LCN/13665(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 19th day of July, 2019
CA/OW/EPT/SHA/03/2019
RATIO
ELECTION PETITION: PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE SCHEDULE, ON INCLUDING POLITICAL PARTIES IN ELECTION PETITIONS
On paragraph 18 of the Schedule, I observed that despite the established rule that a candidate cannot present an election petition without joining his political party as co-petitioner, just as a candidate declared as the winner of an election cannot be sued without joining his political party, as decided in FALEKE V. INEC CA/A/EPT/357/2016 and AGBAJE V. INEC (2016) 4 NWLR (PT. 1501) 151, the drafters of the paragraph did not advert their minds to the fact that in election petitions, there will always be more than one party on both sides of the dispute and therefore predominately used petitioner and respondent in the singular in majority of the paragraphs of the schedule.
In my view, this should not be, as there cannot legally be one petitioner and one respondent in an election petition. PER MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.
ELECTION PETITION: PARAGRAPH 18(1) OF THE ELECTORAL ACT: INTERPRETATION
This Court has considered the interpretation of paragraph 18(1) (Supra) in several cases. In LABOUR PARTY V. BELLO & ORS (2016) LPELR-40848, this Court considered the issue of whether a petitioner must wait for all the respondents to file their replies before filling a pre-hearing notice. The firm position of this Court is that where there are more than one respondent to a petition, the petitioner need to not wait for all the respondents to file their replies in answer to the petition before filing an application for issuance of pre-hearing notice. This is so because the likelihood of each respondent being served on various and different dates is very real. Obviously, where the respondents are served on different dates, their time to file a reply in answer to the petition would certainly start to run on different dates. Since time is of essence in election petition matters the petitioner must ensure that all the time lines stipulated by the law is absolutely complied with. Considering the fatal consequence of failure to apply for issuance of pre-hearing notice, it is safer and reasonable for the appellant to file his application for pre-hearing once the pleadings between him and any of the respondents closes. If he waits for the last respondent to file his reply in answer to the petition and fails to apply within 7 days from the date pleadings between him and the respondent who was served first is deemed closed, he will be caught by the provisions of paragraph 18(4) (supra). See EZEUDU V. JOHN & 6 ORS (2012) 7 NWLR (PT. 1298) 1 AT 6 & 7 (5). PER MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES: LITERAL RULE: WHERE THE WORDINGS OF STATUTES OR RULES OF COURT ARE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS
The law is settled that where the wordings of a statute or rules of Court are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their literal meaning. In the construction and interpretation of a section of the statute or rule of Court, recourse will be had to other sections of the statute where there is ambiguity. Where there is no ambiguity and the provisions of the particular Section or Rule is not subject to the provisions of other sections or Rule, the provisions of the particular Section or rule must be applied as it is. There was no need to call in aid the provisions of paragraph 49 in the interpretation of paragraph 18(1). This was made clear in NWOGU & ANOR V. EKE & ORS (2015) LPELR- 25996 (CA) AT where this Court held that per Ige, JCA. PER MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
TIJJANI ABUBAKAR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. DESTINY AKARAKA NWAGWU
2. ALL PROGRESSIVE GRAND ALLIANCE Appellant(s)
AND
1. UZODIKE AERON
2. PEOPLE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP)
3. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) Respondent(s)
MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This an interlocutory appeal against the majority ruling of the National/State House of Assembly Election Petition Tribunal sitting at Umuahia, Abia State delivered on the 27th day of May, 2019 by Hon. Justice A. A. Aderibigbe delivering the lead judgment and Hon. Kadi M. Y Usman concurring with Hon. Justice W. Animahun dissenting.
?The appellants filed an election petition at the Tribunal challenging the declaration and return of the 1st respondent as winner of the general election held on 9th day of March, 2019 by the 3rd respondent for Aba North State House of Assembly Constituency. Following service of the petition on the 1st respondent on 17th day of April 2019, the 1st respondent filed his reply to the petition on 7/5/2019. The appellants filed their reply to the reply of 1st respondent on 17/5/2019. The 2nd respondent filed its reply to the petition on 27/4/2019. The 3rd respondent filed its reply to the petition on 24/4/2019. The appellant did not file any petitioner?s reply to the reply of 3rd respondent. The appellants applied for issuance of
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pre-hearing notice pursuant to paragraph 18(1) of the 1st schedule to the Electoral Act on 3/5/2019.
At the commencement of pre-hearing, the Tribunal suo motu raised the issue of the propriety or otherwise of filing a joint application for pre-hearing session for all the respondents and whether the application filed on 3/5/2019 applied to the 1st respondent and is not premature as against 1st respondent. The Tribunal invited the parties for addresses on those issues. In its ruling delivered on 27/5/2019, the Tribunal by a majority of 2 to 1 held that the application for issuance of pre-hearing notice filed by the appellants on 3/5/2019 was filed within time against the 3rd respondent but was prematurely filed against 1st and 2nd respondents. The petition against the 1st and the 2nd respondents was dismissed.
Aggrieved by the ruling of the Tribunal, the appellants filed a notice of appeal against the ruling on 31/5/2019. The three grounds of appeal shorn of their particulars are:
GROUND ONE- ERROR IN LAW:
?The learned member of the Election Tribunal below erred in law when they dismissed the appellants? petition
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against the 1st and 2nd respondents on the ground of premature filing of notice for pre-hearing session.
GROUND TWO- ERROR IN LAW:
The Election Tribunal below misdirected itself in law when after holding that an application for notice for pre-hearing session must not await the close of pleadings and yet went ahead to dismiss the appellants? petition against the 1st and 2nd respondents for being filed before the close of pleadings between him and the 1st and 2nd respondents.
GROUND THREE- ERROR IN LAW:
The Tribunal below erred in law when it held that expect where the 7 days provided in paragraph 18 of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act (Supra) run concurrently for all the respondents, different or multiple applications must be made for all the respondents relying on decided cases where the said paragraph 49 of the said First Schedule.?
The appellants? brief of argument was filed on 13/6/2019. The 1st respondent?s brief of argument was filed on 17/6/2019. Appellant?s reply brief to 1st respondent?s brief was filed on 21/6/2019. The 2nd respondent did not file any brief. The 3rd
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respondent?s brief and motion for extension of time filed on 4/7/2019 were withdrawn and struck out for being filed out of time.
From the three grounds of appeal stated above the appellant raised four issues for the determination of this appeal. The issues are:
1.?Whether pre-mature application for the issuance of pre-hearing notice pursuant to paragraph 18(i) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) on the 1st and 2nd respondents in the petition in the Court below can be promoted or elevated to such devastating and/or destructive consequence of having the petition summarily dismissed against the said 1st and 2nd respondents (arising from Ground 1).
2. Whether the Tribunal below was right to hold in one breath that an application for notice to issue pre-hearing notice must not await the close of pleadings and still proceeded to dismiss the appellants? petition against the 1st and 2nd respondents filed after the close of pleading between the appellants and the 3rd respondent that came earlier without waiting for the close of pleading with the 1st and 2nd respondents that came much later (Ground 1 of Notice of
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Appeal).
3. Whether upon a calm and considerate reading of Paragraph 18(1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act (supra) without reference to Paragraph 49(1) of the said First Schedule, it requires multiple applications for the issuance of pre-hearing notice save where pleadings closed concurrently between the petitioner and all the respondents (Ground 3).
4. Whether by any stretch of statutory interpretation, the word ?two or more candidates as used in paragraph 49(1) (supra) can be construed to mean or include non candidate parties/respondents like a political party or an Electoral body like INEC as to necessitate a combined reading of paragraphs 18(1) and 49(1) aforesaid in all Election petitions even where two or more candidates are not sued as respondents.?
The 1st respondent raised one issue for determination. The issue is:
?Having regard to the undisputed fact that the petitioners did not file any application for issuance of pre-hearing notice sheet at the close of pleadings for all the parties, but purportedly filed one prematurely long before close of pleadings whether the Tribunal was not right to have
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dismissed the petition against the 1st and 2nd respondents pursuant to paragraph 18(4) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act as amended.?
The appellants obviously formulated more issues than the grounds of appeal. The Supreme Court and this Court have in a legion of cases emphasized the impropriety of raising more issues than the grounds of appeal. Neither party in an appeal is entitled to raise more issues than the grounds of appeal. See SULE ANYEGWU & ANOR. V. AIDOKO ONUCHE (2009) LPELR-521 (SC) AT 19 (E-F), THE STATE V. OMOYELE (2016) LPELR-40842 (SC) AT 34-35 (E-A). Issue numbers 1 and 3, according to the appellant were raised from ground 1 of the appeal. This is a clear violation of the principle that the number of issues raised for determination must not be in excess of the grounds of appeal. One issue may be raised from one ground of appeal or combination of 2 or 3 grounds of appeal. The reverse is not legally acceptable. That is to say that two issues cannot be raised from one ground of appeal. It is a proliferation of issues which should be avoided. See BILLE V. THE STATE (2016) LPELR-40832 AT 6-7 (E-D). YISI NIG. LTD. V. TRADE BANK PLC
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(2013) LPELR-20087 (SC) AT 14 (B-E). In the circumstances, issue 2 which is purported to be formulated from ground 1 of the appeal and which in fact does not emanate or relate to that ground is hereby struck out having been raised in violation of the settled principles on formulation of issues in an appeal.
No issue was raised from ground 2 of the appeal. It is deemed abandoned and it is hereby struck out.
Issue 4 hangs in the air. The law is settled that an issue for the determination of an appeal must be raised from the grounds of appeal. No issue must be raised outside the grounds of appeal. See OKONOBOR & ORS V. D. EDEGBE & SONS TRANSPORT COY. LTD. (2010) LPELR-2488 (SC) AT 8 (B-D). It is clear that issue 4 does not relate to any of the three grounds of appeal. It is therefore incompetent and it is hereby struck out.
The appellant is left with issues 1 and 3 which I find to be apt for the determination of this appeal. The two issues are interwoven and shall be considered together.
?
On those issues, the appellants? counsel submitted that the Tribunal fell into the error by reading paragraph 18 with paragraph 49(1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act
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in this particular case where such community reading was wholly unnecessary and uncalled for because the petition under review is against one candidate. It is further submitted that Paragraph 18 of the First Schedule (supra) is a complete, independent and substantive provision that is to be considered and applied wholly on its own without any recourse to any other paragraph of the schedule as it relates to the application for issuance of pre-hearing notice and the consequence of either late application or non application at all. He further submitted that upon a calm and considerate reading of same, the application provided for therein is to be made per petition and not per respondent as wrongly held by the Tribunal. He referred to SAEED & ANOR VS YAKOWE (2013) 7 NWLR (PT. 1352) 124 @ 164-5 (cited with approval in BENJAMIN UWAJUMOGU VS. ACHONU A. NNEJI & ORS (2017) LPELR-41435.
?
It is submitted that the dissenting ruling of Justice Animahun at 325-327 of the record, that one application for pre-hearing notice made between a petitioner and any one of the respondents (where no two or more candidates are sued)
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suffices for the petition, if made at the close of pleadings between them is supported by MATHEW NWOGU & ANOR VS BEDE UCHENNA EKE & ORS (2015) LPELR 259969 (CA).
Counsel contended that the dismissal of the appellants? petition was an undue preference and reliance on technicalities over substantial Justice and the Tribunal erred in dismissing the appellants? petition against the 1st and 2nd respondents for being premature when the respondents never suffered any disadvantage prejudice, injustice or miscarriage of justice having had ample time to take part in the pre-hearing session and conference.
In reaction to the above submissions of the appellants? counsel, the 1st respondent?s counsel submitted that the very essence and consequence of breach of the time frame in the Electoral Act and Rules of Procedure for Election Petition, particularly paragraph 18(1) and (4) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010, were captured by NWEZE JSC, in OMISORE V. AREGBESOLA (2015) 15 NWLR (PT. 1482) 205-291 PARA. D-D. ABUBAKAR V. NASAMU (NO. 2) (2012) 17 NWLR (PT. 1330) 523 (SC) AT 574 PARA. C. NWOGU & ANOR V. EKE & ORS (2015)
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LPELR-25996 (CA). He further submitted that from the tenor of paragraph 18(1) & (4), for an application made for issuance of pre-hearing notice to be valid, it must be done either at the close of pleadings for each respondent or at the close of pleading for all the respondents, i.e. at the end or close of the all pleadings. He argued that when an application for pre-hearing session is made and acted upon, that very application is deemed ?spent? and of no more consequence and no longer a live process and it means in the peculiar circumstance that it was filed ?out of time? under paragraph 18(1) of the Rules. He referred to ABUBAKAR V. NASAMU (NO. 2) (SUPRA) PER NGWUTA JSC AT PAGE 591 PARA H. NWOSU V. PDP (2018) 14 NWLR (PT. 1640) SC AT 552 PARA F.
Counsel further argued that the appellants? application of 3/5/2019 for issuance of pre-hearing notice filed ?prematurely? was filed ?out of time? having not been made as at 25/5/2019 i.e 8 days after the close of pleadings on 17/5/2019 as mandatorily required by paragraph 18(1) of the rule. Consequently, the petition was deemed abandoned for all purposes
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at the material time the Tribunal raised the issue on 25/5/2019 and invited counsel for all the parties to address it on the point. He contended that having not satisfied the Tribunal on a valid reason for their inability to properly activate the pre-hearing session as mandatorily required by Paragraph 18(1) of the 1st Schedule to the Act, the Tribunal rightly exercised their powers under paragraph 18(4) to dismiss the petition as against the 1st and 2nd respondents on 27/5/2019.
RESOLUTION:
The whole essence of this appeal is the interpretation of Paragraph 18(1) of the Rules of Procedure for Election Petitions, First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) which provides that:
18. (1) ?Within 7 days after the filing and service of the petitioner?s reply on the respondent or 7 days after the filing and service of the respondent?s reply, as the case may be, the petitioner shall apply for the issuance of pre-hearing notice as in Form TF 008.?
In order to understand the gist and purpose of the application for pre-hearing session and what it meant to achieve paragraph 18(1) of the Rules must be read together
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with paragraph 18(2) to 18(10) of the Rules.
The Tribunal in its considered ruling held that pages 324-325 of the record of appeal that:
?On the issue of issuance of one application on three respondents, we hold that it suffices if the 7 days run concurrently for all the respondents for the petitioners to issue one application on the three of them. Our reasoning is based on the fact that in this situation, pleadings end on the same date and not on different dates which paragraph 18 is intended to deal with, so that hearing is not stalled because of delay caused by a co-respondent.
Pleadings closed between the petitioners and the 1st respondent on 17/5/2019. Between the petitioners and the 2nd and 3rd respondents pleadings closed on 9/5/2019 and 2/5/2019 respectively, when their replies were served on the petitioners? counsel. It follows that it was filed within time against the 3rd respondent and was prematurely filed against the 1st and 2nd respondents. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed against the 1st and 2nd respondent.?
Hon. Justice W. Animahun dissented. He held at page 326-327 of the record that:
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?On paragraph 18 of the Schedule, I observed that despite the established rule that a candidate cannot present an election petition without joining his political party as co-petitioner, just as a candidate declared as the winner of an election cannot be sued without joining his political party, as decided in FALEKE V. INEC CA/A/EPT/357/2016 and AGBAJE V. INEC (2016) 4 NWLR (PT. 1501) 151, the drafters of the paragraph did not advert their minds to the fact that in election petitions, there will always be more than one party on both sides of the dispute and therefore predominately used petitioner and respondent in the singular in majority of the paragraphs of the schedule.
In my view, this should not be, as there cannot legally be one petitioner and one respondent in an election petition. If we decide to go strictly by the arguments canvassed and some of the judgments on paragraph 18(1) of the Schedule, then, the petitioners too must file two replies on each of the respondents, because the word used in the first line of Paragraph 18 of the Schedule are petitioner?s reply and not petitioners? reply.
In the alternative, the draft men were right
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because in legal drafting, it is unusual to use plural because it is settled in interpretation of statues that singular also means plural. It therefore follows that pleadings will close when a sole petitioner or respondent files or when the time for all the petitioners or respondents to file their replies lapse on the same date. This is the only imaginable situation that can enable a single application for issuance of pre-hearing forms to kick start commencement of pre-hearing session. It is inconceivable for more than one process to commence a stage in the proceedings. I am not aware of any Rule of Court where this is provided for. It will be allowed and practicable only if the particular stage of the proceedings involved will hold separately for each of the parties.
Finally, while there is a sanction for filing the application late, as provided for in Paragraph 18(4) of the Schedule, there is no sanction for filing early. As such, it is my view that this is saved by Paragraph 53(1) of the Schedule that reads:
?Noncompliance with any of the provisions of this schedule, or with a rule of practice for the time being operative, except otherwise
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stated or implied shall not render any proceeding void, unless the Tribunal or Court so directs but the proceeding may be set aside wholly or in part as irregular, or amended, or otherwise dealt with in such manner and on such terms as the Tribunal or Court may deem fit and just.?
Accordingly, I hold that it suffices for the first application for issuance of pre-hearing forms to commence pre-hearing session with all the respondents. In view my above decision, I hold that the application is valid against all the respondents.?
This Court has considered the interpretation of paragraph 18(1) (Supra) in several cases. In LABOUR PARTY V. BELLO & ORS (2016) LPELR-40848, this Court considered the issue of whether a petitioner must wait for all the respondents to file their replies before filling a pre-hearing notice. The firm position of this Court is that where there are more than one respondent to a petition, the petitioner need to not wait for all the respondents to file their replies in answer to the petition before filing an application for issuance of pre-hearing notice. This is so because the likelihood of each respondent being served
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on various and different dates is very real. Obviously, where the respondents are served on different dates, their time to file a reply in answer to the petition would certainly start to run on different dates. Since time is of essence in election petition matters the petitioner must ensure that all the time lines stipulated by the law is absolutely complied with. Considering the fatal consequence of failure to apply for issuance of pre-hearing notice, it is safer and reasonable for the appellant to file his application for pre-hearing once the pleadings between him and any of the respondents closes. If he waits for the last respondent to file his reply in answer to the petition and fails to apply within 7 days from the date pleadings between him and the respondent who was served first is deemed closed, he will be caught by the provisions of paragraph 18(4) (supra). See EZEUDU V. JOHN & 6 ORS (2012) 7 NWLR (PT. 1298) 1 AT 6 & 7 (5).
In the instant appeal since Forms TF 008 and TF 009 were issued and served on the 1st and 2nd respondents and they attended the pre-hearing session on 24/5/2019. The purpose of an application for pre-hearing notice
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which is to inform the parties of the impending hearing was achieved.
?Taking into consideration the circumstances of conduct of general elections in this country, our experience as regards adjudication on election petition matters and the unanimous desire to ensure that cases concerning pre and post election matters are heard and disposed of timeously, it will be absurd to punish a petitioner who exhibits serious desire to prosecute his petition. It will amount to pure technicality at the expense of substantial justice to insist that a petitioner must file fresh application for commencement of pre-hearing each time pleading is closed or is deemed closed between him and one of the respondents when he has already triggered commencement of the procedure for pre-hearing session(s). I totally agree with the reasoning and conclusion of Hon. Justice ANIMAHUN that the application filed by the appellant is valid against all respondents. The fact that the application was filed after close of pleadings between the appellants and 3rd respondent but before pleadings closed or was deemed closed between the appellants and 1st and 2nd respondents is of no moment. The
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majority decision of the Tribunal to dismiss the petition against the 1st and 2nd respondents on the ground that the application filed after the close of pleadings between the petitioners and the 3rd respondent is premature in respect of the 1st and 2nd respondents is erroneous. One and same application cannot be both valid and invalid. The most important thing is that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to issue pre- hearing notices and hold pre-hearing sessions was activated. All that the Tribunal is required to do when an application for pre-hearing is filed at the close pleadings between the appellant and one of the respondents but before the close of pleadings between the petitioner and other respondents is to wait until the pleadings is closed or deemed closed between the petitioner and the last respondent served with the petition before commencing pre-hearing sessions which is what the Tribunal did in this case. The record of proceedings on pages 309 and 310 shows that pre-hearing commenced on 23/5/2019 after the close of pleadings between the appellant and 1st and 2nd respondents on 17/5/2019. Thus none of the respondents was denied the right to
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participate in the pre-hearing.
The Tribunal relied on the provisions of Paragraph 49 the Electoral Act where it is provided that:
49. ?Two or more candidates may be made respondents to the same petition and their case may, for the sake of convenience be heard at the same time but for all purpose (including the taking of security) the election petition shall be deemed to be a separate petition against each of the respondents.?
The law is settled that where the wordings of a statute or rules of Court are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their literal meaning. In the construction and interpretation of a section of the statute or rule of Court, recourse will be had to other sections of the statute where there is ambiguity. Where there is no ambiguity and the provisions of the particular Section or Rule is not subject to the provisions of other sections or Rule, the provisions of the particular Section or rule must be applied as it is. There was no need to call in aid the provisions of paragraph 49 in the interpretation of paragraph 18(1). This was made clear in NWOGU & ANOR V. EKE & ORS (2015) LPELR- 25996 (CA) AT
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where this Court held that per Ige, JCA:
I am of the firm view that the lower Tribunal erred greatly in its conclusion that the Appellants ought to have filed application for pre hearing Notice from 23/5/15 to 29-5-15, thereby treating the petition as if it were three petitions filed separately or individually against the three Respondents herein. The Lower Tribunal found itself in this grave error by acceding to the interpretation placed on Paragraph 49 of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 as amended by Respondents. It is my resolve that though the Petition has three Respondents, that did not and would not make the Petition “three in one”. It is one Petition. The Respondents referred to in Paragraph 49 of the 1st Schedule to Electoral Act 2010 as amended cannot by any stretch of any imagination be coterminous or mean the same thing as Respondents to the Election Petition herein. A careful reading of Paragraph 49 aforesaid revealed vividly that “two or more candidates may be made Respondents to the same petition…” is, only referable to joinder of candidates or nominated candidates sponsored by a political party to participate in
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an election conducted by Independent National Electoral Commission and NOT Respondents enumerated as “Respondents” in Sections 133(1) and 137(1) (2) (3) of the Electoral Act 2010 as amended which provide: “133 (1) No election and return at an election under this Act shall be questioned in any manner other than by a Petition complaining of an undue election or return (in this Act referred to as an “election petition”) presented to the competent Tribunal or Court in accordance with the provision of the Constitution or of this Act, and in which the person elected or returned is joined as a party”. 137(1) An election petition may be presented by one or more of the following persons: – (a) A candidate in an election. (b) A Political Party, which participated in the election. 2. A person whose election is complained of is in this Act, referred to as the Respondent. 3. If the Petitioner complains of the conduct of an Electoral Officer, a Residing Officer or Returning Officer, it shall not be necessary to join such officers or persons notwithstanding the nature of the complaint and the commission shall, in this instance, be (a) made a respondent (b) deemed to be
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defending the Petition for itself and on behalf of its officers or such other persons.” There is nothing in the above quoted sections of the Electoral Act which can by any stretch of imagination be interpreted as deeming a single petition mentioned in Sections 133 (1) and 137 (1) (2) of the Electoral Act as separate and distinct petition against those the statute itself expressly made statutory necessary Respondents. Paragraph 49 of 1st Schedule cannot elevate the petition to that unimagined pedestal to operate and divide or separate or dismember a petition into three separate petitions. The intendment of Paragraph 49 of 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act is to warn the Petitioner or an intending Petitioner that if he should join co-contestants or an individual sponsored by a political party in the election petition, then the money to be deposited as security for costs in a Petition will be multiplied by the number of candidates in the impugned election joined to his or her petition at the Registry of the Tribunal. In other words, instead of paying security for costs or make deposit in that behalf in respect of the person returned in the election, only, such
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Petitioner would pay in respect of each of the candidates or so many of them he may have joined as Respondents to his petition.
For the above reasons, I find merit in this appeal. It is hereby allowed. The majority ruling of the National/State House of Assembly Election Petition Tribunal holden at Umuahia, Abia State delivered in Petition No. EPT/AB/HA/02/2019 on 27/5/2019 is hereby set aside. The petition against the 1st and 2nd respondents is hereby restored to the cause list of the Tribunal and shall be heard by another panel.
HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI, J.C.A.: I read in advance the judgment delivered by my learned brother, Misitura Omodere Bolaji-Yusuff, JCA.
I agree that the appeal has merit and should be allowed. It is hereby allowed. I abide by the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.
TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.C.A.: I agree
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Appearances:
Nwabueze I. Nwankwo, Esq.For Appellant(s)
C.C. Elele, Esq with him, E.P. Jumbo, Esq., J. Ojingo, Esq. and E.I Evuline, Esq. for the 1st Respondent.
K. C Nwankwo, Esq. for the 2nd Respondent
For Respondent(s)
Appearances
Nwabueze I. Nwankwo, Esq.For Appellant
AND
C.C. Elele, Esq with him, E.P. Jumbo, Esq., J. Ojingo, Esq. and E.I Evuline, Esq. for the 1st Respondent.
K. C Nwankwo, Esq. for the 2nd RespondentFor Respondent
