DAYO DUYILE & ANOR V. KELLY OGUNBAYO & SONS LTD.
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 4th day of March, 1988
SC.197/1985
JUSTICES
KAYODE ESO Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
AUGUSTINE NNAMANI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
MUHAMMADU LAWAL UWAIS Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
SALIHU MODIBBO ALFA BELGORE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
PHILLIP NNAEMEKA-AGU Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
- DAYO DUYILE
2. SKETCH PUBLISHING CO. LTD. Appellant(s)
AND
KELLY OGUNBAYO & SONS LTD. Respondent(s)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO HELP ANY PARTY TO A LITIGATION ARRIVE AT A CONCLUSION ON WHICH NO EVIDENCE IS LED
Apart from the inference that could be legally drawn from certain facts, e.g. in evidential presumptions, it is not the duty of any court to help any party to litigation to arrive at a conclusion on which no evidence is led. It is for each party to make his own case and as the appellants never justified by evidence their assertion that Exhibit D was based on Exhibit A, the Court certainly would not embark on adventure of making out of the evidence what was not proved. Therefore this Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts on facts unless the findings are either perverse, or it legal as being based on inadmissible evidence or are completely not supported by any evidence or based on matters in evidence but unpleaded. (Fashanu v. Adekoya (1974) 6 SC.83, 91; Yassin v. Barclays Bank D.C.O. Ltd. (1960) 1 All NLR 171; Wuru v. Ekwonyeso (1978) 1 SC.37, 46, 47; Balogun v. Agboola (1974) 10 SC.111, 118, 119; Onowon & Anor. v. Iserhien (1976) NMLR 263). PER BELGORE, J.S.C.
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPANY IN AN ACTION FOR DEFAMATION IS REQUIRED TO PROVE SPECIAL DAMAGES OR EVEN FINANCIAL LOSS TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR THE INJURY TO ITS REPUTATION IN THE WAY OF ITS TRADE OR BUSINESS
Unlike human being, a corporate body suing for defamation, seeks only damages for pecuniary loss it can suffer and not for things only possible in personal feelings. It can sue for loss of profit, shortfall in turnover or anticipatory loss but not natural grief and distress, and not for social disadvantage. A company in law is a person that can sue and be sued, but it can only do these through the agency of its directors who think for it and carry out its objectives. A company is a legal person, but it is inanimate. It has got no personal feeling of grief or distress. A company can only be injuried as to its earnings and not as to its feelings. It can be injured by libel and that injury must be related to its loss in money terms. Its loss of earning, loss of profits, and loss of goodwill are matters that libel can bring as misfortune for the company. It is because of these special attributes of a company that in an action in defamation, a company does not need to prove special damage or even financial loss to recover damages for the injury to its reputation in the way of its trade or business. Lewis v. Daily Telegraph (1964) A.C. 262; Proprietors of Selby Bridge v. Sunday Telegraph (The Times 17th February, 1966). PER BELGORE, J.S.C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOSS OF PARTICULAR CUSTOMERS AS A RESULT OF DEFAMATION CONSTITUTES SPECIAL DAMAGES THAT MUST BE PLEADED IN A DEFAMATION ACTION
It is settled that loss of particular customers constitutes special damage which must be pleaded if the plaintiff wishes to rely on it. He has to give particulars of the names of such customers. But where it is impracticable for the plaintiff to give their names, or where his customers are persons who deal with him over the counter or consist of a “floating or transitory class” the plaintiff can allege and prove a general loss of custom as special damage. Radcliffe v. Evans (1882)2 QB. 524, 539; Worsley v. Cooper (1939) 1 All ER 290. A general loss of customers or business, as distinct from a loss of particular known customers, is a special damage sufficient to support an action if the words complained of in the ordinary course of things do produce such loss of custom or business. Evans Case (Supra); Weld Blundell v. Stephen (1920) AC. 956 at 999; See Calvet v. Tomkies (1963) 1 WLR. 1997. PER BELGORE, J.S.C.
WHETHER OR NOT AN APPEALLATE COURT CAN DISTURB THE AWARD OF DAMAGES OF THE TRIAL COURT IF SUCH AWARD IS EXCESSIVELY HIGH OR UNREASONABLY LOW
Although an appellate court admittedly can disturb an award of damages if such award is excessively high or unreasonably low (See L.C.C. v. Ogunbiyi (1969) 1 All NLR 297, it is settled that a Court of Appeal will not disturb an award of damages made by the lower court merely because it would have come to a different figure if it had heard the case itself. See Thompson v. Adefope (1969) 1 All NLR 322, 327-328. PER NNAMANI, J.S.C.
M. A. BELGORE, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): In a publication of the “DAILY SKETCH” newspaper, dated 25th day of November, 1977, at the time when 1st appellant was its editor, it was inter alia written of the respondent as follows:
“Ogun State Price Board has announced that the sales of commodities worth N29,I33.68 will take place today at the stores of Kelly Ogunbayo and Sons Ltd., No.2 Ibadan Road, Iperu Remo, near Sagamu and starting at 9.00 a.m. (sic).”
The publication was headed in bold letters “PRICE CONTROL TO SELL N29,000.00 HOARDED BEER.” The respondent wrote to the first appellant demanding an apology claiming that the said publication complained of was defamatory. That was on 21st day of December, 1977; and by 11th January, 1978 the final reply of the appellants was that the publication was not defamatory as, they contended, it was a true reproduction of public announcement by Ogun State Price Control Board.
It must be pointed out that at the trial of the action, on libel before the High Court at Sagamu, it was in evidence that the appellants never had in their possession the alleged announcement by the Price Control Board. Secondly, it was evident that though the respondent company was tried for hoarding beer, it was discharged and acquitted and was therefore never found guilty of an offence under the Price Control Decree 1977. Thirdly, it was after litigation was commenced that the appellants wrote on 3rd April, 1978 to Ogun State Ministry of Local Government and Information requesting for a copy of the announcement by the Price Control Board, which was duly sent on 17th April, 1978.The learned trial Judge, after hearing all the evidence held that the publication complained of was defamatory and that it was libellous of the respondent company. He further held it was published recklessly as the appellants had not by the time they published, seen the announcement by the Price Control Board, otherwise they did not have to ask for a certified copy from the Ministry.
On the question that the publication though defamatory, could be covered by privilege, the trial Judge dealt extensively on this subject. The law governing qualified privilege is clearly stated in Section 16 of the Defamation Law Cap. 33 of Laws of Ogun State 1978:
“16 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the publication in a newspaper of any such report or other matter as is mentioned in the Schedule to this Law shall be privileged unless the publication is proved to be made with malice.
(2) In an action for libel in respect of the publication of any such report or matter as is mentioned in Part 2 of the Schedule to this Law the provisions of this section shall not be a defence if it is proved that the defendant has been requested by the plaintiff to publish in the newspaper in which the original publication was made a reasonable letter or statement by way of explanation or contradiction, and has refused or neglected to do so or has done so in a manner not adequate or not reasonable having regard to all the circumstances.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as protecting the publication of any matter the publication of which is prohibited by law, or of any matter which is not of public concern and the publication of which is not for the public benefit.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting or abridging any privilege subsisting at common law immediately before the commencement of this Law.”
The publication by the Price Control Board enjoys qualified privilege only if it was published without malice. The question here is that the appellants published without seeing the alleged announcement and the learned trial Judge held that that single act alone removed any cover of privilege from their publication. The most surprising aspect of this case is that the appellants without seeing the announcement and when confronted with respondent’s letter in line with S.16(2) of Defamation Law, maintained that their publication was not defamatory.
At the Court of Appeal, ten grounds of appeal were argued; the general ground and the rest additional grounds of appeal on error of law filed with leave. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial Court that the main plank of the defence, qualified privilege, could not avail them in that the publication complained of was not based on the announcement by the Price Control Board. As the defence was not available to the appellants, the respondent was never placed in a position to invoke the plaintiffs’ right in law to file a reply to such a defence alleging in the process express malice as in S.B. Bakare v. Ado Ibrahim (1973) 6 SC. 205. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part – it found no justification for the award of N50,000.00 each for (a) Natural grief and distress and (b) Social disadvantage. Also the remaining N100,000.00 awarded as loss of profit was reduced I to N20,000.00 and as there is no cross appeal by respondent, this reduction could not be challenged in this Court. Similarly this Court has not been moved by the respondent to vary the judgment as provided by Order 8 Rule 3(1) of the Supreme Court Rules 1985 and as such the reduction of general damage by the Court of Appeal cannot now be challenged.
The appeal before this Court has taken a new dimension. Grounds 1-7 complained on the award of damages of N20,000.00, being the reduction of N100,000.00 originally awarded as pecuniary loss. The appellants formulated the issue for determination in their brief as follows:
“B. ISSUES ARISING IN THE APPEAL
(1) Whether or not the publication complained of (exhibit ‘D’) was based on the bulletin by the Ogun State Ministry of Information (Exhibit ‘A’) in which case it would be privileged and no liability would attach or it was not based on it, in which case it was not privileged.
(2) Whether the claim for loss of profit is in the nature of special damages which should be specifically pleaded with particularity and strictly proved or it is in the nature of general damages which requires no such particularity of pleading or strictness of proof.
(3) If the said claim is in the nature of special damages requiring specific pleading with particularity, whether or not the pleading of the loss of profit contained in the statement of claim met that requirement.
(4) If the court found that it was general damage that was claimed, whether it was proper to have admitted evidence of actual loss.
(5) Whether loss of profit and diminution of turnover are one and the same thing and whether evidence of proportion of diminution in turnover would amount to prove of equivalent proportion of loss of profit.
(6) Whether in the absence of the “slightest details” that would make evidence of loss of profit “probably believable” it was proper for the court to say it could not uphold the award of N100,000.00 as loss of profit since it was arbitrary and yet go on, in the absence of any rationale or premises to make an equally arbitrary award of N20,000.00 or whether the proper approach, having found no basis for calculation of the loss of profit, was not to dismiss the claim under that heading.
(7) Whether or not the award of N450 costs for a single adjournment is reasonable and whether the Appeal Court should feel obliged to uphold the award (which they accepted to be high) merely because the judge gave reasons for it or the Justices of the Appeal Court have a duty to inquire into the reason-given for the seemingly high award to determine if it was valid reason (in which case the award would be reduced).
(8) Whether it was proper for the Court of Appeal to consider one of two complaints in a ground of appeal and remain silent on the other complaint and yet dismiss the ground of appeal entirely.
(9) Whether having decided that the award of N1,000 as costs during judgment must be reduced in view of the reduction of the damages from N200,000 to N20,000 it was proper for the Court of Appeal to have left the cost unassessed and not to have substituted its own award for the sum of N1,000 which it set aside.
(10) Whether on the whole, the publication was defamatory in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, and if so whether the defence of qualified privilege had not been effectively set up and finally whether the award of damages as well as that of costs for adjournment can stand on the principles on which they were made”
The first point taken was that the findings of the trial Court and Court at Appeal that Exhibit D, the publication complained of, was not based on Exhibit A, the announcement by the Price Control Board. Whilst conceding that Exhibit D is libellous, Professor Adesanya, of Counsel for the Appellants, submitted that the Court of Appeal ought to have held that it was covered by qualified privilege. The concurrent findings of the trial Court and the Court of Appeal was that Exhibit D was published by the appellants without seeing Exhibit A. That being the case, could this Court hold that the stand taken by the two lower Courts is perverse in the light of all the evidence before the trial Court Can a libellous publication be cove,red by the privilege in a document not seen by the appellants The preponderance of evidence at the trial Court points to the fact that the appellants saw Exhibit A for the first time not before publication of Exhibit D, not before the letter demanding amends was written, not even before the suit leading to this appeal was filed. It was after the litigation was commenced that the appellants wrote for and obtained a copy of Exhibit A which they as defendants at the trial tendered. To put it mildly, the appellants, as it would appear in the record before the Court, published recklessly on some hearsay with a bit of mischief in a banner headline portraying the respondent company as being guilty of hoarding which was a criminal offence under the Price Control Decree 1977. The appellants now submit that the trial Court as well as the Court of Appeal, ought to have inferred that Exhibit D was based on Exhibit A. Apart from the inference that could be legally drawn from certain facts, e.g. in evidential presumptions, it is not the duty of any court to help any party to litigation to arrive at a conclusion on which no evidence is led. It is for each party to make his own case and as the appellants never justified by evidence their assertion that Exhibit D was based on Exhibit A, the Court certainly would not embark on adventure of making out of the evidence what was not proved. Therefore this Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts on facts unless the findings are either perverse, or it legal as being based on inadmissible evidence or are completely not supported by any evidence or based on matters in evidence but unpleaded. (Fashanu v. Adekoya (1974) 6 SC.83, 91; Yassin v. Barclays Bank D.C.O. Ltd. (1960) 1 All NLR 171; Wuru v. Ekwonyeso (1978) 1 SC.37, 46, 47; Balogun v. Agboola (1974) 10 SC.111, 118, 119; Onowon & Anor. v. Iserhien (1976) NMLR 263). Surely an appellant seeking to upset two concurrent findings of the lower courts in the absence of the above, beats about the bush for it is in such cases impossible to manifest exceptional circumstances required to set aside those findings. Lakoye v. Oloja (1983) 8 SC.61; Enang v. Adu (1981)11-12 SC. 25, 42; Ojomu v. Ajao (1983) 9 SC.22, 53; Nwadike v. Ibekwe (1987) 4 NWLR 718.
What is remarkable about this publication giving rise to this case is that on its own Exhibit A is not headed and the best one can read into it is that beer would be sold at the respondent’s stores. But Exhibit D went further by the headlines mentioning sale of hoarded beer. I find no substance in ground 9 first canvassed and the ground therefore fails. The cases cited in appellants’ brief, to wit, Fatoyinbo v. Williams 1 FSC. 87,89; Fabunmuyi v. Obaje (1968) NMLR 242; Chief Eba v. Chief Warri Ogodo (1984) 4 SC.84 are not relevant to this case.
The remaining grounds centre on quantum of damages. The Court of Appeal rightly allowed the appeal in respect of natural grief and distress, and social disadvantage for which the trial Court awarded N50,000.00 each.
The remaining grounds centre on quantum of damages. The Court of Appeal rightly allowed the appeal in respect of natural grief and distress, and social disadvantage for which the trial Court awarded N50,000.00 each.
Unlike human being, a corporate body suing for defamation, seeks only damages for pecuniary loss it can suffer and not for things only possible in personal feelings. It can sue for loss of profit, shortfall in turnover or anticipatory loss but not natural grief and distress, and not for social disadvantage. A company in law is a person that can sue and be sued, but it can only do these through the agency of its directors who think for it and carry out its objectives. A company is a legal person, but it is inanimate. It has got no personal feeling of grief or distress. A company can only be injuried as to its earnings and not as to its feelings. It can be injured by libel and that injury must be related to its loss in money terms. Its loss of earning, loss of profits, and loss of goodwill are matters that libel can bring as misfortune for the company. It is because of these special attributes of a company that in an action in defamation, a company does not need to prove special damage or even financial loss to recover damages for the injury to its reputation in the way of its trade or business. Lewis v. Daily Telegraph (1964) A.C. 262; Proprietors of Selby Bridge v. Sunday Telegraph (The Times 17th February, 1966). For pecuniary loss, the trial Court awarded N100,000.00 to the company. The appellants were busy contending that though the publication was defamatory, it was covered by qualified privilege and virtually left uncontested the claim for general damages for N500,000.00. The Court of Appeal felt the trial Court’s award of N100,000.00 was too high and reduced it to N20,000.00. There is no cross appeal by the respondent and there is no application before this Court to vary the judgment of the Court of Appeal as I pointed out earlier. Certainly the award of N20,000.00 is not too high for the blatant defamation and for the loss to the company. What was awarded in the trial court was not in the nature of special damages, it was strictly in conformity with the claim made for general damages and no special proof was needed.
To my mind this appeal lacks substance on all the grounds canvassed. The appellants were reckless in the extreme by publishing what the respondent found offensive and defamatory. They were not contrite throughout the trial and have been lucky to have got away with the order to pay only N20,000.00 as damages. I dismiss this appeal with N500.00 costs and uphold the decision of the Court of Appeal dated 22nd of June, 1984
ESO, JSC.: I had a preview of the lead judgment which has just been delivered by my learned brother Belgore JSC. and I am in complete agreement with his reasoning and his conclusions.
I think it is a great pity there has been no cross appeal in regard to the award of damages in this case as I am not clear in my mind as to the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in reducing the award of N100,000.00 made by the trial judge for loss of profit to N20,000.00. But then it would not be the business of this Court if there is not complaint laid before it by the Respondent as this Court is not to ferret remedy for those who are apparently satisfied with the decision of the lower court.
Subject to this court I too will dismiss the appeal. I abide by all the orders made in the judgment on my learned brother, Belgore, J.S.C.
A. NNAMANI, J.S.C.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Belgore, J.S.C. and I agree entirely with his reasoning and conclusions.
There is nothing that has been put before this Court that would justify interference with the finding of the two lower courts that the article published of the respondent was clearly libellous. Indeed, it seems to me that it was a reckless publication. The publication by the Ogun State Price Control Board had nothing about Hoarded Beer. “Price Contralto sell N29,000.00 Hoarded Beer” was the heading of the publication in the appellants’ Daily Sketch Newspaper. Moreover, the appellants did not have a copy of the Press Release, Exhibit A before they made their own publication, Exhibit D. It was after this suit bad commenced that they wrote for a copy of the Ogun State publication. In fact they did not receive it until 17th April, 1978. The two lower courts were therefore quite justified in finding that the appellants’ publication Exhibit D was not based on the Ogun State Press release Exbibit A.
It is only in relation ‘to damages that I wish to make two comments for purposes of emphasis only. The Court of Appeal first rejected, very rightly in my view, the N50,000.00 which the learned trial Judge awarded to the respondent for “natural grief and distress.” While it is true that a Company, which the Respondent is, has to operate through its principal officers, it, being an artificial person, is incapable of having natural grief and distress.
It is the rejection of the award of N100,000 made by the learned trial Judge for loss of profit that I find unacceptable. Whatever I say is, however, obiter as no cross-appeal was taken by the respondent against the paltry award of N20,000 by the Court of Appeal. In his evidence for the respondent, Alhaji Kelly Ogunbayo said at p.17,
“The percentage loss of the company is 65% as a result of which many members of staff resigned because the company could not pay their wages. Many suppliers also stopped supplying goods to us because the company is regarded as a “Hoarder” as a result of the publication until the Company’s name is cleared in Court of Law that the publication is not justified. Having regard to the 65%, the loss to the Company is N100,000.”
The claim of the respondent was general damages which it is conceded is at large. This evidence was not challenged in cross-examination. The Court of Appeal, after due reference to relevant authorities on the issue of damages, held that there ought to have been some evidence as to how the figure of N100,000 was arrived at. Omo, J.C.A., also after asking the question whether it was a judicial exercise of its discretion for the court to award damages as high as N100,000 without evidence as to how that figure was arrived at, concluded at page 101,-
“Again in a claim for general damages, damages are at large, and the trial court even without any figure being claimed can award proper compensation. It is arbitrary without any evidence as to bow the figure of N100,000 was arrived at to award all of it purely because it was claimed and unchallenged in cross-examination. I am therefore of the view that the amount awarded is excessive and should be reduced. I will reduce damages under this heading therefore to N20,000 only.”
It is significant that Professor Adesanya in this court has attacked this award as arbitrary too for there is no indication of what it was based on. Although an appellate court admittedly can disturb an award of damages if such award is excessively high or unreasonably low (See L.C.C. v. Ogunbiyi (1969) 1 All NLR 297, it is settled that a Court of Appeal will not disturb an award of damages made by the lower court merely because it would have come to a different figure if it had heard the case itself. See Thompson v. Adefope (1969) 1 All NLR 322, 327-328. With respect, in the absence of criteria established by it for its own award, this is what the Court of Appeal has done. I think that although what the respondent gave was an estimate, there was enough material in the unchallenged evidence given by Alhaji Ogunbayo set down above which would justify the award made by the learned trial Judge.
The second comment is based on the submission of Professor Adesanya that no award should have been made for loss of profit. He contended that if a party gives evidence of special damages, he must have pleaded special damages. He said that there was no proof of the general damages claimed. I agree with the Court of Appeal here that the respondent’s pleading that the libel prejudices it in its business was clear enough to enable evidence of such prejudice to be led. If the appellant needed particulars of such prejudice, it ought to have applied to the Court for an order to compel the respondent to supply them See Oguntokun v. Rufai 11 WACA 55 at 66/7. It is settled that loss of particular customers constitutes special damage which must be pleaded if the plaintiff wishes to rely on it. He has to give particulars of the names of such customers. But where it is impracticable for the plaintiff to give their names, or where his customers are persons who deal with him over the counter or consist of a “floating or transitory class” the plaintiff can allege and prove a general loss of custom as special damage. Radcliffe v. Evans (1882)2 QB. 524, 539; Worsley v. Cooper (1939) 1 All ER 290. A general loss of customers or business, as distinct from a loss of particular known customers, is a special damage sufficient to support an action if the words complained of in the ordinary course of things do produce such loss of custom or business. Evans Case (Supra); Weld Blundell v. Stephen (1920) AC. 956 at 999; See Calvet v. Tomkies (1963) 1 WLR. 1997.
I think that in the instant case by the pleading and the evidence earlier referted to, the respondent complied with these requirements.
I would, like my learned brother, Belgore, J.S.C., dismiss the appeal. I endorse all his other orders including the order for costs.
M. L. UWAIS, J.S.C.: I have had a preview of the judgment read by my learned brother, Belgore, J.S.C. I agree that the appeal has no substance and that it should be dismissed.
Accordingly, the appeal is hereby dismissed with N500.00 costs to the respondent.
P. NNAEMEKA-AGU, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment of my brother, Belgore, J.S.C. just delivered and entirely agree with him that the appeal has no merit whatsoever.
Upon the learned Counsel for the appellant conceding it that the publication is prima facie libellous the remaining issues in the appeal rest upon a very narrow compass. It goes without saying that a defence of qualified privilege under section 16 of the Defamation Law of Ogun State depends first and foremost upon the publication of the alleged defamatory matter being accurate. Upon its being conceded that at no place were the words in the headlines;
“Price Control To Sell N29,000.00 hoarded beer”
contained in the official statement it purported to publish and these, particularly the words “hoarded beer”, are the words which are complained of, the defence of privilege under the section falls to the ground. For if an article in a newspaper is introduced by a libellous heading or title, evidence that the facts stated in the body of the article are true or privileged is not sufficient to attach the defence of privilege to the false head-line; the heading, or title must also be shown to be accurate or justifiable. See Lewis v. Clement (1820) 3 B & Ald. 702; Bishop v. Latimer (1861) 4 L.T. (N.S) 755. Indeed the allegation of hoarding could not be true in view of the fact that the respondent had been discharged of the charge of hoarding. Nor could the appellant hide under the fact that large quantities of beer were in fact to be sold in the respondent’s store, as those facts do not cover the real sting of the publication, that is “hoarded beer.” So, no matter how one looks at it, the publication in the appellant’s newspaper was, in the con of the libel complained of, materially inaccurate. Material inaccuracy destroys a defence of qualified privilege. It is to be noted that defence of privilege under section 16 of the Defamation Law of Ogun State was designed to protect journalists who publish certain reports accurately. It affords no panacea for publication of libelous imputations and insinuations irrelevant to the said report. Once a newspaper goes into matters unconnected with, or irrelevant to, the report then that privilege which was designed for its protection to enable it do an honest and accurate reporting is gone. As Lord Atkinson said in Adam v. Ward (1917) AC. 309, at pp.320 and 321:
“The fact that an occasion is privileged does not necessarily protect all that is written or said on that occasion. Anything that is not relevant and pertinent to the discharge of the duty or exercise of the right or the safeguarding of the interest which creates the privilege will not be protected…………….The Judge has to consider the nature of the duty or right or interest and to rule whether or not the defendant has published something beyond what was germain and reasonably appropriate to the occasion………………..A man ought not to be protected if he publishes what is in fact untrue of someone else when there is no occasion for his doing so.”
I shall apply this principle in this appeal, as, it clearly appears, the appellants decided to introduce the element of hoarding, which at all material times was a criminal offence, into the proposed sale of beer in the respondent’s store, an element that was not contained in the official report which they purport to publish or even germain to it, they cannot, in my view, find shelter under the defence of qualified privilege under section 16 of the Defamation Law of Ogun State. At least, the privilege afforded by the section does not extend to the part of the publication complained of. For, it is one thing to have a stock of beer for sale; but it is quite another thing to have the stock of beer for sale because it has been hoarded.
The two situations are not germain to each other. It is in my opinion only if the headline was germain to the body of the official report that the question of malice, if properly pleaded, would fall due for consideration. See Galley: On Libel & Slander (7th Edn.) para. 585 and 586 at p.250.
For the above reasons and the fuller reasons given in the lead judgment of my brother, I dismiss the appeal and subscribe to the orders made in the lead judgment.
Appeal Dismissed
Appearances
Professor S. A. Adesanya with M. E. Esan, O. Ogunbanjo, O. A. Bolaji and Miss G. Mummuny For Appellant
AND
Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N. with Miss A. O. Okojie For Respondent



