DAVID EGHAREVBA V. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
(2013)LCN/6339(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Tuesday, the 25th day of June, 2013
CA/B/332C(C)/2009
Before Their Lordships
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJUJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
SIDI DAUDA BAGEJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPEJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
DAVID EGHAREVBAAppellant(s)
AND
COMMISSIONER OF POLICERespondent(s)
RATIO
THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENCE OF ARMED ROBBERY
In a case of armed robbery, the following elements must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
1. That there was a robbery.
2. That the appellant was the robber or one of the robbers.
3. That the armed robber was armed or was in company of a person so armed. PER OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT CONTRDITCIONS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION CREATES DOUBT IN THE MID OF THE JUDGE
The contradictions and patent disparity in the evidence of the prosecution should have created doubt in the mind of the learned trial judge as it has created doubt in mine. Any doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused. See Archibong v. The State (2006) 5 SCNJ 202; (2006) 14 NWLR Pt. 1000 Pg. 349; Orji v. The State (2008) 4 SCNJ 85; (2008) 10 NWLR Pt. 1094 Pg. 31.
I resolve the second issue in favour of the appellant. PER OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN AFFIRM THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCUSED PERSON ON THE SAME CHARGES
I wish to draw attention also to the fact that the 2nd appellant in CA/B/332CB/2009 had been discharged and acquitted by this court. It would be a travesty of justice to affirm the conviction of the appellant on the same charges in respect of the same facts. See Atiku v. The State (2010) 9 NWLR Pt. 1199 Pg. 241; Kalu v. State (1988) 4 NWLR Pt. 90 Pg. 503; at Pg. 503; Ebri v. The State (2004) NWLR Pt. 885 Pg. 589. PER OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of Hon. Justice J. A. Oyakhirome of the Edo State High Court delivered on 29th of October, 2008 in which the appellant was sentenced along with three others to death by hanging for the offence of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and armed robbery. At the hearing of the appeal, learned appellant’s counsel brought to the attention of the court the fact that the original 2nd appellant had by a bench judgment been discharged and acquitted by this court on 24/4/12. He was the appellant in CA/B/332CB/2009 – Blessing Ero Osayande. The facts that led to this appeal are as follows:
The case for the prosecution at the trial was that on 26/2/2006 at about 2.00am one Mrs. Ehanire Claudette Iyobosasere (PW1) and her children were attacked by a gang of armed robbers. They were beaten up by the robbers and their property which included money, handsets, coral beads and re-charge cards were stolen. During the robbery operation, there was power supply hence PW1, PW2 and PW3 were able to identify the present appellant, David Egharevba (alias) “stone”. In the court below David Egharevba was 3rd accused, Blacky Ojo was 1st accused, Blessing Ero Osayande was 2nd accused and Ifeanyi Nwafor was 4th accused respectively. The victims who gave evidence as PW1, PW2 and PW3 said that they were able to identify the appellant and the co-accused persons as they live in the same neighbourhood.
At the trial four witnesses testified for the prosecution while the present appellant testified on his own behalf and called two witnesses namely DW7 and DW8. DW7 testified that the appellant slept at home on the night of the incident. DW8 a contractor and community leader gave character evidence on behalf of the appeal.
The appellant maintained his innocence throughout the trial and claimed that he slept at home and did not commit armed robbery. The learned trial judge found that the evidence of the victims fixed him at the scene at the material time. He was convicted and sentenced to death by hanging. Dissatisfied with his conviction and sentence, the appellant appealed to this court.
Mr. Olayiwola Afolabi settled the appellant’s brief and filed it on 19/2/10. He also filed a reply brief on 5/3/13. Mrs. O. S. Uwuigbe who is the Solicitor General of Edo State also filed a respondent’s brief on 21/10/11. The appellant’s counsel identified two issues for determination as follows:-
1) Having regards to the serious nature of the offence that the appellant was arraigned, whether the lower court was right when it failed to consider the defence of alibi promptly raised by the appellant in his statement to the police notwithstanding the failure on the part of the police to investigate the alibi raised by the appellant.
(Issue 3 of the additional grounds of appeal)
2) Having regards to the nature of the charge against the appellant, whether the trial judge was right to convict the appellant of the offence of conspiracy and armed robbery when the evidence adduced by the prosecution was riddled with serious elements of suspicion, material contradiction and grave doubts.
(Issue 4 of the additional grounds of appeal)
The respondent also identified three issues for determination as follows:
i. Whether the charge of conspiracy and armed robbery was proved against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
ii. Whether the learned trial judge adequately considered the defence of alibi raised by the appellant.
iii. Whether there was material contradictions, element of suspicion and grave doubts in the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
Since issues 1 and 3 as raised by the respondent are the same as issue 1 raised by the appellant. I will rearrange the issues as follows:
1. Whether the learned trial judge adequately considered the evidence of alibi put up by the appellant.
2. Whether in view of the contradictions in the case of the prosecution enough doubt was created to show that the prosecution did not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE ONE
Whether the learned trial judge adequately considered the evidence of alibi put up by the appellant.
Learned appellant counsel argue that it is incumbent upon the trial court to consider all the defences put up by the accused person, express or implied. He cited TAKIDA v. THE STATE (1968) 1 ALL NLR 270. Counsel referred us to the categorical denial of the allegation by the appellant in his statement to the police in Exhibit P2. Counsel insisted that appellant claimed that he slept in his house on the night of the incident.
In Exhibit P2, appellant gave the address of his house as No. 10 Ewomori New Lagos Road, Benin City. The police did nothing to investigate the alibi that he slept in his house. Learned appellant’s counsel submitted that since the court cannot presume to investigate the alibi put up by an accused to the police at the first opportunity; the court is obliged to accept the evidence of the appellant. He opined that where the alibi is not investigated adequately a conviction must be quashed. He cited ADAMU v. GBADABAWA (1993) NWLR Pt. 594 Pg. 256 at 260; STATE v. AZEEZ (2008) 14 NWLR Pt. 1108 Pg 439 at 504; ALMU v. THE STATE (2009) 10 NWLR Pt. 1184 Pg.31 at 43; CHUKWU V. THE STATE (1996) 7 NWLR pt.337 Pg.686. Counsel submitted that failure to investigate the alibi of the appellant is an admission of the story of the appellant. He argued that there is no evidence that this defence of alibi he raised was investigated and in view of the fact that the evidence to fix the appellant at the scene of the crime is tainted with doubt especially where the star witness PW1 who is the mother of the PW2 and PW3 stated that she suspected the appellant and others to be responsible for the robbery. Counsel insisted placing reliance on ALMU V. THE STATE that the failure of the prosecution to investigate the appellant’s statement in Exhibit P2 infested the prosecution’s case with so many doubts about the cogency or otherwise of the prosecution case.
In reply, the learned respondent’s counsel argued that the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 established beyond doubt the identity of the appellant as one of those who robbed PW1 and her children. Counsel submitted that the evidence of visual identification of the appellant at the scene of crime by the prosecution witnesses was properly relied upon by the trial judge since the evidence having fixed the appellant to the scene of crime, his evidence of alibi cannot stand. Learned appellant’s counsel submitted that in the instant case there is no doubt that the overwhelming evidence adduced by the prosecution has falsified the defence of alibi raised by appellant. He argued that the learned trial judge considered the defence of alibi put up by appellant, but believe and accepted the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as cogent, credible and compelling. He rightly held that the defence of alibi set up by appellant crumbled in view of “more direct and cogent evidence” fixing the appellant to the scene of armed robbery and he rightly rejected the evidence and defence of appellant and co-accused persons. PATRICK NJOVENS V. THE STATE (1999) 1 ACLR pg.224 at 261 was cited as authority.
During the trial, the appellant called his cousin DW7 who stated categorically that the appellant came back from work on the night of the incident, he gave the appellant water to bath, the appellant eat and slept in his room till daybreak. He stated that as he worked overnight to make a shroud ready for a funeral, he was awake all night and would have seen the appellant if he left the house at night. The learned trial judge’s evaluation of the evidence is as follows on page 204 of the record:
“None of the DW7 or DW8 made any statement to the police. It was liked DW8 remembered the event in court over two years after the incident. He couldn’t tell the court the person he made clothes for all night for burial. I reject his evidence as an after thought and not credible.”
His Lordship concluded at page 205 of the record thus:
“For emphasis, let me say again that having found the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4 credible, cogent, direct, convincing and compelling. I accept them….
What the above leads to is that the prosecution has successfully established and I am satisfied that the accused person was wrong in his claim to have been in his house sleeping alone during the commission of the offence of armed robbery in the house of PW1 at 2am on 26/2/06 and I so hold.”
It is my view that the evidence adduced by the prosecution fix the 3rd accused person reasonable doubt at the locus deliciti, scene of crime, that is PW1’s house on 26/2/06 at 2am and I so hold.”To be worthy of investigation, the defence of alibi should be precise and specific in terms of the place where the accused was and the persons he was with at the material time.
The burden is on the prosecution to disprove alibi by proving that the accused was the culprit beyond reasonable doubt. Generally the failure of the police to investigate alibi is not fatal to the prosecution’s case if the prosecution adduces evidence fixing the accused to the scene of crime. See OKOLO OCHEMAJE V. THE STATE (2008) 6 SCNJ 143; (2008) 5 NWLR Pt.1109 Pg.57. As it is the duty of the prosecution to investigation and disprove the defence of alibi, the accused is also obliged to call evidence to support his defence of alibi. See STATE V. FATAI AZEEZ & ORS (2008) 4 SCNJ 325; (2008) 14 NWLR Pt.1108 pg.439.
In this case the police arrested the appellant in the presence of DW8 and he immediately made a statement that he was in his house and did not rob the complainants. The police did not go back to the house to make further enquiries as to his whereabout on the night in question. The police limited their investigation to arresting him and obtaining a statement from him. It would have been a different thing if the IPO had told the court that he went to the house of the appellant after his arrest and found the alibi to be false. During the trial, he called evidence of DW8. The evidence of DW8 in my view was in no way discredited during cross examination. The objective evaluation of the evidence of DW8 by the learned trial judge was made impossible by the mind set of his Lordship that the prosecution witnesses had already given “credible, cogent, direct, convincing and compelling” evidence which had convinced his Lordship that the appellant was at the scene of crime.
Ordinarily the conclusion of the learned trial judge would be unassailable since the plea or defence of alibi must fail once there is reliable and accepted evidence fixing the accused to the scene of crime. Clearly the learned trial judge preferred the oath of the three prosecution witnesses as against the sole oath of DW8 the defence witness in relation to the whereabout of the appellant. See IME DAVID IDIOK V. THE STATE (2008) 4 SCNJ 196; (2008) 13 NWLR Pt. 1104 Pg.225. On the stark application of the law of alibi as applied by the learned trial judge, I cannot find any fault. In that con the issue would have been resolved against the appellant. However, I need to add that in the circumstances of this case, there was reason to doubt the credibility of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.
This leads me to issue two.
ISSUE TWO
Whether in view of the contradictions in the case of the prosecution enough doubt was created to show that the prosecution did not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Learned appellant’s counsel submitted on this issue that in criminal matters, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt and that the burden does not shift. He cited STATE VS. OGBUGUNJO (2001) 2 NWLR (PT.940) 637; ONYIRIMBA VS. STATE (2002) 11 NWLR (PT.777) 83 @ 97-98; ADISA VS. STATE (1991) 1 NWLR (PT.168) 90; EMIOWE VS. STATE (2001) NWLR (PT. 641) 408.
He submitted that it is settled law that all the ingredients to sustain a charge of armed robbery must co-exist and where one of them is absent or tainted with doubt, the charge of armed robbery is not proved. It is trite law that where one ingredient of a charge is not proved, the whole fails. He cited STATE VS. OKECHUKWU (1994) 9 NWLR (PT. 368) @ 296 & 297 RATIO 5. Counsel argued that from the records and from the available piece of evidence before the lower court, we submit that the prosecution never proved the three ingredients stated beyond reasonable doubt that will require learned trial Judge to convict the appellant and sentence him to death.
He submitted that there is a serious doubt on the issue of whether there was robbery on the 25th of February, 2006 at all as alleged by PW1. This issue is very fundamental in establishing the guilt of the appellant which doubt ought to be resolved in his favour.
Counsel argued that while the police stated that they received a distress call and went to the scene of crime, the complainants on the contrary gave evidence that they reported to the State Armed Robbery Section in the morning. Counsel argued that this is important in view of the case made by the appellant during the trial that there was no armed robbery at all in the village or community on the day of the incident. Counsel urged the court to reject both evidence which contradict each other. He cited ZURU V. CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF & 2 ORS (2004) ALL FWLR Pt. 237 Pg. 522 at 536.
Counsel pointed out that the learned trial judge never made a finding in respect of the issue of the confession of PW1 under cross examination that those arrested were those she suspected to be the armed robbers who had robbed her previously. He submitted that the appellants were arrested on mere suspicion by PW1. Counsel cite MILLAR v. THE STATE (2005) 8 NWLR pt. 922 pg.236; AIGBADION V. THE STATE (2000) 7 NWLR Pt.666 pg.678 at 704.
To further cast doubt on whether a robbery actually took place, counsel pointed out that the amount purportedly stolen and indicated in the police investigation report was different from both the crime diary as reported and even from the statement of the witnesses and this fact was noticed even by the court itself. He referred to page 77 of the record where the learned trial judge observed as follows:-
COURT: – the police investigation report is admitted in evidence and marked exhibit P6. The figure of amount allegedly stolen as recorded in police crime diary is different.”
Learned respondent’s counsel argued on the point of whether there is a material contradiction on the issue of who and how the matter was reported to the police that even when police visit the scene of crime on distress call the witnesses would normally go to the police station to make their statement. There is absolutely nothing unusual or contradictory in the evidence of both witnesses and it does not raise any doubt as to whether the robbery incident actually took place on 26/2/06 in the house of PW1.
Counsel submitted that minor discrepancies and inaccuracies that do not touch the justice or substance of the charge cannot be a good ground to disturb the judgment of the trial court. IGABELE V. STATE (2006) 1 MJSC Pg.96 at 108 was cited.
Learned respondent’s counsel contended that the appellant and the others were not arrested on mere suspicion. Counsel referred to the statement of PW1 as recorded in the IPO report on page 2-16 of the record wherein PW1 narrated her previous experiences with armed robbers. Counsel argued that PW1 referred to the earlier incident in January 2006 when she said she suspected the appellant among others responsible for terrorizing her since she packed into her house. Counsel urged the court to ignore as a misconception, the argument that there was any contradiction in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.
I have read the record of proceedings from cover to cover. I must make clear before I start a consideration of the main issues raised by the learned appellant’s counsel that I have been influenced by some peripheral issues raised by the appellant’s counsel. The first one is the point made in the last paragraph of page 3 of the appellant’s brief. While the 1st accused now appellant had stated in the confessional statement Exhibit P4 admitted during the trial but expunged by this court that he robbed the complainant’s house with the appellant and others, which evidence even if not expunged was binding on said 1st accused alone, the said accused on oath stated on page 82 of the record while retracting the statement as follows:-
“In the course of being interrogated, police asked me who my friends were. I told them that the only friend I have is the 3rd accused person David Egharevba, that was how he (3rd accused) was arrested. I never led the police to the houses of the other accused persons where they were arrested”.
The learned trial judge never made a finding on this point even though learned defence counsel made an issue of it at the trial court. It is my belief that such evidence from a co-accused should have put the learned trial judge on notice that in this case there may be more than met the eye and to proceed cautiously in swallowing hook, line and sinker the evidence of the prosecution.
Secondly, DW7 gave character evidence on behalf of the appellant. It is indeed rare in the typical African setting for people to stick their neck out to defend a person charged with the offence of armed robbery unless they are very convinced of the innocence of such person. DW7 swore that he had known the appellant since 2001 as a bricklayer. Let me set out his evidence on page 95-97 of the record.
“I am Julius Amadi. I live at No. 3 Amadi Street, Evbomore Quarters, Benin City. I am the Managing Director, Amadi group of Coys. We do building and civil engineering jobs. I know the 3rd accused – David Egharevba. He worked for me in my site as a bricklayer. Ever since, he has been working for me in that capacity. I do not know him to be an armed robber. I am also a community leader”.
Unfortunately the learned trial judge gave no probative value to the evidence of DW7 and did not consider it at all on the basis that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses did not leave room for doubt. Let us now consider the areas of doubt substantially raised by appellant’s counsel in the brief.
The evidence at the trial by PW1 and PW2 which the learned trial court believed was that the appellant beat PW2 even after she gave him the sum of N7,850.00. All the prosecution witnesses confirmed that they knew the accused even by name as they all lived in the same village.
At Pg. 216 of the record, the learned trial judge held as follows:-
“I apply the above principle to the present case. It is my view that the evidence adduced by the prosecution against each of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th accused persons is strong, so strong that the remote possibility in favour of each accused person can be dismissed with a sentence of “of course it is possible, but not in the least probable”. I so hold.”
In a case of armed robbery, the following elements must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
1. That there was a robbery.
2. That the appellant was the robber or one of the robbers.
3. That the armed robber was armed or was in company of a person so armed.
The learned appellant’s counsel raised several issues in trying to demolish the case made out by the prosecution and in trying to persuade us to overturn the findings or fact by the learned trial judge.
On the issue of how the robbery was reported to the police, I am persuaded by the arguments of learned appellant’s counsel to hold the view that how a case is first reported and investigated is of material importance where the charge is a serious one leveled against the accused. PW4 stated at Pg. 60 of the record thus:
“She invited police to come to her aid. Police Headquarters directed SARS personnel on night duty including myself to proceed to Isiohor to caller’s house which we did. On getting there, we met the complainant and her children crying. They confirmed they called the police. They explained to us how the robbers gain entrance into their house and robbed them. We went round the house, saw where the robbers gained entrance through the window by breaking the protectors. We combed the area. Efforts to arresting the robbers proved abortive.”
PW1 stated at Pg. 45 of the record thus:
“The next day early in the morning I went to the police station to report the incident, I went to SARS office where I made a statement.”
PW2 stated at Pg. 53 as follows:
“Myself, my mother, younger sister and cousin went to the SARS office together on 26th. I made statement to police on the same day.”
The most important testimony is actually that of PW3 who stated categorically at Pg.58 of the record as follows:
“After this event I didn’t see anybody again. At day break we went to the police station to complain. I made a statement at the State C.I.D. (SARS).”
This point was taken up at the trial. The trial court held as follows on this issue.
“I do not see or view the statements of PW1 and PW4 as irreconcilable on the point to make them inconsistent. I do not also see how non taking of photographs of the scene of crime can create ambiguity leading to doubts. I view learned counsel’s submission with respect as an attempt to throw dust into a cloudless atmosphere. I reject it”.
If indeed as the appellant and the co-accused claimed during the trial, there was actually no robbery on the day in question, how and when it was reported becomes a material issue. In my view this is a live issue in this appeal and the contradiction being material has tilted the appeal in favour of the appellant. See Dagayya v. The State (2000) 1 SCNJ 251; (2006) 7 NWLR Pt. 980 Pg. 637; Udosen v. The State (2007) 1 SCNJ 482; (2007) 4 NWLR Pt. 1023 Pg. 125, I resolve this material contradiction in favour of the appellant.
The amount stolen during the robbery was not ascertained as the amount as stated in the Police Investigation Report and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses differ. At pg. 77 of the record, the learned trial judge noted as follows:
“Court – the police investigation report is admitted in evidence and marked exhibit P6. The figure of amount allegedly stolen as recorded in police crime diary is different”.
What, for me was the most important consideration in this case was the antecedents of the parties. According to PW1, she had been robbed previously twice. On a previous occasion, she claimed there was an unsuccessful attempt to rob her. One Uyi Obaseki had told her that the persons who were convicted were the probably the robbers who had robbed her. At Pg. 47 of the record PW1 stated as follows:
“I know one Uyi Obaseki, he is a son to a co-land lady in the Street I have my house, I told the police in my statement that Uyi Obaseki once informed me that Osayande Blessing Ero 2nd accused persons and others were the people who robbed me in 2004. I am aware that the said Uyi Obaseki was actually arrested. I will be surprised to hear that Uyi Obaseki told the police that he never gave me the information concerning who robbed me in 2004. It is not true that since then I have remained very bitter.”
At Pg. 46 of the record PW1 stated as follows:
“I told police in my statement that I suspected them to be the robbers who came to my house on February, 26, 2006, I said in my statement that if there is any robbery in my house, they would be held responsible.”
There was electricity and the robbers were not masked. They did not shoot or kill anyone. I wonder if it does not run counter to the natural order of human behavior that the robbers who were easily identified by their victims would wait around to be arrested by the police after the robbery? The natural order of things is for the robbers to have at least attempted to kill their victims if they could be identified and easily named. I pose this question because the learned trial judge kept on insisting that the identification of the appellant by the complainants was not controverted. It was controverted in my view immediately the appellant entered a plea of Not Guilty to the charge. In any event, the learned trial judge refused to give any probative value to the evidence of all the defence witnesses because of his Lordship’s conclusion that the direct evidence of identification of the appellant by the complainants’ placing him at the scene of crime was unassailable.
I read the record from cover to cover. I do not agree that this case is as cut and dried as the learned trial judge was obviously inclined to believe. It is unfortunate also that the learned trial judge gave scant regard to the evidence of character witnesses. The fact that people came forward to give evidence of good character of the appellant in such a serious charge should have given the trial judge food for thought not to create solely on the evidence of the State. It is also unfortunate that the learned trial judge gave little regard to the contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the antecedents of the relationship between the appellants and the prosecution witnesses.
The contradictions and patent disparity in the evidence of the prosecution should have created doubt in the mind of the learned trial judge as it has created doubt in mine. Any doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused. See Archibong v. The State (2006) 5 SCNJ 202; (2006) 14 NWLR Pt. 1000 Pg. 349; Orji v. The State (2008) 4 SCNJ 85; (2008) 10 NWLR Pt. 1094 Pg. 31.
I resolve the second issue in favour of the appellant.
I wish to draw attention also to the fact that the 2nd appellant in CA/B/332CB/2009 had been discharged and acquitted by this court. It would be a travesty of justice to affirm the conviction of the appellant on the same charges in respect of the same facts. See Atiku v. The State (2010) 9 NWLR Pt. 1199 Pg. 241; Kalu v. State (1988) 4 NWLR Pt. 90 Pg. 503; at Pg. 503; Ebri v. The State (2004) NWLR Pt. 885 Pg. 589.
In the circumstances, I set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant in charge No.B/21C/2007 and enter an order of acquittal and discharge of the Appellant.
Appeal Allowed.
SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.C.A.: I read before now the leading Judgment of my learned brother H. M. Ogunwumiju JCA, just delivered, and I agree. The conviction and sentence of the Appellant by the lower court are set aside by me. I also enter an order of acquittal and discharge on the Appellant. I also allow the appeal.
AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the lead Judgment prepared by my learned brother, HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, JCA. His lordship has painstakingly dealt with the Issues raised for the determination of the appeal and I am in complete agreement with the exposition of the law, reasoning and conclusions in the lead Judgment. I not only have nothing to add, but also adopt the judgment as mine.
Accordingly, I too, resolve the issues in the appeal in the same manner they have been resolved in the lead Judgment and allow the appeal. The conviction and sentence passed on the Appellant in Charge No. B/21C/2007 is hereby set aside. Instead I make orders acquitting and discharging the Appellant.
Appearances
Olayiwola Afolabi Esq.For Appellant
AND
O. S. Uwuigbe (Mrs) Solicitor-General of Edo StateFor Respondent
