DAUDA v. STATE (2020)

DAUDA v. STATE

(2020)LCN/14053CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(MAKURDI JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Wednesday, March 25, 2020

CA/MK/15CA/2019

Before Our Lordships:

Ignatius Igwe Agube Justice of the Court of Appeal

Onyekachi Aja Otisi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Joseph Eyo Ekanem Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

DAUDA MOSES APPELANT(S)

And

THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL TRIALS

On the authority of Section 135(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011, the burden of proving the guilt of the appellant fell on the prosecution. The standard of proof required was proof beyond reasonable doubt. The burden never shifts. Where the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused must be discharged. It must however be stated that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of doubt. Rather, it means the prosecution establishing the guilt of an accused person with compelling and conclusive evidence. It also means a degree of compulsion which is consistent with a high degree of probability. If the evidence is strong against a man as to have only a remote possibility in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence “of course it is possible but not in the least probable”, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt. See Akpan v State (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 160) 101, Ikpo V State (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1521) 501 and Sanmi V State (2019) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1690) 551. PER EKANEM, J.C.A.

INGREDIENTS TO ESTABLISH THE OFFENCE OF ARMED ROBBERY

In keeping with the above, I shall first consider the counts on armed robbery. The offence of robbery is the illegal taking of property from the person of another or in the person’s presence by violence and intimidation. Armed robbery is committed by a person carrying a dangerous weapon regardless of whether the weapon is revealed or not. See Okanlawon V State supra. 472.

To succeed in establishing the charge of armed robbery, the following elements must be proved:
(i) that there was a robbery or series of robberies;
(ii) that the robber(s) was/were armed; and
(iii) that the accused was the armed robber or one of the armed robbers. See Bozin V State (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 8) 465, Eke V State (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 566) 430 and Okanlawon V State supra.

I shall pause at this stage to state that the guilt of an accused person may be established by;
(i) the confessional statement of the accused person;
(ii) circumstantial evidence;
(iii) evidence of eye witnesses. See Dahiru V State (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1640) 567, 580. PER EKANEM, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT AN ACCUSED PERSON CAN BE CONVICTED ON THE BASIS OF HIS CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT ALONE

The law still remains that an accused person can be convicted on the basis of his confessional statement alone once it is shown to be free, voluntary, positive, direct, unequivocal and properly proved without the need for corroboration. SeeKanu V State (1952) 14 WACA 30, Ogedengbe V State (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1421) 338, 358, Dibia V State (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1579) 196, 219 and 220 and Akeem V State (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1597) 311, 340. The reason is that the strongest evidence establishing the guilt of an accused person is his own confession. There is no evidence stronger than a person’s own admission or confession. See Federal Republic of Nigeria V Barminas (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1588) 177, 199.
Nevertheless, over time the Courts have developed the position that it is desirable though not mandatory for the Court to have some evidence outside the confession (no matter how slight) of circumstances which make it probable that the confession was true.

TESTS TO ASCERTAIN THE VERACITY OF A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

I have already stated that generally it is desirable to have outside a confessional statement some evidence of circumstances which make it probable that the confession was true. Courts have developed the following tests to ascertain the veracity of a confessional statement:
(i) Whether there is anything outside the confession which shows that it may be true;
(ii) Whether it is corroborated in any way;
(iii) Whether the relevant statement of fact made in it are most likely true as far as they can be tested;
(iv) Whether the accused had the opportunity of committing the offence;
(v) Whether the confession is possible;
(vi) Whether the alleged confession is consistent with other facts that have been ascertained and established. See Alo V State (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 600) 1357 and Okeke V State supra.
It should be stated that it is not mandatory that each and every of those tests must be analysed by the trial Court. It is sufficient if there is a general corroboration of the important incidents under consideration. See Asimi V State (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1527) 414, 433 – 434 and Jimoh V State (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1286) 149, 168-169. PER EKANEM, J.C.A.

THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE OF CONSPIRACY

Conspiracy generally is an agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act or to carry out a lawful act by unlawful means. SeeOloye V State supra. 525-526. Direct evidence of conspiracy is not always available. Therefore generally at common law, it is a matter of inference deducible from certain criminal acts of the parties accused, done in pursuit of an apparent criminal purpose in common between them. See Adepoju V State (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 103, 115 and Friday V State (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1538) 242. PER EKANEM, J.C.A.

JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the High Court of Justice, Nasarawa State, sitting at Lafia (“the trial Court” for short) delivered on 3/5/2018 in Charge No. NSD/LF/37C/2012. In the judgment, the trial Court (presided over by S.U. Dikko, C.J.) found the appellant guilty of the offences of conspiracy and armed robbery under Sections 6(b) and 1(1) and (2) (a) and (b) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act, 2004. He was sentenced to 21 years imprisonment for the offences.

The facts of the case leading to this appeal are that the appellant (as 2nd accused person) was arraigned at the trial Court along with three other persons (one of whom was at large) on a seven count charge of conspiracy and armed robbery contrary to Sections 6(b) and 1(1) and (2)(a) and (b), respectively, of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act, 2004.

The respondent, to prove its case, called six witnesses and tendered exhibits including exhibits “G” and “O”, said to be the confessional statements of the appellant. The appellant testified in

his defence and did not call any other witness. The case of the prosecution against the appellant was that the appellant along with his co-accused persons on 24/1/2012 and 27/1/2012 at besides Abdullahi Adamu Housing Estate and Millionaires Quarters, Lafia, conspired to and did rob Mairiga Umar Mohammed, and Hassan Suleiman Nalaraba, Abdullahi Usaini, Isah Hassan Nalara, Esq. and Ahmad Hassan of valuable items including cash and phones while armed with deadly weapons including guns. The appellant testified as to his innocence.

At the end of the trial and after considering evidence led before it and the written addresses of counsel, the trial Court, as earlier stated, found the appellant and his co-accused persons guilty as charged and sentenced them.
Aggrieved by the decision, the appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court on 30/7/2018.

Pursuant to the rules of this Court, appellant filed a brief of argument on 15/1/2020 and a reply brief on 13/3/2010. Both briefs which were settled by Matthew G. Burkaa, Esq., were deemed duly filed and served on 18/3/2020.

The respondent filed its brief of argument on 6/3/2020 and the

same was settled by M.J. Abokee, Esq. (Principal State Counsel – Ministry of Justice, Nasarawa State). It was deemed duly filed on 18/3/2020.

At the hearing of the appeal on 18/3/2020, Matthew G. Burkaa, Esq. for the appellant adopted and relied on appellant’s briefs of argument in urging the Court to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the trial Court and discharge and acquit the appellant.

Dr. Abdulkarim A. Kana (the Honourable Attorney – General, Nasarawa State) adopted and relied on the respondent’s brief of argument in urging the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the conviction of and sentence on the appellant.

In the appellant’s brief of argument, the following issues are formulated for the determination of the appeal:
“1. Whether the trial Court was right to have convicted the Appellant for the offence of conspiracy. (Distilled from Ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal.
2. Whether in view of the entire circumstances and the evidence presented during trial, the trial High Court was right to have attached probative value to Exhibit “G” and “O”.

(Distilled from Grounds 3 of the Notice of Appeal).
3. Whether the Respondent has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt to warrant the trial High Court to have convicted and sentenced the Appellant for the offence of Conspiracy and Armed Robbery. (Distilled from Grounds 2, 4 and 5 and 6 of the Notice of Appeal).”

In the respondent’s brief of argument, a single issue is formulated for the determination of the appeal. The issue is:
“Whether the trial Court rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant to 21 years imprisonment for conspiracy to commit armed robbery and armed robbery under Section 6(b) and 1(1) and (2)(a) and (b) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act, 2004”.

Since all the issues raised by appellant revolve around proof of the offences with which the appellant was charged, it is my view that the single issue formulated by the respondent’s counsel is more apt and precise for the determination of the appeal than the issues formulated by appellant’s counsel. The single issue covers all the complaints of the appellant in his grounds of appeal. I therefore adopt the

single issue formulated by the respondent’s counsel for the determination of the appeal.

Arguments of Counsel
Appellant’s counsel set out the ingredients of the offence of conspiracy and submitted that the prosecution did not establish the offence against the appellant. This, he stated, is because the prosecution did not establish any of the ingredients of the offence of conspiracy. It was his contention that the prosecution failed to prove the meeting of minds of the appellant and his co-accused persons to commit an offence.

Appellant’s counsel referred to Exhibits “G” and “O”, the latter of which was held by the trial Court to be the confessional statement of the appellant. He noted that the trial Court primarily based its conviction of the appellant on the statement. He submitted that it is one thing to admit a confessional statement and another thing to attach probative value to it. Thus, he posited, the trial Court was wrong to have convicted the appellant on the basis of the confessional statements. He lamented that the trial Court did not subject the confessional statements to the test

for their truth as laid down in Alo v State (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 600) 1357.

Continuing, counsel contended that Exhibit G was nothing but hearsay as it was impossible for PW5 through whom it was tendered to tender it as he was not the Police Officer who recorded the statement. It was his position that the PW5 could not tender the statement in Court since, according to him, another person who recorded the statement was also the interpreter of the statement. Referring to the case of FRN v Usman (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 632) 1639, he argued that the trial Court ought not to have attached probative value to the statement.

He noted that as regards Exhibit O which was tendered through the PW6, the PW6 testified that he and other Police Officers recorded the statement. He observed that the statement was not tied to any of the Police Officers. He therefore classified exhibits G and O as documentary hearsay which attract no probative value though they were tendered and admitted without objection.

Counsel proceeded to argue that exhibits G and O were not direct, precise and unequivocal as to the commission of the offences alleged against the

appellant.

It was his position that the prosecution did not prove its allegations against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and as such the trial Court was wrong to have convicted the appellant.

He further submitted that there were contradictions and uncertainties in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. He pointed out that the PW1 testified that he was lying prostrate during the robbery of 24/1/2012 yet he claimed to have recognized the alleged robbers. He noted that the PW3 testified that all the robbers carried torchlight while PW4 said they carried guns. He then wondered how the appellant and his co-accused were able to rob the victims of their valuables at the same time.

It was his contention that the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant stole valuables and that at the time of the theft used actual violence or threatened to use violence.

On his part, respondent’s counsel submitted that the offence of conspiracy lies not in doing of the act for which the conspiracy is formed but in forming the scheme of agreement (to commit a crime) by the parties. It was his further submission that the respondent

established a case of conspiracy against the appellant. He posited that the trial Court adequately tested the veracity of exhibits G and O and came to the conclusion that it was consistent with other evidence led by the prosecution.

It was his view that the appellant failed to appreciate the position of the law that in indictment containing conspiracy and a substantive charge, the latter should be dealt with first before the former is considered.

Counsel contended that the trial Court adequately tested the veracity of Exhibits “G” and “O” in the light of evidence before it and came to the right conclusion that the appellant indeed had the opportunity of committing the offence. It was submitted that it was unnecessary to call the person who recorded the statements as he did so in the normal course of his official duty as a police officer.

Counsel submitted that there were no contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and that even if there were, they were not material.

It was finally submitted that the respondent proved all the essential ingredients of the offence of armed

robbery.

The reply of appellant’s counsel was a rehash or an extension of his argument in the appellant’s brief of argument. That is not the function of a reply. I shall therefore discountenance same.

Resolution of the Issue
Appellant, as earlier stated in this judgment, was charged with the offences of conspiracy and armed robbery. On the authority of Section 135(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011, the burden of proving the guilt of the appellant fell on the prosecution. The standard of proof required was proof beyond reasonable doubt. The burden never shifts. Where the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused must be discharged. It must however be stated that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of doubt. Rather, it means the prosecution establishing the guilt of an accused person with compelling and conclusive evidence. It also means a degree of compulsion which is consistent with a high degree of probability. If the evidence is strong against a man as to have only a remote possibility in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence “of course

it is possible but not in the least probable”, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt. See Akpan v State (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 160) 101, Ikpo V State (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1521) 501 and Sanmi V State (2019) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1690) 551.

Since the appellant was charged with both conspiracy and armed robbery, the position of the law, as rightly pointed out by respondent’s counsel, is that the substantive charge (armed robbery) is to be dealt with first and then the Court would proceed to see how far the conspiracy count has been made out in answer to the fate of the charge of conspiracy. See Jimoh V State (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1414) 105, 135 – 135, Okanlawon V State (2015) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1489) 445, 479 and Agugua V State (2017) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1573) 254, 274.

In this instance, the trial Court seems to have relied primarily on confessional statement of the appellant (exhibit O) to convict him. At page 259 of the record of appeal, the learned trial Judge after reviewing the evidence proffered by the prosecution reasoned as follows:
“With this confessional statement and without any proof from the prosecution, the accused person stand guilty of the charged preferred against them”.

Appellant’s counsel contended that the learned trial Judge was wrong in convicting the appellant on the basis of his confessional statements alone without testing their veracity. The law still remains that an accused person can be convicted on the basis of his confessional statement alone once it is shown to be free, voluntary, positive, direct, unequivocal and properly proved without the need for corroboration. SeeKanu V State (1952) 14 WACA 30, Ogedengbe V State (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1421) 338, 358, Dibia V State (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1579) 196, 219 and 220 and Akeem V State (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1597) 311, 340. The reason is that the strongest evidence establishing the guilt of an accused person is his own confession. There is no evidence stronger than a person’s own admission or confession. See Federal Republic of Nigeria V Barminas (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1588) 177, 199.
Nevertheless, over time the Courts have developed the position that it is desirable though not mandatory for the Court to have some evidence outside the confession (no matter how slight) of circumstances which make it probable that the confession was true.

This is especially so where the confession has been retracted. In that case, the trial Court is expected or required to test the truth of it. The essence is to provide a safety catch against conviction of the wrong person on the basis of a purported confession that turns out to be a hoax or sham. SeeBusari V State (2015) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1452) 343, 367, Nalado V State (2019) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1688) 1, 13, Philip V State (2019) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1690) 509, 536 and 543 and Dibia V State (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1579) 196, 217.
The mere fact however that a conviction was based on a confessional statement alone without such evidence of corroboration will not by itself lead to a reversal of the conviction. In Okeke V State (2016) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1512) 417, 439 – 440 M.D. Muhammad, JSC, stated as follows:
“Learned respondent’s counsel is also correct in his submission that although it is desirable for the trial Court to avail itself with some evidence outside the confessional statement in proof of the offence, the absence of such additional evidence would not be fatal to the trial Court’s conviction of the accused on the confessional statement provided

the confession is positive, direct and unequivocal”. See also Ogedengbe V State supra. 358.

In Exhibit O, the appellant stated how he took part in the armed robberies as follows:
“… on 24/01/2011 (sic) my self Sunday, Jamilu and Kudu went for another robbery operation at Milloniers Qtrs it was Sunday that lead us to the compound and was in possession of locally made pistol, three cartridge while I was in possession of rubber gun and three cartridge which I was in Sunday ordered them to lie down on the ground while we robbed them of their money and hand set … On the process a lady managed and escaped and went outside shouting for help, where people came and started purshuwing us … I was arrested …”

In the same statement, he had stated how they carried out the second robbery operation while armed with dangerous weapons. He also described how they locked up their victims in a toilet.

In Exhibit G, the appellant confessed to joining others on 24/1/2012 to rob while armed with locally made pistols.

Given the foregoing, it is not correct for appellant’s counsel to argue that the confessional

statements are not direct, precise and unequivocal. The statements are positive, direct, precise and unequivocal and the trial Court was right in convicting on them in regard to the offences of 24/1/2012 and 27/1/2012.

analysed by the trial Court. It is sufficient if there is a general corroboration of the important incidents under consideration. See Asimi V State (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1527) 414, 433 – 434 and Jimoh V State (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1286) 149, 168-169.
Even though the trial Court did not specifically look for corroborative evidence nor did it specifically or generally apply the test above, there is enough evidence on record to ascertain the veracity of the confessional statements.

In exhibit O, the appellant stated how he accompanied his co-accused persons to rob and how they locked up the victims in a toilet. The PW1 testified that he and others were robbed of valuables in his house and were locked up in his toilet by the robbers. The PW2 testified as to how in another armed robbery incident a small girl alerted neighbours of the incident and they pursued the armed robbers and caught one of them. This was consistent with the narrative in exhibit O. It was therefore safe to convict the appellant on his confessional statements as there was enough evidence outside the confessions to safely convict.

Appellant’s counsel contended that

in respect of exhibit G, the PW5 through whom it was tendered was not the recorder and the interpreter thereof, and so probative value should not have been attached to it. The first point to be made is that the trial Court made a ruling admitting the statement. There is no ground of appeal which attacks the ruling and so it subsists. The issue of the admissibility of the statement therefore does not arise in this appeal. Furthermore, the PW5, through whom the statement was tendered and admitted testified that he was the leader of the investigation team; that he recorded the statements of appellant’s co-accused persons while another member of his team recorded exhibit G; that he would recognize the statement recorded by the other members of the team because he knew their handwritings. (See page 138 of the record). He indeed identified the statement of appellant recorded by PC Samuel Vaalctyough, a member of his statement. It is my view that being the leader of the investigating team and knowing the handwriting of his team member, the statement was properly tendered through him.
I draw support for my position above from the case of Sanmi V State

supra. 582 where Galumje, JSC, stated as follows:
“The Nigerian Police is an institution, where any of its officers can take over investigation of a case from another officer and indeed produce documents that were executed by the previous officers and tender them in Court for the purpose of proving the prosecution’s case.”
In Oloye V State (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1640) 509, 530, Aka’ahs, JSC, opined thus:
“The objection taken by the counsel that only the recorder of the statement can tender it is misleading. The only occasion where a valid objection can be considered is where the statement of an accused is recorded through an interpreter and the accused makes his statement in his mother tongue which is recorded and later translated into English. In such a situation before the translated version is accepted as authentic, the person who interpreted the statement from the mother tongue into English must be called to testify; otherwise the translated version of the statement will at best be treated as secondary evidence while the one recorded in the mother tongue is taken to be primary evidence”.

It was the contention of appellant’s counsel, as I have already stated, that PC Samuel Vaalctyough acted as both the recorder and interpreter of exhibit G and therefore his testimony was vital for the admission of the statement and for weight to be attached to it. There is no evidence on record which bears out the contention that the appellant made his statement in a local language while the police officer interpreted and recorded it. The PW5 testified that the said police officer recorded the statement of appellant. He did not say that it was made in vernacular, interpreted and recorded by the officer. The appellant testified that a police officer brought a paper for him to sign which he did because he was beaten. He did not at all say that he gave his statement in any local language while the police officer interpreted and recorded it. The storm in the tea cup about interpretation of the statement is a completely fresh point out of the blue, as it were, raised by appellant’s counsel. It does not avail him. The same consideration applies to exhibit O.
Exhibit G was admitted in evidence after the trial Court overruled objection to it on the

basis that it was not tendered through the officer who recorded it. Exhibit O was admitted in evidence after trial – within – trial to determine its voluntariness following objection that it was not voluntarily obtained. There is no ground of appeal which attacks the admissibility of the statements and so no question can be raised about their admissibility. Where a confessional statement has been proved to have been made voluntarily, as in this instance, and it is positive and unequivocal, and amounts to an admission of guilt, it is sufficient to ground conviction though its maker resiles from it. See Osetola V State (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 251, 279.
The trial Court was therefore right to have convicted the appellant for the offences charged.

The contention of appellant’s counsel that there were contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses is nothing but the appellant clutching at straws. The point as to PW1 lying prostrate and yet being able to identify the robbers is of no moment as the appellant not only identified himself as one of the robbers but also admitted in his statement that he was caught at the scene.

The further point that the robbers could not hold guns and torchlight, and at the same time be able to steal valuables is speculation carried to the extreme. The further contention as to the exact date of the arrest of the appellant is of no moment as it has no effect on the guilt of the appellant. In any event, it is the law that where there is a contradiction in prosecution’s case and the accused admits the commission of the offence, the contradiction is rendered irrelevant. See Lalapu v COP (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1699) 476, 496.
I now turn my attention to the offence of conspiracy.

proof of conspiracy is for the prosecution to establish some common effort on the part of the accused persons aimed at committing a crime. SeeAdepoju supra. 115 and Gbadamosi V State (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 196) 204. The conspirators need not know themselves and it need not be shown that they met at a particular place and were seen coming out together from that place with conspiratorial mien.
In this instance, in respect of counts 1 and 3, there is evidence on record that the appellant and his co-accused persons worked together to execute a common end, to wit; robbery while armed. The trial Court could therefore infer the meeting of minds of the appellant and his co-accused persons. See Egbe V State (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1695) 201, 216 and 219. Again since the ingredients of armed robbery had been established criminal conspiracy could therefore be properly inferred. SeeSale V State (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1499) 392, 401.

The trial Court was therefore right in convicting the appellant of the offence of conspiracy.
I therefore enter an affirmative answer to the issue for determination and resolve it against the appellant.

On the whole, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. I accordingly affirm the conviction and sentence of the appellant.

IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE J.C.A.: I had the advantage of reading the draft of the Lead Judgment just delivered by my Lord and brother, HON. JUSTICE J.E. EKANEM, JCA. I agree with the reasoning there in advanced in dismissing the Appeal and affirming the decision of the learned trial Judge S.U. Dikko, C.J. convicting and sentencing the Appellant to 21 years imprisonment for the offences of Conspiracy and Armed Robbery.

From the totality of the evidence adduced by the Witnesses for the Prosecution, there is no doubt that the Prosecution discharged the burden of proof cast upon it beyond reasonable doubt as entrenched and dictated by Sections 135(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011 and 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), on the presumption of innocence. In the light of the above, I am in complete agreement with my Noble Lord and the authorities of Egbe vs. The State (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt.1695) 201; 216 and 219; Sale vs. The State (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1499) 392, 401 and in particular Adepoju vs. The State

(2018) 15 NWLR (Pt.1641) 103, 115 and Friday vs. The state (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt.1538) 242; that the offences of conspiracy and Armed Robbery were proved beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant thus warranting his conviction and sentence. No miscarriage of justice was occasioned him to warrant our interfering with the Judgment of the lower Court, Accordingly, I also dismiss the Appeal with the ignominy it deserves.

ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.: My Learned Brother, Joseph E. Ekanem, JCA, made available to me in advance, a draft Copy of the Judgment just delivered in which this appeal has been dismissed. The issues arising tor determination have been fully considered and resolved.

I agree the predictable conclusion that this appeal is without merit. I also dismiss the appeal and affirm the conviction and sentence of the Appellant.

Appearances:

Matthew Burkaa, Esq. (with him, Abubakar Musa, Esq.) For Appellant(s)

Dr. Abdulkarim A. Kana (Hon. Attorney-General, Nasarawa State) (with him R.I. Addra, Esq. (Chief State Counsel, Ministry of Justice, Nasarawa State) and M.J. Abokee, Esq. (Principal State Counsel, Ministry of justice, Nasarawa State) For Respondent(s)

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