DANTIYE v. APC & ORS (2020)

DANTIYE v. APC & ORS

(2020)LCN/14551(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, August 21, 2020

CA/ABJ/CV/498/2020

Before Our Lordships:

Ayobode Olujimi Lokulo-Sodipe Justice of the Court of Appeal

Mudashiru Nasiru Oniyangi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Bitrus Gyarazama Sanga Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

HON. NASIRU GARBA DANTIYE APPELANT(S)

And

ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS (APC) 2. MUSA MUHAMMAD ADAMU 3. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT A GROUND OF APPEAL MUST RELATE TO THE DECISION OR JUDGEMENT APPEALED AGAINST

The general rule is that a ground of appeal is competent when it relates to the decision or Judgment appealed against. Where a ground of appeal does not relate or connect the issue in controversy and pronounced upon by the trial Court, then such ground of appeal will be incompetent. See OKPALA VS. OKAFOR (1991) 7 NWLR (204) 510, IKWEKI VS. EBELE (2005) 2 SC (11) 36. NGIGE VS. OBI (2006) ALL FWLR (330). Where a ground of appeal is not flowing from the decision appealed against, such ground of appeal will be incompetent and liable to be struck out, along with the issues distilled due to the incompetence of the ground of appeal. see F.B.N PLC. VS. AKPARABONG COM. BANK LTD (2006) ALL FWLR (319) AT 927, (INOMIARU VS. R.C.C (1995) 7 NWLR (404) 214, PROF B. J. OLUFEAGBA AND ORS VS. PROF. S. O. ABDUL-RAHEEM AND ORS. (2009)18 NWLR (PT. 1173) 384. A ground of appeal will valid and competent if it relates to the decision appealed against and constitute a challenge to the ratio of the said decision. See CHIEF CLEMENT O. C. OKAFOR VS. ANTHONY ABUMOFUANI (2016) LPELR – 40299. PER ONIYANGI, J.C.A.

MEANING OF A “RATIO DECIDENDI”

A ratio Decidendi has been described as the enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided. Put in another way, it is the principle of the decision. See DR. DARU & ORS VS. BARRISTER IBRAHIM AMINU UMAR (2013) LPELR – 21905. MR. KAMARU GBANDEBO SHITU VS. KWARA STATE POLYTECHNIC ILORIN AND ORS. (2014) LPELR – 23820, CHIEF ABUBAKAR ZIBIRI ODUGBO VS. CHIEF ALIU ABU (2001) LPELR – 2238, Ogundare, JSC of blessed memory said thus: “The principle of law upon which a particular case is decided is called the ratio decidendi and the effect of this is to serve as basis of doctrine of Judicial precedent in subsequent cases with similar facts”.
Having provided meaning for the word “ratio Decidendi” The meaning for “Obiter Dictum” in the Black law Dictionary 6th Edition, at page 1072, Obiter Dictum is provided thus:
“Words of opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case”.
In the case of NOEL VS. OLDS 78. U.S. APP. D.C 155, 138F. 2D. 501, 588, the Court said thus:
“A remark made, or opinion expressed by a Judge in his decision upon a cause ‘by the way’ that is incidentally and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as procedures: ‘A decision’ on the other hand is a determination of that Court and includes judgment, decree, order, conviction, sentence or recommendation. See Section 318 (1) of the 1999 Constitution. The right of appeal does not exist in a vacuum. It can only be invoked when there is in existence against the person wishing to exercise the right of appeal against a decision of the Court.” See also CLEMENT ODUNUKWE VS. DENNIS OFOMATA AND ANOR. (2010) LPELR – 2250 (2010) 18 NWLR (PT. 1225) 4040, MISS NKIRU AMOBI VS. MRS GRACE O. NZEGWU AND ORS (2013) LPELR – 21863, IRENE NGUMA VS. ATTORNEY GENERAL IMO STATE (2014) LPELR – 22252.PER ONIYANGI, J.C.A.

MUDASHIRU NASIRU ONIYANGI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): At the Federal High Court Abuja Judicial Division, the Appellant as plaintiff took out an originating summons seeking against the Respondents in this Appeal as defendants for the determination of the following questions.
“Whether in the light of the provisions of Section 31 of the Electoral Act 2010 (As Amended) the 2nd Respondent did not submit false information to the Independent National Electoral Commission to wit:
(a) Claiming that he is the holder of the statement of Result issued by Top Quality College issued to Mohammed Musa Adamu.
(b) Representing as true, a purported statutory Declaration of Age Purportedly deposed by his father at the Registry of the High Court of the Capital Territory Abuja, on the 10th January, 2009 being a Saturday and 10th September, 2009 being a Thursday simultaneously
(c) Representing as true a purported affidavit deposed to at the Registry of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory on 16th May 2019 containing facts pertaining to the loss of his voter’s card.
(d) Representing as true a purported affidavit of

fact explaining the discrepancy between his name and the name on the statement of result issued by Top quality college to Mohammed Musa Adamu.
(e) Representing to the 1st Respondent that he is the person described as the holder of the Statement of Result issued by Top Quality College to Mohammed Musa Adamu.
(f) Representing to the Commission that he worked with the Abuja Municipal Area Council between 2009 to 2019 when in fact he worked with the Abuja Municipal Area Council between 2009 to 2020.
RELIEF SOUGHT.
“If the above question is answered in the negative, the plaintiff shall be seeking the following reliefs from the Honourable Court.
1. A declaration that in view of the information contained in:-
(a) The statement of Result issued by Top Quality College issued to Mohammed Musa Adamu.
(b) The purported statutory declaration of Age purportedly deposed to at the Registry of the High Court of the Capital Territory Abuja on the 10th January, 2009 being a Saturday and 10th September 2009 being a Thursday simultaneously.
(c) The purported affidavit purportedly deposed to at the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory

in 2009 containing facts pertaining to the loss of his voter’s card on 26th May, 2019.
(d) The purported affidavit of the fact explaining the discrepancy between the 2nd Defendant’s name and the name on the Statement of Result issued Top Quality College issued to Mohammed Musa Adamu.
(e) The representing to the 3rd Defendant that the 2nd Defendant is the person described as the holder of the Statement of Result issued by Top Quality College issued to Mohammed Musa Adam.
(f) The representing to the 3rd Defendant that the 2nd Defendant worked with the Abuja Municipal Area Council between 2009 and 2019 when in fact he worked with the Abuja Municipal Area Council between 2009 to 2020.
(g) The 2nd Respondent has presented false information to the 3rd Defendant and therefore not qualified to contest for the post of member representing Babura/Garki Federal Constituency of Jigawa State.
2. A Declaration that the 1st Defendant having nominated the 2nd Defendant as its candidate for the Babura/Garki Federal Constituency of Jigawa State, did not nominate a qualified candidate for the by-election scheduled for 14th March, 2020.

An Order of this Honourable Court directing the 3rd Defendant to discountenance the nomination of the 2nd Defendant as the candidate of the 1st Defendant in respect of the Babura/Garki Federal Constituency scheduled to hold on the 14th March 2020.
4. And for such further and other Orders that this Honourable Court shall deem fit to make in the circumstance.

The gist of the fact upon which the foregoing claim of the plaintiff (Appellant) is predicated is that the Appellant as plaintiff before the trial Court challenged the qualification of the 2nd Respondent (2nd Defendant) as the candidate of the 1st Respondent (1st Defendant) All Progressives Congress (APC) for the election into the office of member representing Babura/Garki Federal Constituency of Jigawa State of Nigeria. Pursuant to Section 31(5) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as Amended). The complaint of the Appellant is that the 2nd Respondent made false representation in his INEC form EC9, submitted to the 3rd Respondent (INEC) through the 1st Respondent (APC) on the 18th of February, 2020 as the candidate for the Election into the Office of Member representing the above mentioned Federal

Constituency of Jigawa State held on the 14th day of March, 2020.

Issues were joined by parties and consequent upon the adoption of processes filed and exchanged by respective party, the learned trial judge in his considered wisdom found against the plaintiff (Appellant). See page 639 of the Record of Appeal where the Trial Court concluded thus:
“In the final analysis, it is the finding of this Honourable Court from the totality of the case presented by the parties that the 2nd Defendant is qualified to participate in the election scheduled for 14th March, 2020. The vexed issue of false misrepresentations in its entirety was not proved by cogent and credible evidence.
Premised on the established facts, it is therefore the humble but firm opinion of this Court as inspired by Superior authorities that the case of the plaintiff has failed and it is accordingly dismissed.”

The Appellant as plaintiff was not happy with the outcome of trial and being dissatisfied, appealed to this Court vide his Notice of Appeal dated and filed on 23rd day of June, 2020. (see pages 640 – 651 of the Record of Appeal). There are six grounds of

appeal, upon which the appellant sought for the following reliefs: (see page 649 of the Record of Appeal).

RELIEFS SOUGHT FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL
(1) An order of this Honourable Court allowing the Appeal.
(2) An order of this Honourable Court setting aside the Judgment of the Federal High Court of Nigeria, Abuja Judicial Division in suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/295/2020 coram: Hon Justice Ijeoma L. Ojukwu, delivered on the 16th day of June, 2020.
(3) An order of this Honourable Court granting all the reliefs sought at the lower Court.
(4) And such further or other orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in order to give effect to the decision of the Court.

Parties filed and exchanged their respective brief of argument, in compliance with the rules.

In the adopted brief of argument of the Appellant filed on 7th day of July, 2020 and settled by Abdul Mohammed, Esq. four issues are identified for the determination of this appeal. They are:
(a) Whether the learned Trial judge erred in Law when he found that the case of PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY & 2 ORS VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI EREMIENYO (2020) LPELR – 49734 (SC) is

not applicable in the instant suit? (Ground 1 & 2).
(b) Whether the learned Trial Judge erred in Law when he failed to give probative value to Exhibit Dantiye 1A2? (Grounds 3 and 4).
(c) Whether the learned Trial Judge erred in Law when His Lordship gave probative value to exhibit Musa 1 (The West African Senior School Certificate Examination) after finding that the same document ostensibly emanated from WAEC? (GROUND 5).
(d) Whether the learned Trial Judge was right to rely on the case of ORJI VS. PDP (2009) 14 NWLR (PART 1161) P9 310 to come to the conclusion that the date of resignation of the 2nd Defendant is the date of the submission of the letter and not the date stated by the 2nd Respondent himself in his letter of resignation? (Grounds 6).

On behalf of the 1st Respondent, his counsel Umar A. A. Esq. in his adopted brief of argument dated 13th day of July, 2020, and filed on 14th day of July 2020 presented the following two issues for determination of the Appeal.
I. Whether the Trial Court was correct in finding that the Appellant did not prove a case of submitting false information with cogent and credible evidence.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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Whether the trial Court was right in holding that the 2nd Appellant was qualified to contest or participate in the election scheduled for 14th March, 2020.The 2nd Respondent’s brief of argument written by Y. C. Maikyau SAN is dated and filed on the 24th day of July, 2020. In paragraph 3.0 to 3.1 of the said brief he opted to adopt the four (4) issues presented by the Appellant for the determination of this Appeal.
The 3rd Respondent did not present any issue for the determination of the appeal. Let me put on record, that the appellant also filed reply brief to the briefs of the 1st and 2nd Respondent’s on 23 day of July 2020, and 27th day of July 2020 respectively. Upon a careful reading of the issues presented by the Appellant, and adopted by the 2nd Respondent and that of the 1st Respondent, the Court has decided to adopt the four issues presented by the appellant for the determination of the appeal. Again it is worthy of note that the 2nd Respondent also filed a Cross Appeal to this Appeal. The Cross Appeal was registered separately as CA/ABJ/CV/531/2020. I will deal with the Cross Appeal separately, having being filed

separately. So also the Appellant filed a Notice of intention to contend on 28th day of July, 2020. Not this alone, he again in his brief raised a preliminary objection to ground one of the Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE ONE
Whether the Learned Trial Judge erred in Law when he found that the case of PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND 2 ORS VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI-EREMIENYO (2020) LPELR – 49734 (SC) is not Applicable in the instant suit ?. (Grounds 1 and 2).

The case of the appellant is that the 2nd Respondent submitted false information to the 3rd Respondent in his INEC form EC9 (Affidavit in support of personal particulars). When he said that his name is “Musa Mohammed Adam’’ whereas in the submitted West African Senior Certificate Examination (WASSCE) issued by Top Quality College, his name in the statement of result is “Mohammed Musa Adam”. He referred to page 77 and 85 of the record of Appeal. He argued further that the 2nd Respondent subsequently deposed to an affidavit wherein he stated that his name was wrongly spelt as Musa Mohammed Adamu. He averred as follow.
“On my WAEC Statement of Result issued

by “Top Quality college” with Exam Number “4202009079” obtained in 2006 my name was wrongly spelt as Musa Mohammed Adamu, my correct name is Musa Mohammad Adamu”.

It is the contention of the appellant that the foregoing affirment is an attempt to effect a correction of an error that was not committed by the 2nd Respondent but by Top Quality College. He submitted that 2nd Respondent cannot effect the change in the error but only the school or the institution concerned that can effect the change. He relied on the case of PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND 2 ORS VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI-EREMIENYO (2020) LPELR 49734 (SC). Further he argued that the Supreme Court stated in the case of JESSO MARITIME RESOURCES VS. M/T MOTHER BENEDICTA (2019) 12 NWLR (PT. 1686) 326 that a correction of an error can only come from the person alleging that the error has been committed by another without proof that he has conveyed the error to the entity making the error so as to afford them the right to respond to the allegation. He added that it was only after information have come out in the open that the name of the candidate who wrote the WAEC is

MOH’D MUSA ADAM what the second respondent said his name is also MOH’D MUSA ADAM in the WAEC certificate. Further he said the deposition of the 2nd Respondent that his WAEC statement of Result issued by “Top Quality College” with Exam Number “4202009079” obtained in 2006 his name was wrongly spelt as MUSA MOHAMMED ADAM is false information. He referred to page 86 and 176 of the Record. It is his contention that there is no proof before the trial Court that the 2nd Respondent conveyed letter to the West African Examination Council informing it that wrote his name in error nor is there any evidence that a person can submit his name as MOHAMMAD MUSA ADAMU to WAEC, and WAEC will decide to write the name as MOH’D MUSA ADAM. He argued further that there cannot be any more falsehood than the attempt to represent that a Secondary school made mistake to the spelling of the name Muhammad as Mohammed when in fact the information in the custody of the organizers of the examination is Moh’d and Mohammed as represented by 2nd Respondent to the 3rd Respondent. But for the filing of this action, the 3rd respondent and the whole

world would never have known that the name of the 2nd Respondent in the Record of WAEC is MOH’D and not MUHAMMAD as he represented to the 3rd Respondent. He then posed the question whether a trial Court can insist that a name rejected by a party is the name of that party. He added that a Court does not have the vires to make a case different from the case presented by the party. Courts must base their decision on the case presented by the parties. He relied on the case of FBN VS. ADEYEMI (2018) LPELR – 45689, CHABASAYA VS. ANWASI (2010) 4 FWLR (PT. 543) 7713. Court should not take the parties by surprise and that the Court should not deny parties of the right of fair hearing, as enshrined in Section 36 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1999 (as amended). He relied on the case of ALHAJI OGUNLOWO VS. PRINCE OGUNDARE (1993) 1 NWLR. (PT. 307) 610 AT 624, OJO – OSAGIE, SANNI VS. ADEMILUYI (2003) 3 NWLR (PT. 807) 381.

In the end he urged the Court to hold that the decision in the PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND 2 ORS VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI-EREMIENYO AND 3 ORS (SUPRA) is on all fours with the fact of this case and hence by the rule

of precedence, the Lower Court is bound to follow the decision of the Supreme Court. He cited the case of DALHATU VS. TURAKI (2003) LPELR – 917 (SC). He urge the Court to set aside the decision of the Trial Court.

On behalf of the 1st Respondent (All Progressive Congress) it is argued that, it is trite that the appellant who sought declaratory reliefs must succeed on the strength of his case. He relied on the case of MOHAMMED VS. WAMMAKO & ORS (2017) LPELR – 42667, C.P.C VS. INEC (2012) 1 NWLR (PT. 1280) 106 OF 131, AGI VS. PDP & ORS (2016) LPELR – 42578. Again and replying on the case of MOHAMMED VS. WAMMAKO & ORS (SUPRA). He argued that the standard of proof required in an allegation under Section 31 (5) of the Electoral Act 2010 as amended is squarely put on the person who asserts the falsification and should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. He also relied onSection 135(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011. And the case of ALFA VS. PDP & ORS (2019) LPELR – 47685. It is the case of the 1st Respondent that the nature of evidence presented by the Appellant before the trial Court did not establish the case of

submission of false information by the 2nd Respondent to the 3rd Respondent and hence the Trial Court was right to come to the conclusion reached. He relied on pages 636 – 637. He argued that the sum total of the Appellant case built on Exhibit Dantiye 1A2 on page 95 of the Record, and which appears at page 95 of the Record of Appeal, and the foundation of which can be traced to the 1st Affidavit in support of the originating summons which can be found from page 74 of the Record. He contended further that the letter of enquiry to the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory referred to in exhibit Dantiye 1A2 was never … before the Trial Court, and hence the nature of question, inquiries or information sought by the Appellant remain unknown. Therefore, reliance cannot be placed on the letter as requested by the Appellant. It is his case that the name of the 2nd Respondent as shown on the face of Exhibit Dantiye 1 and spanning through pages 76 – 90 of the Record and other Processes filed by the Appellant is MUSA MUHAMMED ADAMU. Whereas the purported Exhibit Dantiye 1A2 made a report about MUSA MOHAMMED ADAMU. He submitted that the Appellant

who failed to explain this contradiction to the Trial Court has not purge himself of the purported error he is alleging or challenging, and that Exhibit Dantiye 1A2 is plagued with inherent contradiction that it is not safe to rely on it. He added that from the entirety of the formulated grounds, the Appellant has never challenged the qualification of the 2nd Respondent to contest the election. Neither the affidavit in question is a qualifying certificate under the constitution nor is it one of the documents listed to be submitted to the 3rd Respondent preparatory to the election. He relied on the case of MAIHAJA VS. GAIDAM (2018) 4 NWLR (PT. 1640) 434 AT 498 – 499, PDP VS. AGI (2017) 17 NWLR (PT. 1593) 368 @ PAGE 455 – 456.

On the relevance or otherwise of the case of PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND 2 ORS VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI-EREMIENYO (2020) LPELR – 49734, it is not Applicable in the instance suit because the facts and circumstance of the case not being in ground or same with that of the instant Appeal. He referred to the case of A. G. CROSS RIVERS STATE VS. A. G. FEDERATION AND ANOR (2012) LPELR 9335. He added that the case of

PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND 2 ORS VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI-EREMIENYO AND 3 ORS, is distinguishable from this case in many respect. He itemized (4) four of such distinguishing factors in pages 16 – 17 of the 1st Respondent brief. He argued that “correction” must have the effect of altering or changing the character of the document in question. He also referred to the counter affidavit by the 1st Respondent which can be found in pages 286 – 287 of the record of Appeal. He submitted that the attitude of this Court has been to accommodate minor discrepancies in names as recently demonstrated in the case of ABUBAKAR AND ANOR VS. INEC AND ORS (2019) LPELR – 48488. Further he submitted that the frantic effort of the Appellant to draw a huge difference between Musa Muhammad Adamu, Moh’d Musa Adam and Mohammed Musa Adamu is of no any legal effect to warrant applying the decision in PDP VS. BIOBARAKUMA (supra). He urged the Court to take the Judicial notice of the notorious fact that all the three names are used in this part of the world as synonyms. He argued that in arriving at the conclusion reached the Lower Court considered all the evidence

put before it including Exhibit Musa I which is the 2nd Respondent’s certificate issued by the WAEC containing his passport photograph. He argued further that the recondity of this issue was thus, whether the said result belongs to the 2nd Respondent. He submitted that working at the circumstances of this case and other corroborating evidence the Trial Court rightly decided that the result belong to the 2nd Respondent and that there were no such similar elements or circumstances in the PDP VS. BIOBARAKUMA’S case as contended by the Appellant. He added that in the circumstances of the peculiarities of this case as it relates to the name of the 2nd Respondent there does not exist such ambiguity or discrepancy to warrant any DEEDPOOL or affidavit correcting the names. And that the 2nd Respondent did not at any time depose to any document seeking to correct his name as erroneously asserted by the Appellant. He urge the Court to resolve this question against the Appellant.

On the part of the 2nd Respondent it is contended that this issue raised the all-important subject of Judicial precedence in adjudication process. He added that it is settled low

that in Originating Summons proceeding; it is the claimant’s affidavit in support of the case or complaint presented to the Court for determination. He relied on the case of JUKOK INT’L LTD. VS. DIAMOND BANK PLC (2016) 6 NWLR PART 1507 PG 55 AT 104 PARAGRAPH C – E. He argued that the Court do not apply decisions of superior Court irrespective of the differing facts and circumstances. A case is only an authority for what it decides and that the doctrine of stare decisis operates where the issue determined by the Court in an earlier case is similar to the issue the Court is subsequently approached to determine. He rely on the case of YAKO AND ANOR VS. JIBRIN AND ORS (2019) LPELR – 48971, YAKI AND ORS VS. BAGUDU AND ORS (2015) LPELR – 25721, ABU VS. ODUGBO (2001) 7 SCNJ 262 OR 299, OBIUWEUBI VS. CBN (2011) 2 – 3 SC PT. 1 PG 46. The complaint of the Appellant in the main can be found in paragraphs 10, 11,12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons. In paragraph 18, the Appellant ever as follows.
”The 2nd Defendant supplied false information to the 1st Defendant with respect to

the personal particulars of the 2nd Defendant who is contesting for Babura/Garki Federal Constituency on the platform of the 1st Defendant”.

The reaction of the 2nd Respondent are contained in the following paragraphs of the counter affidavit of the 2nd Respondent. See paragraph 11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 23, 24, 31, 36 and 37. In paragraph 37 the 2nd Respondent averred as follows:
“That my name written as MOHD MUSA ADAM in Exhibit MMA2 was imputed in that manner by the WAEC officials and my name as written on the Statement of Result issued to me was so written by the staff of Top Quality College who issued the statement of Result”.

He contended further that the Appellant did not deny the deposition of the 2nd Respondent. He added that Exhibit MMA3 referred to in paragraph 20 of the counter affidavit stating that the West African Senior Certificate issued to the 2nd Respondent bears his passport seized photograph. That is to say that there is a physical means of identification linking the 2nd Respondent to the Statement of Result issued by Top Quality College which bears the same registration number. He added that Exhibit MMA3 is the

true resemblance of the 2nd Respondent. He relied on the following cases TOM TEC NIG. LTD. VS. FEDERAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (2009) 12 S.C. (PART III) 162 AT 180 LINES 25 – 30, ONAH VS. OKENWA (2011) ALL FWLR PT. 565 PAGE 357. He argues further that it was based on the foregoing that the Lower Trial Judge came to the conclusion at pages 635 – 639. Further he submitted that on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instance case, the learned trial judge was on a ferma terra, when he held that the facts of PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY & 2 ORS VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI-EREMIORIYO & ORS (supra) relied on by the Appellant is distinguishable from the fact of the present case and that the Trial Judge was right when he concluded that in this case at hand, MOH’D MOHAMMED, MUHAMMED are synonyms.

It is his case that in PDP & 2 ORS VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI-EREMIORIYO & ORS (supra), the various names in the documents of the 1st Respondent in that case were different from each other. That the difference in the names was not a case of difference in spelling, they were names different and distinct from each other appearing on different documents

denied by the 1st Respondent. That informed the finding of the Apex Court per Ejembi Eko JSC. He also referred to the decision of this Court in Appeal No. CA/PEPC/002/2019 delivered On 9th day of September 2019. Per Garuba JCA. In the light of the foregoing decisions he submitted that the learned Trial Judge was right in holding that the Appellant who alleged in paragraph 10 (f) of the affidavit in support of the originating summons that the 2nd Respondent, did not adduce any evidence in support of his allegations. He added that the Appellant’s deposition in paragraph 10(f) and 15 of the Originating summons to the effect that the WAEC Result printed from WAEC website – Exhibit Dantiye 2 which was attached to the further affidavit at page 365 of the Record of Appeal is the Result of the Student with Examination Number 4202009079 as contained in the website of the West African Examination Council who wrote the May/June West African Senior School Certificate Examination in the year 2006 is infact an admission against interest of the Appellant. This is seen use, the evidence before the Trial Court established that the student with the above mentioned

Registration Number, who wrote the May/June West African Senior School Certificate Examination in the year 2006 is no other than the 2nd Respondent.

He added that the Registration Number admitted by the Appellant relates to the Statement of Result issued by Top Quality College. The printout from the WAEC website (Exhibited by both the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent) and the WAEC Certificate issued to the 2nd Respondent bearing his photograph, all have the same registration Number admitted by the Appellant to be that of the person who wrote the Examination.

On admission against interest, he relied on the following cases EJIMADU VS. DELTA FREEZE LIMITED (2007) 13 NWLR (PART. 1050) PAGE 96 AT 110 PARAGRAPH F – H; OFFODILE VS. OFFODILE (2019) 16 NWLR (PART 1980) PAGE 189 AT 211. He submitted further that having regards to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case at hand, the learned trial Judge was right when he found that the case of PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND 2 ORS VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI-EREMIENYO (supra) is distinguishable from the fact of this case and thus inapplicable. He urged the Court to hold that the case of

ATIKU ABUBAKAR & ANOR VS. INEC & 2 ORS is most applicable to this case. Further he argued that apart from the fact that the burden of proof that the certificate issued to the 2nd Respondent by WAEC or the Statement of Result issued by Top Quality College squarely rest on the Appellant plaintiff, the passport photograph attached to the WAEC Certificate settled the fact that it is the 2nd Respondent’s name that was written as MOH’D MUSA ADAM by WAEC contrary to the Appellant’s submissions the 2nd Respondent did not fail to disclose his name to the 3rd Respondent. He drew attention to spelling error in his name and did not have control over any error of spelling that a 3rd party may make in writing his name. On the unchallenging finding he relied on the case of NNADIKE VS. NWACHUKWU (2019) LPELR 48131.

He urged the Court to discountenance and reject the submission in paragraph 32, 33 and 34 of the Appellant’s brief of argument and resolve issue one against the Appellant and in favour of the 2nd Respondent.

By this issue one which is out of grounds, 1 and 2 of the grounds of Appeal wherein the Appellant’s main grouge is that the 2nd

Respondent by an affidavit dated 10th September 2009 sought to correct his name by deposing to the fact on his WAEC Result issued by “Top Quality College” with Examination Number “4202009079” obtained in 2006, his name was wrongly Spelt as MUSA MOHAMMED ADAMU instead of MUSA MUHAMMAD ADAMU. From the body of the complaint of the Appellant, he is not challenging or quering the ownership of the said results but the attempt made by the affidavit deposed to by the 2nd Respondent which according to the Appellant is geared towards correcting the 2nd Respondent’s alleged wrongly spelt name. Upon a careful reading of the argument by respective counsel for and against, the question I consider yarning for answer is whether or not the 2nd Respondent by his Affidavit in issue was trying to correct his name on those documents, wherein he observed that his names are wrongly spelt. In his frantic efforts to drive home his complaint, the Appellant formulated the following questions for determination (see pages 4 – 5 of the Record of Appeal). Thus:
“Whether, in the light of the provision of 531 of the Electoral Act 2010 (As Amended)

the 2nd Respondent did not submit false information to the independent Electoral commission to wit:”
(a) Claiming that he is the holder of the statement of Result issued by Top Quality College issued to Mohammed Musa Adam.
(b) Representing as true a purported Statutory Declaration of Age purportedly deposed to by his father at the Registry of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja on 10th January, 2009 being a Saturday and 10th September, 2009 being a Thursday, simultaneously.
(c) Representing as true a purported Affidavit deposed to at the registry of the Federal Capital Territory on 16th May, 2019 containing facts pertaining to loss of voter’s card.
(d) Representing as true, a purported affidavit of fact(s) explaining the discrepancy between name and the name on the statement of Result issued by Top Quality College to Mohammed Musa Adamu.
(e) Representing as true, a purported affidavit of fact(s) explaining the discrepancy between name and the name on the Statement of Result issued by Top Quality College to Mohammed Musa Adam.
(f) Representing to the commission that he worked with the Abuja

Municipal Area Council between 2009 and 2019 when in fact he worked with the Abuja Municipal Area Council between 2009 to 2020”

Relying upon the foregoing questions the Appellant sought for Declaratory reliefs disqualifying the candidate of the 2nd Respondent to participate in the Bye Election of 14th March, 2020. It is trite that in a claim for declaratory reliefs just as in the case at hand, the plaintiff must prove his entitlement to such declaratory relief by cogent and credible evidence and must rely on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defense. Declaratory reliefs are not granted on the admission by the adverse party. See the following cases;AGI VS. P.D.P AND ORS (2016) LPELR – 42578, MOHAMMED VS. WAMMAKO AND ORS (2017) LPELR – 4266. C.P.C VS. INEC (2012) 1 NWLR (PT.1280) 10607131, DUMEZ NIG LT VS. NWAKHOBA (2008) 18 NWLR (PT. 1119) 361, EMENIKE VS. P.D.P (2012) LPELR – 7802 (SC), MATANMI VS. DADA (2013) LPELR – 19929.

Further to the foregoing, the standard of proof required in an action pursuant to 31(5) of Electoral Act 2010 as amended, is proof beyond reasonable doubt pursuant to the

provision of Section 135(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011. See the cases of KAKIH VS. P.D.P (2014) 15 NWLR (PT. 1430) 374, NWOBODO VS. ONOH (1984) 1 SCNLR 1. Therefore, where allegations that either forgery or submission of false document is made, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. See SALEH VS. ABAH (2017) LPELR – 41914 ALFA VS. P.D.P AND ORS (2019) LPELR – 47685. The learned trial Judge in his considered judgment concluded as follows on the allegation of the Appellant (see page 639 of the Record of Appeal).
“In the final analysis, it is the finding of this Honourable Court from the totality of the case presented by the 2nd Defendant as qualified to participate in the election scheduled for 14th March 2020. The vexed issue of false misrepresentations in its entirely was not proved by cogent and credible evidence”.

Back to the question posed by me, it must be determined whether or not the 2nd Respondent was trying to correct his name or submitted false information.

Since the complaint of the Appellant is that the trial Court did not properly consider the case by concluding that the case of

PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND 2 ORS VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI-EREMIENYO (SUPRA) is not applicable in the instance case. Before considering whether or not the said case is distinguishable from the fact of this case, the finding of the Court on this question will be reproduced herein under for case of reference and better understanding. See pages 636 – 639. Of the Record of Appeal where the Court said thus:
“Now, from the statement of result issued by Top Quality College exhibited by plaintiff in Exhibit Dantiye 1, exhibit Musa 1 which is the WAEC Certificate with the picture of the 2nd Defendant ostensibly emanating from WAEC, and Exhibit Musa 2 a copy of WAEC Result printed online (the last two were Exhibit by the 2nd Defendant), it is evidence that the 3 results have Mohammed Musa Adam, Moh’d Musa Adam and Moh’d Musa Adam respectively. The first as earlier said is a statement of result from Top Quality College where the other two are from WAEC. The 3 sets of Results have exactly the same subjects taken and subject grades and same examination centre which is Top Quality College, Kano Exhibit Musa 1 has the photograph of the 2nd Defendant as this

has not been disputed. He argued that from the foregoing, it will be preposterous to say that they belong to different persons other than the 2nd Defendant whose photograph appeared”.
“The names in dispute Mohammed Musa Adam, Muhammed Musa Adam and Moh’d Musa Adam appear similar and by the argument of the learned senior Counsel MAIKAUSAN for the 2nd Defendant, there could be some disparity in the writing of the names premised on accepted norms error or even misnomer; …
The issuing body WAEC have not put out a disclaimer of the result claimed by the 2nd Defendant. Neither has the plaintiff established forgery or produced some other person who may be the true owner of the Result. In the absence of that, this Court cannot on the mere speculation of the plaintiff hold that the 2nd Defendant supplied false information, the names on the documents notwithstanding. The real issue here is whether the 2ndDefendant on Record is the owner and writer of the WAEC results as shown in the three calabits. It bears same subjects taken. In the absence of the contrary, the Court cannot align with the position of the plaintiff.”

In the

light of the foregoing and considering the fact of this case at hand, I feel comfortable with the reasoning and finding of the trial Court that the fact of this case is different from that in the case of PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND 2 ORS VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI-EREMIENYO (2020) LPELR – 49734… Notwithstanding the binding effect of that decision on this Court, the issues are clearly distinguishable. In the PDP VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI-EREMIENYO (supra), the affidavit in question was meant to change the names of the 1st Respondent. That is not the case in this present case. The 2nd Respondent’s stand is that his name has been wrongly spelt. Further to this, he has not added any name nor introduced any new one. All the concern of the 2nd Respondent is that in those certificate his names has been wrongly spelt. Thus in my humble view informed the finding of the Apex Court in PDP VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI-EREMIENYO (supra) that the 1st Respondent has at various times used different names and had many depositions on the issue. One other thing that stand clear in this case at hand and which clears the cloud is the fact that the registration number of the 2nd

Respondent admitted by the Appellant relates to the Statement of result issued by Top Quality College, not this alone, the print out from the WAEC website exhibited by both the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent and the WAEC certificate bears the photograph of the 2nd Respondent. This fact has neither being challenged nor disputed. The Appellant kept mute on the picture attached to the said certificate. Neither could it be said nor suggested that it is the 2nd Respondent that attached the said picture. Thus judicial notice can be taken of the fact that document which has its source from WAEC. In my view this certificate keep on starring the Appellant in the face and hence he appeared rattled of the obvious facts that the 2nd Respondent has the Examination number “4202009079” assigned to him and that he wrote the Examination and issued with the Result to which his photograph is attached.
This situation put the Appellant in a position of admitting against his own interest. Put in another words, it constitutes on admission against interest. See the case of EJIMADU VS. DELTA FREEZE LIMITED (2007) 13 NWLR PART 1050 PAGE 96 AT 110,

OFFODILE VS. OFFODILE (2019) 16 NWLR (PART 1989) PAGE 189 AT 211. The effect of an admission against interest is that an admission of fact by a party against his interest need no further proof of such fact. See AWOTE VS. OWODUNNI (NO. 2) (1987) 2 NWLR PT. 57 PG. 367. ATANZE VS. ATTAH (1999)3 NWLR PT. 596 PG 647. ALHAJI J. A. ODUTOLA AND ANOR VS. PAPERSACK NIGERIA LIMITED. (2006) NWLR (PT. 1012) 470.

I therefore, in view of the foregoing agree with the submission of the learned senior counsel. representing the 2nd Respondent contained at page 14 paragraphs 4.21 – 4.23. For all the foregoing therefore, I am of the irresistible conclusion that the learned trial Judge was right when he found that the case of the PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND 2 ORS VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI-EREMIENYO (supra) is not only distinguishable from the fact of this case but also inapplicable to the instant case. I therefore have no hesitation in resolving this issue against the Appellant and in favour of the 2nd Respondent.

ISSUE TWO
“Whether the learned trial Judge erred in Law when the Court failed to give probative value to exhibit Dantiye 1A2 (Grounds 3 & 4)”.

The contention of the Appellant on this issue is that three of the affidavits submitted by the 2nd Respondent did not emanate from the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory as represented to the 3rd Respondent. In support of this contention is the Appellant’s reliance on the provision of the 1st schedule of the High Court Civil Procedure Rules and the fact according to him that there is no Registry in GUDU DISTRICT where Affidavits can be sworn and a letter from the office of the Chief Registrar of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. For better understanding, it is this letter which is said to have being written from the Office of the Chief Registrar of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory that is referred to as Exhibit DANTIYE 1A2. See page 362 of the Record of Appeal.

The Appellant relied on Section 146(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 on presumption of documents. The case of the Appellant is that he caused a letter to be written to the Chief Registrar of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. In response to that said alleged letter by the Appellant an Alleged reply was received dated 12th March, 2020 asserting

that the affidavit under reference did not emanate from the Federal Capital Territory High Court of Justice. Abuja. The Affidavit in issue can be found on pages 21, 24 and 25 of the Record of Appeal. And also pages 83, 86 and 87, of the same Record. He challenged the finding of the Court that it is not borne out of the Record and hence perverse. He relied on the case of UNUIGBE AND ANOR VS. UWAHEREN AND ANOR (2018) LPELR – 44194… He urged that since the High Court Registrar of the Federal Capital Territory did not say that it did not receive the annexures, it does not lie in the mouth of the Court or any other person who is not a recipient of the letter Exhibit Dantiye 1A1 to contend that the Exhibits does not have the annexures. He added that it is trite Law that a document speaks for itself and that had the Court properly evaluated the response from the office of the Chief Registrar, its decision would have been reached differently and resolved in favour of the Appellant. He added that the response of the High court unequivocally shows that the documents which the learned trial Judge stated was not attached was properly attached. For

confirmation, (he referred to pages 362 – 363 of the record).

On the finding of the Court that the name used in Exhibit Dantiye 1A2 is not the name used by the 2nd Respondent. He argued that the reason for the finding is because the heading of the letter has the name Muhammed Musa Adamu while the body referred to Muhammad Musa Adamu. He referred to page 636 of the Record, where the Court found on issue of names and submitted that the Court having so found cannot turn round to say that the names are different. He relied on the case of A.G RIVERS STATE VS. A.G AKWA IBOM (2011) WRN 1, FRN VS. IWEKA (2011) PLELR – 9350. He submitted that the Trial Court having found that Mohammed and Mohammad are synonyms, the trial Court was in error to refuse to give probative value to Exhibit Dantiye 1A2 merely because it was the name Mohammed on the subject of the letter and Muhammad in the body of the letter.

It is the case of the Appellant that another defect to the affidavit is that it does not meet the requirement of the Rules of Court in force when it was filed i.e. to show that it has been duly sworn before a commissioner for oath. He urged the Court

to resolve this issue and determine that since the evidence before the Court is that.

(a) There is no registry of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory in the district of GUDU where affidavits are being sworn in 2009.
(b) The filing fees stated as the filing fees for the statutory declaration of age deposed to on the 10th September, 2009 and the affidavit deposed to on the 10th September, 2009 is in breach of the provision of the 1st schedule to the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004.
(c) The affidavit purportedly deposed to on the 16th May, 2019 is contrary to the form of affidavit of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory which this Court can take judicial notice of pursuant to Section 122 of the Evidence Act.
(d) Coupled with the content of Exhibit Dantiye 1A2 which is a certified true copy that enjoins the presumption of genuineness.

He urged the Court to hold that the 2nd Defendant on the score of the affidavit which he presented to the 3rd respondent as valid have breached the provisions of Section 31 (5) of the Electoral Act, entitling it to make the declaration in Section 31 (6) of the Electoral Act.

This is more so in that one of the affidavit is the one containing his age and as such there is no proof that he is constitutionally qualified to contest for the post of member House of Representative as required in the constitution.

The first Respondent while conceding that the trial Court is bound by the provision of the Evidence Act and that it is trite that the purport of certification as a true copy is to render the secondary document admissible as having come from a proper custody in lieu of presenting the Original copy. That a certified true copy can at law be ascribed the value it does not contextually contain. He added that it is a legal formality to open the doors of our Courts’ proceeding to admit secondary documents that are otherwise inadmissible i.e copies other than original and that the law does not intend to anoint as true or accurate the contents of a certified true copy of a document other than what the document contain i.e. as the true copy of its original and that the trial Court rightly reached its conclusion on Exhibit Dantiye 1A2. He added that the Appellant cannot legally seek refuge under

Section 146 (1) of the Evidence Act which inures on the admissibility of a certified true copy of a public document. It is his contention that dates is one of the important identities of a document. He argued that the purported affidavit the Appellant claimed to have inquired about were never placed before the court at least to form basis of comparison. He asked, how then will the Court Judiciously conclude that the purported letter or Exhibit Dantiye 1A2 was making reference to the affidavit in issue? He submitted that the trial Court rightly refused to attach probative value to the contents of Exhibit Dantiye 1A2 because the piece of evidence made reference to documents that were not demonstrated to the trial Court. He added that the Appellant who sought declaratory reliefs had the undischarged burden to explain the manifest contradiction and discrepancies in the documents that constituted Exhibit Dantiye 1A2 vis-a-vis the name of the 2nd Respondent and the corresponding date. The Appellant who sought declaratory reliefs had the undischarged burden to explain the manifest contradiction and discrepancies in the documents that constituted the foundation of

his case. There is clear disconnection in respect of the dates of the document that constitute Exhibit Dantiye 1A2 and also the subject matter. The Appellant having failed to explain to the Court even when the contradiction were raised by counsel cannot be heard to complain that the trial Court refused to attach probative value to the Exhibit. Being an arbiter, the Court cannot make or remake case for the parties. He urged the Court to resolve the issue against the Appellant.

For the 1st Respondent, it was submitted that what the trial Court did was right when he refused to attach any probative value to the Exhibit Dantiye 1A2, which is in response to the purported enquiry on the 2nd Respondent vide a letter by the Appellant’s counsel. The said Exhibit did not refer to the letter of enquiry in the affidavit. Further he argued that the Appellant did not produce any evidence before the Trial Federal High Court to establish the fact that the FCT High Court does not have a registry where Oath can be made other than at the Maitama Division of the FCT High Court and that the Appellant failed to produce anything for the Trial Court to take Judicial notice

of under Section 122(J) of the Evidence Act 2011 and that he neither refer the Court to any such document nor did he place before the Court facts which are credible to support such allusions. Rather the notorious is that the FCT High Court has Courts within the Abuja Municipal in Maitama, Jabi, Apo, Wuse, Nyanya, Lugbe and Gudu District with each having officials of the Court who process documents including Affidavit and statutory declaration of Age. He added that the said affidavit and statutory declaration of age are judicial and official act which enjoy presumption of regularity under Section 168 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011. Exhibit Dantiye 1A2 on the other hand was intended to dislodge the presumption of Law which inured in favour of the Affidavit and statutory declaration of Age. He submitted that the trial Court was right when he held that no probative value can be attached to Exhibit Dantiye 1A2. He relied on the case of CPC VS. INEC (2011) 18 NWLR (PT. 1279) PAGE 493. It is the case of the 1st Respondent that the argument of the Appeal is self-defeating in the sense that assuming but without conceding that the affidavit and statutory Declaration of

Age are invalid and void by reason of insufficient fees and or the use of wrong form, would the Court have been able to countenance a void document in order to decide the Appellant’s complaint. Answering the question in the negative, he added that any document that is void and lack legal value and Court cannot even see the document for the purpose of a determination. He added that assuming that the Declaration were made on wrong form and insufficient fees were paid there on, would that have derogated from the fact that they were in fact made or that they are false thereby amounted to making false representation to INEC. He answered in the negative and argued that payment of insufficient fees prescribed for filing of any process does not render the process void. He rely on the case of NIGERIA AGIP OIL CO. LTD. VS. NKWEKE (2016) ALL FWLR (PT.845)1. NWACHUKWU AND ANOR VS. ANELE (2019) LPELR. 46609. It is his case that a document or process is defective only if the form does not render the document or process invalid or void. And does not derogate from the fact that the document was in fact made. He cited in aid the use of BELLO VS. AG. OYO STATE (1986) LPELR

– 764, OMISORE AND ANOR VS. AREGBESOLA (2015) LPELR 24803, SPOG PETROCHEMICALS LTD VS. P.P.L. LTD (2018) 1 NWLR (PART. 1600) PAGE 32 OF 388 PARAGRAPH E-H AND PAGE 341 PARAGRAPH E-H. He contended further that the trial Court refused to Act on Exhibit Dantiye 1A2 because the fact that a document is certified does not make it automatically reliable. A document may be certified but lack prohibitive value.

He urge the Court to affirm the finding of the trial Court and to hold that the 2nd Respondent did not contravene the provision of Section 31(5) of the Electoral Act and that the Court will not in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the 2nd Respondent gave false information to INEC (3rd Respondent) make an order against the 2nd Respondent. He relied on the case of ITANYI AND ANOR VS. BAGUDU AND ORS, MAIHAJA VS. GAIDAM, MOHAMMED VS. WAMMAKO (supra). He urge the Court to resolve the issue against the Appellant.

Consequent upon my careful reading of the argument for and against by parties in respect of this issue, it is my humble view that what is in context is whether or not the trial Court gave probative consideration to Exhibit

Dantiye 1A2. This Exhibit can be found on page 362 of the Record. It is a letter from the office of the Chief Registrar High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja dated 12th March, 2020. Authored by Awa U. Awa (HOD Enforcement). and addressed to Madyam Legal consultant, Notaries Public and Consultants, No 8, Dakala Street, off Parakou Cresent Wuse 2. Abuja. Attention:- Matazu Aliyu Shamsudin Mohammed Associate.

I herein under reproduce the subject content of the letter thus:
Sir,
RE-CONFIRMATION OF THE AUTHENTICITY OF AFFIDAVITS AND STATUTORY DECLARATION OF AGE OF MUSA MUHAMMED ADAMU
With reference to your letter dated 6th march, 2020 in respect of the above subject matter; we write to confirm that the copies of the General form of Affidavit deposed to by one Musa Muhammad Adamu 10th September, 2009 and 16th May, 2019, and the Statutory Declaration of Age Declared by one Arc. Muhammad Adamu dated 10th January, 2009 are not authentic and same did not emanate from the Federal Capital Territory High Court of Justice, Abuja.
Accept the assurance of the Chief Registrar’s regard please.
Signed
“Awa U. Awa 12/3/2020.
(HOD Enforcement)”

The foregoing letter is said to be in response to the letter said to have been written from the Chambers of MADYAN LEGAL CONSULTANTS dated 6th October, 2020 address to the Chief Registrar Federal Capital Territory High Court. I herein under reproduce the said letter that gave birth to the letter christened “Exhibit Dantiye 1A2”.
“MADYAN LEGAL CONSULTANTS NOTARIES PUBLIC AND CONSULTANTS No. 8 Dakala Street off Parakou Crescent Wuse ii Abuja.
Email: madyanlegalconsultant@gmail.com
Tel: +2348067681669
+2347063645472
6th October, 2020
The Chief Registrar,
Federal Capital Territory High Court
Plot 426, Tigris Crescent,
Maitama, Abuja.
Dear sir,
CONFIRMATION OF THE AUTHENTICITY OF AFFIDAVIT AND STATUTORY DECLARATION OF AGE OF MUSA MOHAMMED ADAMU.
The above subject matter refers, we have been presented with a purported deposed affidavit to the registry of the Federal Capital Territory High Court on the 10th of September, 2009, deposed to be by one Musa Muhammed Adamu. We note that the amount paid was N50 with no revenue receipt. We know that as

at 2009 the fees for an affidavit was N200. The copy of the Affidavit is attached as Annex 1.
We were also presented with another Statutory Declaration of Age deposed to by one Alhaji Muhammed Adamu on the 10th January, 2009 and 10th September, 2009 with no revenue receipt number. We note that the filing fee paid was also N50. Which again was not the filing fee for the affidavit as encapsulated in the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rule 2004, which was the extant rule at the time. The copy of the Affidavit is attached as Annex 2.
We were also issued with another Affidavit purportedly deposed to on the 16th May, 2019. We note that it does not conform with the form of general Affidavit currently in use at the Registry of the High Court of Federal Capital Territory. The copy of the Affidavit is attached as Annex 3.
Kindly confirm to us whether these annexures are duly deposed to at the Registry of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory.
Thank you.
Yours Faithfully,
Madyan Legal Consult.
Signed
Matazu Aliyu Shamsudin Mohammed
Associate,”

Let me quickly note here that both the letter Exhibit Dantiye 1A2

and the letter from the law firm of MADYAN LEGAL CONSULTANT were certified on 26th/6/2020 at the Federal High Court.

The learned trial Judge has this to say on the said Exhibit Dantiye 1A2, hear his Lordship:
“In the same vein, the court is not minded to award probative value to same information from on verified (SIC) website and the letter from FCT High Court, as in the later, the names sought to be clarified was not the name used by the 2nd Defendant. The letter of counsel to the plaintiff erroneously dated 6/10/2020 was not accompanied with the documents which allegedly called for clarification. Since the procedure was wrong, it follows that the answer cannot be accorded credible value. I hold the view that this issue cannot be resolved in favour of the plaintiff.”

In my view, and which is predicated on a careful perusal of the letters Exhibit Dantiye 1A2 and the letter form the Law firm of MADYAN LEGAL CONSULTANT dated 12th March, 2020 and 6th October, 2020 respectively, there are lots of questions that agitates the mind and which answers to them cannot be found on Record. One of which is the finding of the Court that the

documents for which clarification were sought were not attached to either the letter from the Law firm of Counsel to the Appellant to the Chief Registrar FCT High Court, dated 6th October, 2020. Nor the purported reply from the office of the Chief Registrar. Secondly the letter from the law firm of the Appellant is dated 6th October, 2020. This is the originating letter on page 363, to the Chief Registrar FCT High Court Abuja. The reply to that letter written by the AWA U. AWA is dated 12th March, 2020. (see page 362). It is unheard of that the letter seeking for clarification has a date later that on the reply to such letter i.e. letter from chamber dated 6th October, 2020, reply to the letter from the FCT High Court is dated 12th March, 2020. That is to say that the reply precedes the letter calling for clarification.

It is the date on the letter that is also inscribed against the signature of the Author (AWA U. AWA) i.e. 12th March, 2020. There is need for clarification of this letter if not an enquiry.

Another issue is that the letter was written to the Chief Registrar of the FCT High Court. The reply is authored by one AWA U. AWA (HOD

Enforcement). There is nothing to show in the body of the letter that the letter was written on behalf of the Chief Registrar FCT High Court. In my humble view the said Author of Exhibit Dantiye 1A2, AWA U. AWA wrote in his capacity as HOD Enforcement and not for or on behalf of the Chief Registrar.

There is nothing to show that the said author was writing on behalf of or on the directives of the Chief Registrar. This again need clarification and or an enquiry.

Added to the foregoing, clarification was sought on the document of Musa Muhammed Adamu, the reply through purported to be giving his finding on Musa Mohammed Adamu, but in the body of the letter, finding was made on the documents of Musa Mohammad Adamu. To me, based on the foregoing, a judicial and judicious mind like that of the learned trial Judge will have doubt operating in his mind as to the genuineness and authenticity of both the letter and the reply there to which in my view run contrary to and at cross purposes to each other. If nothing else, with the foregoing, I have no hesitation in my mind in agreeing with the finding of the learned trial Judge that the document are not reliable

and cannot be ousted and relied upon. Due to so many virus of irreconsible inconsistence. Exhibit Dantiye 1A2 has much to be desired. To say a little, I would have called for an enquiry by the Chief Judge of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja on the role of AWA U. AWA (HOD Enforcement) on this issue. That notwithstanding, I resolve this issue against the Appellant.

ISSUE 3
“whether the learned Trial Judge erred in Law when his Lordship gave probative value to Exhibit Musa 1 (The West African Senior School Certificate Examination) after finding that the same document ostensibly emanated from WAEC? (Ground 5)”

The complaint of the Appellant by this issue simplicita is that the West Africa Examination Council (WAEC) result presented by the Appellant marked Exhibit Musa 1, is doubtful and that it was not certified pursuant to Section 104 of the Evidence Act 2011 being a document categorized under Section 102 of the Evidence Act 2011 as public Document. He argued that the West African Examinations Council is a creation of the Law under the West African Examination Council Act (CAP. W4) Laws of Federal Republic of

Nigeria 2004, being a public body that issued to the second Respondent the certificate in issue tagged Exhibit Musa 1, the said certificate ought to be certified being a public document issued by a public body. Failure to certify the said document renders the document inadmissible. He relied on the case of NWAOGU VS. ATUMA AND 2 ORS (NO. 3) (2013) 4 – 5 SC. (PT. 1) 130, FAWEHINMI VS. IGP (2000) 7 NWLR. (PT. 665) 481 AT 525. PARA B – H, EMEKA VS. CHUBA – IKPEAZU AND ORS (2017) LPELR-41920. It is his case that the learned trial Judge erred in law when he gave probative value to the contents of Exhibit Musa 1, (the West African Senior School Certificate Examination) when the document was never certified by the West African Examination Council. He also relied on the case of ARAKA VS. EGBUE (2003) 33 WRN. I. NZEKWU VS. NZEKWU (1989) 3 SC (PT. 11) 76. S.P.D.C. (NIG) LTD VS. NWOLU (1991) 3 NWLR (PT. 180) 496 AT 504, LAWAL VS. MAGAJI (2010) 8 WRN 102. He added that when a document is not admissible, the fact that it was not objected to does not constitute reason for the Court to rely on it. He relied on the following cases:

UNITY LIFE AND FIRE INSURANCE CO LTD VS. I. B. W. A. LTD. (2001) 7 NWLR (PT. 713), (PAGE NOT PROVIDED) ALASHE VS. OLORI – ILU (1964) 1 ALL NLR 390 AT 397, JACKIER VS. INTERNATIONAL CABLE CO. LTD (1888) 5 TLR 13. SALAU OLUKADE VS. ABOLADE ALADE (1976) INLR (PT.1) 67 AT 73 – 75, OWONYIN VS. OMOTOSHO (1961) 2 SCNLR 57, YASSIN VS. BARCLAYS BANK DCO (1968) ALLNLR 171, MINISTER OF LANDS WESTERN NIGERIA VS. DR. N. AZIKIWE (1969)1 ALLNLQ 49 AND KOSSEN (NIG) LTD VS. SAVANNAH BANK (NIG) LTD. (1995) 9 NWLR (PT. 421). He urged the Court to resolve the issue against the Respondents.

On behalf of the 1st Respondent, it is contended that the nature of Evidence presented by the Appellant before the trial Court did not establish the case of submission of false information by the 2nd Respondent. He submitted that the trial Court was right to come to the conclusion reached on pages 636 – 637 of the Record of Appeal. This is the only argument of the 1st Respondent in respect of Exhibit Musa 1.

For the 2nd Respondent, it was argued that this issue also calls for the meaning of the word “OSTENSIBLE” as an adverb. It is his contention that the West African Senior

School Certificate issued to the 2nd Respondent which bears his physical identification was attached to the 2nd Respondent’s Counter Affidavit to the Originating summons and the Notice of preliminary objection as “Exhibit Musa 1” on page 176 of the Record of Appeal. He added that in nowhere did the appellant deny the said certificate as bearing the photograph of the 2nd Respondent. He submitted that where a fact is deposed to in an affidavit, failure to deny that fact in a counter Affidavit amount to an admission. He relied on the case of NBCI VS. ALFIJIR (MINNA) NIG.) LTD. (1993)4 NWLR PT. 287, PAGE 356, PARA B – C, so also he referred to Section 123 of the Evidence Act 2011 (As Amended) he urged further that by the foregoing, the learned trial Judge was right when he came to the conclusion reached on pages 336 of the Record of Appeal. He added that the fact that the certificate bears the photograph of the 2nd Respondent was not Appealed against, and neither was any objection raised to the admissibility of Exhibit Musa 1, before the trial Court, but now raised before this Court. The objection raised in this Court was so raised without

the leave of the Court. Hence the trial Court was on a strong wicket for acting on Exhibit Dantiye 1 & 2. Having not appealed against the admission of Exhibit Musa 1, the Appellant’s submission in paragraph 61, 62, 63 and 64 of the brief are an after-thought. He added that the Appellant commenced the action by way of an Originating summons and attempts to get the suit heard under the general cause list, where evidence would be tendered by parties was objected to by the appellant who insisted that the matter be best heard on Affidavit of parties and that the documents were sufficient to resolve the dispute between parties. He relied on then case of BOKO VS. NUNGWA AND ORS (2018) LPELR 45890 on the position of the law on copies of public documents attached to Affidavit.

Finally, he submitted that it is the ostensibility of Exhibit Musa 1 as a document emanating from WAEC that should have made and did make the trial Court attach Probative value to the Exhibit which is relevant and not otherwise. He provided the meaning to the word “Ostensible” as given in Webster Dictionary as:
“Offered as real or having the character

represented seeming, profess or pretended”.

He argued further that to say that “Exhibit Musa 1 which is a WAEC certificate with the picture of the 2nd Defendant ostensibly emanating from WAEC” meant that it is apparent on the face of Exhibit Musa 1, that indeed it emanated from WAEC.

He urged the Court to hold that the learned trial Judge did not err in law when His Lordship accorded probative value to Exhibit Musa 1, having found that the document ostensibly emanated from WAEC. He urges the Court to resolve the issue against the Appellant.

I have read and considered the foregoing arguments. The pertinent question is whether or not Exhibit Musa 1 can be acted upon by the trial Court and secondly whether the contention of the Appellant on the word ostensible is correct. I will like to start on the connotation of the Appellant on the word “ostensible”, without wasting time, I agree with the Webster dictionary definition of the word ostensible as provided by the Learned Senior Counsel representing the 2nd Respondent thus: –
“Offered as real or having the character represented, seeming less or

pretended”
By the foregoing, the contention of the Appellants regarding his notion of the word “ostensible” cannot stand in the circumstance of the fact of this case. This is an attempt to lead the Court astray. I condemn the submission in the strongest term and same is discountenanced.

Now to the question whether or not the said document can be acted upon. My response to the foregoing question is positive. This is so because the document which has its origin from WAEC office has the picture of the 2nd Respondent inplanted on the result from the WAEC office. This has not been disputed. Not this alone, the entire process initiated by the Appellant is vide on Originating summons. By that process, the issue is filed purely on affidavit evidence and annexures there in attached in support of the averments in the supporting affidavit. These document are usually in any form. The issue of whether or not they are certified does not render them irrelevant. On issues of this nature, this Court has taken a stand on document attached to processes in a case initiated under the Originating Summons. See BOKO VS. NUNGWA AND ORS (2018) LPELR 45890

per Ekanem JCA. Hear his Lordship:
“Exhibit DK8 attached to the counter affidavit of the 1st Respondent is a photo-copy of the recommendation of the Legislative Election Appeal Committee of the 1st Respondent. It is also Exhibit 2 attached to the 2nd Respondent. Exhibit DK9 attached to the 1st Respondent counter affidavit is a photo-copy of the extract of the decision of the National Working Committee of the 2nd Respondent. It is also Exhibit 1 attached to the counter affidavit of the 2nd Respondent. By Section 102 (a) and (b) of the Evidence Act, 2011, the documents are private documents and therefore needed no certificate by any one, the certification of Exhibit DK8 by the 1st Respondent’s Legal officer was a mere surplusage. The certification of Exhibit by 1st Respondent’s legal officer is because it is an extract of the numerous decision of laying proper foundation for the admissibility of the documents does not arise because the trial was not by oral evidence but by affidavit evidence. The document at page 345 of the Record of Appeal Which Appellants counsel relied on to submit that Exhibit DK8 and DK9 were sent to the 3rd

Respondent thus making them public documents seems to be a rogue or strange document as it is neither referred to in the 1st Respondents counter affidavit nor is it marked as an exhibit. I shall therefore ignore it.
Exhibit DK10 is a photo-copy of INEC Nomination forms Benue State. Being addressed to the 3rd Respondent an official body, and having been received by it, it becomes a public document. It is certified by the Legal Officer of the 2nd Respondent who cannot do so not being an officer of the 3rd Respondent. This is the basis of the objection of appellant’s counsel, but I think his objection is founded on quicksand and therefore cannot stand. The case of the appellant was initiated by way of originating summons which is fought on the basis of affidavit evidence. Generally speaking objection can not be raised against a document attached to an affidavit or a counter-affidavit because the question of admissibility of the document does not arise in that circumstance. See ADEJUMO VS. GOVERNMENT OF LAGOS STATE (1970) ALL NLR 187. The same position was taken by the Supreme Court again in NWOSU VS. IMO STATE ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION AUTHORITY (1990)

2 NWLR (PT. 135) 608, 135. The position of the law above has been extended to document attached to the originating summons. See JUKOK INTERNATIONAL LTD VS. DIAMOND BANK PLC (2016) 6 NWLR (PT. 1507) 55. The reason for position of the law requesting documents attached to an affidavit was stated by Mbaba JCA in Ilorin East Local Government vs. Alasinrin (2012) LEPLR 8400 thus ‘that a document attached or exhibited with affidavit forms part of the evidence adduced by the deponent and is deemed to be properly before the Court if satisfied that it is credible. Being already an evidence before the Court (on oath), the formality of certification for admissibility (if it required certification) has been dispensed with. Of course the reason for this is easy to adduce, the first being that affidavit evidence is already an admitted evidence before the Court, unlike pleading which must be converted to evidence at the trial, at which time issue of admissibility of an exhibit is decided. The second point is that an exhibited copy of a document attached to an affidavit evidence must necessary be a photocopy of secondary copy… it is therefore unthinkable to expect the

exhibited photocopy to be certified by the adverse party before the Court can attach probative value to it.’ “Appellant’s counsel cited the case of FAWEHINMI VS. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE (supra) to buttereme his argument. This case of FAWEHINMI VS. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE (supra) was decided by this Court in the year 2000, the more recent decision of this Court set out above represent the current state of the Law and I am bound to follow them.” (underling ours for emphasis).
The forgoing, in my humble view adequately provide the appropriate answer to the issue at hand and thereby support the finding of the learned trial Judge on Exhibit Musa 1. Therefore, I have no hesitation in adopting and applying same to this issue and resolving issue three against then Appellant.

ISSUE 4
Whether the learned trial Judge was right to rely on the case of ORJI VS. PDP (2009) 14 NWLR PART 1161) PG. 310, to come to the conclusion that the date of resignation of the 2nd Defendant is the date of the submission of the letter and not the date stated by the 2nd Respondent himself in his letter of resignation? (Ground 6).

The appellant contended here that the 2nd Respondent’s letter dated 31st December 2019, the effective date which he supplied was 31st January, 2020. He referred to pages 26 – 27 and 88, 89 of the Record). He argued that by the letter of resignation of the 2nd Respondent’s appointment and the letter of acceptance the 2nd Respondent resigned his appointment with effect from 31st January, 2020.

He called in the date on his resignation of appointment letter which is effective on the 31st December 2019. He added that in the form EC9, the 2nd Respondent stated that he resigned effective on the 31st December, 2019. The appellant insisted that this is a false information. He contended that the case of the appellant has consistently being that by stating that he resigned effective 31st December 2019,instead of 31st January, 2020. By that the 2nd Respondent supplied false information. He relied on the case of ANGOS DIDE VS. SELEKE TIMIBI (2009) LPELR – 4038. He submitted that the learned trial Judge erred in law and changed the character of the case of the plaintiff to one challenging the constitutionality of the date of resignation when the

Court held in the Court Judgment at page 639 of the Record. He added that the trial Court was bound by the decision in PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND 2 ORS VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI EREMIENYO AND 3 ORS (SUPRA) and the case of ANGOS DIDE VS. SELEKETIMIBI (supra). He added that the finding of the trial Court that whether date is relied upon to determine the effective date of resignation meets the constitutional requirement of Section 66(1)(f) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeal in the case ANGOS DIDE VS. SELEKETIMIBI (supra) which requires that a person should not present false information as to the date of resignation to the 3rd Defendants. He argued that the case of ORJI VS. PDP AND ORS (2009) 14 NWLR (PT. 1161) PG 310 does not deal with the integration of effective date of retirement or that the Court could replace the effective date of retirement of a public servant from the one he admitted to be his retirement date. He added that the case ORJI VS. PDP AND ORS (supra) is about the definition of who a public officer is. He submitted that the learned trial Judge erred in law when the Court

relied on an inapplicable case of ORJI VS. PDP AND ORS (supra) rather than relying on the case of ANGOS DIDE VS. SELEKETIMIBI (supra) which was adopted by the Supreme Court in the case of PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND 2 ORS VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI EREMIENYO AND 3 ORS (supra).

He urge the Court to allow the Appeal and set aside the Judgment of the Federal High Court Abuja Judicial Division in suit No FHC/ABJ/CS/295/2020 CORAM; Justice Ijeoma l. Ojukwu. Delivered on the 16th day of June, 2020. And proceed to grant the reliefs sought by the Appellant in this Appeal.

The position of the 1st Respondent on the issue of resignation from employment is well settled in our corpus juris. He submitted that the Court have Consistently maintain that the effective date of resignation is reviewed by the employer. He argued that the 2nd Respondent duly resigned his Appointment within the constitutional time frame allowed for a civil servant to contest for an elective office in Nigeria, having resigned not later than thirty days before the scheduled election in compliance with Section 66 (1)(f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.(as amended). He

relied on the case of ONUKWUBIRI AND ANOR VS. IBEAKANMA AND ORS. (2014) LPELR – 23804. He added that as endorsed on the face of the letter of Respondent which is part of the documents assembled as Exhibit Dantiye 1, the letter was received on 31/12/2019, and payment of the 2nd Respondent’s salary in lieu of notice Exhibit MMAS dated 31/12/2019, and Exhibit MMA6 which is the endorsement on surrender/return of identity card by the 2nd Respondent to his former employer also dated 31/1/2019. He submitted that by the legion of Judicial authorities, the 2nd Respondent effectively resigned his appointment on the 31st of December 2019, he relied on the case of SUNDAY VS. OLUGBENGA AND ORS (2008) LPELR 4995 (CA). On the strength of the foregoing, he urged the Court to uphold the decisions of the trial Court and dismiss the Appeal with substantial cost against the Appellant.

On behalf of the 2nd Respondent, it is submitted by the learned senior counsel Y. C. Maikyau that the Appellants case was founded on the 2nd Respondent’s letter of Resignation and the Director of Administration’s letter forwarding the 2nd Respondent’s letter of

Resignation as stated in paragraphs 65 and 66 of the Appellant’s brief of Argument (see pages 26 and 27 of the Record of Appeal). He added that the said letter under reference express the wish of the 2nd Respondent to resign with effect from 31st of January 2020. The 2nd Respondent gave the effective date of his resignation as 31st December, 2019. In his form EC9. This is what the Appellant termed false information to the 3rd Respondent. He referred to the response of the 2nd Respondent contained in paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 33, 34 and 35 of the Counter affidavit to the originating summons. He contended that the Appellant did not deny that the 2nd Respondent tendered his resignation on the 31st December, 2019. And that he paid the requisite salary in lieu of notice and also handed over his identity card which was duly acknowledged. He relied NBCI VS. ALFIJIR (MINING) (NIG) LTD. (1993)4 NWLR PART 287, PAGE 256, PARA B – C, ZUBAIRU VS. MOHAMMED (2009) LPELR – 5124. He submitted that the 2nd Respondent did in fact resigned from his employment on 31st December, 2019 as stated in his INEC form EC9 submitted to the 3rd Respondent (INEC). Also the trial

Judge was right in his conclusion. He submitted further that from the foregoing, the contention of the Appellant in paragraph 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74 and 75 of the Appellant’s brief of argument are totally misconceived. He relied on the case of DIDE VS. SELEKETIMIBI (SUPRA) AND PDP AND 2 ORS VS. BIOBARAKUMA DEGI-EREMENYO AND 3 ORS (SUPRA) are distinguishable from the fact of this Appeal and thus inapplicable. He argued that the case at hand did not deal with different dates in two different Statutory Declaration of Age, belonging to one person. The date of resignation of the 2nd Respondent is one determined by law and upon the facts and the step taken by the 2nd Respondent which agrees with the information provided in the 2nd Respondent form EC9. He argued further that the learned trial Judge did not change the character of the Appellant’s case as contended in paragraph 69 of the Appellant’s brief of argument. The Court did not only found that the date of resignation of the 2nd Respondent was 31st of December, 2019, but also that “the vexed issue of false misrepresentations in its entirety was not proved by cogent and credible

evidence”. He contended that the finding by the trial Court that 2nd Respondent was qualified to context the election of 14th March, 2020 whether the effective date of his resignation was 31st December, 2019 or 31st January, 2020 having satisfied Section 66 (1) of the 1999 Constitution was not an alternative decision after categorically holding that in the instant case the effective date of the resignation is the 31st of December 2019.

He urged the Court to resolve the issue in favour of the 2nd Respondent and against the Appellant.

The issue at stake herein is very narrow. The question is whether or not the letter of resignation tendered by the 2nd Respondent dated 31st December, 2019 is in compliance with Section 66(1) (f) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended.
The learned trial Judge in his considered judgement came to the following conclusion.
“It has been held in ORJI VS. PDP AND ORS (2009) 14 NWLR (PT. 1161) PG 310. That the effective date of resignation is the date the letter was written and received by the approving authority. Therefore, in the instant case the effective date of resignation

is the 31st December, 2019.
Assuming without conceding that this is not the case, Section 66 (1) (f) of the 1999 constitution provides that, ’No person shall be qualified for election to the senate or the house of Representatives if he is a person employed in the public service of the federation or any state and has not resigned, withdrawn or retired from such employment thirty days before the date of the Election’. The effective date of resignation being it the 31st day of December, 2019 or 31st January, 2020 are well above (30) days before the scheduled date of election being the 14th March, 2020. Then 2nd Defendant’s resignation was in time and there is no evidence that he received any salary after the date statutory prescribed for resignation. It is my opinion that 2nd Defendant is qualified to participate in the conduct of the Election of 14th March, 2020”.
In my understanding of the provision of Section 66(1)(f) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, all that is required by an aspiring contestant who is under employment in any public service of the Federation is to effectively resign from such

service, 30 days before the date of such Election he is intending to contest. The Courts, this Court inclusive have given interpretation to when the calculation of the 30 days prescribed under Section 66 (1) (f) will start to count. Hence the decision in plethora of authorities stating that the 30 days will start to run from the date the letter of Resignation tendered is received by the approving authority. Regardless of the date the letter is written, what is important for the calculation of the 30 days is the date the letter is received by the body that is authorised to approve the resignation from employment. Further to this is that there must be 30 clear days from the date the letter of resignation is received to the date the intended Election will be conducted.
In the case ofZUBAIRU VS. MOHAMMED (2009) LPELR – 5124, Augie JCA now Justice of the Supreme Court said thus while considering similar provision.
“The legal position is that resignation from unemployment is by giving the required length of notice or payment in lieu of notice. Resignation dates back from the date the notice is received. There is absolute power to resign and no

discretion to refuse to accept the notice of resignation. It must be emphasized that where a person has taken steps he is required by law to take, in this case, submit his letter of resignation, the refusal, failure, neglect of the relevant officials to do their part, in this case stop the payment of his salary cannot be visited on the person. This principle of law has been applied in the commencement of an action or initiation of a process. See ALAWODE VS. SEMOH (1959) SLNLR 91 AND SAUDE VS. ABDULLAHI (1989) 4 NWLR (PT 116) 387, 436 AND 437. It is the view of this tribunal that the principal of law applies with equal force here. What was required of the 1st Respondent by Section 107(1) of the Constitution is to resign his appointment 30 days before the election. From the pleadings of the parties and evidence led, we are of the view that the 1st Respondent has duly resigned his appointment as required by law”.
Also in the case of ONUKWUBIRI AND ANOR VS. IBEAKANMA AND ORS. (2014) LPELR – 23804, Agube JCA said thus hear his Lordship.
“if by Exhibit c which is the letter/Application for voluntary Retirement, the said Application was

received on the 14th day of July, 2000, by the customs serving them by the provision of Section 306 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 which is the ground norm of this nation that: ‘(2) the resignation of any person from any office established by this constitution should take effect when the writing signifying the resignation is received by the authority or person to whom it is addressed or by any person authorised by that authority or person to receive it’; then the 1st Respondent was deemed to have resigned on 14th July, 2020 such that no matter how we look at it, there is a win-win situation in favour of the 1st Respondent. In the case YESUFU VS. GOVERNMENT OF EDO STATE (2001) 13 NWLR (PT. 731) as cited by the learned counsel of for the 1st – 3rd Respondents, the Court at pages 525 – 533 para 5, H – E, in line with the provision of the Constitution above cited held that, ‘’A notice of Resignation of an appointment becomes effective and valid the moment it is received by the person or authority to whom it is addressed… it is not necessary for the person to whom the notice of resignation

is addressed to reply that the resignation has been accepted”.
In SUNDAY VS. OLUGBENGA AND ORS (2008) LPELR 4995. Fabiyi, JCA then and later Justice of the Supreme Court (retired) has this to say on effective date of resignation.
“It is clear to me that a notice of resignation is effective not from the date of the letter or from the date of the purported acceptance, but from the date the letter was received by the employer or his agent. Refer to W.A.E.C VS. OSHIONEBO (2006) 12 NWLR (PT. 994) 258. But bluntly resignation takes effect from the date notice is received by the employer or its agent. See ADEFEMI VS. ABEGUNDE (supra) at p. 28. In BENSON VS. ONITIRI (supra), ADEMOLA, O. F (as then called) pronounced as follows:- ‘further, it is clear on the authority of RIDDAN VS. THE WAR OFFICE (1959)3 ALL F.R. 5221, 588. That resignation dates from the date notice was received. There is absolute power to resign and no discretion to refuse to accept notice. In the present case, I do not think it matters to whom the notice of resignation was addressed, whether to the minister who made the appointment or the board, on which the person was

serving… I am of the view that notice of Resignation to either of them is good, nor do I think it necessary for the Board or anybody else to reply that the resignation is accepted.”For more elucidation on the point under consideration, the Supreme Court further held in the same case of BENSON VS. ONITIRI (supra) as follows:-
“that there is common law right to resign unless there is reason to show that the holder of the office cannot and the appellant’s common law right remains Unfiltered as the Lagos Town planning law was silent on resignation. The appellant was untitled to send his notice of resignation to LEDS, a corporation which he was serving and which had right to receive it and since the LEDS, sent a copy thereof to the ministry and the permanent secretary dealt with it, notice to the permanent secretary is notice to the minister since it is a matter not requiring the exercise of the minister’s personal discretion. The effective date of resignation was when the permanent secretary in the absence of the minister accepted the notice of resignation and considered and treated the Appellant as having resigned.”

In the case at hand, it is not in dispute that the letter of resignation was written on 31st day of December, 2019. The said letter was received on 31st December,2019. Same date. The effective date of resignation of the 2nd Respondent having regard to the foregoing decided cases is 31st day of December, 2019. The election in issue was scheduled and conducted on the 14th March, 2020, by simple arithmetic, 31st December, 2019 – 14th March, 2020 is quite over 30 days prescribed under Section 66 (1) (f) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Therefore, the argument propounded by the learned counsel representing the appellant will not and cannot fly. Accordingly, it is discountenanced. I am at home with the argument and submission of the Learned Counsel from the inner and outer bar representing the first and 2nd Respondents respectively to come to the conclusion that the learned trial Judge was right in his conclusion that the 2nd Respondent properly resigned his employment.

This issue is therefore resolved against the Appellant.

Consequently, upon the foregoing resolution and conclusion of the 4 issues formulated against the

Appellant, this appeal is devoid of any merit and same be and is hereby dismissed in its entirety.

The judgment of the Federal High Court Abuja Judicial Division in suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/295/2020 delivered by Honourable justice Ijeoma l. Ojukwu delivered on the 16th day of June, 2020 is hereby affirmed.

A cost of N100,000.00 each is awarded in favour of the 1st and 2nd Respondent respectively and against the Appellant.

From here I will proceed to consider the cross appeal by the 2nd Respondent. However, I consider it pertinent to put on record that the registry of this Court for whatever reason decided not to allow the Cross Appeal to share the same cord as a twin action with the main appeal, the registry has separated Paul and Barnabas by giving a separate Appeal number to the Cross Appeal as follows: CA/ABJ/CV/531/2020.

CROSS APPEAL
This judgment is predicated on the Notice of Cross appeal by the 2nd Respondent in the main appeal who herein after referred to as the cross appellant against the Appellant in the main appeal who is herein after referred as 1st cross Respondent/Appellant and 2 ORS.

The Notice of cross appeal is dated

and filed on 29th July, 2020. (see pages 652 – 663 of the record of appeal for the Cross Appeal transmitted on 10th day of July, 2020) in content, the Notice of Cross Appeal has 4 (four) grounds, and the relief sought are as follows. See pages 660 – 661.

RELIEFS SOUGHT
1. An order of this Honourable Court allowing the Cross appeal.
2. An order striking out or dismissing the appellant/plaintiff’s suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/295/2020 filed on the 3rd day of march 2020 as statute barred for failure to comply with the provision of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (fourth alteration No 21) Act 2010 as amended).
3. An order of this Honourable Court Striking out as incompetent the Appellant/plaintiff’s process titled “AFFIDAVIT NO 1 IN SUPPORT OF ORIGINATING SUMMONS” having been filed outside the period of 14 days prescribed by Section 285 (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (fourth alteration No 21) Act 2017 (as amended) for the Commencement of Pre-election matter.
4. An order of this Honourable Court, that provision of Section 31 (7) of the Electoral Act 2017 (as amended)

is mandatory and failure to serve the Originating summons at the address as statutory provided renders the service null and void and liable to be set aside.
5. And for such further order(s) this Honourable Court may deem fit to made in the circumstance of this appeal.

The facts leading to and as stated in the main appeal NO:CA/ABJ/CV/498/2020, are hereby adopted as the fact upon which this cross appeal is predicated.

The 1st cross Respondent Appellant also filed a Notice of Intention to contend pursuant to Order 9 of Rules 1 and 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016 on the 28th day of July, 2020. Where in the Appellant 1st Cross-Respondent applicant contending that the decision of the Federal High Court of Nigeria Abuja Judicial Division in suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/295/2020 Coram:- HON. JUSTICE IJEOMA L. OJUKWU, delivered on the 16th day of June, 2020, wherein the learned trial Judge dismissed the 2nd Respondent/Cross-Appellant preliminary objection be affirmed on the varied grounds as follows:
1. The right to complaint about the falsity of the information submitted by a person to the independent national Electoral

commission is created by Section 31 of the Electoral Act.
2. By the provision of 31 (3), (4)and (5) of the Electoral Act the right of Action accrues from the time that the names are published and not from the date the information is submitted.
RELIEF SOUGHT
An order of this Honourable Court affirming the portion of decision of the Federal High Court of Nigeria, Abuja Judicial Division in suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/295/2020 Coram: HON. JUSTICE IJEOMA L. OJUKWU, delivered on the 16th day June, 2020, wherein the learned trial Court Judge dismissed the 2nd Respondent/Cross-Respondent’s preliminary objection contending that the suit is Statute barred.

The Cross Appellant/2nd Respondent filed his brief of Argument on the 24th day of July 2020. Therein he formulated four issues for the determination of the Cross Appeal. They are herein under Reproduced.
1. Whether having regard to the provision of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (four Alteration no. 21) Act 2017 (as amended) and the fact presented in the 3rd of March 2020, the learned Trial Judge was right to find that the Appellant’s Action was

commended within the period of 14 days prescribed by Section 285(9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (fourth alteration No 21) Act 2017 (as amended) and placed reliance on the provisions of Section (2)(a) of the interpretation Act 2004 to come to the conclusion notwithstanding the several decision of this Court and the Supreme Court on the inapplicability of the interpretation Act in Election matter (Ground 1).
2. Whether having regard to the provision of Section 282 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (fourth alteration No 21) Act 2017 (as amended) read together with Order 3 Rule of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2019, the process filed on the Appellant/Cross-Respondent filed “Affidavit No 1 in Support of the Originating summons” was a valid and competent part of the Originating Summons filed on the 3rd of March, 2020? (Ground 2).
3. Whether having regard to the decision of this Honourable Court and the Supreme Court in ITANYI & ANOR VS. BAGUDU & ORS (2018) LPELR – 46984 (A), MAIHAJA VS. GAIDAM (2018)4 NWLR PART 1610 P. 454 AND MOHAMMED VS. WAMAKO (2018) 17 NWLR PART 1619

PART 578, which interpreted action under Section 31(5) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) as raising allegation of crime requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt the learned trial Judge was right to have held that the Appellant/Cross-Respondent’s action brought under Section 31(5) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) did not border on the allegation of crime (ground 3).
4. Whether by the provisions of Section 31 (7) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) the service of the originating Summons on the Cross Appellant by substituted means at an address other than the address provided in the Cross Appellants Form EC9 was proper in Law ? (Ground 4).

In the brief of argument filed by Abdul Mohammed Esq. representing the 1st Cross-Respondent/Appellant on the 29th July, 2020, the following issues are presented for the determination of the Cross Appeal.
a. Whether the cause of action in respect of the provisions of Section 31 arises from the date of the submission of the form envisaged there in or the date of publication of the form (distilled from ground 1 and Appellant’s/Cross-Respondent’s Notice

of intention to contended).
b. Whether parties in a pre-election matter regulated by Section 285 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Fourth alteration) Act, are precluded from filling certified true copies of documents which has already been filed after the expiration of 14 days (Distilled from Ground 2).
c. Whether in the absence of any dispute as to documents in contention in a suit, parties cannot resolve issues pertaining to the provisions of Section 31(5) except by viva voce trial? (ground 3).
d. Whether a party who is in breach of the provisions of Section 31(7) of the Electoral Act can complain if he was served the originating processes in this suit by substituted means? (Distilled from Grounds 4).

It will be recalled that I indicated before now that the Appellant/Cross Respondent filed a notice of intention to contend that the decision of Court below be varied pursuant to Order 9 rule 1 & 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016. His Notice of contention in effect is that the decision of the Federal High Court of Nigeria Abuja Judicial Division in Suit NO: FHC/ABJ/CS/2915/2020 Coram Hon. Justice Ijeoma L.

Ojukwu delivered on the 16th day of June, 2020 wherein the learned trial Court Judge dismissed the 2nd Respondent/Cross Respondent’s preliminary objection by holding that:
“Now Section 31(3) of The Electoral Act provides that the 3rd Defendant shall within (7) days of the receipt of the personal (page 81 of the Record) particulars of the candidate publish same in the constituency where the candidate intends to conduct the Election.
Irrespective of the provision of Section 31 (3) of the Electoral Act, the 3rd Defendant has the power to amend its timetable and make regulations in regards to the conduct of election. In the instant case, the plaintiff claims That the last day of publication is the appropriate day when his cause of action arose on the 18th February, 2020 when the form was submitted.
I have carefully perused all the document and averments of the parties and in my view as inspired by the evidence placed before me and by superior Authorities that the cause of action of the plaintiff should ordinarily arise on the last day stated for the submission of forms. This is because, a candidate may have need to regularize his

documents within the last day stated for submission. It is only when this day arrives that a party can irrebutably say that a candidate is relying on the documents submitted to INEC by the INEC time table, the last day fixed for the submission of the form EC9 was 6.pm on 20th February, 2020. The information supplied in form EC9 is presumed to be the information relied on by the party and the information which INEC is authorised to publish unless that presumption is rebutted the date to be relied on is 20th February, 2020 and not 25th February, 2020.”

Shall be affirmed on the varied grounds as here in before reproduced. The 1st Respondent also raised an objection to the competence of Ground 1 of the Notice of Cross Appeal by the Cross Appellant/2nd Respondent. His bone of contention is that the said ground one comprise both the ratio decidendi and the obiter dictum.

The reaction of the Cross Appellant to the Notice of contention by the Appellant/Cross Respondent is that the process of the Notice of contention was filed on the 25th day of July, 2020 at the registry of this Court intend of the Registry of the Trial Court. Failure to file the said

Notice rendered the notice incompetent. He argued that the Respondents Notice by its nature, is like a notice of Appeal. he referred to the case of NNADI & ANOR VS. ODIKA AND ORS (2017) LPELR 43448, ALHAJI MATORI VS. ALH. DAN BAUCHI AND ORS (2004) ALL FWLR (PT. 177) PAGE 1010 AT 1029, PARA C – E, HABU AND ORS VS. NUT TARABA STATE AND ORS (2005) LPELR – 11465.

By Order 9 Rule 1 and 2, the notice of contention is basically for a Respondent who have not appealed from the decision of the lower Court and desires to contend in the appeal that the decision of that Court should be varied. Hence a Respondent who desires to contend must give Notice to that effect specifying the grounds upon which the contention is predicated.
The question that agitates the mind, is whether the notice to contend by the Appellant Cross Respondent is competent. The Cross Respondent is competent. The 1st Cross Respondent/Appellant who file the notice of contention is the appellant in the main appeal, it is his appeal that gave the right and privilege to the Respondent’s in this appeal to cross appeal. My careful reading of Order 9 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016

suggests to me that the appellant cannot again by way of any reaction file a notice of contention in response to the cross appeal in his appeal. Having filed an appeal, he can contend all his complaint in his appeal. Ordinarily he is presumed to have registered all his complaint against the Judgment appealed against in his notice of appeal. By his grounds of appeal, he is asking the Court to vary, change modify or reverse the orders made by the trial Court. The cross 1st Respondent/Appellant haven appealed against the decision of the trial court will not be competent under the guise of reacting to a cross appeal to his appeal to file a notice of contention.
To say a little, what the Appellant Cross Respondent has done is to have a double bite at the sherry. Put in another way, he wanted to speak from the two sides of his mouth. Another incurable virus that has infected his notice of contention is that it was filed in the registry of this Court, rather than filing same at the trial Court’s registry. See ALH. MATORI VS. ALH. DAN BAUCHI AND ORS (2004) ALL FWLR (PT. 177) PAGE 1010 AT 1029, HABU AND ORS VS. NUT TARABA STATE AND ORS (2005) LPELR

– 11465, NNADI & ANOR VS. ODIKA AND ORS (2017) LPELR 43448. I therefore have no hesitation in my mind in coming to the conclusion that the notice of contention filed by the Appellant/1stCross Respondent on 28th day of July 2020 is incompetent and constitutes an abuse of Court process. Same is hereby discountenanced and dismissed.

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
Next for consideration is the preliminary objection by the Appellant/cross Respondent to Ground 1 of the Notice and Ground of Appeal. The objection is predicated on the complaint that the Ground offends against the Rule of Court as it comprises both the ratio decidendi and the obiter dictum. It is the contention of the 1st Cross Respondent/Appellant that the aspect of the Judgment appealed against is an obiter dictum and that it is not against the main decision of the trial Court. He relied on the case of A. I. C. LIMITED VS. NIGERIA NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION (2005) LPELR -6, where the Apex Court explained the distinction between ratio decidendi of a case and the obiter dictum. He also relied on the following cases AMERICA INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE CO. VS. CEEKAY TRADERS LTD (1981) ANLR 50 at

80, WAGBATSOMA VS. F. R. N. (2018) LPELR – 43722 AT 17 – 21, OMISORE AND ANOR VS. AREGESOLA AND ORS (2015) 15 NWLR (PT. 1482) 205. After reproducing the part of the finding of the trial Court that he categorized as obiter dictum, he contended that where an appeal is filed against an obiter dictum, the ground of appeal is defective and must be discountenanced. He relied on the case of ADO (DANGA JERE) VS. STATE (2017) LPELR – 48041.

He urged the Court to strike out the ground one. He relied on the following cases. NWADIKE VS. IBEKWE (1987) 4 NWLR (PT. 67) 7, KOREDE VS. ADEDOKUN (2001) 15 NWLR (PT. 736) 483. and JEV AND ANOR VS. IYORTYOM AND ORS (2014) LPELR – 23000. Again he urged the Court to Strike out issue one same having being distilled from an incompetent ground.

Reacting to the challenge to the competence of ground one of the Ground of appeal, the learned silk representing the cross Appellant submitted that the Counsel representing the 1st Cross Respondent/Appellant did not file any notice of preliminary objection but merely argued the objection in his brief of argument to the cross Appeal. He urged the Court to hold

that the preliminary objection is incompetent because the cross respondent objector failed to file any motion to register his grounds of objection to the competence of the ground of objection to the competence of the ground of appeal. He relied on the case of NWAOBOSHI VS. NWOKO AND ORS. (2019) LPELR – 47896.

He argued that it is clear that the purported preliminary objection of the Appellant/Cross Respondent is not capable of terminating the Cross Appeal. He urged the Court to strike out the preliminary objection, discountenance the argument canvassed there to and expunge same from the Appellant/Cross Respondent’s Brief of Argument.

In the event that the Court did not agree with his forgoing submission, he argued that ground one of the Cross Appeal is competent. On the appellant/cross Respondent contention that ground one contains both the ratio decidendi and the obiter dictum of the Judgment of the trial Court and in particular the portion where the trial Court said thus:
“In any case, even if the cause of action accrued on 18/2/2020 by virtue of Section 15(2)(a) of the interpretation Act, 2004, it has been established that

where a period of time is prescribed by the statute and that period is to be computed, “from” the date of a particular event, the computation excludes the date on which the event occurred.”

He relied on the case of A. I. C. LIMITED VS. NIGERIA NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION (2005) LPELR 6; AFRO – CONTINENTAL NIGERIA LTD VS. JOSEPH AYANTUYI AND ORS (1995) 9 NWLR (PT. 420) PAGE 439, it is his argument that the finding of the trial Court complained against by the Appellant Cross Respondent does not contain an obiter dictum but a ratio decidendi of the decision of the Court. He added that the issue the Court was resolving was whether or not the action of the plaintiff was statute barred. If in considering such, the Court came to the conclusion that the cause of action arose on the 20/2/2020 and went further to say that there were 12 days between that date (20/2/2020 and the 3/3/2020) when the suit was filed at the trial Court. For the trial Court to have counted 12 days from 20/2/2020 to 3/3/2020, it was obvious that the trial Court started counting from the 21/2/2020 to get 12 days and not 20/2/2020. He argued that the foregoing was to

Justify the rule of computation of time to show that it excluded the date of the happening of the event that led to the trial Court finding under contention. He submitted that, the entire portion of the trial Courts judgment quoted in ground 1 of the notice of Cross Appeal, constitutes the ratio decidendi in the case and hence the cross Appellant rightly challenged the decision of the trial Court to adopt and apply the provisions of the interpretation Act, 2004. In computing the time within which the Appellant/Cross Respondent ought to have filed his action as plaintiff before the trial Court. He added that the portion appealed against by the Cross Appellant is clearly part of the resolution by the trial Court of the issue presented before it, and not a mere obiter dicta. He urged the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection and hold that the Cross Appellant’s Ground No. 1 is competent and argument on issue 1 therein canvassed is also competent.

The ground one objected to by the Appellant/1st Cross Respondent on the ground that it is incompetent having regard to the complaint that it consists both the ratio decidendi and obita dicta is herein

under reproduced for purposes of better understanding.
GROUND ONE
“The learned trial Judge in dismissing the cross Appellant/2nd respondent’s objection to the competence of the Appellant’s suit erred in law when it found as follows:”
“Now Section 31(3) of the Electoral Act provides that the 3rd Defendant shall within seven (7) days of the receipt of the personal particulars of the candidate publish same in the constituency where the candidate intend to contest the election. Irrespective of the provision of Section 31 (3) of the Electoral Act, the 3rd defendant has the power to amend its timetable and make regulations in regards to the conduct of elections. In the instant case, the plaintiff claims that the last day of publication is the appropriate day when his cause of action arose on the 18th February, 2020 when the form was submitted.
I have carefully perused all the documents and averments of the parties and it is my view as inspired by the evidence placed before me and by superior authorities that the cause of action of the plaintiff should ordinarily arise on the last day slated for submission of the

forms. This is because a candidate may have need to regularize his document within the last date slated for submission. It is only when this day arrives that a party can irrebuttably say that a candidate is relying on the documents submitted to INEC. By the INEC timetable, the last day fixed for the submission of form EC9 was 6pm on 20th February, 2020. By 6pm on 20/2/2020, the information supplied in form EC9 is presumed to be the information relied by the party, the information which INEC is authorised to publish unless that resumption (sic) is rebutted. The date to be relied on is 20/2/2020 and not 25/2/2020. However, where the plaintiff states unequivocally that he become aware of the alleged false information on the 18th/2/2020 his cause of action shall start to run from that day.
In the instant case the last day of submission was 20/2/2020 and this suit was filed on 3/3/2020. From a mathematical calculation on the 14 days prescribed by the constitution, plaintiff filed this suit within 12 days of the accrual of the cause of action.
In any case even if the cause of action accrued on 18/2/2020 by virtue of Section 15(2)(a) of the interpretation Act 2004,

it has been established that where a period of time is prescribed by statute and that period is to be computed ‘from’ the date of a particular event the computation excludes the date on which the event occurred.
The Applicant filed this case within time.”

And this has caused injustice to the cross Appellant.

The pertinent question is whether or not the foregoing ground of appeal is competent and whether it is against the ratio decidendi, or obita dicta of the finding of the first Court.
The general rule is that a ground of appeal is competent when it relates to the decision or Judgment appealed against. Where a ground of appeal does not relate or connect the issue in controversy and pronounced upon by the trial Court, then such ground of appeal will be incompetent. See OKPALA VS. OKAFOR (1991) 7 NWLR (204) 510, IKWEKI VS. EBELE (2005) 2 SC (11) 36. NGIGE VS. OBI (2006) ALL FWLR (330). Where a ground of appeal is not flowing from the decision appealed against, such ground of appeal will be incompetent and liable to be struck out, along with the issues distilled due to the incompetence of the ground of appeal. see

F.B.N PLC. VS. AKPARABONG COM. BANK LTD (2006) ALL FWLR (319) AT 927, (INOMIARU VS. R.C.C (1995) 7 NWLR (404) 214, PROF B. J. OLUFEAGBA AND ORS VS. PROF. S. O. ABDUL-RAHEEM AND ORS. (2009)18 NWLR (PT. 1173) 384. A ground of appeal will valid and competent if it relates to the decision appealed against and constitute a challenge to the ratio of the said decision. See CHIEF CLEMENT O. C. OKAFOR VS. ANTHONY ABUMOFUANI (2016) LPELR – 40299.
Haven provided what a competent ground of appeal should be, I consider it apt to provide the meaning for ratio decidendi. The question is what is ratio decidendi or what constitutes a ratio decidendi.
A ratio Decidendi has been described as the enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided. Put in another way, it is the principle of the decision. See DR. DARU & ORS VS. BARRISTER IBRAHIM AMINU UMAR (2013) LPELR – 21905. MR. KAMARU GBANDEBO SHITU VS. KWARA STATE POLYTECHNIC ILORIN AND ORS. (2014) LPELR – 23820, CHIEF ABUBAKAR ZIBIRI ODUGBO VS. CHIEF ALIU ABU (2001) LPELR – 2238, Ogundare, JSC of blessed memory said thus:

“The principle of law upon which a particular case is decided is called the ratio decidendi and the effect of this is to serve as basis of doctrine of Judicial precedent in subsequent cases with similar facts”.
Having provided meaning for the word “ratio Decidendi” The meaning for “Obiter Dictum” in the Black law Dictionary 6th Edition, at page 1072, Obiter Dictum is provided thus:
“Words of opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case”.
In the case of NOEL VS. OLDS 78. U.S. APP. D.C 155, 138F. 2D. 501, 588, the Court said thus:
“A remark made, or opinion expressed by a Judge in his decision upon a cause ‘by the way’ that is incidentally and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as procedures: ‘A decision’ on the other hand is a determination of that Court and includes judgment, decree, order, conviction, sentence or recommendation. See Section 318 (1) of the 1999 Constitution. The right of appeal does

not exist in a vacuum. It can only be invoked when there is in existence against the person wishing to exercise the right of appeal against a decision of the Court.”
See also CLEMENT ODUNUKWE VS. DENNIS OFOMATA AND ANOR. (2010) LPELR – 2250 (2010) 18 NWLR (PT. 1225) 4040, MISS NKIRU AMOBI VS. MRS GRACE O. NZEGWU AND ORS (2013) LPELR – 21863, IRENE NGUMA VS. ATTORNEY GENERAL IMO STATE (2014) LPELR – 22252.
In the light of all the foregoing and after a sober reflection on the portion of the Judgment from which ground one is coined, it is done on me that the objection in nature is not capable of terminating or removing ground one from the grounds of appeal for being incompetent.
I agree with the submission of the learned senior Counsel representing the 2nd Respondent Cross Appellant that the portion of the Judgment in issue relates to the Application of the provision of Section 15 (2) (a) of the Interpretation Act 2004, in the computation of time in Electoral matter. Therefore, it is a necessary pronouncement to the issue under consideration by the trial Court and hence forms part of the integral part of the decision reached

on the preliminary objection raised by the Cross Appellant/2nd Defendant before the trial Court to the effect of whether or not the action is statute barred. Therefore, it is my ardent view that the portion of the finding of the Court made as part of Ground one in the notice of appeal cannot be classify as Obiter Dictum but part of the ratio decidendi.

In result, the preliminary objection by the Appellant/Cross Respondent, is devoid of any merit. Same is over ruled and accordingly dismissed.

I will now proceed with the consideration of the main appeal.

ISSUE ONE
“Whether having regard to the provision of Section 258(9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (fourth Alteration No. 21) Act, 2017, (as amended) and the facts presented in the Originating Summons filed on the 3rd of March, 2020, the learned Trial Judge was right to find that the Appellant’s action was commenced within the period of 14 days prescribed by Section 285(9) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. (fourth Alteration)”.

The argument of the learned senior Counsel on this issue challenges the competence of

the originating summons by which Appellant/Cross Respondent commenced the action at the Trial Court to entertain the originating summons filed on the 3rd March, 2020. Pursuant to Section 31 (5) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). He contended that there is no doubt that by virtue of the provision of Section 285 (14) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. (Fourth Alteration No 21) Act 2017, the Appellant/Cross Respondent’s suit is a Pre-Election in nature.

Referring to paragraph 9 of the affidavit in support of the Originating summons and the provision of Section 285 (14) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (fourth alteration No 21) Act 2017, he argued that the Appellant/Cross respondent’s suit was prediction in nature as stated in the Originating Summons filed on the 3rd of March, 2020. He added that the INEC form EC9, which the Appellant alleged contained false information was admittedly submitted to INEC, (3rd Respondent) on 18th February, 2020 and the fact was not disputed by the Appellant nor the 3rd Respondent (INEC). It is his case that the cross appellant filed a preliminary objection

to the competence of the suit on the ground that the action is outside the constitutionally prescribed 14 days within which such an action must be filed from the date of accrual of the cause of action. (Section 285 (9) He reproduce the ground of objection as contained on pages 169 – 170 of the Record. He contended that by Section 31 (1) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) political parties are to submit the list of the candidate they intend to sponsor at an election with all the prescribed particulars under Section 31 (2) thereof.

He contended that Section 31 (3) of the said Act, the commission should publish the personal particulars of candidates within 7 days of receipt of form EC9. The Cross Appellant having submitted his said form EC9on the 15th February, 2020 to INEC, the filing of the suit by the Appellant Cross Respondent on the 3rd March, 2020 is statute barred. He referred to the finding of the trial Judge contained on pages 633 to 634 of the Record of Appeal. He submitted that the finding by the learned trial Judge is erroneous, having regard to the fact before the Trial Court and the state of the Law regulating Electoral matters on

computation of time. He argued that Section 31(3) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) the 1st Respondent having submitted the Cross Appellant’s INEC form EC9 to the 3rd Respondent on the 18th February, 2020, the 7 days period within which to publish the Cross Appellant’s INEC form ended on 24th February, 2020 must be included. He relied on the case of IKECHUKWU VS. INEC (2014)17 NWLR PT. 1436 PAGE 255 AT 284. Further he submitted that the publication of the said form on 25th February, 2020 was a null and void act, which cannot be reckoned with for the purpose of determining when the cause of action accrued to compute the period of 14 days within which the Appellant ought to file the action as provided under Section 285(9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Fourth Alteration No 21) Act 2017 (as amended). He relied on the case of MCFOY VS. UAC (1961) 3 WLR 405 AT 409, MAMMAN AND ANOR VS. HAJO (2016) 8 NWLR (PT. 1515) PAGE 411 AT 479. He argued further that the deposition in paragraph 9 of the affidavit in support of the Originating summons, was an admission against interest by the Appellant. He relied on EJIMADU VS. DELTA FREEZE LTD & ORS

(2007)13 NWLR (PART 1050) PAGE 96 AT 110 (PARAGRAPH F – G). It is his case that from the foregoing and by simple arithmetic there are more than 14 days from 18th of February, 2020 and the 3rd of March, 2020 when the action was filed. There are 15 days between 18th February, 2020 and 3 March, 2020, therefore the appellant’s suit filed outside of 14th days was statute barred by reason of section 285 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). He urged the Court to set aside the finding of the trial Court and hold that the appellant’s cause of action against the Cross Appellant arose on the 18th February, 2020 and that by the 3rd of March, 2020 when the suit was filed, the period of 14 days had lapsed. He relied on the case of OSAKWE VS. INEC (2005) 13 NWLR (PT. 942) PAGE 442 AT 473.

He urged the Court to hold that the suit is incompetent and ought to struck out, resolve the issue in favour of the Cross Appellant. and strike out the Originating Summons.

The reaction of the Appellant/Cross Respondent to this issue is that a cause of action is said to arise in relation to the law

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donating the right of action to the litigant. i.e. Section 31 (1) to (3) of the Electoral Act. He relied on the case of IKPEAZU VS. EKEAGBARA AND ORS (2016) LPELR – 40847, ATIKU ABUBAKAR AND ANOR VS. INEC AND 2 ORS. SC 1211/2019. (unreported) delivered on 15th November 2019. He added that by the 2nd Respondent/Cross Appellant own admission in paragraph 4.10 and the exhibit Musa 2, the time table and schedule of activities for Bye Election into Babura/Garki federal constituency of Jigawa State, he submitted that since the suit was filed on 3rd March, 2020, it was so filed within the time envisaged by Section 285 (9) of the Constitution and as interpreted by the Supreme Court. He urged the Court to hold that the action is not statute barred.

The issue here is whether or not the action by the Appellant/1st Cross Respondent is statute barred. The complaint of the Cross Appellant is that the action by the Appellant/Cross Respondent filed on the 3rd day of March 2020 is statute barred. The fact relied on simply is that the 2nd Respondent/Cross Appellant submitted his form EC9 to the 3rd Respondent INEC on the 18th day of February, 2020. By virtue of

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Section 31(3) of the Electoral Act, the 3rd Respondent should publish within 7 days the personal particulars of the candidate submitted under form EC9. The Cross appellant contended that the action by the Appellant/Cross Respondent was filed on 3rd March, 2020 and hence statute barred.
The contention of the cross appellant is that the form EC9 having been submitted on 18th February, 2020, the 7 days within which to publish the form will terminate on 24th of February, 2020. The Cross Appellant contended that if the publication was made on 25th/2/2020 then it was made contrary to the requirement of Section 31(3) i.e. published after 7th day, and hence statute barred. Therefore, the publication of the form on 25th February, 2020 was null and void and therefore the suit by the Appellant Cross Respondent is statute barred. He relied on paragraph 9 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons, and the case ofIKECHUKWU VS. INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (PT. 1436) PAGE 255 AT 284.
At pages 633 – 634 of the Record of Cross Appeal the learned trial Judge concluded that the last date for submission of the form EC9 of the Cross appellant was 20/2/2020

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and the suit was filed on 3/3/2020. Therefore, the appellant filed his action within 12 days. That is to say that the suit was so filed in less than 14 days. I will rather agree with the finding of the Court instead of the argument by Learned Senior Counsel. The Cross appellant played his role in accordance with the rule of the game. The presumption of regularity also operates in favour of the 3rd Respondent. That is to say that he also published the document within the prescribed date. It does not lie in the mouth of the Appellant to assert when the publication was made. Therefore, the assertment in his affidavit cannot in the circumstance the determining factor. What could have been best is for the 3rd Respondent to declare when he made the publication. Therefore, I will discountenance the preposition of the learned Senior counsel while I will settle with the finding of the learned trial Judge that the action by the appellant was not filed outside the 14 days prescribed and hence not statute barred. I therefore resolve this issue against the Cross Appellant.

ISSUE 2
“Whether having regards to the provision of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Fourth Alteration no 21) Act 2017, (as amended)

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read together was Order 3 Rule 9 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2019, the process filed on the 24th of April, 2020 by the Appellant/Cross-Respondent titled affidavit No 1 in support of the Originating Summons was a valid and competent part of the Originating Summons filed on the 3rd of March, 2020”. (Ground 2).

The argument of the Cross Appellant in respect of this issue is that processes of Court do not exist at the whims and coprices of counsel but governed by the law and in particular the Rule of Court and where applicable the constitution or other enabling statutes. Referring to Section 285 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (fourth alteration No 21) Act 2017. (as amended) clearly stipulate 14 days within which to commence a legal action in a pre-election matter. It is his case that the action by the appellant was so initiated under the Federal High Court Rules. He contended that after the filing of the Originating Summon on 3rd March, 2020, in compliance with the Rules, the Appellant filed

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another Affidavit on the 24th of April, it is the Affidavit that the Appellant contended should not have been entertained. It is this affidavit the Cross Appellant submitted that it is not contemplated by the Rule and that it offends the strict 14 days’ requirement for the filling of the Originally process. Prescribed under Section 285(9) of the Constitution.

On the part of the Appellant it was argued that the contention of the cross appellant is without any basis in the eye of the law. He added that what the law requires is that the suit be initiated within 14 days and that the Constitution did not put a bar to getting evidence in support of the action filed He relied on the case of FEMI JOSEPH V PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND 3 ORS in Appeal NO CA/A/51/2020 delivered on 18th March, 2020 (unreported) where the Court ruled that Section 285(9) did not prevent the filing of further processes after the filling of the Originating Processes within the 14 days prescribed. He urged the Court to hold that the trial Court was right with its conclusion. He urge the court to resolve the issue against the Appellant.

The Cross- Appellant’s bone of contention in

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this issue is that the appellant filed an additional affidavit day after the filing of the originating Process. From the argument of the learned Silk contained on page 15 of his brief of argument (para 5.4) which goes thus-
“The appellant Originally filed his Originating Summons on the 3rd April, 2020 a contained in pages 3-7 of the Record of Cross- Appeal Affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, pages 8-12, copies of Exhibit to be relied upon pages 13-27, written address pages 28-38. With the above processes filed on 3rd March, 2020. The Appellant’s Originating Summons was issued in compliance with Rule 10 and served on the defendant’s Form of commencement, there was nothing more for the Appellant to file as far as the Originating Summon was concerned; save to amend the process already filed with the leave of the Court”

Further to the foregoing the Cross- Appellant learned Senior Counsel concluded as follows on pages 16 of his brief of Argument at pages 5.5. Thus.
“Notwithstanding the completion of the processes of filing the Originating Summons as stated above, the Appellant as plaintiff filed another

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process titled
“AFFIDAVIT NO 1 IN SUPPORT OF THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS” on the 24th of April 2020. This was more than 51 days after commencement of the motion. See pages 74-95 of the Record of Cross-Appeal…”

A careful reading of the foregoing ordinarily suggests to any concerned party that the appellant strictly complied with the provision of Order 3 Rule 9 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019. Without more. The cross appellant has no complaint against the Originating processes filed but against the “additional affidavit filed days there after filing and the issuance of the originating Summons by the registry. The question is whether there is any rule against the filing of other processes after the issuance of the originating summons. My answer to this question is in the Negative. Both the provision of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and the Federal High Court Rule, Order 3 Rule 9 has nothing limiting the parties from filing any further processes necessary for the determination of the Suit before the Court offer having complied with the preconditions to initiate the

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originating process. I have no hesitation in agreeing with the reliance of the trial court on the process since there is no law preventing it from so doing. Base on the foregoing, I resolve this issue against the Cross Appellant.

ISSUE 3
“Whether having regard to the decision of this Honourable Court and the Supreme Court in ITANYI AND ANOR VS. BAGUDU & ORS (2018) LPELR – 46984 (A), MAIHAJA VS. GAIDAM (2018) 4 NWLR PART 1610 PAGE 454 and MOHAMMED VS. WAMMAKO (2018) 17 NWLR PART 1619 PAGE 573, which interpreted action under Section 31(5) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) as raising allegation of crime requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, the learned Trial Judge was right to have held that the Appellant/Cross Respondent’s action brought under Section 31(5) of Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) did not border on the allegation of crime? (ground 3)”

The Cross appellant conceded to the fact that the action by the Appellant Cross Respondent was initiated pursuant to Section 31(5) of the Electoral Act 2010 and to support this, he reproduced paragraphs 10 (a) – (g), 16 and 18 of the affidavit in support of the

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Originating Summons. He contended that the learned Trial Judge’s finding contained on page 632 of the Record of Cross Appeal thus:
“From the case of the plaintiff, his grouse was the false information presented by the 2nd defendant to the 3rd defendant in INEC form EC9”

In addition, the learned Trial Judge describe the suit by the Appellant Cross Respondent as follow: –
“It is the grouse of the plaintiff that the 2nd defendant falsely misrepresented information to the 3rd defendant where he stated that he is the bearer and owner of the statement of Result issued by Top Quality College with the name Mohammed Musa Adam.”

He argued that in view of the foregoing finding the Trial Judge’s appreciation of the case presented by the appellant becomes apparent. He referred to page 630 – 631 of the Record of Appeal. he however submitted that the trial Court fail of appreciate the binding decision in the cases of ITANYI AND ANOR VS. BAGUDU (SUPRA), MOHAMMED VS. WAMMAKO (SUPRA) and MAIHAJA VS. GAIDAM & 3 ORS (SUPRA). when the Court found that the action founded on Section 31 (5) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended)

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does not border on allegation of crime of forgery. He urge the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Cross Appellant.

I have read the brief by the Appellant Cross Respondent, I cannot find any direct argument on this issue in his brief. Therefore, I will determine the issue on the argument canvassed by the Learned Senior Counsel. The contention of the Cross Appellant simpliuta is that the issue of giving false information pursuant to Section 31(5) of the Act need to be prove by stand of proof. That is to say that it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
I am at one with the submission of the learned senior counsel to that effect and in that regard. The effect of that is that the finding of the trial Court to the contrary, despite the binding effect of the decision of the Apex Court on similar issue constitute a misdirection on the part of the learned trial Judge. Agree, the conclusion of the Court that the Appellant failed to establish his case by preponderance of evidence same will still give the same effect as finding that the Appellant failed to prove the allegation beyond reasonable doubt. It would have been more proper to

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follow the binding precedence than to depart in this circumstance. In this wise, which the Court has only followed the wrong or long route to arrive at the desired destination. It is my ardent conclusion that allegation of this nature as in the instant appeal are to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Those decided cases herein before cited are blindly on the trial Court and this court hence, having regard to the fact of this case, the standard of proof required having regards to the allegation, Section 31(5) of the Electoral Act, andSection 135(2), 137 of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended) is prove beyond reasonable doubt. The trial Court misdirected itself. I resolve this issue against the Appellant 1st Cross Respondent.

Issue 4
Whether by the provision of S 31 (7) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) the service of the Originating Summons on the Cross Appellant by substituted means at an address other than the address provided in the Cross – Appellant’s Form EC9 was proper in Law (Ground 4)

The argument of the Cross-Appellant’s Senior Counsel in respect of this issue is in the direction of Section 31(7) of the Electoral Act 2010. (as amended)

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and to the effect that all documents and court processes shall be served at the addresses supplied by such candidate. He relied on the case of INEC V APC (2009)2 NWLR (PT. 1126) 524, UNITED GEOPHYSICAL NIGERIA LTD and ORS V MOSHESHE (2014) LPELR- 24464. He submitted that based on the foregoing position of the Law, the Cross Appellant ought to have been served at the address he stipulated in his INEC Form EC9, pursuant to Section 31(7) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). He added that the trial Court rather than insisting on such mode of service back down and ordered, and justified the mode by which the cross appellant was ordered to be served i.e. by (substituted service). See the finding of the trial court on the substituted service ordered on pages 629 – 630. He urged further that the trial Court ought to have held that the failure to serve the Originating Summons in strict compliance with the provision of Section 31(7) of Electoral Act 2010 rendered the service null and void. He relied on ATIKU V INEC (2019) 7 – 11 SC page 88 where the Court held thus.
“I should think the law is settled now on the point

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that where a special procedure for seeking redress is by statute provided, the party seeking such redress must follow such. Special procedures”

He also relied on case ofTOUTION S. A V GCO (2011) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1236) page 1 at 23 para A. Based on the foregoing he urged the Court to resolve the Issue in favour of the Appellant.

The Appellant Cross Respondent Learned Counsel argued that by the provision of Section 31(7) of the Electoral Act, duty is placed on the Candidate to supply “an Identifiable address.” He added that the address supplied by the 2nd Respondent/Cross Appellant is “FAGEN GAWO TOWN GARKI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA JIGAWA STATE” He added that address given is akin to stating that one Leaves in Maitama in Abuja Municipal Area Council Federal Capital territory. It is his argument that there is an uncontested reposition that the address provided as untraceable, He referred to para 3 (k) at page 530 of the Record. He added that the trial court was right in his findings contained on page 630 of the Record. He cited in aid the following cases FEDERAL HOUSING AUTHORITY V OLAYEMI & ORS (2017) LPELR-43376, FAWEHINMI V. AKILU (1987) 4 NWLR (PT.67) 797 at 843

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and MAGIT V. UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE MAKURDI (2016) ALL FWLR (PT 298) 1313 at 1345.

He urge the Court to discountenance the submission of the Learned Silk and dismiss the Cross – Appeal.

As I said before the main grudge of the Cross Appellant by this issue is that he was not served personally but by means of substituted service. This mode of service is not in compliance with the provision of Section 31(7) of the Electoral Act and the decided cases by the Apex Court pursuant to Section 31(7) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). I cannot fault his submission regarding issue of service of processes under Section 31(7) of the Electoral Act. That is the law. By those pronouncements the provision of the law and the rules on services has to be strictly complied with. I also agree entirely. The question is, where it becomes evidently clear that the defendant to be served with Originating Summon cannot be served personally after many attempt to serve him failed. In my humble view, it is also provided for that in the rules of Court that where all frantic efforts to effect personal service on a party failed,

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the plaintiff can seek for assistance through another window provided. i.e substituted service. It is not in dispute here that the Appellant confronted the trial Court with his predicament of inability to serve the Cross Appellant personally with the Originating summons. That informed his tapping of the available option of substituted service. He did not just serve the Cross appellant by substituted service by his own volition. He sought and obtain an order of the Court to so act. Pronouncement of Court, enjoys the presumption of validity and regularity. Based on the application of the Appellant before the Trial Court which is by way of a motion exparte as prescribed under the Rules and supported by an affidavit putting forward the predicament of the Appellant regarding service, the learned trial Court in exercise of his judicial discretion granted an order of substituted service and hence the Cross Respondent was served and he joined issues with the Appellant before the trial Court. The beauty of that process is that the Cross Appellant was able to defend the suit.
As I said before, the position of the law on service of Originating summons pursuant to

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Section 31(7) of the Electoral Act is sacrosanct. However, the substituted service of the said process in the circumstance of the fact of this case is inevitable. Hence I am left in no doubt that the mode of service sought and ordered by the trial Court was proper in the circumstance of this case. Let me add that proceeding in Electoral matters are sui generis and are time bound. For this purpose, the substituted service ordered by the Court would enhance fair hearing and trial of the action of the Appellant against the Cross Respondent/Appellant and others.

For all the foregoing, it is my firm view and conclusion that this issue be and is hereby resolved against the Cross Appellant.

On the whole, I have no hesitation in coming to the unequivocal conclusion that this Cross Appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.

I dismiss the Cross Appeal.

Again the Judgment of the Federal High Court in suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/295/2020, delivered on 16th day of June, 2020 Coram, Hon. Justice Ijeoma L. Ojukwu is hereby affirmed.
Parties to bear their respective cost.

AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading, the lead

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judgment, just delivered by my learned brother, MUDASHIRU NASIRU ONIYANGI, JCA. My lord, has dutifully resolved all the issues raised in the Main Appeal and Cross-Appeal (even though bearing a number different from the main appeal) admirably, and I agree with his reasoning and conclusions. I have nothing useful to add to the judgments by way of contribution.

Consequently, I too dismiss the Main Appeal as well as the Cross-Appeal. The judgment of the lower Court appealed against is affirmed.

I abide by the orders in respect of costs as contained in the lead judgments.

BITRUS GYARAZAMA SANGA, J.C.A.: I have the privilege of reading a draft of the Judgment just delivered by my learned brother, M.N. Oniyangi, J.C.A. I agree with and adopt as mine the finding in the lead judgment, that this appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. The decision by the Lower Court in suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/295/2020 is affirmed by me. I also abide by the order as to cost contained in the lead Judgment. I have read a draft of the Judgment by my learned brother M. N. Oniyangi J.C.A. in the Cross Appeal, which for reasons yet to be made manifest was given a different

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appeal No. CA/ABJ/CV/531/2020, by the registry of this Court. My learned brother also thoroughly considered the submission by learned Counsel to the 2nd Respondent/ Cross Appellant and the Appellant/ Cross Respondent in their respective briefs and reached the inevitable conclusion that the Cross appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. The judgment by the Lower Court delivered on 18th June, 2020 in suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/295/2020, is affirmed by me. I abide by the order as to cost.

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Appearances:

ABDUL MOHAMMED, ESQ., with him, FRANCIS OBIABO AMEDU, ESQ., CHIEMELIE NNEOMA ONYIA, OLUWATOYIN ESTHER BETIKU and PRINCE ONINNA ANUIUKWU, ESQ. FOR APPELLANT/ IST CROSS RESPONDENT For Appellant(s)

A. UMAR, ESQ. FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT

Y. C. MAIKYAU, SAN with him, NWABUEZE OBASI-OBI, ESQ., T. A. RAPU, ESQ., H. A. MATUNJI, ESQ., and C. P. NWAORZOR, ESQ. FOR THE 2ND RESPONDENT/ CROSS APPELLANT

WENDY KUKU (MRS.) with him, S. M. DAMBABA FOR THE 3RD RESPONDENT For Respondent(s)

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