DANJUMA RABE v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA(2018)

DANJUMA RABE v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

(2018) LCN/4707(SC)

In The Supreme Court of Nigeria

On Friday, the 14th day of December, 2018

SC.147/2013

RATIO

EFFECT OF UNDENIED, UNDISPUTED OR UNCHALLENGED FACTS IN LAW

At the close of PW.1’s evidence neither the Appellant nor his counsel cross-examined the witness. Thus, facts not denied, disputed or challenged are in law, as well as common sense, taken as admitted and of course established. This Court had stated so previously in a number of cases, including ODULAJA v. HADDAD (1973) 11 SC 35; OKUPE v. IFEMEMBI (1974) 3 SC 97; OMEREGBE v. LAWANI (1980) 3 4 SC 10; DUROSARO v. AYORINDE (2005) 8 NWLR (pt. 927) 407; AJAGBE v. IDOWU (2011) LPELR 279 (SC). PER EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C.

CONSEQUENCE OF A COUNSEL ANNOUNCING APPEARANCE FOR THE ACCUSED PERSON

Courts assume, when a counsel announces his appearance for the accused person, that he has the authority of his client, the accused person, for the full conduct of the client case: FRN v. ADEWUNMI (2007) 4 SC (pt. 111) 30; (2007) 10 NWLR (pt. 1042) 399. This general or apparent authority includes counsel entering into a compromise for damage control or any other tactical reasons: NNSC v. SABAWA (1988) NWLR (pt. 74) 23; OYEGUN v. NZERIBE (2010) 16 NWLR (pt. 1220) 568. This Court, per Karibi-Whyte, JSC, citing with approval Halsbury’s Laws of England, stated the scope of the authority of a counsel acting on behalf of his client thus in AFEGBAI v. A.G, EDO State (2001) 14 NWLR (pt. 733) 425 “The scope and the amplitude of the authority of counsel acting on behalf of his client is stated in paragraph 1181 Halsbury’s Law of England 4th Edition; to include —the action and all matters incidental to it and to the conduct of the trial, such as withdrawing the record, challenging the juror, calling or not calling witnesses, cross-examining or not cross-examining witnesses, consenting to a reference to arbitration, a compromise, or verdict, … The client’s consent is not needed for a matter which in within the ordinary authority of counsel. Thus if in Court, in the absence of the client, a compromise or settlement is entered into by counsel where authority has not been expressly limited, the client is bound.” PER EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C.

INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 218 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT (CPA)

JUSTICES

OLABODE RHODES-VIVOUR Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

AMIRU SANUSI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

EJEMBI EKO Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

SIDI DAUDA BAGE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

DANJUMA RABE Appellant(s)

AND

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA Respondent(s)

EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant was arrested on 21st March, 2012 for being in possession of dried weeds suspected to be Indian Hemp (Cannabis Sativa). The weeds weighed 4.4 kg in total. After preliminary investigations and laboratory analysis of the substance, which established the weeds to be Indian Hemp (Cannabis Sativa), the Appellant was arraigned before the Federal High Court, Ilorin on a count charge alleging that he, “without lawful authority trafficked in 4.4 kilogrammes of cannabis sativa (otherwise known as Indian Hemp) a drug similar to cocaine, Heroin, LSD, etc. (and) there committing an offence contrary to, and punishable under Section 11 (b) of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act Cap N30 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.”

The charge, together with the Proof of Evidence containing his two extra-judicial statements, all recorded as having been made by the Appellant himself on 21st March, 2017 voluntarily, were served on him prior to his arraignment at the trial Court on 22nd May, 2012. The proof of Evidence at page

2 thereof has the following notices given to the Appellant: -IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 36(6)(b) OF THE 1999 CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA AND SECTION 43 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT CAP E45, LAWS OF THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA 2004″. That is:
1.00 TAKE NOTICE that the prosecution will at the trial of this case tender the following as exhibits
1.01 4.4 Kilogrammes of Cannabis Sativa otherwise known as Indian Hemp recovered and seized from the accused person
1.02 Certificate of Test Analysis
1.03 Packing of Substance Form
1.04 Request for Scientific Aid Form
1.05 Confessional statements of the accused person under caution in Hausa and the translation into English Language
1.06 Drug Analysis Report
1.07 Brown Envelope
2.00 TAKE NOTICE that the prosecution in proof of its case shall call the following as witnesses
2.01 PW.I Suleiman A. Ahmed (ASN 1) Is the exhibit officer
2.02 PW.II Usman Kubrange (DSN) to testify on how they arrested the accused person
2.03 PW.III Mohammed Tanimu (CNA) Witnessing Officer

2.04 PW.IV Forensic Expect To testify on how he analysed the recovered substance.
The Notices, though given inter alia pursuant to Section 36 (6) (b) of the 1999 Constitution, were, apparently, also given in fulfilment of the dictates of Section 36 (6) (a) of the Constitution that the Appellant having been “charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to be informed in detail of the nature of the offence”; that is, the allegation against him. On the day (that is 22nd May, 2012), the Appellant was arraigned before the Federal High Court he was represented by a Counsel M. A. Lawal (Mrs.), Legal Aid Counsel. The Constitution, Section 36 (6) (c) & (d) thereof guarantees him the rights “to defend himself in person or by a legal practitioner of his own choice”, and to examine or cross-examine whoever the prosecution may call as witness(es) against him. The minutes of the proceedings of the said 22nd May, 2012 suggest that one Issa Turei Abdul-Kadir was engaged by the Court to interpret to or from him “from English to Hausa and vice versa”. Upon “the charge read,

interpreted and explained to (the Appellant) from English to Hausa and vice versa”, and the Appellant, “appearing” to the Court “perfectly to understand” same, pleaded guilty to the lone charge.

The Appellant was not summarily convicted on his plea of guilt. The prosecution, notwithstanding that the Appellant had pleaded guilty to the lone charge, elected to call Ahmed Akopari Suleiman as a witness. The said Ahmed A, Suleiman testified on oath as follows
Adeleye: Calls PW.1 for prosecution of facts
Lawal: No objection
PW.1: Affirms. Speaks English Cautioned under Section 206 Evidence Act 2011
PW.1: My names are Ahmed Akopari Suleiman. NDLEA Kwara State Command Ilorin is my address. I am ASN by rank. I am the Kwara State Command Exhibit Officer. I know the accused person.
On 21/3/12, he was brought to my office with one black polythene bag. In his presence and the presence of the 2 officers that brought him, I opened the black polythene bag and it contained some dried weeds which I tested and it proved positive for cannabis sativa weighing 4.4kg. In his presence, I issue out some forms which were filed and signed by the suspect and

the two officers. I also took small sample of the suspected dried weeds and put in a transparent evidence pouch and I sealed it in his presence. I kept the bulk of the exhibit. I attach the request for scientific aid form to the evidence pouch and took it to the forensic expert in Lagos. I brought back a brown sealed envelope and drug analysis report. In the course of my schedule of duty, the case file passed through me and I was able to go through the statement. I can identify the forms by my name and handwriting.
Identifies forms, seeks to tender.
Lawal: No objection
Court: The Forms are admitted in evidence as follows: Certificate of test analysis as EXHIBIT A.
Packing of substance form as EXHIBIT B.
Request for scientific aid form as EXHIBT C.
PW.1: I can identify the brown envelope. Identifies brown envelop. Seeks to tender.
Lawal: No objection.
Court: Brown envelope is admitted in evidence and marked EXHIBIT D.
Pw.1: I can identify the drug analysis report. Witness identifies report. Seeks to tender.
Lawal: No objection.
Court: The drug analysis report is admitted in evidence and marked. EXHIBIT E.

Pw.1: Applies for brown envelope to be opened to ascertain its contents.
Lawal: No objection. Court: Granted.
PW.1: opens envelope. The evidence pouch I took to Lagos is in the envelope. Seeks to tender.
Lawal: no objection
Court: Evidence pouch is admitted in evidence as EXHIBIT F.
PW.1: I can identify the bulk exhibit. Witness identifies bulk Exhibit. Seeks to tender.
Lawal: No objection.
Court: The bulk exhibit is admitted in evidence and marked EXHIBIT G.
PW.1: Identifies Hausa and English version of accused person’s statement, seeks to tender.
Lawal: No objection.
Court: The Hausa and English version of the accused person’s statement are admitted in evidence and marked EXHIBIT H AND H1.
PW.1: That is all.
Lawal: No cross-examination

(1980) 3 4 SC 10; DUROSARO v. AYORINDE (2005) 8 NWLR (pt. 927) 407; AJAGBE v. IDOWU (2011) LPELR 279 (SC). The credibility or probative value of the PW.1’s evidence is not an issue in this appeal.
It was on the strength of the evidence of PW.1, coupled with his earlier plea of guilt to the charge read, explained and interpreted to him, that the prosecutor at page 12 of the Record urged the trial Court “to convict the (Appellant) based on the evidence”. The defence counsel acquiesced in that prayer in the presence of the Appellant.
The trial Court, when it convicted the Appellant “as charged”, did so not entirely on the plea of guilt but on the unchallenged evidence of the PW.1 which includes the 9 exhibits tendered in evidence through him.
The Appellant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. This further appeal on a lone ground of appeal complains that
The Lower Court erred in law when it held that the plea of guilt entered by the appellant had obviated the necessity of the trial Court going into full-blown trial, without giving any considerations or any legal effect to the corresponding duty imposed on the trial

Court by Section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
The Appellant’s counsel, in formulating this ground, seems to me to have created a hole himself, like a gnawing mouse in the kitchen, in the proceedings of the trial Court of 22nd May, 2012 in order to find loopholes in the case for his attack against the decision of the Lower Court. The Appellant was not convicted on his plea of guilt. The prosecutor, notwithstanding that plea, still went ahead to call evidence of the PW.1 through whom some exhibits, including the Appellant’s extra-judicial confessions, were put into the evidence against the Appellant. I agree, as Ogbuinya, JCA had put it in the lead judgment of the Lower Court particularly at page 111 of the Record that
By the Appellant’s plea of guilty, an oral confession which is accommodated in law, he not only surrendered himself to the waiting arms of the law, but became, paradoxically, his own accuser. By his own volition of plea of guilty, the appellant destroyed and extinguished the presumption of innocence that accrues to him by the dint of the inviolable provisions

of Section 36 (5) of the Constitution, as amended, and made himself the undoubted owner of the required mens rea and acteus reus vis-a-vis that charge preferred against him.
Upon his pleading guilty to the charge there was no further necessity for the prosecutor to call evidence to establish the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecutor, however, went extra mile. He called evidence to further establish the guilt of the Appellant on the lone charge. The evidence not cross-examined or interrogated remains unchallenged and undiscredited. The prosecutor had thus made the assurance of the Appellant’s guilt on the information he had preferred against him doubly sure.
Having read the records of this appeal and the briefs exchanged I have no doubt that the Appellant was grossly in error, in whatever belief he labours under, that he was convicted upon his pleading guilty to the lone charge of trafficking in 4.4 kg of Cannabis Sativa (Indian Hemp). He was not convicted under Section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA). Rather, he was convicted on the

evidence of the PW.1 and other pieces of evidence brought in through the PW.1 that were neither challenged nor discredited and on which, through his own counsel, he submitted to the prayer of the prosecutor that he be convicted on.
The counsel’s authority to compromise the Appellant’s defence to the allegation, the subject of the charge and trial has not been challenged. Courts assume, when a counsel announces his appearance for the accused person, that he has the authority of his client, the accused person, for the full conduct of the client case: FRN v. ADEWUNMI (2007) 4 SC (pt. 111) 30; (2007) 10 NWLR (pt. 1042) 399. This general or apparent authority includes counsel entering into a compromise for damage control or any other tactical reasons: NNSC v. SABAWA (1988) NWLR (pt. 74) 23; OYEGUN v. NZERIBE (2010) 16 NWLR (pt. 1220) 568. This Court, per Karibi-Whyte, JSC, citing with approval Halsbury’s Laws of England, stated the scope of the authority of a counsel acting on behalf of his client thus in AFEGBAI v. A.G, EDO State (2001) 14 NWLR (pt. 733) 425

“The scope and the amplitude of the authority of counsel acting on behalf of his client is stated in paragraph 1181 Halsbury’s Law of England 4th Edition; to include —the action and all matters incidental to it and to the conduct of the trial, such as withdrawing the record, challenging the juror, calling or not calling witnesses, cross-examining or not cross-examining witnesses, consenting to a reference to arbitration, a compromise, or verdict, … The client’s consent is not needed for a matter which in within the ordinary authority of counsel. Thus if in Court, in the absence of the client, a compromise or settlement is entered into by counsel where authority has not been expressly limited, the client is bound.”
It is erroneous, as suggested by the Appellant’s sole ground of appeal that the Appellant was summarily convicted on his guilty plea and in the circumstance the trial Court ought to have proceeded under Section 218 of the CPA. The Appellant was convicted on the evidence including the viva voce evidence of the PW.1 and other pieces of evidence put in through the PW.1, and upon the defence counsel consenting to the verdict on those available evidence.

Section 218 CPA does not contemplate a conviction upon evidence or full trial, howbeit short. It provides 218. If the accused pleads guilty to any offence with which he is charged the Court shall record his plea as nearly as possible in the words used by him and if satisfied that he intended to admit the truth of all the essentials of the offence of which he has pleaded guilty, the Court shall convict him of that offence and pass sentence upon or make an order unless there shall appear sufficient cause to the contrary.
It has been averred in the Appellant’s Brief, as part of the sole issue formulated for the determination of the appeal, that “there is no finding on the record of proceedings to suggest/establish that the accused/Appellant intended to admit the offence charged”. The brief of argument never once points out any facts on the record suggesting that the Appellant did not intend to plead guilty and/or admit the charge. On the contrary, Page 9 of the record clearly has the evidence that the Appellant at arraignment and in the presence of his counsel pleaded guilty to the charge read and explained. The presumption is that he was

properly advised before he embarked on that course, and that he intended to plead guilty.
Appellant’s counsel submits further at page 5, paragraph 4.09 of the Appellant’s Brief that “at page 12 (of the Record) the Appellant was not called upon at all by the trial Court to admit or not to admit the evidence led against him by the prosecution”, and that “the lower Court fell into error when it affirmed the decision of the trial Court without giving consideration into the proper interpretation and application of Section 218 and 285 (2)” of CPA. The submission rests on the Appellant’s Counsel’s erroneous appreciation of the proceedings contained at pages 9 -12 of the Record. When an accused is represented by counsel the Court does not arrogate to itself the functions of the defence counsel, who at all times should be at alert to protect the interest of his client to the best of his professional abilities or responsibilities. The failure of counsel, or a tactical approach on his part, to discharge his function cannot and should not be visited on the Court, which at all times material remains an impartial umpire.

This appeal, without much further ado, is devoid of any substance. Accordingly, it is hereby dismissed in its entirety. I have not seen anything that warrants my interfering with decision appealed in the appeal No. CA/IL/C45/2012.
Appeal dismissed.

OLABODE RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C.: I read a draft copy of the leading judgment prepared by my learned brother, Ejembi Eko, JSC, and I am satisfied with His lordships reasoning and conclusions that there is no merit in this appeal.

The appellant was arrested on 21 March, 2012 for being in possession of 4.4kg of Cannabis Sativa (in local palance Indian Hemp). He was charged under Section 11(b) of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act Cap N30 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. He was convicted and sentenced to 12 months imprisonment. At the trial the appellant pleaded guilty to the charge and did not cross examine PW1 whose evidence was very damaging and conclusive of the guilt of the appellant. In the concurring judgment I shall highlight the consequence of entering a guilty plea. The importance of cross examination, and the

effect of unchallenged, un-rebutted evidence given by the prosecution.
(a) GUILTY PLEA.
When an accused person is represented by counsel and the charge is read and explained to him in the language he understands and he pleads guilty, that is the best evidence that he committed the offence.
The resultant effect of the admission of guilt by the appellant is that he fully agrees that he committed the offence for which he is charged, and the Court may convict of the plea of guilty.
(b) THE IMPORTANCE OF CROSS EXAMINATION
In Simon v State (2017) 1-2 SC (Pt.II) p.1. I explained the importance of cross-examination thus:
When a witness (the adversary) testifies on a material fact in controversy in the case, the other party if he does not accept the witness testimony as true should cross-examine him on that fact or at least show that he does not accept the evidence as true. Where, as in this case he fails to do either, the Court can take his silence as an acceptance that the party does not dispute the fact…”
The main purpose of cross-examination is to test the veracity of a witness.

The material fact in controversy in this case is whether the appellant was caught with 4.4kg of Cannabis Saliva by the Police on 21 March 2012. In the absence of cross-examination of PW1 the evidence of the prosecution has established the fact that the appellant was indeed caught with 4.4kg of Cannabis Saliva and was arrested on the said day with the amount of drugs as stated in the charge. The Court is thus at liberty to act on the testimony of PW1 as true and convict the appellant.
Both Courts below and this Court have so acted and they were correct to so act.
(c) UNCHALLENGED EVIDENCE
Where evidence is unchallenged, the unchallenged and un-rebutted facts are to be taken as true. See Omoregbe v Lawani (1980) 3-4 SC p .10
The resultant effect of the admission of guilt by the appellant plus unchallenged evidence given by the prosecution is that evidence led by the prosecution is one way, very damaging and conclusive proof of the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, and finally, when as in this case the appellant pleaded guilty to the charge and did not cross-examine the prosecutions vital witness, it is clear that it

was always the appellants intention to plead guilty since he and his counsel were well aware that there was no defence to the charge.
Learned counsel for the appellant was unable to dislodge concurrent findings of fact by the two Courts below that appellant was arrested with 4.4k6g of Cannabis Sativa. That fact is true and the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.

I am satisfied that there are no redeeming features in this appeal. It is for this, and the comprehensive reasoning in the leading judgment that I too dismiss this appeal.

MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.: I am in total agreement with my learned brother, Ejembi Eko with the judgment just delivered and in support of the reasonings from which the decision came about, I shall make some comments.

This appeal arose from the judgment of the Court of Appeal or Court below or lower Court, Coram: Paul Adamu Galinje JCA (as he then was), Obande F. Ogbuniya and Tijjani Abubakar JJCA, which decision was on the 7th February, 2013 whereby it upheld the judgment of the Federal High Court, Ilorin Division presided over by A.O.

Faji J. on 22nd May, 2012 in which the appellant was convicted for trafficking in 4.4. Kilogram’s of Cannabis Sativa (otherwise known as Indian hemp) and sentenced to a 12 month imprisonment term.

On the 11th October, 2018 date of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant, Isiaka Abiola Olagunji Esq adopted the brief of the appellant filed on 30-10-2013 in which a sole issue was crafted for determination of the appeal, viz.
Whether the Court of Appeal was not in error when it affirmed the decision of the trial Court convicting and sentencing the appellant based on a plea of guilty when there is no finding on the record of proceedings to suggest/establish that the accused/appellant intended to admit the offence charged.

Adeola Omotunde Esq adopted the brief of argument of the respondent filed on the 23-9-2016 and deemed filed on the 11-10-2018 and in it was also formulated a single issue which is as follows:-
Whether the Court of Appeal was not patently right when it affirmed the decision of the trial Court convicting and sentencing the appellant based on a plea of guilty after reading, interpretation, explanation

and confirmation of understanding of the charge against him.

The two differently drafted issues on either side are really asking the same question which simply is whether the Court of Appeal was right in affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the trial Federal High Court based on the plea of guilty of the appellant.

Canvassing the stance of the appellant, learned counsel contended that the lower Court erred in law when it acted only on the plea of guilty of the appellant when there was no finding on the record to establish that the trial Court put to the accused all necessary questions to ensure that he intended to admit the offence in line with the requirements of the provisions of Sections 218 and 285 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

It was stated for the appellant that in keeping with the provisions of Sections 218 and 285 (2) of the CPA that where the plea of guilty is made by an accused person as in the case at hand, the Court should ask all necessary questions to ensure that the accused intended to admit of the offence and this was absent herein with fatal consequences leading

to a non-conviction of the accused. He cited Onuoha v Police (1956) NR NLR page 96 at 98; Garkida & Anor v COP (1964) NMLR 103; Osuji v IGP (1965) LLR 143 at 145; Duah v Commissioner of Police (1950) 13 WACA 85; Essien v The King (1950) 13 WACA 6; Odofin v Ayoola (1984) 11 SC 72 at 106-107; Mangai v State (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt.279) 108 at 121 etc.

Contending further, learned counsel for the appellant stated that the extra-judicial statements of the accused/appellant, exhibits H and H1 were admitted without the evidence of the interpreter when it was in evidence that the exhibits themselves were obtained by the Police with the use of an interpreter and so admitting those exhibits without calling the interpreter to testify rendered the documents inadmissible inspite of the plea of guilty. He relied on Olalekan v The State (2002) FWLR (Pt.91) 1605; Owonyin v Omotosho (1961) ALL NLR 304 at 308; Alade v Olukade (1976) 10 NSCC 34 at 37; Effiom v State (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt.373) 507 at 569;

Gbadamosi v Dairo (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt.357) 812 at 829; Uka v Kolo (2002) FWLR (Pt.127) 1167; Willoughby v International Merchant Bank Ltd (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.48) 105 at 118.

Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there was nothing from the proceedings of the trial Court to indicate that the said Court was not satisfied with the plea of guilty of the accused person who voluntarily, willingly and unequivocally pleaded guilty to the charge against him. Also, that the accused intended to admit the truth of all the essentials of the offence in question and was properly convicted and sentenced accordingly by the trial Court which position was properly affirmed by the lower Court. He cited Odedo v INEC (2008) LPELR-2204 (SC); Omoju v FRN (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt.1085) 38 at 61.

He stated that by the provisions of Sections 251 of the Evidence Act, 2011, a wrongful admission of evidence should not of itself be a ground to reverse a decision by an appellate Court that the evidence could not reasonably have affected the decision which would have been the same without the

unlawfully admitted evidence. He cited Archibong v State (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt.1000) 349.

This appeal is anchored on the ground as put forward by the appellant that exhibits H and H1 being the confessional statements of the appellant are inadmissible the Court of Appeal ought to have expunged them from the record and based its findings and decision on the remaining legally admissible evidence which would have led to the favorable finding for the appellant culminating in a non-conviction. The stance of the respondent being contrary is that the said Exhibits H and H1 are admissible documents and properly admitted at the trial Court but even if those documents are expunged would not change the course of events and the concurrent findings and decisions of both Courts below.

To refresh the mind, the appellant was arraigned before the Federal High Court, Ilorin on a one count charge, viz:-
“That you: Danjuma Rabe, male, Adult, 27 years, on or about the 21st day of March, 2012, along Bode Sa’adu-Jebba Road in Moro Local Government Area of Kwara State, within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, without lawful authority trafficked in 4.4

Kilogrammes of Cannabis Sativa (otherwise known as Indian Hemp) a drug similar to cocaine, Heroin, LSD, etc., thereby committing an offence contrary to and punishable under Section 11 (b) of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act, Cap N30, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004”
The appellant had pleaded guilty to the above stated charge and the confessional statements H and H1 admitted by the Court of trial to the effect that he committed the crime of trafficking 4.4 kilogrammes of Canabis Sativa ordinarily known as Indian Hemp.
The definition of possession of Indian Hemp is well set out in a long line of cases but that of Chukwuma v FRN (2011) 13 NWLR (Pt.1264) 391 at 412 would serve our purpose as this Court stated as follows therein, viz:-
“The ingredients of the offence of unlawful possession of Indian Hemp contrary to and punishable under Section 10h of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (Amendment) Decree No.15 Of 1992 are:-
1. That the weed was in possession of the accused;
2. That the weed is proved to be Indian Hemp (cannabis) without Lawful authority.
In this instant case, the prosecution proved the first

two ingredients at the trial Court by adducing credible evidence which were ample enough to sustain the charge and conviction of the appellant.
The appellant did nothing to prove that he was in lawful possession of the substance.”
In the interpretation Section 52 of NDLEA ACT
“…any substances, natural or synthetic in the first schedule of the single convention of Narcotic Drugs, 1961 and the convention on Narcotic Drugs as amended in the second schedule to this Act including the United Nations Convention Against illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1989”.
The position of the appellant is that the lower Court erred in law when it acted on the plea of guilty of the appellant when there was no finding on the record to establish that the trial Court put to the accused all necessary questions to ensure that he intended to admit the offence in line with the requirements of the stipulation of Sections 218 and 285 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (CPA for short).
It is therefore necessary to go into the said provisions for clarification.

SECTION 218:-
“If the accused pleads to any offence which he is charged and Court shall record his plea as nearly as possible in the words used by him and is satisfied that he intended to admit the truth and all the essentials of the offence of which he has pleaded guilty the Court shall convict him of that offence and pass sentence upon or make an order against him unless there shall be sufficient cause to the contrary.”
Similarly, Section 285(2) provides as follows:
“(2) If the defendant says that he is guilty and the Court is satisfied that he intends to admit the offence and show no cause or no sufficient cause why sentence should not be passed, the Court shall proceed to sentence.”
It seems to me that the interpretation put forward by the appellant and which he is urging the Court to accept is outside the ambit of the provisions of Section 218 and 285 (2) CPA communally taken together as should be. Also that interpretation of the appellant is not what was intended by the lawmakers as the appellant is asking the Court to do the impossible which is to go into the recesses of the inner workings of the mind of an accused to be well situated to

say that indeed the accused intended to plead guilty or admit of the crime. The situation is all the more settled bearing in mind what transpired at the Court of trial during the arraignment thus:-
“ISSA TUREI ABDUL-KADIR affirms to interpret from English to Hausa and vice versa.
Charge read, interpreted and explained to accused person from English to Hausa and vice versa and he appeared perfectly to understand same.
Plea: pleads guilty”
From the above record it is clear that what was expected of the learned trial judge he carried out and the extra duty which the appellant seems to place on him is beyond the contemplation of the law as provided by the legislature. As it has been reiterated in numerous judicial pronouncements, when a plea of guilty has been recorded the appellate Court can only deal with an appeal against the conviction if it appears
(1) That the appellant did not appreciate the nature of the charge or did not intend to admit he was guilty of it or
(2) That upon the admitted facts he could not in law have been convicted of the offence charged. See the English case of Rex v Ford (1923) 2 KB page 400 at 403;

Duah v Commissioner of Police (1950) 13 WACA 85.
The appellant in this instance is hanging on a slim thread of fair hearing which is difficult to keep afloat as he was given the opportunity of being heard and on his own volition and in circumstances convincing to the adjudicator that he intended to admit of the offence charged with all its ramifications when he pleaded guilty, he cannot turn round at a later date to claim to have been misled or misdirected when there is nothing on the record to show as such. See the case of Omoju v FRN (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt.1085) 38 at 61 per Tobi JSC is apt and it is thus:-
“The law is elementary that if an accused person pleads guilty, the burden of proof placed on the prosecution becomes light, like a feather of an ostrich. It no longer remains the superlative and competing burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. After all, the guilty plea has considerably shortened the distance and brought in some proximity the offence and the mens rea or actus reus of the accused as the case may be. That makes it easier to locate the causation or causa sine qua non.”
I agree with the submission of learned counsel

for the respondent that by the provisions of Section 251 of the Evidence Act, 2011 a wrongful admission of evidence such as the confessional statements of the appellant, Exhibits H and H1 would not produce a sufficient ground to reverse the decision of the appellant where the evidence could not reasonably have affected the decision which would have been the same without the admitted evidence. In effect if Exhibits H and H1 were expunged from the proceedings of the trial Court the exculpation of the appellant from the crime would not be the resultant fall out as from the record his plea of guilty with the full understanding of what was at stake as borne out from the record would not change the outcome. SeeArchibong v State (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) p. 349.
From the foregoing and the better reasoning in the lead judgment, I see no basis to go outside what the Court of Appeal did and so I too dismiss the appeal as I affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal which affirmed the conviction and sentence of the trial High Court.
Appeal dismissed.

AMIRU SANUSI, J.S.C.: I read in draft form, the Judgment

just rendered by my learned brother Ejembi Eko, JSC and I find myself in entire agreement with his reasoning and conclusion that this appeal is devoid of any merit and deserves to be dismissed.

The appellant herein, was arrested in possession of weeds or substance suspected to be cannabis sativa otherwise known as lndian Hemp and was later arraigned before the Federal High Court, llorin in Kwara State (the trial Court). When the charge was read and explained to the accused person now appellant, he pleaded guilty to the charge. The trial Court however chose not to adopt short summary trial procedure to convict him but instead allowed the prosecution to lead evidence in proof of the charge or allegation against him. The prosecution thereupon called the investigation officer from NDLEA to testify through whom several Exhibits were tendered in evidence without objection from the accused who was Represented by counsel. Among the exhibits tendered, were the substance/weeds found in possession of the appellant, certificate of analysis, government chemist report, as well as the confessional statements voluntarily made by the accused/appellant in

Hausa Language and its English translated version, all without objection.
It is pertinent to say that the appellant did not call any witness for his defence or testify for him defence.
The learned trial Judge having considered the entire evidence adduced by the prosecution, coupled with the unequivocal plea of ‘guilt’ by the accused/appellant, convicted him as charged and accordingly sentenced him. The appellant however appealed to the Court of Appeal, Ilorin division (the lower Court), albeit, without success. He further appealed to this Court challenging the lower Court’s resolve to affirm the appellant’s conviction by the trial Court.
It would appear to me that the prosecution, now appellant, had placed on the table all the necessary or required evidence in proof of the ingredients of the offence the accused was charged of committing. For instance, the weeds which the appellant owned up as having been found in his possession which were confirmed by the government analyst to be cannabis sativa or Indian Hemp as shown in his report (Exhibit E).
Similarly, the appellant had made voluntary confessional

statements which were also tendered without any objection by the defence before they were admitted in evidence as Exhibits H and HI. Again as I stated earlier, the appellant on arraignment before the trial Court, pleaded guilty to the charge when same was read and explained to him.
It needs to be pointed out that a confession made voluntarily is an admission by the maker that he had really committed the offence. It is indeed regarded as the best evidence that the accused person had really committed the offence, since it is his own confession. The fact that there was no objection when the prosecution tendered Exhibits H and HI, is in my view, a conclusive evidence that it was voluntarily made and therefore liable to conviction even if solely on it, is sound, correct or faultless. See Yesufu v State (1976)6 SC 167; Osuagwu v State (2013) 1-2 SC 194; Nsofor v State (2004) 18 NWLR (pt 905) 292; Abdullahi vs State (2015) EJSC (Vol 8) 103. See also Section 27 (1) and (2) of Evidence Act. In this instant case, the trial Court was right in convicting the appellant even based on his confession alone,

which was voluntarily made and was also admitted without any objection and was also never retracted. That notwithstanding, the appellant clearly and unequivocally pleaded guilty to the charge when same was read and explained to him in the presence of his counsel. With regard to the affirmation of the conviction by the trial Court by the Court below, I think that was most ideal thing for it to do in view of the antecedents of the case, when it unwittingly affirmed the conviction of the appellant by the trial Court which was faultless and flawless procedurally or otherwise, bearing in mind the ample or adequate evidence adduced in the case by the prosecution (now respondent) in proof of the charge against the accused/appellant.
On the whole, I am fully convinced that this appeal is devoid of any merit and deserves to be dismissed. While adopting the fuller and more detailed reasoning of my learned brother Ejembi Eko JSC in his leading Judgment as mine, I shall also dismiss this appeal for being meritless. Appeal dismissed.

SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.S.C.: I have had the benefit of reading

in draft the lead Judgment of my learned brother EJEMBI EKO, JSC, just delivered. I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusion reached. I do not have anything useful to add. The appeal lacks merit, and it is accordingly dismissed by me.

Appearances:

Isiaka Abiola Olagunju, Esq. with him, Mas’ud Alabelewe, Esq. and Olusola Bankole Oladipo, Esq. For Appellant(s)

Adeola Omotunde, Esq. For Respondent(s)

Appearances

Isiaka Abiola Olagunju, Esq. with him, Mas’ud Alabelewe, Esq. and Olusola Bankole Oladipo, Esq. For Appellant

AND

Adeola Omotunde, Esq. For Respondent