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National Industrial Court

D.O Olasoji VS Obafemi Awolowo University Teaching Hospitals Complex Management Board

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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE IBADAN JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT IBADAN

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE J.D. PETERS

 

DATE: 4TH APRIL, 2019                                                   SUIT NO: NICN/OS/02/2014

 

BETWEEN

D.O Olasoji                                                                                       –                       Claimant

 

AND

Obafemi Awolowo University Teaching Hospitals

Complex Management Board                                                         –                       Defendant

 

REPRESENTATION

  1. A. Ogunkola with S.O.A Popoola for the Claimant

K.O. Fayokun with Mrs. Solape Badafor the Defendant

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

  1. Introduction & Claims

This case has a rather long and chequered history. By a Writ of Summons dated 21/11/97, the Claimant had commenced this case at the Federal High Court, Osogbo. There the Defendant had raised a preliminary objection on the basis of Section 2(a), Public Officers’ Protection Act, Cap. P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. The Federal High Court upheld the preliminary objection and accordingly dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and remitted the case back to the lower Court for trial. Now, with the coming in to force of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (Third Alteration) Act, 2010, this case was transferred to the National Industrial Court of Nigeria for hearing and determination.

 

In his originating processes filed in this Court on 6/5/14 the Claimant sought the following reliefs –

 

  1. Declaration that the purported dismissal of the claimant from defendant’s service             as communicated to the claimant in a letter ref.      PC.6080/43 of 27th January, 1997             is null and void as the act and manner of     the said dismissal is ultra vires, illegal     and unconstitutional being in breach of the said Act of 1990 and claimant’s     constitutional right of hearing.
  2. Declaration that the suspension of the claimant by a letter ref. Pc. 6080/41 of 7th November, 1996 is null and void being contrary to the provision of the    Act of             1990 and therefore of no effect whatsoever.
  3. An order directing the defendant to refund to the claimant such sum as have been wrongfully withheld from him as a result of the wrongful suspension        effected by virtue of letter ref. 6080/41 of 7th November, 1996.
  4. An order of this Honourable Court setting aside the letters of the purported suspension and dismissal of the claimant and directing the defendant to restore the claimant to his post and office as Clerical Officer in the defendant’s service with             all his salaries and entitlement due since the unlawful dismissal and without     prejudice to his promotion prospects.

 

The Claimant filed along with his processes witness statement on oath as well as list and copies of the documents to be relied on at trial. The Defendant subsequently filed its defence processes in response to the pleadings filed by the Claimant.

 

  1. Case of the Claimant

The Claimant opened his case on 1/11/18, testified in chief and tendered 10 documents as exhibits. The documents tendered were admitted in evidence without objection and marked as Exh. C1 – Exh. C10 respectively.

 

The case of the Claimant as revealed from his evidence in chief is that he was appointed by the respondent as a Clerical Assistant by a letter of 11/1/83 but upgraded to a Clerical Officer by another letter of 19/10/83 which appointment was confirmed with effect from 8/2/85 by a letter of 4/12/85; that he was promoted to the post of Senior Clerical officer effective from February, 1988 by a letter dated 12/5/85ref. P. 6080/112; that he received a query dated 29/10/96 ref. No 6080/Vol. II/38 to which he responded through his letter of 31/10/96; that he was later invited by a letter ref. no. OAUTHC/437/Vol. II/518 of 6/11/96 to appear before the Panel of Enquiry set up by the “Management” and subsequently suspended by the “Management” through a letter ref. PC. 6080/41 of 7/11/96; that consequent upon the report of the Panel set up by the ‘Management’ he was dismissed which was communicated to him through a letter PC. 6080/43 of 27/1/97; that he then instituted the action when there was no response to his letter of appeal dated 29/9/97; that his appointment is permanent and pensionable and had spent 14 years in the defendant’s service and still has more years to serve until he reaches retirement age and that his employment with the defendant is a contract of service protected by statute (i.e University Teaching Hospital ( Reconstitution of Boards, etc) Act, 1990 and that his suspension and dismissal must be predicated upon compliance with the provisions of the Act and non-compliance with the provisions renders his suspension and dismissal ultra vires and void.

 

Under cross examination, CW1 testified that he was employed as a Clerk at the time and worked in Administration, Records, Security, Supply of the Defendant as junior staff; that he could not recollect working in the Nursery School of the Defendant; that he could not recollect having cases of misconduct against him while working with Defendant; that he had been disciplined by Defendant before; that he could recollect appearing before a fact finding Panel that investigated him; that he protested at the time respecting the Panel; that he protested orally and it was recorded with the Panel’s Report; that he did not approach the Defendant to temper justice with mercy following the Report of the Panel; that he never represented himself as a senior officer of the Defendant; that financial impropriety was not one of the findings against him; that he did not try to return any money for settlement to anybody; that he remembers two ladies who were always appearing at the Panel; that he did not have a relationship with any of the two ladies; that he could not remember any evidence that he lodged in an hotel with any of the two ladies; that he did not say at the Panel that he was somewhere else with one on the ladies when the incident happened and that he  still remembers all that transpired at the Panel.

 

  1. Case of the Defendant

The Defendant also opened its case on 1/11/18. It called one Samuel Olusegun Fawole as its lone witness. The witness adopted his witness statement of 6/5/14 as his evidence in chief and tendered one document. The document was admitted without as Exh. D1.

 

The case of the Defendant from the evidence in chief of the witness is that he is the Director of Personnel in the employment of Obafemi Awolowo University Teaching Hopsitals Complex, Ile-Ife, Osun State and that by virtue of my duties, I am conversant with the facts of this case; that the Defendant is a statutory body saddled with powers and responsibilities to employ discipline or dismiss its staff for the purpose of facilitating the smooth operations of its Hospital services and health care delivery units; that the Defendant has built a reputation as one of the most prestigious tertiary health care institution of its kind in Nigeria and beyond; that the Defendant upholds a tradition of best health care delivery standards and is committed to best practices in the health sector; tThat the Defendant runs a School of Nursing with similar reputation and commitment to high standards and best practices. Witness stated that sometimes in 1997 I served as Secretary to a Panel of Enquiry which investigated the conduct of the Claimant as a member of staff in the Defendant’s employ; that as Secretary of the investigation Panel of Enquiry which investigated MR D.O. Olasoji (the Claimant), he sat throughout the proceedings and took the entire minutes of the proceedings of the Panel; that he is aware of all that transpired at the Investigating Panel of Inquiry proceedings; that the Panel was conducted in compliance with the rules of natural justice and the constitutional demands of fair hearing; that the Claimant was given all opportunity to make his case and he did make his case without fear or bias; that the Panel thoroughly investigated the facts surrounding the conduct of the Claimant as a staff of the Defendant; that the facts before the Panel were “overwhelmingly convincing” of the case against the Claimant; that the Panel found as a fact that the Claimant colluded with one Mr. A Akinsola to present himself to Miss Funmilayo Ogundipe and Miss Olubunmi Oladele that he could influence their admission into the Defendant’s School of Nursing; that  the Panel found as a fact that the Claimant did extort the sum of Fifteen Thousand, Three Hundred and Fifty Naira (=N=15,350.00) from Miss Funmilayo Ogundipe and Miss Olubunmi Oladele upon the promises of influencing their admission into the Defendant’s School of Nursing; that the Panel found that the Claimant’s acts have brought serious damage to the image and reputation of the Defendant, a reputation that has taken painstaking efforts to build over the years and that the Panel found the acts of the Claimant as gross misconduct warranting his dismissal from the Defendant’s employ.

 

Under cross examination DW1 stated that proceeding at the Panel was tape recorded and  transcribed; that those who gave evidence including the Claimant were not there when he transcribed the proceedings; that Claimant was given a copy of the transcribed proceedings; that he does not know if Claimant  was given a copy of the tape and that he is not aware he was given.

 

  1. Submissions of learned Counsel

At the close of trial and pursuant to the direction of the Court, learned Counsel to the Defendant filed a final written address on 21/11/18. In it learned Counsel set down 3 main issues down for determination as follows – 1.Whether the Claimant’s contract of service with the Defendant enjoys statutory flavor. 2.            Whether the Defendant followed due process in dismissing the Claimant from service. and 3.            Whether the Defendant is to reinstate the Claimant to his service unconditionally.

 

Arguing these issues, learned Counsel submitted that where the terms and conditions of a contract of employment or service are specifically provided for by statute or regulations, it is said to be a contract protected by statute or an employment with statutory flavour citing Bamigboye v. Unilorin (1999))10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 290; that appointments by the Defendant do not enjoy ‘statutory flavour’ except those of a very top rate cadre, citing Fakuade v. OAUTHCMB (1993)5 NWLR (Pt. 291) 47 and that the Claimant being a junior staff of the Defendant his employment does not enjoy statutory protection; that Claimant has failed to prove same and that Section 9, University teaching Hospitals (Reconstitution of Boards, etc) Act, 1985 cannot apply to the Claimant in respect of his employment with the Defendant. Counsel prayed the Court to so hold. In the alternative Counsel submitted that if the Claimant’s employment is one protected by the statute, then the Claimant has been properly removed from service in accordance with sections 9 & 10 of the University Teaching Hospitals (Reconstitution of Boards, etc) Act, 1985 and the Defendants are not in breach of the conditions of service set out to govern the Claimant’s employment. Counsel prayed the Court to so hold. Counsel submitted that the requisite procedure was followed in dismissing the Claimant and that the Defendant needed not wait till final conviction of the Claimant for the criminal allegations leveled against him, citing Maikyo v. Itodo (2007)29 NSCQR 1408 & Zildeh v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission 29 NSCQR 701. Learned Counsel therefore urged the Court to hold that the Defendant followed due process and the Claimant is unable to prove that the Defendant violated due process in dismissing the Claimant from service. Finally, on whether the Defendant is to reinstate the Claimant to his service unconditionally, Counsel submitted that the Court will not grant specific performance in respect of breach of contract of service citing NEPA v. Adedeji (2002)17 NWLR (Pt. 578) 615. Learned Counsel urged the Court not to grant the reliefs sought by the Claimant since it has not been proved that his dismissal is wrongful or that the Defendant failed to comply with the relevant procedure for his dismissal. Counsel prayed the Court to dismiss the case of the Claimant.

 

Counsel to the Claimant filed his final written address on 12/12/18. In it learned Counsel simply adopted all the 3 issues set down for determination by the Defendant. Respecting issue 1, learned Counsel submitted, citing Idoniboye-Obu v. NNPC (2003) FWLR (Pt. 146) 959, that two of the vital ingredients that must co-exist before a contract of employment may be said to import statutory flavour include – 1. The employer must be a body set up by statute and 2. The establishing statute must make express provisions regulating the employment of the staff of the category of the employee concerned especially in matters of disciplines; that the Defendant did not deny the averments of the Claimant that his employment is protected by the University Teaching Hospitals (Reconstitution Boards, etc) Act, 1990. Rather that the Defendant merely stated in its statement of defence in paragraph 12 that the Claimant was treated in accordance with all laws, rules and extant provisions relating to his employment and his status in the defendant’s employ and also that both the suspension and dismissal of the Claimant are not contrary to the University Teaching Hospitals (Reconstitution of Boards, etc) Act, 1990 and that by Sections 5 and 10 of the statute the service of the Claimant with the Defendant is one protected by that statute. Counsel prayed the Court to so hold, citing Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (Supra) & University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital Management Board & Anor. v. Dawa (2002) FWLR (Pt. 108) 1402 at 1424. Counsel submitted f urther that in cases of contract of service reinforced by statute, a strict compliance with statutory requirements for its determination is required citing University Teaching Hospital Management Board & Anor. v. Nnoli (1994)10 SCNJ 71 at 85 & SPDC Co. Nigeria Limited v. Addico & Anor. (2016)All FWLR (Pt. 816) 439 at 460. According to the learned Counsel, it is not the position of the Claimant that he could not be removed but that for his removal there must be a strict compliance by the Defendant with the procedure laid out in section 10 of the statute; that the Panel of Inquiry was not set up by the Chief Medical Director as mandated by the statute but rather by ”Management”; that Exh. C5, Exh. C7 & Exh. C8 Exh. D showed that all the actions which ought to be taken by the Chief Medical Director were not taken by him as well laid out by the statute. Considering the foregoing, learned Counsel urged the Court to resolve this issue in favor of the Claimant. Finally on issue 3 which is whether the Defendant is to reinstate the Claimant to his service, Counsel submitted that as in this case where the Claimant was purportedly dismissed in flagrant disregard for the statutory provisions, such a victim is entitled to be restored to his position he occupied before his purported dismissal citing Olaniyan v. University of Lagos. Learned Counsel therefore urged the Court to grant all the reliefs as sought by the Claimant and reinstate him to the position he was with the Defendant before the wrongful termination of his employment. On 7/1/19, learned Counsel to the Defendant filed a 3-page reply address on points of law.

 

 

  1. Decision

I read all and clearly understood all the processes filed by the parties in this case. I heard the oral testimonies of the witnesses called at trial as well as watched their demeanor. In much the same vein, I heard the submissions of learned Counsel on either side during the adoption of their final written addresses. I also carefully evaluated all the exhibits tendered and admitted in this case. Having done all this, I set down the following issues for the just determination of this case –

 

  1. Whether the employment of the Claimant with the Defendant is protected by the statute.
  2. Whether the Claimant was dismissed following the procedure as prescribed by the statute.
  3. Whether or not the Claimant is entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought.

 

Before proceeding to examine the issues set down for determination serially, it is imperative that I make a review of the exhibits tendered and admitted at trial. The rationale for this being the need to weed out or indentify any of them inadvertently admitted in evidence so as for the Court to have a clear focus on what is left. The law is trite that the fact that a piece of evidence was admitted without objection from the other side does automatically place an iota of reliability on it. Indeed the Court is allowed at the stage of evaluation as this to completely discountenance any such wrongly admitted evidence. In Maigwandu v. Maradun & Anor. (2018) LPELR (CA), the Court of Appeal per Shuaibu JCA reiterated its earlier decision in Agbi v. Ogebeh (2006)11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 65 at 118 when it held that –

”A Court is expected in all proceedings before it to admit and act only on evidence          which is admissible in law. Thus, if a Court should in      inadvertently admit             inadmissible evidence, it is duty bound not to act upon it. And any piece of             evidence which slip into the record without passing the test of admissibility is not        legal evidence and is liable to be expunged even if admitted by consent”.

 

Exh. D1 is the report of the administrative panel of inquiry allegedly set up to investigate the allegations against the Claimant. I perused the 129-page report. The exhibit was admitted without objection by the Claimant. I note that the exhibit was not signed by any of the members of the Panel. Secondly, the exhibit has no date. The danger posed by this exhibit is that it raises a serious question of reliability respecting the authors of same. In other words, the source of this exhibit becomes suspect. The law is trite that an unsigned and undated document is nothing but a worthless piece of paper with no evidential value. It has content which can assist the Court in the just determination of case in which it is tendered. Now, although admitted the law allows the Court at a stage of evaluation of exhibits tendered as in the instant case to discountenance same. On the authorities, I find Exh. D1 unreliable not having been signed or dated is a worthless piece of paper possessing no evidential value. See Uzokwelu v. PDP & Ors. (2018) LPELR (CA). I discountenance same and expunge it from the record of this Court. It has no evidential utility and any reliance on it will not augur well for or support the course of justice.

The first issue for determination is whether the employment of the Claimant with the Defendant is protected by the statute. This issue as set down by the Court is akin to issue 1 which both parties also set down for determination. The issue as to whether or not an employment is protected by the statute is a fundamental one. For, its determination one way or the other has far reaching consequences on the status of an employee and the final outcome of a case in which it is raised. While the learned Counsel to the Claimant argued that the employment of his client has statutory protection, the Counsel to the Defendant submitted otherwise.

 

Now, is the employment of the Claimant in this case one with statutory flavor? When is an employment said to have statutory flavor? With respect to employment with statutory flavour Adekeye JSC in Dr. Taiwo Oloruntoba-Oju & Ors. v. Prof. Shuaibu O. Abdul-Raheem & Ors. (2009) LPELR-2596 (SC) put the position of the law as follows –

 

‘… where the terms and conditions of a contract of employment or service are        specifically provided for by statute or regulations made there under – it is said to            be a contract protected by statute or in other  words an employment with   statutory flavour”.

 

His lordship went further to state that the question of whether a contract of employment is governed by statute or not depends on the construction of the contract itself or the relevant statute and that the duty to construe the contract or the relevant statute is the exclusive preserve of the Courts. Only very recently, the Court of Appeal in Nasarawa State University & Anor. v. Nekere (2018) LPELR (CA), while commenting on when an employment is said to have statutory flavor emphasised, inter alia, that  

“A contract of employment with statutory flavour occurs when the contract of       service is governed by statute or         where the conditions of service are contained in           regulations derived from statutory provisions. They invest the employee with a    legal status higher than an ordinary matter/servant relationship. See Shitta – Bey       v Federal Public Service    Commission (1981) 1 SC 40, Olaniyan v University of     Lagos supra and Comptroller – General, Customs v Gusau supra”.

 

It is now beyond doubt that the appellate Courts in this country have sufficiently stated and restated the law relating to when an employment is with statutory flavor. Suffices to say, and without  much ado, that it is trite to state, perhaps for clarity, that for an employment to be one with statutory flavour, it must meet one of two conditions. One, the terms and conditions applicable to that particular employment must have been specifically provided for by a particular statute. Or in the alternative, the regulation which contains the applicable terms and conditions of the particular employment must have been made pursuant to or in the exercise of power conferred by a statute. It is also correct to add that it is not just sufficient that a statute confers power to make such regulations and the regulations are made. The making of such regulations must certainly be expressed to be in pursuance of the power so conferred to make same. Now both sides are in agreement that the Defendant here is a creation of the statute. It is also agreed that that statute is the University Teaching Hospitals (Reconstruction of Boards, etc) Act, Cap. U15, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. Section 5 of this Act deals with powers of the Board. Subsection 5 of same confers on the Board the power to appoint (including power to appoint on promotion and transfer and of confirmation of appointments), power to advance, to terminate or discipline employees (including consultants) holding or acting in any office in the hospital; and any such appointment shall be made having due regard to any personnel establishment approved for the hospital. Under section 9 of the Act is the procedure for the removal and discipline of clinical, administrative and technical staff of the Board. Now, the provision of section 10 of the Act is of paramount importance to the case of the Claimant in particular. That section deals with Discipline of junior staff. I had said that the section is of importance for it is part of the argument streneously canvassed by the learned Counsel to the Defendant that the Claimant being a junior staff has no form of protection under the statute establishing the Defendant. Specifically, section 10 of the Cap. U15, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 states as follows –

 

”10.     Discipline of junior staff

(1)       If any junior staff is accused of misconduct or inefficiency, the Chief          Medical Director may suspend him for not more than three months and forthwith         shall direct a committee –

(a).      To consider the case; and

(b).      To make recommendations as to the appropriate action to be taken                           by            the Chief Medical Director.

(2).      In all cases under this section, the officer shall be informed of the charge    against him and shall be given reasonable opportunity to defend himself.

(3).      The Chief Medical Director may, after considering the recommendation      made pursuant to subsection (1) (b) of this section, dismiss, or take such other disciplinary action against the officer concerned.

(4).      Any person aggrieved by the Chief Medical Director’s decision under         subsection (3) of this section may, within a period of 21 days from the date of the       letter communicating the decision to him, address a petition to the Board to     reconsider his case”.

 

I have examined nearly in detail the statutory provision on the establishment and powers of the Defendant. It was not argued before me that the Claimant was not a staff of the Defendant. It is also obvious from the provision of the statute that notwithstanding that the Claimant was a junior staff, the Act establishing the Defendant offered his employment some measure of protection especially respecting the determination of same.

 

It is on record that right from the time of employment of the Claimant, all the documents given to him from Exh. C1 his offer of appointment and Exh. C2 – his letter of confirmation of appointment, the Claimant was always informed that he would be ”subject in all respects to all conditions of service stipulated from time to by the Board of Management”. Aside from the provisions of Cap. U15 no other terms and conditions of appointment of the Claimant was presented before me at trial. This is perhaps because there is none. I resolve issue 1 in favor of the Claimant and against the Defendant. I answer the question in the affirmative and hold that the employment of the Claimant with the Defendant was and is still protected by the statute. I dare add that the argument that the Claimant being a junior staff of the Defendant his employment is not protected by the statute tends to demean the contribution of a junior staff to an establishment. Such an argument simply looked down on the role and contribution of junior staff to the progress and development of the Defendant. Certainly if the services of junior employees are not essential they would not have been employed in the first place by their employer.

 

The second issue for determination is whether the Claimant was dismissed following the procedure as prescribed by the statute. Having held that the employment of the Claimant has statutory protection, it portends that for his employment to be disengaged, the laid down procedure must be strictly complied with by the Defendant. That is to say that the Defendant must comply with the provision of section 10 of its establishment Act. Under the Act, in event of an allegation of misconduct or inefficiency against a junior staff (Claimant in the instant case), the Chief Medical Director is empowered to suspend him for a period of not more than three months. Thereafter the Chief Medical Director is to set up a Committee to consider the case and make recommendations as to the appropriate action to be taken by the Chief Medical Director. The junior staff concerned here shall be informed of the charge against him and shall be given reasonable opportunity to defend himself. After considering the recommendation made to him may dismiss or take such other disciplinary against the junior staff concerned. Any person aggrieved by the Chief Medical Director’s decision under subsection (3) of section 10 may, within a period of 21 days from the date of the letter communicating the decision to him, address a petition to the Board to reconsider his case.

 

Now, did the Defendant comply with the statutory requirement before dismissing the Claimant? The evidence led by the Defendant in dismissing the Claimant shows, inter alia, the Claimant was issued a Query on 29/10/96 (Exh. C5); that he was invited to appear before a Panel of Enquiry by Exh. C7; that he was by Exh. C8 written by one L. A. Ilesanmi for the Director of Administration, suspended and that by Exh. C9 Claimant was dismissed from the services of the Defendant. Of note is the fact that the suspension of the Claimant was by Management. It is also on record that the Panel of Enquiry set up to investigate the Claimant was set up by the Management. Statutorily, the Chief Medical Director of the Defendant plays a major role in matters relating to the discipline of junior staff of the Defendant. His role is specifically stated in section 10 of the establishing Act. In the events leading to the dismissal of the Claimant it could not be said that the procedures laid down by the statute were followed. Claimant was never queried by the Chief Medical Director. He was not suspended by the Chief Medical Director. The alleged Panel of Enquiry was not set up either by or on behalf of the Chief Medical Director. It is not out of place to say that the Chief Medical Director abdicated his statutory responsibility in relation the discipline of the Claimant in the instant case. My finding is that the Defendant did not comply with the procedure laid down in its establishment Act in dismissing the Claimant. I have no hesitation in holding so and I so do. I resolve issue 2 in favor of the Claimant and against the Defendant.

 

The final issue for determination whether or not the Claimant is entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought. The reliefs sought by the Claimant in this suit are mainly 4. I have examined the reliefs sought vis a vis the evidence led and the findings of this Court. Now, this Court has found and held that the employment of the Claimant is protected by the statute establishing the Defendant.  The Court has also found and held that the provision of the statute was not complied with by the Defendant before dismissing the Claimant. The letters of suspension and of dismissal served on the Claimant have no basis and are indeed founded on a wrong and shaky foundation. They cannot stand the test of time and law. I have no hesitation in setting them aside and I so do. In an employment with statutory flavour as in the instant case, the Court is empowered to make an order of reinstatement in the absence anything to the contrary. Not only that, the Claimant is also entitled to arrears of all his outstanding salaries and allowances. From I hold that the Claimant is entitled to all the reliefs sought in this Court against the Defendant.

 

Finally, for the avoidance of doubt and for all the reasons as contained in this Judgment,

 

  1. I declare that the purported dismissal of the claimant from defendant’s service as communicated to the claimant in a letter ref. PC.6080/43 of 27th January, 1997 is null and void as the act and manner of the said dismissal is ultra vires, illegal and      unconstitutional being in breach of the said Act of 1990 establishing the        Defendant..
  2. I declare that the suspension of the claimant by a letter ref. Pc. 6080/41 of 7th November, 1996 is null and void being contrary to the provision of the establishment Act of the Defendant of 1990 and therefore of no effect          whatsoever.
  3. Having declared them null, void and of no effect, I here set aside the purported letters             of suspension and of dismissal dated 7/11/96 and 27/1/97 respectively same having been written and served on the Claimant in contravention of statutory    provisions.
  4. The Defendant is here ordered to reinstate the Claimant to his post and office as Clerical Officer in its service with all his salaries and entitlement due since the          unlawful dismissal and without prejudice to his promotion prospects.

 

  1. The Defendant is here ordered to refund to the Claimant such sum as have been wrongfully withheld from him as a result of the wrongful suspension effected by           virtue of letter ref. 6080/41 of 7th November, 1996.
  2. The Defendant shall pay the cost of this proceedings assessed at =N=100,000.00 only to the Claimant.
  3. All the terms of this Judgment shall be complied with within 30 days from today.

 

Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

 

____________________

Hon. Justice J. D. Peters

Presiding Judge

 

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