CROSS RIVER UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY (CRUTECH) V. MR. LAWRENCE O. OBETEN (2011)

CROSS RIVER UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY (CRUTECH) V. MR. LAWRENCE O. OBETEN

(2011)LCN/4444(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Wednesday, the 6th day of April, 2011

CA/C/24/2010

RATIO

ISSUE OF JURISDICTION: WHEN CAN THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION BE RAISED

JURISDICTION: EFFECT OF LACK OF JURISDICTION

…lack of jurisdiction is detrimental, disastrous, devastating and without leverage for salvaging the situation, regardless of desirability of such a course of action. In this connection, a plea as in the instant case, that an action is caught under the anvil of being statute barred is one that raises the issue of jurisdiction which is serious and fundamental. PER MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A.

CAUSE OF ACTION: DEFINITION OF “CAUSE OF ACTION”

…a cause of action has been defined as consisting of, every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed, in order to support his right to favourable judgment. See Adimora v. Ajufo (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.80) 1. Put differently, it is the factual situation stated by the plaintiff, which, if substantiated entitles him to a remedy against the defendant. See Egbe v. Adefarasin (supra). PER MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A.

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH A CONDITION PRECEDENT: CONSEQUENCE OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH A CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR ACTIVATING OR SETTING THE REQUIRED LEGAL PROCESS IN MOTION

The law which does not border on technicality is basic on the point that when an action is instituted and there is non – compliance with a condition precedent or prescribed pre – condition for activating or setting the required legal process in motion, any suit, which has been instituted in contravention of mandatory statutory provisions is incompetent and the court is equally derobed of competence to entertain it and jurisdiction to determine the suit. See Ubwa v. Bashi (2008) 4 NWLR (pt. 1077) 303; Nigerian Universal Bank Ltd. v. Samba Petroleum Co. Ltd. (2006) 12 NWLR (pt. 993) 98. PER MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A.

ISSUE OF LIMITATION: WHETHER THE ISSUE OF LIMITATION OF DURATIONAL PERIOD FOR THE INSTITUTION OF AN ACTION IS STATUTORY AND NOT MERELY PROCEDURAL

The issue of limitation of durational period for the institution of an action is statutory and not merely procedural. It is thus a matter of substantive raw rather than one of technical justice. This is moreso, because laws must be ascertainable, decisive and predictable. Laws are meant to be obeyed and or complied with. Thus, when a law provides a mode for the doing of an act, it does not admit anything which is different or contrary from the stipulated mode. PER MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A.

JUSTICES:

JA’FARU MIKA’ILU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

CROSS RIVER UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY (CRUTECH) – Appellant(s)

AND

MR. LAWRENCE O. OBETEN – Respondent(s)

MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an interlocutory appeal against the ruling of P. M. Ekpe, J. of the High court, cross River state of Nigeria, sitting at Calabar, delivered on 24th July, 2009 and in which the said court struck out the preliminary objection raised by the appellant herein, on the basis that it was misconceived. Parties were then ordered to file their respective depositions within 14 days and the matter was subsequently adjourned to 23rd October, 2009 for hearing.

The gravamen of the preliminary objection raised by the appellant/defendant before the trial court was that the suit instituted by the respondent herein as the plaintiff was statute barred. The facts of the case as garnered from the statement of claim contained in the record of appeal include the following. The respondent was employed by the appellant. The respondent’s initial letter of appointment was dated 19th, June, 1997. The respondent’s appointment, which was later confirmed, was terminated vide appellant’s letter dated 2nd August, 2006. Thereafter, the respondent received another letter from the appellant dated 17th January, 2007, wherein the respondent was informed that records kept by the appellant, showed that the respondent was yet to adhere to the directive to obtain a certificate of medical fitness from the Medical Centre. The respondent who considered this development as indicative of his having been recalled or reinstated, promptly complied therewith and submitted the said certificate of medical fitness to the appellant as contained in the said letter dated 17th January, 2007. When the respondent’s hope of being reinstated became unrealized, he then filed Suit No. HC/135/2007 against the appellant. The respondent claimed the following reliefs:
(19) WHEREOF the Plaintiff claims against the Defendant as follows: –
(a) A declaration that the termination of the Plaintiffs appointment is wrong, illegal, void, unconstitutional and is of no effect.
(b) The continue refusal of the Defendant to take back the Plaintiff and pay him his accumulated salaries despite the medical test he did and submitted the report accordingly on the directive of the Defendant is wrong, illegal and a breach of Plaintiff’s fundamental right and the condition of service/ Cross River State Public Service Rules, 2004 binding them.
(c) An order reinstating the Plaintiff in the employment of the Defendant.
(d) An order directing the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff his arrears of salary of N14,647 a month from the month of October, 2006 to when he will be reinstated and thereafter.
(e) General damages of N2m” (sic)

On 7th May, 2007, the appellant as defendant filed a notice of preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain and determine the suit as constituted, on the following two grounds:
“1. That this honourable court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit in so far as the same is Statute Barred and cannot be sustained having regards to section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law of Cross River 2004 as amended by section 1 of Public Officers protection (Amendment) Law 2007.
2. That this suit constituCLETUS NNAJI & ORS. v. OGUZIE ONUOHAtes an abuse of court processes.”
Upon the adoption of written addresses previously filed and exchanged by the learned counsel for the parties, the aforesaid ruling of the learned trial judge was delivered. In the said ruling, the learned trial judge, observed, reasoned and held:
“Section 1 (a) of the public Officers, Protection Law as amended stipulates that an action can only be brought against a Public Officer or authority within 6 months next after the act or default complained of.

The question before this court is: When did time begin to run for the claimant/Respondent. His appointment was terminated and a letter issued to him in August 2006. Sometimes in January 2007 another letter was again written to the claimant requesting for a medical report which he produced even though he was never re – instated. The claimant then finally instituted this suit in April, 2007.
I do not need to delve into the contents of any of the letters issued to the claimant. Suffice it to say that the defendants had abridged the time when the letter of January 2007 was written to the claimant. It is however presumed that the claimant had probably failed the medical test in the estimation of the defendant hence the defendant’s refusal to recall him.
In my view, the defendant would be acting in bad faith if the claimant is shut out at this stage. I agree with counsel for the claimant that the subsequent letter to the claimant has indeed abridged and set the time running from August 2006 to January 2007 – a five month period.
Consequently, it is my view that this preliminary objection is misconceived and I do strike it out accordingly.”

The appellant was dissatisfied with the ruling and has appealed to this Court, vide its notice of appeal containing three grounds of appeal and filed on 6th August, 2009 after leave to so appeal was sought before and granted by the trial court. In the appellant’s brief of argument filed on 5th March, 2010 and prepared by Utum Eteng Esq., two issues identified for the determination of this appeal are as follows:
“1. Whether this suit was not statute barred thereby denying the trial court the jurisdiction to hear same having regards to the letter of termination dated August 2, 2006, the subject matter of the Suit, the clear claims of the Claimant in paragraphs 6, 11 and 19 of the statement of claim and reliefs (a) (c) and (d) in the writ of summon filed on 19/4/07, outside the mandatory statutory period of 3 months.
2. Whether the amendment of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law Cross River State by Section 1A of the amended law altered the already vested rights of the parties retrospectively when the said amendment was made after the cause of action had arisen going by the old law.”

The respondent in his brief of argument filed on 1st April, 2010 and prepared by Otaba O. Obeten Esq., adopted the issues formulated by the appellant and accordingly predicated his arguments thereon.

On 11th January, 2011 when the appeal matter came up for hearing before us, Chris Onugba Esq., learned appellant’s counsel adopted and relied on appellant’s brief as filed and urged us to allow the appeal and set aside the trial court’s ruling. Similarly, Fidelis Ibiang Esq., learned counsel for the respondent, adopted and relied on respondent’s brief. We were also urged to dismiss the appeal. Having given consideration to both issues formulated in the appellant’s brief, coupled with a perusal of the record of proceedings, inclusive of the court processes filed in this matter, I am of the firm viewpoint that the two issues are adequate for the resolution of the instant appeal.

In arguing the first issue, learned counsel for the appellant restated the established position of the law, that a claimant’s writ of summons and statement of claim, “are the indexes employed to determine whether or not a subject matter is properly before the Court.” in order to vest it with jurisdiction. Reference was made to NEPA v. Atukpor (2000) FWLR (pt. 20) 622, (2001) 1 NWLR (Pt. 693) 96 and Egbe v. Adefarasin (1986) 1 NWLR (pt. 3) 549.
It was then argued, that since paragraphs 6, 11 and 19 (a), (c) and (d) of respondent’s statement of claim showed that his claim is based on the subsisting letter of termination of his appointment dated 2nd August, 2006 and in respect of which specific reliefs were claimed, the suit having been instituted on 19th April, 2007 was brought outside the mandatory statutory period of 3 months provided under section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cross River State, being the applicable law in force. Citing Utih v. Egorr (1990) 5 NWLR (pt. 153) 771/775; Egbe v. Adefarasin (supra); Obiefuna v. Okoye (1961) 1 NWLR 357; P. N. Udoh Trading Co. Ltd, v. Abere (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 723) without specifying the page and Unilorin v. Adeniran (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1031) 521, it was his submission, that the suit having been brought outside the prescribed period, “offends against the law and robs the court of jurisdiction.” Furthermore, that either on the basis of the appellant’s letters dated 2nd August, 2006 or 17th January, 2007, “the suit was still non – existent “as the period of 3 months allowed by law had elapsed and the respondent’s right of action, had been totally extinguished by law, leaving him with an unenforceable cause of action.”
On his part and in response on the first issue, learned respondent’s counsel in his brief conceded the point that a court is only entitled to look at the claimant’s writ of summons and statement of claim, in order to determine whether or not, it has jurisdiction to entertain a matter. It was his argument that the second letter which directed the respondent to obtain a medical certificate of fitness and with, “which he indeed complied has invalidated and or cancelled the termination letter issued to him by the appellant.” Again, that the issue of the action being statute barred has not arisen in this matter. It was strongly contended by the learned respondent’s counsel that the heavy reliance placed by the appellant on the Public Officers Protection Law was meant to deprive the respondent from getting justice. Citing Ngige v. Obi (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 330) 1041/1061, it was submitted that courts, “are now more concerned with doing justice rather than giving undue prominence to technicality.” Again, it was pointed out that it would amount to “abrogation” of a court’s constitutional responsibilities, if it closes its eyes to “the sinister tenor of ouster provision of the statute.” Reliance was placed on Jombo v. Petroleum Equal Fund (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 294) 2335 for this submission.

On the second issue, learned appellant’s counsel reiterated the position of the law which is trite, that the law applicable to a cause of action is the law in force when the cause of action arose. Citing the cases of University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital v. Akilo (2000) FWLR (Pt. 28) 2286/2287 – 2288; NEPA v. Atukpor (2000) FWLR (Pt. 20) 622/625, it was argued that “the rights and obligations of parties must be navigated within the compass of the provisions of the law as it was when the appellant wrote to the respondent on 2nd August, 2006 terminating his appointment.” According to learned appellant’s counsel, the reliefs claimed by the respondent centered on the lone letter of determination dated 2nd August, 2006 as there are no two such letters.
The learned appellant’s counsel argued without conceding, that if appellant’s letter of 17th January, 2007, “had abridged” the time as per the finding by the trial court; that the question then arises as to whether the time was abridged for the operational purpose of the unamended law, that is section 2 (A) or for the activation of the amended law, that is S. 1 (A) which was not in existence when the cause of action arose in order to regulate the termination. It was further argued that if the abridgement of time envisaged by the trial court was in respect of the amended law; “the respondent’s action would still have been statute barred in so far as the alleged – bridged period between 17th January, 2007 and 19th April, 2007 would have exceeded the prescribed period of three months.
Again, that if the trial court envisaged the amended version of the law, it would amount to a wrong application of the law as the amended Section 1 (A) of the law cannot affect or change the already vested rights of the parties.
For these standpoints, learned appellant’s counsel referred us to and quoted copiously from authorities which include; Unilorin v. Adeniran (2007) 6 NWLR (pt. 1031) 498/508; OHMB v. Garva & Ors. (2002) 11 NSQR 141, NEPA v. Atukpor (2000) FWLR (pt. 20) 622/626, (2001) 1 NWLR (Pt. 693) 96; Uwaifo v. Attorney General of Bendel state (1982) 7 SC 124; Olutola v. Unilorin (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 416.

On this second issue, the learned counsel for the respondent adopted the arguments previously canvassed in the respondent’s brief in relation to the first issue. It was added that as at the time the respondent filed his suit before the trial court, the applicable law has been amended with the statutory limitation period of three months enlarged to six months. Learned respondent’s counsel maintained the position that in the instant appeal the cause of action, “is the refusal of the appellant to reinstate and pay the respondent after he had complied with the directive contained in its subsequent letter.” It was then submitted that the jurisdiction of a court to entertain an action is dependent on the state of the law at the time of filing an action. Reference was made to the case of Unilorin v. Adeniran (2007) All FWLR (pt. 381) 471, (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1031) 498.

In the resolution of the two issues raised in the instant appeal, the first issue which touches on jurisdiction will be firstly resolved. The gist of appellant’s contention on this issue is simply this: whether the trial court was right when it overruled the preliminary objection raised by the appellant and found that it has jurisdiction to entertain and determine the suit instituted by the respondent, when regard is had to the provisions of Section 2 (a) of the public officers Protection Law as amended and applicable to the instant appeal.
The deeply engraved principles which guide a court in the determination of the question, whether or not it has jurisdiction include; that there should be no feature in the case which disentitles the court from exercising its jurisdiction and the need for the case to have been brought before the court by due process and upon the fulfillment of any condition precedent to the assumption and exercise of jurisdiction by the said court. Indeed, the question as to whether an action has been instituted within the time laid down by the limitation law is an essential pre – condition which must be satisfied before a court can competently assume jurisdiction.

It is thus an issue that goes to the jurisdictional jugular of the court and it is capable of being raised at any stage of the proceedings. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; Sosan v. Ademuyiwa (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt. 27) 241. The issue of jurisdiction by whatever name called and under whatever guise or colouration, can be raised at any point in time or stage of the proceedings. Indeed, it can be invoked or convoked for the first time at the Supreme Court – the apex court, with or without leave of court and this can even be done viva voce – orally. Also, the court can raise it suo motu See Omomeji v. Kolawole (2008) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1106) 180. Hence, lack of jurisdiction is detrimental, disastrous, devastating and without leverage for salvaging the situation, regardless of desirability of such a course of action. In this connection, a plea as in the instant case, that an action is caught under the anvil of being statute barred is one that raises the issue of jurisdiction which is serious and fundamental.

In determining this point, the need arises for a determination of the cause of action in this matter. For one, a cause of action has been defined as consisting of, every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed, in order to support his right to favourable judgment. See Adimora v. Ajufo (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.80) 1. Put differently, it is the factual situation stated by the plaintiff, which, if substantiated entitles him to a remedy against the defendant. See Egbe v. Adefarasin (supra). It is thus, a fundamental principle of law that it is the claim of the plaintiff that paves the way for and or determines the jurisdiction of the court which entertains the claim, In this regard, the best guide in the determination of jurisdiction of a court is the subject matter of the claim as endorsed in the writ of summons and subsequently transferred into the statement of claim which supercedes the writ of summons. See Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 9 – 10 SC 31; Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank Ltd. (1983) 6 SC 158, (1983) 1 SCNLR, 296; Emeka v. Emodi (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt. 900) 433 and Onuorah v. Okeke (2005) 10 NWLR (pt. 932) 40.

In the instant case, while the learned appellant’s counsel argued that the respondent’s action was caught by the limitation statute, the learned counsel for the respondent contended otherwise. Again, while the appellant is insisting that respondent’s action was predicated on the letter of termination dated 2nd August, 2006, the respondent is resisting the proposition and maintains that the subsequent letter dated 17th January, 2007 should carry the day. So in either case, which is which? Howbeit it is to be noted that both parties are ad idem and this has been borne out by the printed record, that the writ of summons in the instant case was taken out or issued on 19th April, 2007. It has also not been seriously contested by the respondent, that the Public officer Protection Law is invocable in this case. What has been submitted is that courts are more inclined and disposed under the current dispensation, to the doing of substantial justice rather than technical justice.

It is the law that where a statute provides for a particular method of doing something or performing a duty which has been regularized by the statute, that method and no other, must be the one to be adopted. See C. C. B. (Nig.) plc v. Attorney – General Anambra state (1992) g NWLR (pt. 261) 528. Thus, if a law requires the fulfillment of a pre – condition before a particular act or action, substantive or procedural is to be done or taken, non fulfillment of the pre – condition or compliance therewith will be prejudicial to the defaulting party. See Aina v. Jinadu (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 233) 91.

It is in this regard, that for the purposeful intendment of statutes with stipulation of durational limitation, the clock begins to wind down and time begins to run from the moment which culminates into the date on which the cause of action accrues. Invariably, the cause of action accrues on the particular date which gave rise to the incident in question. Thereafter, any proceeding thereon must be commenced by the application for and issuance of writ of summons or any other originating processes, within the period duly prescribed by the relevant and applicable statute. See Eboigbe v. N. N. P. C. (1954) 5 NWLR (Pt 347) 649.

Under the Public Officers Protection Law, suits instituted against persons covered by it, must be commenced within the limited period stated therein; otherwise they will become stale or extinguished. It is a limitation statute which provides for a well spelt out time frame for the commencement of an action by a prospective litigant. It does not admit of foot dragging, late coming or sleeping on duty so to say. It has no accommodation or beddings for a sleeping beauty. See Chigbu v. Tonimas (Nig.) Ltd. (2006) 9 NWLR (pt. 984) 189. Thus, where a law stipulates a durational period for the institution of a suit, such an action cannot be commenced after the expiration of the statutorily prescribed period. See P. N. Udoh Trading Co. Ltd. v. Abere (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 723) 114; v. J. S. C. Kaduna State (1993) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1; Adeosun v. Jibesin (2001) 11 NWLR (pt.724) 290.

Again, the question or issue as to whether an action has been commenced within time or otherwise, in order to determine whether it is statute barred or not is a matter of computation or calculation of raw figures. Indeed, a court of law has no discretion in the matter. See Aina v. Jinadu (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 233) 91. It is thus settled, that the constitutionally provided right of access to courts, does not exclude statutory provisions which regulate the exercise of the conferred right. The law which does not border on technicality is basic on the point that when an action is instituted and there is non – compliance with a condition precedent or prescribed pre – condition for activating or setting the required legal process in motion, any suit, which has been instituted in contravention of mandatory statutory provisions is incompetent and the court is equally derobed of competence to entertain it and jurisdiction to determine the suit. See Ubwa v. Bashi (2008) 4 NWLR (pt. 1077) 303; Nigerian Universal Bank Ltd. v. Samba Petroleum Co. Ltd. (2006) 12 NWLR (pt. 993) 98.
In respectful disagreement with the position maintained by the learned counsel for the respondent, a condition precedent is not synonymous with or akin to an ouster clause. It is simply an additional formality which a prospective litigant or plaintiff must accord adequate consideration, so as not to be left stranded. It is pre – emptive and requires the litigant to be pro – active. Equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent. When a person sleeps on his right, it may turn out to be a costly or expensive sleep with irreversible consequences.
A challenge or complaint regarding whether an action is statute barred or not, is an issue of law which borders squarely on competence of the action and jurisdiction of a court. See owners of the MV Arabella v. N.A.I.C. (2008) 11 NWLR (pt. 1097) 182.

The issue of limitation of durational period for the institution of an action is statutory and not merely procedural. It is thus a matter of substantive law rather than one of technical justice. This is moreso, because laws must be ascertainable, decisive and predictable. Laws are meant to be obeyed and or complied with. Thus, when a law provides a mode for the doing of an act, it does not admit anything which is different or contrary from the stipulated mode. There are no two ways about it. It is either a plaintiff has valid and sustainable cause of action or not. Late is late without necessarily being too late and a miss is as good as a mile. Where rights of parties come up for determination, courts are expected to be detached and dispassionate. In the instant case, it is worth restating that where by operation of law, a cause of action is no longer extant, an application for writ of summons by a prospective plaintiff and the issuance of the said writ, based on a claim that has gone stale or became extinguished, would be null and void ab initio and thus incapable of conferring jurisdiction on the court. Such a court will lack both competence and jurisdiction to adjudicate thereon.
Thus, in the instant case, while a declaration one way or the other could have been made on the letter of termination of appointment dated 2nd August, 2006, no such pronouncement for or against could have been made with regard to the letter headed, “Re – certificate of medical fitness”, dated 17th January, 2007.

Let me, state, albeit briefly on the second issue, that it is a fundamental principle of Nigerian Law, that rights and obligations of parties which are in issue or contention in a litigation, are determinable on the basis of the substantive and organic law which is in force at the time of the act in question. See Aremo II v. Adekanye (2004) 13 NWLR (pt. 991) 572.Thus, the relevant law which is applicable in respect of a cause of action is the law in force at the time the cause of action arose and in the case of jurisdiction, it is the applicable law as at the time when the action was instituted. See Utih v. Onoyivwe (1991) 11 NWLR (pt.166) 166. Unless, it is otherwise expressly stated, retrospectively must not be read into or implied in an enactment.

The law is settled, that where a defendant raises an objection as in the instant case that the plaintiff’s action is caught by limitation statute and the objection is upheld by the trial court or sustained by an appellate court, the proper order to be made in the given circumstances is not one of striking out, but of dismissal of the said action, since there is nothing to be saved or salvaged therefrom. See Egbe v. Adefarasin (No. 2) (1987) 1 NWLR (pt. 47) 1; N. P. A. v. Lotus plastics Ltd. (2005) 19 NWLR (pt.959) 138.

In the premise, the two issues raised and argued in this appeal are resolved in favour of the appellant. In this regard, the appeal succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. I hereby set aside the ruling delivered by the learned trial judge on 24th July, 2009 in suit No. HC/135/2007. The said suit instituted by the respondent herein is accordingly dismissed as the same is statute barred. I make no order as to costs.

JA’AFARU MIKA’ILU, J.C.A.: I have read in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother Massoud Abdulrahman Oredola, JCA. I am in agreement with the same. It is trite taw that where objection based on limitation statute is upheld by the trial court, or appellate court, the proper order to be made is not one of striking out, but dismissal of the action. Refer to EGBE v. APEFARASIN (No.2) (1987), NWLR (pt 47) 1. The appeal succeeds and it is allowed. The ruling of the trial Judge of 24th July, 2009 in suit No. HC/135/2007 is set aside. The suit is dismissed as statute barred. No order as to costs.

ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU, J.C.A.: My learned brother, Massoud Abdulrahman Oredola, JCA, gave me the opportunity of reading the draft of his judgment. I am in agreement with his reasoning and the conclusion that the appeal has merit. I allow the appeal and I abide by the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.

Appearances

Chris Onugba Esq. For Appellant

AND

Fidelis Ibiang Esq. For Respondent