COSMOS C. NNADI v. NATIONAL EAR CARE CENTRE & ANOR (2014)

COSMOS C. NNADI v. NATIONAL EAR CARE CENTRE & ANOR

(2014)LCN/7087(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 4th day of April, 2014

CA/K/242/2012

RATIO

CONSIDERATIONS IN DETERMINING WHAT AN EMPLOYMENT WITH STATUTORY FLAVOUR MEANS

In determining what an employment with statutory flavour means, this Court and the apex Court have held several times that it relates to employment in the public or civil service of the Federation, States or Local Governments, or agencies of government, including institutions and parastatals wherein the civil service or public service rules apply or are made relevant or incorporated. See the case of Kwara State Polytechnic Ilorin v. Shittu (2012) 41 WRN 26.
In the case of University of Ilorin v. Abe (2003) FWLR (Pt. 164) 267 at 278, this Court held:
“It is now firmly established by a long line of decided cases by apex Court that when an office or employment has statutory flavour, in the sense that the conditions of service of the employee are provided for and protected by a statute or regulation made there under, a person holding that office or is in that employment enjoys a special status over and above the ordinary master/servant relationship. In order to discipline such a person, the procedure laid down in the relevant statute or regulation must be complied with, strictly. Consequently, the only way to terminate such a contract of service with a statutory flavour is to adhere strictly to the procedure laid down in the statute or regulation made thereunder.”
The above was followed in the case of New Nigeria Newspapers Ltd v. Atoyebi (2013) LPELR-21489 (CA) where we said this of employment with statutory flavour:
“In employment with statutory flavour, that is, employment governed by statute wherein procedure for employment and dismissal of employees are clearly spelt and the employment cannot be terminated other than in the way and manner prescribed by the statute concerned and any other manner of termination inconsistent with the statute is null and void… such is applicable in contract of employment under the public and civil service of the Federation, States, Local Government and agencies of Government…”
See also Osumah v. Edo Broadcasting Service (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 253) 773 at 787, Oloruntoba Oju v. Abdulraheem (2009) 26 WRN 1; (2009) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 83. PER ITA GEORAGE MBABA, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

ABDU ABOKI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ITA GEORGE MBABA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

COSMOS C. NNADI Appellant(s)

AND

1. NATIONAL EAR CARE CENTRE
2. ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE FEDERATION Respondent(s)

ITA GEORAGE MBABA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Federal High Court, Kaduna, in suit No. FHC/KD/CS/111/10, delivered on 16/3/12 by Hon. Justice M. I. Shuaibu (as he then was), wherein his lordship dismissed the claim of the Plaintiff, now Appellant.
Appellant’s claim at the lower Court was for:
“(a) A declaration that the Plaintiff is a confirmed Public Servant in a permanent and pensionable employment of the Defendants.
(b) A further declaration that the Plaintiff’s employment cannot be brought to an end through a letter of termination with one month notice of salary in lieu of Notice as contained in the Defendant’s letter dated 2rd of April, 2010.
(c) An order setting aside the letter of termination served on the Plaintiff dated 23rd April, 2010 and reinstating the Plaintiff back to his position as Senior Craftsman (electrical) in the employment of the Defendants.
(d) A further order that the Plaintiff should be paid all his salaries benefits and other entitlement from 8th of February, 2010 until the final determination of the case pursuant to his employment with the Defendants.
(e) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants from terminating the employment of the Plaintiff except as set out in the Public Service Rules.
(f) Cost of this action.”
At the trial of the case each party called a witness and tendered exhibits. Appellant had been employed in the service of the 1st Respondent since on 29/1/2001. His appointment was later confirmed and in the letter of appointment the Respondents had told the Appellant that:
“All other conditions of service(s) are similar to those obtained in Public Service.”
Despite the above, Appellant said, the 1st Respondent, rather than use the condition of service applicable to confirmed public servants, applied the provisions of paragraph a(c) of his letter of appointment to terminate his appointment, on 23/4/2010. The said paragraph 4(c) says:
“Unless you are dismissed and provided you are not under any bond to serve the centre for a stipulated period, you may terminate your engagement by giving one month’s notice or paying one month salary in lieu of notice. Where the appointment is terminated with salary in lieu of notice, payment will be effected less any debt that may be outstanding against you.”
Prior to the issue of the said letter of termination on 23/4/2010, the 1st Respondent had commenced disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant, which included setting up of a Disciplinary Panel and placement of suspension order on him (Appellant) as per a letter dated 5/2/10. Appellant appeared before the Disciplinary Panel.
Appellant’s submission that as a confirmed staff of the 1st Respondent, his appointment was governed by the civil service Rules applicable to Public servants or Civil servants, and so it could not be brought to abrupt end by one month’s notice or payment of one month’s salary in lieu, was rejected by the trial Court.
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on 7/6/2012 and raise 5 grounds of appeal. He filed his brief of argument on 16/10/12, on being served with the Records of Appeal, which was transmitted to this Court on 18/9/2012. In the Brief, Appellant distilled two issues for determination, namely:
“(1) Whether the appellant’s appointment was validly terminated.
(2) Whether the said employment of the appellant could be brought to an end during the pendency of a disciplinary proceedings against the appellant.”
The Respondent did not file any Brief and when the appeal was heard on 27/2/14, there was evidence the Respondents had been served with the hearing notice, but they failed to come to Court.
Appellant moved us accordingly.
The Appellant’s Counsel, Charles Mafua Esq. who settled the brief, called us to consider the legal import of Exhibit E letter of Termination of appointment of the Appellant, issued on 23/4/2010, which the trial Court relied upon to dismiss the claim of the Appellant, when he said:
“What stands clear from Exhibit ‘E’ the Plaintiff was terminated not based on any criminal action but because the 1st Defendant no longer requires (sic) his service.”
Counsel said that the Exhibit E, (sic) (meant to say Exhibit A) issued to Appellant as appointment letter, had placed him on probation for a period of 2 years and that paragraph 4 (b) of it gave 1st Respondent the power to terminate the employment upon satisfaction of the Medical Director that the Appellant was not qualified for efficient service or was unsuitable for other reasons; but said that Appellant’s employment was not terminated pursuant to paragraph 4 (b) of the letter of employment. Rather, that 1st Respondent preferred paragraph 4 (c), which, surprisingly, was made for the benefit of the Appellant. He argued that the termination of Appellant’s appointment, either pursuant to paragraph 4 (b) or under the Public Service Rules, 2008 (Exhibit F), must admit of disciplinary procedures as set out in Exhibits F and G, as the Appellant, at the time of the said termination, was a confirmed staff, who under the said Rules and procedure, must be granted fair hearing. He referred us to the relevant portions of Exhibits F and G.
Counsel argued that Appellant’s case found support in Part v, (6) of Exhibit G, which provided that a permanent staff of 1st Respondent, such as Appellant, could not be suspended as done by 1st Respondent through Exhibit C, but could only be interdicted. He went further to show the categories of officers whose appointments may be terminated without due process, for instance, one on temporary appointment.
Counsel submitted that it was not in dispute that Appellant was a permanent staff, whose employment was statutory and pensionable and the termination of his appointment must be in accordance with the statute governing the employment, that is, Exhibits F and G. He added that it was in realization of the above fact that the 1st Respondent issued Exhibit J to the Appellant and subsequently Exhibits C and D – letters of suspension and invitation to disciplinary Committee, respectively; that all of the above steps were taken, pursuant to the statutes guiding the employment of the Appellant; that the 1st Respondent had also relied on those steps, heavily, in its defence at the trial court; but that in spite of that consensus by the parties on the issue of procedure before termination, the learned trial Court failed and neglected to make any pronouncement on this important issue and rather narrowed the contest when he held:
“What stands clear from Exhibit E the plaintiff was terminated not based on any criminal action but because the 1st defendant no longer requires his service. Thus the termination was not predicated on misconduct as stipulated under section 3 of chapter 3 of the relevant public service Rules.”
Counsel submitted that by so saying, the trial Court found as a fact that the 1st Respondent did not follow the procedure but exercised its power of termination under Exhibit A, paragraph 4 (c) which did not grant the 1st Respondent the said power. Thus, 1st Respondent, who commenced the trial of the appellant as provided by statute, abandoned same, mid-stream and reverted to Exhibit A, paragraph 4 (c), and in doing so, failed to comply with the mandatory statutory provision, which required that Appellant be put on notice as to the outcome of his trial by the Disciplinary Committee. He relied on section 3 of Exhibit G, part V (vi).
Counsel submitted that by the provision, referred above, in Exhibit G, it is not only decisions on criminal allegations that ought to be communicated to the Appellant, as found by the trial Judge, but decisions on each and every allegation made against the Appellant. He urged us to hold that Exhibit E did not communicate such decisions to the Appellant, and that the trial Judge was wrong when he held:
“In consequence thereof, the Plaintiff is not entitled to be put on notice as to the outcome of the investigation Panel.”
Counsel urged us to adopt the findings of the trial Court, when it said:
“It is not in doubt, based on Exhibits A and B, the offer of appointment and confirmation of appointment that the Plaintiff was a confirmed staff of 1st Defendant. Likewise by Exhibits F and G the relationship between the parties was regulated by both the Public Service Rules and Guidance for Appointment, Promotion and Discipline. Thus, the relationship had statutory flavour…” See page 388 of the Records.
The above in view, Counsel urged us to resolve the issue in favour of the Appellant.
On issue 2, whether the employment of the Appellant could be brought to an end during the pendency of a disciplinary proceedings against him, Counsel submitted that it was not in doubt that the 1st Respondent subjected the Appellant to disciplinary proceedings as per Exhibit C (letter of suspension dated 5/2/10), Exhibit D (invitation to Disciplinary Committee, dated 19/2/10) and Exhibit I (1st Respondent solicitor’s letter of 3/6/10). He also relied on Exhibits J, J1, K, K1 and L tendered through 1st Respondent.
Counsel argued that Exhibit C had placed Appellant under indefinite suspension for alleged offences, and the Appellant was still serving the suspension when his employment, with statutory flavour, was brought to a premature end through Exhibit E, without reference to the outcome of the investigation conducted on him for which he was suspended.
Counsel submitted that it was a serious error in law for the Respondents to terminate Appellant’s employment during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. He relied on Exhibits F and G and the findings of the trial Court thereon, and said that the 1st Respondent acted in breach of its own Rules in Exhibits F and G; that by issuing Exhibit C to Appellant suspending, instead of interdicting him, they breached part V paragraph 6(1) of Exhibit G, and when they failed to recall the Appellant at the end of the investigation or to communicated to him the outcome of the investigation on him, 1st Respondent breached section 19 (vi) of Exhibit G; that Exhibit E (the letter of termination) had no bearing with the outcome of the investigation of the Appellant by the Disciplinary Panel: that the provisions of the Exhibit G was mandatory, with the use of the word, or shall. He relied on Onudue v. Odogwu (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 317) 390.
Counsel submitted that the consequence of failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Exhibit G, section 19 (VI) was summarized by the trial Judge, when he said:
“Although the motive of a party in exercising his powers under a contract is irrelevant to the validity of the exercise, the validity of the exercise will be impugned by failure to comply with the procedure laid down by statute for the exercise. See Eperokun v. University of Lagos (1950) 4 NWLR (Pt. 134) 162 at 164.”
He submitted that although the trial Court made the above findings, it failed to apply the principles to this case. Counsel also highlighted what he called other short comings in the judgment of the trial Court and urged us to resolve the issue in favour of the Appellant.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES
I think the two issues raised by the Appellant for the determination of the appeal can be and should be taken together, this is because the outcome of the determination of any of the two issues will affect the other positively or negatively. Appellant had asked:
“(1) Whether the Appellant’s appointment was validly terminated, and
(2) Whether the said employment of the Appellant could be brought to an end during the pendency of a disciplinary proceedings against him (Appellant).”
Unfortunately, the Respondents had no reply to the arguments of the Appellant as they filed no brief, to afford this Court a pip into their mind as to the legal, and/or factual assessment of the decision of the learned trial Court, which favoured them (Respondent), in the light of the faults alleged by the Appellant.
By law, the judgment of a Court, upon delivery, turns out to put the judge that delivered it on trial as to his sense of justice, knowledge of the law and appreciation of the evidence in the case, as well as his application of the knowledge of the law and evidence adduced to reach the conclusion he made. Sometimes, it even stretches to ancillary issues as to the level of carefulness, uprightness and integrity of the judge, as well as his command of the language of the Court (English grammar), sense of humor and writing skill!
Where therefore a Respondent who profited from the Judgment, fails to come up with any brief, on appeal, in defence of the judgment he received, (as the Respondent has a duty to defend the judgment of the Court, where he does not cross appeal), the trial Court is left as an orphan, abandoned without protection against the missiles and offences of the Appellant! Of course, the law and his legal integrity will always come to his rescue at such times, if he acted properly. Because arguments in this appeal is one sided, this Court has a duty to excavate and scrutinize the judgment of the trial Court, in the con of the issues raised by the Appellant, to determine whether it was right in the circumstances.
By the findings of the learned trial Court, Appellant’s employment was one with statutory flavour, as it held:
“It is not in doubt, based on Exhibits A and B the offer of appointment and confirmation of appointment that the plaintiff was confirmed staff of the 1st Defendant. Likewise, by Exhibit ‘F’ and ‘G’, the relationship between the parties was regulated by both the Public Service Rules and Guidelines for Appointment, Promotion and Discipline.” (See page 388 of the Records)
The trial Court went on to say, relying on the case of Adeniyi v. Governing Council of Yaba College of Technology (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 300) 426 at 450, that:
“The principle is where the contract of service is protected by statute and the removal of a person is predicated upon compliance with statutory provisions, non-compliance with the statutory provisions renders the removal ultra vires and void. Also in Abdulraheem v. Olufeagha (2006) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1008) 280 at 328, it was held that where employees employments have statutory flavour, with permanent and pensionable rights, their appointment can only be terminated in accordance with the provisions of a statute. Although, the motive of a party in exercising his powers under a contract is irrelevant to the validity of the exercise, the validity of the exercise will be impugned by failure to comply with the procedure laid down by statute for the exercise. See Operokun v. University of Lagos (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 134) 162 at 164.”
Those were excellent findings and statement of the principles of law relating to termination of employment or dismissal in a contract of service with statutory flavour. Of course, those findings of the trial court were not appealed against and so they remain binding and binding on the parties. See the case of Shukka v. Abubakar (2012) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1291) 497; Wazirin Gwantu v. Isiyaku Sarkin Yaki (2013) LPELR-21416 (CA).

Did the learned trial Court follow those clear principles, after finding, correctly, that the Appellant’s employment was graced with statutory flavour? Sadly, the answer is No, as his lordship rather somersaulted when, despite his earlier findings and statement of the principles of law about Appellant’s appointment being with statutory flavour, held as follows:
“What stands clear from Exhibit E the Plaintiff was terminated not based on any criminal action but because the 1st defendant no longer requires his service. Thus, the termination was not predicated on misconduct as stipulated under section 3 of chapter 3 of the relevant Public Service Rules.”
Exhibit ‘E’ was the letter of termination of appointment issued to the Appellant by the 1st Respondent on 23/4/2010. It reads, in part:
“I am directed to refer to paragraph 4 Section C of your letter of appointment and to inform you that your services with National Ear Care Centre is no longer required with effect from 13th April, 2010. Arrangement will be made to pay you one month salary in lieu of notice as soon as you handed (sic) over all the National Ear Care Centre properties in your possession (including your identity card) to your head of Department…”
Paragraph 4 (c) of the letter of appointment issued to Appellant on 29/1/2011 (which Exhibit E referred to) said:
“Unless you are dismissed and provided you are not under any bond to serve the Centre for a stipulated period, you may terminate your engagement by giving one month’s notice or paying one month’s salary in lieu of notice. Where the appointment is terminated with salary in lieu of notice, payment will be effected less any debt that may be outstanding against you!”
As can be seen from the above it appears the paragraph 4(c) of the Appellant’s letter of appointment was actually made for the use of the Appellant, if he intended to bring the contract of service to an end. For the 1st Respondent, what obtained was paragraph 4 (b), which said:
“If at any time if is established to the satisfaction of the Medical Director that you are not qualified for efficient service or unsuitable in other ways, your engagement may be terminated by giving one month notice in writing or payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice.”
Meanwhile, paragraph 4 (a) of the letter of appointment stated that his post was pensionable, but that his appointment would be on probation for initial period of 2 years, or such longer period as may be deemed advisable. Paragraph 4 (d) said Appellant would “be subject in all respect to any other conditions which the management may stipulate from time to time.” And by paragraph 4 (e) “all other conditions of service are similar to those obtained in the Public Service.”
I believe it was in pursuance of paragraphs 4 (d) and (e) of the letter of appointment that Appellant was given Exhibits F and G, which were Public Service Rules, 2008 and Conditions of Service or Guides for Appointment, Promotion and Discipline, respectively. The two documents are carried on pages 133 to 145 and 146 to 165 of the Records of Appeal, respectively.
Appellant’s appointment was confirmed, with effect from 1/2/2003, as per Exhibit B (on page 125 of the Records), following the satisfactory completion of the probationary period of service by the Appellant. Thus, the Exhibits F and G became the relevant and operative conditions of service of the relationship between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent, as rightly stated by the learned trial Court, taking over and improving on the skeletal provisions contained in the letter of appointment (Exhibit A) issued to Appellant on 29/1/2001.
Appellant was issued with Exhibit C – a letter of suspension, on 5th February, 2010, which reminded Appellant that he was facing a disciplinary action for an act of insubordination and for failure to retire advances, and that he had been directed to under go Psychiatric Assessment and obtain a report for the Committee’s further action, and was thereby sent on indefinite suspension “pending conclusion of the ongoing case.” He was invited to Junior Appointment, Promotion and Disciplinary Committee Meeting, as per Exhibit D, dated 19/2/2010. See pages 129 and 130 of the Records.
It appears, while the Disciplinary proceedings were pending, the 1st Respondent took a decision to ease out the Appellant from service, in utter abandonment of the disciplinary process and total disregard of the Exhibits F and G, which spelt out the process to be followed to terminate Appellant’s appointment. Even if 1st Respondent’s Disciplinary Committee had concluded the trial of the Appellant and recommended his removal from service (and there is nothing to establish this), Part V Section 19 (VI) of Exhibit G states:
“The appropriate Committee, after considering the report and any further evidence before it, shall then decide on the degree of guilt or responsibility of the officer on the allegations made against him, and if the officer is not exonerated, shall decide on the punishment to be inaflicted (sic) in the case of officers on Grade Levels 01 – 13, while recommendation in respect of officers on Grade Level 14 – 17 shall be forwarded to the Federal Civil Service commission through the Head of service. The decision on each allegation made against the officer shall be communicated to him in writing by the appropriate authority.” (See page 162 of the Records).
Of course, as submitted by the Appellant’s Counsel, the 1st Respondent did not comply with the above provisions. And, in the attempt to try to circumvent that provision, the learned trial Judge held:
“What stands clear from Exhibit E the Plaintiff was terminated not based on any criminal action but because the 1st defendant no longer requires his services. Thus, the termination was not predicated on misconduct as stipulated under section 3 of chapter 3 of the relevant Public Service Rules.” (Pages 392 of the Records).
I think that was strange findings, and completely perverse. How did the trial Judge come by the conclusion that the termination of Appellant “was not based on any criminal action but because the 1st Respondent no longer required his services” that “the termination was not predicated on misconduct as stipulated under section 3 of Chapter 3 of the relevant Public Service Rules?”
By so saying, the learned trial Judge showed that he knew that the relevant law or rule that governed the termination of the Appellant, in the circumstances, was the Public service Rules (Exhibit F). That was a legal and judicial admission that Appellant’s termination, at that stage of his employment (as a confirmed staff), could not have been governed by paragraph 4(c) of his appointment letter, which, in fact, was for the use of Appellant, if he opted to terminate his employment! After, the 1st Respondent had initiated a disciplinary process for investigation of the Appellant, as per Exhibits C and D, and the proceedings were ongoing, the law, (Part V section 19 (IV) of Exhibit G) required the, Appellant to be served with the decision reached on him on each allegation made against him by the 1st Respondent, at least to show why or how the decision was taken against him!
The Respondents could not subvert their rules, and circumvent their disciplinary process on the trial of the Appellant and then terminate his appointment during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, alleging, his services were no longer required!
I do not think that in an employment with statutory flavour, a boss, assuming the office of employer, can simply wake up with imperial powers and issue a letter of termination or dismissal to an employee, bringing to an end his services, with a backdating effect, as purportedly done by 1st Respondent in this case, in complete disregard of the procedures stipulated in the conditions of service governing the contract of service. This is because employees who are members of the public or civil service and related services have a more secure and jealously guarded tenure and their position is not that of mere master and servant relationship, whereof a master can simply fire his servant for any reason or with out any reason, provided he gives him the stipulated notice (usually, one month) or salary in lieu of the notice.
To remove a public servant in flagrant contravention of the rules governing his service, whether under contract or under provisions of a statute or regulations made thereunder, is to act capriciously and to destabilize the security of tenure of his public service, frustrate his hopes and aspirations and thereby act in a manner inimical to order, good government and well being of the society. This, of course, does not include tenure of service in political appointments. See the case of NBTE v. Anyanwu (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 256) 1266; Kwara State Polytechnic, Ilorin v. Shittu (2013) 17 WRN 78; (2012) LPELR-9843 (CA); Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (2001) FWLR (Pt. 56) 778.

Part V of Exhibit G (Guidelines for Appointment, Promotion and Discipline – Revised January 2008) provides for Disciplinary Procedures in the 1st Respondent. By section 8 (iii) and (iv) thereof:
“If an officer is interdicted or suspended, he shall be informed in writing and the interdiction or suspension shall take effect from the date he is so informed.”
“If the criminal proceedings against a suspended officer result in his acquittal or if the disciplinary proceedings against him… result otherwise than in hrs dismissal, he shall be reinstated in his office by the disciplinary authority with effect from the or (sic) interdiction.”
I have already held that the 1st Respondent did not publish the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings conducted against the Appellant and did not communicate the decision (if any) of the Disciplinary Committee to the Appellant as required by section 19 (vi) of part V of Exhibit G. 1st Respondent rather appears to have abandoned the entire Disciplinary Proceedings, to resort to terminating the appointment of the Appellant (as if he was still on probation!) by Exhibit E, which was issued on 23/4/2010 and made to take effect from 13/4/2010 – that is, making the termination to have a backdating effect! It also alleged his services were no longer required, paying him one month’s salary in lieu of notice!
The fact that the 1st Respondent did not publish or pursue the outcome of the Disciplinary proceedings on the Appellant can be presumed under section 167 of the Evidence Act 2011 in favour of Appellant, that the Disciplinary Committee did not fault the Appellant and so the proceedings result in his acquittal, or otherwise than in his dismissal. Appellant should therefore have been given the benefit of section 8 (iv) of Part V of Exhibit G, which stipulates his re-call from suspension and reinstatement in his office by the Disciplinary Authority.
I think Exhibit E (termination letter) was therefore a rape of justice by the 1st Respondent. And even when it was obvious that the 1st Respondent had abandoned the said Disciplinary Proceedings against the Appellant, the learned trial Court strangely sourced for a reason to base and justify the unlawful termination of the service of the Appellant, quite against the run of evidence and the sound findings which the trial Court made, that “The termination was not predicated on misconduct as stipulated under section 3 chapter 3 of the relevant Public Service Rules!”
In the circumstances, I hold that this appeal is wholly meritorious as I resolve the issues in favour of the Appellant and allow the Appeal. I therefore set aside the judgment of the Court below in this case, delivered on 16/3/12 and in its place enter the judgment which the trial Judge ought to have made, for the Appellant, pursuant to section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act 2004 and Order 3 Rules 3 and 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011.
It is hereby declared that:
(1) The Appellant, being a confirmed staff of the 1st Respondent, his employment cannot be brought to an end through a letter of termination with one month Notice or one month’s salary in lieu of notice as contained in 1st Respondent’s letter (Exhibit E) dated 23/4/2010, contrary to the provisions of Exhibits F and G.
(2) It is hereby ordered that the said letter of termination of appointment of the Appellant was wrongful and unlawful and therefore null and void.
(3) Appellant therefore remains a staff of the 1st Respondent entitled to be paid his salary and other entitlements, as the Exhibit E ceased to be, and shall be so paid.
The Respondents shall pay the cost of this appeal, assessed at N50,000.00 (Fifty thousand naira only).

ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading the lead judgment of my learned brother Ita George Mbaba, J.C.A., and I agree with his reasoning and conclusions.
I too agree that the appeal is meritorious and is allow by me. I abide by the consequential orders as to costs in the lead judgment.

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, Ita George Mbaba, JCA. I abide the conclusions reached therein.

Appearances

Charles Mafua Esq, with him Ezema Esq.For Appellant

AND

UnrepresentedFor Respondent