COMPAGNIE GENERALE DE GEOPHYSIQUE NIGERIA LIMITED V. OKPARAVERO MEMORIAL HOSPITAL LIMITED
(2011)LCN/4711(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 13th day of July, 2011
CA/B/329/2005
RATIO
CONTRACT: WHETHER A CONTRACT MAY BE IN WRITING, ORAL OR IMPLIED
…it is an established rule of law that contracts may be in writing oral or even implied. Consequently, a contract between parties may be expressed by words or by an agreement in writing. Similarly, contract could be implied by conduct of the parties themselves as in this instant case. See Majekodunmi V. National Bank of Nigeria Ltd (1978) 3 SC 119 at 127; B. Stabilini & Co. Ltd V. Obasi (19 97) 9 NWLR (pt 502) 293 at 297. Similarly, a contract may be subject to the terms that are implied by question or trade usage. See British Crane Corporation V. Pswich Planllire Ltd (1975) QB 303 or (1974) All ER 1059. PER AMIRU SANUSI, JCA
JUSTICES:
AMIRU SANUSI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
GEORGE OLADEINDE SHOREMI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
COMPAGNIE GENERALE
DE GEOPHYSIQUE NIGERIA LIMITED – Appellant(s)
AND
OKPARAVERO MEMORIAL HOSPITAL LIMITED – Respondent(s)
AMIRU SANUSI, JCA (Delivering the leading Judgment): At the High Court of Justice Delta State (the lower court for short), the respondent herein as plaintiff at the lower court filed under Undefended List, a claim of five hundred and three thousand fifteen Naira only (N503, 015.00) with interest thereon against the defendant now appellant. The subject of the claim was the alleged breach of contractual agreement between the two parties by the defendant/appellant for its failure or refusal to settle medical charges on treatment rendered on the two staff of the appellant company when they got involved in motor accident and were rushed to the plaintiff hospital and were admitted and treated at the respondent hospital even though one of the two patients by name Ebenezer Omene passed on while on admission and the other patient Daniel Majekodunmi recovered and was later discharged from the hospital.
On receipt of the court processes filed under the Undefended List, the appellant indicated its intention to defend the suit, hence the lower court transferred it to the General Cause List. In filing its defence, the defendant/appellant denied that it authorized or instructed that the two staff or any patient for that matter should be sent to the plaintiff/respondent’s hospital for treatment. It also denied ever having any medical or retainership agreement with the respondent hospital. The suit later went on full-blown trial and in the end, the lower court found in favour of the plaintiff/respondent in its considered judgment delivered on 20th April, 2004, wherein it held the defendant/appellant liable for the hospital fee claimed by the plaintiff/respondent as mentioned above, albeit, refused to award any interest on the said sum.
Aggrieved by the decision of the lower court, the defendant appealed to this court. To that effect, the appellant filed its Notice of Appeal dated 24th May, 2004 containing four grounds of appeal. Out of the four grounds of appeal, the appellant distilled two issues for the determination of the appeal as contained in its brief of argument dated 21/12/2005 and filed same day. The two issues for determination the appellant proposed are: –
(1) Whether there was enough and proper evaluation of issues and evidence to warrant the liability of Appellant to Respondent.
(2) Whether the learned trial judge relied on relevant facts and law in awarding damages.
The appellant also filed Appellants Reply Brief on 20/5/2008 dated 6th December 2007, which I will comment on later in this judgment.
On its part, the respondent, upon had been served with appellant’s brief of argument, responded by filing its own Respondent’s Brief of Argument on 25/6/2007 but dated 20/5/2007 but deemed filed 20/5/2008. In the said brief only one issue was formulated for determination of the appeal, which reads thus: –
“Whether the respondent is entitled to be paid for the medical services rendered to the acknowledged staff of the Appellant, named MR. DANIEL MAJEKODUNMI and EBENEZER OMENE (deceased).
A close look at the issues raised by the two parties left me with the view, that the first issue raised by the appellant is more-or-less the same with the sole issue raised in the respondent’s brief. They only differ in the manner they were couched. Treating the appeal in either of them will to my mind, adequately determine the questions canvassed by the parties in the appeal. The second issue raised by the appellant is also sufficiently subsumed by either of the two issues; hence it will be superfluous to consider it separately. I shall therefore in treating this appeal, be guided by the sole issue raised in the respondent’s brief in view of its elegance.
The learned appellant’s counsel submitted that in his judgment, the trial judge in one breath on page 146 of the record of appeal found that the treatment of the appellant’s staff was contractual since they were staff and there was discussion and negotiations going on between the two parties herein. The trial judge as such simply found that there was merely an invitation to treat and there was no contractual agreement between the parties on retainership as would justify the appellant to accept, admit and treat the injured staff on behalf of the appellant. But in another breath, the learned trial judge found contrarily, that there was standing oral contractual retainership agreement between the parties. He submitted that since the trial judge had admitted that the relationship between the parties was merely at the stage of invitation to treat, he should have rejected the contention of a standing contractual relationship. He said the trial judge should not have provided further facts to boost the level of relationship to a contract since it had not reached the stage of an offer, which was not there at all. He stated that in view of that, the appellant’s staff treatment stands on its own contractual plat- form and did not flow from any standing retainership agreement, as there was never any such relationship at all. See Sparkling Breweries Ltd v. UBN Ltd (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt 737) 359 or (2001) FWLR (Pt 71) 1682. Since the trial court was convinced that the relationship between the parties was nothing beyond invitation to treat and that there was no retainership agreement upon which the claim of payment was based, the only option open to the trial court was to dismiss the claim, submitted the learned appellant’s counsel. He also argued that since the court was not sure of the existence of retainership contract between the parties but was certain that the relationship between them was merely at the stage of invitation to treat, it should have found that there was no valid retainership agreement. See K.S.U.D.B V. Fanz Const. Ltd (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt l42) 1 at 44. It is also the submission of the learned appellant’s counsel that the trial court considered the core issue before, which was the treatment of the two patients which was on its own and held the appellant liable for the settlement of the bill for the said treatment simply because they were brought to the respondent’s hospital by the staff of the appellant who was even not authorized to take them to that hospital by the respondent in view of the absence of any written retainership agreement between the parties or written reference letter sent to the respondents authorizing them to treat the two patients on its behalf as should be the case and in compliance with the appropriate standard and accepted procedure in that type of situation. In the instant case, added the learned appellant’s counsel, the appellant pleaded a documentary document to show the procedure of referring patients to a hospital, which should be through a reference letter as applicable to all corporate bodies such as the present appellant. He also submitted that the staff of the appellant got involved in the accident not in the course of their official duties as the accident occurred outside the normal approved official working hours but while on their own frolics or errand and also outside the company’s premises, hence the appellants could not be held liable to pay for their treatment. See Odebunmi V. Abdullahi (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt 489) 526 at 538. While urging this court to take judicial notice of the practice in corporate bodies in referring patients to private hospitals, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that they adduced adequate evidence oral and documentary on the procedure for referring staff through reference letter and that the appellant and respondent had never previously entered into any retainership agreement and had also never referred any of its staff to the respondent hospital for treatment. He said the trial judge was therefore wrong in his finding that there was any oral retainership agreement which was also denied by them through a pleaded documentary evidence (Exhibit M) which the trial judge failed or refused to consider before arising to his conclusion based on the oral testimony of the respondent and its (respondent’s) Exhibit P which was even not pleaded and was earlier withdrawn but relied on by the learned trial judge in his finding on the existence of oral retainership agreement. He argued that parties are bound by their pleadings and any evidence, which was not pleaded, goes to no issue and must be expunged and he urged me to do same. See Nwanji V. Coastal Services (Nig.) Ltd (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt 885) 552.
It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the core issue that the trial court failed to consider and determine is the circumstance upon which the two patients were brought to the respondent hospital e.g. by who or at whose instance. The burden to trace proves that squarely lies on the plaintiff/respondent as the party that made or pleaded such issue or averment by virtue of Section 135 (1) of Evidence Act. See also UNTHMB v. Nnoli (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt 363) 376 at 403. The learned counsel to the appellants argued that there were series of contradictions in the evidence adduced by the respondent on this. For instance, in its pleadings on the name and identity of the medical advisor to the appellant, whether the two patients were brought at the same time or differently and at what intervals, the number Registration number of the ambulance that conveyed the first patient to the hospital and the name of the appellant’s medical officer(s) who brought or accompanied the patient(s) to the respondent hospital i.e. one, two or three of them? He said the evidence led by the respondent on these aspects were contradictory and conflicting with one another throughout the proceedings and that such contradictions were material to the case of the respondent. He submitted that the law is trite, that the case of a party must be consistent in order to prove same. A party would not be allowed to take one stance in his pleading and then to summersault at the trial and give or take a different stance as the respondent did in the present case in the instances mentioned supra. He on this submission reliance was placed on the case of Ajide V. Kelani (1985) 33 NWLR (Pt 12) 248; He then said that in view of his above submissions this court should hold that the trial court ought to have rejected the evidence of the respondent with regard to who sent the two patients to respondent hospital or that they were sent there at the instance of the appellant as held by the trial court in view of the contradictions highlighted above which were not explained by the respondent. See Okeji V. Olokoba (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt 654) 513; Adebayo V. Ighodalo (1996) 5 SCNJ 23. He further argued that any evidence, which is at variance with the pleadings, indicates unfaithfulness and should be rejected. See Nnajiofor V. Okonu (No.2) (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt 36) 505.
The learned appellant’s counsel went further to submit that the respondent failed to lead evidence to show or establish the identity of the actual person who took the only surviving patient to the respondent hospital since it has the burden to adduce such evidence in proof of its allegation and the trial court failed to address such issue which the appellant’s referred to in its address. This failure so to do on the part of the trial court, according to the learned appellants’ counsel, led to miscarriage of justice, since the law is settled that presumption could be made that party who withhold or failed to lead evidence on a point which such evidence is available, the court could presume that such evidence was withheld by the party because if produced, it will be detrimental or unfavorable, to its case hence the withholding of same by it. See Section 149 (d) of Evidence Act and the case of Jallco Ltd & Anor V. Owoniboys Technical Services Ltd (1995) 4 NWLR (pt 391) 354 at 546.
Learned appellant’s counsel proceeded to submit that that the decision of the trial judge was arbitrary as it was inconsistent with the evidence adduced, as it failed to determine the question of who brought the patients and also it failed to evaluate, appraise and analyze the evidence led on who had actually brought the patients, hence he urged this court, though an appellate court, to interfere and evaluate the evidence and make its finding on it since the trial court failed to so. See IBWA Ltd V. John Elue Const. Co Ltd (2004) 7 NWLR (Pt 873) 601 at 614; Hussaini V. Ogbuokiri (2004) 7 NWLR (Pt 873) 524 at 542-543; Odiba V. Azege (1939) 9 NWLR (Pt 566) 370.
Then on the issue dealing with the award of damages by the trial court, the learned appellant’s counsel submitted that the trial judge was swayed by the alleged appellants failure to query or dispute the hospital bills sent to it by the respondent on the treatment of the two patients, hence it awarded them. He argued that Exhibit G was a clear denial of the bills at page 46 of the Record. He said, for instance the special damages claimed on treatment of a bone fracture and charges on the ambulance was queried or disputed by them, as there was no reference to fracture on the report the respondent sent to the appellants and considered in court. He said that that aspect of the respondent’s claim awarded by the trial court was strictly proved, likewise the claim of on transportation cost of ambulance to convey the patient to Dr. Sagay’s Clinic for fracture plastering. He also argued that even if the appellant did not deny or dispute the claim which fell under special damages the claimant still had the burden to strictly prove same. See Calabar Cement Co. Ltd V. Daniel (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt 188) 750; Odiba V. Azege (supra) UBA Plc V. Samba Pet Co Ltd (2002) 16 NWLR (Pt 793) 361 at 402; Onuigbo V. Nwekeson (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt 283) 533.
It was finally submitted by the appellants counsel, that the trial court appraisal and evaluation of the evidence was faulty, hasty and improper and the award of damage claimed by the plaintiff/respondent being special damages were not proved strictly as the law requires. He also opined that the trial court did not dispassionately consider all the issues raised by the parties counsel. See Polycarp Ojogbue Ajie Nnubia & 4 Ors (1972) 6 SC 227 at 236. He then urged this court to set aside the decision of the lower court.
On his part, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the learned trial judge was correct in finding in favour of the respondent and granting its entire claim for payment of medical bills for the treatment it gave to the appellant’s staff. He said the evidence led by the respondent through its medical director and the two witnesses it called were uncontradicted. He said PW3 Dr. Sagay said the doctor of the appellant on 26/1/1999 came to his hospital and informed him that he had a patient in respondent’s hospital with broken leg and that he was going to bring that patient to his hospital to apply plaster of pariscast (POP) on him and he obliged him. The witness also stated under cross examination, that he had earlier treated many staff of the appellant’s and was always paid by the appellant. He said after completing this treatment he sent his bill to the respondent hospital. He also submitted that when the bill was tendered in evidence the appellant as defendant, did not object to it and did not also cross examine PW3 through whom it was tendered hence that was sign of acceptance of same by the appellant.
On the issue of prior written contract or retainership or referral letter, the learned respondent counsel submitted that such did not arise because workers or staff of the appellant were previously sent to the respondent and were duly treated and bills forwarded to the appellant were duly settled by it.
He said flowing from this course of business relationship between the parties, the approach by the appellant through its medical officer Dr. O. Connor for retainership and the circumstances leading to the rushing of the two staff of the appellant to the respondent for medical treatment immediately after their accident and the forwarding of the bills without any rejection or query from it, clearly renders the insistence of having prior retainership agreement or referral letter as uncalled for and of no moment. He said in view of the surrounding circumstances leading to the rushing of the two patients/staff of appellant to the Respondent hospital, the latter is entitled to the settlement of the bills it sent to the appellant even without any prior written agreement or retainership or referral letter, since they were brought to the hospital by the appellant and they were its staff. He said the reason for none settlement by the appellant, namely, because the accident was caused by Dumex Nigeria Limited is frivolous as the appellant was liable to settle the bill since the patients were brought to the respondent hospital by it or on its instruction. The learned counsel further submitted that when the respondent wrote the appellant informing it about the treatment applied on its two staff by the respondent hospital, the appellant did not do anything as confirmed by DW1 and the respondent was allowed to continue with the treatment unabated even though it merely replied that that the bills were forwarded to Dumex Nigeria Limited. He said the appellant is therefore estopped from making that as its defence belatedly as that was not the position it held and maintained earlier and the trial judge was correct in taking that position. See Ude V. Oguji (1993) NWLR (Pt 580) 1; Iga V. Amaku (1976) 11 SC; Re Bature (1994) 1 NWLR (Pt 319) 325 Ratio 12 at page 240. The learned counsel for the respondent further argued that the patients were not staff of Dumex Nigeria Limited hence respondent could not have forwarded its bill to it. The appellant is therefore supposed to settle its bill and to if possible approach Dumex for reimbursement instead avoiding payment of the bills.
Learned counsel for the respondent again submitted that the trial court had duly and adequately considered and evaluated the evidence adduced in the case before it before arriving at its conclusion. This, as an appeal court, had therefore no business interfering with the evidence or reevaluating the evidence again argued the respondents counsel before and he urged this court to affirm the decision of the lower court in its entirely See Paul Charlie & 3 Ors V. Chief E.E. Gudi & 2 Ors (2001) All FWLR (Pt 362) 1992 at 1794/1995 R 4 at p 2010; Abdu Dagacin Beli V. Tijni Umar (2005) All FWLR (Pt 290) 1520 at 1523 R4 and 1530 Para E.G Livestock Feeds Plc v. Funtua (2005) All FWLR (Pt 95) 296 at 298 R1 Arowolo V. Ifabiyi (2002) FWLR (pt 95) 296 at 298 R I; Obidike V. State (2002) FWLR (Pt 37) 784 at 794 R14 pp 823 -924 para G-A.
As I said earlier, the appellant filed a two paged Appellants Reply Brief of Argument. Having gone through the said Reply Brief, I am of the firm view, that same did not deal with new issues or points raised in the respondent’s brief. By the provisions of Order 6 Rule 5 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2007, Reply brief is supposed to be a reply on new issues raised in a respondent’s brief. It is therefore not aimed at affording an appellant another opportunity to re-write or reargue his case or to fine tune the argument advanced in his main brief. In this present case all that the appellant did was to reply again to arguments raised in response to the point raised or canvassed in the appellant’s brief. The appellant is therefore precluded from further replying to the arguments raised in the respondent’s brief in as much as new or fresh issues were not raised or introduced in the respondent’s brief. It is my opinion therefore, that the contents of the Reply brief ran riot and violent to the provisions of order 6 Rule 5 of this Court Rules of 2007. See Cameroons Airlines V. Ofutuizu (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt 929) 200; Kayode V. State (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt 1063) 281 at 298. For that reason I shall discountenance the Appellant’s Reply Brief and discard same.
In this instant case, there is no dispute that the two staff who got involved in an accident were the staff of the appellant company and that they were also rushed to respondent hospital for treatment of the injuries they sustained as a result of the accident, by the appellant’s medical advisor. The parties are also ad idem that they under went the treatment in the respondent’s hospital even though one of them died while on admission. Equally not in dispute, is the fact that the patients were rushed to the respondent hospital by medical advisor of the appellant by name Dr. Connor even though there were minor discrepancies on the spelling of the name of Dr. Connor which I feel such discrepancies should not have been over flogged since the identity of the appellant’s medical advisor was not in doubt notwithstanding the wrong spelling or misspelling of his name in the Exhibit or pleadings. From the stance of the parties, there is also no dispute that the respondent treated the two patients sent to it for such treatment by the appellant and it later sent its bills for settlement. The appellant did not seem to question the bills or raise some doubts in the amount claimed therein by the respondent, except of course, the minor eyebrows it raised on the amount claimed on the treatment of the fracture sustained by one of the parties who was treated by Dr. Sagay.
To my mind the major disagreement between the parties is as to who was responsible to in settling the hospital bills. The appellant is denying liability to settle the bills mainly for two reasons:-
(1) That it did not agree to settle the bills because it did not authorize the rushing of the patients to the respondent hospital as there was no prior retainership agreement between it, and the respondent’s hospital and it had new sent or caused to be sent any referral letter to the respondent authorizing the treatment given to the patients by the respondent.
(2) That the bills should have been directed to Dumex Nigeria Limited which caused the accident for settlement instead of sending the bill to it (appellant).
Now let me consider the two reasons supra relied by the appellant for not honoring or settling the bill submitted to it by the respondent. At page 146 of the Record of appeal the respondent herein while testifying as PW1 at the trial court said inter alia, as follows:-
“I know the Defendant before they brought the patients to me. I knew the Defendant as far as 1996 when they operated in Elume. They used my clinic for their staff. Each time they had a patient, the patient was brought either by the doctor who was the medical advisor, an Egyptian or by a nurse. At no time was any referral letter brought with those patients and we treated, sent bills and the bills were paid. For example on 13th of May, 1996 I send a bill to the Defendant for two persons that I treated. This is a copy of the bill in question when I treated patient for the defendant in 1996 had no formal retainership agreement with them. It was all oral, the medical Advisor came to the hospital and discussed with me and therefore started sending patients.”
The above quoted piece of evidence was not disputed or challenged during cross examination by the appellant at all. The lower court perhaps based on that piece of evidence and other evidence adduced before, arrived at the under mentioned conclusion where it said thus:-
“The plaintiff therefore based his relationship of retainership on an oral agreement with no clearly defined terms. In this regard he tendered Exhibit PK to show the deposition in 1966-1998.”
The appellant’s grouse is that the piece of evidence quoted above was not pleaded. The piece of evidence as I understand it was aimed at establishing whether there was really the necessity of having a prior retainership or written agreement between the plaintiff/respondent and the defendant/appellant before the letter could be liable to settle the hospital bills sent to it by the respondent in view of the previous treatment it made to its patients without prior referral letter or retainership agreement. In paragraph 7 of the defendant counter affidavit the following averment was made: –
“In specific answer to paragraphs 2 and 9 of the affidavit Defendant states that Defendant never at any time instructed any body to rush a patient to plaintiff, moreso when Defendant has nobody known as DR O. Connor in its employment”.
Also in Paragraph 8 the appellant deposed as follow:-
“Defendant states that it his its own clinic where it staff who needs medical attention are rushed to when they are injured in hours of duty. Where there is need to refer any staff for further treatment Defendant does so by a reference letter only to its retainers.”
In view of the above averments therefore, it would not be correct to say that there was no pleading on that piece of evidence, as the respondent adequately met the appellant on the above averments in Paragraphs 8-13 of its Reply to Counter Affidavit.
Further to the above quoted testimony of PW1, there is also the testimony of PW2 or E.U. Sagay an Orthopedic Surgeon who treated one of the patients Mr. Daniel Majekodunmi on his fracture. He testified inter alia, that Dr. O. Connor the medical Advisor to appellant brought the patient to his hospital without getting any referral letter from the appellant and after the treatment the patient was taken back to the respondent hospital and he submitted his bills to the respondent hospital. While admitting that they handled many of appellant’s cases earlier, he said his bills were always promptly settled by the appellant.
From the foregoing, I think it has been established that there had been a long existing customer relationship between the parties herein even though there had not been a written contract agreement or retainership between them prior to the admission of the patients in the hospital. The patients were certainly taken to the hospital of the respondent for treatment by their medical advisor, Dr. O. Connor and the appellant had never denied that he was their medical advisor or that they had no knowledge of their staff being rushed to that hospital. If they did not approve or consent to their being admitted there, why did the appellant not protest on its patients being retained there receiving treatment but to merely revolt after bills had been sent to them for settlement? Again, why did they also not raise the issue of the patients getting involved in the accident while on their own errand or frolic after official working hours and cause them to be removed from the respondent hospital?
The trial court in its findings stated that the relationship between the two parties herein was based on its retainership on oral agreement. I do not agree more. The issue is, in a situation where such a transaction is based on oral agreement would it not be binding on the parties, especially where their conduct or practice approves of same to be binding on them? I think it is so, afterall, it is an established rule of law that contracts may be in writing oral or even implied. Consequently, a contract between parties may be expressed by words or by an agreement in writing. Similarly, contract could be implied by conduct of the parties themselves as in this instant case. See Majekodunmi V. National Bank of Nigeria Ltd (1978) 3 SC 119 at 127; B. Stabilini & Co. Ltd V. Obasi (19 97) 9 NWLR (pt 502) 293 at 297. Similarly, a contract may be subject to the terms that are implied by question or trade usage. See British Crane Corporation V. Pswich Planllire Ltd (1975) QB 303 or (1974) All ER 1059.
From the surrounding circumstances of this case, I am of the firm view, that there existed an oral agreement of retainership between the appellant and the respondent. It is also based on that oral retainership that the appellant caused its two patients to be rushed to the respondent hospital for treatment without any formal retainership agreement or referral letter and they were duly treated for the injuries they sustained in the accident before one of them passed on. The terms of the oral retainership could be implied that after the treatment bills could be sent to the appellant for settlement of same. It is my considered view therefore, that the defence posed by the appellant that the bills should have been passed by the respondent to Dumex Nigeria Ltd is of no moment and porous, since Dumex Nigeria Limited did not send the patients to the respondent and it had also not been shown that the respondent had any similar previous oral or written retainership agreement with Dumex Nigeria Limited or that it had any such previous dealings or transaction in that regard with it and also the patients were staff of the appellant and NOT of Dumex Nigeria Limited. It will therefore be preposterous for the appellant to suggest or insinuate that the respondent should pass its bill to Dumex Nigeria Limited for settlement. Thus, in the light of all that I said above, the sole issue has to be resolved in favour of the respondent and against the appellant and it is accordingly been so resolved.
In the result, it is my judgment that the appeal lacks any merit. It fails and is accordingly dismissed. The decision of the lower court is therefore hereby affirmed with an order on costs of N30, 000.00 to be paid to the respondent herein by the appellant.
GEORGE OLADEINDE SHOREMI J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of reading the Judgment of my learned brother SANUSI J.C.A. I agree with his reasoning in this appeal. I agree that it is established by evidence that there had been a long existing relationship between the parties so as to infer an oral contract.
I agree that the relationship between the parties was based on its retainership on oral agreement. It is an established rule of law that a contract may be in writing, oral or implied. A contract would be implied by the conduct of the parties themselves. See: MAJEKODUNMI V. N.B.N. LTD 1978 3SC 119 AT 127. B. STABILINI & CO. LTD V. OBASI (19971 9 NWLR (PT. 520) 293 AT 297 CA.
This appeal lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed by me.
The decision of the learned trial Judge is affirmed. Cost of N30, 000.00 is awarded in
CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME (Ph. D) JCA: I have had a preview of the Judgment just delivered by my learned brother, AMIRU SANUSI JCA.
For the reasons given and the conclusion reached in the lead Judgment, which I adopt as mine, I also find no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. I also award N30, 000.00 as costs to be paid by the Appellant to the Respondent.
Appearances
D.E. Ezaga Esq. For Appellant
AND
For Respondent
