COMMISSION OMORHIRHI & ORS. V. MICHAEL ENATEVWERE
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 11th day of March, 1988
SC.196/1986
JUSTICES
AUGUSTINE NNAMANI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
MUHAMMADU LAWAL UWAIS Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
CHUKWUDIFU AKUNNE OPUTA Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ABUBAKAR BASHIR WALI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
EBENEZER BABASANYA CRAIG Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
- COMMISSION OMORHIRHI
2. ODUDU EHWIEITWIE
3. OKPINRHO ESALUBI
4. VWERRHIKPE ESESEANOVWE
5. BANE ESESEANOVWE
(for themselves and on behalf of the Adobo family of Oha) Appellant(s)
AND
MICHAEL ENATEVWERE Respondent(s)
RATIO
CAN A PARTY BE ALLOWED TO RELY UPON A DEFENCE WHICH IS BASED ON FACTS NOT CONTAINED IN THE STATEMENT OF DEFENCE
A party shall not be allowed to rely upon a defence which is based on a fact or facts not stated in his statement of defence, unless he alleges such a fact or facts in his pleading by way of special defence. He must allege in his Statement of Defence any fact not stated in the statement of claim on which he relies in defence as establishing fraud and such other crime or any fact showing illegality – See Albert Adeoye v. Ibidun Jinadu (1975) 5 S.C. 102 and U.A.C. Ltd v. James Eggay Taylor 2 W.A.C.A. 70 at 71 where the Privy Council said –
“In the opinion of their Lordships there is no rule which is less subject to exception than the rule that charges of fraud, and a fortiori charges of criminal malversation or felony, against a defendant ought not to be made at the hearing of the action unless, in a case where there are pleadings, those charges have been definitely and clearly alleged so that the defendant comes into court prepared to meet them.” PER WALI, J.S.C
WHAT ARE THE MAIN FUNCTIONS OF PLEADINGS IN CIVIL MATTERS OF DISPUTE
Pleadings must be sufficient, comprehensive and accurate; as their main functions are to ascertain with such degree of certainty as humanly possible the various matters in dispute among the parties and those which there are agreements on them. Morenatu Oduke & Ors. v. Kasumu & Anor. (1966) N.M.L.R. 28. This will stop either party from surprising the other by raising an unforseen issue .PER WALI, J.S.C
WHAT IS A TRAVERSE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF A TRAVERSE TO ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN A STATEMENT OF CLAIM
A traverse may be by simple denial of the plaintiff’s allegation. But where a defendant fails to deny specifically an allegation of fact in the statement of claim and a denial cannot be reasonably inferred from the defendant’s pleadings, that fact will be taken as admitted and therefore regarded as established at the hearing without any further proof. See Samson Ajibade v. Miyowa & Anor. (1978) 9 & 10 S.C. 1 and Eko Odume v. Ume Nnachi & Ors. (1964) 1 All N.L.R. 329.PER WALI, J.S.C
WHETHER AN APPEAL COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE FINDINGS OF FACT BY THE TRIAL COURT
It is not the business of the appeal court to interfere with the findings of fact by a trial court which are justified and supported by the credible evidence adduced. Where the appeal revolved around issues of fact and there was nothing on the record to show that lower court was erroneous in those findings, the Court of Appeal would dismiss the appeal. See Lucy Onowah & Anor. v. J.J.I. Iserhien in Re Lucy Onowah -Appellant (1976) 9-105 S.C. 95 and Popoola Olubode & Ors. v. Alhaji A. Salami (1985) 4 S.C. 41. PER WALI, J.S.C
THE PRINCIPLE REGARDING THE STANDARD OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES
The elementary principle regarding the burden of proof is that generally, criminal cases are proved beyond reasonable doubt for in criminal cases there is a compelling presumption of innocence which must prevail unless the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty of the offence charged:- Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1942) 2 All E.R.373. In civil cases, on the other hand, the standard required is proof by preponderance of evidence; proof by putting the totality of the testimony adduced by both parties on an imaginary scale, the evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses on one side of the scale, and that of the defendant and his witnesses on the other side, then weighing them together to find out which side preponderates:
Odofin & Ors. v. Mogaji & Ors. (1978) 1 L.R.N. 212. PER OPUTA, J.S.C
- B. WALI, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The plaintiff’s claim as endorsed on the Writ of Summons is –
“The plaintiffs claim against the defendants jointly and severally is for the sum of N20,000.00 (Twenty thousand Naira) being special and general damages for the wrongful act of the defendants when on the 12th day of December 1981 at Okozi Village, within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the defendants trespassed on plaintiff’s farm without the consent and or authority of the plaintiff and indeed against his will and damaged his economic crops/trees to wit: Cassava stems, sugar cane, okra, tomatoes and melon.”
The claim was particularised as follows:-
“30,000 matured cassava stems at 30k each…. N9,000.00
10,000 matured sugar cane at 50k each… N5,000.00
5,000 tall okro at 50k each……… N2,500.00
1,000 fruit bearing tomato plants at 50k each… 500.00
2,000 matured melon balls at 20k each……… 400.00
General Damages………….. 2,600.00
Total……………………. N20, 000.00
The claims were denied. Pleadings were ordered and exchanged and issues joined. The case was set down for hearing. The parties called evidence to support the averments in their respective pleadings. In a judgment delivered by the learned trial judge (Akenzua J.) in which he meticulously considered and evaluated the evidence before him he found in favour of the plaintiff that-
“There is no evidence in support of the submission of the learned counsel for the defendants that stealing is the subject of the plaintiffs report. I therefore reject it. The nature of the defence pleaded in this case is a claim of title to Okozi land and a justification under customary rights granted to people including the plaintiff’s father, Oriche to farm in Okozi land. No plan of Okozi
land is tendered and no evidence of traditional history is given except evidence of dispute and quarrels over the said land by members of Adobor Family and the members of the Plaintiffs family. Despite these deficiencies in the defendants’ case, the defendants claim no relief in their Statement of Defence. I am satisfied that no defence has been filed against the plaintiffs action. I am consequently satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, the plaintiff has proved the trespass he had complained of; and has shown both from his own evidence as well as the evidence of the defence that the defendants did in fact enter the plaintiff’s farm and harvested or damaged the said crops.
As to damages, I am satisfied that the plaintiff had successfully proved the various items of his special damage. He called one, Oritsegbubemi Asifo Ajuya, P.W.3 and gave evidence of the prices attachable to the various crops claimed damaged or harvested by the defendants. This witness tendered Exhibit A-A1 which are documents titled:
“States Price List (A)
Confidential
Crop Valuation
and
Federal Price List (B)
Price List – All Federal Govt.
Projects”.
Never was this witness contradicted in his evidence as to the prices assigned to the various items of special damages claimed by the plaintiff. No alternative figures or prices were suggested to the witnesses or to the plaintiff himself. The defence appeared to be satisfied with the plaintiffs evidence on this and that of his expert witness P.W.3. I am therefore left with no alternative but to
accept the evidence of the plaintiff and his witness, the P.W.3. I therefore hold that the plaintiff had proved his claim on the Special Damages. On the whole of the evidence, the plaintiff has proved his case and he is entitled to judgment as follows:-
(a) 30,000 Cassava at 16k ………………. N4,800.00
(b) 10,000 sugar cane at 10k…………….. 1,000.00
(c) 5,000 tall okro at 20k ……………….. 1,000.00
(d) 1,000 tomatoes at 50k ………………. 500.00
(e) 2,000 melon at 20k ………………….. 400.00
Award (a), (b) and (c) in accordance with the undisputed prices contained in Exhibit A-A1 while Award (d) and (e) is the undisputed prices as per the plaintiff himself as not contained in Exhibit A-A1. In addition to the above, the plaintiff is entitled to General Damages assessed at N2,000.00 with cost against the defendants assessed at N200.00.
Thus the defendants shall pay to the plaintiff a total sum of N7,700.00 as special damages, N2,000.00 as general damages and N200.00 costs.”
Henceforth, both the plaintiff and the defendants will be referred to as the respondent and the appellants respectively.
Dissatisfied with the judgment of Akenzua J. the appellants appealed against it to the Court of Appeal, Benin Division. Before that Court, five grounds of appeal were filed and canvassed. These grounds were supported by the appellants’ Brief of Arguments. The respondent also filed Brief and during the hearing of the appeal in the Court of Appeal, learned counsel for both the appellants and the respondent made oral submissions. In a unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered by Musdapher, J.C.A., the appeal was dismissed. The judgment of the trial Court was affirmed and N250.00 costs was awarded to the respondent.
With the leave of the Court of Appeal granted on 17th February 1986, the appellants have now further appealed to this Court on grounds of law and mixed law and facts.
Before discussing the issues raised in this appeal I shall briefly state the facts involved in the case.
The respondent, Michael Enatevwere, who is also the respondent is Urhobo by tribe and lives in Orerokpe Village very close to Okozi Village. He has a farm in Okozi Village. In 1979 he started preparing the farm for planting crops and by 1980 the farm was ready and he planted cassava; tomatoes, sugar cane, okra and melon. Throughout the time he was preparing the farm and to the time he planted his crops nobody challenged or disturbed him.
In 1981, when the crops were ready for harvesting, the appellants entered upon the farm harvested and removed the crops. As a result the respondent filed an action against the appellants claiming the Sum of N20,000.00 as special and general damages for the appellants’ acts of trespass to the farm and the crops he planted therein.
In the appellants’ Brief of Arguments the following issues were formulated for determination –
“1. Is Section 137(1) of the Evidence Act applicable to the case or not
2. Were the Justices of the Court of Appeal justified in affirming the decision of the trial Court when that court allowed the plaintiff/respondent to make a case contrary to paragraph 3 of his Statement of Claim
3. Were the Justices of the Court of Appeal right in affirming the decision of the trial Court when that court placed reliance on and belief in and acted on the evidence of plaintiff-respondent, P.W.1 and 2 when the respondent had earlier told the Police in Exhs. C & D that he was the only one who saw the appellants harvesting his crops and no one else
4. Was there a defence to the action or not If so were the Justices of the Court of Appeal right in affirming the decision of the trial Court which said there was no defence to the action”
The three issues formulated were accepted and adopted by the respondent and same were re-produced at pages 4 – 5 of the respondent’s Brief.
In arguing issue (1) which is covered by ground 1 of the grounds of appeal, it was the contention of the appellants that in order for the respondent to succeed in his claim, the standard of proof required must satisfy Section 137(1) of the Evidence Act since the commission of a crime is directly in issue. He referred to paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim and some excerpts from the printed record. He also made reference to Section 383 Cap. 48 Vol. II Laws of Bendel State of Nigeria. In further support of his argument he cited
Okuatume v. Obabokor (1966) N.M.L.R. 47 at 48 and Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (1967) N.M.L.R. 45 at 47. He tried to distinguish the two cases supra from Ikoku v. Oli (1962) 1 All N.L.R. 194 in which it was decided that commission of crime was not directly in issue.
In reply to the submission above, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that Section 137(1) of the Evidence Act has no application in the case as the respondent’s claim was for a remedy against the acts of trespass committed by the appellants on his land and the consequential damage resulting therefrom to his crops. In support of his submission he referred and relied on Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (14th Edition) Paragraph 1335 at page 787; Herper v. Charlesworth (1825) and B & C at 574 and Okolo v. Uzoka (1978) 1 L.R.N. 192.
In order to find out whether or not the commission of crime is directly in issue in this action, the Statement of Claim as filed by the respondent should be examined. It is a short one and I reproduce it hereunder:-
“1. The plaintiff and the 1st defendant are farmers residing near Odiete Junction, Orerokpe, while the 2nd – 5th defendants are also farmers residing at Oba Village, Orerokpe.
2. On or about the 12th day of December, 1981, at Okozi Village, within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the defendants jointly and severally damaged/harvested plaintiff’s crops/economic trees on plaintiff’s large acreage of farm without the consent and authorization of the plaintiff and indeed against his will.
Particulars of (Special) Damages
30,000 matured cassava stems at 30k each ….. N9,000.00
10,000 matured sugar cane at 50k each …………N5,000.00
5,000 tall okra at 50k each …………………………. 2,500.00
1,000 fruit bearing tomatoe plants at 50k each …….. 500.00
2,000 matured melon balls at 20k each……………….. 400.00
General Damages …………………………………….. 2,600.00
Total…………..N20,000.00
3. The plaintiff witnessed the wrongful acts of the defendants as above adumbrated with other members of his family and thereafter lodged a report against the defendants at the Police Station who refused and or neglected to charge the defendants but referred the matter civil.
4. Plaintiff shall at the trial of this action rely on all legal and equitable authorities and or call expert evidence to substantiate his claims.
5. By reason of the damages to plaintiff’s crops/economic trees by the defendants as aforesaid, the plaintiff has suffered damage, inconvenience and loss of profits and has demanded the sum of
N20,000.00 as special and general damages for the infringement of his legal right but the defendants have refused and or neglected to pay the same wherefore plaintiff was compelled to institute this action and claim as per the Writ of Summons.”
On strict examination of the Statement of Claim quoted supra I am unable to see or to discern from it where the commission of crime was pleaded as contended by learned counsel for the appellants.
The learned trial judge adequately treated this issue in his judgment where he said-
“As to the submission by the learned counsel for the defendants that the claim formulated in paragraph 2 of the Statement of Claim amounts to a commission of crime. I do not, with the greatest respect to the learned counsel, agree that this is tenable.
It is urged upon the Court to hold that by the use of expression “Severing of the Cassava” amounts to stealing. In paragraph 2 of the Statement of Claim and, indeed, in the Writ of Summons, there is nowhere this expression was used by the plaintiff. If the expression came out in the oral evidence of the plaintiff, it must be understandable because the plaintiff gave his evidence in Urhobo language through an interpreter. So also his witnesses. What is alleged in the Statement of Claim is “damaged/harvested plaintiffs crops/economic trees”. If “severing” is used, learned counsel did not direct the Court to that expression during and after his address. Even if the expression “Severance” were used, it will not ipso facto connote stealing because there are two actions displayed by the person who severed. First by entering into the farm then touching the crops and then severing them from the plants in trespass. After severance, which is the first of the action taken by the severer, the crops are taken away then this a second action which is stealing of the crops. Thus if it is the contention of the learned counsel that his clients severed the crops from the plant or from the land then it is still trespass that they ever went into the land at all to touch the crops before severing them from the land. The acts of the person who went into a com field and there plucked all the corns from the field is a trespasser as well as being a thief, if it is known and proved that after committing the trespass he took possession of the crops he had plucked. In a situation like this an action for trespass can be at the instance of the owner of the com field if it is the defence of the defendant is that as owner of the land, the farm should not have been made by the plaintiff. It is trespass to remove any part of the soil of land in the possession of another or any part of the building or other erection which is attached to the soil so as to form part of the reality. It is a recognised act of trespass to sever anything attached to the soil or land. Thus in Clerk & Lindsell, 14th Edition, at page 787, paragraph 1355, it is laid down that the trespass may involve the severing and carrying away of things attached to the soil. What suffices here at the moment is that severance is trespass if done on another’s property. Being satisfied, therefore, that this is trespass, my next consideration is to see whether from the evidence, the plaintiff has proved his case. Thus the issue of proof under Section 137(1) Evidence Act is no longer applicable.”
The Court of Appeal after examining the pleadings and the evidence adduced as regards this issue, came to the same conclusion as did the learned trial judge when Musdapher, J.C.A., delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court said-
“I have carefully examined the pleadings in this case and the issue of stealing or any crime does not arise in this case. Section 137(1) of the Evidence Act only applies where there is a specific allegation of a crime so that its commission can properly be said to be a basis or foundation of the claim or defence as the case may be. See Nwobodo v. Onoh & Others (1984) 1 S.C. 1 at 40. See also Ikoku v. Oli (1962) 1 All N.L.R. Vol. 1 part 1194. The fact that the respondent had reported the appellants to the police and had accused them of criminal acts as in Exhibits C & D, does not necessarily mean he has grounded or based his case directly on the issue of a criminal conduct. His case, in accordance with his Statement of Claim is completely based on trespass and damages to his crops. The question of stealing the crops is not an issue between the parties.”
In WORDS AND PHRASES LEGALLY DEFINED (2nd Ed.) Vol. 5 at page 222, the word “Trespass” is given the following definition-
“Trespass is a wrongful act, done in disturbance of the possession of property of another, or against the person of another, against his will. To constitute a trespass the act must in general be unlawful at the time when it is committed………Whoever is in possession, may maintain an action of trespass against a wrongdoer to his possession.”
…..
“Every unlawful entry by one person on the land in the possession of another is a trespass for which an action lies … (and) a person trespasses upon land if he wrongfully set foot on, or rides or drives over it, ….. or pulls down or destroys anything permanently fixed to it or wrongfully takes minerals from it….”
In Godwin Nwankwere v. Joseph Adewunmi 1967) N.M.L.R. 45, the Federal Supreme Court, when considering the applicability of Section 137(1) of Evidence Act to civil proceedings said at page 48 –
“The section applies where “the commission of a crime by party to any proceedings is directly in issue”. The Act gives a number of words and phrases a special and precise meaning and in construing any particular provision of the Act it is essential to give effect to that meaning. Section 2 contains a definition of “fact in issue” which is far from including every allegation which might properly be made or denied in a pleading. The definition reads-
“fact in issue” includes any fact from which either by itself or in connection with other facts the existence, non-existence, nature or extent of any right, liability or disability asserted or denied in any suit or proceeding necessarily follows’
Fact “directly in issue” is not defined. Section 6 declares that evidence may be given of facts in issue and of “such other facts as are hereinafter declared to be relevant”. Section 9(1) states that “any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact”, which indicates that facts showing motive are not in the ordinary case to be included among the facts in issue but among the other facts declared to be relevant. In our view that is the way to regard the evidence of bribery in this case. The evidence that the defendant refused to return the certificate in order to bring pressure on the plaintiff to pay him the final #5 showed a motive for his act, but as the plaintiff could have succeeded in his claim without proving any motive it cannot be said that the alleged motive was a fact in issue or directly in issue.”
From the exposition of the law above, it is clear that where in a civil claim, a person can succeed without proving criminal motive, the motive cannot be regarded as a fact in issue in order to apply the provision of Section 137(1) of the Evidence Act. The respondent could have succeeded as he did, without proving any criminal motive in the appellants’ act of trespassing upon his land and harvesting/or destroying his crops. The statement of defence filed by the appellants also goes to confirm that the commission of crime was not in issue as the parties were litigating over the possession and ownership of the disputed land. Paragraphs 2, 18 and 19 of the Statement of Defence read
“2. The defendants deny paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the Statement of Claim. Defendants did not trespass on and destroy plaintiffs crops as alleged. Plaintiff suffered no damage.
18. Sometime after, the plaintiff and his people uprooted the cassava of the 1st defendant from the land in dispute, the 1st defendant reported this matter to the Police. The plaintiff and his people were arrested. They were later discharged on the ground that the land was in dispute. Shortly after this, the plaintiff filed this action against the defendants.
19. The defendants have rubber trees, cassava, yams, sugar canes, plantains, troughs and ponds on the land.”
The issues joined in the pleadings were simply on trespass and the subsequent destruction of the crops on the land in dispute. The precise forms into which the pleadings are cast, does not matter; the judge will look at the substance of the allegation.
The issue raised in Grounds 2 and 3 of the appellants’ Grounds of Appeal is directly connected with ground 1, and as such they must stand or fall by it.
As shown in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Exhibits C & D the statements made to the police by the respondent are of no effect to either the appellants’ or the respondent’s case in the manner they were introduced into the proceedings as evidence. The simple fact that the respondent averred in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim that he complained to the police as regards the appellants’ acts of trespass does not, in my view turn the complaint into a criminal one. As shown in that paragraph, the police refused to take any action as they regarded the complaint a civil matter between the parties. The appellants did not specifically plead Exhibits C and D in their Statement of Defence. At any rate, the best use that the appellants could have made of Exhibits C and D was to cross-examine the respondent on them when he was giving his evidence, in order to impeach his credibility. See Sections 208 and 209 of the Evidence Act. In the case of Ala de v. Aborishade (1960) 5 F.S.C. at 173, the Federal Supreme Court while commenting on the admissibility and use of Statements made by persons in previous proceedings said –
“that evidence given in a previous case can never be accepted as evidence by the court trying a later case except when section 34(1) of the Evidence Act applies. The evidence given in an earlier case by persons who also testify in a later case may be used for cross-examination as to credit but it is of no higher value than that. The pleadings in an earlier case may, however, be referred to show what was, in that earlier case, the claim or defence sought to be set up and to point to inconsistency on the part of one party or the other to the later case.”
Exhibits C and D were tendered during examination in chief of the 1st Defence Witness which is against the laid down principle – see Owanso Agbeyin v. The State (1967) N.M.L.R. 129 and Ifenedo v. The State (1967) N.M.L.R. 200. It cannot also be used or regarded as evidence upon which the court can act – see R. v. Joshua (1964) 1 All N.L.R. 1 and Onubogu & Anor. v. The State (1974) 9 S.C.1 at 20. The respondent was at no time in the proceedings before the trial court confronted with Exhibits C and D as required by Section 198 of the Evidence Act. See Alade v. Aborishade (1960) F.S.C. 160.
The appellants averred in paragraph 20 of their Statement of Defence that when they went into the land in dispute in possession of the respondent to stop the purported acts of trespass by the respondent’s servants, the respondent complained to the police, as a result of which the appellants were arrested but later released when they discovered the complaint was false; this in my view, did not specifically plead Exhibits C & D, the purported statement of the respondent to the police. It was the appellants’ case that the respondent accused them of stealing cassava and the burden was on them to prove that allegation. In their pleadings there is no averment that the respondent accused them of stealing. See Benson Ikoku v. Enoch Oli (1962) 1 All N.L.R. 194.
This disposes of the appellants’ complaint as contained in Ground 6 of the Grounds of Appeal. Accordingly, both grounds 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the Grounds of Appeal fail and are dismissed.
Grounds 4 and 5 of the Grounds of Appeal complain of insufficiency of evidence to sustain the judgment of the trial court.
The appellants’ contention under Ground 5 is that “once it was shown that the respondent’s statement to the police, Exhibit ‘D’ made at the earliest opportunity is inconsistent with the evidence in court the proper thing for the court to do was to disregard the evidence of the plaintiff in toto and hold that the plaintiffs case is not proved as required by law”; and in support of this the case of Joshua v. The Queen (1964) 1 All N.L.R. 1 at pp. 3 and 4 was cited. Learned counsel also submitted that the trial court did not consider the evidence of D.W.1, police Sergeant Katsina Ekiyekunmo who was said to have visited the farm trespassed upon by the appellants.
As for Ground 4 it was the learned counsel’s submission that the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal misdirected themselves in law in up holding the judgment of the trial court when that court had misdirected itself by holding that the appellants filed no defence to the action, and also claimed no relief. He referred to paragraphs 1 and 20 of the Statement of Defence and submitted that there was a general traverse to respondent’s pleadings, as well as a prayer to dismiss the respondent’s claim. The case of Services Press Ltd. v. Nnamdi Azikiwe 13 W.A.C.A. 301 was cited in support of the general traverse.
In reply to the submission above, learned counsel for the respondent referred to the evidence of D.W.1 and D.W.2 and submitted that by that evidence, the appellants had confirmed the acts of trespass on the respondent’s land. And on the complaint about contradictions in the respondent’s evidence and also establishing a case contrary to his pleadings, learned counsel submitted that the contradictions, if any, are not so material to affect the respondent’s case and that the evidence led was in line with his pleadings.
As rightly pointed out by the Court of Appeal, both Exhibits C and D were not put to D.W.1 to enable him explain the alleged contradictions between them and his evidence on oath. As I have earlier on said, Exhibits C and D were not pleaded by the appellants and therefore the respondent could not have joined issue on them. The Court of Appeal has adequately dealt with this issue in the lead judgment of Musdapher, J.C.A.
A party shall not be allowed to rely upon a defence which is based on a fact or facts not stated in his statement of defence, unless he alleges such a fact or facts in his pleading by way of special defence. He must allege in his Statement of Defence any fact not stated in the statement of claim on which he relies in defence as establishing fraud and such other crime or any fact showing illegality – See Albert Adeoye v. Ibidun Jinadu (1975) 5 S.C. 102 and U.A.C. Ltd v. James Eggay Taylor 2 W.A.C.A. 70 at 71 where the Privy Council said –
“In the opinion of their Lordships there is no rule which is less subject to exception than the rule that charges of fraud, and a fortiori charges of criminal malversation or felony, against a defendant ought not to be made at the hearing of the action unless, in a case where there are pleadings, those charges have been definitely and clearly alleged so that the defendant comes into court prepared to meet them.”
On the same issue relating to allegation of crime – see also E. N. Tamaklae v. The Basil Trading Co. Ltd. 6 W.A.C.A. 231 and S.Usenfowokan v. Sule Salami Idowu (1969) N.M.L.R. 77.
Pleadings must be sufficient, comprehensive and accurate; as their main functions are to ascertain with such degree of certainty as humanly possible the various matters in dispute among the parties and those which there are agreements on them. Morenatu Oduke & Ors. v. Kasumu & Anor. (1966) N.M.L.R. 28. This will stop either party from surprising the other by raising an unforseen issue ..
Reading the statement of defence as a whole, particularly paragraph 2, one would concede to the appellants that the germane issue raised and averred in paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the Statement of Claim, has been traversed. Paragraph2 of Statement of Defence provides –
“The defendants deny paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the Statement of Claim. Defendants did not trespass on and destroy plaintiff’s crops as alleged. Plaintiff suffered no damage.”
And in paragraph 20 of the Statement of Defence, relief was claimed.
It reads-
“The defendants contend that the action is very speculative and gold-digging and that it should be dismissed with costs against the plaintiff.”
In my view the averments in paragraph 2 of the Statement of Defence supra contain sufficient traverse to averments in paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of the Statement of Claim, thus joining issues, while paragraph 20 of the Statement of Defence also contains relief by praying the court do dismiss the action with costs.
A traverse may be by simple denial of the plaintiff’s allegation. But where a defendant fails to deny specifically an allegation of fact in the statement of claim and a denial cannot be reasonably inferred from the defendant’s pleadings, that fact will be taken as admitted and therefore regarded as established at the hearing without any further proof. See Samson Ajibade v. Miyowa & Anor. (1978) 9 & 10 S.C. 1 and Eko Odume v. Ume Nnachi & Ors. (1964) 1 All N.L.R. 329. Although it is not sufficient to make a general denial of the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s pleadings, but by common practice, this has now come to be accepted as sufficient traverse if put in the following standard and recognised form –
“Save as is hereinbefore (or hereinafter) admitted the said defendant denies each and every material allegation of fact, contained in the statement of claim as if same were set out herein and
traversed seriatum.”
See Mandillas & Karaberis Ltd. v. Lamidi Apena (1969) N.M.L.R. 199 and Edward Attah & Ors. v. Chukwurah Nnacho & Ors. (1965) N.M.L.R. 28, particularly at page 31 where the Supreme Court in considering a general traverse which is, in substance like the one quoted supra, said-
“Now it seems clear that the cumulative effect of these two paragraphs is that the appellants joined issue with respondents in respect of all the lands described in the pink area of Exhibit 2. By common practice a general traverse in the forms of paragraph 15 of the Statement of Defence has always been accepted and when employed it puts the opponent to proof of the facts stated or alleged.”
The statement of the learned trial judge that the appellants did not file a statement of defence to the respondent’s action complained of in this ground, did not in my view affect the decision arrived at by the judge. Before making the pronouncement he had already considered the evidence adduced by the parties in support of facts averred in their respective pleadings and made findings in favour of the respondent. He said –
“The defence of title to Okozi land put up by the defendants does not cover the nature of trespass alleged committed by them on the plaintiff’s crops/economic trees.”
….
“The nature of the defence pleaded in this case is a claim of title to Okozi land and a justification under customary rights granted to people including plaintiffs father, Oriche, to farm in Okozi land. No plan of Okozi land is tendered and no evidence of traditional history is given except evidence of dispute and quarrels over the said land by members of Adobor family and the members of the plaintiffs family….
I am consequently satisfied that on the balance of probabilities, the plaintiff has proved the trespass he had complained of; and has shown both from his own evidence as well as the evidence of the defence that the defendants did in fact enter the plaintiffs farm and harvested or damaged the said crops. As to Damages, I am also satisfied that the plaintiff had successfully proved the various items of his special damage. “As for the contradictions complained of by the appellants, which are in relation to Exhibits C and D and the evidence given by the respondent on oath, I have already stated that Exhibits C and D were not pleaded and are therefore not evidence before the court. The respondent was not even confronted with them to explain the inconsistencies or contradictions, even if to say they were pleaded and properly admitted. The conclusion reached upon by Musdapher, J.C.A. in the judgment had adequately dealt with this issue, and I need not say more than that.
It is not the business of the appeal court to interfere with the findings of fact by a trial court which are justified and supported by the credible evidence adduced. Where the appeal revolved around issues of fact and there was nothing on the record to show that the lower court was erroneous in those findings, the Court of Appeal would dismiss the appeal. See Lucy Onowah & Anor. v. J.J.I. Iserhien in Re Lucy Onowah -Appellant (1976) 9-105 S.C. 95 and Popoola Olubode & Ors. v. Alhaji A. Salami (1985) 4 S.C. 41.
Both grounds 4 and 5 must also fail.
On the whole, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal is hereby confirmed. The respondent is awarded N500.00 costs against the appellants.A. NNAMANI, J.S.C.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, WALI, J.S.C. and I entirely agree with his reasoning and conclusions.
It seems that the appellants made heavy weather of Section 137 of the Evidence Act. From the Writ of Summons filed by the respondent, and from pargraph 2 of his statement of claim, it is clear that the cause of action was trespass and consequential damages. The High Court and the Court of Appeal had made findings that crime was not in issue in this case. I see no justification to interfere with those concurrent findings. It is well established that Section 137 of the Evidence Act will only apply when crime is directly in issue Ikoku v. Oli (1962) 1 All N.L.R. 194; Fadare v. Attorney-General of Oyo State (1982) 4 S.C.1. This appeal does not have much substance, and I too do dismiss it. I abide by all the orders made by my learned brother, WALI, J.S.C., including the order for costs.M. L. UWAIS, J.S.C.: I have had a preview of the judgment read by my learned brother Wali, J.S.C. I agree that the appeal has no merit and that it should be dismissed. I accordingly, dismiss it with N500.00 costs to the respondent.
C. A. OPUTA, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of a preview in draft of the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother Wali, J.S.c. I am in complete and total agreement with him that this appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.
The claim before the court of first instance was “for the sum of N20,000.00 (Twenty thousand Naira) being special and general damages for the wrongful act of the defendants when on the 12th day of December , 1981, at Okozi Village the defendants trespassed on plaintiffs farm and damaged his economic crops/trees to wit: cassava stems, sugar cane, okra, tomatoes and melon … “. Pleadings were ordered, filed and delivered on both sides, and it is from the averments in those pleadings that one can gather the live issues that will go on to trial. The relevant paragraphs of the
Statement of Claims are:-
“2 On or about the 12th day of December, 1981, at Okozi Village…the defendants jointly and severally damaged/harvested plaintiffs crops/economic trees on plaintiffs large acreage of farm without the consent and authorization of the plaintiff and indeed against his will…
3. The plaintiff witnessed the wrongful acts of the defendants as adumbrated above with other members of his family and thereafter lodged a report against the defendants at the Police Station who refused and or neglected to charge the defendants but referred the matter civil” (Italics mine to emphasise the nature of the claim before the Court).
In view of the Issues For Determination as formulated in the Appellants’ Brief of Argument, I will straight away emphasise that in the Plaintiffs Writ of Summons, the expression used to describe the Defendants’ wrongful acts was” Trespass”. In paragraph 3 of his Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff did not hide the fact that he made a report to the Police with a view to the possible prosecution of the Defendants by the Police but the Police refused to prosecute and rather requested him to resort to his civil remedies.
What then was the answer of the Defendants to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Plaintiffs Statement of Claim reproduced above In paragraphs 2, 17 and 18 of their Statement of Defence, the Defendants pleaded thus:-
“2. The defendants deny paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the Statement of Claim. Defendants did not trespass on and destroy Plaintiffs crops as alleged. Plaintiffs suffered no damage.
17 Sometime later, the defendants noticed that the plaintiff was making farming grants to other people on payment of money to him. The defendants then summoned the plaintiff to the Otota of Okpe. The plaintiff refused to attend. The defendants then went on the land to stop all strangers from working on the land. Because of this act by the defendants, the plaintiff brought police to arrest the defendants by falsely telling the police that the defendants harvested his cassava. On investigation the Police discovered that the plaintiff told lies against the defendants who were then set free.
18. Sometime after, the plaintiff and his people uprooted the cassava of the 1st defendant from the land in dispute. The 1st defendant reported this matter to the police. The plaintiff and his people were arrested. They were later discharged on the ground that the land was in dispute. Shortly after this, the plaintiff filed this action against the defendants”.
From the paragraphs of the Defendants’ Statement of Defence especially paragraphs 17 and 18, it is quite evident that there is more in this case than meets the eyes; much more than an ordinary, simple and straight-forward case of trespass to land. Each side levelled accusations against the other; each side freely used the police against the other; and the bone of contention has always been the ownership of the land in dispute. The question now is- Was the trespass complained of by the present Plaintiff/Respondent a genuine trespass or was it just another decoy, another ruse in the parties’ continuing battle of affliction The surrounding circumstances of this case as they appear from the pleadings will compel any trial court to be wary and to insist on strict proof I will comment further on this aspect of the case when I consider the grounds of appeal and the Questions For Determination as formulated by the parties.
After due hearing on relevant evidence, the learned trial judge, Akenzua, J. found for the plaintiff and awarded him N9,700.00 general and special damages for trespass and N200.00 costs. Dissatisfied and aggrieved the Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal, Benin Division. That court dismissed the Defendants’ appeal and upheld and confirmed the decision of the Court of first instance. Again dissatisfied and aggrieved the Defendants have now finally appealed to this Court on six grounds of law, mixed law and fact, and of pure fact. As far as the appeal on fact is concerned, especially Ground 5 – the omnibus ground that the decision is against the weight of evidence, I will say straightaway that it is still the policy of this Court not to interfere with, or disturb, the concurrent findings of two lower courts on the facts unless some exceptional circumstances are shown which render those findings perverse.
Grounds 2, 3 and 6 of the Defendants/Appellants’ grounds of appeal mention and relate to two exhibits tendered during the trial- Ex.C (the report made by the Plaintiff to the Police) and EX.D (the Statement made by the Plaintiff to the Police in elaboration and support of his report, Ex.C). It will be more convenient to start with these grounds first, in order to determine the relevance, the value and the impact of those two exhibits on, and in, this case. But first let me reproduce the three grounds:-
“2. The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that “the contents of Exh.C (report to the Police) go to no issue joined between the parties” because the appellants did not plead same, whereas the respondent himself pleaded in paragraph 3 of his Statement of Claim that he lodged a report of the alleged crime to the Police. And it is this error in law that made the Justices of the Court of Appeal to uphold the erroneous decision of the trial judge.
3. The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law in upholding the judgment of the trial judge when it is clear from the judgment that the learned trial judge omitted and/or failed completely to consider the effect of Exhs. C and D on the case for the plaintiff, which failure led him to give the wrong decision.
6. The Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law in upholding the decision of the trial Court when that court erroneously:-
(i) permitted the plaintiff to make a case contrary to Exhs. C & D, and;
(ii) permitted the plaintiff to make a case contrary to paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim.
I underlined the expression “contents” used in Ground 2 of the grounds of appeal. I think it should by now, be obvious that lodging a report, (the fact that a report was lodged) is one thing, while the contents of that report will constitute an entirely different, thing. There are also radical and fundamental differences in the way in which either may be proved.
Now how does one prove the contents of a document under our law Section 90(1)(b) of our Evidence Act Cap 62 of 1958 makes a document admissible as proof of its contents if, inter alia, the maker of the document is called as a witness to produce and tender the document. There are, of course, exceptions to calling the maker of the document (Statement) to produce his document (statement) provided in the self same Section 90(1)(b) of our Evidence Act Cap 62 of 1958, but these do not apply here. In this case, Exhs. C and D were not tendered through their makers. Exhibit C is supposed to be the substance of a report allegedly made by the plaintiff to the Duty Officer at the Orerokpe Police Station. That Duty Officer was not called to tender Ex.C. The plaintiff whose report Ex.C purports to be, was not given any opportunity to affirm or deny the contents of Ex.C. when he testified in this case at the trial Court. Rather Police Sergeant No. 3886 Katsina Ekeyekumo called as D.W.1 tendered Ex.C. He also tendered EX.D. He was not the maker of Ex. D. He was only the recorder. The plaintiff who was the maker was again not given any opportunity to affirm or deny the contents thereof. The question now arises – From the hands of D.W.1 for what purpose will these two exhibits be admitted Each as proof of its contents Or each simply as a res – as a thing (Ex.C) he found in the Police file and as a Statement he recorded (Ex. D) at Orerokpe Police Station For one thing, D.W.1 could not have been and was in fact not cross-examined as to the truth, accuracy and correctness of the contents of Exs. C and D since he did not make them. From the hands of D.W.1 the contents of Ex.C and EX.D will be inadmissible as hearsay. They (Exs. C and D) can only be admissible to show that a report was made and that a statement was made but not as proof of their contents: see Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor (1956) 1 W.L.R. 965 where the Privy Council observed at p.970:-
“Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as a witness mayor may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made” (Italics mine).
This Court in Sanusi v. The State (1984) 10 S.C. 166 at pp.198/199 drew a similar distinction between tendering a document/statement just as a Res and tendering it as proof of its contents. If the contents of Exs. C and D are hearsay, as indeed they are in this case, how then can the two courts below be blamed for not using hearsay evidence to arrive at their conclusions
Exhibits C and D can in this case be rightly used for the purposes of cross-examination of the plaintiff in an attempt to impeach his credit under Section 198 of the Evidence Act. This was what the two courts below held and they are right. See Alade v. Aborishade (1960) 5 F.S.C. 167. They should therefore be applauded not blamed. That being so, Grounds 2, 3 and 6 of the Grounds of appeal all fail. That being so again the “3rd Issue Arising For Determination in This Appeal dealing with Exhs. C and D does not then arise.
I will now tackle the more difficult question raised in this appeal, namely:”
1. Is Section 137(1) of the Evidence Act applicable to the case or not”
The marginal heading of that Section is “Burden of Proof beyond reasonable doubt” and the Section stipulates:-
“137-(1) If the Commission of a crime by a party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceeding civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) The burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is, subject to the provisions of Section 140, on the person who asserts it, whether the commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in the action.
(3) …..
The elementary principle regarding the burden of proof is that generally, criminal cases are proved beyond reasonable doubt for in criminal cases there is a compelling presumption of innocence which must prevail unless the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty of the offence charged:- Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1942) 2 All E.R.373. In civil cases, on the other hand, the standard required is proof by preponderance of evidence; proof by putting the totality of the testimony adduced by both parties on an imaginary scale, the evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses on one side of the scale, and that of the defendant and his witnesses on the other side, then weighing them together to find out which side preponderates:
Odofin & Ors. v. Mogaji & Ors. (1978) 1 L.R.N. 212. But Section 137(1)of the Evidence Act insists on proof beyond reasonable doubt irrespective of the fact whether or not the proceedings are criminal or civil, once it is established that the commission of a crime by a party to such proceedings is directly in issue with emphasis on the clause “is directly in issue”.
The next question that naturally arises now is – Was the commission of a crime by any party to the present proceedings directly in issue This question is relevant because the learned trial judge at p.66lines 14-20 held:-
“I am consequently satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities the plaintiff has proved the trespass he had complained of and had shown both from his own evidence as well as the evidence of the defence that the defendants did in fact enter the plaintiffs farm and harvested or damaged the said crops”.
Obviously the learned trial judge applied a lower standard than that required under Section 137(1) of the Evidence Act and he will be right only if that Section is not applicable. That the main claim before the trial court is for trespass is really not the answer. For sometimes the same act may be both a crime and a tort like assault. By the decision of this court in Okuarume v. Obabokor (1966) N.M.L.R. 48 when the act which constitutes the tort in the civil proceeding is also a crime, (in that case an assault) then that act, which is a crime, and which is directly in issue, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt whether the proceedings be civil or criminal “otherwise a person who alleges that he was assaulted might fail to prove the assault in a criminal prosecution and yet obtain judgment in civil proceedings”.
The next question is – how can the trial court determine whether or not “the commission of a crime by a party to the proceeding is directly in issue” Again this question has been answered in many cases decided by this Court when it considered the operation and scope of Section 137(1) of the Evidence Act. In Ikoku v. Oli (1962) 1 All N.L.R. 194 at pp.199/220, this Court postulated:-
“….the sub-section only applies where there is a specific allegation of a crime in the pleadings, so the commission of a crime can properly be said to be a basis or foundation of the claim or defence, as the case may be. For example, the sub-section would apply where a defendant in an action for libel pleaded justification of an allegation that the plaintiff had committed a criminal offence or where a petitioner sought divorce ….. on the grounds of rape, sodomy or bestiality
…
Facts directly in issue are to be distinguished from facts which come collaterally into question….”
The latter point was elaborated more in the case of Nwankwere v. Adewunmi (1967) N.M.L.R. 45 at p.48 where this Court held that even where a plaintiff makes an allegation of crime in his pleadings but nevertheless can succeed in his claim without proving the crime, it cannot there be said that the commission of the alleged crime was a fact directly in issue.
I will now apply the two principles distilled from the Ikoku v. Oli and Nwankwere v. Adewunmi supra to the facts of this case. Chief Idigbe in his Brief submitted that the claim in this case contained an allegation of the crime of stealing against the Defendants because that was the crime the plaintiff reported to the Police as contained in Exhibits C and D. Having held that the contents of Exs.C and D constitute inadmissible hearsay evidence, I will not now rely on them to found any allegation or imputation of crime against any party to these proceedings. I will rather go to the pleadings. No paragraph of the Statement of Claim charged the Defendants directly with any crime. The nearest is paragraph 3 which talked of “the wrongful acts of the defendants as adumbrated above” that is in paragraph 2. Paragraph 2 alleged that the Defendants “damaged/harvested plaintiff’s crops/economic trees in a plaintiff’s large acreage of farm”. This certainly is not an allegation of the crime of stealing. Even where the crops and economic trees were severed from the land and removed, this would still be trespass to the land or conversion of the severed crops and trees. Now stealing is conversion coupled with an animus furandi not just conversion which is tort. Also the mere entry into the land of the plaintiff was trespass. The plaintiff needed not even prove more than that, to succeed. Thus the old Writ of trespass commanded the defendant to show cause quare clausum querentis fregit. The mere intrusion of the defendants into the land found by the learned trial judge to be in the possession of the plaintiff (and there has not been a reversal of that finding) is trespass. Because the pleadings of the parties do not contain any specific allegation of crime and because from those pleadings the plaintiff needs not prove stealing (or any crime for that matter) to succeed in his action for trespass, I too hold that Section 137(1) of the Evidence Act does not apply to this case. The trial judge was therefore right to use the “lower standard” of preponderance of evidence here, rather than the “higher standard” of proof beyond reasonable doubt. I also hold that the Court of Appeal, Benin Division was right to say that the Benin High Court was right in saying that Section 137(1) of the Evidence Act does not apply.
The more intriguing aspect of this appeal is that the learned trial judge made the following findings and statements, which make the entire battle over Section 137(1) of the Evidence Act look like a storm in a tea-pot or more appropriately like mere semantics, a mere play on words:-
At pp.63, 64 and 66 the judge found:-
(i) “I believe the plaintiff that his crops had been wrongfully harvested by the defendants who unwarrantedly went into his farm situate in Okozi land to effect same”.
(ii) “I am satisfied that the defendants did this in order to drive away the plaintiff from the land …. ” (p.64 lines 2 to 4).
(iii) “The defence of the defendants cannot excuse them from liability. “(p.64 lines 6-7).
(iv) “This case has been established by the evidence of the parties; both the plaintiff and the defendants…” (p.64 lines 19-20).
(v) “I am consequently satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, the plaintiff has proved the trespass complained of ……” (p.66 lines 15-16).
In view to the findings above and following this court’s decision in Nwankwere v. Adewunmi supra I will even say that even if Section 137(1) of the Evidence Act applies (which I hold does not apply) it has been complied with.
This then leads to something more radical and more substantial. What is the meaning of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” used in Section 137(1) of the Evidence Act Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community both in criminal as well as in civil cases if what is required is proof beyond the shadow of a doubt, if what is required is absolute certainty- Miller v. Minister of Pensions supra.
Even in criminal cases where it is required that the charge be proved “beyond reasonable doubt” – even there, there are degree of proof within that standard. In other words, in proportion as the crime is enormous so ought the proof to be clear. In civil cases, requiring proof by preponderance of evidence, even there too, there may be degrees of probability within the standard. In both criminal and civil cases, it is obvious that the degree depends on the subject-matter. From the above it is safe to assume that in both criminal and civil cases, the general rule would seem to be that the circumstances of each case must be such as would lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to reach the conclusion reached by the trial judge. The degree of probability required to reach that conclusion as well as the degree of doubt which would prevent one coming to that conclusion would depend on the conclusion to be arrived at. If in either case the reasonable prudent and just man entertains real and substantial doubt, of course he will not arrive at the conclusion (he will not enter judgment if you please). And what is real and substantial doubt Is it not another way of saying a reasonable doubt And a reasonable doubt will surely prevent a reasonable prudent and just man from coming to the conclusion – (the judgment). In other words in either criminal or civil cases the trial judge has to be satisfied and in either he cannot be satisfied if he has reasonable doubt. When this is realised, then the phrase “reasonable doubt” can be used justly and aptly in a civil as well as in a criminal case. In that con, Section 137(1) of the Evidence Act has not added much to the discussion. The point is that any and every allegation has to be proved to the satisfaction of the judge.
This leads on to the final point. The learned trial judge said he was satisfied that the Plaintiff had proved his case. To be satisfied and still have a reasonable doubt would be a very uncomfortable state of mind. I will venture to say that it is an impossible state of mind: Bater v. Bater (1951) Probate W.35 at p.36 per Bucknill, L.J. If the trial judge was satisfied it then meant that the Plaintiff/Respondent proved his case, proved his material averments, beyond reasonable doubt.
In the final result and for all the reasons given above and for the fuller reasons in the lead judgment of my learned brother Wali, J.S.C. which I now adopt as mine, I, too, will dismiss this appeal and same is hereby dismissed. I will abide by all the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.E. B. CRAIG, J.S.C.: I have had a preview of the judgment of my learned brother Wali, J.S.C. and for the reasons given by him, I agree that this appeal fails and should be dismissed. The only point of substance in the whole appeal was whether Sec.137(1) of the Evidence Act applies to the facts of this case. In his Writ of Summons, the Plaintiff had sued for trespass together with a claim of N20,000.00 as general and special damages. In his Statement of Claim he pleaded that the Defendants had wrongfully entered on his farmland at Okozi Village, damaged and/or harvested his crops and taken them away. He later reported the matter to the Police who advised him to take civil action against the defendants.
The main argument presented by the Defence Counsel Mr. Giwa, is that the acts pleaded by the plaintiff as having been done by the Defendants, i.e.
(i) the trespass – (entry on the land)
(ii) the damage to the crops
(iii) the harvesting of crops without permission and
(iv) taking them away (asportation).
amount to an allegation that the Defendants had stolen the Plaintiffs crops. In Counsel’s submission, this is a crime and should have been proved “beyond reasonable doubt” as required by Sec.137(1) of the Evidence Act.
This point, in my view, was adequately dealt with in the judgment of the lower Court as well as in the lead judgment, and I merely wish to add a few words of mine for emphasis.
As previously stated, the plaintiffs claim in the trial court was simply one for trespass and consequential damages. In my view, that claim was not predicated on the commission of any crime and crime was not an issue in the case. Indeed, the issue between the parties was whether the Defendants had trespassed on the land in dispute and not whether they had stolen any crops on it.
It may be argued that the sum total of the acts of the Defendants, (if stretched far) probably amounted to the offence of “stealing”, but the plaintiff has not based his case on stealing. He did not allege that the Defendants “stole” anything. He in fact did not use the word “steal” in his Statement of Claim, and therefore he was not obliged to prove any stealing in order to succeed in his case. This means that “stealing” was not a direct issue between the parties, and the plaintiffs case cannot be determined on a point which was not in issue. Benson Ikoku v. E. Oli (1962) 1 All N.L.R. 194.
The claim before the Court was one for the tort of trespass and the plaintiff is entitled to succeed if he shows by a preponderance of evidence that the Defendants have disturbed his possession of the farmland. This he did and I am of the view that the trial court was right to give judgment in his favour. The Court of Appeal was also correct to confirm that judgment.
For the reasons more fully set out in the lead judgment,I agree that this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is hereby affirmed. I make the same order as to costs as is contained in the lead judgment.Appeal Dismissed
Appearances
P.O. Giwa (with him A.M. Shaibu) For Appellant
AND
Chief Akpedeye For Respondent



