COAST OIL LIMITED v. TUBOSCOPE VETCO INTERNATIONAL & ANOR
(2019)LCN/12657(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 6th day of February, 2019
CA/L/1022/2014
RATIO
COURT AND PROCEDURE: PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST
“Pre-judgment interest can be awarded where it is contemplated in an agreement between the parties, under a mercantile custom and under the principle of equity such as breach of fiduciary relationship. See Ekwunife v. Wayne (WA) LTD (1989) 5 NWLR (PT 122) 422 at 445, Idakula v. Richards (2001) 1 NWLR (PT 693) 111 at 122, 124 and 124-125, Sani Abacha Foundation v. UBA PLC (2010) 1 NACLR 264 at 272, Berende v. Usman (2005) 14 NWLR (PT 944) 1 and Berliet Nigeria LTD v. Kachalla (1995) 9 NWLR (PT 420) 478. The entitlement to interest must be established by credible evidence: Reo Enterprises v. Nwosu (2002) 11 WRN 16 at 33 and R.C.C. (NIG) LTD vs. R.P.C LTD (2005) 10 NWLR (PT 934) 615 at 640-641.” PER UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
CONTRACT: PRIVITY OF CONTRACT
“It is an elementary principle of law that the doctrine of privity of contract is to the effect that a person who intends to enforce a contract must show, not only that he gave consideration, but also that he is a party to that contract. In law, a contract exists only between the parties to it. A person who is not a party to the contract cannot sue upon it. By the doctrine of privity of contract, a contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations arising therefrom on any person except parties to it. Put simply, a stranger cannot acquire rights or incur obligations arising from a contract to which he is not a party. See REICHIE v. NBCI (2016) LPELR (40051) 1 at 25, REBOLD INDUSTRIES LTD v. MAGREOLA (2015) LPELR (24612) 1 at 22-23 and INCAR v. OJOMO (supra).” PER UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
CONTRACT: PRIVITY OF CONTACT
“The appellant, on the settled principle of the doctrine of privity of contract, was a stranger to the contractual relationship between the 2nd Respondent and Vetco Inspection GMBH, hence the appellant cannot enforce that contract. Makwe v. Nwukor (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 733) 356; (2001) LPELR – 1830 (SC) F.O. Negbenebor v. E.O. Negbenebor (1971) All N.L.R. 210; Ikpeazu v. A.C.B Ltd. (1965) 1 N.M.L.R 374 @ 379.” PER TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU J.C.A
JUSTICES:
TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
GABRIEL OMONIYI KOLAWOLE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
COAST OIL LIMITED – Appellant(s)
AND
1. TUBOSCOPE VETCO INTERNATIONAL
2. SHELL PETROLEUM DEVT. CO. LTD – Respondent(s)
UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
The Appellant and the 1st Respondent had a business relationship wherein they executed contract projects in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria. While the business relationship lasted they executed contracts for the 2nd Respondent. The business affairs of the Appellant and 1st Respondent went catawampus and litigation arose as a consequence. The action which spawned this appeal was instituted by the Appellant before the High Court of Lagos State in Suit No. LD/926/2000: Coast Oil Limited v. Tuboscope Vetco International & Anor. The Appellant claimed the following reliefs:
1. As against the 1st Defendant:
(i) An Order that the partnership between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant be dissolved.
(ii) An Order that the affairs of the partnership be wound up.
(iii) Sale of partnership assets.
(iv) For the purpose aforesaid that all necessary accounts and inquiries be taken and made.
(v) Payment to the claimant of all sums found due to the Claimant on the taking of the said accounts.
(vi) Interest on the sums found due to the Claimant at Central Bank of Nigeria rates per annum from 1999 to judgment;
(vii) Interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of judgment until the final liquidation thereof.
(viii) Such further or other relief as the Court may deem fit.
(ix) Costs.
2. As against the 2nd Defendant:
(i) The sum of N2,561,145.70 (Two Million, Five Hundred and Sixty-One Thousand, One Hundred and Forty-Five Naira, Seventy Kobo) being monies due from the 2nd Defendant to the Claimant for price adjustments under Contract No. L-1239.
(ii) Interest on the said sum at the rate of 21% per annum from June, 1995 till judgment.
(iii) Interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of judgment until final liquidation thereof.
(See pages 289-290 of Volume 1 of the Records)
The parties filed and exchanged pleadings and the matter went to trial with the parties adducing testimonial and documentary evidence. At the hearing, the Appellant abandoned reliefs 1 (i)-(iii) against the 1st Respondent and pursued the other reliefs. In its judgment, the lower Court entered judgment in part for the Appellant against the 1st Respondent but dismissed the case against the 2nd Respondent. The Appellant was dissatisfied with the judgment of the lower Court and appealed against the same. The scarified judgment of the lower Court which was delivered on 22nd January 2013 is at pages 809-826 of Volume II of the Records, while the Notice of Appeal which was filed on 10th April 2013 is at pages 827-830 of Volume II of the Records.
The Records having been compiled, the parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument. The Appellant’s Brief was filed on 3rd June 2016 but deemed as properly filed on 7th March 2017. The 1st Respondent’s Brief was filed on 21st July 2016 but deemed as properly filed on 28th November 2018 while the 2nd Respondent’s Brief was filed on 7th March 2017. At the hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the parties urged the Court to uphold their respective submissions in the determination of the appeal.
The Appellant formulated three issues for determination as follows:
(i) Whether or not the learned trial Court misdirected itself as to the Appellant’s claim for interest in the paragraphs of its Judgment complained of in this appeal.
(ii) Whether or not the Appellant is entitled to interest on the yearly commissions due to it from the 1st Respondent between 1999 and 2007.
(iii) Whether or not the reasons relied upon by the trial Court for dismissing the Appellant’s claims against the 2nd Respondent are justifiable.
The 1st Respondent distilled a sole issue for determination in respect of the appeal as it affected it, namely:
Whether the decision of the trial Court on the claim for pre-judgment interest was proper having regards to the law and the peculiar facts of this case.
The 2nd Respondent adopted the Appellants issue number three which addressed the part of the decision of the lower Court that affects the 2nd Respondent.
Now, the Appellant raised two grounds of appeal from which it distilled three issues for determination. This is not proper. The settled legal position is that it is not proper to proliferate issues for determination. The issues for determination must not outnumber the grounds of appeal; they can be equal or less but definitely not more. An issue can be crafted from more than one ground of appeal but it is not desirable to split a ground of appeal into a number of issues. See Agu v. Ikewibe (1991) 3 NWLR (PT 180) 385 at 401, Highgrade Maritime Services LTD vs. F. B. N. LTD (1991) LPELR (1364) 1 at 29, Teriba vs. Adeyemo (2010) LPELR (3143) 1 at 10 and Nduul vs. Wayo (2018) LPELR (45151) 1 at 19. The Appellants issue numbers one and two which are distilled from ground one of the grounds of appeal are not proper.
In the circumstances, I will discountenance with them and adopt the sole issue for determination distilled by the 1st Respondent and the Appellant’s issue number three for purposes of resolving this appeal. For clarity, the issues on which I will presently consider the submissions of learned counsel and resolve this appeal are as follows:
1. Whether the decision of the trial Court on the claim for pre-judgment interest was proper having regards to the law and the peculiar facts of this case.
2. Whether or not the reasons relied upon by the trial Court for dismissing the Appellant’s claims against the 2nd Respondent are justifiable.
The above issues only concern each Respondent on each issue, so the Respondents only proffered submissions on the issue that relates to them.
ISSUE NUMBER ONE
Whether the decision of the trial Court on the claim for pre-judgment interest was proper having regards to the law and the peculiar facts of this case.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT’S COUNSEL
The Appellant submits that the failure by the lower Court to award pre-judgment interest to it between 1999 and 2007 was occasioned by the lower Court misconceiving and misdirecting itself as to the reliefs claimed. The cases of Chidiak v. Laguda (1964) 1 ALL NLR 164, Abisi v. Ekwealor (1993) LPELR SC. 103/1990 and Nnadozie v. Mbagwu (2008) 3 NWLR (PT 1074) 363 were referred to on the meaning of misdirection and misconception. It was opined that the interest claimed was from 1999 to judgment and not from 2007 to judgment and that the Statement of Account, Exhibit C26, detailed in Appendix A thereof the total amount due to the Appellant between 1999 and 2007 without incorporating the interest component, which was the relief which the Appellant now claimed.
It was contended that the lower Court was under the misconception that the Appellant claimed interest because interest was awarded in favour of the 1st Respondent in an earlier suit and consequently failed to consider Exhibit C25 which computed the interest due to the Appellant. It was conclusively submitted that the misconception prejudiced the Appellant as the amount which was due to the Appellant on the judgment became drastically reduced as a result of the failure to award the interest claimed. The case of Sosanya v. Onadeko (2005) 8 NWLR (PT 926) 183 was relied upon and the Court was urged to invoke its power under Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act and amend the judgment of the lower Court by awarding the actual amount the Appellant is entitled to.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE 1ST RESPONDENTS COUNSEL
It was submitted that the purpose of an award of interest is to compensate a party who has been kept out of the use of funds to which it is legitimately entitled to. The case of Omega Bank (NIG) PLC v. O.B.C. LTD (2002) 16 NWLR (PT 794) 483 at 561 was referred to on the circumstances when interest can be awarded, id est, where it is contemplated by an agreement between the parties, under a mercantile custom or under a principle of equity such as fiduciary relationship.
It was argued that the Appellant did not furnish any evidence of any agreement that contemplated payment of interest for delayed payment and that the Appellant accepted the Statement of Account, Exhibit C26, as being a fair and acceptable reflection of the state of accounts. Exhibit C26, it was stated did not include any computation of interest since there was no such agreement. It was posited that the lower Court was justified in awarding interest only from 2007 when the account was reconciled and the amount due to the Appellant confirmed. It was asserted that pre-judgment interest must be strictly proven before it can be awarded to the party claiming the same and that the Appellant did not adduce evidence to support its claim for pre-judgment interest having placed heavy reliance on the Statement of Account, Exhibit C26. The cases of Abuja Trans-National Market v. Abdu (2007) ALL FWLR (PT 376) 657 at 687-688 and Midas Bank PLC v. Commerce Progetti (NIG) LTD (2009) LPELR – 8263 (CA) were cited in support.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NUMBER ONE
The disceptation under this issue is simple and straightforward. It is on the Appellant’s claim for pre-judgment interest on the amount adjudged as due to it. The pre-judgment interest as claimed by the Appellant is from 1999 to the date of judgment. The lower Court however awarded pre-judgment interest from 2007 to the date of judgment.
Now, pre-judgment interest, otherwise known as interest as of right must be specifically claimed and evidence adduced in proof thereof failing which it will not be awarded by a Court. Pre-judgment interest can be awarded where it is contemplated in an agreement between the parties, under a mercantile custom and under the principle of equity such as breach of fiduciary relationship. See Ekwunife v. Wayne (WA) LTD (1989) 5 NWLR (PT 122) 422 at 445, Idakula v. Richards (2001) 1 NWLR (PT 693) 111 at 122, 124 and 124-125, Sani Abacha Foundation v. UBA PLC (2010) 1 NACLR 264 at 272, Berende v. Usman (2005) 14 NWLR (PT 944) 1 and Berliet Nigeria LTD v. Kachalla (1995) 9 NWLR (PT 420) 478. The entitlement to interest must be established by credible evidence: Reo Enterprises v. Nwosu (2002) 11 WRN 16 at 33 and R.C.C. (NIG) LTD vs. R.P.C LTD (2005) 10 NWLR (PT 934) 615 at 640-641.
Let me iterate that the lower Court awarded the Appellant pre-judgment interest from 2007, not from 1999 claimed. The award was based on what the evidence established and not on account of any misdirection or misconception of the relief claimed. The claim for pre-judgment interest is for interest to be paid on the amount adjudged due to the Appellant. There is in evidence, Exhibit C26, which is the statement of account reconciling and setting out the amount due to the Appellant as at March 2007. The Appellant accepted the figure on Exhibit C26 as representing the amount he is entitled to as at March 2007. It is instructive that Exhibit C26 did not incorporate any interest computation from 1999 to 2007, but the amount arrived at therein was acceptable to the Appellant as being what was due to it. The CW1, the Chairman of the Appellant Company, in his testimony stated:
I have seen the Accounts Exhibit C26. It represents a fair position of the relationship we have and it is acceptable to me.
(See page 770A of Volume II of the Records)
Among the reliefs claimed by the Appellant include, taking of all necessary accounts and payment of the sums found due on the taking of the said accounts. The said accounts taken and accepted by the Appellant and on the basis of which payment is to be made to the Appellant is Exhibit C26. In this regard, the Appellant’s counsel informed the lower Court at page 770 of Volume II of the Records as follows:
Mr. Abiose: we have decided to drop some of the claims and concentrate on the real issues in controversy. Claims 4-9. With regard to Claim 4, we have mutually agreed to use the account which 1st defendant prepared with respect to the transaction.
The Statement of Account, Exhibit C26, was thereafter tendered and admitted by consent. On the evidence therefore, the amount which the Appellant accepted as due to it as at March 2007 was as in Exhibit C26. The Appellant can therefore not be had, as in Exhibit C25, to calculate interest between 1999 and 2007 to arrive at a figure different from what is in Exhibit C26. If the Appellant had confuted the amount, which was the product of the reconciliation, it will be understandable; but having not contested Exhibit C26 on the ground that the interest component, if any was agreed, was not incorporated therein, it cannot be heard to contend for the payment of any interest between 1999 and 2007, having accepted Exhibit C26 as being what was due to it. The lower Court was definitely right when it held at page 821 of Volume II of the Records that the Appellant unilaterally awarded interest to itself and made a claim based on that award it made.
If indeed the Appellant was entitled to any interest from 1999 to 2007 based on any agreement between the parties, mercantile custom or principle of equity, such as breach of fiduciary relationship, then Exhibit C26 which did not incorporate the interest would not have been acceptable to the Appellant. The fact that the said Exhibit C26 was acceptable to the Appellant is conclusive that there is no agreement on payment of interest for delayed payment of commission. By all odds, Exhibit C26 reflects payment of interest to the 1st Respondent; but it is judgment interest by order of Court and not interest on late payment of compensation.
In finding that the Appellant was entitled to pre-judgment interest from 2007 the lower Court reasoned and held as follows at page 822 of Volume II of the Records:
By exhibit C26 prepared by the 1st defendant, $7,852.16 is owed the claimant as at 31st March 2007. The claimant is entitled to this amount.
I enter judgment for the claimant for the sum of $7,852.16 or its Naira equivalent at the current exchange rate.
The claimant is also entitled to interest on the judgment sum. The reason for awarding the interest is that this amount has been due to the claimant since 2007 when the account was reconciled by the 1st defendant and was not paid.
The lower Court then conclusively made the award in favour of the Appellant as follows:
I award against the 1st defendant interest of 18.36% on the sum of $7852.16 from 31st March 2007 till today and 10% statutory interest from today till the entire sum is liquidated.
(See page 823 of Volume II of the Records)
From the evidence on record, the lower Court arrived at the correct decision when it awarded pre-judgment interest from 31st March 2007. The Appellant did not establish its entitlement to pre-judgment interest from 1999. This issue number one is therefore resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent.
ISSUE NUMBER TWO
Whether or not the reasons relied upon by the trial Court for dismissing the Appellant’s claims against the 2nd Respondent are justifiable.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT’S COUNSEL
The Appellant submits that the lower Court was wrong in dismissing its case against the 2nd Respondent on the ground that there was no privity of contract between the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent. It was stated that the work to be done under the contract was to be done by the Appellant and that it was therefore futile to contend that the Appellant is not a party or privy to the contract.
On the contention that the contract was not signed, it was stated that even though the 2nd Respondent did not sign the contract, the other parties signed and that the cases relied on by the lower Court on the effect of an unsigned document were where the contracts were disputed and therefore distinguishable from the instant case where the 2nd Respondent does not dispute the existence of the contract.
It was further contended that the amount claimed for variation is not disputed or controverted by the 2nd Respondent as the only issue it raised is that there is no proof of approval by its Tenders Boards. It was asserted that the contract did not provide for the Tenders Board to approve price adjustments and it was conclusively submitted that since the amount claimed as price adjustment was not disputed or controverted that the Appellant had proved its case on the balance of probability.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE 2ND RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL
The 2nd Respondent submits that it has no privity of contract with the Appellant since the mere mention of Appellant’s name as agent of the contracting party in the contract does not give the Appellant any right to sue or be sued on the contract. The cases of Incar v. Ojomo (1988) 5 NWLR (PT 39) III, Oforkaja v. Taraba State Govt. (2003) FWLR (PT 178) 1026 at 1038, Owena Bank vs. Olatunji (2002) 5 NWLR (PT 760) 325 among other cases were referred to.
It is the further contention of the 2nd Respondent that the contract which the Appellant relies on for its claim against it is undated and unsigned and has no probative value. It was maintained that the ratio decidendi in the case relied upon by the lower Court was that an unsigned document had no probative value, irrespective of whether the existence of the transactions therein are disputed or not.
On the entitlement to the variation or price adjustment, the 2nd Respondent submits that the burden of proof is on the Appellant to establish the approval of the same by the 2nd Respondent’s Tenders Board. The cases of OYOVBIARE v. OMAMURHOMU (1999) 10 NWLR (PT 621) 23 at 34, UNIC v. UCIC LTD (1999) 3 NWLR (PT 593) 17 at 26-27 and OKAFOR v. SOYEMI (2001) 2 NWLR (PT 698) 468 at 472 were relied upon. It was conclusively submitted that the Statement of Account, Exhibit C26, agreed between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent did not include any reference to the sum claimed by the Appellant against the 2nd Respondent, showing that no sum was legitimately due.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NUMBER TWO
The principal claim of the Appellant against the 2nd Respondent is for the sum of N2.5million being monies claimed as due to it for price adjustments under a contract. In dismissing the claim, the lower Court held that the Appellant was not a party to the contract and could not enforce the same, that the relied on by the Appellant in contract relied on by the Appellant in proof of its case is undated and unsigned and is of no probative value and finally that even if the contract can be enforced that the evidence did not establish that the price adjustment was approved by the 2nd Respondent’s Tender Board.
It is an elementary principle of law that the doctrine of privity of contract is to the effect that a person who intends to enforce a contract must show, not only that he gave consideration, but also that he is a party to that contract. In law, a contract exists only between the parties to it. A person who is not a party to the contract cannot sue upon it. By the doctrine of privity of contract, a contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations arising therefrom on any person except parties to it. Put simply, a stranger cannot acquire rights or incur obligations arising from a contract to which he is not a party. See REICHIE v. NBCI (2016) LPELR (40051) 1 at 25, REBOLD INDUSTRIES LTD v. MAGREOLA (2015) LPELR (24612) 1 at 22-23 and INCAR v. OJOMO (supra).
It is instructive that the Appellant does not claim to be a party to the contract which was tendered as Exhibit C29.
The parties to the contract are shown to be the 2nd Respondent and Vetco Inspection GMBH. The Appellant’s contention is that the work to be done by Vetco Inspection GMBH under the contract is to be performed by the Appellant. This may well be so. But it does no more than make the Appellant the agent of Vetco Inspection GMBH and the person liable under the contract and who can enforce the same remains Vetco Inspection GMBH. The Appellant, being a stranger to the contract and the agent of a disclosed principal can neither sue nor be sued on the contract: OFORKAJA v. TARABA STATE GOVT (supra), FALCON BENTIL (NIG) LTD v. MANULU (2002) FWLR (PT 95) 329 at 408. Accordingly, the decision of the lower Court that the Appellant cannot enforce the contract based on the doctrine of privity of contract is unimpeachable.
The Appellant makes a kerfuffle of the lower Court having held that an unsigned document has no probative value and therefore the contract cannot be enforced. It has not been confuted that the contract Exhibit C29 was not executed by the 2nd Respondent. The settled state of the law as expounded by Tobi; JSC in OMEGA BANK (NIG) PLC v. OBC LTD (2005) 8 NWLR (PT 928) 547 at 541 in this regard that:
18
Where a document is not signed, it may not be admitted in evidence even if it is admitted in evidence the Court should not attach any probative value to it.
See also GARUBA v. K. I. C. LTD (2005) 5 NWLR (PT 917) 160 and JINADU v. ESUROMBIARO (2009) 9 NWLR (PT 1145) 55.
The contention of the Appellant that the other party to Exhibit C29 executed the contract does not change the fact that the document is inchoate, not having been executed by one of the parties; it remained a worthless piece of paper which cannot be enforced. The contention that because the 2nd Respondent does not dispute that there is a contract and therefore the unsigned Exhibit C29 can be enforced does not enthuse me. The law, which is ensconced like the Rock of Gibraltar, is that an unsigned document is worthless and cannot be accorded any probative value. The decision of the lower Court in this regard cannot be faulted.
The Appellant’s argument to the effect that the lower Court was wrong in its decision that there is no approval of the price adjustment by the 2nd Respondent’s Tender Board is equally unavailing. The lower Court made the finding, ex abundantia cautela, after having correctly held that there is no privity of contract and that the unsigned contract has no probative value. Hear the lower Court at pages 825-826 of the Records:
Assuming I am wrong and the agreement can be proved against the 2nd defendant because in Exhibit C27 it referred to the Agreement, specifically in clause 5.8, the Naira Adjustment stated in the letter has a proviso. It is subject to 2nd defendants Tender Board’s Approval.
Whose responsibility is it to seek this approval? It is of course the responsibility of the party that is claiming to be entitled to the adjustment. It must back up the request for adjustment with documents and invoices to enable the Tender Board reach a decision on the application.
There is no evidence that the claimant applied to the Tenders Board. DW2 stated that there was no application for approval. That the claimant was not even a party to the Agreement L-1239.
The claim against the 2nd defendant is not established. The claimant is a stranger to the contract L-1239 and the contract Agreement relied upon is inchoate in as much as the 2nd did not sign it and date it.
Also, the Tenders Board of the 2nd defendant did not approve the said adjustment.
The claim against the 2nd defendant is dismissed.
(Underlining supplied)
The law is that the conclusion of the trial Court on the facts is presumed to be correct and it is for the person seeking to upset the judgment on the facts to displace the presumption. See WILLIAMS v. JOHNSON (1937) 2 WACA 253, BALOGUN v. AGBOOLA (1974) 1 ALL NLR (PT 2) 66, EHOLOR v. OSAYANDE (1992) LPELR (8053) 1 at 43 and ONI v. JOHNSON (2015) LPELR (24545) 1 at 24.
There is nothing in the Appellant’s submission which upsets the presumption that the findings of the lower Court on proof of the approval vel’ non by the 2nd Respondent’s Tenders Board is not correct. Ineluctably, the lower Court was correct in its decision. The concatenation of the foregoing is that this issue must be resolved against the Appellant. The decision of the lower Court dismissing the Appellant’s claims against the 2nd Respondent is the correct decision.
To now put a wrap on this judgment, the two issues for determination have been resolved against the Appellant. In a coda, the appeal is devoid of merit. It fails and it is hereby dismissed with N100, 000 costs in favour of each of the 1st and 2nd Respondents.
TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A.: I had the advantage of a preview of the lead judgment, rendered by my learned brother, UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, JCA.
I am in agreement with the meticulous resolutions of the issues thrown up in the appeal, by his Lordship.
The appellant, on the settled principle of the doctrine of privity of contract, was a stranger to the contractual relationship between the 2nd Respondent and Vetco Inspection GMBH, hence the appellant cannot enforce that contract. Makwe v. Nwukor (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 733) 356; (2001) LPELR – 1830 (SC) F.O. Negbenebor v. E.O. Negbenebor (1971) All N.L.R. 210; Ikpeazu v. A.C.B Ltd. (1965) 1 N.M.L.R 374 @ 379.
I, too dismiss the appeal as grossly lacking in merits. The well considered judgment, rendered on 22nd January, 2013 in re Suit: LD/926/2000, at the Lagos High Court of is hereby affirmed.
I adopt the order of the costs of this appeal, made in the lead judgment, against the appellant and in favour of each of the respondents, as mine.
GABRIEL OMONIYI KOLAWOLE, J.C.A.: I have been privileged to read in draft, the leading judgment of my learned brother, UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, JCA which has just been delivered and wherein, he found the appeal as lacking in merit and dismissed same.
I really do not have anything useful to add as the lead judgment has competently and adequately considered and resolved the issues in contention between both parties.
I abide with the consequential order as to costs made by my learned brother in the said judgment.
The appeal is dismissed by me too.
Appearances:
For Appellant(s) Victor Ogude, Esq. for the 1st Respondent.
Tani A. Molajo, Esq., SAN with him, Mrs. Eriwu Molajo, Ms. Bukola Raheem & Seun Lari-Williams, Esq. for the 2nd Respondent. For Respondent(s)
