CHUKWUDI OYEM V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2013)

CHUKWUDI OYEM V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

(2013)LCN/6309(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Wednesday, the 19th day of June, 2013

CA/A/193C/2012

JUSTICES

ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MOORE A.A. ADUMEIN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

CHUKWUDI OYEM Appellant(s)

AND

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA Respondent(s)

RATIO

THE IMPLICATION OF AN ACCUSED PERSON PLEADING GUILTY TO AN OFFENCE

The implication of an accused person pleading guilty is that he admits all the essential ingredients of the offence. The burden of proof placed on the prosecution is deemed discharged because by that plea of “guilty,” the offence is deemed proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the case of AYO OMOJU v F.R.N. (supra) Niki Tobi, JSC, at p. 62, para A- C had this to say –
“There is no language in Section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act suggesting that the court must ask the appellant if he admits all the essentials of the offence of which he pleads guilty. All that the section requires is that the court must be satisfied that the accused person intended to admit the truth of all the essentials of the offence. In the language of the section, the exercise is within the mind of the Judge and does not go out to meet the accused. Whether the Judge is satisfied or not remains his subjective judgment. The moment the Judge is so satisfied, he can convict and pass the appropriate sentence.”(Emphasis supplied). PER AKOMOLAFE-WILSON, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT AN ACCUSED PERSON IS ENTITLED TO FURTHER HEARING AFTER A PLEA OF GUILT

TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant, as 2nd accused, was arraigned along with one Faith Osama, as 1st accused by the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) at the Federal High Court, Abuja with the offence of Transportation of 103.1 kilograms of dried weeds suspected to be Indian hemp (cannabis sativa), a narcotic drug, contrary to Section 14(b) of the NDLEA Act 2004. At the trial, the appellant pleaded guilty while the 1st accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the facts were stated by the prosecution. The Certificate of Preliminary Test Analysis and the Confessional Statement of the appellant were tendered and admitted as exhibits without objection. The appellant was consequently convicted upon his plea, his confessional statement and other evidence as presented by the prosecution and sentenced to five years imprisonment with hard labour, without option of fine.
The brief facts of the case are that the appellant and the other accused person were arrested by officials of NDLEA, Abuja while driving a car with a fake Ministry of Defence plate number. When the boot of the car was opened 12 bags of dried weed suspected to be Indian hemp (cannabis sativa) were found. A preliminary test was conducted on the weeds in the presence of the accused persons and the test proved positive. A sample of the weed was put in a transparent evidence pouch, and sealed in the presence of the accused person. This was taken to laboratory for drug analysis by a forensic expert. The appellant wrote a confessional statement which was endorsed by a superior police officer. However, the report of the analysis was not received before the prosecution of the case at the lower court.
This appeal is against the conviction and sentence of the appellant.
The grounds of appeal are –
GROUND ONE:
The learned trial Judge erred in law by convicting the appellant when the prosecution had not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
GROUND TWO:
The learned trial Judge erred in law and on the facts when he sentenced the appellant to a term of imprisonment without option of fine.
GROUND THREE:
The judgment of the trial court is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
In the Appellant’s Brief of Argument settled by Aliyu O. Saiki Esq, two issues were formulated for determination from the grounds of appeal filed –
“i WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HAD PROVED ITS CASE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT TO WARRANT THE CONVICTION OF THE APPELLANT IN THIS CASE. (GROUNDS ONE AND THREE).
ii WHETHER ASSUMING THE CONVICTION OF THE APPELLANT WHICH IS NOT CONCEDED, THE TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT IN IMPOSING A TERM OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE. (GROUND TWO)”
The respondent, in its brief of argument settled by David Adegbe, two issues for determination were couched as follows.
“a. WHETHER OR NOT, THE RESPONDENT HAS PROVED THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
b. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT IN CONVICTING AND SENTENCING THE APPELLANT TO FIVE YEARS IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT OPTION OF FINE.”
The issues formulated by both counsel are similar; but I adopt issue one of the appellant and two of the respondent as they are better elegantly drafted.
ISSUE ONE
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HAD PROVED ITS CASE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT TO WARRANT THE CONVICTION OF THE APPELLANT IN THIS CASE. (GROUNDS ONE AND THREE)
It is the contention of the appellant that the prosecution failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt for failure to obtain expert opinion to prove that the suspected weeds were actually Indian hemp. Mr Saiki for the appellant submitted that from the charge there are two essential ingredients the prosecution must prove namely –
i. That the appellant knowingly transported the alleged substance.
ii. That the substance transported was actually Indian Hemp otherwise known as Cannabis Sativa, a Narcotic Drug.
The burden is on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt -OKOROJI v STATE (2001) FWLR (Pt. 77) 871 at paras G-E. Exhibit PW1A, the certificate of test analysis carried out at the point of arrest, he argued, does not qualify as an expert evidence as PW1 himself testified that he is an exhibit keeper and therefore cannot be an expert on drug analysis. He contended that an essential ingredient of the offence has not been proved and therefore the case must fail and the appellant ought to be acquitted. He relied on ONYIA v STATE (2006) 11 NWLR (pt. 991) 267 at 293-294; RASAKI v STATE (2011) 16 NWLR (pt. 1273) 251. Citing ISAH v STATE (2010) 16 NWLR (pt. 1218) 133 at 164, and ABOKOKUYANRO v STATE (2012) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1285) 530 at 532 learned counsel submitted that the presence of a confessional statement does not automatically amount to proof beyond reasonable doubt as the statement must be consistent with other ascertained facts. He concluded that the appellant was wrongly convicted because the prosecution failed to prove the most essential element of the offence and his conviction therefore ought to be quashed -SHUROMO v STATE (2010) 16 NWLR (pt. 1218) 65 at 110.
In his re-action, learned counsel for the respondent noted that the appellant pleaded guilty and his confessional statement was admitted without objection. He submitted that the admission of guilt by the appellant has satisfied the burden of proof required by law. On the issue of certificate of the test analysis, learned counsel noted that it was admitted without objection as a scientific proof that the substance is cannabis sativa after it had been tested with the narcotic identification and found to be positive. He argued that forwarding the substance was for drug analysis and not for confirmation of the substance and the fact that the result had not arrived as at the time of trial is not sufficient reason to set aside the conviction of the appellant. Learned counsel, relying on the case of BAKARE v THE STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.52) 579 reiterated the view of the apex court where it stated that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all doubt. He emphasized that the preliminary test confirmed that it was cannabis sativa which appellant himself confirmed. Leaned counsel submitted that in the circumstances of this case, the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and urged us to so hold -YARO v STATE (2007) 32 NSCGR 229 or 18 NWLR (Pt. 1066) 215 at 293, para H; NIGERIAN NAVY v LAMBERT (2007) 32 NSCQR 258 or (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1066) 300 at 312, para C-E; IHUEBEKA v STATE (2001) ACLR 183 at 201 para 30 or (2000) FWLR (Pt. 11) 1827 at 1846-1847 paras G-A
Issue two is whether or not the trial court was right in sentencing the appellant to five years imprisonment without option of fine.
The learned counsel for the appellant, without conceding that the conviction of the appellant is right, submitted that the trial court ought to have granted the appellant the option of fine, in view of the passionate allocutus made by his counsel and the fact that he is a first offender as confirmed by the prosecution. On the issue and essence of mitigating sentence, counsel relied on the pronouncements of this court in the case of KWALE v STATE (2003) FWLR (Pt. 159) 1504 at 1531, 1533, paras D-F, paras A-B; 1534 paras B-D; 1534 paras D-E. It is his further submission that even though there is no provision of fine under the NDLEA Act, the imposition of fine is not expressly prohibited and in law, where no express mention is made excluding the imposition of fine, the court can impose a fine. He urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellant.
As for the respondent, his counsel submitted that Section 14(b) of the NDLEA Act, 2004 provides that a person, convicted should be sentenced to not less than 5 years and not more than 25 years while section 11(b) provides for a life imprisonment sentence. It is his contention that whichever law is applicable, the trial Judge exercised his discretion and since there is no evidence that such discretion was not exercised judiciously and judicially, this court should not interfere. In support he relied on SARKIN NOMA v ZARIA N.A. (1963) NMLR 97 at 102. Counsel referred to the trial Judge’s consideration of allocutus at p.30 lines 3-14 and submitted that the learned trial Judge had a sound reason for refusing to impose fine as he opined that imposition of fine will encourage more persons into the crime as fine will be a token of the proceeds of the crime. He urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the respondent.
ISSUE ONE
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HAD PROVED ITS CASE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT TO WARRANT THE CONVICTION OF THE APPELLANT IN THIS CASE.
It is not disputed that the appellant pleaded guilty to the offence after his arraignment in court. By virtue of S. 187(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, if an accused person pleads guilty to a charge, the plea shall be recorded and he may in the discretion of the court, be convicted thereon. However, where the offence is punishable with death, then the court shall enter a plea of not guilty on behalf of the accused. -CHUKWU v STATE (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 335) 640 (SC).
In the instant case, the offence charged was non-capital. The learned trial Judge rightly entered a plea of “not guilty” for the appellant. In such a circumstance the position of the law is clear that where the offence for which an accused person is charged is non-capital offence, the trial court has the discretion to convict the accused. This is because the plea of guilty is an unequivocal admission of the commission of the offence charged -TORRI v THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE OF NIGERIA (2011) LPELR 8142 (SC) at p.20.

It has long been established that after a plea of guilt by the accused before a court exercising criminal jurisdiction, he is not entitled to any further hearing. Putting it in another way, by entering a guilty plea, hearing is foreclosed as the next procedural step of the Judge is to proceed to conviction without formally calling upon the prosecutor or accuser to prove the commission of the offence by establishing the burden of proof required by law. See R v WILSON (1959) SCNLR 462, (1959) 4 FSC 175; DANGOTE v CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PLATEAU STATE (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 717) 132 at 159; SAMUEL AYO OMOJU v FRN (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1085) 38 at 60 paras A-B.
In my view, it seems to me preposterous for the appellant’s counsel to submit that the conviction of the appellant is unjustified in view of the sterling circumstances of this case. The bare uncontroverted facts of the case, as stated earlier is that the appellant pleaded guilty to the offence charged. His plea was clear, direct and positive. A cursory examination of the Record of Appeal evinces the fact that the appellant was represented by a counsel throughout the trial. At his arraignment, when the charge was read and explained to the appellant, he pleaded thus –
“2nd accused – I understand the charge read and explained to me. I plead guilty to the charge”. See page 18 lines 15-16 of the Record of Appeal
When the prosecution wanted to commence the hearing of prosecution witnesses, he applied “to deal with the case of 2nd accused who pleaded guilty to the charge”. Consequent upon this, the court asked “the 2nd appellant whether he still stands by his plea of guilty which he enters (sic) on 27/1/12” The appellant again responded thus –
“2nd accused – I plead guilty. I still stand by my earlier plea of guilty.” (Page 21 line 7 of Record of Appeal)
Even more, after the confirmation of his plea, the prosecution proceeded to call two witnesses. PW1 is the Exhibit keeper of the FCT Command of the NDLEA Abuja to whom the NDLEA operatives (officers) took the appellant, his vehicle and the goods in his vehicle and conducted the preliminary test on the weeds recovered in the boot of the vehicle. PW2 is the officer that obtained the appellant’s confessional statement. After the conclusion of the case for the prosecution, the court again asked –
“Court – Is there any reason why the court should not convict the 2nd accused as applied by the prosecution?”
The appellant, incidentally, replied thus –
“2nd accused – I have no cause to show why I should not be convicted”. (Page 26 line 13 of the Record of Appeal)
The implication of an accused person pleading guilty is that he admits all the essential ingredients of the offence. The burden of proof placed on the prosecution is deemed discharged because by that plea of “guilty,” the offence is deemed proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the case of AYO OMOJU v F.R.N. (supra) Niki Tobi, JSC, at p. 62, para A- C had this to say –
“There is no language in Section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act suggesting that the court must ask the appellant if he admits all the essentials of the offence of which he pleads guilty. All that the section requires is that the court must be satisfied that the accused person intended to admit the truth of all the essentials of the offence. In the language of the section, the exercise is within the mind of the Judge and does not go out to meet the accused. Whether the Judge is satisfied or not remains his subjective judgment. The moment the Judge is so satisfied, he can convict and pass the appropriate sentence.”(Emphasis supplied)
It is pertinent to note that in the instant case, from the facts garnered from the confessional statement of the appellant, he is not only literate, he is a graduate with a degree in B.Sc in Accounting. Apart from the fact that he was represented by a lawyer, he must be deemed to be personally aware and conscious of the implication of his plea of guilt. There is therefore every reason for the learned trial Judge to be satisfied that the accused intended to admit the truth of all the essential elements of the offence charged even moreso as his assertion of guilt was repeated three times. Better still, more illuminating is the confessional statement of the appellant, which in the first place, he being literate, was personally recorded by him, and secondly, it was endorsed by a superior police officer. The confession is voluntary, direct, clear, positive, unequivocal and speaks for itself about the commission and guilt of the offence charged.
For ease of reference and appreciation of the point made, the confessional statement is hereby reproduced –
“I OYEM CHUKWDI herein been cautioned in English Language that I am not oblige to say anything unless I wish to do so and whatever I say will be taken down in writing and may be given as evidence 30/11/2011.
I Oyem Chukwdi I was 37 year to the family of Oyem Peter in Obiaruku in Delta -State I attended Oka Primary School and also Obiaruku Grammar School all in Delta -State. And after that I went to Abraka, Delta State University Abraka where I got my B.Sc Accounting 1999. I am marry to Mrs Oyem Elibeths we are bless with children. I’m staff of Ministry of Finance Delta-State and I been with them for about two years. I did transportation of Indian-hemp when I was in Secondary School which is about 20yrs ago and before that time, I use to carry Indian-hemp from Benin to Obiaruku with my friend’s car named Monday and I later entered University and after my Education I gained employment -so I did not go back into Indian -hemp transport again. I use to have a friend named Chidi Ogwu that works with Nigeria Army though he is late now and I got Army Batch from him and he was also the one that gave me the plate Number with registration Number FG 78A06. On Tuesday 22nd of November 2011 my cousin Faith Usama called me on phone begging me to help her out of his mess, because she needed money for her son school fees and I told her that, I don’t do his business, again, she continuing calling me on phone and directed me to whose I will go and collect the twelve bags of Indian-hemp for her with one other man named Ossai because I was hearing the man voice on phone and on the 30th of November 2011 in the morning I send one boy named Ifeanyi that use to run around for me to go and collect the twelve bags of Indian-hemp for me with my vehicle peogeot 307 Lemy colour at Obiaruku village in Delta-State as directed by Madam Faith Usama and after that, the boy arrived I now took Army Identity Card which I did with computer inscription Captain Oyem Chukwdi as my friend directed and I now set out to Abuja with the Indian-hemp in my peogeot 307 with registration Number FG 78 A06 and I was controlled on phone by Mrs Faith Usama and immediately I arrived at Abuja, I stop at Gwegw to where I meet Mrs Faith Osama and one man where I suspected is Ossai with one other lady and before I know what were happening NDLEA officers on operation about 2pm arrested me and Faith Osama while others escaped and we where brought to NDLEA office at Gudu were the counted the bags and it amounted to twelve in white sock covered with block nylon bag -of the india-hemp was tested and it proved positive for cannabis sativa and weigned 103.1kg in my presence, Faith Usama pressence and witness officer and I signed and thumb printed same forms before writing my statement under caution.” (Underlining for emphasis)
A perusal of this confessional statement reveals same to be conual, direct and positive, pointing clearly to the admission of the offence charged.
The law is clear, and there are plethora of authorities to the effect that a free and voluntary confession of guilt, whether judicial, or extra judicial, if it is direct and positive and properly established, is sufficient proof of guilt and is enough to sustain a conviction without any corroborative evidence so long as the court is satisfied with the truth of the confession -SOLOLA v STATE (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 937) 460, EDHIGERE v STATE (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt. 464) 1 SC, IHUEBEKA v THE STATE (2000) 4 SC (Pt. 1203), IDOWU v STATE (2000) 7 SC (Pt. 11) 50, ALARAPE v STATE (2001) 14 WRN 1 SC, ONUNGWA v THE STATE (1976) 1 SC 1 (REPRINT) 74.

A voluntary confession which is direct and positive is an assertion by a person accused or charged with a crime suggesting that he understands or is conscious of the allegation against him, yet he is admitting that he indeed committed the offence. It is therefore a clear proof of the offence charged and the court is entitled to regard the charge as proved and convict the accused accordingly. In OKEKE v STATE (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 842) 25 SC -the Supreme Court held:
“Confession of an accused person to the commission of a crime plays a major part in the determination of his guilt and a court of law is entitled to convict on the confession if it comes to the conclusion that the confession is voluntary. This is because the confession itself puts an end to the rough and speculative edges of criminal responsibility in terms of mens rea and actus reus.”
To learned counsel for the appellant the prosecution failed to prove the second ingredient of the offence, that is, that the suspected substance was Indian hemp, cannabis sativa, as alleged, because at the time PW1 gave evidence, the forensic expert report had not been received; hence according to him at the time the substance was seized, it was not certain whether it was actually Indian hemp. Learned counsel placed heavy reliance on the evidence of PW1 at page 22 line 3-6 where he stated –
“…The leader of the team opened the boot of the Peugeot and inside we found 12 sacks of dried weed suspected to be cannabis sativa.”
However, counsel seems to ignore the continuation of the evidence of PW1 when he testified thus –
“We off-loaded the sacks in the presence of the two accused person, and opened all the sacks. We discovered that all the twelve sacks contained the dried weed. I conducted a preliminary test on the weed, in the presence of the accused and other witnessing officers. The test proved positive for cannabis sativa, a narcotic drug.” (Page 22 lines 6-13 of the Record of Appeal)
It is paramount to note that this witness was not cross-examined as to his personal qualifications, or as to his ability to make these tests. Instead, Exhibit PW1A, the Certificate of Test Analysis was admitted without objection.
The fact that the substance is Indian hemp was also confirmed by the appellant in his confessional statement –
“….the Indian Hemp was tested and it proved positive for cannabis sativa….”
In my view, it is ridiculous and laughable to contend as the appellant did, that the learned trial Judge was hasty to have convicted the appellant simply because the drug analysis report had not been received from the forensic expert, despite the blatant, bare faced facts of admission of guilt by the appellant. In the confessional statement, he exhibited himself as a “guru” in the transportation of Indian hemp which he confessed he had been engaged in for over 20 years before his arrest and prosecution. I wonder, if indeed he cannot be regarded as an expert in identification of whether or not a weed is Indian hemp since he has been dealing with it for more than 20 years! After all, the main function of an expert witness is to assist the court to arrive at the truth in the judicial process; and in fact, the court is not bound to accept expert evidence, particularly when it is not consistent with the ordinary course of events as led in evidence by other witnesses. – AJALA v THE STATE (1979) 10 C.A 115, BASSEY A. IDEN v THE STATE (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 365) 719 at 729.
In the instant case, the combination of the plea of guilty and the confessional statement constitute more than sufficient proof required by law hence the opinion of an expert in this circumstance, in my view is not sacrosanct for the conviction of the appellant. A voluntary confession or/and a plea of guilt is the best evidence to rely on to convict an accused person -JUA v STATE (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1184) SC 217 at 230; TIMOTHY v THE FRN (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1344) 213 at 235.
This appellant wrote a voluntary confessional statement, pleaded guilty, twice to transporting Indian hemp and on the third occasion informed the court that he had no cause to show why he should not be convicted. At the point of arrest, he agreed that the preliminary test conducted showed that the weeds he was carrying proved positive to be cannabis sativa. If I may ask, what other proof was required to establish the guilt of the appellant or the offence charged?
In the prevailing circumstances of this case, there is no doubt that what the appellant was transporting is indeed Indian hemp, cannabis sativa. I hold that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial Judge was right in convicting the appellant -YARO v STATE (supra) Issue one is hereby resolved against the appellant in favour of the respondent.
ISSUE TWO
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT IN CONVICTING AND SENTENCING THE APPELLANT TO FIVE YEARS IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT OPTION OF FINE.
The appellant submits here that the court ought to have granted the appellant option of fine irrespective of the fact that there is no provision in the law for it because of the allocutus made by his counsel; mainly because he is a first offender. Learned counsel for the respondent holds a contrary view. It has been established that an appeal court does not alter a sentence on the mere ground that if the members of the court had been trying the appellant, they might have imposed a differed sentence. For an appeal court to interfere, the sentence must be manifestly excessive in view of the circumstances of the case or be wrong in principle -UWAKWE v STATE (1974) 9 SC 25.
The factors which guide the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to review sentences include –
(a) The gravity of the offence
(b) The prescribed punishment for the offence;
(c) Prevalence of a particular class of crime in a locality and
(d) The circumstances of the offence to see if there are grounds of mitigating the punishment.
In the instant case; the appellant was convicted for the offence of knowingly and without lawful authority transporting 103.1kg of Indian hemp contrary to Section 14(b) of NDLEA Act. The offence of transportation of drugs is actually proscribed by Section 11(b) of the Act and the sentence is life imprisonment as noted by the prosecution at p.29 of the Record of Appeal. Section 14(a) deals with conspiracy. Even then, the sentence on conviction is imprisonment for a term not less than fifteen years and not exceeding 25 years. There is no provision for option of fine. The offence upon which the appellant was convicted clearly is a grievous offence. So many lives have been destroyed and are still being destroyed, especially youths, by the use of drugs. Judicial notice can be taken of the prevalence of use of drugs and its attendant negative results on people. Even though the appellant is a first offender, he confessed to the fact that he had been transporting Indian hemp for about 20 years. When his age is calculated from the confessional statement, he had been engaged in the business as early as even before he attained the age of 17 years. So many lives must have been destroyed from his unlawful acts. Yet the court only convicted him for 5 years, even less than the minimum prescribed by law. The circumstances in the case of KWALE v STATE (supra) heavily relied upon by the appellant are not apposite to the case at hand. See pages 1531-1532, of the report. The appellant in that case was charged for stealing of the sum of N110,200 but was found guilty of only N13,000. There were other mitigating circumstances which the Court of Appeal held that the trial court ought to have taken into consideration in giving an option of fine in the cited case. There are no such mitigating circumstances in this case. The learned trial judge acted upon a right principle and had a sound reason for refusing an option of fine. -See page 30 lines 3-14 of the Record of Appeal. I have no reason whatsoever to interfere or reduce the sentence of the learned trial Judge. Issue 2 is hereby resolved against the appellant in favour of the respondent.
After a thorough consideration of the two issues involved in this appeal, I have no just reason to disturb the decision of the trial court. The appeal is dismally devoid of merits and it is accordingly dismissed. The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. I also affirm the conviction and sentence of the appellant.

ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA, J.C.A.: I have read before now, the lead judgment of my learned brother Akomolafe-Wilson JCA, just delivered. The two Issues raised have been resolved adequately and I have nothing useful to add. I agree with the reasons and the conclusions reached in the lead judgment. The appeal is devoid of any merit and I dismiss it. I affirm the judgment of the lower court, delivered by B. B Aliyu J, on the 5th of March 2012.

MOORE A. A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment of my learned brother, Akomolafe-Wilson (JCA) just delivered.
I agree completely with my learned brother that this appeal is devoid of merit and it is hereby dismissed.
I also affirm the conviction of the appellant and the sentence imposed on him by the lower court.

Appearances

Aliyu O. Saiki Esq with him Abubakar Saiki, Omotosio Afolabi, Edel-Ekoli and Ibrahim T. HassanFor Appellant

AND

Emmanuel AmehFor Respondent