CHINEDU MUOKEBE v. ALHAJI BALA HARUNA
(2014)LCN/7504(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 6th day of November, 2014
CA/C/106/2013
RATIO
APPEAL: PRELIMINARY OBJECTION IN APPEAL; WHETHER PRELIMINARY OBJECTION SHOULD BE DETERMINED FIRST BEFORE THE APPEAL
Apparently, the first issue to address in this appeal is the preliminary objection raised by the Respondent as part of his Respondent’s brief of argument. The existence of a Preliminary Objection in an appeal symbolizes a rough pathway clogging the hearing of such appeal. Without first determining and disposing of same, the appeal cannot properly be set for determination. See S.B.N. Ltd. vs. I.O. Corp (2001) 1 NWLR pt 693, page 194, Onyeknuluje vs. Animashaun (1996) 3 NWLR pt 439, page 637 at 644, Onuoha vs. N.B. (1999) 13 NWLR pt 636, page 621, Onyemeh vs. Egbuchulam (1996) 5 NWLR PT 488 P.255. Further indication is also the case of Ogboru vs. Ibori (2006) 13 WRN 40, (2005) 13 NWLR pt.942 Page 319 wherein a Court is enjoined to determine pending applications before judgment is delivered. per. PAUL OBI ELECHI, J.C.A.
COURT: JURISDICTION; WHEN AN THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION BE RAISED IN A PROCEEDING
Jurisdiction is a threshold issue. That is the main reason why it can be raised at any stage of the proceeding at the trial Court, appeal Court or the Supreme Court. It can even be raised by the trial Court suo motu. No Court can entertain a matter when it lacks jurisdiction. That is why; it is always advisable to raise the issue of jurisdiction timeously to save time and cost and to avoid a situation where after conclusion of hearing and judgment, the entire proceedings is declared a nullity. See Petro Jessica Enterprises Ltd. vs. Leventis Technical Coy Ltd. (1992) 5 NWLR pt.244, page 675, Adegoke vs. Adibi & Anor (1992) 5 NWLR Pt 242, page 410, Gileve & Anor vs. Addingi & Anor (2014) LPER 221, Madukolum vs. Nkemdils (2001) 46 WRN 1. per. PAUL OBI ELECHI, J.C.A.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INCONSISTENCY OF LAW WITH THE CONSTITUTION; THE CONSEQUENCE OF ANY LAW THAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION
In the case of National Union of Electricity Employees & Anor vs. Bureau of Public Enterprise (2010) 7 NWLR pt 1194 page 538 at 543, the Court held:
“Under the consistency test, the validity of Law is determined by its consistency with the provisions of the Supreme Law, that is the Constitution. Where any Law is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution such Law, to the extent of that inconsistency, is void. The Constitution takes precedence over and above all other Laws and decrees” per. PAUL OBI ELECHI, J.C.A.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING; WHETHER A LITIGANT WHO FAILED TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS CASE CAN TURN AROUND TO COMPLAIN OF THE BREACH OF HIS RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING
I think I agree entirely with the observation and findings of the lower Court that there was no denial of fair hearing on the part of the Appellant. It appears that it is now a common practice for litigants to blow the issue of fair hearing out of proportion. Fair hearing only means that a party should be given an opportunity to be heard and present his case before the Court. This is fully entrenched in section 36 in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended. It therefore follows that the provisions of this section are only breached when a party is denied the right or opportunity to be heard and present his case before the Court or call witnesses as the case may be. However, if a litigant who has all the opportunity to present his case before the Court fails to do so, he cannot be heard when he turns round to complain of the breach of his right of fair-hearing. See Mohammed vs. Kano N.A (1968) 1 ALL NLR 234, Bonor vs. Ekiyor (1997) 9 NWLR pt. 519 page 1, Otu vs. Udonwa (2000) 13 NWLR Pt. 683 page 157. per. PAUL OBI ELECHI, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
ONYEKACHI A. OTISI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
PAUL OBI ELECHI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH JUDE JELLA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
CHINEDU MUOKEBE Appellant(s)
AND
ALHAJI BALA HARUNA Respondent(s)
PAUL OBI ELECHI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of Hon. Justice E.O. Abua in suit No. HD/3A/2012 delivered on the 27th day of March, 2013. Upon being dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Appellant has appealed to this Court.
The facts of this case are that the Respondent as Plaintiff in the lower Court on the 3rd day of May, 2012 took out summons previously at the Chief Magistrate Court, Obudu in suit No. MOD/R.6/2012 against the Appellant as Defendant to give up possession of a filling station situate at No. 1 Anderson Street, Obudu to the Respondent upon the termination of the lease agreement entered into by the parties on the 14th of May, 2011. The Appellant thereupon filed a Preliminary Objection to the competency of the suit which said objection was taken together with the suit on the merit by the Learned Chief Magistrate on the 4th day of September, 2012, and judgment was entered against the Appellant. There upon, he filed a Notice of Appeal to the High Court of Justice Obudu. The said Court after taking a passionate consideration of the appeal dismissed same, and awarded N10,000.00 cost against the Appellant. Being dissatisfied in No. HD/3A/2012, the Appellant has lodged another appeal before the Court of Appeal, Calabar.
In his Brief of Argument date 2nd May, 2013 and filed on the 3rd May, 2013, the Appellant distilled two issues for determination viz:
– Whether the Court below properly addressed the issue of jurisdiction.
– Whether the Court below properly addressed the issue as to whether the Chief Magistrate indeed granted what was not claimed.
Both issues were argued together thus: Learned Appellant’s Counsel submitted that the Learned trial Judge did not properly address the issue of jurisdiction when he affirmed the judgment of the trial Magistrate Court. The Learned trial Magistrate as well misconstrued the position of the Law when he over-ruled the Defendant/Appellant’s Preliminary Objection to proceed to recover possession contending that he failed to take cognizance of sections 17 and 18 of the Rent control and Recovery of Premises Law of Cross River State of Nigeria 2004. Rather than consider the purport of the above section, Learned Counsel concluded that the Learned trial Judge descended into the arena and set up a different case from that of the parties as could be seen from page 23.
On issue No. 2, he submitted that the trial Court was wrong to grant to the Respondent a relief he did not claim as the trial Court is not a father Christmas. See Osuji vs. Ekeocha (2009) 7 MJSC pt 11 page 74 at 79. The claim of the Plaintiff against the Defendant is as follows:
– Possession of Oando Filling Station and appurtenances held over by the Defendant.
– The sum of N100,000.00
In conclusion, Learned Appellant’s Counsel urged the Court to allow the appeal.
In reply, first on his Preliminary Objection, Respondent’s Counsel submitted that the appeal filed in this matter is contrary to the provisions of section 39(1) of the Rent Control and Recovery of Premises Law of Cross River State 2004 which makes the State High Court as the final Court in appeal matters and no more. The appeal is therefore a nullity having been brought contrary to the provisions of the Law. See Onwuka vs. Onunuju (2009) 5 MJSC pt (1) page 130 at 132.
Section 39(1) states thus:
“. A landlord or tenant aggrieved by a decision of a Court may within thirty days from the date of such decision appeal to the High Court having jurisdiction in the area of the Court which shall have jurisdiction in the area which shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal.
. The decision of the High Court shall be final with respect to the issue upon which the appeal is made”
This appeal is therefore brought contrary to the above provisions which cannot be waived either by the parties or the Court placing reliance on the authority of Osho vs. Attorney General Ekiti State (2002) FWLR (pt.100) page 1308. The appeal, counsel contended, constitutes an abuse of Court process as Learned Counsel for the Appellant who has been handling this matter from the magistrate Court level ought to known that there is no further right of appeal to the Court of Appeal as stated in the case of Cocotton Paulous vs PZ Co Ltd. (1965) LLR No. 70. According to Learned counsel, this Court has an inherent jurisdiction to dismiss a proceeding of this nature which is an abuse of Court process, placing reliance on the authority of Onyebuchi vs. INEC (2002) FWLR pt 103.
The issues raised above border on jurisdiction which can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and when so raised, it should be determined at the earliest opportunity. The appeal according to Learned Appellant’s Counsel is incompetent and should be struck out.
On the two issues formulated by the Appellant vis-a-vis the notice and grounds of appeal, it would be seen that the issues distilled for determination do not flow from the notice and grounds of appeal filed by the Appellant on pages 112 to 113 of the records of proceedings. He then submitted that issues for determination not based on grounds of Appeal filed, goes to no issue. It is incompetent and must be struck out, reliance being placed on the authority of African Cotton Ltd vs. Yankara (2008) ALL FWLR pt 402 page 1192. To demonstrate this point further, Learned Respondent’s Counsel pointed out that issue 1 of the Appellant was formulated from the particulars of ground 1 of the appeal reflected on page 112 of the records of Appeal thus:
PARTICULARS:
. The court below did not properly address the issue of jurisdiction.
. Flowing from the above he submitted that issues for determination can only be formulated from the grounds of Appeal and not from particulars of ground relying on the case of Unity Bank Plc vs. Bonari (2008) ALL FWLR Pt.416 page 1825. Even issue 2 does not flow either from ground 1 or 2 of the notice and grounds of appeal filed by the Appellant. Also the argument in this appeal does not appear to be meant for this Court of Appeal as could be seen on leaf 4 of his Appellant’s brief of argument headed “Argument” which is neither paged nor paragraphed. In consequence therefore, Learned Respondent’s counsel then urged the Court to strike out all the issues formulated by the Appellant and consequently strike-out the appeal. Also to uphold the Preliminary Objection.
On the other hand, Learned Respondent’s Counsel stated that in the event of the Preliminary Objection being over-ruled, that he will then consider the issues formulated by the Appellant on their merit. Such issues include:
. Whether the Court below properly addressed the issue of jurisdiction.
. Whether the Court below properly addressed the issue as to whether the Chief Magistrate indeed granted what was not claimed.
Arguing his Respondent’s Brief, Learned Counsel submitted that by virtue of the contents of Exhibit P1 dated 4th May, 2O11 under Article 11, the parties had contracted their intentions to the agreement, on how a party can terminate the agreement by giving two months notice thereto, See Exhibit P2 and Exhibit P3 (Seven days notice of intention to recover possession). In view of the above, Learned Counsel submitted that by implication, the parties have done away with the provisions of section 17 of the Rent Control and Recovery of Premises Law of 2004. See Afro-Tech Service Ltd. Vs. Mia and Sons Ltd (2011) FWLR pt 35 page 643. By virtue of Exhibit P1 (lease Agreement), the parties are bound in Law by the clear words of Exhibit P1 and the duty of the Court is to give effect to the contract (Exhibit P1) in the light of the terms agreed upon by the parties. Even though Exhibit P3 (notice of owners intention to recover possession was not allowed to run its full course, the suit can still be commenced provided that the suit is not heard before the expiration of the seven days notice. See Etehie vs. Raji FWLR 108.
On the court awarding what was not claimed, Learned Counsel submitted that it is totally misleading and misconceived as the lower Court did not award what was not claimed. The reliefs awarded, Learned Counsel contended, are consequential orders which flow out from the suit as could be seen from pages 7-8 of the record of proceedings and in particular the testimony of Pw1 and also page 24 of the record of proceedings i.e reliefs 3 and 4. See Amaechi vs. INEC (2008) ALL FWLR pt 407 page 1 at 111, Egharerba vs. Oruonghae (2002) FWLR pt 121 page 1945 at 1969. In view of the above, he urged the Court to dismiss the whole appeal and award N50,000.00 as cost.
In the Appellants Reply brief to the Preliminary Objection dated 3rd May, 2014 and filed on 5th May, 2014, Counsel submitted that the Respondent’s Preliminary Objection is quite stereotyped and did not envisage the present times and the dynamism of Law. On the right of appeal being a Constitutional matter and how Court guards their jurisdictional powers, he cited the case of the Nigeria Army vs. Warrant Officer Banny Yakubu (2013) ALL FWLR pt 677 page 592. Section 39(a) of the Rent Control and Recovery of Premises Law Cap R 3 Laws of Cross River State is inconsistent with the Supreme Law relying on National Union of Electricity Employees & Anor vs. Bureau of Public Enterprise (2010) 7 NWLR pt 1194 page 538. The Appellant can not therefore be constrained in line with section 39(a) (Supra). Also the Appellant’s issues of determination flow from the grounds of appeal as against the contention of the Respondent’s submission on the point.
Finally, he urged the Court to discountenance the Preliminary Objection raised by the Respondents. In his Appellant’s Reply Brief on the merit, Learned Counsel submitted that the Appellant was denied a right of fair hearing at the lower Court as could be seen from the records of the Court on page 17.
On the consequential orders of the Court, Counsel submitted that Courts do not grant reliefs which are not claimed. Also such consequential orders must not detract from the judgment or contain extraneous matters placing reliance on Ilona vs. Idakwo & Anor (2003) Vol. 14 NSCQR pt.11 page 1011. In conclusion, he urged the Court to allow the appeal.
Before considering the merits or otherwise of this appeal, it would be necessary to make some remarks on the presentation and style of the Appellant’s brief of argument and especially on the issues considered. Learned Appellant’s Counsel distilled two issues for determination. But after going through the whole Brief of Argument, there is no place that the Learned Counsel concluded his argument with a prayer urging the Court to resolve either of the two issues in their favour. This to my mind, is a fundamental flaw in the Appellant’s Brief of Argument and indeed a far departure from the style of presentation of arguments where issues are laid down for consideration. No matter how simplistic this may appear to be, Learned Counsels are counseled to toe this line of capping up their arguments at the end of every issue for determination. The above remarks notwithstanding, I will now proceed to consider the two issues as distilled by the Appellant in this appeal and adopted by the Respondent.
Apparently, the first issue to address in this appeal is the preliminary objection raised by the Respondent as part of his Respondent’s brief of argument. The existence of a Preliminary Objection in an appeal symbolizes a rough pathway clogging the hearing of such appeal. Without first determining and disposing of same, the appeal cannot properly be set for determination. See S.B.N. Ltd. vs. I.O. Corp (2001) 1 NWLR pt 693, page 194, Onyeknuluje vs. Animashaun (1996) 3 NWLR pt 439, page 637 at 644, Onuoha vs. N.B. (1999) 13 NWLR pt 636, page 621, Onyemeh vs. Egbuchulam (1996) 5 NWLR PT 488 P.255. Further indication is also the case of Ogboru vs. Ibori (2006) 13 WRN 40, (2005) 13 NWLR pt.942 Page 319 wherein a Court is enjoined to determine pending applications before judgment is delivered.
The objection raised is to the effect that this appeal is contrary to the provisions of section 39(a) of the Rent Control and Recovery of Premises Law of Cross River State 2004.
Section 39(1) states:
. A Landlord or tenant aggrieved by a decision of a Court may within thirty days from the date of such decision appeal to the High Court having jurisdiction in the area of the Court which shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal.
. The decision of the High Court shall be final with respect to the issue upon which the appeal is made.
According to Learned Respondent’s Counsel, what it means is that in rent matters in Cross River State, the High Court is the final appeal Court. So this appeal is in contravention of the provisions of section 39(2) of the Recovery of Premises Law, Cross River State and therefore a nullity relying on the case of Onnukwa vs. Ononuju (2009) 5 MJSC pt. 1 page 130. The jurisdiction of this Court has now been put into question.
Jurisdiction is a threshold issue. That is the main reason why it can be raised at any stage of the proceeding at the trial Court, appeal Court or the Supreme Court. It can even be raised by the trial Court suo motu. No Court can entertain a matter when it lacks jurisdiction. That is why; it is always advisable to raise the issue of jurisdiction timeously to save time and cost and to avoid a situation where after conclusion of hearing and judgment, the entire proceedings is declared a nullity. See Petro Jessica Enterprises Ltd. vs. Leventis Technical Coy Ltd. (1992) 5 NWLR pt.244, page 675, Adegoke vs. Adibi & Anor (1992) 5 NWLR Pt 242, page 410, Gileve & Anor vs. Addingi & Anor (2014) LPER 221, Madukolum vs. Nkemdils (2001) 46 WRN 1.
I would like to make further references to sections 39(1) & (2) of the Rent Control and Recovery of Premises Law (supra) before considering the justice, ability or otherwise of bringing this appeal up to this level. By legislation, statues and other enabling Laws, some causes or matters have their limits in terms of prosecution, appeals etc. In Cross River State, Section 39(2) of the Rent Control and Recovery of Premises Law provides: “The decision of the High Court shall be final.”
The above provision of the Law is what the Respondent’s Counsel asserted to be that the High Court is the final journey for any appeal from the Rent Control and Recovery of Premises Law Cap R3, Laws of Cross River State. The Law appears to limit or put constraints on a party’s access to the court. In the case of the Nigeria Army vs. Warrant Officer Banny Yakubu (2013) ALL FWLR pt. 677 Page 592 the Court held:
“Right of appeal being a Constitutional right cannot be easily whitened down…”
“Courts do guard their jurisdiction jealously and zealously. As such, any enactment which takes away the rights of the citizen accessing the Courts is to be construed narrowly against any one claiming its benefit”
Section 39(a) of the Rent Control and Recovery of Possession Law Cap R3 Laws of the Cross River State has limitative effect on access to justice and therefore inconsistent with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, and also fails the consistency test.
In the case of National Union of Electricity Employees & Anor vs. Bureau of Public Enterprise (2010) 7 NWLR pt 1194 page 538 at 543, the Court held:
“Under the consistency test, the validity of Law is determined by its consistency with the provisions of the Supreme Law, that is the Constitution. Where any Law is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution such Law, to the extent of that inconsistency, is void. The Constitution takes precedence over and above all other Laws and decrees”
It is on the basis of the above that I hereby resolve that section 39(a) of the Rent Control and Recovery of Possession Law Cap R3 does not apply to limit the Appellant’s access to Court to the High Court only. As a result therefore, the Preliminary Objection is hereby over-ruled and accordingly dismissed. This issue is therefore resolved in favour of the Appellant.
Learned Appellant’s Counsel contended that the trial Court was wrong to grant to the Respondent a relief he did not claim as it is unlawful to grant same when there is no formal prayer for it. The Court, he said, is not a Father Christmas. See Osuji vs. Ekeocha (2009) 7 MJSC pt 11 Page 74 at 79.
The reliefs being complained of include:
. The Plaintiff, ….. is entitled to possession.
. That the Defendant shall vacate from Oando filling station situate and lying of No. 1 Anderson Street, Obudu, folthwith and give possession of same to the Plaintiff.
. That the Plaintiff shall pay for and own all the remaining products the Defendant may be having at the filing station as shall be assessed by both the Plaintiff and Defendant.
. That the sum of N600,000.00 deposited in this Court by the Plaintiff as to utilized rent, shall be released to the Plaintiff and after the rent for 2012 must have been deducted on prorata basis and paid to the Plaintiff .
. Award of N10,000.00 cost against the Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff.
On the otherhand, a look at the Plaintiff’s claims are as follows:
. Possession of Oando Filling Station and appurtenances held over by the Defendant.
. The sum of N100,000.00 as cost.
The above reliefs granted by the trial Court are what the Respondent in his brief of argument called consequential orders which flow naturally from the reliefs granted. Actually, a trial Court has the powers to grant a relief not specifically asked for as a consequential relief. See Garba vs. University of Maiduguri (1989) 1 NWLR pt 18, page 550, Ilona vs. Idakwo & Anor (2003) 11 NWLR pt 830, page 53, Saddiq Jauro Bayo vs. Dan Daj Halihu Njidda & Ors (2004) 8 NWLR pt.876, page 544.
A consequential order is one that gives effect to a judgment, order or decision. It follows that it cannot detract from it. In other words as stated in the case of Obayagbona vs. Obazee (1972) 5 SC 247 a consequential order is:
“One giving effect to a judgment or order to which it is consequential. It is directly traceable to or flowing from the order duly prayed for and made”
See Odefin vs. Agu (1992) 3 NWLR Pt.229 p.372.
Looking at the reliefs so far granted, some of them do not appear consequential in nature and form. They have therefore gone beyond the reliefs prayed for and granted and as such they are no more flowing from the decision and judgment of the trial Court. The trial Court though not a father christmas, granted more reliefs than was asked for, this is not allowed in Law. It is on the basis of the above that I hereby resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.
On the issue of fair hearing, Appellant’s Counsel submitted that they were denied fair hearing at the lower Court. The Appellant need not establish any injury to be able to invoke his right to fair hearing, relying on Olumesan vs. Ogundepo (1996) 2 NWLR pt 433, page 628. The Defendant was not offered an opportunity to defend his case and rather the trial Court, suo motu, entered a plea of ‘not liable’ when at page 17 of the records, the Court said:
“It is proper to enter a plea of ‘not liable’ for the Defendant and allow the Plaintiff to state his case.”
Also the Appellant submitted that ….
“The Learned Chief Magistrate in the Court below… misconstrued the Law when he over-ruled the Defendant/Appellant’s Preliminary Objection especially as it relates to the seven days notice of owners intention to proceed to recover possession”
The arguments and submissions proferred in support of the Appellant’s issues for determination are not really meant for the Court of Appeal at this appellate level. Infact, these arguments and submissions are meant for the High Court on its appellate level. It could have been a different thing if the reasoning and conclusion of the Learned High Court judge was attached one way or the other. It will also be noted that this Court had herein before in the course of this judgment, depicted the style and presentation of this Appellant’s brief.
Before taking a position on whether the Appellant was denied a right of fair hearing, it would be necessary to look at the records of the Court below as could be gathered in the judgment of the lower Court at page 97 of the record of Appeal. Part of the judgment of the lower Court at page 108 reads thus:
“… the Defendant/Appellant could thus have tendered his evidence as well as take his Preliminary Objection to the Court’s jurisdiction he had so much faith in, he could not as the records show, he was never in Court. The opportunity was there but he was not there to take it I would say.
It is also instructive to note that the Defendant/Appellant never attended Court in that proceedings right from the inception of the case to judgment. It is seen that the Plaintiff had been brought from hospital in Kaduna State for that proceedings on the 14th day of May, 2012… the Court could therefore not have ordered a perpetual absentee/Appellant to testify in the case before it. He was not there and so cannot say that he was denied, any fair hearing. He was not just there to be heard and has not up till now come to Court to be heard.”
I think I agree entirely with the observation and findings of the lower Court that there was no denial of fair hearing on the part of the Appellant. It appears that it is now a common practice for litigants to blow the issue of fair hearing out of proportion. Fair hearing only means that a party should be given an opportunity to be heard and present his case before the Court. This is fully entrenched in section 36 in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended. It therefore follows that the provisions of this section are only breached when a party is denied the right or opportunity to be heard and present his case before the Court or call witnesses as the case may be.
However, if a litigant who has all the opportunity to present his case before the Court fails to do so, he cannot be heard when he turns round to complain of the breach of his right of fair-hearing. See Mohammed vs. Kano N.A (1968) 1 ALL NLR 234, Bonor vs. Ekiyor (1997) 9 NWLR pt. 519 page 1, Otu vs. Udonwa (2000) 13 NWLR Pt. 683 page 157.
The Appellant in the appeal at hand is guilty of not utilizing an opportunity given to him to come and present his case but to no avail. Records showed that he never for one day appeared in Court not to talk of denying him any opportunity of presenting his case.
In the circumstance, I do not agree with the Appellant that the lower Court denied him the opportunity to be heard and present his case. Rather, it was the Appellant who either refused and/or neglected to make use of the opportunity. Estoppel will not allow him to raise that issue at this eleventh hour of the case. Accordingly, I hereby resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent and hold that the Appellant was given ample opportunity to present his case but either refused or neglected to do same. That issue therefore fails.
In the final analysis, I hereby find and resolve all the two issues resolved against the Appellant. The appeal has no merit and it is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the lower Court is hereby affirmed. I assess and fix cost at N50,000.00 against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondent in this appeal.
ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.: My learned Brother, Paul Obi Elechi, JCA, made available to me a draft copy of the lead Judgment in this appeal. The issues raised in this appeal have been comprehensively addressed. I am in agreement with his reasoning and conclusion; dismissing this appeal.
I abide by the orders made in the lead Judgment, including the order as to costs.
JOSEPH JUDE JELLA, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in advance the lead judgment of my learned brother, PAUL OBI ELECHI, JCA, in this appeal. I agree with his reason and conclusion.
I abide by the other consequential orders as made in the lead judgment.
Appearances
E. A. Idom-Morphy Esq.For Appellant
AND
B. Mohammed Esq.For Respondent
