CHIEF SUNDAY BOBADE v. ALABA ADEBAYO & ORS
(2019)LCN/13429(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 7th day of June, 2019
CA/AK/261/2017
RATIO
ESTOPPEL PER REM JUDICATAM: THE CRITERION FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATAM TO APPLY
For the doctrine of estoppel rem judicatam to apply the only other criterion, being the third is the finality of the judgment and its subsistence as against the subsequent action sought to be defeated by the invocation of the principle of res judicatam.PER MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS: CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
That it could not be held to be proof of the content, therefore. Tabik Investment Ltd v. GTB Plc. (2011) ALL FWLR (pt.602) 1592 @ 1602 SC on the requirements of certification of public documents thus:
a. The certification is paid for;
b. There is an endorsement/certification that it is a true copy of the document in question;
c. The endorsement or certificate is dated and signed by the officer responsible for certification with his name and official title. Section 104(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Relied upon.
Justus Nwabuoku & 5 Ors v. Francis Onwordi & 3 Ors (SC 344/2001) delivered 26th May, 2006, per Niki Tobi, JSC. Also relied on to the effect of non compliance with Section 111, now Section 104 Evidence Act, 2004 and also Section 112 of the Act.PER MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: THE PROVISION OF SECTION 104 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT LFN 2004 DOES NOT APPLY TO PROCEEDINGS IN THE CUSTOMARY COURT
The fact of Section 104 of the Evidence Act on certification is trite. However, I agree with the Respondents that the Section 104 of the Evidence Act, 2004 is inapplicable to the proceedings of a customary Court.PER MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.
PARTY: CONSISTENCY: PARTIES MUST BE CONSISTENT ALL THROUGH THEIR CASE
A party must be consistent in his case at the trial as well as on appeal. SeeKelani v. Ajide (1985) had based his appeal on Exhibit; B can he turn round to deny its existence on account of uncertification. PER MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
OYEBISI FOLAYEMI OMOLEYE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
CHIEF SUNDAY BOBADE Appellant(s)
AND
1. ALABA ADEBAYO
2. HIGH CHIEF AJALOSI OLALEYE ADEDIPE
3. MR. ISRAEL ADEWUNMI
4. MR. LAWRENCE BAKARE
5. MRS. ABIGAIL AKINYEMI
6. REV. ENOCH ADELABU
7. MRS. AINA AREMO
8. MRS. JANET AREMO
(for themselves and on behalf of Loso Quarters, Ogbagi Akoko) Respondent(s)
MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant being the claimant in the lower Court instituted the suit vide a writ of summons dated 10th December, 2015 for the following reliefs;
i. A declaration that all that parcel of land situated lying and being at Ipati Farmland belongs to Ijikun quarters who have been in control from time immemorial.
ii. A declaration that members of Ijikun quarters are the persons entitled to Customary Right of Occupancy all over the parcel of land known and called Ipati Farmland.
The Defendants/Respondents upon application for substitution and joinder of defendants brought a preliminary objection against the said claim on the ground of plea of Estoppel per rem judicata by an application dated and file on the 9th day of February, 2017 respectively.
That the lower Court upon hearing both parties on the preliminary objection raised by the Respondents delivered judgment therein on the 16th October, 2017 in favour of the Respondents while dismissing the claim of the Appellant on the position that the Appellant?s claim is caught up by Estoppel per rem
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judicata.
It is this judgment of the lower Court that the Appellant has now appealed against.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
The Appellant hereby formulates the following issues for the determination of this appeal by the Honourable Court to wit.
1. Whether from the totality of the evidence before the lower Court, the Respondents succeeded in proving estoppel per rem judicata against the Appellant?s claim (Ground 2)
2. Whether the Respondents? Exhibit C upheld the judgment in the appeal brought at the Akoko Divisional Court of Appeal (Ground 1).
3. Whether the Respondents? Exhibit B; a public document, being the photocopies of the judgment of the Akoko Divisional Court of Appeal and being not duly certified is admissible in law as prove of the contents therein (Ground 3).
ARGUMENTS ON ISSUES
Issue I and II were argued together, thus:-
1. Whether from the totality of the evidence before the lower Court, the Respondents succeeded in proving estoppel per rem judicatam against the Appellant?s claim (Ground 2,) and
2. Whether the Respondents? Exhibit C upheld the judgment in the appeal
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brought at the Akoko Divisional Court of Appeal (Ground 1).
The learned counsel restated that the case of Ogunsakin & 6 Ors v. Balogun & Anr (2015) LPELR ? 4027a CA page 9, paragraphs A ? E had stated the conditions for the existence of the plea of res judicata thus:-
1. That the parties are the same in both the previous and present proceedings.
2. That the claim or issue in dispute in both actions is the same
3. That the res or subject matter of the litigation in the two cases is the same
4. That the decision relied upon to support the plea of estoppel per rem judicatam must be valid and subsisting and final; and
5. That the Court that gave the previous judgment relied upon to sustain the plea must be a court of competent jurisdiction.
Honda place Ltd v. Globe Motors Holding Nig. Ltd, (2005) 14 NWLR (pt. 945) 273; Makun v. F. U. T Minna (2011) Vol. 6 (pt. 1)MJSC 140 @ 172 ? 173, it was submitted that a look at Exhibit ?C? at page 44 of the record of appeal attached to the respondent?s notice of preliminary objection to sustain the plea of estoppel per rem judicate ?
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contains the proceedings of the Divisional Adviser Court with No. CA/14/56 indicating the proceedings in the appeal brought by the Appellant?s predecessor ? in ? title against the decision of the Akoko Divisional Court of Appeal in the case No. 101/55 (i.e Exhibit B) that the Exhibit ?C? shows evidently that the decision of the Divisional Court of Appeal was appealed against, whilst the Divisional Adviser Court in appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the Akoko Divisional Court of Appeal (Exhibit B) made orders therein and adjourned the appeal sine die. It was contended that a matter adjourned sine die puts the subject matter of the case as between the parties in a state of abeyance vis a vis the judgment in Exhibit C above.
That Exhibit C did not constitute res judicata and no final and subsisting and also shows that the matter in Exhibit B was still in continuance.
That an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings and case put forward by the parties before the lower Court.
The following cases were relied on for this position of the law.
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A.G.Oyo State v. Fairlakes Hotel Ltd (1988) 5 NWLR (pt. 92) 1; Fatunbi v. Olanloye (2004) 6-7 SC. 68; O. S. I. E. C. v. A. C. (2010) 19 NWLR (pt. 1226) 273; Shinning Star Ltd v. Ask Steel Nig. Ltd (2011) 3 SCM 196 @ 219, B – D; Contracts & Anr. V. U. B. A. (2011) 10 SCM, 63 @ 81 – 82, 1, A ? D. See also the case of Okunriboye v. Osuma (2017) all FWLR (pt.866) 342, (2016) LPELR 41373 (CA), where this Honourable Court held that an appeal is a continuation of the hearing of the case at the lower Court.
On their part, the respondents, through their learned counsel had upon the strength of the Additional Record of Appeal transmitted by them by leave of this Court, raised a point of preliminary objection in their Brief of Argument dated 22nd October, 2018 and filed on 23 ? 10 ? 2018, but deemed filed on 25 ? 10 ? 2018 and adopted at the hearing on the 7 ? 3 ? 2019.
The objection is as to whether the suit of the Appellant (as claimants) was properly constituted before the Court below to give rise to this appeal for the reason of the unsigned writ of summons.
?
On the merit of the appeal, two
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issues were raised thus:-
i. Whether the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatam as raised and argued by the respondents is sustainable by Exhibit B and/or whether C is capable of rendering Exhibit B invalid for the purpose of establishing estoppel against the Appellant?s claim before the Court below.
ii. Whether the provisions of the Evidence Act (2011) is applicable to Exhibit B, same being proceedings and/or judgment of a customary Court and/or whether the strict provisions of the Evidence Act is applicable to the document/proceedings (viz Exhibit B) emanating from a customary court or whether the acts of a public officer over which the Respondents (as Defendants in the Court below) have no control can vitiate the proceeding and the Ruling of the court below.
Arguing the preliminary objection, the learned counsel to the respondent pointed out that the amended writ of summons dated 30th day of December, 2016 and filed on 9th day of January, 2017 was unsigned and therefore the initial action upon which the appeal arose was incompetent. Reference is made to Amadasun v. Ume (2007) 39 WRN 65 at 68 ratio 1 on the need for a prior resolution of
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a dispute relating to a challenge of jurisdiction of a Court, in this case whether the suit was properly initiated at the trial court, in the first place.Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 NLR 341 on the recondite conditions for the conferment of jurisdiction and competence of a Court to adjudicate was relied upon and argued that the writ of summons on which the suit of the Appellant was built was not signed at all, either by the Appellant (as Claimant himself or by his counsel (M. P. Ogele, Esq.) who issued same; pages 1 and 2 of the Additional Record of Appeal was referred to).
That unsigned documents were worthless and of no legal effect. BrewTech Nigeria Ltd v. Folageshin Akinnawo (2016) LPELR 400 94 (CA); Garuba v. Kwara Investment Company Ltd (2005) 5 NWLR (pt. 917) 160; Gbadamosi & Anr v. Biala (2014) LPELR (24389 CA).
That an unsigned writ is in curably bad and cannot confer jurisdiction. See Buhari v. Adebayo (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1416); M. W. T. Adamawa State v. Yakubu (2013) 6 NWLR (pt. 1351) 481 and urged that the writ be struck out not withstanding that the Respondent was the beneficiary of the judgment dismissing the suit. That this
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appeal be struck out for deriving its life from the incompetent writ of summons.
In reply to the preliminary objection, it was by the Appellant?s Reply Brief of Argument dated on 18 ? 2 ? 2019 and filed on 5 ? 3 ? 2019 and adopted at the hearing argued that the fact of the unsigned writ of summons was not raised at the trial Court nor was it part of the decision appealed nor did the grounds of Appeal raise same;
That the Respondent cannot raise the incompetence of the appeal on the writ, therefore; as the appeal was competently before the Court. Heritage Bank Ltd. v. Bentworth Finance Nig. Ltd (2018) 3 SCM 65 at 87; Bank of Industry Ltd v. Awojugbagbe Light Industries Ltd (2018) 5 SCM @ 49 ? 54.
That the preliminary objection should be dismissed as incompetent as it could only have been raised at the lower (trial Court) and more so that it may only be raised against the hearing of the appeal and nothing more.
?
I have perused the amended writ of summons complained against and as contained on page of the record of appeal. It is unsigned as conceded to by the Appellant in the Reply Brief of Argument and in
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response.
It is an over beaten path that, indeed unsigned document and more so in the nature of an originating process does not ignite the jurisdiction of a Court as it is incompetent and unknown to law; it not having been taken out as by law ordained by the legal practitioners Act and the Rules of Court, confers no legitimacy to any actions thereon built.
The attempt to equate such objections to mere objections on points of law which needs to be raised at the trial Court first or upon leave to be raised at the appellate Court cannot sail as the objection herein is a jurisdictional challenge. It goes to the legal validity of the writ of summons and hence the jurisdiction of the Court of trial to in the first place take cognizance of the suit.
There being no valid writ of summons, the Appellant had no process to have grounded the suit that was allowed and which formed the basis of the appeal. The principle in Mcfoy v. UAC 1961 AC has always been the trite and applicable locus classicus in this instance. I invoke same to the effect that you cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stand. It will collapse. Jurisdictional issue may be raised
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at any stage of the Court hierarchy and even at the Supreme Court for the first time.
In this case it has been raised herein and even with leave sought to raise it as a fresh issue and to be grounded upon the Additional Records of Appeal.
The fact of non raising of same at the trial or in the grounds of appeal was immaterial. The Appellant could not have conveniently done so against himself in any case.
The Respondent had raised the preliminary objection to the competence of the appeal which was grounded upon a decision that was incompetently initiated and proceeded with and thus throwing out the judgment appealed.
In essence, the Respondent was contending that there was no competent and valid judgment to have appealed from. I agree.
The preliminary objection succeeds and the appeal is struck out. For the avoidance of doubt, the impugned writ of summons and the judgments founded thereon, which constitute the basis of the appeal just struck out are also struck out for incompetence.
The judgments are those initiated by suit No. HIK/19/2015 and its incompetent statement of claim signed for M. P Ogele, the claimant/Appellants?
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counsel by an unidentified person who in any case cannot be delegated the legal work of a counsel not been shown to be a legal practitioner, himself.
On the merit of the appeal the respondents had by their Brief of Argument.
The learned counsel on its issue I argued that the Appellant was not contesting that the parties and subject matter of the suits were the same, but rather that the extent that of the contention that there was an appeal Exhibit ?C? and the judgment in Exhibit ?B? was not final and subsisting having been adjourned sine die, that it was immaterial as a final decision on any matter unless up-turned on appeal by another final decision and by a court of competent jurisdiction, such judgment whether right or wrong remains subsisting Christopher Ogidi & Ors v. Muobike Okoli & Ors (CA/E/201/2008) 2014 NGCA 41 (31st March 2014); Jimoh & Ors v. Akande & Anor (2009) 5 NWLR (pt. 1135) 549.
It was contended that a decision is final if the issues raised therein cannot be judicially revisited or re-opened by the Court that made the decision except by an appellate Court. Onyeabuchi v. INEC (2002) 4 SC
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(pt. 1) 27.
We have been urged to hold that the decision of the Akoko Divisional Court of appeal Exhibit B is a final decision of the Court. That the Exhibit C does not constitute a final decision altering varying or upturning the decision in Exhibit ?B?, rather than being adjourned sine die and advising parties to produce either survey plan or sketch plan (which ever will be cheaper) in order to ascertain further the area of dispute between the parties, did not invalidate the judgment in Exhibit ?B? of 19th June, 1956.
That the burden of proof was placed on who will fail if no evidence was led; and appellant who will fail if no prosecution of Exhibit C was taken to its logical conclusion.
That Appellant herein and his predecessors in title had gone to sleep after lodging an appeal against the decision in Exhibit ?B? and only woke up in 2015 vide a writ of summons to contend against and wondered whether Exhibit ?C? can be held to be in perpetuity (ad in finitum); or whether an appeal can be held for life or till eternity.
?
Counsel contends that it cannot be, as in
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equity, ?vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt? meaning (that equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent).
That the Appellant whose predecessors in-title had filed an appeal as far back as 1956, and abandoned same is precluded by law to originate the suit as done in the Court below.
That even if Exhibit ?C? can be held in perpetuity, the Appellant?s right had been defeated by the prolonged delay. That delay defeats equity Newswatch Communication Ltd v. Aliyu Ibrahim (2006) 34 WRN 1 ratio 7 @ pg. 8 (2006) ALL FWLR (pt. 34) page 9 was referred to contend that the right of fair hearing cannot be set up by a person who is a slumberer, weakling or indolent or a lazy litigant but only by a person who is up and kicking in the judicial process by taking advantage of the principle at the appropriate time.
The principle is not available to a party who set a trap in the litigation process against the court and accused the Court of wrong doing even when such so called wrong doing is as a matter of facts propelled or instigated by the party through his counsel, that Exhibit ?C? can at best only be taken to
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uphold Exhibit ?B? same not having been prosecuted diligently to the end.
It was therefore urged that issue 1 be resolved in favour of the Respondents.
RESOLUTION
It is crystal clear that there is no argument on whether the parties and subject matter of the judgment in Exhibit B and C are the same.
For the doctrine of estoppel rem judicatam to apply the only other criterion, being the third is the finality of the judgment and its subsistence as against the subsequent action sought to be defeated by the invocation of the principle of res judicatam.
It is clear in the matter at hand that the decision of the customary divisional appeal Court, Akoko is a final decision as the rights of the parties herein over the same subject matter on appeal there to by the present respondent had been settled.
The ExhibitC sought to be relied upon was not a decision of a Court that upturned the Exhibit B; rather it was an inchoate proceedings by its adjournment sine die.
?The interim orders made therein as to the need to file sketch map or survey plan as the parties may chose
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(whichever one that was cheaper) in order to identify the portion of each partys portion of the land did not add or subtract anything from the finality of Exhibit ?B?; the subsisting judgment. It would be iniquitous and most unreasonable to constitute the inchoate Exhibit C as a judgment and as one setting aside the final judgment in Exhibit B.
It conferred or declared no right or benefit in favour of the Appellant, just as it did not derogate from the Respondents subsisting and adjudged right or benefit having the suit against them and the judgment therein dismissed by Exhibit B. Exhibit B was a final and subsisting decision and satisfied the plea of estoppel rem judicatam. The Appellants argument is unfounded in law and Respondent is on sound footing.
Issue I is resolved against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondents.
ISSUE 2
On this issue, the Appellant had argued that the Exhibit ?C? being the judgment of a Court and a public document was not certified in accordance to law under Section 104 of the Evidence Act, 2011; that the name and the
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signature of the public officer who certified same has not been shown and cannot be relied on to ground the estoppel as held by the High Court.
That it could not be held to be proof of the content, therefore. Tabik Investment Ltd v. GTB Plc. (2011) ALL FWLR (pt.602) 1592 @ 1602 SC on the requirements of certification of public documents thus:
a. The certification is paid for;
b. There is an endorsement/certification that it is a true copy of the document in question;
c. The endorsement or certificate is dated and signed by the officer responsible for certification with his name and official title. Section 104(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Relied upon.
Justus Nwabuoku & 5 Ors v. Francis Onwordi & 3 Ors (SC 344/2001) delivered 26th May, 2006, per Niki Tobi, JSC. Also relied on to the effect of non compliance with Section 111, now Section 104 Evidence Act, 2004 and also Section 112 of the Act.
That on the above, Exhibit ?B? should be disregarded as not being duly certified, being photocopies. That the Exhibit B had not been duly proved and ought to have been rejected by the Court. Ogbu v. Ani
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(1994) 7-8 SCNJ (pt. II) 363 relied on to show that a photocopy which is not original and uncertified was in admissible. Kwara State Water Corp. v. AIC (Nig.) Ltd (2009) ALL FWLR (pt. 485) 1728 CA; Fawehinmi v. IGP (2000) 7 NWLR (pt. 665) 481 @ 525 ? 535 CA.
That issue 3 be resolved in favour of the Appellant.
THE RESPONDENT:
The respondent had in reply argued that the Evidence Act was not applicable to the Exhibit ?B? on the ground that it was a proceedings and judgment of a customary Court and that after-all the Respondents had no control over the acts of a public officer and therefore cannot vitiate the proceedings and the Ruling of the Court below in Exhibit ?B?. that Section 256 of the Evidence Act, 2011 had excluded the application of the Evidence Act to the proceedings of a customary court, the Exhibit ?B? being such a decision. Adeyemi Ogunnakke v. Taiwo Oyayemi (1987) NWLR (pt. 53) 760; Chief Awo Osu v. Ibor Igiri & 3 Ors (1988) 1 NWLR (pt. 69) 221 reconfirmed the Adeyemi v. Ogunnnaike Oyayemi case (supra).
That a public officer of the customary Court was not such an officer for
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the purpose of Section 104 in the application to Exhibit ?B? that such a document therefrom, as in Exhibit ?B? cannot be strictly held to be bound by the Evidence Act. That even if applicable, slight and/or substantial compliance with the provisions of the Act by the officer of the customary Court will suffice in law.
That Section 104 was only Directory on the public officer whose duty it is to produce the certified copy (CTC) of Exhibit ?B? on request. That customary Courts are manned by laymen and the Evidence Act is relaxed in relation to them, but would need to perform their acts with diligence.
It was urged that there was no denial of the previous judgment in 1956 and that the non strict compliance with the directory requirement of certification should not prejudice the Respondent. We are urged to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent.
RESOLUTION
The fact of Section 104 of the Evidence Act on certification is trite. However, I agree with the Respondents that the Section 104 of the Evidence Act, 2004 is inapplicable to the proceedings of a customary Court. The said proceeding includes its
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judgment as in Exhibit B in this appeal. Customary Courts are usually manned by non lawyers are not bound by the strict application of the Rules of Evidence and the Evidence Act except those that affect the right of fair hearing and fair trial.
I do think that the Appellant cannot turn sommersault and deny the validity of same Exhibit B upon which he had founded his appeal culminating to Exhibit C.
A party must be consistent in his case at the trial as well as on appeal. SeeKelani v. Ajide (1985) had based his appeal on Exhibit; B can he turn round to deny its existence on account of uncertification
If he does, as he is doing now, then that amounts to the admission that his appeal against the judgment was spurious and an abuse of judicial process and only intended to harass and embarrass the Respondent and waste the precious time of the Court. Could it be added reason for the adjournment sine die granted thereon by Exhibit ?C I surmise and say no more.
The Respondent had argued that the Exhibit ?B? be reckoned as admissible. I agree with
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him.
Issue 2 is resolved in favour of Respondents and against the Appellants.
On the whole, the appeal fails, the 2 (two) issues having been resolved in favour of the Respondents.
The decision dismissing the appeal on the basis of estoppel per rem judicatam is upheld as valid, correct and subsisting between the parties rendering the suit at the High Court appealed from, i.e HIK/19/2015, correct, therefore.
However, an account of my earlier resolution and the success of the preliminary objection on the incompetence of the originating writ of summons in the Court, the decision of that Court in HIK/19/2015 had been rendered in competent; and so also the instant appeal, being an offshoot of the incompetent action that culminated into the proceedings and judgment on appeal.
The instant appeal is, accordingly, struck out for lack of footage.
I should mention in passing that the Appellant?s elder brother (i.e 1st son of the claimant/Appellant?s predecessor in title herein) had made statements for the plaintiff/appellant and against the interest of the defendant to the counter claim being his brother and strengthened the
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Respondents? Defence and counter claim.
The Appellant had straineously argued that the decision of the Akoko Divisional Court of Appeal was not covered by Section 256 of the Evidence Act as the Court sitting on Appeal over the decision of a customary Court was strictly speaking not a customary Court as it was a Court sitting on appeal over the customary Court?s decision.
A provisional or Area, Customary or any Court outside the High Court and which hears or determines Appeals on customary law is indeed in the circumstances, in the nature of a customary Court of appeal.
Indeed, even if the Divisional Court were not a customary Court, I do not see any miscarriage of justice caused to the Appellant on the apt invocation of the principle of estoppel res judicatam founded upon the facts on record of appeal.
The inequity in the appellant?s claim of recent and only on 10th January, 2017 in the face of the ancient decision of 1956, commends the appeal as oppressive.
On the whole and on the basis of the invalidity of the originating process of the writ of summons and statement of claim, the said writ, judgment founded thereon
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and this appeal are struck out for incompetence.
I do award a nominal cost of N100, 000 only in favour of the Respondents and against the Appellant.
OYEBISI FOLAYEMI OMOLEYE, J.C.A.: I had the opportunity of reading the draft of the leading judgment, in this appeal, just delivered by my learned Brother, Mohammed A. Danjuma, JCA.
For the reasons well articulated in the said leading judgment, I agree that the appeal is incompetent and equally strike it out.
I also abide by the order of costs.
PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, J.C.A.: I read in draft the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, MOHAMMED A. DANJUMA, JCA.
I agree with him that the originating process in this case the writ of summons is the foundation of the action. In other words if it is faulty the principle in MCFOY V UAC (1961) AC comes to play; which is that you cannot put something on nothing. This Court did hold in SHUAIBU V MUAZU (2007) 7 NWLR PT 1033, 271 that an omission to sign a writ of summons or an originating summons is a mere irregularity which does not render the writ or the originating summons void. But it
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does render it incompetent. In the case of OMEGA BANK NIG PLC V OBC LTD (2005) AFWLR, PT 249, 1964 AT 1993, the Apex Court per Niki Tobi, JSC had this to say:
“A document which is not signed does not have any efficacy in law. As held in cases examined, the document is worthless and a worthless document cannot be efficacious.”
It follows that this infraction borders on the competence of the Court to adjudicate on the matter. This means that the notice of preliminary objection is accordingly sustained. And this knocks off the substratum of the appellant’s case from inception at the trial Court. In the circumstances I find that it will be unnecessary to deal with the other issues raised in the grounds of appeal.
For this reason I agree that the judgment of the lower Court founded on an invalid writ be struck out. I abide by the order of cost.
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Appearances:
Adelanke Akinrata, Esq. with him, A. K. Adewusi, Esq., Taiwo Gbadebo, Esq. and Dele Akinyelure, Esq.For Appellant(s)
O. E. Oyesusi, Esq.For Respondent(s)
Appearances
Adelanke Akinrata, Esq. with him, A. K. Adewusi, Esq., Taiwo Gbadebo, Esq. and Dele Akinyelure, Esq.For Appellant
AND
O. E. Oyesusi, Esq.For Respondent
