CHIEF KOKU GARIGA & ORS. V. BAYELSA STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS. (2012)

CHIEF KOKU GARIGA & ORS. V. BAYELSA STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS.

(2012)LCN/5152(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Thursday, the 16th day of February, 2012

CA/PH/166/2011

RATIO

THE EFFECT OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OF A COURT

It is trite that the question of jurisdiction is a radical and crucial one since a court that lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine a case but proceeds all the same engages in a futile exercise. That court’s proceedings, no matter how well conducted and brilliantly decided, is ab initio a nullity and remains so. Because of its fundamental nature, the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by either a party to the proceedings or even the court suo motu provided in the latter instance parties are heard by the court on the issue so raised before a decision is taken by the courts. PER. DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.C.A.

ON THE MEANING OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction has been defined as the limits imposed on the power of a validly constituted court to hear and determine issues between persons seeking to avail themselves of its process by reference to the persons between whom the issues are joined or the kind of relief sought. See AG Lagos State v. Dosunmu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt 111) 552, SC, Daplanlong v. Dariye (2007) 8 NWLR (Pts 1036) 332, Lufthansa Airlines v. Odiese (2006) 7 NWLR (Pt 978) 39 CA and Messrs N.V Scheep v. The M.V “S Avaz” (2000) 12 SC (Pt 1) 64. Because courts are creatures of statute it is the statute that creates the particular court that also confers on the court its jurisdiction. PER. DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.C.A.

THE STATUTORY PROVISION ON THE ROLES OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AN ELECTION

It is in the further exercise of this same powers that the National Assembly in S31(1), S33 and S87(4)(d) (i) and (ii), and (9) of the 2010 Electoral Act as amended provides:
“31(1) Every political party shall not later than 60 days before the date appointed for a general election under the provisions of this Act submitted to the Commission in the prescribed forms, the list of the candidates the party proposes to sponsor at the elections, provided that the commission shall not reject or disqualify candidates for any reason whatsoever.
33. A political party shall not be allowed to change or substitute its candidate whose name has been submitted pursuant to section 31 of this act, except in the case of death or withdrawal.”
“S87(d) In the case of the position of a chairmanship candidate of an Area Council a political party shall, where they intend to sponsor candidate-
(i) Hold special congress in the Area Councils, with delegates voting for each of the aspirants at designated centers on a specified, date; and
(ii) The aspirant with the highest number of votes at the end of voting shall be declared the winner of the primaries of the party and the aspirant’s name shall be forwarded to the Independent National Electoral Commission as the candidate of the party.
(9) Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act or rules of a political party, an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State or FCT, for redress.” (Underlining supplied for emphasis).
Article 13.1 of the P.D.P also provides thus:
“There shall be a National Chairman who shall be the executive of the party. His function shall be to:
(a) summon and preside over the meetings of the National Convention, the National Executive Committee, the National Caucus and the National Working Committee of the Party;
(b) Provide firm and effective leadership and direct the activities of the party under the overall supervision of the National Executive Committee;
(c) Promote and defend the integrity, policies and programmes of the party and make pronouncements for and on behalf of the National Executive Committee outlining the policies, programmes and activities of the party;
(d) Assign specific functions to any member of officer of the party;
(e) Delegate his power to the Deputy National Chairman or any of the National Vice Chairman;
(f) Cast votes if and when necessary;
(g) Present to the National convention a comprehensive statement of the state of the party and the political situation generally;
(h) Ensure strict compliance with the provisions of this constitution and do all such other things as shall promote the growth and welfare of the party.” PER. DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

PAUL ADAMU GALINJE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

TUNDE OYEBANJI AWOTOYE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

1. CHIEF KOKU GARIGA (P.D.P. Chairman Nominee, Sagbama L.G.A.
2. CHIEF INEYE INGBAIFEGHA (P.D.P. Chairmanship Nominee, Kolokuma/Opokuma L.G.A.
3. SELEKEBINA SABOR (P.D.P. Chairmanship Nominee, Ekeremor L.G.A. Appellant(s)

AND

1. BAYELSA STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION
2. MR. PERES PERETU
3. EDDY JULIUS
4. EBIKITIN SUNDAY DIONGOLI
5. SAMUEL BOY
6. MICHAEL OGBOLOSINGHA
7. CHIEF DARIUS OBIENE (Sued in his capacity as erstwhile Chairman of the P.D.P. Adhoc Electoral Panel)
8. MR. JAMES AGARI (Sued in his Official capacity as the Secretary of the P.D.P. State Executive Committee In Bayelsa State).
9. CHIEF RUFUS ABADI (State Chairman P.D.P. Bayelsa State. Respondent(s)

DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.C.A.: (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellants and the 2nd – 9th respondents are members of the Peoples Democratic Party, the P.D.P, in Bayelsa State. The 8th and 9th respondents are the state secretary and chairman of the party respectively. The 7th respondent is the chairman of the Electoral panel set up by the party in the state to conduct its primaries for the Local Government Council Elections that took place on 3rd April, 2010. 1st respondent is the statutory body responsible for the conduct of the elections.”
Interested in contesting the chairmanship seats of their respective Local Government Councils, Sagbama, Ekeremor, and Kolokuma Opokuma, on their party’s platform, the appellants collected and filled the party’s nomination and expression of interest forms. At the party’s Local Government Area congresses held on 28th November 2009, the appellants were duly screened and declared the party’s chairmanship candidates for the forthcoming Local Government council Elections. Upon their success at the congresses, the 9th respondent in his capacity as the state chairman of the P.D.P submitted appellants’ names on behalf of the party to the 1st respondent by his letter dated 3rd December 2009. The 9th respondent, on the 10th December 2009, issued the appellants with certificates of return, letters of congratulation and directed them to proceed to the 1st respondent for screening. Instead of screening the appellants, 1st respondent screened the 2nd – 6th respondents to whom the 8th respondent, without any authority from the 9th respondent, also issued certificates of return to contest the same chairmanship seats the appellants had earlier been declared candidates for by the 9th respondent. The unfolding drama took the appellants to the lower court where by an originating summons on 31/3/2010, commenced the action decision in respect of which brought about the instant appeal.
At the court, Bayelsa State High Court, the claimants sought answers to the following questions:
“1. WHETHER the first defendants is not under a legal obligation by the combined provisions of Articles 13.1(c) and 13.22 of the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party 2009 (as Amended) and all other provisions of the said constitution to screen the claimants as the lawfully nominated candidates of the People Democratic Party for Sagbama, Kolokuma/Opokuma, Ogbia, Ekeremor and Yenagoa Local Government Areas respectively of Bayelsa State in respect of the forthcoming Local Government Elections in Bayelsa State stated for the 3rd of April, 2010, having been presented to it by the 9th defendants.
2. WHETHER by the provisions of Article 13.22 and Article 13.1 and all other provisions of the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party 2009 (as amended), the 9th defendant, as against the 8th defendant, is not the one legally empowered to issue certificates of Return and present the names of the validly nominated candidates of the Peoples Democratic Party for Sagbama, Kolokuma/Opokuma, Ogbia, Ekeremor and Yenagoa Local Government Areas respectively of Bayelsa State to the 1st defendant for screening in respect of the forth coming Local Government elections in Bayelsa State for 3rd April, 2010.
3. Whether by the provisions of Article 13.1 and all other provisions of the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party 2009 (as amended), the 8th defendant is legally empowered to overturn certificates of Return already issued by the 9th defendant to the plaintiffs by issuing subsequent certificates of Return to the 2nd – 6th defendants.”
In the event of the court’s answers to the foregoing questions turning out in their favour, the appellants prayed the court the following eleven reliefs:
“1. A declaration that the 1st defendant is under a legal obligation by the combined provision of Articles 13.1(c) and 13.22 of the constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party 2009 (as amended) to screen the claimants as the lawfully nominated candidates of the Peoples Democratic Party for Sagbama, Kolokuma/Opokuma, Ogbia, Ekeremor and Yenegoa Local Government Areas respectively of Bayelsa State in respect of the forthcoming Local Government elections in Bayelsa State for 3rd of April, 2010.
2. A declaration that the purported screening of the 2nd to 6th defendants as chairmanship candidates of the Peoples Democratic Party by the 1st defendant is illegal, null and void.
3. A DECLARATION that by provisions of Article 13.22 and Article 13.1 and all other provision of the constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party 2009 (as amended), the 9th defendant as against the 8th defendant, is the one legally empowered to issue Certificates of Return and present the names of the validly nominated candidates of the Peoples Democratic Party for Sagbama, Kolokuma/Opokuma, Ogbia, Ekeremor and Yenegoa Local Government elections in Bayelsa State slated for 3rd of April, 2010.
4. A DECLARATION that by provisions of Article 13.22 and Article 13.1 and all other provision of the constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party 2009 (as amended), the 8th defendant is not legally empowered to overturn Certificates of Return already issued by the 9th defendant to the plaintiffs by issuing subsequent certificates of Return to the 2nd – 6th defendants.
5. An order setting aside the certificates signed and issued to the 2nd to 6th defendants by the 8th defendant herein in his capacity as Secretary of the state executive committee of the Peoples Democratic Party in Bayelsa State for same was a nullity and ultra vires.
6. An order setting aside the screening exercise carried out by the 1st defendant between the 16th and 18th of December, 2009 on the 2nd – 6th defendants among others as Peoples Democratic Party flag bearers or nominees for Sogbama, Kolokuma/Opokuma, Ogbia, Ekeremor and Yenegoa Local Government Areas respectively of Bayelsa State in the forthcoming elections as same was in exercise in futility.
7. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 2nd to 6th defendants either by themselves and/or through their agents, privies and or servants jointly and/or severally from parading themselves as P.D.P chairmanship candidates for the forthcoming Local Election in Bayelsa State in Sagbama, Kolokuma/Opokuma, Ogbia, Ekeremor and Yenegoa Local Government Areas respectively of Bayelsa State.
8. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st defendant from according recognition to the 2nd to 6th defendants as chairmanship candidates duly returned by the Adhoc electoral panel of the Peoples democratic Party for Sagbama, Kolokuma/Opokuma, Ogbia, Ekeremor and Yenegoa Local Government Areas respectively of Bayelsa State to contest the forthcoming Local Government election on the platform of the P.D.P
9. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st defendant from organizing, supervising and/or conducting any Local Government election(s) in Bayelsa State in respect of the forthcoming Local Government Elections slated for 3rd of April, 2010 without the inclusion of the Plaintiffs as the validly nominated candidates of the Peoples Democratic Party.
10. An order compelling the 1st defendant herein to accept the screen the plaintiffs as the validly nominated chairmanship candidates, duly returned by the Adhoc Electoral Panel of the Peoples Democratic Party for Sagbama, Kolokuma/Opokuma, Ogbia, Ekeremor and Yenegoa Local Government Areas respectively in Bayelsa State.
11. Such further order or other orders as this Honourable court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of the case.”
The 1st to the 6th respondents in opposition to the action filed their respective counter affidavits. They also raised preliminary objections against the suit on similar grounds. The grounds are:
“1. That the subject matter of this suit is an intra-party dispute in so far as the fulcrum of this suit is to determine who are the validly nominated candidates of the P.D.P for the council elections of 3/4/2010.
2. That the plaintiffs being members of the Peoples Democratic Party have not brought this suit in compliance with Art 21.1 of the P.D.P Constitution providing for the process of internally resolving remedies before coming to invoke the jurisdiction of this court.
3. That by virtue of the P.D.P Constitution (as amended) it is within the preserve of the National Executive Committee of the P.D.P. under Article 17.1 of the said constitution to resolve any dispute as to the authentic candidates of the P.D.P. in any election, including chairmanship candidates of the Bayelsa State branch.
4. That this action ought not to have been commenced by originating summons having regards to the substantial dispute on fact that are likely to arise from the depositions in the various affidavits.”
The lower court relied on this court’s decisions in Nigerian Civil Service Union v. Essiem (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt. 12) 306 at 315 and the Supreme Courts’ decisions in Onuaha v. Okafor (1983) NSCC 494 at 505 and Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) 310 at 347 in upholding 1st – 6th respondents preliminary objections and striking out appellants, suit.
Dissatisfied by the decision, the claimants have appealed to this court on an amended Notice containing two grounds.
It is significant to note at this point that originally there were five appellants. The names of Beneth Igbani and Prince Okolobaowei A. Seimokumo, following an application in that regard and this court’s order granting same, have been struck out. The appeal as constituted remains that of Chief Koko Gariga, Chief Ineye Ingbaifegha and Selekebina Sabor the P.D.P chairmanship nominees for Sagbama, Kolokuma/Opokuma and Ekeremor Local Government Councils respectively.
Parties have filed and exchanged their briefs of argument in compliance with the rules of the court. The two issues distilled in the appellants’ brief as having arisen for the determination of the appeal read:
“1. Whether the learned Trial judge was right when he declined to interpret the provision of the constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party (P.D.P) (Exhibit AA14) in relation to the facts of this case.
2. Whether the learned trial judge was right when he declined to grant the relief of the appellants.”
The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondents adopted appellants’ first issue as being the only issue that arises for the determination of the appeal. On the other hand, the 4th and 9th respondents have adopted appellants’ 2nd issue as the lone issue that calls for determination in the appeal.
Appellants’ contention under their two issues is that the lower court has erred, given the facts of their case, in declining jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues in controversy between the parties.
Firstly, learned appellants’ counsel argues, courts guard their jurisdiction jealously and do not let go same easily as the lower court has done in the instant case.
Secondly, by the combined effect of S.1(1), 6(1) and 6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, judicial powers of interpreting laws and documents are vested in the courts. Article 27.1 of the Peoples Democratic Party which places this function in the National Executive of the party, being inconsistent with the overriding provision of the constitution, is inoperative to the extent of its inconsistency.
In further argument, learned appellants’ counsel contends that certain facts are settled in the dispute between the parties to the present matter. All parties to the dispute except the 1st respondent are members of the same party. The appellants and the 2nd – 6th respondents have participated in the same primaries conducted by their party for the nomination of the party’s candidates for the chairmanship offices in the respective Local Government Councils in the election the law empowered the 1st respondent to conduct. The appellants having emerged the party’s candidates following the primaries, have had their names submitted by the 9th respondent to the 1st respondent for screening. By exhibit AA14, the party’s constitution as amended, it is further argued, 9th respondent remains the party’s alter ego without whose delegation of powers to or authorization of the 7th and 8th respondents, the latter lack the powers to submit any names of the party’s candidates for screening to the 1st respondent. Learned counsel insists that it is illegal for the 1st respondent to reject the list submitted to it by the 9th respondent and instead accept and act on the one subsequently submitted to it by the 7th and 8th respondents. Learned appellants counsel relies inter alia on the decisions in Rector, Kwara Polytechnic v. Adefila (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt 1056) 12 at 113, Amachi v. INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt 1080) 227 at 344, Agbakoba v. INEC (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt 1119) 489 at 571, and Adeogun v. Fashogbon (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt 1115) 149 at 174- 175 and stresses that appellants case goes beyond questioning the internal affairs of the party and is for that reason justiciable. He urges that in allowing appeal this court assumes the jurisdiction the lower court wrongly declined and grant the appellants the reliefs they seek and have through the affidavit in support of their originating summons demonstrated they merit.
Responding, learned counsel to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th respondents submits that the arguments advanced by learned appellants’ counsel as well as his reliance on the cases he refers the court to are misconceived. The facts on the basis of which the decisions learned appellants’ counsel relies upon were arrived at are different from those of the instant case. The decisions, argues learned counsel, on the authority of Adegoke Motors v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt 109) 2501. Onafowokan v. The State (1987) Onyia v. State (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 118) 142 at 160 do not therefore avail the appellants. The appellants have gone into unnecessary voyage of discovery completely ignoring the essence of their appeal. The question to address, submits learned counsel, and rightly too in my view, is whether or not the lower court, which jurisdiction to entertain appellants’ suit was challenged, is correct in its finding that it lacks jurisdiction and in consequence declining entertaining the case.The constituents of a court’s jurisdiction, it is submitted, have long been spelt out in very many cases. Relying on Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 and APC V. NDIC (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt 1002) 404, counsel emphasizes that these constituents must be conjunctively met and once any is lacking, the court’s jurisdiction over a matter abates. And this, learned counsel contends, is what occurred in the instant case.
Firstly, learned counsel contends, the appellants and all the respondents, except the 1st are members of the same party. The constitution of the party which the appellants urge the court to condemn represents the contract between the members of the party. Members of the very party are seen, in the eyes of the law to have foregone their rights as same are subsumed in the letters of the party’s constitution. The constitution binds members who are only entitled to such remedies as are contained in their constitution. Relying on the very decisions the lower court invoked to uphold the objections raised against appellants suit, learned counsel submits that it is never the business of a law court to re-write for parties the agreement they voluntarily entered into. Learned counsel further buttresses his submission by relying on UBA V. SAX (NIG) Ltd. (1994) 8 NWLR (PT 381) 150 at 165, Afrote v. MIA (2001) 6 WRN 65 at 114, Wejin v. Ashaka Cement (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt 211) 608 and Total Nigeria Plc. v. Morkah (2002) 9 NWLR (PT 773) 492.
Secondly, contrary to the contention of the appellants, learned respondents counsel submits, neither Article 27.1 is inconsistent with S 6(1) and 6(6)(b) of the 1999 constitution as amended nor does same take away the judicial powers of the lower court by placing same in the National Executive of the P.D.P of which the appellants are members. The lower court, argues learned counsel, has indeed exercised its interpretative power by abiding by what the parties have agreed to among themselves. Relying on the decisions in Rector Kwara Polytechnic v. Adefila (2007) 15 NWLR (PT 1056) 42 at 113 and Savannah Bank v. Ajilo (1989) ALL NLR 26 at 39-40, learned counsel insists that the lower court has not abdicated its constitutional responsibility of interpretation. The court by giving effect to the terms in the agreement contained in the constitution of the P.D.P has performed its interpretative duty. The issue in controversy between the parties in the instant matter does not require the determination of the rights and/or obligations of any of the parties under any law or document either of which could be adjudged to be inconsistent into S.6(1) and 6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution, learned counsel reemphasizes. He refers, us further to the following Beredugo v. College of Science and Technology (1991) 4 NWLR (PT 187) 651 and I.D.D. V. AIB (2002) 4 NWLR (PT 758) 660 to support his submissions.
Finally, learned counsel to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th respondents submits that appellants complaint being a question as to how a political party is run and/or who should be the party’s candidate is a political question which court’s lack the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon. Referring further to Ehinlanwo v. Oke (2008) 6-7 SC (PT.11) 123, Bakam v. Abubakar (1991) 6 NWLR (PT 199) 564 Anazodo v. Audu (1999) 4 NWLR (PT 600) 530 and Osakwe v. INEC (2005) 13 NWLR (PT 942) 442, learned counsel urges that their issue for the determination of the appeal be resolved against the appellants and the appeal dismissed.
Mr. Collins Boleigha Esq. settled the 4th and 9th respondents’ brief of argument. The arguments therein are virtually the same as those canvassed in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th respondents’ brief of argument. Repeating those submissions serves no added purpose.
Now, the real question this appeal raises is whether or not the lower court is right to have declined jurisdiction over appellants action and depending on the answer to the question posed whether this court can assume jurisdiction over the matter and grant the appellants the reliefs they seek.
It is trite that the question of jurisdiction is a radical and crucial one since a court that lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine a case but proceeds all the same engages in a futile exercise. That court’s proceedings, no matter how well conducted and brilliantly decided, is ab initio a nullity and remains so. Because of its fundamental nature, the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by either a party to the proceedings or even the court suo motu provided in the latter instance parties are heard by the court on the issue so raised before a decision is taken by the courts.

As rightly submitted by the learned counsel to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th respondents, the Supreme Court has in Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (supra) held that for a court to have jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter:
“1. The court must be properly constituted as regards number, qualification of members of the bench and no member is disqualified for one reason or another.
2. The subject matter is within the competence of the court to determine and
3. The matter was commenced through due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent in for the exercise of jurisdiction.”
Respondents’ objection against appellants’ action is premised on two major grounds: that a court of law lacks the jurisdiction to rewrite for parties the contract they entered into, here manifested by the P.D.P Constitution; that on the authorities, some of which the lower court invoked, courts lack the jurisdiction of determining internal matters of political parties which raise political questions. The facts of the instant case do not, with due respect to the learned trial judge, allow for the application of the common law principles on the basis of which the court’s jurisdiction is challenged which challenge the court sustained. The lower court’s decision drew from the common law principle which otherwise makes the issue in controversy in the instant case a political question in respect of which, up till 2003 under the then Electoral Act, courts lack the jurisdiction to hear and determine. That principle has been tempered with. The reversal of the common law principle commenced in 2006 when the then Electoral Act in S34 allowed the political parties to substitute their candidates for any election only in the event of the death of the erstwhile candidates or for “cogent and verifiable reasons” and aggrieved persons were entitled to seek redress in court where the parties fall in breach of that requirement.
Learned respondents counsel have argued that neither the law establishing the 1st respondent nor the Local Government Law in Bayelsa state provide for the regulation of political parties and or makes it mandatory for the 1st respondent to accept the list of candidates submitted by the political parties. The two legislations could not have so provided since particularly by virtue of item 56 of the 2nd schedule to the 1999 constitution that function, being under the exclusive legislative list, belongs to the National Assembly.
It is in the further exercise of this same powers that the National Assembly in S31(1), S33 and S87(4)(d) (i) and (ii), and (9) of the 2010 Electoral Act as amended provides:
“31(1) Every political party shall not later than 60 days before the date appointed for a general election under the provisions of this Act submitted to the Commission in the prescribed forms, the list of the candidates the party proposes to sponsor at the elections, provided that the commission shall not reject or disqualify candidates for any reason whatsoever.
33. A political party shall not be allowed to change or substitute its candidate whose name has been submitted pursuant to section 31 of this act, except in the case of death or withdrawal.”
“S87(d) In the case of the position of a chairmanship candidate of an Area Council a political party shall, where they intend to sponsor candidate-
(i) Hold special congress in the Area Councils, with delegates voting for each of the aspirants at designated centers on a specified, date; and
(ii) The aspirant with the highest number of votes at the end of voting shall be declared the winner of the primaries of the party and the aspirant’s name shall be forwarded to the Independent National Electoral Commission as the candidate of the party.
(9) Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act or rules of a political party, an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State or FCT, for redress.” (Underlining supplied for emphasis).
Article 13.1 of the P.D.P also provides thus:
“There shall be a National Chairman who shall be the executive of the party. His function shall be to:
(a) summon and preside over the meetings of the National Convention, the National Executive Committee, the National Caucus and the National Working Committee of the Party;
(b) Provide firm and effective leadership and direct the activities of the party under the overall supervision of the National Executive Committee;
(c) Promote and defend the integrity, policies and programmes of the party and make pronouncements for and on behalf of the National Executive Committee outlining the policies, programmes and activities of the party;
(d) Assign specific functions to any member of officer of the party;
(e) Delegate his power to the Deputy National Chairman or any of the National Vice Chairman;
(f) Cast votes if and when necessary;
(g) Present to the National convention a comprehensive statement of the state of the party and the political situation generally;
(h) Ensure strict compliance with the provisions of this constitution and do all such other things as shall promote the growth and welfare of the party.”
The foregoing provisions of both the extant Electoral Act as well as the constitution of the political party on which platform the appellants sought to contest the chairmanship seats of their respective Local Government Councils bring to the fore at least four unassailable realities.
Firstly, once a political party has submitted its list of candidates to the body empowered to conduct the election, here the 1st respondent, that body “shall not reject or disqualify such candidates for any reason whatsoever.” The power to determine who its candidate for a particular election has thus remained the exclusive preserve of the political party and neither the court nor the electoral body can resolve that for the party.
Secondly, once the party has, in compliance with S87 of the electoral Act and/or its constitution or guidelines for the conduct of congresses for the selection of its candidates for any election, submitted its list of candidates for the election, it substitutes or changes the candidates in the submitted list only in the event of their “death” or “withdrawal” from contesting the election.
Thirdly, a party’s prospective candidate for a particular election that has any grievance pertaining the procedure the party adopted in the selection or election of its flagbearer for the election is entitled under S87(9) supra to seek redress in court.
Finally, the chairman of the P.D.P. the relevant political party herein, by the party’s constitution is the party’s alter ego whose authorization and/or delegation of function to the 7th and 8th respondents is a necessity for the latter to transact on their party’s behalf.
From all these it follows that the appellant who, having participated in the congresses for the selection of their party’s candidates for the election into the chairmanship offices of their Local Government Councils, successfully emerged as the party’s candidates and had their names transmitted to the 1st respondent as the party’s flag bearers but were disallowed to contest the election, are entitled to seek redress in the court. I entirely agree with learned appellants’ counsel that a court of law must jealously guard its jurisdiction where a statute confers it with same, as the Electoral Act has done in S87(d) (i) & (ii) and (9) supra has in the instant case done on the lower court, to hear and determine the appellants case given the grief or injury they assert. To do otherwise is to abdicate its responsibility. See Agbakoba v. INEC (2008) 18 NWLR (PT 1119) 489 at 571 and Adeogun v. Fashogbon supra.The second limb of the arguments proffered by the respondents is equally untenable. It is trite, and learned counsel for both sets of respondents have cited and relied on apposite judicial authorities, that courts lack the jurisdiction to re-write for parties the contract they voluntarily entered into. Counsel must however be reminded that the P.D.P. constitution they flaunt as the contract which subsumes appellants’ rights to seek redress does not make provisions for the conduct of congresses for the selection of the party’s flag bearers for the offices the appellants set out to contest. Had it done so and in breach of S87(a) (i) and (ii) of the Electoral Act 2010 as amended, being void, it would have been incapable of stopping the appellants in approaching the lower court which has clearly been vested by virtue of subsection 9 of the section with the jurisdiction to entertain their case. see Fasel Services Ltd. v. NPA (2003) 8 NWIR (Pt 821) 73, Sodipo v. Leminkainen OY (Na. 2) 1986) 1 NWLR (Pt 15) 220 and Ibrahim v. Osim (1988) 3 NWLR (PT 82) 257.The lower court’s ruling declining jurisdiction over the instant matter is for all the foregoing manifestly perverse. It is for those reasons that I resolve the issues in the appeal against the respondents and allow the appeal which has succeeded. What reliefs are the appellants entitled to?
I hasten to restate that the lower court has made some very crucial findings in respect of which none of the respondents have appealed. It is in the court’s decision that appellants had participated, and the affidavits for and against the appellants’ originating summons sustain these findings, in their party’s congresses and emerged the party’s candidates for the 3-4-2010 Local Government Council Chairmanship elections. 9th respondent the party’s chairman had congratulated them, issued them with certificates of return and submitted their names to the 1st respondent as their party’s flag bearers. It was subsequent to all these that the 7th and 8th respondents submitted another list which the 1st respondent acted upon to substitute the appellants. Evidence abound also that in submitting the subsequent list the 7th and 8th respondents were neither authorized to nor delegated by the 9th respondent.
The dispute between the appellants and those whose names were submitted by the 7th- 8th respondents in substitution to appellants’ names to the 1st respondent arose out of a single primary conducted by the party in respect of each of the Local Government Councils. It is my considered view that this is a case of unlawful substitution and the appellants who are the lawful candidates are entitled to all the reliefs canvassed in this court. Invoking S15 of the court of appeal Act and relying on Amaechi v. INEC supra, I hold that the names contained in the list submitted to the 1st respondent by the 7th and 8th respondents were never the P.D.P’s candidates in the 3-4-2010 Local Government Elections conducted by the 1st respondent.
In Amaechi v. INEC & 2 Ors. (2008) 1 SC (PT 1) 36 at 119 when faced with a similar situation, in invoking S6(6) a of the 1999 constitution as amended and S22 of the Supreme Court’s Act, the Apex Court remarked thus:
“This court and indeed all courts in Nigeria have a duty which flows from a power granted by the constitution of Nigeria to ensure that citizens of Nigeria, high and low get the justice which their case deserves…. ”
In addition to S.6(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, S15 of the Court of Appeal Act 2004 as well as order 4 rules 3 & 4 of the Court of Appeal, Rules 2011 equally vest this court with enormous powers in deciding the real issues in controversy between the parties in an appeal and facilitating the justice the parties deserve. S15 of the court of Appeal Act which is word for word the same as S22 of the Supreme Court Act provides:
“15. The Court of Appeal may, from time to time, make any order necessary for determining the real question in controversy in the appeal, and may amend any defect or error in the record of appeal, and may direct the court below to inquire into and certify its findings on any question which the court of Appeal thinks fit to determine before final judgment in the appeal, and may make an interim order or grant any injunction which the court below is authorized to make or grant and may direct any necessary inquiries or accounts to be made or taken, and, generally shall have full jurisdiction over the whole proceedings as if the proceedings had been instituted in the Court of Appeal as court of first instance and may re-hear the case in whole or in part or may remit it to the court below for the purposes of such re-hearing or may give such other directions as to the manner in which the court below shall deal with the case in accordance with the powers of that court, or, in the case of an appeal from the court below, in that court’s appellate jurisdiction, order the case to be re-heard by a court of competent jurisdiction.”
Order 4 rules 3 and 4 of the Court of Appeal rules 2011 further provide thus:
“inference of fact
3. The court shall have power to draw inferences of fact and to give any judgment and make any order, which ought to have been given or made, and to make such further or other order(s) as the case may require, including any order as to costs.
Powers not limited by notice of appeal
4. The powers of the court under the foregoing provisions of this Rule may be exercised notwithstanding that no notice of appeal or respondent’s notice has been given in respect of any particular part of the decision of the court below, or by any particular party to the proceedings in the court, or that any ground for allowing the appeal or for affirming or varying the decision, of that court is not specified in such a notice; and the court may make any order; on such terms as the court thinks just, to ensure the determination of the merits of the real question in controversy between the parties.” (underlining for emphasis).The 3-4-2010 Local Government Elections to which the instant appeal relates have been conducted and the P.D.P has won same. It has been demonstrated in this judgment that it is the appellants who being the lawful candidates for the election that won the elections for their party. The justice the appellants deserve and indeed the determination of the real issue in controversy between the parties in the appeal require that the appellants be and are hereby declared the lawfully elected chairpersons of their respective local Government Councils.
Parties are to bear their respective costs.

PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A.: I have read in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned presiding Justice, M.D. MUHAMMAD JCA. (OFR), and I agree with the reasoning contained therein and the conclusion arrived thereat. For the same reasons in the lead judgment, I allow the appeal and endorse all the consequential orders made therein including order as to cost.

TUNDE O. AWOTOYE, J.C.A.: I have read through the draft of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother M.D. MOHAMMAD, JCA. (OFR).
I agree totally with the reasoning and conclusion therein.
I have nothing more to add. I also order that the appellants be declared the lawfully elected chairpersons of their respective Local Government Councils.
Parties are to bear their respective costs.

Appearances

Nelson Okedinachi Esq.For Appellant

AND

Johnbull Esq
Tonye Braide Esq
D. Sekibo Esq.For Respondent