CHIEF JACOB BALOGUN & ORS v. ALHAJI SULAIMON ADEYEMO
(2011)LCN/4386(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Monday, the 21st day of March, 2011
CA/I/164/05
RATIO
THE PRINCIPLE IN KOJO II V. BONSIE: WHAT THE PRINCIPLE IN KOJO II V. BONSIE ENTAILS AND WHEN IT IS APPLICABLE
Lord Denning held in Kojo II v. Bonsie (supra) Privy Council Judgments by Olisa Chukura (supra) page 608 at 671. “Where there is a conflict of traditional history, one side or the other must be mistaken, yet both may be honest in their belief. In such a case demeanour is little guide to the truth. The best way to test the traditional history is by reference to the facts in recent years as established by evidence and by seeing which of the two competing histories is the more probable.” (My emphasis). The principle in Kojo v. Bonsie (supra) would apply if both traditional histories are complete and one side of the complete traditional history conflicts with the other side of the complete traditional history – see Eze v. Atasile (2000) 6 SCNJ 209. PER JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.
MODES OF ACQUISITION OF LAND: WHETHER THE MODES OF ACQUISITION OF LAND BY SETTLEMENT AND BY GRANT CAN BE COMBINED TO PROVE TITLE TO LAND; THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MODES OF ACQUISITION OF LAND BY SETTLEMENT AND BY GRANT
Their witness, the 4th D.W, testified in that regard that the source of their ancestor’s title to the land was by settlement and by grant from one Oja. The two modes of acquisition of land are mutually antagonistic and strange bedfellows and cannot be combined to prove title to land. Once both modes of acquisition are put forward, the person projecting them has shot himself in the foot and his case comes to grief on that score – see Dokunbo v. Omoni (1999) ….. NWLR (Pt.616) 647 at 554 thus: “Be it noted that there is clearly a difference between a grant and a settlement. A grant comes from a previous title holder to a subsequent one called a grantee; whereas settlement does not recognize a previous title holder. See Adedibu & Anor v Olofa (1968) NMLR 462. PER JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.
BOUNDARY MARK: WHAT CAN CONSTITUTE A GOOD BOUNDARY MARK
..it is trite that natural marks like a road, river, building or stream can constitute good boundary marks – see Awere v. Lasoju (1975) N.N.L.R. 79 at 82. PER JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
SIDI DAUDA BAGE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MODUPE FASANMI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. CHIEF JACOB BALOGUN
2. RAIMI MONKU
3. DEJO BALOGUN Appellant(s)
AND
ALHAJI SULAIMON ADEYEMO Respondent(s)
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal questions the decision of the High court of Justice of Oyo State sitting at Oyo town, awarding title to land located at Egunbiyi Alagunmu area of Oyo in Oyo State with a perpetual injunction in respect of the land, and N10,000 general damages for trespass to the said land in favour of respondent against appellants.
The respondent, as plaintiff in the court below, sought for these reliefs in paragraph 37 of his statement of claim:
“37 WHEREOF the plaintiff claims against the Defendants jointly and severally:
(a) Declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to a grant of a statutory right of occupancy in respect of plaintiff’s piece of land at Egunbiyi Alagunmu Area, Oyo State of Nigeria more particularly delineated in plaintiff’s survey plan No. JAC/010/OY/2001 signed by Owolabi O. S. licensed surveyor.
(b) N10,000.00 General Damages for trespass committed by the Defendants sometime in February,1999.
(c) Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants, their agents, servants and/or privies from further committing trespass to the said laid, entering thereon or doing anything whatsoever thereon.”
Pleadings were exchanged before the suit proceeded to trial. Respondent called some witnesses and tendered the survey plan of the disputed area in evidence. Respondent’s case was anchored on traditional evidence of grant of the piece of land to him by its owner, one Mogaji Abogunrin; the appellants relied on patrimony as traditional evidence of their root of title to the disputed piece of land. They also tendered in evidence a survey plan of the disputed land.
The court below took final addresses of counsel for the respective disputants before it pronounced judgment granting all the reliefs averred by respondent against appellants in paragraph 37 of the statement of claim (supra).
A notice of appeal containing seven grounds of appeal was filed by appellants against the said judgment. Four issues were distilled from the grounds of appeal – issue (i) covering grounds 1 and 5; issue (ii) for ground 3; issue (iii) for ground 4; and issue (iv) for grounds 1, 6 and 7 – in the appellants’ brief of argument prepared by their learned counsel, Mr. Folorunso, dated 14.9.06, and filed on 18.9.06, pursuant to a deeming order granted on 9.11.06, deeming the brief duly filed on the said 9.11.06.
The issues for determination framed by appellants are, for quick reference, copied, below:
“i Whether the evidence of Boundary men and Tenants put on the land by the Plaintiff established Plaintiff’s claims – Grounds 1 and
ii Whether evidence of Traditional History relied upon by both parties is conclusive and the principle in the case of Kojo Vs. Bonsie will not apply in this case – Ground 3.
iii Whether the evidence of 1PW, 2PW, 4PW, 5PW, 6PW has been discredited – Ground 4.
iv Whether it has been proved that the Plaintiff’s Grantors title is better than the Defendants Title – Ground 1, 6,7.”
It was submitted on issue (i) (supra) that the 5th P.W and 6th P.W called by respondent in the court below as boundary-men did not establish respondent’s case on the premise that the 5th P.W admitted he did not know the boundary of Abogunrin family land, while the 6th P.W, a boundary man of Abogunrin, the respondent’s grantor, testified contrary to the survey plan in Exhibit P1 that the piece of land granted to respondent share boundary with one Fatuke’s piece of land, also, that the 6th P.W admitted a pending suit between 1st appellant and himself which prompted his testimony in the case against 1st appellant, which the court below neglected to consider leading to a miscarriage of justice in the present case.
It was also submitted on issue (i) (supra) that appellants challenged the title of respondent’s grantor which was not considered by the court below; nor was there evidence to establish respondent’s prior possession of the disputed land, showing respondent did not prove his title to the land by evidence of boundary-men or tenants, consequently issue (i) should be resolved in appellants’ favour on the strength of the cases of Efetirorojee v. Okoalefe (1991) 7 SCNJ 85 at 94; Ekpa v. Utong (1991) 7 SCNJ 170 at 182; Clay Industry v. Aina (1997) 7 SCNJ 491 at 510; and Aigbobahi v. Aifuwa (2006) 2 SCNJ 61at 78.
Submissions on issue (ii) (supra) were to the effect that Abogunrin family was said by respondent to be the original founder and settler on the disputed land which was later granted respondent by the Abogunrin family who had also put appellants’ ancestor, one Adelakan Obadapata, as tenant on part of their family land, from where appellants continued as tenants of the Abogunrin family, quite contrary to appellants’ assertion that one Olasoji, their ancestor, settled on the disputed land on his own accord and could not have, been the tenant of the Abogunrin family whose land is situate at Igbo Mogaji near Erelu, removed from the disputed land. Submissions on issue (ii) (supra) added that 3rd P.W.’s evidence of grant of a piece of land to him at Olorunda by the Abogunrin family established that the disputed land is not the same as the one granted to the witness; that Exhibit P1, respondents survey plan, does not show where the Abogunrin family land share boundaries with the piece of land granted to respondent by the family; that the Baptist primary School and the Baptist Church on the disputed land bear the name of Balogun, appellants’ ancestry; it was wrong for the court below to hold that Abogunrin installed 1st appellant as the Balogun, therefore he was the one that granted land to 1st appellant; respondent never enjoyed possession of the disputed land; and that the court below should have resolved the inconclusive traditional evidence relied upon by the parties in accordance with the principle in the case of Kojo v. Bonsie (1957) 1 WLR 1223, by having recourse to recent acts of possession on the land, which showed respondent did not prove title to the disputed land vide the case of Ewo v. Ani (2004) 1 SCNJ 272 at 280-281; Osafite v. Odi (1994) 2 SCNJ 1 at 15 and Uka v. Irolo (2002) 7 SCNJ 137 at 168.
Appellants submissions on issue (iii) (supra) suggested that 1st P.W admitted under cross-examination that the respondent’s grantor’s land had no northern boundary nor was any shown in the area verged blue to be part of Exhibit P1, the survey plan, showing respondent did not prove with certainty the disputed area of land; that 2nd P.W admitted under cross examination that he did not know the history of appellants’ family.
It was submitted further that 4th P.W contested the stool of Balogun with 1st appellant and lost and admitted he refused to recognize 1st appellant as the Balogun, showing his “bias and prejudice” deprived his evidence of any weight; 5th P.W admitted under cross-examination that he did not know the boundary of the Abogunrin family land, while 6th P.W admitted under cross-examination that he has a pending litigation against 1st appellant, showing the evidence of the 1st P.W, 2nd P.W, 4th P.W, 5th P.W and 6th P.W were discredited, deserving no weight by the court below vide Fagbenro v,. Arabadi (2005) 2 SCNJ 326 at 343.
Issue (iv) (supra) canvassed appellants’ challenge of the grantor’s title, the Abogunrin family, stating their land is at Igbo Mogaji near Erelu without proof from respondent establishing ownership of the disputed land’s nexus with Abogunrin family land which the court below failed to make any findings of fact contenting itself with the summary of the evidence and the clich’E9 “I believe, I do not believe” without assigning reasons for awarding the disputed land to respondent contrary to the decisions in the cases of Ogbuokwelu v. Umfanafunkwa (1994) 5 SCNJ at 57: Ngene v. Igbo (2000) 2 SCNJ 136 at 156-157; Nneji v. Chukwu (1996) 12 SCNJ 388 at 400; Akibu v. Opaleye (1974) 11 SC 189; Onwugbufor v. Okoye (1996) 1 NWLR (pt.424) 252; and Agbabiaka v. Saibu (1998) 10 NWLR (Pt. 571) 534.
Appellants concluded by praying for the appeal to be allowed and the case of the respondent in the court below dismissed.
The respondent filed an amended brief of argument prepared by his learned counsel, Mr. Omoloye, dated 28.11.07, and filed on 29.11.07, but deemed properly filed on 22.9.08, by an order of court. A single issue for determination was formulated in the respondent’s brief as follows:
“Whether the findings of fact of the learned trial judge were supported by the evidence before the court?”
Respondent argued contrary-wise that the court below evaluated the traditional evidence led by both sides and resolved that respondent’s root of title was conclusive and rejected appellants’ evidence as bereft of credibility, which findings of fact in favour of respondent were supported by evidence vide the cases of Banishebi v. Faleye (1987) 4 SCNJ 1 at 9 and Nwawuba v. Enemuo (1988) 5 SCNJ 154 at 165.
Respondent’s brief argued further that the P.W.5, tenant of the grantor, testified in support of respondent’s case and was believed by the court below, whilst the P.w.6 gave unshaken evidence as boundary man of respondent, but appellants never called any boundary witness to challenge respondent’s case; that P.W3, P.W.4 and P.W5 gave unchallenged evidence of paying customary tribute “Isakole” to the grantor on every “ogiyan” festival which all taken together proved respondent’s title to the disputed land as found by the court below.
Respondent’s brief also contended that Exhibit P1 and Exhibit D1, the respective survey plans, have identical features and boundary men, except the omission of the Omole family land as boundary of the disputed land, upon which the court below found the identity of the disputed land established; and that the said finding should not be disturbed as it was not shown to be perverse and was based on the evidence of P.W.1, the surveyor, and Exhibit P1, the survey plan prepared by him, and admitted in evidence through him without objection following the case of Buraimoh Popoola v. Jaiyeola Balogun and Ors. (2007) 8 NWLR (pt.103) 574 at 598.
It was also argued in respondent’s brief that contrary to the pleadings of appellants that they have title to the disputed land by settlement, the evidence of the DW4, one Alhaji Ganiyu Ajiboye, stated that one Oja gave the land to them – Balogun – and also to the Mogaji, whilst respondent traced his title by grant from Mogaji Abogunrin family who was the first settler on the land with the blessing of the Alaafin of Oyo before making the grant to respondent; consequently the appeal should be dismissed.
The issues framed by appellants for determination on the appeal (supra) may conveniently be accommodated under the encompassing solitary issue formulated by respondent and, in my respectful view, respondent’s issue for determination is apt to the appeal and is hereby adopted for discussion on the appeal, with slight modification thus:
“Whether the findings of fact of the court below were supported by credible weight of evidence adduced before it.”
The 4th P.W. and the 6th P.W testified as tenant and boundary man respectively of the respondent’s grantor for the purpose of establishing title of the grantor as the rightful person to make a valid grant of the disputed land to respondent. The court below believed their evidence as tenant and boundary man respectively of respondent when it held on page 87 of the record that:
“From the totality of evidence by the plaintiff which includes evidence of boundary men and tenants put on the land by the plaintiff, it is my view that the plaintiff has been able to prove by preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to the claim asked for.” (My emphasis).
This is an issue of fact and credibility of 4th P.W. who testified as tenant of respondent on the disputed land. An appellate court has to tread cautiously on such an issue – see the Privy Council case of Abotche Kponuglo v. Adja Kodadja reported in Privy Council Judgments by Olisa Chukura page 255 at page 259 thus:
“Now, while even on questions of fact and credibility, a Court of Appeal must not abdicate its functions, it is nevertheless trite law that, not possessing the advantages of the Judge of first instance, a Court of Appeal should be chary of overruling his/ opinion on a pure question of credibility.”
The court below had before it evidence of bad blood between the two witnesses – 4th P.W. and 6th P.W. – and 1st appellant. In the case of the 4th P.W, their friction arose over a chieftaincy tussle between 1st appellant and the 4th P.W, as stated by the 4th P.W under cross examination on page 56 of the printed record thus:
“It is true that I contested to be Balogun in 1979 and the 1st Defendant (1st appellant) was picked as against me. It is true that I refuse to recognize him as the Balogun.”
In effect, the 4th P.W’s bitterness for the loss of the chieftaincy post to 1st appellant in 1979, was still with him when he gave evidence for respondent against appellants in the court below. The bitterness is so heavy that 4th P.W refuses to recognize 1st appellant as the Balogun or chief.
The court below did not express any opinion on the integrity of the 4th P.W, the bitter witness. It simply accepted his evidence en bloc. I think, with due deference to the court below, that it lost the advantage or opportunity of assessing the credibility of the 4th P.W against the backdrop of the sour relationship between the 4th P.W and the 1st appellant. Belief of a witness such as the 4th P.W without assigning any reason for the belief as did the court below is unacceptable – see Akibu v. Opaleye (1974) 11 S,C, 189 (supra) cited by Mr. Folorunso for the appellants.
Similarly, in the case of 6th P.W, the boundary witness, his friction with 1st appellant arose from a land dispute which was pending in court at the time he gave evidence for respondent in the court below. His evidence was also accepted in like manner as the 4th P.W, as stated in the course of this discourse contrary to the decision in Akibu v. Opaleye (supra).
Chieftaincy and land disputes are not light matters. Their volatile nature and the tension they generate cannot be over emphasized – see the case of Owoseni v. Faleye and Another (2005) 7 S.C. (Pt.11) 79 at 194, on the enmity chieftaincy disputes generate. While in the case of Onuoha and Others v. The State (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.101) 23 at 34-35, the bad blood land disputes cause was stated thus:
“.. The deceased was the father of P.W.2. The Appellants have long standing land disputes with the deceased to the knowledge of P.W.2. Just how disinterested would P.W.2 be in his evidence? This then imposed on the trial court the obligation to regard and view the evidence of P.W.2 rather critically and satisfy itself that there is no danger in believing it and acting on it.”
The 4th P.W’s testimony and that of the 6th P.W should, therefore, have been taken with a pinch of salt by the court below as their integrity to testify impartially was impaired by the grouse they had against is appellant emanating from chieftaincy and land disputes respectively – see Onuoha and others v. The State (supra) page 23 at pages 34, 35, and 41.
In my respectful opinion, the court below having not supplied the basis for accepting the 4th P.W’s evidence as one of the tenants of the respondent when he was at logger-heads with 1st appellant over a chieftaincy dispute and the 6th P.W for the land feud between 1st appellant, their evidence was suspect and should not have been accepted hook, line and sinker by the court below. The argument by respondent that 4th P.W made important admissions as the leading member of 1st appellant’s family against the interest of the appellants does not, with respect, impress me, as the evidence came from a disgruntled person or source and deserved no weight.
The court below stated the principle in Kojo II v. Bonsie (1957) 1 W.L.R. 1223 was inapplicable to the case. The 7th P.W. from the grantor’s family gave evidence of the grant of the disputed land to respondent by the Abogunrin Chieftaincy family who were first settlers on the land with the blessing of the Alaafin of Oyo the overlord, a specie of traditional history or evidence, His evidence constituted complete traditional history of respondent’s title to the disputed land. The appellants relied on inheritance from their fore-fathers as their own root of title to the disputed land. But in respect of appellants, they floundered by sharply contradicting the origin of their title by stating through the 4th D.W that Balogun, their progenitor, got the land by settlement when they migrated to Oyo with one Oja, only to summersault in another voice that Oja gave the land to Balogun. Lord Denning held in Kojo II v. Bonsie (supra) Privy Council Judgments by Olisa Chukura (supra) page 608 at 671.
“Where there is a conflict of traditional history, one side or the other must be mistaken, yet both may be honest in their belief. In such a case demeanour is little guide to the truth. The best way to test the traditional history is by reference to the facts in recent years as established by evidence and by seeing which of the two competing histories is the more probable.”
(My emphasis).
The principle in Kojo v. Bonsie (supra) would apply if both traditional histories are complete and one side of the complete traditional history conflicts with the other side of the complete traditional history – see Eze v. Atasile (2000) 6 SCNJ 209.
In the instant case, only respondent projected a complete or unblemished traditional history. Appellants’ traditional evidence was self materially contradictory on the type of title their progenitor got over the disputed land. Their witness, the 4th D.W, testified in that regard that the source of their ancestor’s title to the land was by settlement and by grant from one Oja. The two modes of acquisition of land are mutually antagonistic and strange bedfellows and cannot be combined to prove title to land. Once both modes of acquisition are put forward, the person projecting them has shot himself in the foot and his case comes to grief on that score – see Dokunbo v. Omoni (1999) ….. NWLR (Pt.616) 647 at 554 thus:
“Be it noted that there is clearly a difference between a grant and a settlement. A grant comes from a previous title holder to a subsequent one called a grantee; whereas settlement does not recognize a previous title holder. See Adedibu & Anor v Olofa (1968) NMLR 462
The self materially contradictory evidence for appellants on the type of title acquired over the disputed land by their first parent defeated the application of the principle in Kojo v. Bonsie (supra) to the case and, the court below was, in my considered view, right in declining to use the said principle in respect of the case – see Shittu Onigbede and Others v. Samuel Balogun and Another (2002) 2 SCNJ 219 at 234 per Ogundare, J.S.C. (of blessed memory).
The court below considered, aright, in my view, the complete traditional history of respondent’s title to the disputed land on the stable and cogent evidence of 7th P.W, a member of the grantor’s family, and came to the sound conclusion that respondent had proven his case based on traditional evidence of grant – see Ikpang and Others v. Edoho and Another (1978) 2 LRN 29 at 39 – 41; Ige v. Akoju (1994) 4 SCNJ 288; and Ezeokonkwo v. Okeke (2002) 5 SCNJ page 1at 14.
The contention by appellants that respondent’s grantor’s title was put in issue was adequately repelled by respondent in paragraphs 32 and 33 of the reply to the statement of defence and the testimony of 7th P.W that the Alaafin of Oyo, as titular overlord of the place, gave his blessing or permission to the grantor’s first parent to settle on the disputed land as its first settler.
So much on this issue.
Appellants’ dwelt on the Baptist School and the Baptist Church as one of their incidents of ownership of the disputed area. Paragraph 12 of their rejoinder to reply to the statement of defence, however, pleaded that the school is situate outside the disputed piece of land. The 1st appellant testifying as the 1st D.W also stated that the Baptist school and the Baptist Church are not on the disputed piece of land, so both could not, in my view, have been of assistance to appellants in this case. Rather, respondent showed acts of possession by erecting pillars or poles as boundary marks fencing the disputed land vide the case of Majekodunmi v. Abina (2002) l SCNJ 106.
Heavy weather was made by appellants of the northern boundary of the disputed land, contending that it was not oriented in the survey plan in Exhibit P1 to reflect respondent’s grantor’s land as boundary mark in the area. The survey plan was pleaded by respondent in paragraph 2 of the statement of claim with the additional information that a copy of it was attached to the statement of claim. The appellants’ denial of paragraph 2 of the statement of claim in their paragraphs 1 and 2 of the statement of defence was evasive. It did not frontally attack or raise the issue of the northern boundary of the land. Paragraph 17 of appellants’ statement of defence pleaded their own survey plan without questioning the northern boundary of the land contained in respondent’s survey plan. Nor did appellants’ survey plan delineate a different northern boundary from the one configured by respondent’s survey plan. Paragraph 5 of the rejoinder to the reply to the statement of defence referred to the land in issue as the disputed piece of land. The appellants did not, therefore, make specific issue of the northern boundary of the land in their pleadings and cannot be allowed to make an issue out of it in their final address -see Lewis and Peat (NRI) Ltd. v. Akhimien (1976) 1 All NLR (pt.1) 460 at 465; and Ezeudu and Others v. Obiagwu (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt.21) 208 at 220.
Also, both respondent’s survey plan in Exhibit P1 and appellants’ survey plan in Exhibit D1 are ad idem on the road from Iseyin to Oyo town as the feature comprising the northern boundary of the disputed land. The 7th P.W from the grantor’s family also confirmed the said road constituted the boundary mark of the disputed land in the cardinal north. Similarly, the 2nd D.W, a registered surveyor, through whom the survey plan in Exhibit D1 was admitted in evidence, confirmed that:
“The plan also showed an existing road on the northern part from Iseyin to Oyo.”
The 2nd D.W confirmed further that the two survey plans in Exhibits p1 and D1 were in respect of the same location of the disputed piece of land though not of the same scale as to size. The is appellant testifying as the 1st D.W also stated inter-alia that:
“I know the land in dispute it is my own farmland. In 1999, I saw some poles in my farmland and I rushed to report to the police at Durbar, Oyo that I saw strange poles…..”
It is, accordingly, futile to contend that the parties did not know the disputed land, as the evidence in the record showed they knew what they were fighting for – see Dosunmu v. Joto (1987) 4 NWLR (pt.65) page 297.
In addition, only the boundary that is in dispute needs to be proved. And in the instant case, appellants did not dispute boldly or frontally the northern boundary of the disputed piece of land both in their pleadings, survey plan and evidence, consequently the need to prove the northern boundary never, arose in the case and, respondent was entitled to rely on the uncontested northern boundary feature engrained on the survey plan in Exhibit Pl accordingly – see Omorogie v. Idugiemwanye (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.5) 41 or (1985) 2 N.S.C.C 838 at 847 – 49. 852.
Whether 1st P.W, the maker of Exhibit p1, stated that the grantor’s boundary with the grantee’s land in the northern side of the land was not contained in Exhibit P1 would, in my view, be of no moment. The boundary as found in the northern side of the land is on the road from Iseyin to Oyo town and is put in Exhibit p1 and confirmed by Exhibit D1, showing beyond argument that the northern boundary of the land was proven to be on the Iseyin- oyo road. Exhibit p1 served, therefore, as a hangar to assess the oral evidence of the 1st p.w vide the cases of Olujinle v. Adeagbo (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt.75) 238, Kindey v. Military Governor of Gongola State (1988) 2 NWLR (pt.77) at 448 and Fashanu v. Adekoya (1974) 6 SC. 83 at 91-92, or (1974) 1 All N.L.R. (Pt.1) 35 at 41-42.
In other words, the northern boundary of the land was proven to be on Iseyin – oyo road, and it is trite that natural marks like a road, river, building or stream can constitute good boundary marks – see Awere v. Lasoju (1975) N.N.L.R. 79 at 82.
The respondents having proved on the preponderance of evidence title to the disputed piece of land by traditional evidence of grant over an ascertained or definite/defined parcel of land as shown in the course of this discourse, the court below was right in its judgment that respondent was entitled to the reliefs sought by him against appellants in paragraph 37 of the statement of claim (supra). The appeal lacks merit. I dismiss it and affirm the decision of the court below (Oyelaran,J) with N30,000 costs to respondent against appellants.
SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.C.A.: I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother, J.S. IKYEGH, J.C.A. just delivered.
I agree with the reasoning and conclusion that the appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed. I dismiss same and abide by the consequential orders made in the read judgment including order on Costs.
MODUPE FASANMI, J.C.A:I have had the advantage of reading in advance the Judgment of my learned brother J. S. Ikyegh, J. C. A. The issues have been adequately dealt with.
I am in complete agreement with his reasoning and conclusion. The appeal lacks merit. I abide by the consequential orders in the said leading Judgment.
Appearances
Mr. Adebayo FolorunsoFor Appellant
AND
Mr. O. O. OmoloyeFor Respondent
