CBN v. OODO & ANOR (2020)

CBN v. OODO & ANOR

(2020)LCN/14488(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Wednesday, July 15, 2020

CA/A/1185/2018

Before Our Lordships:

Peter Olabisi Ige Justice of the Court of Appeal

Emmanuel Akomaye Agim Justice of the Court of Appeal

Yargata Byenchit Nimpar Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA APPELANT(S)

And

1. GABRIEL OODO 2. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction being a fundamental element in any adjudication, it must be resolved at the earliest. The importance of jurisdiction has received attention in a plethora of cases, one of such is DAPIANLONG V DARIYE (2007) LPELR-928(SC) which held thus:
“It is settled law that jurisdiction is a radical and crucial question of competence because if a Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a case, the proceedings are and remain a nullity ab initio, however well conducted and brilliantly decided they might be since a defect in competence is not intrinsic, but extrinsic to the entire process of adjudication. Jurisdiction is therefore considered to be the nerve centre of adjudication; the blood that gives life to the survival of an action in a Court of law in the very same way that blood gives life to the human being in particular and the animal race in general – See Onyenucheya v. Milad, Imo State (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt. 482) 429; Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341, Barsoum v. Clemessy International (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 632) 516; Utih & Ors v. Onoyivwe (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 166) 166.” PER NIMPAR, J.C.A.

DEFINITION OF THE TERM “GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS”

Garnishee Proceedings is a process of enforcing a money Judgment by the seizure or attachment of debts due and accruing to the Judgment Debtor, which forms part of his property in the hands of a third party for attachment. They are separate and distinct proceedings and are governed strictly by the provisions of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, see UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC VS UBOKULO (2009) LPELR 8923 (CA); CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA VS OKEB NIGERIA LTD (2014) LPELR 23162(CA); HERITAGE BANK LTD VS INTERLAGOS OIL LTD (2018) LPELR 44801(CA). PER NIMPAR, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT AN EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR GARNISHEE ORDER NISI IS IN THE FORM OF AN INITIATING PROCESS

It is settled that an ex parte application for Garnishee Order Nisi is in the form of an initiating process and therefore should be served on the Judgment Debtor as specifically provided for by law and as required for initiating processes. Failure to serve initiating process according to law divest the Court of jurisdiction; see HARRY V MENAKAYA (2017) LPELR- 42363(SC) where the apex Court held thus:
“The law is trite and well settled on the fact that service of the originating process or hearing notice constitutes the foundation on which the whole structure of litigation or appeal is built, and in its absence, the entire proceeding will be rendered void and any decision reached thereon is a nullity. Therefore, the issue of service of an initiating process, be it a Writ of Summons, an Originating Summons, a Notice of Appeal or a Notice of Petition, whether in election matters or in winding-up proceedings et cetera, is so central, fundamental and very germane to the proceedings springing or emanating from such processes. Service is the very pillar or foundation upon which any proceeding is built, before any Court no matter its status. In other words, the principle applies evenly whether before inferior Courts, Tribunals, or superior Courts of record. As stringent as the procedures in Military Tribunals are, service of process is made fundamental and nothing can be done outside it. It is no wonder therefore that Rules of Court all over, make adequate and elaborate provisions for service of any initiating process in particular and other processes in general. Apart from the fact that it is a fundamental human right of a party, extracted from his right to fair hearing as entrenched under Section 36 of the Constitution to have an initiating process or hearing notice in respect of any Proceedings served on him, such service or non-service, as the case may be goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the adjudicating Court. Put differently, a Court will not be clothed with jurisdiction to adjudicate on any matter if one of the parties has not been served with either the initiating process of the hearing notice for a particular day or proceedings. Section 122 of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended) is very specific on the procedure followed by the Court in ensuring that adequate service is effected on all parties. In the absence of proper service, there can be no adjudication. It is the practice and the Court has made it a point of duty to satisfy itself on the question of service.
…I must emphasize that service of process is an important aspect of the judicial process. Failure to serve a named party with Court process offends Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)… Any breach of this principle renders proceedings a nullity… Service of process, I must say is a fundamental issue and condition precedent before the Court can have competence to adjudicate. …I must say that the appellants made a serious blunder in this appeal by treating the issue of service of originating process with levity… This appeal was not commenced by due process of law as condition precedent to assumption of jurisdiction by the Court were absent.” (Emphasis provided). PER NIMPAR, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT A NOTICE OF APPEAL IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND MUST BE SERVED PERSONALLY ON THE OTHER PARTY

It has been re-iterated by this Court in the case of Ihedioha v. Okorocha (unreported supra) that a Notice of Appeal, being an originating process, is fundamental to the jurisdiction of the Court and it must be served personally on the other party. On the question of a Court’s illegibility in assuming and exercising jurisdiction over matters brought before it, the conditions precedent are clearly specified as laid down in the celebrated case of Madukolu v Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SC NLR 341. The requirements include the fact that the case must come before the Court, initiated by due process of law and upon the fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. Again and on the fundamental institution of service of process, this Court, in the case of Sken Consult (Nigeria) Ltd & Anor V. Ukey (1981) 1 SC 6 at 26, unanimously held after reference made to the Madukolu’s case supra, and said:- “The service of process on the defendant so as to enable him appear to defend the relief being sought against him and the appearance by the party or any counsel must be those fundamental conditions precedent required before the Court can have competence and jurisdiction. This very well accords with the principles of natural justice.” The absence of service forecloses foundation. See again the case of Macfoy V. UAC Ltd (1962) AC 152 where the absence of foundation denotes that: “you cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse.” Per OGUNBIYI, J.S.C. PER NIMPAR, J.C.A.

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This Appeal is against the ruling in Garnishee Proceedings pursuant to a Judgment in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/302M/2016 wherein Garnishee Order Nisi was made absolute by the Court below, the National Industrial Court holding at Abuja on the 23rd May, 2016. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on the 20/6/2017 setting out 3 Grounds of Appeal.

Facts relevant to this Appeal are straight forward and amenable to brief summary. This is a Garnishee Proceedings for a liquidated sum of N10,054,439.5K (Ten Million, Fifty Four Thousand Four Hundred and Thirty Nine Naira Five Kobo) wherein the Judgment Creditor/Garnishor 1st Respondent through an ex-parte application made to the Court below, the National Industrial Court (NICN) obtained an order nisi dated 24th day of June 2015. The lower Court purportedly in compliance with Section 83(2) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act directed that the Order Nisi should be served on the Judgment Debtor (2nd Respondent) and the Garnishee/Appellant respectively.

The Appellant as the Garnishee at the Court below by way of

Preliminary Objection challenged the Jurisdiction of the Court below to entertain the Garnishee proceedings on the following grounds:
i. Order VIII Rule 2 of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules was not followed.
ii. The Garnishee Applicant is a Federal Government Agency such that Section 251(d) (p)(q) & (r) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, confers exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal High Court to entertain/adjudicate on any matter where a Garnishee Applicant is a party.
iii. The condition precedent before initiating proceedings in any Court against the Garnishee were not followed such the consent of the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation was not first sought for and obtained before the institution of the matter against the Garnishee in obedience to Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
iv. Garnishee proceedings are governed by Sheriffs and Civil Act and certain conditions must be met before a valid Garnishee proceedings can be instituted against the Garnishee.

The objection was heard and the Court dismissed the application and dissatisfied with the decision the Appellant

filed this Appeal.

The Appellant’s Brief settled by E. E. AKUTUS, ESQ., is dated 25th January, 2019 and filed on the 30/01/2019 but deemed on the 4/6/2020, it distilled 3 issues for determination as follows:
i. Whether the Appellant is not a Public officer within the meaning and scope of the Public Officer Protection act and therefore not bound by the provision of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil process Act.
ii. Whether the trial Court has jurisdiction in a matter involving an agency of the Federal Government.
iii. Whether the lower Court ought to have invalidated the order nisi for violating Section 83 (2) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act and whether the service of the order Nisi on the counsel was proper.

The First Respondent’s Brief settled by A. G. OCHIGBO ESQ., is dated 21st day of February, 2019 filed on the 25/2/2019 but deemed on the 4/6/2020 and it formulated 3 issues for determination thus:
1. Whether or not, the Appellant (Central Bank of Nigeria) is a public officer within the meaning of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act to warrant the requirement of the consent of the Attorney

General of the Federation.
2. Whether or not the total trial Court has the jurisdictional competence to entertain the matter even though the Appellant/Garnishee Central Bank of Nigeria being an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria is a party on the face of Section 251(1) (d) (p) & (r) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
3. Whether the lower Court ought not to have invalidated the order Nisi for violating Section 83(2) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act and whether the service of the order Nisi on the 2nd Respondent’s counsel was proper.

The Appellant reacted to the 1st Respondent’s Briefs by filing a Reply on points of law dated 6th March 2019, filed on the 7/5/2019 but deemed on the 4/6/2020.

The 2nd Respondent’s Brief settled by IBRAHIM ANGULU, ESQ., is dated 9th April, 2019 and filed same day, but deemed on the 4/6/2020. It donated a sole issue for determination as follows:
Whether the Garnishee was not incompetent in view of the fact that the mandatory requirement of the law to serve the order Nisi on the Judgment Debtor (2nd Respondent).

I have considered the Notice of

Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the briefs of the respective parties and I am inclined to adopt issues donated by the Appellant for determination in this Appeal being the initiator of the Appeal. Doing so will ensure all areas of complaint are effectively addressed. All other issues should also be easily subsumed into the issues presented by the Appellant. In view of the jurisdictional challenge, the issues shall be considered seamlessly to avoid repetition and for expediency.

APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS
ISSUE 1
The Appellant states that the Garnishee application to set aside the Order Nisi made on the 24th June 2015 by the Court below on the ground that the provision of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Processes Act Cap 56 LFN 2004 was not complied with prior the institution/commencement of the Garnishee Proceedings by the 1st Respondent/Judgment creditor. The Appellant further states that the trial Judge while making the Order Nisi absolute refused the said application to set aside the Order Nisi made on the 24th June, 2015 and held that the Appellant herein is not a public officer within the meaning and scope of Section 84.

It is the Appellant’s opinion that the trial Judge of the Court below gravely erred in law when it held in its ruling delivered on the 23rd May, 2016 at page 91 of the Record of Appeal. The Appellant in presenting their argument for the sake of clarity addressed the issue by asking three questions presented thus:
a. Whether the Appellant is a public officer within the meaning and scope of the Public Officer Protection Act CAP P41 LFN 2004.
b. If the answer to (a) is answered in the affirmative, whether the Appellant as a public officer is bound by the provision of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act CAP S6 LFN 2004.
c. Whether by a combined affirmative answer of (a) and (b), the 1st Respondent/Judgment creditor had met with the condition precedent before it proceeded to institute the garnishee proceedings against the Appellant.

On the first question, the Appellant submits that the word Public Officer as stipulated in Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act 2004 does not only refer to a natural person(s) sued in their personal names but extends and included public bodies, artificial person(s) sued by their official names or

titles and statutory corporation, citing FGN V. ZEBRA ENERGY LTD (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt 798) 195.

The Appellant also submits that it is trite and settled law that the word “person” when used in legal parlance, such as a corporation sole or public bodies, corporate or unincorporated. Further, the Appellant submits that based from the forgoing, when construing the word person and/or any person as used in the Public Officers Protection Act, same ought not to be construed in a narrow/limited sense, that is to say as referring only to natural persons or human being but should be construed in its expansive sense to include artificial person such as corporation sole, statutory bodies, relied on N.I.I.A V. AYANFALU (2007) 2 NWLR PT 1018.

The Appellant submits that a calm, cumulative and ejusdem generic reading of Section 18(1) & (3) of the Interpretation Act Cap LFN 2004, Section 84(1) SCPA where the word “or of Court” is used, the disjunctive interpretation of the word “or” when used in an enactment and the definition of person in the definition section of the Public Officers Protection Act will therefore without

doubt or further clarification clearly show that the meaning of the word person or any persons includes both companies, associates or body of persons as well as statutory bodies or persons, corporate or unincorporated.

Furthermore, the Appellant submit that the word “person” or “any person” as used in the Public Officers Protection Act was intended by the draftsman in its expansive scope to cover both human beings, legal or artificial person such as corporate or unincorporated bodies carrying out public functions/duties or providing public services citing EKEMODE V. ALAUSA (1961) ALL NLR 135.

The Appellant submits further that the Central Bank of Nigeria being a statutory body recognized under the laws and created by an act of legislature clearly without equivocation falls within the ambit of who a public officer is within the meaning and scope of the Public Officer’s Protection Act: FN 2004 and they urge the Court to hold so.

The Appellant submits that from Section 84 of the Sheriff and Civil Processes Act that the draftsman envisaged such a situation as the present one, where a Public Officer as in the instant

case, the Appellant will be in custody or control of funds (in his official capacity). They further submits that the Appellant and 2nd Respondent, being public officers (as contended above) they are bound by and covered under the canopy of the provisions of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Processes Act. This is more so because statutorily, the Appellant as the bankers’ bank and the official bank of both the Federal Government and the State Government is a custodian of both private and public funds and as such, holds all monies in its official capacity.

In continuation of argument, the Appellant submits that being a public officer, the 1st Respondent ought to have sought and obtained the prior consent of the Attorney General of the Federation before it proceeded to commence the Garnishee proceedings to attach the monies of the 2nd Respondent in the Appellants’ custody in his official capacity. Also, the Appellant submits that assuming without conceding that by any fanciful stretch of imagination, it is argued that the Appellant under whose custody the money attached was is not a Public Officer, the trial Judge could still not have made

the Garnishee order absolute in the circumstance, that is, because the 2nd Respondent (at trial Court) under whose control the money was, is a Public Officer by the Act.

The Appellant states that the rationale for requirement of consent of the Attorney General before Judgment can be executed was equally necessary even if the Attorney General is a party in the case referred to ONJEWU V. KSMCI (2003) 10 NWLR (PT. 827) 78.

The Appellant submits that the Judgment sum sought to be satisfied is that of and under the control of the 2nd Respondent and in custody of the Appellant who are both Public Officer and agent of the Federal Government and the consent of the Attorney General must be obtained before same could be attached, citing GOVT OF AKWA IBOM STATE V. POWERCOM NIG. LTD (2004)6 NWLR (PT 868) 202.

The Appellant submits that the Court must possess both jurisdiction and competence to be properly seized of a cause or matter. Jurisdiction in this sense means the legal capacity, power or authority vested in it by the condition or statute creating it. Further, they submit that the issue of jurisdiction which is the live wire of any litigation, where

not present robs the Court of its powers to adjudicate on any issue presented before it. The importance is that it is the lifeline of trial. A trial or an order of Court made without jurisdiction is a nullity, as jurisdiction is fundamental as settled in MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM 1962 SCNLR 341.

The Appellant further submits that the jurisdiction of any Court or tribunal is confined, limited and circumscribed by the statute creating it. Jurisdiction is the very basis on which any Court or tribunal tries a case. Therefore the Attorney General’s consent being a condition precedent to attaching any sum in the custody of a Public Officer and having been created by the Sheriffs and Civil Processes Act is a jurisdictional issue circumscribing the powers of the Court to rightly entertain the garnishee proceeding in line with Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Processes Act. Furthermore, the failure of the 1st Respondent/Judgment creditor to obtain the requisite consent from the Attorney General before seeking to enforce the Judgment obtained the 2nd Respondent in the instant case deprived the trial Court of the Jurisdiction to hear his application ab initio

and to make the orders it made thereto. It urged the Court to find for the Appellant.

ISSUE 2
The second issue was argued based on the provisions of Section 251 of the Constitution and Order VIII Rule (2) of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules. The Appellant submits that the Judicial character and attitude, which has been established and followed in a long line and plethora of authorities is that the Garnishee/Appellant being an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria and in view of the unambiguous provisions of Section 251 (1)(d),(p),(q) & I of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).

The Appellant submits that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is the ground norm and that jurisdiction is the bedrock of any action or proceeding which is the legal power or authority that enables a Judge to entertain a matter that is brought before him, referred to PETER OBI V. INEC & 6 ORS (2007) 31 NSC QR 734 @ 776.

The Appellant submits further that the aim of Section 251 (1) (d) (p), (q) & I of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is to vest exclusive jurisdiction on the

Federal High Court in any matter in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party as held in NEPA V. EDEGBERO & ORS (2002) 12 NSCQR 105 @ 121. The Appellant submits that the clear and unambiguous provision of Section 251 (1) (d) (p), (q) & I of the Constitution did not expressly exclude or exempt garnishee proceedings which the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction.

The Appellant states that it is prudent and expedient to further submit here that in the principle of construction and interpretation of the Constitution is to give effect to the clear/liberal words of the Constitution as was held in the case of NAFIU RABIU V. STATE (1981) 2 NCLR 293. It discountenanced frivolity and requires Courts in construing the Constitution to do so with liberalism and avoid construing it in a manner that one section would defeat the intent and purpose of another. Based on the above expositions, the Court is urged to give effects to the clear and unambiguous provision of Section 251 (1) (d) (p) (q) & I irrespective of the nature of the proceedings whether Garnishee or not, the Constitution did not make a distinction.

The Appellant submits that Order Viii Rule 2(a) of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules which goes hand in hand with Section 83(1) of Sheriff and Civil Process Act provide that Garnishee Proceedings may be taken in any Court in which the Judgment debtor could under Civil Procedure Rules in the Magistrate Court as the case may be, sue the Garnishee in respect to the debt, referred the Court to CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA V. AUTO IMPORT & EXPORT & ORS (2013) 2NWLR PT 1337 Page 80 @ 88. Furthermore, Rule 9 of the same order recognizes the fact that it is only a Court that has the competence to entertain Garnishee Proceedings where such matter is taken to. The Appellant respectfully submits that based on the above authorities, the ex-parte application filed and dated 16/6/15 by the 1st Respondent was filed at a wrong forum as the Court below does not have the competency to entertain same. It is submitted again that without any modicum of doubt that the Appellant is an agency of the Federal Government and was summoned to a wrong forum. It urged the Court to so hold.

ISSUE 3
Appellant’s issue 3 was argued on the basis of certain questions, thus:

Is a Garnishee Proceeding a separate and distinct suit? If the answer in (i) is in the affirmative, it then leads to the next question.
ii. They were argued together with for orderliness.
a. What is the originating process, writ or simply put the legal process that invites/brings or summons the garnishee and the Judgment debtor to the proceedings?
b. What is the mode of service of that original process that summons the Judgment debtor and the Garnishee to the Court?

It is submitted with humility that a Garnishee Proceedings is a special, rigid, inflexible, distinct and separate action which its procedure must be followed with the accuracy of mathematics and referred to WEMA BANK PLC V. BRASTEM-STERR (NIG) LTD 6 NWLR (Pt 1242) 58. The Appellant submits that from the forgoing authority, it is settled that a garnishee proceedings is a separate action for the enforcement of a Judgment. The Appellant argued that if their position is adopted by the Court that a garnishee proceeding is a separate action, it then follows that the “Order Nisi” which initiates, invites/summons the Garnishee and the Judgment debtor to the Court, is the

Originating Process in the Garnishee Proceedings, akin also to a writ or Civil Summons, the service of which must be personal service and if on a corporation, the service must be at the Head Office of the Corporation.

It is further submitted that service of Civil Summons initiating a proceeding must be valid in order to invoke the Jurisdiction of the Court, citing FATAI AYODELE ALAWIYE V. ELIZABETH ADETOKUNBO OGUNSANYA (2012) LPELR 1966 SC.

Furthermore, the Appellant submits that the Court below ought to have taken Judicial notice under Section 122 (1) & (2) a, b, I & m and Section 124 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011 as amended of the law of service of Originating Summons in Nigeria. It is submitted that service of Order Nisi ought to have been effected in accordance with the rules relevant to service of ordinary summons. The Appellant submits that the decision in Araka’s case, the provision of the statute under Section 83 (2) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act which was violently breached and host of other authorities cited are very clear and unambiguous and should be accorded liberal interpretation. Further, the Appellant argued that

leave is required before the Order Nisi can be served on the counsel. And on failure to obtain leave where same is required is fatal, see URUNNE V. AGBORO (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt 723) 206 at 209.

Finally, the Appellant submit that from the laws relied upon under issue 1, 2 and 3 of their brief, irresistible conclusion can be drawn from the case of the 1st Respondent that due diligence was not followed in the prosecution of his case at the Court below. The Appellant prays this Court to allow this Appeal by setting aside the Order Nisi/Order Absolute/Ruling made by the trial Court on 24/6/2015 and 23rd May 2016 respectively with cost.

1ST RESPONDENTS SUBMISSIONS
ISSUE 1
The 1st Respondent submit that the Appellant, the Central Bank of Nigeria is not by any stretch of imagination a Public Officer within the meaning of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act to warrant the requirement of consent of the Attorney General of the Federation before a Garnishee Order Nisi can be made against the Central Bank of Nigeria. He asked who a Public Officer is under Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act? Furthermore, that by the Constitution

of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the term Public Officer relate to the holder of the office as reflected in Section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. The 1st Respondent submits that by the combined and community reading of Section 84 of the Sheriffs & Civil Process Act, Section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act and Section 318(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, they point conclusively to the definition that a Public Officer is a holder, officer or person holding a Public Office. It does not include artificial person as the Central Bank of Nigeria. He referred the Court to the case of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA V. NJEMANZE (2015) NWLR (Pt. 1449) 276.

The Respondent submits that from the construction of the wordings of the relevant provisions of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act and Section 318(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, in conjunction with the legal position/Judicial pronouncement by this Court in the above cited case, the Appellant is not a Public Officer within the meaning of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act

to warrant the requirement of the consent of the Attorney General before the monies of the 2nd Defendant in the hand of the Appellant be Garnished.

The 1st Respondent further submits that in considering this very issue, the following questions beg for answer:
1. Was the Judgment of the trial Court in the substantive case leading to the Garnishee Proceedings against a Public Officer or agency of the Federal Government?
2. Is the Judgment debtor the Central Bank of Nigeria or any other Government agency whose account is sought to be garnished?
3. Does the money sought to be Garnished belong to the Central Bank of Nigeria or any other agency of the Federal Government?

In answering the above questions, the 1st Respondent submits that the Judgment of the trial Court in the substantive case was not against the Central Bank of Nigeria as a person or Attorney General of the Federation. No Government Ministry, Agency, Parastatal or even the Central Bank of Nigeria was a party to the case even at the trial Court, referred to page 9 of the Record of Appeal.

The 1st Respondent emphatically submits that while the Central Bank of Nigeria is

a Public Officer within the meaning and confines of the Public Officers Protection Act because of the use of the word “any person” she is not a Public Officer within the meaning of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act because of the phrase “Public Officer”.

The Respondent states that their reason for the above postulation is predicated on the ratio decidendi in the case of IBRAHIM V. J.S.C KADUNA STATE (supra) which is the locus classicus case that drafted Corporate Bodies or Public Institutions into the meaning of Public Officer based on the provisions of Public Officers Protection Law of Northern Nigeria 1963 and the Interpretation Law of Northern Nigeria 1963.

The Respondent submits that looking at the definition of the Public Officers under the Interpretation Act, the Constitution and the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, it will be difficult to construe the phrase ‘Public Officer’ as used under Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act to mean “any person” as used under the Public Officers Protection Act to hold that Central Bank of Nigeria is Public Officer within the meaning of

Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act and they urge this Court to hold so in following the decision C.B.N V. ADEDEJI (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) p.226 @ 242. Further, the 1st Respondent submits that the case of IBRAHIM V. J.S.C KADUNA STATE (supra) does not apply to the case at hand as the ratio decidendi in that case is completely different from the case, citingIKUEPENIKAN V. STATE (2015) 9 NWLR (Pt.1465) 518 @ 540.

The Respondent urge this Court not to abide by the decision in CBN V. HYDRO AIR PTY LTD (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt.1434) P. 482 but to follow the Court’s decision in the case of CBN V. NJEMANZE AND SHARIKA & SONS LTD V. GOV. KADUNA STATE (supra).

Furthermore, the Respondent submit that in every Garnishee Proceedings, where the Central Bank is a party, what shows or is conspicuous on the face of the motion paper and the Order Nisi is the name of the Central Bank as a known personality in law. The validity of such Order Nisi does not depend upon the inclusion of the names of the officials of the bank. What it means is that, the Central Bank as an artificial entity can defend itself in the Garnishee Proceedings without necessarily

depending on its staff. It is the Central Bank as a person that is in custody of the funds in its office and not the staff thereof.

Finally, the Respondent states that it will be an error and contrary to every known canon of interpretation of statutes to describe the Central Bank as a Public Officer placing reliance on the Section 318 of the Constitution because that will equally mean stretching the meaning of the phrase “Public Officer” beyond the dictates of the Interpretation Act and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended and urge the Court to hold so.

ISSUE 2
The Respondent submits that given the enormous and robust Jurisdiction bestowed on the National Industrial Court (trial Court) by the constitution, the trial Court posses a wide Jurisdiction to accommodate the Garnishee Proceeding not minding the fact that a Federal Government agency, in this case Central Bank of Nigeria is involved.

The 1st Respondent submits further that the Appellants submissions under their issue 2 is a misconception of the provisions of Section 251 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria vis-à-vis the

provisions of Section 254 (c) (1) & (4) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. He argued that Section 254 (C) (1) contains the unequivocal jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court. That Section 254 (C) (a) also connects to any Labour Market, Employment, Trade, Unions, Industrial Relations and Matters Arising from Workplace, Conditions of Service, Welfare of Labour and Employee.

The Respondent further submits that the provisions of Section 254 (C) (1) is superior to Section 251 of the Constitution which embodied the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in that the Constitution says NOTWITHSTANDING the provisions of Section 251 of the Constitution and anything contained in the Constitution referred to OLATUNBOSUN V. NISER COUNCIL (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 25

The Respondent further submits that the effect and import of the word NOTWITHSTANDING, the provisions of Sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in the Constitution as used in Section 254 (C) (1) of the Constitution and in consonance with the above Judicial position, every other provision in the constitution particularly relating to the jurisdiction of other Courts such as the Federal

High Court, High Court of FCT and State High Court are subsidiary or inferior to the provisions of Section 254 (c) (1) of the Constitution which clearly enshrined the jurisdiction of National Industrial Court. In other words, the term notwithstanding totally excluded the Jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, High Court of FCT, State High Court from the operation of the Jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court, such that the Jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, High Court of FCT and the State High Court cannot prevail over the provision of Section 254 (c) (1) of the Constitution.

In reaction to the Appellant’s submission that the garnishee proceeding at the Court below ought to have been commenced before the Federal High Court on the ground that an agency of the Federal Government is involved will amount to taking away the Jurisdiction of the trial Court which is legitimately bestowed upon it by the Constitution. Just as the Counsel for the Appellant rightly submitted relying on the case of MOBIL OIL (NIG) LTD V. FBIR (1977) 3 SC 53, that no Court is entitled to substitute its words for the words of the Act.

The Respondent states that going by the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant, the following question calls for an answer:
1. Which Court has the jurisdiction in a matter between the Central Bank of Nigeria and its staff in which the subject matter borders on wrongful dismissal and payment of gratuity?
2. Will it be the Federal High Court because the Central Bank of Nigeria as an agency of the Federal Government is involved?

The Respondent submit that the Federal High Court will not have the Jurisdiction to entertain the matter in the above question because it is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court as particularly provided for in Section 254 (c) (1) of the Constitution even though the Central Bank of Nigeria being an agency of the Federal Government is involved because the word notwithstanding as used in Section 254(c) (1) has practically limited the Jurisdiction of the Federal High Court when it comes to the exercise of the Jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court.

The 1st Respondent finally on this point submits that the National Industrial Court has sufficient powers to entertain the case at hand

even though the Central Bank of Nigeria is involved and they urge this Court to hold so.

The Respondent posits that if this Court answers this issue 2 in the affirmative that the lower Court had Jurisdiction to hear this matter as they have contended, then the provision of Order viii Rule 2 of the Judgment (enforcement) Rule is sufficiently complied with.

The Respondent contends that in accordance with the provision of the constitution, the trial Court has Jurisdiction to entertain this matter and as such have complied with Order Viii Rule 2.
Finally, on this issue the Respondent states that the case of CBN V. AUTO IMPORT & EXPORT & ORS (2013) 12 NWLR (PT. 1337) does not apply to the facts of this case and urge this Court to so hold.

ISSUE 3
The 1st Respondent submits that the Appellant is a meddlesome interloper dabbling into what does not concern it. The Appellant is complaining that the Order Nisi was not properly served on the 2nd Respondent/Judgment debtor. They are not complaining that the Order Nisi was not properly served on them, instead, they are arguing that the Order Nisi was served on counsel for the 2nd

Respondent instead of serving it on the 2nd Respondent personally. The Respondent states that the Appellant did not enter appearance for the Judgment debtor/2nd Respondent or even Appeal on their behalf. The conduct of the Appellant in formulating and arguing issue 3 on behalf of the 2nd Respondent who is not a Co-Appellant amount to a dramatic show of busy body and urge this Court to hold so.

The 1st Respondent contended that the Order Nisi was properly served on the Judgment debtor/2nd Respondent and to that extent the Court below found no reason to set aside the Order Nisi. The Respondent states that the rules guiding the service of Order Nisi is well articulated in the provisions of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules and the National Industrial Court Rules 2007, for instance, Order 8 Rule 4(1) of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules. The import of the provision is that Order Nisi shall be served in accordance with the Rules of Court that issued the Order Nisi. It has to be served in the manner prescribed for service of Court process by the rules of the Court that issued the Order Nisi.

The Respondent states that the Counsel to the 2nd Respondent Mr.

Angulu filed a Notice of Appeal on behalf of the 2nd Respondent, thereafter he filed a Stay of Execution before the Court below which was dismissed by the trial Court. That by these steps and actions, Mr. Angulu has sufficiently represented the 2nd Respondent even after Judgment of the trial Court was delivered on the 29th September 2014 such that he comes under Order 7 Rule 2(2) of the Rules of the trial Court to be served. The 1st Respondent’s reaction to this is at pages 42-50 and 70-79 of the Records of Appeal.

The process or Order Nisi was meant to be served on the 2nd Respondent/Judgment debtor that was before the trial Court via their counsel, citing SHAHIMI V. AKINOLA (1993) 5 NWLR (PT. 294) 434 AT 474. The Respondent submits that assuming without conceding, that service of the Order Nisi on the Counsel representing the 2nd Respondent is not proper, the law as decided in the case of CBN V. INTERSTELLA COMMS. LTD (SUPRA) is that “proper service is dispensed with where the adverse party has entered appearance.”

The 1st Respondent states that the 2nd Respondent, having being represented by their counsel, cannot complain of

irregular service. The 2nd Respondent was quite aware of the matter because he participated from the beginning to the end. Even if the service is not proper, they can be taken to have waived their right to complain on this note. The Respondent states that the Garnishee Central Bank failed to file an affidavit to show cause, rather, they filed a Preliminary Objection challenging the competence of the proceeding dated 18th September, 2015 before the trial Court. The trial Court considered the Preliminary Objection and dismissed it. The Respondent submits that the law is that where a Garnishee filed a Preliminary Objection instead of an Affidavit to show cause, such Preliminary Objection has been held to amount to concession of facts as decided in OMNIA (NIG) LTD V. DYKTRADE LTD (2007) 15 NWLR (PT.1058) 576. He urged this Court to disregard the submissions of the learned Counsel for the Appellant and dismiss this Appeal.

2ND RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
SOLE ISSUE
The 2nd Respondent submits that the trial Court was in error in making the Order Nisi absolute in gross violation or non compliance with a lawful requirement that an Order Nisi must

be served on the Judgment debtor, referred to Section 83(2) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act CAP 56 LFN 2004 which provides thus:
“At least fourteen days before the day of hearing a copy of the order nisi shall be served upon garnishee and the Judgment debtor.”

The 2nd Respondent submits that the law is very explicit on service of Court process and specifically in the law cited above, the 1st Respondent in this Appeal failed, neglected and refused to serve the Judgment Debtor with Order Nisi made by the trial Court citing WEMA BANK PLC V. BRASTEM-STERR (NIG) LTD (2011)6 NWLR (PT 122) 58 AT 80. The 2nd Respondent asked the pertinent question at this juncture therefore is whether the jurisdiction of the Court in the circumstance has been invoked? They answered the question in the negative. Where a party has not done what he is required to do, he cannot be clothed with any favour, referred the Court to TUBONEMI V. DIKIBO (2005) 5 NWLR (PT 974) 565. It is therefore a sine qua non for the Defendant to be served with the Order Nisi and the commencement process of the Garnishee Proceedings.

The Respondent contends that the issue of non

service of the Order Nisi and the originating process is not in dispute as Counsel for the 1st Respondent in his argument and process filed stated that since Counsel represented the 2nd Respondent in the lower Court, that the 1st Respondent need not be served with the Order Nisi and commencement proceedings of the Garnishee Proceedings. The Respondent further submits that the non service of the Originating Processes makes the entire Garnishee Proceedings null and void, citing DARSEY PRESS LIMITED V. AYO (2019) 1 NWLR (PT. 1654) AT 571.

Furthermore, the 2nd Respondent submits that the lower Court is bound to pronounce on all the objections raised by the Appellant in the lower Court because it is a requirement of fair hearing relying on OPARA V. N.C.S.B. (2011) 4 NWLR (PT.1248) 1 AT 30. The 2nd Respondent argued that the procedure adopted by the Judgment Creditor (1st Respondent) denies the Appellant and 2nd Respondent fair hearing.

Finally, the 2nd Respondent states that it is clear that proceedings that took place without service of Order Nisi and process for Garnishee on the Appellant (Judgment Debtor) in lower Court was void and should be set aside.

APPELLANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW
The Appellant in reply on issue one submits without prejudice to the previous submission, that the Supreme Court in the case of IBRAHIM V JSC (1998) 14 NWLR (PT. 584) and a litany of other authorities canvassed by the Appellant in his brief from page 4-14 have laid to rest the law that the word Public Officer connotes both natural and artificial persons and that the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation is required before the funds under the custody and control of the Appellant will be attached. It is a misconception of the law that a Public Officer as used under Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act means a natural person. Under the ejusdem generis rules of interpretation, words are construed that the later words used or referred means the same as the first class of words mentioned in any statute.

Similarly, under the Interpretation Act, the meaning of doubtful words or phrases can be gleaned or gathered from reading the whole text. This is captured by the latin maxim nonseitur a scociis. Therefore it will be incongruent to assume that the word Public Officer relates to

only natural persons. The Appellant submits that the 3 rhetorical questions asked by the 1st Respondent’s Counsel at page 8, paragraph 2.12 of his brief do not apply and are misconceived. The 1st Respondent’s Counsel cited the case of KAREEM NIG LTD V. THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF FINANCE (2002)-(2004) 11 NWLT (PT.1) page 500, however, the anatomy of the case shows that the Judgment has two segments with the use of the word “and”, “to wit” and suggest thus:
a. It presupposes that the consent of the Attorney General is required if the money sought to be attached is a public fund.
b. The same consent is required if the money is under the custody and control of a public officer.

The Appellant submits that if the word “and” is interpreted disjunctively, in either situation in (a) and (b) above, the consent of the Attorney General is still required for the fund to be attached. Further, the Appellant submits that it will be incongruent to hold that the fund under the custody and control of the Appellant and by extension, under the control/usage of the 2nd Respondent, are not Public Funds. Furthermore, the

Appellant submits that there are no two sets of meaning attached to the word “Public Officer”. Public officer is same both under Interpretation Act, the Constitution and as used under the Public Officer Protect Act and the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.

The Appellant contends that the Courts and indeed the Supreme Court in IBRAHIM V. JSC KADUNA (SUPRA) were mainly stating the law and not legislating over it. Finally, the Appellant submits that this Court in CBN V. HYDRO AIR PPTY LTD (SUPRA) while relying on the case of IBRAHIM V. JSC KADUNA STATE (SUPRA) affirmed that the Appellant is a Public Officer and a person in law and the consent of the Attorney General is required before funds under her custody/control can be attached. It urged the Court to discountenance the argument canvassed by the 1st Respondent Counsel on issue 1.

The Appellant reacting to issue 2 of the 1st Respondent’s submission on at page 23, opined thus:
“The National Industrial Court can even venture into matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal high Court including certain instances where the Federal Government agency is a party like

the case at hand.”

The Appellant submits that the above quotation itself is contradictory, approbating and reprobating. And literally speaking, the words in the paragraph collide with each other. It is akin to what literature students call oxymoron. Furthermore, the Appellant submits that if the matter is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, as he rightly submitted, then the word can, and in certain instance become appropriate therefore that the words in the paragraph are self contradictory.

The Appellant states that their response is that the cases of CBN V. IMPORT & EXPORT (2013) 2 NWLR (PT. 1337) 95 and WEMA BANK PLC have laid to rest this matter to the effect that it is the Federal High Court which has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain any action where the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party.

Further, the Appellant submits that while Section 254(C) (1) of the CFRN created the matters in which the trial Court has powers to adjudicate, Section 254 D (1) provided the jurisdiction of the trial Court. Also, the Appellant submits that all the robust powers given to the trial Court were based on

labour related matter and there is no where it was provided that the trial Court has jurisdiction in a matter where the agency of the Federal Government is a party.

The Appellant submits that the legislature intends that the Court should not in its interpretation create confusion but help to achieve management of the process guided by the statutory enactment. This is captured by the latin maxim – ut res magis valet guam pereat and the case of AG FED V. SODE (1996) NWLR (PT.128)

The Appellant submits that based on the above provisions of the Constitution, the Garnishee Proceedings at the trial Court can come under the umbrella of the word “any action” as used in the section. And the funds set to be attached evolved as a result of banking and can equally come under the canopy of the words, connected or pertaining to banking.

The Appellant in response to 1st Respondent’s issue 3 submits that in Garnishee Proceedings, the parties are the Garnishee, the Judgment Creditor and the Judgment Debtor whose asset is to be attached. Also, the Appellant contends that a Garnishee Proceeding is a distinct/separate suit, if the Court

adopts this view, it means that the notice of Order Nisi which initiates/invites/summons the parties to the proceedings is the Originating Summons in this action. The Appellant further submits that the 1st Respondent Counsel agreed with the Appellant’s submission at page 27 paragraphs 4.03 of his brief.

The Appellant further contends that it would be incongruent for them to keep quiet and gloss over the fundamental breach of service of Originating Process in a suit in which he is a principal party. The Appellant submits that the issue of service of Order Nisi being the Originating Process in the Garnishee Proceedings was vigorously canvassed at the trial Court by both parties and even the 1st Respondent’s Counsel made submissions and proffered arguments on it at the trial Court.

Furthermore, the Appellant argues that the issue of service which arose at the trial Court was also one of the items on the Notice and Grounds of Appeal, particularly Ground 1 and Ground 2. Notwithstanding the complaint regarding the mode of service of the Order Nisi, the trial Court went ahead and made the Order Nisi absolute.

The Appellant submits that

without prejudice to their earlier submissions on this issue at page 21-25 of their brief, the service of Order Nisi is regulated by Section 83 (2) of the Sheriffs & Civil Process Act and it enjoins service on the Judgment Debtor no more no less. Finally the Appellant submits that the Rule of Service is very germane as it invokes the Jurisdiction of the Court generally irrespective of the parties before it.

The Appellant’s position is that the Order Nisi ought to be served in accordance with the Rules of Service of Originating Summons and this position is in tandem with Order 8 Rule 4(1) of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules and the rules regulating service of all Originating Processes in Nigeria is personal service. Furthermore, the Appellant submits that the Rule of Court is subject to the statutory provisions. And if there is conflict between the Rules of Court and statutory provisions on the same issue, the later prevails, relied on MOBIL PRODUCING NIG V. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (PT. 798) P.1 at 12. The Appellant submits that the Rules of Court are like equity, they follow the law. Appellant finally urged the Court to allow the Appeal.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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RESOLUTION
The three issues donated by the Appellant and adopted for resolution all have aspects of a jurisdictional challenge in form or the other. Jurisdiction being a fundamental element in any adjudication, it must be resolved at the earliest. The importance of jurisdiction has received attention in a plethora of cases, one of such is DAPIANLONG V DARIYE (2007) LPELR-928(SC) which held thus:
“It is settled law that jurisdiction is a radical and crucial question of competence because if a Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a case, the proceedings are and remain a nullity ab initio, however well conducted and brilliantly decided they might be since a defect in competence is not intrinsic, but extrinsic to the entire process of adjudication. Jurisdiction is therefore considered to be the nerve centre of adjudication; the blood that gives life to the survival of an action in a Court of law in the very same way that blood gives life to the human being in particular and the animal race in general – See Onyenucheya v. Milad, Imo State (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt. 482) 429; Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341, Barsoum v. Clemessy International

(1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 632) 516; Utih & Ors v. Onoyivwe (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 166) 166.”

It would be expedient to start from the beginning which is service of Originating Process covered by issue 3 and it challenges service of the Order Nisi which is the commencement of Garnishee Proceedings. Garnishee Proceedings is a process of enforcing a money Judgment by the seizure or attachment of debts due and accruing to the Judgment Debtor, which forms part of his property in the hands of a third party for attachment. They are separate and distinct proceedings and are governed strictly by the provisions of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, see UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC VS UBOKULO (2009) LPELR 8923 (CA); CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA VS OKEB NIGERIA LTD (2014) LPELR 23162(CA); HERITAGE BANK LTD VS INTERLAGOS OIL LTD (2018) LPELR 44801(CA). Resolution of this aspect of the Appeal will turn on the issue of whether the steps taken by lower Court in the conduct of the Garnishee Proceedings before it in accordance with the provisions of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. Starting with the service of Order Nisi, Section 83(2) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act

provides thus:
“At least fourteen days before the day of hearing a copy of the order NISI shall be served upon the Garnishee and the Judgment debtor.”
Service of initiating process on a party is a precondition to the Court’s competence and jurisdiction. The Order Nisi made was served on Counsel and not the party named in the Order. It is obvious that Counsel to the 2nd Respondent is not the Judgment Debtor. The argument of the 1st Respondent is that the rules of the National Industrial Court allow for service of Court processes on Counsel but it is flawed. Obviously, the Originating Processes leading to the Judgment was not served on any other party but the Judgment debtor. It is indubitable that after parties in litigation enter appearance in any suit, subsequent service of Court processes is usually effected on the Counsel representing the party. It is settled that an ex parte application for Garnishee Order Nisi is in the form of an initiating process and therefore should be served on the Judgment Debtor as specifically provided for by law and as required for initiating processes. Failure to serve initiating process according to

law divest the Court of jurisdiction; see HARRY V MENAKAYA (2017) LPELR- 42363(SC) where the apex Court held thus:
“The law is trite and well settled on the fact that service of the originating process or hearing notice constitutes the foundation on which the whole structure of litigation or appeal is built, and in its absence, the entire proceeding will be rendered void and any decision reached thereon is a nullity. Therefore, the issue of service of an initiating process, be it a Writ of Summons, an Originating Summons, a Notice of Appeal or a Notice of Petition, whether in election matters or in winding-up proceedings et cetera, is so central, fundamental and very germane to the proceedings springing or emanating from such processes. Service is the very pillar or foundation upon which any proceeding is built, before any Court no matter its status. In other words, the principle applies evenly whether before inferior Courts, Tribunals, or superior Courts of record. As stringent as the procedures in Military Tribunals are, service of process is made fundamental and nothing can be done outside it. It is no wonder therefore that Rules of Court all over,

make adequate and elaborate provisions for service of any initiating process in particular and other processes in general. Apart from the fact that it is a fundamental human right of a party, extracted from his right to fair hearing as entrenched under Section 36 of the Constitution to have an initiating process or hearing notice in respect of any Proceedings served on him, such service or non-service, as the case may be goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the adjudicating Court. Put differently, a Court will not be clothed with jurisdiction to adjudicate on any matter if one of the parties has not been served with either the initiating process of the hearing notice for a particular day or proceedings. Section 122 of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended) is very specific on the procedure followed by the Court in ensuring that adequate service is effected on all parties. In the absence of proper service, there can be no adjudication. It is the practice and the Court has made it a point of duty to satisfy itself on the question of service.
…I must emphasize that service of process is an important aspect of the judicial process. Failure to serve a named

party with Court process offends Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)… Any breach of this principle renders proceedings a nullity… Service of process, I must say is a fundamental issue and condition precedent before the Court can have competence to adjudicate. …I must say that the appellants made a serious blunder in this appeal by treating the issue of service of originating process with levity… This appeal was not commenced by due process of law as condition precedent to assumption of jurisdiction by the Court were absent.” (Emphasis provided) By analogy, the respondent in the appeal at hand who was the appellant at the lower Court ought to have known that the appellant herein was to be served personally and where that failed, the service ought to have been by substituted means by an order of Court sought and obtained. The respondent had failed to comply with the rules of Court since the processes were not ex-parte proceedings. The failure to put the appellant on notice was fatal therefore to the respondents case. It has been re-iterated by this Court in the case of Ihedioha v. Okorocha (unreported

supra) that a Notice of Appeal, being an originating process, is fundamental to the jurisdiction of the Court and it must be served personally on the other party. On the question of a Court’s illegibility in assuming and exercising jurisdiction over matters brought before it, the conditions precedent are clearly specified as laid down in the celebrated case of Madukolu v Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SC NLR 341. The requirements include the fact that the case must come before the Court, initiated by due process of law and upon the fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. Again and on the fundamental institution of service of process, this Court, in the case of Sken Consult (Nigeria) Ltd & Anor V. Ukey (1981) 1 SC 6 at 26, unanimously held after reference made to the Madukolu’s case supra, and said:- “The service of process on the defendant so as to enable him appear to defend the relief being sought against him and the appearance by the party or any counsel must be those fundamental conditions precedent required before the Court can have competence and jurisdiction. This very well accords with the principles of natural justice.” The

absence of service forecloses foundation. See again the case of Macfoy V. UAC Ltd (1962) AC 152 where the absence of foundation denotes that: “you cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse.” Per OGUNBIYI, J.S.C
The Court in the case of WEMA BANK PLC V BRASTEM-STERR (NIG) LTD (2011) 6 NWLR (Pt.1242) 58 and on a similar issue had this to say:
“In Garnishee Proceedings, the service of the order NISI on the Judgment debtor is a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the Court to make an order absolute, failure to service the Order NISI before an order is made absolute is a fundamental omission which renders the proceedings void because the Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the next stage in the garnishee proceedings. In the instant case, the 2nd Respondent as a judgment debtor was not served with the order NISI which was mandatory before order absolute was made. This was a fundamental omission which rendered the proceedings void because the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the next stage in the Garnishee proceedings.”
If we are to go by the argument of the 1st Respondent that

service on Learned Counsel is good service, the question to ask if the 1st Respondent can legally do so without leave of Court, the process being an initiating process and service a condition precedent. The argument is misplaced in the context of the facts in this Appeal. The failure to serve originating processes on a party as required by law divest the Court of jurisdiction and the Court cannot proceed to the next stage as was done in this case.
The 1st Respondent questioned the propriety of the Appellant not being the party affected, to raise the issue of service of the Order Nisi on the 2nd Respondent, it called the Appellant a meddlesome interloper. It is trite that being a precondition and a jurisdictional issue, it could be raised by any of the parties before the Court, see LABOUR PARTY V INEC (2009) LPLER- 1732(SC) which held thus:
“…the issue of jurisdiction is said to be so fundamental that it can/could be raised at any stage/time by any party or even by the Court. See the cases of Adesanya v. The President (1981) 1 NCLR 386; Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Lord Chief Ifegwu (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt.842) 113; (2003) 5 SCNJ 219; (2003) 112 LRCN

2233 and Chief Elugbe v. Chief Omokhafe & 2 Ors. v. The Military Administrator Edo State of Nigeria & 2 Ors. (2004) 12 SCNJ 106; (2004) 11-12 S.C. 60; (2004) 20 NSCQR 355 and many others.”
The 1st Respondent therefore missed it when it opposed the Appellant in raising the issue.

On this issue, the proceedings leading to the making of the Order Nisi absolute was done without jurisdiction and therefore must be set aside. Ordinarily, the Appeal could have ended here but I am mindful of the admonition by the apex Court that all Courts below the Supreme Court must resolve all issues presented to it by the parties, in the case of IKPEKPE V WARRI REFINERY & PETROCHEMICAL CO. LTD & ANOR (2018) LPELR- 44471(SC) where EKO, JSC said:
“The Lower Court, having struck out the suit, did not decide or resolve the question. They should have resolved it, in case they may be wrong as an intermediate Court, on the issue of jurisdiction. The appeal before the Lower Court was not an interlocutory Appeal but an appeal against final decision. It therefore behoved the lower Court, an intermediate Court, to resolve all the issues before it or express an

opinion on the merits of the case. This alternative course was what this Court enjoined the Lower Court to take, as can be seen from NIPOL LTD v. BIOKU INVESTMENT & PROCO LTD (1992) 23 NSCC (pt. 1) 606 at 618; KATTO v. CBN (1991) 9 NWLR (pt. 214) 126 at 149.”

In obeisance to the Counsel, I shall now proceed to resolve the remaining issues. The other jurisdictional challenge is covered by issue 2 which questions the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain a matter where an agency of the Federal Government is a party. I have carefully considered the submissions of the Appellant and without waste of time, I say that the Appellant is an agency of the Federal Government, that is not contested. It is also settled that the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is circumscribed by Section 251(1) (d) (p) (q) & (I) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and it provides the subject matter that the Federal High Court can exercise jurisdiction. The Constitution also used the word NOTWITHSTANDING to circumscribe the jurisdiction. On the other hand Section 254 C (1) provides for the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court and it states:<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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“Notwithstanding, the provisions of Section 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters.”
The use of the word Notwithstanding changed the landscape of the provision on jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, several decisions defined the word notwithstanding as having the effect of excluding any other provision of the statute or other subordinate legislation so that the section may fulfill itself, see SARAKI V FRN (2016) LPELR-40013(SC), it held:
“In NDIC v. Okem Ent. (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt.880) 107 at 182 this Court, per Uwaifo, JSC (rtd) stated as follows: “When the term notwithstanding” is used in the section of a statute, it is meant to exclude an impinging or impeding effect of any other provision of the statute or other subordinate legislation so that the said section may fulfil itself.” See further Olatunbosun v. NISER COUNCIL (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 25: Ndaba (Nig.) Ltd v. UBN Plc

(2009) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1158) 256 at 304.”
By virtue of the use of the word notwithstanding in Section 251(1) and 254C of the 1999 Constitution, the jurisdictions of the Federal High Court and the National Industrial Court are mutually exclusive. They do not share any jurisdiction, the subject matter being specifically circumscribed by the Constitution.
It is obvious that the National Industrial Court is strictly a labour and employment related matters, it is a specialized Court, it is not a Court of general jurisdiction. Subject matter is the most important factor in determining whether the National Industrial Court will have jurisdiction in a matter and regardless of the parties. The Federal High Court on the other hand also has subject matter and party jurisdiction. The argument of the Appellant that because it is an agency of the Federal Government and therefore the Federal High Court is the only Court with jurisdiction is flawed, jurisdiction is not just determined by only the party issue but also subject matter. The two must go together. A Court can only exercise jurisdiction when certain element are in existence as held in the case of OSI V ACCORD PARTY & ORS

(2016) LPELR- 41388(SC) which held:
“Before a Court can assume Jurisdiction on a matter or appeal it must be satisfied that the following conditions are met or satisfied, namely: (i) That it is properly constituted regarding the number and qualification of its member as the case may be. (ii) That the subject matter of the action or appeal is within its Jurisdiction as governed or donated to it by Law. (iii) That the action or appeal is initiated by due process of Law; and, (iv) Any condition precedent to the exercise of its Jurisdiction must be fulfilled or met. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (ALL NLR 687); Dangana & Anor v. Usman & 4 Ors (2012)2 SC (pt III) NURTW & Anor v. RTEAN & Ors (2012) 1 SC (pt I) 119.
The relevant element in the above decision is that subject matter must be within the Jurisdiction donated to the Court by the Constitution of a statute. Where subject matter is within the jurisdiction of a particular Court, parties alone cannot confer jurisdiction on another Court. The best example here is land matters. Going by the argument of the Appellant, where a Government agency is contesting land with another party,

the Federal High Court should have jurisdiction simply because one of the parties is a Federal agency. This is contrary to law because Section 251(1) of the Constitution does not have land as subject matter on which the Federal High Court will have jurisdiction and no other legislation by the National Assembly has conferred on the Federal High Court such jurisdiction. Land matters are strictly within the state High Court jurisdiction, see ADETAYO & ORS V ADEMOLA & ORS (2010) LPELR-155(SC) held thus:
“Close examination of the entire provisions of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution prescribing the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to the exclusion of all other Courts, there is nothing therein specifically conferring jurisdiction in that Court in causes or matters concerning land disputes. Although the Section also indicated that the National Assembly may confer additional jurisdiction to the Court, there is no indication that such Act of the National Assembly had been promulgated conferring additional jurisdiction to the Court to entertain causes and matters on land disputes. If any such additional jurisdiction had been given, the most

relevant statute to examine in search for it in my view, is the Land Use Act because jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to entertain land matters cannot be inferred by implication in the construction of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution the meaning of which is quite clear and plain as no causes or matters in land dispute are mentioned therein. Since the provisions of Section 251(1)(r) of the 1999 Constitution are not helpful in tracing any jurisdiction in land matters to the Federal High Court as jurisdiction of Court is derived from statutes conferring the jurisdiction, I decided to examine the provisions of the Land Use Act 1978 which was promulgated specially and specifically to deal with the control and management of land in Nigeria. The Courts conferred with jurisdiction to entertain disputes between Nigerians in exercising their right to acquire and use land under the Act are clearly specified therein.”
In the same vein, labour and employment matters are not listed anywhere in Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution, however, the constitution bestowed jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court. The Judgment that gave rise to the Garnishee

Proceedings was an employment matter and the trial Court had jurisdiction to try the case. Related to that is whether the same Court can also handle Garnishee Proceedings, this will take us to the provisions of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act on Garnishee Proceedings. Section 83(1) state thus:
“the Court may, upon the ex parte application of any person who is entitled to the benefit of a judgment for the recovery of payment of money either before or after any oral examination of the debtor liable such judgment and upon affidavit by the applicant or his legal practitioner that judgment has been recovered and that it is still unsatisfied and to what amount, and that any other person is indebted to such debtor and is within the state, order that debts owing from such third party, herein after called Garnishee, to such debtor shall be attached to satisfy the Judgment, or order, together with costs of the Garnishee Proceedings and by the same or any subsequent order it may be ordered that the garnishee shall appear before the Court to show cause why he should not pay to the person who has obtained such judgment or order the debt due from him to such

debtor or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the Judgment or Order together with cost aforesaid.”
Garnishee Proceedings may be taken in a Court in which the Judgment debtor could under Civil Procedure Rules of the Court or in the Magistrate Court as the case may be to lawfully recover the debt. Admitted that the National Industrial Court was not specifically mentioned, however, the definition of a Judgment given as given by the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act would generically include the National Industrial Court and therefore, Garnishee Proceedings can commence in the National Industrial Court because the Judgment in which the debt arose is from that Court. The Court has the power to ensure execution of its Judgment.
Furthermore, Order VIII Rule 2 of the Judgment Enforcement Rules provides for Garnishee Proceedings as follows:
i. That the Garnishee Proceedings should be filed in any Court in which the Judgment debtor could under the Civil Procedure rules or under the appropriate section or rule sue the Garnishee.
ii. An application for Garnishee proceedings is not or does not necessarily commence in the Court which

delivered the Judgment, rather, in a Court that has the competence to entertain it.
The Appellant argued that a Judge could be competent to handle a matter but be incompetent to determine Garnishee Proceedings. This is out rightly a flawed understanding and it was not backed by authorities. The Federal High Court does not have jurisdiction over labour and employment related matters, and therefore the National Industrial Court which has jurisdiction and handed down the Judgment is also competent to determine Garnishee Proceedings. If it can make a monetary award enforceable by Garnishee Proceedings, it also can make the initial Order Nisi absolute as the case may be. In labour and employment matters against the Appellant, the National Industrial Court is bestowed with Jurisdiction and not the Federal High Court. There is no need to stretch the issue further, I agree with the 1st Respondent in this regard, Section 254 C (1) clearly excludes other Courts in labour and employment related matters. This Appeal emanated from such labour related matter. The case of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA V AUTO IMPORT & EXPORT & ORS (SUPRA) relied upon by the

Appellant is irrelevant because the portion of the Judgment quoted did not say that a Court such as National Industrial Court cannot handle Garnishee Proceedings and the use of the words trial Court means the Court that determined the claim and if Garnishee Proceedings can commence in a Magistrate Court then the National Industrial Court is eminently qualified to also handle the proceedings. I agree that the Court may not necessarily have to be the Court that gave Judgment, such as the apex Court making an award and where the money to be garnisheed is in a state different from the place of Judgment. I disagree with the Appellant when he said Garnishee Proceedings are akin to counter claim, it cannot be so. The case is therefore not applicable.

Continuing with the resolution of the issues, the next contentious issue is whether the Applicant is a Public Officer in the context and scope of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act so as to be bound by Section 84 of the Act. Section 84(1) and (3) (a) state thus:
“84: consent of Appropriate officer or Court necessary if money is held by Public officer or the Court.
(1) Where money liable to be

attached by garnishee proceedings is in the custody or under the control of a public officer in his official capacity or in custodial egis, the order nisi shall not be made under the provisions of the last preceding section unless consent to such attachment is first obtained from the appropriate officer in the case of money in the custody or control of a public officer or the Court in the case of money in custodial egis, as the case may be.
(3) In this section “appropriate officer” means
(a) In relation to money which is in the custody of a public officer who holds a public office in the service of the Federation, the Attorney General of the Federation.
The definition of a Public Officer with regards to Public Officers Protection Act has been settled in a plethora of authorities, one of such is IBRAHIM V J.S.C (supra) which defined a Public Officer to include artificial person such as corporations sole, Public Bodies, Corporations or unincorporated and in CBN V ADEDEJI (supra) the Appellant herein was recognized as a Public Officer. The 1st Respondent vehemently opposed and cited some authorities where the Appellant in the context

of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act was not recognized as a Public Officer, such as SHARIKA & SONS LTD V GOV. KADUNA STATE (2013) LPELR-20379 which held that Public Officer in the context of Sheriff and Civil Process Act does not include artificial persons. Another of such cases is CBN V INTERSTELLA COMMUNICATION LTD (2015) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1462) 456 which the 1st Respondent relied on to say by virtue of Section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, (as Amended) Public Officer refers to holders of offices and not artificial persons. Placing this argument against the submission that the Central bank is Federal Government banker and the need for Attorney General’s consent is to avoid embarrassing the Government with regards to Public Funds, the apex Court in the cited case also alluded to the fact that taking the peculiarities of the facts of that Appeal, consent of the AGF had been sought and obtained. It further said the Appellant cannot be a Public Officer in the context of the Appeal, see CBN V INTERSTELLA (supra) which held:
“The Appellant’s contention herein centres on the provision of Section 84(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act

which Counsel submits was not complied with in that the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation was not first sought and obtained before the order Nisi was made. The historical background of the Garnishee Proceeding, in the trial Court and lower Court, which took its root from Suit No. FHC/UM/CS/95/2004 has been explicitly outlined earlier in the course of this judgment. The outcome of the said suit gave reason for the 3rd Respondent, herein, to constitute an inter-ministerial Committee which included the Attorney-General of the Federation as one of the members to negotiate with the 1st and 2nd Respondents on the terms, with a view to settling and paying NITELS’s debts owed the 1st and 2nd Respondents… I seek to restate further that by the new agreement per exhibit ‘J’ at page 32 of the record it was agreed by 1st and 2nd respondents on these term: “The earlier agreed equivalent value of $47,735,042.00 replaces the first tranch of N5 billion, out of the present total debt sum of N12 billion. This is to be paid to us within 30 days from today. The balance of N7 billion or $51,851,852.00 (which ever we prefer or is

greater on the date of payment) is to be paid to us within 180 days from today; and where the said balance cannot be paid in full within 180 days, the outstanding sum shall attract interest at a rate of 18 percent per annum from today… An order of the Honourable Court adopting the offer of N12 Billion made to the judgment creditor by the Federal Government of Nigeria via its Judgment Debt Verification Committee vide the Federal Ministry of Justice letter Ref. No. MJ/LIT/ABJ/NSA/128/08/64 of 19th March, 2009 and the terms of acceptance of the said offer by the Judgment Creditors vide their letter of 20th March, 2009 as the Terms of Settlement of the Judgment Debt arising from the Judgment of this Honourable Court dated 6th November, 2007 in this suit.” With the total default of the AGF to obey the consent judgment orders, the 1st and 2nd Respondents resorted to the Court vide a Garnishee Proceeding. An order Nisi was made by the Court on 16th November, 2011 and the judgment debtors and Garnishee/Appellant were summoned to appear before it to show cause why the order Nisi should not be made absolute. The Order Nisi was thereafter made absolute. An appeal

before the lower Court by the Appellant/Garnishee and 3rd and 4th Respondents was dismissed and the Judgment by the trial Court was affirmed. The crux of issue 4 is whether the lower Court was right when it held that the appellant herein is not a public officer and hence the AGF’s consent as required under Section 84(1) of SCPA does not apply to the case herein. It is the submission by appellant’s counsel that by Section 84(1) it is mandatory that the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation, be sought and obtained first before the Garnishee proceedings herein can be competent. In addition to the foregoing peculiar situation of circumstance of this case it would be pertinent to draw attention to page 73 of the record before us where the 3rd and 4th Respondents filed a motion for an order setting aside the order Nisi made by the Federal High Court on 16th November, 2011. Specifically at page 77 of the record, the said respondents in their paragraph 13 of the affidavit in support of the application deposed to this fact and said; “That the Judgment Creditor had so far been paid the sum of Two billion, seven hundred million Naira in fulfillment of the

agreement and towards the discharge of the compromised sum of Twelve billion Naira (N12,000,000,000.00).” As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents, the said foregoing deposition is an admission against interest made by the 3rd and 4th respondents from whom the Appellant wants the 1st and 2nd respondents to obtain consent. It is a fact admitted which need no further proof. See Rauph Bello Oseni V. Chief Lasisi Bajulu & 2 Ors (2010) All FWLR (Pt 511) 813 at 831 – 832 and also Section 123 of the Evidence Act 2011. In further confirmation of the 3rd and 4th Respondents’ commitment, are Exhibits ‘I’ and ‘L’ contained at pages 31 and 35 of the record which are very instructive. The documents are very unambiguous that the 3rd and 4th respondents conceded the debt of N12 Billion to the 1st and 2nd Respondents on behalf of NITEL. Exhibit ‘L’ specifically affirms thus in part: “that the Federal Government shall pay Interstella Communications Limited, the sum of N12,000,000,000.00 (Twelve Billion Naira) only, in full and final settlement of the Judgment debt. I am to inform you that the Federal Government will commence payments to

discharge the negotiated sum as soon as practicable…” Following from the foregoing explicit and clear cut concession, will it now be just and proper that the 3rd and 4th Respondents should recede on their commitment to the 1st and 2nd Respondents on behalf of NITEL. The answer in my view is certainly in the negative. Rather and as rightly argued and submitted by the learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents, the peculiar facts of this case herein removes it from the purview of the general interpretation of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act in that the consent of the 4th Respondent by virtue of Exhibits ‘I’ and ‘L’ has already been obtained and the Appellant (CBN) was acting as a Banker only, to the 3rd Respondent (FGN). It should be noted clearly that the principle underlying securing the AGF’s consent as prescribed in Section 84 SCPA is to avoid embarrassment on him of not having the prior knowledge that funds earmarked for some purposes have been diverted in satisfaction of a judgment debt, which the government may not know anything about. See the persuasive authority of the case of Onjewu V. KSMCI (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt 827) 40 at 89. The

learned counsel for the appellant made reference exhaustively to Section 84(1) of the SCPA and submitted emphatically that the Attorney-General of the Federation is the appropriate officer from whom consent must be obtained in respect of money in the custody of a public officer in the public service of the Federation. Counsel submits further that the appellant as well as its officials have been held to be public officers and relied on the case of CBN V. Adedeji (supra) wherein the lower Court followed the decision of this Court in Ibrahim V. JSC under reference. For purpose of clear understanding, it is expedient that the provision of Section 84(1) of the SCPA is hereby reproduced as follows: “where money liable to be attached by garnishee proceedings is in the custody or under the control of a public officer in his official capacity or in custodio legis, the order nisi shall not be made under the provisions of the last preceding section unless consent to such attachment is first obtained from the appropriate officer in the case of money in the custody or control of a public officer or of the Court in the case of money in custodia legis, as the case may be.” I

have indicated earlier in the course of this judgment that the case under consideration herein is very peculiar and the circumstance cannot be fitted within the general interpretation of Section 84 of SCPA. Again the case of Onjewu V. KSMCI (supra) is well under reference. Furthermore and as rightly submitted on behalf of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, certain qualifying conditions must be met for a case to come under the purview of Section 84 of SCPA. In other words, justice would demand that the AGF must be a neutral/nominal party in the transactions and proceedings giving rise to the application for order nisi and not him being the debtor. It is well and explicit on the facts of this case that the AGF has all along held out himself to be an active participant in the several stages of negotiations, transactions and even part payment of the debt owed. Paragraph 13 of the affidavit in support of the AGF’s application of page 76 of the record is under reference as admission against interest. In the circumstance, the AGF cannot be a neutral/nominal party in this case. It is right to say that by implication Section 84 of the SCPA which stipulates “consent” had

already been fully complied with as the government itself negotiated the terms, and took steps to settle the debts, before it later reneged on full satisfaction thereof. The most potent factor which makes Section 84(1) of the SCPA inapplicable herein is because the Attorney-General is the debtor and has been sued in that capacity. With the AGF being the Judgment Debtor therefore, will it not be absurd to require that his consent should be sought especially having admitted that he had taken the move by paying part of the debt in question The appellant’s contention, understanding and interpretation of Section 84(1) of SCPA is a total misconception, I hold. The interpretation in my view would run against the application of natural justice, which could not have been the intendment of the legislature… It could not have been the intention of the legislature that Section 84(1) of the SCPA should be used as an umbrella for the 3rd and 4th respondents to evade a debt owed, by simply putting its funds in the hands of the appellant; it is not also the intention that a judgment creditor should first obtain the consent of the debtor before proceeding against the debtor

to recover his money. The submission by the learned counsel for the appellant would certainly be counter-productive. It will also defeat the doctrine of the Rule of law which, as rightly argued by 1st & 2nd respondents counsel, is the hallmark of our democracy. This Court in NPA V. CGFC SPA (1971) NLR (P.11) 463 held that a section of a statute should not be given an undue emphasis, that it did not possess, and that a statute cannot be applied in a situation where its effect is clearly contrary to the intendment of the Legislature in passing that Law. Again and contrary to the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, the consent of the AGF had all along been obtained. Consequently, the Garnishee Proceedings against the Appellant was rightly commenced and I so hold. The other leg of the argument is where the appellant’s counsel holds out the CBN as a public officer and relied on the case of Ibrahim V. JSC (supra) in particular. In the case under consideration, I have ruled that the relationship between the appellant and the 3rd and 4th Respondents is that of Banker and customer relationship. In other words and as rightly argued by 1st

and 2nd respondents’ counsel, the appellant is not a public officer in the context of Section 84 SCPA, when regard is had to the history of this appeal. Section 84 has been reproduced earlier in the course of this judgment. It is apparent herein, on the facts of this case that the CBN acts as a Banker to the Federal Government Funds with respect to government funds in its custody. Section 2(e) of the CBN Act provides thus: “act as a banker and provide economic and financial advice to the Federal Government.” Section 36 of the CBN Act also provides: “The Bank shall receive and disburse Federal Government moneys and keep accounts thereof.” The appellant does not stand as public officer in this situation. Therefore, it follows that the need to seek the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation does not arise. Relevant to this conclusion is again the persuasive authority of CBN V. Ukpong (supra) cited also by the appellant’s counsel wherein Fabiyi, JCA (as he then was) held thus on his consideration of the purpose for establishing the CBN: “Generally, it is for overall control and administration of the monetary and banking policies of the Federal

Government …It is not established for commercial or profit making purpose…” The case of Purification Tech. (Nig) Ltd. v . AG Lagos State (supra) is also on all fours with the facts of the case under consideration herein. Again the persuasive judgment of the Court of Appeal at pages 679-680 is relevant and said “…There is absolutely no basis for treating government bank accounts any differently from bank accounts of every other juristic personality or customers…” In resolving the 4th issue against the appellant, I hold the strong view that the consent of the 3rd and 4th Respondents was adequately obtained by the 1st and 2nd Respondents, and the Garnishee Proceedings was competently commenced. Further still on the relationship between the 3rd Respondent and the appellant in this case, same is purely that of a Banker to a customer. Therefore, the question of whether the Appellant is a public officer, who cannot release funds except the consent of the AGF is obtained, does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case.”Per OGUNBIYI, J.S.C
I reproduced part of the Judgment in extensor to put paid certain conceptions held by the 1st Respondent

on the question whether the Appellant is a Public Officer or not. The apex Court in the above quoted Judgment did not make the general statement that CBN is not a Public Officer in the context of Section 84 SCPA in all cases it was a qualified statement. The peculiar facts in that Appeal were taken into account as the erudite jurist made those findings; it was not a general statement of law to be applied across the board. One can clearly see that it was stated therein that consent had been sought for and obtained in the peculiar facts of the case. The authority is distinguishable and therefore not applicable in this case.
The Court also made it clear that the need for consent cannot be discriminatorily applied to Government Funds as distinct to private funds; this to my mind justifies the point canvassed by the Appellant that consent of the AGF is required where the funds are in the custody of a Public Officer regardless who owns the funds. It would be absurd to interpret Public Officer in Section 84 of SCPA in the restrictive sense as interpreted by on the basis of Section 318 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended)

alone, because if so done, the safety measures put in there for Government funds would have been defeated. Government funds kept in the Central bank are not kept with a particular individual who is a Public Officer, this is why the interpretation given to Public Officer in the case of IBRAHIM V J.S.C (supra) by the Supreme Court should apply to all cases. Interestingly, the said interpretation was not over ruled by the apex Court in the case of CBN V INTERSTELLA (supra). It also did not over rule the interpretation in IBRAHIM V J.S.C. (supra). It should therefore enjoy or be given a general application instead of limiting the definition to office holders only.
I concede that there are divergent views on the question whether the CBN is a Public Officer, apart from the authorities cited by the 1st Respondent there are authorities also to the contrary, these are CBN V OSCKO PETROLEUM LTD & ORS (2018) LPELR-46732(CA) and CBN V UKPONG (2006) LPELR- 11610(CA) but CBN V ZAKARI (2018) LPELR-44751(CA) expressed my view above thus:
“The Appellant, the Central Bank of Nigeria, is established by the Central Bank of Nigeria (establishment) act, of 2004

(now 2007) as statutory body. Section 2 thereof sets out its objectives (or functions), while Section 4 provides for its authorised capital subscribed and held by the federal government of Nigeria alone. Section 2 of the aforementioned act, provides thus: “the principal objects of the bank shall be to- a. ensure monetary and price stability; b. issue legal tender currency in Nigeria; c. maintain external reserves to safeguard the international value of the legal tender currency; d. promote a sound financial system in Nigeria; and e. act as banker and provide economic and financial advice to the Federal Government.” subsections (1) and (2) of the said act provide that: “1. the authorized capital shall be one billion naira. 2. all the capital of the bank shall be subscribed and held only by the federal Government.” That the Appellant, as a bank, has been established and owned by the Federal Government of Nigeria to provide Public Services in the discharge of its mandate as a public institution has been acknowledged and reinforced by the Court in the case of CBN V. UKPONG (2006) 13 NWLR (PT. 998) p. 555 @ 571, wherein it was enunciated that: “the Respondent

failed to advert his mind to Section 2 of the CBN Act which states the purpose for establishing the CBN. generally, it is for overall control and administration of monetary and banking policies of the federal government. all the other sections of the act, read with clear sight and focus, are geared towards the realization of those objectives. it has no shareholders to whom it pays dividends. it is not subject to payment of income tax. Its entire capital is provided by the Federal Government. stricto sensu, it is not established for commercial or profit making purpose… the central bank of Nigeria was established for public service simpliciter.” The question that arises is this, “whether the appellant is a public officer, therefore the consent of the attorney-general of the federation, must be obtained first to attach money in its custody to satisfy a Judgment debt by a judgment creditor in a garnished proceedings against it. Section 84 of the Sheriff’s and Civil Process Act provides thus: “(1) where money liable to be attached by garnishee proceedings is in the custody or under the control of a Public Officer in his official capacity or in custodial egis, the

order nisi shall not be made under the provisions of the last proceeding section unless consent to such attachment is first obtained from the appropriate officer in the case of money in the custody or control of a public officer or of the Court in the case of money in custodial egis, as the case may be. (2) In such cases, the order or notice must be served on such public or on the registrar of the Court, as the case may be. (3) In this section, “appropriate officer” means- (a) in relation to money which is in the custody of a public officer who holds a public office in the public service of the federation, the attorney general of the federation. (b) …” who then is a public officer within the ambit of the provisions of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act by the combined effect of the provisions of Section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act, and Section 318(e) of the 1999 Constitution (amended), “public service of the federation, means” the service of the federation in any capacity in respect of the Government of the federation, and includes service of “staff of any statutory corporation established by an act of the national assembly.” the Appellant

having been established by an act of the national assembly, that is, the Central Bank of Nigeria Act, of 2004, (now 2007) it is part of the public service of the federation. The provisions of Section 1(1) (2) of the Central bank of Nigeria Act, is hereunder reproduced to reinforce the adumbration supra: “1(1) there is established for Nigeria a body known as the central bank of Nigeria (hereafter in the act referred to as the bank). (2) the bank shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and common seal and may sue and be sued in its corporate name.” one of the objectives for establishing the appellant is to provide banking, economic and financial services, to the government of the federation, it is therefore part of the public service of the Federation. In CBN V. AMAO (2010) 16 NWLR (pt. 1219) p. 217 @ 303, the apex Court, per ONNOGHEN J.S.C. (as he then was) when considering whether the central bank of Nigeria comes within the public service of the federation or not, held that: “Public Service of the Federation means service of the Federation in any capacity in respect of the Government of the Federation and include service as (c) staff of any

statutory Corporation established by an act of the national assembly. by the above provisions, it is beyond doubt and serious contention that the Appellant bank, a statutory corporation established by an act of the national assembly i.e. the Central bank of Nigeria act, is part and parcel of the Public Service of the federation over which the federal government has the exclusive right and power to prescribe pensions payable to its employees outside the central bank of Nigeria act.” it must be noted that the definition of “public service of the federation under Section 318(1) of the 1999 constitution (amended) is not exhaustive. it includes services enumerated under items (a-h) of the said section. The law is trite, wherever the word “includes” is used in a statute, it is intended to enlarge or widened the scope of the things listed or enumerated. in other words, other things or whatever mentioned can be increased where appropriate. See Rabiu v. The State (1980) 8-11 SC p. 85. therefore, the appellant can render any other services not specifically mentioned or listed by the provisions of Section 318(e) and items (a-h), thereof, and to include any other services

by acting under Sections 2, 39 and 40 of the Central Bank of Nigeria (establishment) Act; for instance in Ibrahim v. JSC (1998) 14 NWLR (pt. 581) p. 1 @ 38, when considering the term public officer, it was held that: “it is thus clear to me that the term “public officer” has by law been extended to include a “public department” and therefore, an artificial person, a public officer or a public body.” In Central Bank of Nigeria v. Okefe (2015) lpelr-24825 (ca), this Court, when considering who is a public officer in the public service of the federation, in view of the provisions of Section 318(1) of the 1999 constitution (amended) and Section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act, held that: “from the community reading and effect of the provisions of the laws set out above, it is clear that the Appellant the central bank of Nigeria, a statutory corporation established by an act of the national assembly, is a Public Officer being a part of the Public Service of the Federal of Nigeria.” in considering whether the appellant is a public officer for the purpose of the application of the provisions of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (which has been

reproduced supra), the intention or intendment of the legislature must be sought as expressed in the words used in the statutes in question. I think, it is pertinent, at this juncture, to be reminded of the general principles of interpretation of the provisions of statutes generally. that is, what is the purport and import of provisions of the statute in question, that is to say, what the legislature intended to achieve by such or statute MUKHTAR, CJN in the case of A. G. Federation v. Lagos State (2013) 16 NWLR (pt. 1380) p. 249 @ 317, enunciated that: “it is a settled principle of interpretation that provisions in statutes must be given their simple and direct meaning, which construes and give the statute its legal meaning. In the process of doing so, the intention of the legislature must be explored and taken into consideration, but will not be to the extent of bringing into the provision a different complexion from what was intended by the legislature. In this wise, the Court should confine itself to the plain and unambiguous meaning of the words used.” The rule of interpretation of statutes is that where the words of a statute are plain, clear and

unambiguous, the words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning. The intention of the legislature must be sought as expressed in the words used in couching the provisions. The import of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act is to avoid embarrassment of not knowing that funds earmarked for some purposes have been diverted in satisfaction of a judgment debt which the government may not know anything about. ONJEWU V. KSMCI (2003) 10 NWLR (pt. 827) 40. See FGN V. INTERSTELLA COMMS. LTD (2015) 9 NWLR (pt. 1463) p. 1036 and Action Congress v. INEC (2007) 12 NWLR (pt. 1048) p. 220. In my view, when considering who is a public officer for the purpose of the provisions of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, a wider construction or interpretation is to be resorted to in order to realise what the legislature intended to achieve by the said provisions of Section 84 of the aforesaid act. whereas the provisions of Section 84 of the SPCA are intended to protect or safeguard the funds of the government in custody of an officer or any institution, certain conditions must be satisfied before such funds can be applied to satisfy a judgment debt.

Under the public officers’ (protection) law, the intendment of the legislature is to protect or safeguard employees of the government from unnecessary or prolonged civil legislation in a Court of law. Therefore, in my view, Public Officer as used under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers (protection) law should not be given a broad interpretation as under Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. Perhaps, this might be the reasoning of the Court in the case of FGN V. INTERSTELLA COMMS. LTD (2015) 1 NWLR p. 1 @ 36 (supra), where it was held that the import of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act is to avoid embarrassment of not knowing that funds earmarked for some purposes have been diverted in satisfaction of a judgment debt which the government may not know anything about. (ONJEWU V. KSMCI (2003) 10 NWLR (PT. 827) 40. I am not unmindful of the decisions of this Court in the case of CBN V. NJEMANZE (2015) 4 NWLR (PT. 1449) p. 276 @ 286; SHARIKA & SONS LTD V. GOV. KADUNA STATE, CBN V. INTERSTELLA COMMS. LTD (2015) 8 NWLR (PT. 1462); FGN V. INTERSTELLA COMMS LTD (2015) 9 NWLR (PT. 1663) P. 1 @ 36 AND ALAMIEYESEIGHA V. IGONIWARI (NO.2) (2007) 7 NWLR (PT. 1034) p.

314 @ 579, that an artificial entity created by law cannot be a public officer under the provisions of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. it is to be noted of recent, this Court, by its several decisions held that central bank of Nigeria, is a public officer notwithstanding that it is a creature of the law. The cases recently decided by this Court are: “(a) CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA V. ALH. MOHAMMED KAKURI (2016 LPELR-41468(CA) (b) APPEAL NO. CA/L/710/2015 MR. ADEBAYO LATEEF SANNI V. UNITY BANK PLC & CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (UNREPORTED) DELIVERED ON 10 MARCH, 2017, BY THE COURT OF APPEAL LAGOS DIVISION. (C) APPEAL NO. CA/YL/132/2015 CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA V. ASSET MANAGEMENT CORPORATION OF NIGERIA & 10 ORS (UNREPORTED); DELIVERED ON 12 APRIL, 2017 by the COURT OF APPEAL, YOLA DIVISION. (D) APPEAL NO. CA/YL/76/2016 CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA V. MAIYINI CENTURY COMPANY LTD (UNREPORTED); DELIVERED ON 30 MAY 2017, by the COURT OF APPEAL YOLA DIVISION.” PER BDLIYA, J.C.A
Flowing from above, I resolve issue one in favour of the Appellant and hold that the Central bank in the circumstances of this Appeal is a Public Officer and therefore

consent of the Attorney General was a precondition to the granting of Order Absolute. In the absence of such consent the Order Absolute was given without jurisdiction and therefore, it must be set aside. I hereby set aside the Garnishee Order Absolute.

The Appeal is meritorious and is hereby allowed. The Order Absolute made in the ruling of the Court below delivered on the 23rd day of May, 2016 and the entire ruling is hereby set aside. The trial Court had no jurisdiction due to faulty Service of Originating Processes and failure to seek and obtain consent of the Attorney General before the Order Nisi and Absolute could be made. In the absence of jurisdiction, the Garnishee Proceedings must be set aside. It is hereby set aside.
Each party to bear its cost.

PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.: I agree.

EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my Learned brother, YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, JCA. I agree with the reasoning, conclusions and orders therein.

Appearances:

E. AKUTUS, Esq. For Appellant(s)

G. OCHIGBO, Esq. – for 1st Respondent

IBRAHIM AUGULU, Esq. – for 2nd Respondent For Respondent(s)