CBN v. ACCESS BANK & ORS
(2022)LCN/16101(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(KADUNA JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Thursday, March 10, 2022
CA/K/313/2017
Before Our Lordships:
Mojeed Adekunle Owoade Justice of the Court of Appeal
Bitrus Gyarazama Sanga Justice of the Court of Appeal
Mohammed Baba Idris Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA APPELANT(S)
And
1. ACCESS BANK PLC 2. KAURA MOTORS NIGERIA LIMITED 3. BUREAU FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISE RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO:
THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT AS CIRCUMSCRIBED IN THE CONSTITUTION
It is also settled that the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is circumscribed by Section 251(1)(d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and it provides the subject matter over which the Federal High Court can exercise jurisdiction. The Constitution also used the word “NOTWITHSTANDING” to circumscribe the jurisdiction. In considering Section 251(1)(d) of the Constitution, both the subject matter and the parties are important. The provision is so clear, it is plain, and its applicability to the situation at hand is to say the least inadequate. This is so because whichever way one looks at jurisdiction, garnishee proceedings though clearly a means of enforcement of judgments, cannot be properly termed as substantive civil or criminal suit covered by the provisions of Section 251(1) of the Constitution, and in any event, as rightly pointed out, the Appellant was not even a party in Suit No. KDH/KAD/473/2009 before the trial Court, which delivered the judgment now sought to be enforced. The Appellant only became a party for the purpose of the garnishee proceedings after the 1st Respondent sought to enforce the judgment of the Court. MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
It is apparent herein, based on the facts of this case that the Central Bank of Nigeria (the Appellant) acts as a banker to the Federal Government Funds with respect to government funds in its custody (as in this case, the 3rd Respondent). Section 2(e) of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act provides as follows:
“act as a banker and provide economic and financial advice to the Federal Government.”
While Section 36 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act also provides that:
“The Bank shall receive and disburse Federal Government moneys and keep accounts thereof.”
See the case of CBN VS. UKPONG (2006) 13 NWLR (PT. 998) 555, wherein it was held on the consideration of the purpose for establishing the Central Bank of Nigeria thus:
“Generally, it is for overall control and administration of the monetary and banking policies of the Federal Government …It is not established for commercial or profit making purpose…”. MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A.
THE INTREPRETATION OF STATUTES IN THEIR NATURAL AND ORDINARY MEANING
“it is a settled principle of interpretation that provisions in statutes must be given their simple and direct meaning, which construes and give the statute its legal meaning. In the process of doing so, the intention of the legislature must be explored and taken into consideration, but will not be to the extent of bringing into the provision a different complexion from what was intended by the legislature. In this wise, the Court should confine itself to the plain and unambiguous meaning of the words used.”
The rule of interpretation of statutes is that where the words of a statute are plain, clear and unambiguous, the words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning. The intention of the legislature must be sought as expressed in the words used in couching the provisions. The import of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act is to avoid embarrassment of not knowing that funds earmarked for some purposes have been diverted in satisfaction of a judgment debt which the government may not know anything about. See generally the cases of ONJEWU VS. KSMCI (2003) 10 NWLR (PT. 827) 40; FGN VS. INTERSTELLA COMMS. LTD (2015) 9 NWLR (PT. 1463) P. 1036 and ACTION CONGRESS VS. INEC (2007) 12 NWLR (PT. 1048) P. 220. MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A.
THE DUTY OF A PUBLIC OFFICER FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE ACT
In my view, when considering who is a public officer for the purpose of the provisions of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, a wider construction or interpretation is to be resorted to in order to realize what the legislature intended to achieve by the said provisions of Section 84 of the aforesaid Act. Whereas the provisions of Section 84 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act are intended to protect or safeguard the funds of the government in custody of an officer or any institution, certain conditions must be satisfied before such funds can be applied to satisfy a judgment debt.
I am not unmindful of the decisions of this Court in the cases of CBN VS. NJEMANZE (2015) 4 NWLR (PT. 1449) p. 276 at 286; SHARIKA & SONS LTD VS. GOV. KADUNA STATE; CBN VS. INTERSTELLA COMMS. LTD (2015) 8 NWLR (PT. 1462); FGN VS. INTERSTELLA COMMS LTD (2015) 9 NWLR (PT. 1663) P. 1 at 36 and ALAMIEYESEIGHA VS. IGONIWARI (NO. 2) (2007) 7 NWLR (PT. 1034) 314 at 579, that an artificial entity created by law cannot be a public officer under the provisions of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A.
MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): By a Motion Exparte brought pursuant to Sections 83, 85 and 86 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, 2004 and under the inherent powers of the Court dated the 9th day of May, 2016, the 1st Respondent herein (Formerly Diamond Bank Plc) as Judgment Creditor/Applicant applied for a Garnishee Order Nisi against the Appellant as 1st Garnishee and others and the trial Court granted the reliefs sought by the 1st Respondent as follows:-
“1. An Order attaching the accounts (including fixed deposits and/or investments accounts of the judgment debtor – Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) with the garnishee banks in satisfaction of the judgment debt in this suit amounting to N29,997,807.20.
2. An Order that the Garnishees disclose by affidavit on oath and with statements of account, the sum(s) outstanding in the judgment Debtor‘s accounts with each of the Garnishees however described within 14 days of service of the order of this Honourable Court.
3. An Order directing the Garnishees to appear before the Court to show cause why the Garnishees should not pay to the Judgment Creditor/Applicant the monies of the Judgment Debtor in their custody in satisfaction of the judgment debt.
4. Such order or orders as this Honourable Court may deem proper to make in the circumstances.”
The case was then adjourned for the garnishees to show cause why the order should not be made absolute. On its part, the Appellant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection on the 20th day of June, 2016 on the following grounds:
“1. That the 1st Granishee is the Central Bank of Nigeria and a Federal Government agency.
2. That failure of the judgment creditor to initiate this proceeding before the proper Court has robbed this Honourable Court of the jurisdiction to entertain this matter.
3. That Section 251(1)(d) gives the Federal High Court the exclusive Jurisdiction to entertain this matter against the 1st Granishee.
4. That Order VIII Rule 2, 3 and 9 of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules states that only Courts where the judgment creditor can sue the 1st garnishee for the debt can entertain the claim.
5. That Sections 7 (1) (e), 2 and 3 of the Federal High Court Act gives the Federal High Court the Jurisdiction to entertain the matter against the 1st Garnishee.
6. That this suit is incompetently commenced against the 1st Garnishee.
7. That the failure of the judgment creditor to comply with the provisions cited above has robbed this Honourable Court of jurisdiction.
8. That the Order Nisi issued against the 1st garnishee is incompetent as this Honourable Court lacked the Jurisdiction to grant it.
9. That this Honourable Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this suit and it ought to be struck out in limine as against the 1st Garnishee.
10. The 1st garnishee for the purpose of this objection shall be relying on the accompanying affidavit; and the written address in support of this application.”
The Appellant also filed an affidavit to show cause why the garnishee order should not be made absolute against it wherein it deposed that there are no sufficient facts before the Court to prove that the 3rd Respondent maintains a bank account with the Appellant containing the judgment sum.
The trial Court in the Suit No: KDH/KAD/473/2009 presided over by Honourable Justice Hannatu A. L. Balogun after considering both the Notice of Preliminary Objection and the affidavit to show cause filed by the Appellant and the processes in response to same, gave separate rulings on the same 30th day of November, 2016 dismissing the Notice of Preliminary Objection, assuming jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and consequently made the Garnishee Order Absolute against the Appellant.
Dissatisfied with the said rulings of the Court below, the Appellant has appealed against same vide its Notice of Appeal which was further amended and deemed proper before this Court on the 4th day of November, 2021 comprising of 3 (Three) Grounds of Appeal.
The parties to the appeal then filed their respective Briefs of Argument.
The Appellant‘s Brief of Argument was filed on the 5th day of October, 2021 and settled by its Counsel wherein 3 (three) issues were distilled for determination as follows:
“1. Whether the trial Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the Garnishee proceedings against the Appellant viz-a-viz the provisions of Section 251(1)(d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), Sections 7(1)(a)(b) and 8 of the Federal High Court Act and Order VIII Rules 2, 3 and 9 of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules. (Ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal)
2. Whether the trial Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the Garnishee proceedings against the Appellant viz-a-viz the provisions of Section 84 Sheriff and Civil Process Act and Section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), without the prior consent of the Attorney General of the Federation first obtained. (Ground 2 of the Notice of Appeal)
3. Whether the trial Court was right to make the Garnishee Order Nisi Absolute against the Appellant. (Ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal.”
The 1st Respondent also filed its Brief of Argument argued by its Counsel, I. K. Ijomah Esq. and formulated 3 (three) issues for determination thus:
“1. Whether in the light of the provision of Section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution, Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and upon a proper construction of Order VIII Rules 2, 3 and 9 of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules, the Kaduna State High Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain and hear the Garnishee proceedings against the Appellant in the enforcement of its own judgment.
2. Whether the Central Bank of Nigeria – the Appellant is a Public officer as contemplated under Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act for which consent of the Attorney General of the Federation must be sought and obtained before a Garnishee proceeding is commenced against CBN.
3. Whether the trial Court was not right in making the Garnishee Order Nisi Absolute against the Appellant.”
The 2nd Respondent on its own part filed its Brief of Argument settled by its Counsel, Fred Ogidi Esq. and adopted the issues for determination raised by the 1st Respondent.
The 3rd Respondent also filed its Brief of Argument which was settled by its Counsel, Peter Jude Osuji Esq. wherein it raised 2 (two) issues for determination as follows:
“1. Whether the trial Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the Garnishee proceedings against the Appellant vis-a-vis the provisions of Section 84 Sheriff and Civil Process Act and Section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), without the prior consent of the Attorney General of the Federation first obtained.
2. Whether the trial Court has the right to make the Order Nisi Absolute against the Appellant.
On the other hand, the Appellant also filed a Reply Brief of Argument on the 5th day of October, 2021 and settled by its Counsel, Hadiza Mary Usman Esq.
On issue one, the Appellant‘s Counsel argued that Section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) clearly outlines the matters in which the Federal High Court enjoys exclusive jurisdiction to the exclusion of the State High Court and that the position is on all fours with Section 7(1)(a) and (b) and Section 8 of the Federal High Court Act and as such the garnishee proceedings filed at the trial Court fall under the matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court and thus the trial Court lacked the requisite jurisdiction to have entertained the garnishee proceedings against the Appellant. On this point, counsel cited the cases of ALI VS. C.B.N. (1997) 4 NWLR (PT. 498) PAGE 192; CBN VS. OKEB NIG LTD & ORS (2014) LPELR – 23162 (CA) and CBN VS. IMPORT EXPORT (2013) 2 NWLR (PT. 1337).
The Appellant‘s Counsel also argued that the control of the Treasury Single Account is a fiscal measure that falls under the ambit of Section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).
On issue two, the Appellant‘s Counsel argued that the Appellant is in the public service of the Federation as provided under Section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), and manned by a public officer in accordance with Section 19 of the 5th Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) (interpretation section). It was also submitted that by Section 84(1)(c) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act Cap 56 LFN 2004, the Order Nisi should not have been made. Counsel referred this Court to the cases of SKEN CONSULT VS. UKEY (1981) SC 6 AND C.B.N. VS. J. I. NWANYANWU & SONS ENTERPRISES NIGERIA LIMITED (2014) LPELR – 22745.
The Appellant‘s Counsel has argued that there is nothing to show that the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation was obtained before instituting the garnishee proceedings.
On issue three, the Appellant‘s Counsel argued that despite the facts deposed to in the Appellant‘s Affidavit to show cause contained at pages 66 – 68 of the Record of Appeal, the Court still went ahead to make the order nisi absolute against the Appellant and that the decision is erroneous as the Court should have taken cognizance of the affidavit to show cause as well as the further affidavit to show cause contained at pages 106 – 107 of the Record of Appeal.
The Appellant‘s Counsel also submitted that there were no material facts placed before the trial Court to prove that the 3rd Respondent maintains an account with the Appellant or that the Appellant is indebted to it and that monies in the Treasury Single Account (TSA) is an account which is a collection or pool of monies belonging to the Federal Government and all its agencies and that it is not possible to differentiate monies belonging to one Federal Government Agency from the other without specification of the account details and that the TSA is under the supervision of the Federal Government and not the Appellant.
The 1st Respondent‘s Counsel, in response to the arguments of the Appellant‘s Counsel argued that the fact that an action is against the Federal Government or its agency as in the extant case does not ipso facto bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. On this point, counsel referred to the cases of NABORE PROPERTIES LIMITED VS. PEACE – COVER (NIG) LTD (2015) 2 NWLR (PT. 1443) PAGE 286 AT 315 PARAS E – F; F.M.B.N. VS. LAGOS STATE GOVERNMENT (2010) 5 NWLR (PT. 1188) PAGE 570 – 601 PARAS B –D and ADETAYO VS. ADEMOLA (2010) 15 NWLR (PT. 1215) PAGE 169 AT 190 PARAS F – G.
The 1st Respondent‘s Counsel also argued that the authorities of CBN VS. OKEB NIG LTD & ORS (2014) LPELR – 23162 (CA); CBN VS. IMPORT EXPORT (2013) 2 NWLR (PT. 1337) and Order viii Rules 2 and 3 of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules cited by the Appellant does not apply to this case on hand.
On issue two, the 1st Respondent‘s Counsel argued that the Appellant is not a Public Officer as contemplated under Section 84 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act consequently, the consent of the Attorney General is not required prior to the commencement of garnishee proceedings in enforcing the judgment of the trial Court and reference was made to the cases of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA VS. FALASH ENTERPRISES NIG. LTD APPEAL NO. CA/K/16/2017 PAGES 18 – 19 wherein the Court relied on the case of CBN VS. NJEMANZE (2015) 4 NWLR (PT. 1449) PAGE 284 – 288 PARAS G – G and CBN VS. INTERSTELLA COMMUNICATIONS LTD (2015) 8 NWLR (PT. 1462) PAGE 1456 AT 506 PARAS D – F.
On issue three, the 1st Respondent‘s Counsel argued that in the absence of an appeal against the findings of the trial Court in pages 65 and 163 of the Record of Appeal as reproduced by the 1st Respondent‘s Counsel, the issue 3 raised by the Appellant is academic and incapable of changing the definite findings of the trial Court same being unchallenged.
The 1st Respondent‘s Counsel further submitted that the law has not placed upon the 1st Respondent the requirement of submitting the account number of the 3rd Respondent with the Appellant.
The 2nd Respondent‘s Counsel in response to the argument of the Appellant‘s Counsel contained in the Appellant‘s Brief of Argument, argued on issue one that for the Federal High Court to assume exclusive jurisdiction under Sub Section (d) of Section 251(1) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), it is not enough that the action is against the Central Bank of Nigeria but in addition, the dispute must arise from banking. On this point, counsel referred to the case of WEMA SECURITIES & FINANCE PLC VS. NIGERIA AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE CORP (2015) LPELR – 24833 (SC).
The 2nd Respondent‘s Counsel also argued that considering the case of GUARANTY TRUST BANK PLC VS. INNOSON NIGERIA LIMITED (2017) LPELR – 42368 (SC), it is apparent that the dispute being one of garnishee is not in any way connected to banking such as to confer jurisdiction on the Federal High Court exclusively as the Appellant being a bank is only incidental. Counsel also referred to the case of CBN VS. OKPANACHI & ORS (2018) LPELR – 46730 (CA).
On issue two, the 2nd Respondent‘s Counsel argued that a public officer is a natural person and not a body corporate as in the instant case and referred to the case of FEDERAL COLLEGE OF EDUCATION OSIELE, ABEOKUTA VS. AJAYI (2014) LPELR – 24401 (CA).
On issue three, the 2nd Respondent‘s Counsel adopted the arguments of the 1st Respondent on the said issue.
The 3rd Respondent‘s Counsel on the other hand conceded to the appeal.
In its Reply Brief, the Appellant argued in response to the argument of the 1st Respondent with several authorities which argument this Court will consider in the course of giving its judgment. In conclusion, counsel urged the Court to consider all the authorities and arguments proffered and grant the reliefs sought by granting an order setting aside the execution levied against the Appellant by the trial Court.
RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES
Having summarized the arguments of the parties herein, I shall now proceed to determine the issues in this appeal and in doing so I shall adopt the issues for determination raised by the Appellant in his Brief of Argument as those that have arisen for the determination of this appeal.
ISSUE ONE
Whether the Trial Court has the Jurisdiction to entertain the Garnishee proceedings against the Appellant viz-a-viz the provisions of Section 251(1) (d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), Section 7(1) (a)(b) and 8 of the Federal High Court Act and Order VIII Rules 2, 3 and 9 of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules.
For ease of consideration, it is important I bring out the point of argument under this issue and to my mind it is:
Does a garnishee proceeding such as the one at hand fall under the matters provided for in Section 251(1)(d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), Section 7(1)(a) and (b) of the Federal High Court Act and Order VIII Rules 2, 3 and 9 of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules?
Under consideration also, would be to know whether the Appellant is an agency of the Federal Government.
The Central Bank of Nigeria is an agent of the Federal Government having been created by an Act of the National Assembly via the Central Bank of Nigeria Act. Also, looking at the provisions of the Act especially at Section 2(e), it is clear that amongst the principal object of the bank, is to act as banker and provide economic and financial advice to the Federal Government. Looking at the above, there is no dispute that the Appellant is an agent of the Federal Government.
It is also settled that the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is circumscribed by Section 251(1)(d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and it provides the subject matter over which the Federal High Court can exercise jurisdiction. The Constitution also used the word “NOTWITHSTANDING” to circumscribe the jurisdiction. In considering Section 251(1)(d) of the Constitution, both the subject matter and the parties are important. The provision is so clear, it is plain, and its applicability to the situation at hand is to say the least inadequate. This is so because whichever way one looks at jurisdiction, garnishee proceedings though clearly a means of enforcement of judgments, cannot be properly termed as substantive civil or criminal suit covered by the provisions of Section 251(1) of the Constitution, and in any event, as rightly pointed out, the Appellant was not even a party in Suit No. KDH/KAD/473/2009 before the trial Court, which delivered the judgment now sought to be enforced. The Appellant only became a party for the purpose of the garnishee proceedings after the 1st Respondent sought to enforce the judgment of the Court.
Also, the issues at the trial Court did not have related matters of banking, or “…connected with or pertaining to banking…” within the meaning and purport of Section 251(1)(d) of the Constitution as it relates to the Appellant.
In the circumstances therefore, this Court is of the firm view that the High Court of Kaduna State had the jurisdiction to entertain the matter of the garnishee proceeding as it did on this score. It also is clear from reading the provisions of Order VIII Rules 2, 3 and 9 of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules and Section 7(1)(a)(b) and 8 of the Federal High Court Act, that they are procedural in nature and not capable of conferring the Court with jurisdiction. It only laid down the procedure to be followed to enforce the judgment of Court by way of garnishee proceedings.
The role of a garnishee in any garnishee proceeding is delimited. It is not envisaged that after the judgment creditor has gone through the rigors of establishing his rights through the legal system, that the garnishee, who is asked to surrender the judgment debtor‘s money in its possession should engage the judgment creditor in another bout of legal battle.
Before I conclude, It is also important to state in addition to all that I have already said that to my mind, the argument of the Appellant in paragraph 5.19 of the Appellant‘s Brief of Argument does not hold water because the substantive suit being one involving a banker/customer relationship between the 1st and 3rd Respondents which culminated into the enforcement of the judgment by the institution of the garnishee proceedings at the Court that gave the substantive judgment does not preclude the 1st Respondent from getting the judgment sum owed by the 3rd Respondent even though same is under the control of the Appellant, and I so hold.
It is therefore my unshaken view, having all the above findings in mind, that the trial Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the garnishee proceedings against the Appellant viz-a-viz the provisions of Section 251(1)(d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), Sections 7(1) (a)(b) and 8 of the Federal High Court Act and Order VIII Rules 2, 3 and 9 of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules.
This issue is therefore resolved against the Appellant and 3rd Respondent in favor of the 1st and 2nd Respondents.
ISSUE TWO
Whether the trial Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the garnishee proceedings against the Appellant viz-a-viz the provisions of Section 84 Sheriff and Civil Process Act and Section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), without the prior consent of the Attorney General of the Federation first obtained.
On this issue, the contention of the Appellant is whether the Appellant is a Public Officer in the context and scope of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act so as to be bound by Section 84 of the Act. Section 84(1) and (3)(a) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act provides as follows:
“84: (1) Where money liable to be attached by garnishee proceedings is in the custody or under the control of a public officer in his official capacity or in custodial egis, the order nisi shall not be made under the provisions of the last preceding section unless consent to such attachment is first obtained from the appropriate officer in the case of money in the custody or control of a public officer or the Court in the case of money in custodial egis, as the case may be.
(3) In this section “appropriate officer” means
(a) In relation to money which is in the custody of a public officer who holds a public office in the service of the Federation, the Attorney General of the Federation.”
The definition of a Public Officer with regard to the Public Officers Protection Act has been settled in a plethora of authorities, one of which is the case of IBRAHIM VS. J.S.C. (1998) 14 NWLR (PT. 1), which defined a Public Officer to include artificial person such as corporations sole, public bodies, corporations or unincorporated and in CBN VS. ADEDEJI (2004) 13 NWLR (PT. 890) PAGE 226 AT 245 – 249, the Appellant herein was recognized as a public officer.
The 1st Respondent in this case has vehemently opposed and cited some authorities where the Appellant in the context of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act was not recognized as a public officer, such as the case of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA VS. FALASH ENTERPRISES NIG. LTD, APPEAL NO: CA/K/16/2017 PAGE 18 – 19, wherein the Court relied on the case of CBN VS. INTERSTELLA COMMUNICATION LTD (2015) 8 NWLR (PT. 1462) 456 which the 1st Respondent relied on to say that by virtue of Section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, (as Amended) public officer refers to holders of offices and not artificial persons.
It is apparent herein, based on the facts of this case that the Central Bank of Nigeria (the Appellant) acts as a banker to the Federal Government Funds with respect to government funds in its custody (as in this case, the 3rd Respondent). Section 2(e) of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act provides as follows:
“act as a banker and provide economic and financial advice to the Federal Government.”
While Section 36 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act also provides that:
“The Bank shall receive and disburse Federal Government moneys and keep accounts thereof.”
See the case of CBN VS. UKPONG (2006) 13 NWLR (PT. 998) 555, wherein it was held on the consideration of the purpose for establishing the Central Bank of Nigeria thus:
“Generally, it is for overall control and administration of the monetary and banking policies of the Federal Government …It is not established for commercial or profit making purpose…”
See also the case of PURIFICATION TECH. (NIG) LTD VS. AG LAGOS STATE (2004) 9 NWLR (PT. 879) 665. There is absolutely no basis for treating government bank accounts any differently from bank accounts of every other juristic personality or customers.
It would be absurd to interpret a Public Officer in Section 84 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act in the restrictive sense as interpreted on the basis of Section 318 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) alone, because if so done the safety measures put in there for Government funds would have been defeated. Government funds kept in the Central Bank of Nigeria are not kept with a particular individual who is a public officer. This is why the interpretation given to Public Officer in the case of IBRAHIM V J.S.C. (supra) by the Supreme Court should apply to all cases. It should therefore enjoy or be given a general application instead of limiting the definition to office holders only.
I agree that there are divergent views on the question of whether the Central Bank of Nigeria is a Public Officer. However, it is important to note that every case that is brought before a Court can be distinguished from the facts that are peculiar to them.
That the Appellant, as a bank, has been established and owned by the Federal Government of Nigeria to provide public services in the discharge of its mandate as a public institution has been acknowledged and reinforced by the Court in the case of CBN V. UKPONG (Supra), wherein it was enunciated that:
“the Respondent failed to avert his mind to Section 2 of the CBN Act which states the purpose for establishing the CBN. Generally, it is for overall control and administration of monetary and banking policies of the federal government. All the other sections of the act, read with clear sight and focus, are geared towards the realization of those objectives. It has no shareholders to whom it pays dividends. It is not subject to payment of income tax. Its entire capital is provided by the Federal Government. stricto sensu, it is not established for commercial or profit making purpose… the Central Bank of Nigeria was established for public service simpliciter.”
The question that arises is: whether the Appellant is a public officer, wherefore the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation must be obtained first to attach money in its custody to satisfy a judgment debt by a judgment creditor in a garnishee proceeding against it? Who then is a public officer within the ambit of the provisions of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act?
By the combined effect of the provisions of Section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act, and Section 318(e) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), “public service of the federation” means the service of the federation in any capacity in respect of the government of the federation, and includes service of “staff of any statutory corporation established by an act of the national assembly.”
The Appellant having been established by an act of the National Assembly, that is, the Central Bank of Nigeria Act of 2004, (now 2007), it is part of the Public Service of the Federation.
In CBN VS. AMAO (2010) 16 NWLR (PT. 1219) P. 217 at 303, the Supreme Court, when considering whether the Central Bank of Nigeria comes within the Public Service of the Federation or not, held:
“Public Service of the Federation means service of the Federation in any capacity in respect of the Government of the Federation and includes service as (c) staff of any statutory corporation established by an act of the national assembly. By the above provisions, it is beyond doubt and serious contention that the Appellant bank, a statutory corporation established by an act of the national assembly i.e. the Central Bank of Nigeria act, is part and parcel of the Public Service of the Federation over which the Federal Government has the exclusive right and power to prescribe pensions payable to its employees outside the Central Bank of Nigeria Act.”
It should be noted that the definition of “public service of the federation” under Section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) is not exhaustive. It includes services enumerated under items (a – h) of the said section. The law is trite that wherever the word “includes” is used in a statute, it is intended to enlarge or widen the scope of the things listed or enumerated. In other words, other things or whatever mentioned can be increased where appropriate. Therefore, the Appellant can render any other services not specifically mentioned or listed by the provisions of Section 318(e) and items (a – h) thereof, and to include any other services by acting under Sections 2, 39 and 40 of the Central Bank of Nigeria (Establishment) Act. For instance in IBRAHIM VS. J.S.C. (1998) 14 NWLR (PT. 581) P. 1 at 38, when considering the term public officer, it was held: “it is thus clear to me that the term “public officer” has by law been extended to include a “public department” and therefore, an artificial person, a public officer or a public body.” In CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA VS. OKEFE (2015) LPELR – 24825 (CA), this Court, when considering who is a public officer in the Public Service of the Federation, in view of the provisions of Section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and Section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act, held thus: “from the community reading and effect of the provisions of the laws set out above, it is clear that the Appellant, the Central Bank of Nigeria, a statutory corporation established by an act of the national assembly, is a Public Officer being a part of the Public Service of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”
In considering whether the Appellant is a public officer for the purpose of the application of the provisions of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (which has been reproduced supra), the intention or intendment of the legislature must be sought as expressed in the words used in the statutes in question. It is pertinent at this juncture, to be reminded of the general principles of interpretation of the provisions of statutes generally. That is, what is the purport and import of provisions of the statute in question, that is to say, what the legislature intended to achieve by such a statute.
In the case of A. G. FEDERATION VS. LAGOS STATE (2013) 16 NWLR (PT. 1380) P. 249 at 317, it was enunciated that:
“it is a settled principle of interpretation that provisions in statutes must be given their simple and direct meaning, which construes and give the statute its legal meaning. In the process of doing so, the intention of the legislature must be explored and taken into consideration, but will not be to the extent of bringing into the provision a different complexion from what was intended by the legislature. In this wise, the Court should confine itself to the plain and unambiguous meaning of the words used.”
The rule of interpretation of statutes is that where the words of a statute are plain, clear and unambiguous, the words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning. The intention of the legislature must be sought as expressed in the words used in couching the provisions. The import of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act is to avoid embarrassment of not knowing that funds earmarked for some purposes have been diverted in satisfaction of a judgment debt which the government may not know anything about. See generally the cases of ONJEWU VS. KSMCI (2003) 10 NWLR (PT. 827) 40; FGN VS. INTERSTELLA COMMS. LTD (2015) 9 NWLR (PT. 1463) P. 1036 and ACTION CONGRESS VS. INEC (2007) 12 NWLR (PT. 1048) P. 220.
In my view, when considering who is a public officer for the purpose of the provisions of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, a wider construction or interpretation is to be resorted to in order to realize what the legislature intended to achieve by the said provisions of Section 84 of the aforesaid Act. Whereas the provisions of Section 84 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act are intended to protect or safeguard the funds of the government in custody of an officer or any institution, certain conditions must be satisfied before such funds can be applied to satisfy a judgment debt.
I am not unmindful of the decisions of this Court in the cases of CBN VS. NJEMANZE (2015) 4 NWLR (PT. 1449) p. 276 at 286; SHARIKA & SONS LTD VS. GOV. KADUNA STATE; CBN VS. INTERSTELLA COMMS. LTD (2015) 8 NWLR (PT. 1462); FGN VS. INTERSTELLA COMMS LTD (2015) 9 NWLR (PT. 1663) P. 1 at 36 and ALAMIEYESEIGHA VS. IGONIWARI (NO. 2) (2007) 7 NWLR (PT. 1034) 314 at 579, that an artificial entity created by law cannot be a public officer under the provisions of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. It is also to be noted that recently, this Court by its several decisions, has held that the Central Bank of Nigeria is a public officer notwithstanding that it is a creature of the law. See the cases of CBN VS. ALHAJI KAKURI (2016) LPELR – 41468 (CA) and CBN VS. ZAKARI (2018) LPELR – 44751 (CA).
It is also important to note before I conclude here that the authority of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA VS. INTERSTELLA COMMS LTD (2018) 7 NWLR (PT. 1618) 294 as cited by the 1st and 2nd Respondents herein, does not apply to this case on hand as it is clearly different in its fact. For a better understanding, it is important to reproduce the issue which was laid before the Apex Court and its holding on that issue thus:
“The appellant‘s contention herein centers on the provision of Section 84(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act which counsel submits was not complied with in that the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation was not first sought and obtained before the order Nisi was made. The historical background of the Garnishee Proceeding, in the trial Court and lower Court, which took its root from Suit No. FHC/UM/CS/95/2004 has been explicitly outlined earlier in the course of this judgment. The outcome of the said suit gave reason for the 3rd Respondent, herein, to constitute an inter-ministerial Committee which included the Attorney-General of the Federation as one of the members to negotiate with the 1st and 2nd Respondents on the terms, with a view to settling and paying NITELS‘s debts owed the 1st and 2nd Respondents. In other words, to negotiate on the terms of the 3rd Respondent taking over and paying NITEL‘s debt owed 1st and 2nd Respondents. The Federal Government of Nigeria therein offered to pay 1st and 2nd Respondents a novation sum of N24.666 billion (see Paragraph 7 of 2nd Respondent‘s uncontested deposition at pages 47 and 48 of the Record and Report of the Inter Ministerial Committee at pages 180 to 189 of the Record of Appeal). Exhibit ‘D’ of page 125 of the Record was the President‘s Instruction to the AGF that the Judgment Debt Verification Committee should deal with the said recommendation by the Inter-Ministerial Committee with a view to dispose of the matter “in national interest.” It is intriguing to say that the Judgment Debt Verification committee, instead of verifying the debt and paying the offer of N24.666 billion already made and accepted, informed the 1st and 2nd Respondents that the said offer sum of N24.666 billion could not be paid in 2009 because the Budget for that year for such payment had been exhausted. They therefore made an offer of N12 billion to be paid immediately (see paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 of 2nd Respondent‘s uncontested affidavit contained at pages 7 and 8 of the Record). I seek to restate further that by the new agreement per exhibit ‘J’ at page 32 of the record it was agreed by 1st and 2nd respondents on these terms:
“The earlier agreed equivalent value of $47,735,042.00 replaces the first tranch of N5 billion, out of the present total debt sum of N12 billion. This is to be paid to us within 30 days from today. The balance of N7 billion or $51,851,852.00 (which ever we prefer or is greater on the date of payment) is to be paid to us within 180 days from today; and where the said balance cannot be paid in full within 180 days, the outstanding sum shall attract interest at a rate of 18 percent per annum from today.” (Emphasis Mine)
Exhibit ‘K‘ at pages 33 and 34 of the record being a demand note for the 1st payment of $47,735,042.00 per the foregoing agreement is relevant in confirmation. At pages 41 and 42 of the record and with the consent of the 3rd and 4th respondents, a consent judgment, Exhibit ‘Q‘ was entered by the Federal High Court, Umuahia on 17th June, 2009 by which the Court adopted the offer of N12 billion made by the 3rd and 4th respondents, and the 1st and 2nd respondents terms of acceptance. I will reproduce the 1st order made by the Federal High Court thereof as follows:
“1. An order of the Honourable Court adopting the offer of N12 Billion made to the judgment creditor by the Federal Government of Nigeria via its Judgment Debt Verification Committee vide the Federal Ministry of Justice letter Ref. No. MJ/LIT/ABJ/NSA/128/08/64 of 19th March, 2009 and the terms of acceptance of the said offer by the Judgment Creditors vide their letter of 20th March, 2009 as the Terms of Settlement of the Judgment Debt arising from the judgment of this Honourable Court dated 6th November, 2007 in this suit.”
With the total default of the AGF to obey the consent judgment orders, the 1st and 2nd Respondents resorted to the Court vide a Garnishee Proceeding. An order Nisi was made by the Court on 16th November, 2011 and the judgment debtors and Garnishee/Appellant were summoned to appear before it to show cause why the order Nisi should not be made absolute. The Order Nisi was thereafter made absolute. An appeal before the lower Court by the Appellant/Garnishee and 3rd and 4th Respondents was dismissed and the judgment by the trial Court was affirmed. The crux of issue 4 is whether the lower Court was right when it held that the appellant herein is not a public officer and hence the AGF‘s consent as required under Section 84(1) of SCPA does not apply to the case herein. It is the submission by appellant‘s counsel that by Section 84(1) it is mandatory that the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation, be sought and obtained first before the Garnishee proceedings herein can be competent. In addition to the foregoing peculiar situation of circumstance of this case, it would be pertinent to draw attention to page 73 of the record before us where the 3rd and 4th Respondents filed a motion for an order setting aside the order Nisi made by the Federal High Court on 16th November, 2011. Specifically at page 77 of the record, the said respondents in their paragraph 13 of the affidavit in support of the application deposed to this fact and said:
“That the Judgment Creditor had so far been paid the sum of Two billion, seven hundred million Naira in fulfillment of the agreement and towards the discharge of the compromised sum of Twelve Billion Naira (N12,000,000,000.00).”
As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents, the said foregoing deposition is an admission against interest made by the 3rd and 4th respondents from whom the Appellant wants the 1st and 2nd respondents to obtain consent. It is a fact admitted which need no further proof. See Rauph Bello Oseni V. Chief Lasisi Bajulu & 2 Ors (2010) All FWLR (Pt 511) 813 at 831 – 832 and also Section 123 of the Evidence Act 2011.
In further confirmation of the 3rd and 4th Respondents‘ commitment, are Exhibits ‘I‘ and ‘L‘ contained at pages 31 and 35 of the record which are very instructive. The documents are very unambiguous that the 3rd and 4th respondents conceded the debt of N12 Billion to the 1st and 2nd Respondents on behalf of NITEL. Exhibit ‘L‘ specifically affirms thus in part:
“that the Federal Government shall pay Interstella Communications Limited, the sum of N12,000,000,000.00 (Twelve Billion Naira) only, in full and final settlement of the judgment debt. I am to inform you that the Federal Government will commence payments to discharge the negotiated sum as soon as practicable…”
Following from the foregoing explicit and clear cut concession, will it now be just and proper that the 3rd and 4th Respondents should recede on their commitment to the 1st and 2nd Respondents on behalf of NITEL, the answer in my view is certainly in the negative. Rather and as rightly argued and submitted by the learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents, the peculiar facts of this case herein removes it from the purview of the general interpretation of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act in that the consent of the 4th Respondent by virtue of Exhibits “I‟ and “L‟ has already been obtained and the Appellant (CBN) was acting as a Banker only, to the 3rd Respondent (FGN). It should be noted clearly that the principle underlying securing the AGF‟s consent as prescribed in Section 84 SCPA is to avoid embarrassment on him of not having the prior knowledge that funds earmarked for some purposes have been diverted in satisfaction of a judgment debt, which the government may not know anything about. See the persuasive authority of the case of Onjewu V. KSMCI (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt 827) 40 at 89.
The learned counsel for the appellant made reference exhaustively to Section 84(1) of the SCPA and submitted emphatically that the Attorney-General of the Federation is the appropriate officer from whom consent must be obtained in respect of money in the custody of a public officer in the public service of the Federation. Counsel submits further that the appellant as well as its officials have been held to be public officers and relied on the case of CBN V. Adedeji (supra) wherein the lower Court followed the decision of this Court in Ibrahim V. JSC under reference. For purpose of clear understanding, it is expedient that the provision of Section 84(1) of the SCPA is hereby reproduced as follows:
“where money liable to be attached by garnishee proceedings is in the custody or under the control of a public officer in his official capacity or in custodia legis, the order nisi shall not be made under the provisions of the last preceding section unless consent to such attachment is first obtained from the appropriate officer in the case of money in the custody or control of a public officer or of the Court in the case of money in custodia legis, as the case may be.”
I have indicated earlier in the course of this judgment that the case under consideration herein is very peculiar and the circumstance cannot be fitted within the general interpretation of Section 84 of SCPA. Again the case of Onjewu V. KSMCI (supra) is well under reference. Furthermore and as rightly submitted on behalf of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, certain qualifying conditions must be met for a case to come under the purview of Section 84 of SCPA. In other words, justice would demand that the AGF must be a neutral/nominal party in the transactions and proceedings giving rise to the application for order nisi and not him being the debtor. It is well and explicit on the facts of this case that the AGF has all along held out himself to be an active participant in the several stages of negotiations, transactions and even part payment of the debt owed. Paragraph 13 of the affidavit in support of the AGF‘s application of page 76 of the record is under reference as admission against interest. In the circumstance, the AGF cannot be a neutral/nominal party in this case.
It is right to say that by implication Section 84 of the SCPA which stipulates “consent” had already been fully complied with as the government itself negotiated the terms, and took steps to settle the debts, before it later reneged on full satisfaction thereof. The most potent factor which makes Section 84(1) of the SCPA inapplicable herein is because the Attorney-General is the debtor and has been sued in that capacity. With the AGF being the Judgment Debtor therefore, will it not be absurd to require that his consent should be sought especially having admitted that he had taken the move by paying part of the debt in question The appellant’s contention, understanding and interpretation of Section 84(1) of SCPA is a total misconception, I hold. The interpretation in my view would run against the application of natural justice, which could not have been the intendment of the legislature.
In the present transaction, and as rightly submitted by the 1st and 2nd Respondents‘ counsel, the appellant is only a Banker to the 3rd and 4th respondents and has in that capacity made Payments to the 1st and 2nd respondents based on the consent of the 4th respondent. It could not have been the intention of the legislature that Section 84(1) of the SCPA should be used as an umbrella for the 3rd and 4th respondents to evade a debt owed, by simply putting its funds in the hands of the appellant; it is not also the intention that a judgment creditor should first obtain the consent of the debtor before proceeding against the debtor to recover his money. The submission by the learned counsel for the appellant would certainly be counter-productive. It will also defeat the doctrine of the Rule of law which, as rightly argued by 1st and 2nd respondents counsel, is the hallmark of our democracy. This Court in NPA V. CGFC SPA (1971) NLR (P.11) 463 held that a section of a statute should not be given an undue emphasis, that it did not possess, and that a statute cannot be applied in a situation where its effect is clearly contrary to the intendment of the Legislature in passing that Law. Again and contrary to the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, the consent of the AGF had all along been obtained. Consequently, the Garnishee Proceedings against the Appellant was rightly commenced and I so hold.
The other leg of the argument is where the appellant‘s counsel holds out the CBN as a public officer and relied on the case of Ibrahim V. JSC (supra) in particular. In the case under consideration, I have ruled that the relationship between the appellant and the 3rd and 4th Respondents is that of Banker and customer relationship. In other words and as rightly argued by 1st and 2nd respondents‟ counsel, the appellant is not a public officer in the con of Section 84 SCPA, when regard is had to the history of this appeal. Section 84 has been reproduced earlier in the course of this judgment. It is apparent herein, on the facts of this case that the CBN acts as a Banker to the Federal Government Funds with respect to government funds in its custody. Section 2(e) of the CBN Act provides thus: “act as a banker and provide economic and financial advice to the Federal Government.” Section 36 of the CBN Act also provides: “The Bank shall receive and disburse Federal Government moneys and keep accounts thereof.”
The appellant does not stand as public officer in this situation. Therefore, it follows that the need to seek the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation does not arise. Relevant to this conclusion is again the persuasive authority of CBN V. Ekong (supra) cited also by the appellant‘s counsel wherein Fabiyi, JCA (as he then was) held thus on his consideration of the purpose for establishing the CBN:
“Generally, it is for overall control and administration of the monetary and banking policies of the Federal Government – It is not established for commercial or profit making purpose…”
The case of Purification Tech. (Nig) Ltd v. AG Lagos State (supra) is also on all fours with the facts of the case under consideration herein. Again the persuasive judgment of the Court of Appeal at pages 679 – 680 is relevant and said “… There is absolutely no basis for treating government bank accounts any differently from bank accounts of every other juristic personality or customers…”
In resolving the 4th issue against the appellant, I hold the strong view that the consent of the 3rd and 4th Respondents was adequately obtained by the 1st and 2nd Respondents, and the Garnishee Proceedings was competently commenced. Further still on the relationship between the 3rd Respondent and the appellant in this case, same is purely that of a Banker to a customer. Therefore, the question of whether the Appellant is a public officer, who cannot release funds except the consent of the AGF is obtained, does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case.
The 4th issue herein is resolved also against the appellant.” (Emphasis Mine)
From the above reproduced findings and decision of the Apex Court which was raised before it, it is clear that same is not on all fours with the instant case. In that case, the government itself negotiated the terms, and took steps to settle the debts, before it later reneged on full satisfaction thereof and also, the most potent factor which makes Section 84(1) of the SCPA inapplicable therein is because the Attorney-General is the debtor and has been sued in that capacity. He had all along held out himself to be an active participant in the several stages of negotiations, transactions and even part payment of the debt owed which later resulted in the garnishee proceeding. This was not so in the instant case and there is nowhere it was stated in the instant case that the Attorney General was part of the proceeding in the substantive suit leading to the garnishee proceedings and then this appeal.
The answer to the question posed by learned Counsel to the parties in this appeal therefore is that, on the basis of the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the Appellant is a public officer as to warrant the application of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. It is therefore my decision after considering the arguments of the learned Appellant‘s Counsel in the Appellant‘s Brief of Argument alongside the Reply Brief of Argument and the authorities contained therein, that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the garnishee proceedings against the Appellant viz-a-viz the provisions of Section 84 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act and Section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). The Appellant being a public officer, the 1st Respondent needed to obtain the prior consent of the Attorney General of the Federation before instituting the garnishee proceeding against the Appellant as the said Section 84 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act is Mandatory.
This issue is thus resolved in favour of the Appellant and 3rd Respondent herein against the 1st and 2nd Respondents.
Having found the Court below to be without jurisdiction as I have done under this issue, I think it is irrelevant to proceed with the consideration of issue three.
In the circumstances, it is the decision of this Court that the trial Court should not have entertained the garnishee proceedings brought before it as the condition precedent for assuming its jurisdiction was not observed as provided for under Section 84 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act thus rendering its entire decision in the garnishee proceedings a nullity.
This appeal, in the light of all my consideration on the issues raised and argued by parties herein, succeeds and both the Garnishee Order Nisi and the Garnishee Order absolute made by the Court below are therefore hereby set aside.
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.: I agree.
BITRUS GYARAZAMA SANGA, J.C.A.: I have the privilege of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother M. B. Idris, JCA. My brother in the lead judgment meticulously considered the facts of this suit, the submission by learned counsel on the garnishee proceedings especially as to whether the trial Court is vested with the jurisdiction to issue order Nisi resulting in an Order Absolute in favour of the 1st Respondent against the Appellant who is the Garnishee without complying with Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
My brother in the lead judgment thoroughly waded through a plethora of judicial authorities with a view to determine whether the Appellant is a Public Officer within the meaning of Section 84 (Supra) and reached the inevitable conclusion that the condition precedent for commencing garnishee proceedings against the Appellant was not observed thus depriving the lower Court of jurisdiction. I agree with and adopt as mine the decision in the lead judgment that the lower Court’s proceedings are a nullity for failure of the 1st Respondent to comply with Section 87 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
I also nullify the garnishee Order Nisi and Absolute issued by the lower Court against the Appellant thus setting aside same.
Appearances:
S. B. Muhammad, Esq. For Appellant(s)
L. J. Lagan, Esq. – for 1st Respondent
F. Ogidi, Esq. – for 2nd Respondent
S. S. Sani, Esq. – for 3rd Respondent. For Respondent(s)