BARRISTER DOSU BABATUNDE v. OSUN STATE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION ILA-ORANGUN
(2019)LCN/13447(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Monday, the 10th day of June, 2019
CA/AK/178/2013
RATIO
JURISDICTION: WHEN CAN IT BE RAISED
It is a well settled principle of law that an issue of jurisdiction can be raised at anytime even for the first time even on appeal. The issue of jurisdiction is a fundamental one that goes to the competence of the Court to adjudicate on a matter. It can even be raised suo motu by the Court. As OBASEKI, JSC puts it very beautifully in the case of OLOBA V AKEREJA (1988) 3 NWLR, PT 84, 508. It is an exhibition of wisdom to have the issue of jurisdiction determined before embarking on the hearing and determination of the substantive matter. As according to him there is no justice in exercising jurisdiction where there is none. That it is injustice to the law, to the Court and to the parties to do so. See also ESABUNOR & ANOR V FAWEYA & ORS (2019) LPELR 46961 (SC).PER PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, J.C.A.
APPEAL: WHEN THE DECISION OF A COMPETENT COURT OF JURISDICTION IS NOT APPEALED AGAINST
Conversely it is also well settled that a decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction not appealed against remains subsisting and binding. In the case of NA ALLAH V AJIYAN GOMBE (2014) LPELR ? 23452 (CA), this Court held that:
……… a Court of Appeal cannot set aside a judgment or ruling of a lower Court against which there is no notice and grounds of appeal legally filled before it Anah v Anah (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt 1091) 75. In the absence of an appeal against a judgment of (sic) decision of a Court, it remain inviolate for all time Olawepo V Security and Exchange Commission (2011) 16 NWLR (Pt 1272) 122 ……….PER PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, J.C.A.
APPEAL: AN ISSUE CANNOT BE RAISED FOR DETERMINATION EXCEPT IT COMES FROM A GROUND OF APPEAL
This position is fortified by the principle of law that states that an issue cannot be raised for determination unless it is distilled from a ground(s) of appeal. See PHARMA-DEKO PLC V FINANCIAL DERIVATES COMPANY LTD (2014) LPELR 24047 (CA); ABDU V STATE (2016) LPER-41461 (SC); NWANKWO & ORS V YAR?ADUA & ORS (2010) 12 NWLR, PT. 1209, 518 and HENSHAW V. TRADITIONAL RULERS COUNCIL, CALABAR SOUTH LGA & ORS (2018) LPELR-45526 (CA).PER PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
BARRISTER DOSU BABATUNDE Appellant(s)
AND
OSUN STATE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION ILA-ORANGUN Respondent(s)
PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant, a Legal Practitioner by an originating summons filed before Hon. Justice Oloyede Olamide Folahanmi of the Osun High Court sitting in Ila Orangun on the 20/03/2012 claimed against the respondent as follows:-
1. DECLARATION that the appointment of the claimant as the defendant?s legal retainer vide defendant?s letter dated 21st April, 2009 is a contract of or for service which is still subsisting until same is determined by the defendant.
2. DECLARATION that the claimant is entitled to be paid his annual retainership fee of N768,911.00 from 2010 for as long as the contact subsists.
3. An order directing the defendant to pay to the claimant his annual retainership fee of N768,911.00 respectively for each of years 2010 and 2011 both totalling N1,537,822.00 and for such other years or fraction of year for which the contract may subsist until same is determined.
The summons called for a determination of the following three questions by the trial Court: –
i) Whether going by the contents of the letter of appointment of the claimants
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as the defendant?s legal retainer dated 21st April, 2009, the claimant?s said appointment require annual renewal.
ii) If the answer to question (i) above is in the negative, whether the appointment of the claimant as the defendant?s legal retainer as per the content of the letter of appointment dated 21st April, 2009 is still subsisting.
iii) Whether the claimant is not entitled to be paid his annual retainership fee of N768,911 from 2010 till determination of his appointment and or the date of judgment.
In support of the summons was a 17 paragraph affidavit and four annexures marked as Exhibits DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4. Accompanying the summons is a written address also dated and filed on the 20/03/2012.
The respondent after entering a conditional appearance and filing a number of preliminary objections, in specific reaction to the summons filed a 15 paragraph counter affidavit and a written address both dated and filed on the 30/04/2012. After resolving the series of preliminary objections the matter proceeded to hearing on the 11/03/2013.
In its judgment delivered on the 28/03/2013, the learned trial judge found for
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the defendant/respondent and dismissed the claim of the plaintiff/appellant. It is against this judgment that the appellant has appealed to this Court by his amended notice of appeal filed on the 02/03/2017 but deemed on the 18/05/2017 containing the following four grounds:-
1. The trial Court erred in law when it held that the retainership enures in the first instance for a year certain and is subject to renewal on the agreement of both parties when Exhibit DB1 did not by any stretch of imagination say so.
2. The learned trial Court erred in law to have treated the Appellant?s case as a claim for fees by charges under Section 16(1) and (2) of the Legal Practitioners Act 2004 (requiring the Appellant to furnish the bill of Charges which must contain particulars of the principal items included in the bill before commencement of action in Court) when the case of the Appellant as revealed by the pleadings and evidence falls under fees by Agreement as envisaged by the provisions of Section 15(3)(d) of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1975.
3. The learned trial Court erred in law when it failed to recognise that by the Respondent?s failure
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to protest against the alleged insufficiency of particulars contained in the letter dated 21st April, 2009 whether before or during trial, either by way of pleadings or oral arguments, it had waived its rights of objection to the insufficiency of particulars in the bill of charges as raised by the Court suo motu in its judgment.
4. The trial Court erred in law when it suo motu raised the issue of furnishing the defendant with a bill of charges which must contain particulars of the principal items included in the bill at least one month before the commencement of the action, without allowing the parties to address it on this vital issue and therefore proceeded to determine the case based on this issue.
Whereof the appellant urged the Court to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the trial Court and enter judgment in favour of the appellant as per his claim before the lower Court.
In arguing the appeal, Mr. Jola Akintola of counsel for the appellant adopted his brief filed on the 02/03/2017 but deemed on the 18/05/2017 as his legal arguments in support of his appeal. In it counsel raised the following four issues for the determination of
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the Court:-
1. Whether having regards to the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Respondent?s letter dated 21st April, 2009 (Exhibit DB1) the learned trial Court was right to hold that the contract of retainership between it and the Appellant enures in the first instance for a year certain and subject to renewal for subsequent years on the agreement of both parties. GROUND 1
2. Whether it was right for the trial Court to have treated the Appellant?s case as a request for fees through bill of charges under S. 16(1) and (2) of the Legal practitioners Act, LFN, 2004 rather than as fees by agreement of parties under the provision of S. 15(3) (d) of the Legal Practitioners Act, LFN 2004: GROUND 2.
3. Whether the failure of the Respondent to protest the insufficiency of the particulars contained in the letter dated 21st April, 2009 either before or during the trial by way of pleading or oral arguments does not constitute a waiver of its right of objection to the insufficiency of particulars in the bill of charges as raised suo motu by the trial Court in its judgment: GROUND 3.
4. Whether the trial Court was right when it suo motu
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raised the issue of furnishing the Respondent with the bill of charges (in spite of the clear wordings of Exhibits DB1 (sic) which contained fixed annual fees) which must contain particulars of the principal items included in the bill at least one month before the commencements of the action, without allowing the parties to address it on this vital issue before proceeding to determine the case based on the said issue: GROUND 4.
On issue (1) counsel submitted that the learned trial Court treated the contract of retainership between the parties as one for a year certain when the contract as contained in the letter dated the 21st April, 2009 does not say so but allows it to run from year to year until determination by either party which contract was never determined in this case.
On issue (2), Mr. Akintola submitted that the learned trial Court treated the appellant?s case as a request for claim for fees through bill of charges rather than as a claim for fees by agreement as envisaged by Section 15(3) (d) of the Legal Practitioners Act, LFN, 2004 which does not require the appellant to furnish his bill of charges which must contain particulars of
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the item of claim as required by SECTION 16(1) and (2) of the Legal Practitioners Act, LFN, 2004.
On issue (3) counsel contended that the learned trial Court failed to recognise that by the failure of the respondent to protest the alleged insufficiency of the particulars in the bill of charges whether by way of pleadings or oral argument throughout the trial; it had waived its right of objection to the insufficiency of particulars in the bill of charges.
On the last issue, counsel submitted that the learned trial Court by suo motu raising the issue of insufficiency of particulars in the bill of charges without giving any opportunity to the parties to be heard on same and deciding the case of the appellant based on the said issue breached the rules of fair hearing which occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the appellant.
The respondents brief of argument was filed on the 23/02/2018. In adopting same as his legal arguments in opposition to the appeal Mr. Olawale Sonibare of counsel for the respondent raised three issues for determination of the Court:-
1) Whether the (lower Court) State High Court has jurisdictional power to
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entertain the appellant?s claims by virtue of SECTION 254(A)(1) of the Constitution of the FRN (Third Alteration) Act 2012 having regard to Section 7 (1)(a)(i)-(ii) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006.
2) Whether the claim of the appellant is not a request for professional fee which required supply of bill of charges under SECTION 16(1) and (2) of the Legal Practitioners Act, LFN, 2004.
3) Whether there was no traceable factor of undue influence and conflict of interest in the appointment of the appellant as a legal retainer with the Respondent.
On issue (1), counsel submitted that the claim of the respondent is for a related work done which only the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to entertain. That as such the Osun State High Court has no power to entertain the claim.
On issue (2), counsel submitted that the appellant failed to comply with SECTION 16(1) & (2) of the LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT, 2004, by failing to give one month?s notice and to give a bill of charges to the Respondent.
On their last issue, Mr. Sonibare submitted that the legal retainership between the appellant and respondent was as a
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result of undue influence, irregular, illegal, null and void and therefore contrary to public policy.
The appellant filed an eight page reply to the respondent?s brief. I do not intend to summarise the reply in this judgment, suffice it to say that I will refer to it in dealing with any issue that arises therein in the course of this judgment.
It is important however that before going into a consideration of this appeal to first deal with the issue raised by the appellant?s counsel in paragraph 2.07 at page 3 of his reply brief. This is a challenge to the respondent?s issue (1) questioning the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain this matter. The contention of counsel is that the respondent had at the lower Court raised the same issue of jurisdiction by a notice of preliminary objection which the trial Court dismissed for lacking in merit. That since there is no cross appeal the respondent cannot properly raise that issue under the guise of a respondents notice. That since the appellants case was dismissed and not struck out, the respondent cannot be heard to urge the Court to affirm the judgment on the ground
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that it wrongly assumed jurisdiction to try the matter. That if the Court actually lacked jurisdiction, the proper order to make would be one striking out the matter and not an order of dismissal as was done. Counsel referred to the case of NWADIKE V WILLIAMS & ANOR (2014) LPELR ? 23029 (CA); SCOA (NIG) PLC V STERLING BANK PLC (2016) LPELR ? 40566 (CA) and ADESOKAN V ADETUNJI (1994) 6 SCNJ, 123.
It is a well settled principle of law that an issue of jurisdiction can be raised at anytime even for the first time even on appeal. The issue of jurisdiction is a fundamental one that goes to the competence of the Court to adjudicate on a matter. It can even be raised suo motu by the Court. As OBASEKI, JSC puts it very beautifully in the case of OLOBA V AKEREJA (1988) 3 NWLR, PT 84, 508. It is an exhibition of wisdom to have the issue of jurisdiction determined before embarking on the hearing and determination of the substantive matter. As according to him there is no justice in exercising jurisdiction where there is none. That it is injustice to the law, to the Court and to the parties to do so. See also ESABUNOR & ANOR V FAWEYA & ORS
10
(2019) LPELR 46961 (SC).
Conversely it is also well settled that a decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction not appealed against remains subsisting and binding. In the case ofNA?ALLAH V AJIYAN GOMBE (2014) LPELR ? 23452 (CA), this Court held that:
?……… a Court of Appeal cannot set aside a judgment or ruling of a lower Court against which there is no notice and grounds of appeal legally filled before it ? Anah v Anah (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt 1091) 75. In the absence of an appeal against a judgment of (sic) decision of a Court, it remain inviolate for all time ? Olawepo V Security and Exchange Commission (2011) 16 NWLR (Pt 1272) 122 ……….?
It follows that since there is no cross appeal by the respondent against the ruling of the lower Court of 05/06/2012 assuming jurisdiction in this matter, the party cannot be heard now attacking the jurisdiction of the Court. This position is fortified by the principle of law that states that an issue cannot be raised for determination unless it is distilled from a ground(s) of appeal. See PHARMA-DEKO PLC V FINANCIAL DERIVATES COMPANY LTD (2014) LPELR ?
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24047 (CA); ABDU V STATE (2016) LPER-41461 (SC); NWANKWO & ORS V YAR?ADUA & ORS (2010) 12 NWLR, PT. 1209, 518 and HENSHAW V. TRADITIONAL RULERS COUNCIL, CALABAR SOUTH LGA & ORS (2018) LPELR-45526 (CA). Based on the foregoing findings I hold that this issue having been determined by the lower Court and there being no cross appeal and it not being related to any ground(s) of appeal in this case is incompetent. It is accordingly struck out.
This leaves two of the three issues raised by the respondent for determination, i.e issues (2) and (3). Issue 2 is more or less the same with issues (2) and (4) raised by the appellant. These derive from grounds 2 and 4 of the grounds of appeal. However issue (3) raised by the respondent does not relate to any of the issues raised by the appellant. It provides as follows:-
?Whether there was no traceable factor of undue influence and conflict of interest in the appointment of the appellant as a legal retainer with the respondent?
?I have gone through the four amended grounds of appeal filed by the appellant in respect of this appeal together with their particulars. This issue is not
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distilled from or related to any of the grounds of appeal filed in this appeal. I have already decided this issue earlier in this judgment. As Muntaka-Coomassie, JSC puts it very aptly in NWANKWO & ORS. V YAR?ADUA & ORS (SUPRA):
?Issues must fall within the scope or ambit of the grounds of appeal and any issue falling outside is incompetent. .. issues for determination whether formulated by the appellants or the Respondents must be tailored to the real issues in the grounds of appeal; see the following case of Shittu V Fashawe (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 946) 671 at 687; and (b) Mark v Eke.?
For this reason and the more elaborate reasons given earlier on and the authorities cited, I hold that this issue is incompetent. It is also accordingly struck out.
?
This leaves us with the four issues raised by the appellant in a manner of speaking. I do not see any real difference between issues (2), (3) and (4) raised by the appellant. They appear to be saying the same thing in different ways. From all the surrounding circumstances of this case I formulate this issue for the determination of this appeal: whether
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the learned trial judge was right in interpreting Exhibit DB1, the contract of retainership between the appellant and the respondent as a contract certain for one year subject to renewal by both parties.?
I am confident that this sole issue cuts across all the grounds of appeal and would adequately and justly determine this appeal.
For the avoidance of doubt, I reproduce Exhibit DB1:
APPOINTMENT AS COLLEGE LEGAL RETAINER
Further to your application on the above, requesting for appointment as external solicitors for the handling of legal matters of the College, I am pleased to inform you that the Governing Council has approved your appointment as College Legal Retainer with retrospective effect from 1st January, 2009.
I wish to state that your appointment is based strictly on merit, considering your wealth of experience on legal issues spanning over two (2) decades and the well seasoned lawyers in your Chambers.
Consequently, your legal retainership fee will be Seven Hundred and Sixty-Eight Thousand, Nine Hundred and Eleven Naira only (N768, 911.00) per annum in line with the existing policy on the matter in the
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College.
It is our strong belief, that you will continue to protect the interest of the College to justify the confidence reposed in you.
If you accept the offer, kindly forward your letter of acceptance to the undersigned within a week from the day you receive this letter.
Thank you.
On the face of it Exhibit DB1 read together with Exhibit DB2, it is apparent that there is a valid contract between the appellant and the respondent. Where the relationship between the parties is governed by a written agreement as in this case, the only duty of the Court is to resort to their terms as agreed in the contract to see whether such terms support the claims of both parties to the contract. See AONDO V. BENUE LINKS NIG LTD (2019) LPELR-46876 (CA) and EPE RESORTS & SPA LTD V UBA PLC (2018) LPELR-45310 (CA). The contract between the appellant and respondent in this case is for a legal retainership at the annual cost of N768, 911 with retrospective effect from 1st January, 2009. The offer was made on the 21st April, 2009. The bone of contention between the parties in this case is that while the appellant maintains that the retainership
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agreement was not just for the year 2009 but to subsist until determined by the parties, the respondent contended that the agreement was only for one year, 2009. In the case of AFROTEC TECHNICAL SERVICES (NIG) LTD V MIA & SONS LTD & ANOR (2000) 15 NWLR, PT 692, 730, the Supreme Court held that, for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties to a contract, regard must be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case. In the case ofSONNAR (NIG) LTD & ANOR V. NORDWINE & ANOR (1987) 4 NWLR, PT 66, 520, ESO JSC emphasized that the tests applied by the Courts in order to determine the intention of parties to a contract have been objective rather than subjective. See also SYNDICATED INVESTMENT HOLDINGS LTD V NITEL TRUSTEES LTD & ANOR (2014) LPELR-22. The question then is what is the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of this case that should and indeed made the trial Court to adopt the stance that the contract was only for one year, 2009 subject to a renewal agreement reached by the parties. It should be noted that this interpretation by the Court became necessary because
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there was an omission in the contract specifying that the retainership was for one year subject to renewal by the parties. Speaking for myself and objectively I would look at the conduct of the parties in making the agreement signed in April, retrospectively effective from January as only because the validity of the retainership is one year. If it were for an unspecified or indefinite period subject only to determination by the parties as alleged it would not have mattered when it started. In other words there would have been no need to have back dated the commencement period of the agreement. Secondly and quite curiously that the appellant, a party to the agreement, who according to Exhibit DB1 has experience of over two decades in legal practice and who probably signed a few or a number of such agreements failed to see the short coming in Exhibit DB1. It is in the nature of retainership agreements to be for one year subject to renewal. The detailed provisions for such renewals are normally captured in the agreement. Again my understanding is that as a legal retainer, apart from advising the respondent on how to avoid dispute, he is to represent him as
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counsel to resolve disputes which cannot be avoided. It is perhaps presumptious to have expected the appellant to jump into his role night away of being a legal retainer. Seeing that Exhibit DB1 was merely an offer letter he could have drafted a retainership agreement for legal services and other services like maintenance of the generating set, vehicles, to name a few. Thirdly, by his own admission as evidenced by Exhibit DB3, it was only on the 16th November, 2011 that the appellant wrote to the respondent. Why did he not ask for payment in 2010? Can it be inferred that it is because he knew that the agreement was only for 2009 and since there was no renewal it had lapsed? That he probably got hold of the agreement towards the end of 2011 and decided to take advantage of the loophole in the agreement that failed to provide specifically for the period of the contract? I am aware of paragraph 12 of the appellant?s supporting affidavit where he averred that his, ?appointment as the defendants legal retainer is contractual and does not need any yearly renewal but goes from year to year unless determined by the defendant?. To start with
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this is no contract agreement between the parties per se. All there is the offer letter Exhibit DB1 and the acceptance letter, Exhibit DB2. Even the offer letter which was accepted by the appellant, a lawyer of over two decades does not spell out what his duties to the respondent as a legal retainer entails. Was the appellant hoping to use this fluidity to his advantage as he seems to be doing now What he cannot do however is to read into the offer letter what is not there. In the case of BABA V NIGERIAN CIVIL AVIATION TRAINING CENTRE (1991) 5 NWLR, PT 192, 388 (SC) the Court held that:
It is a general rule that where parties enter into a contract they are bound by the terms thereof and the Court will not allow to be read into such a contract terms on which there is no agreement?.
See also KIOKI V MAGNUSSON (1999) 8 NWLR, PT 625, 492 AT 494 (SC). The situation would have been different if in Exhibit DB3, instead of the appellant stating:
? with respect to our service as the school legal retainer and we thank God we have, to the best of our ability discharged diligently the functions assigned to us ever since”
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they pinpointed to what actually they did or the respondent invited or called them to do between January, 210 and November, 2011 which would have entitled them to the fees. Then the respondents would be deemed to have held themselves out as having renewed the retainership agreement. They would not be condoned to state that they assumed that the appellant had ceased to be their legal retainer since January, 2010. Again another aid to the Court in interpreting this type of contract is to subject it to terms that are implied by custom or trade usage. I am satisfied that the learned trial judge did this and in part and quite effectively. Even if he went overboard somewhat, as alluded to by the appellant, that is per incuriam and does not distract from the main/substantive finding. I am in perfect agreement with the appellant and he is on point on the law that a Court cannot raise an issue suo motu and decide on it without giving the parties a hearing. I do not agree however that is what the learned trial judge did in this matter. Like I pointed out earlier he may have gone aboard a bit but not in a fatal way. What the learned trial judge did was
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to subject the terms of the agreement between the parties to the implied custom and usage of legal practice vis a vis retainership agreements. it is also pertinent to note that Exhibit DB1 did mention in it?s paragraph 3 referring to the legal retainership fee thus:
in line with the existing policy on the matter in the college.?
This explains why the respondent reacted that since they did not get a request for renewal of the appellant?s appointment in 2010 they assumed he had ceased to be their legal retainer since January 2010. Could the inference then be made that since from Exhibit DB1, the appellant applied for the appointment as the college legal retainer, he must be aware of the policy of the college on that, which is for retainers to apply to the college for the yearly renewal of the retainership agreement? Only the appellant can answer that. However, since the implied custom and trade usage has been applied by the trial Court and upheld by this Court that is no longer of any moment. It is a notorious fact which this Court can take judicial notice of that at the end of
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every year legal practitioners lobby company secretaries of big/notable companies and parastatals to either get appointed as retainers or have their retainership agreements renewed!
On the whole and from all my findings in this judgment I hold that this appeal lacks merit. It is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the trial Court is accordingly affirmed.
I cannot end this judgment without commenting on the attitude of the appellant, an acclaimed experienced legal practitioner of over two decades experience. I suppose that experience is a post call one which if over two decades as at 2009 is now over three decades. It is an embarrassment to say the least for a senior lawyer at that to waste ample judicial time and tax payers? money from 2011 till to date, a period of eight years for a claim of less than N2, 000, 000!!! Even if counsel is afflicted with the highest degree of penury, what happened to charity? What happened to the NBA Policy on pro bono? What better institution to give pro bono service to than an educational one involved in the education of our children? And one from whom the appellant has enjoyed one year retainership fee for
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offering no known services. And also one on whose council he was a member. What happened to social and communal responsibilities?
This notwithstanding and because the respondent is a public institution who neither pay costs nor filing fees, I make no order as to costs in this case. Each party is to bear its own cost.
MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.: I agree that the appeal be dismissed. I endorse Patricia Ajuma Mahmoud, JCA’s view.
RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.: I have had the priviledge of reading the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, JCA.
The consideration of the issues raised in this appeal by way of meticulous assessment made me to accept in totality the reasoning and conclusion reached thereat. The appeal as provided is unmeritorious and flatly failed with the consequence of dismissal. Whereas the judgment of the Osun State High Court sitting in Ila-Orangun delivered on the 20th day of March, 2012 by Hon. Justice Oloyede Olamide Folahanmi in Suit No. HIR/2/2012 is accordingly affirmed.
Costs of prosecution and defending the appeal
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to be the individual responsibility of the parties herein.
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Appearances:
Mr. Jola Akintola with him, Mr. Victor OmololaFor Appellant(s)
Mr. Olawale Sonibare with him, Mr. V.N. AbileFor Respondent(s)
Appearances
Mr. Jola Akintola with him, Mr. Victor OmololaFor Appellant
AND
Mr. Olawale Sonibare with him, Mr. V.N. AbileFor Respondent
