BADERI & ORS v. PDP & ORS
(2022)LCN/16033(CA)
In the Court of Appeal
(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Tuesday, January 04, 2022
CA/ABJ/CV/876/2021
Before Our Lordships
Ali Abubakar Babandi Gumel Justice of the Court of Appeal
Mohammed Danjuma Justice of the Court of Appeal
Muhammad Ibrahim Sirajo Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
1. USMAN MAHDI BADERI 2. YUSUF MOHAMMED DIKKO 3. BA’ABA SHERIF MODU 4. KELU ABBA APPELANT(S)
And
2. PEOPLE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 2. NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY 3. NATIONAL SECRETARY, PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY 4. DEPUTY NATIONAL CHAIRMAN (NORTH) PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY 5. NATIONAL VICE CHAIRMAN (NORTH EAST) PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY 6. NATIONAL ORGANIZING SECRETARY PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
WHO IS A JURISTIC PERSON
A juristic person means a body of persons, a corporation, a partnership or other legal entity that is recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties who can sue and be sued. This Court according to OGUNWUMIJU JCA (as she then was) in OKEKE VS. NNAMDI AZIKIWE UNIVERSITY TEACHING HOSPITAL (2018) LPELR-43781 (CA). It is not the specific name under which a person is sued that decides whether or not the person is a juristic person. What determines this issue is whether or not a natural person exists who bears that name or a similar name or had in fact hitherto bore that name. If it is a creation of statute, it is the recognition of that artificial person under an extant law that is relevant -PER MOHAMMED DANJUMA, J.C.A.
ON WHETHER A TRADE UNION CAN SUE AND BE SUED
In the case of Chief Gani Fawehinmi V. NBA & Ors (No. 2), (1989) 2 NWLR Pt. 105 at page 558 particularly at page 605, paragraphs B—F the Supreme Court reviewed and approved the decision in the English case of Taff Vale Railway Co. V. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (1901) A.C 426. In that case, it was held that a Trade Union registered under the Trade Union Act, 1871 and 1876 could sue or be sued in its registered name. Lord Macnaghten in his speech in the House of Lords in the case said at page 437: “Parliament has legalized trade unions, whether registered or not, if registered, they enjoy certain advantages” -PER MOHAMMED DANJUMA, J.C.A.
WHETHER AN AGENT OF A DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL IS LIABLE FOR THE CONTRACT HE ENTERS ON BEHALF OF THE SAID PRINCIPAL
It should be noted that it is a well-established position of the law that an agent of a disclosed principal acting within the scope of his authority is ordinarily not personally liable on a contract he enters on behalf of the said principal, see OKAFOR V. EZENWA (2002) 13 NWLR (part 784) 319 OSIGWE V PSPLS MANAGEMENT CONSORTIUM LTD (2009) 3 NWLR (PT 1128) 378. The proper person to sue or be sued upon a contract entered into by such an agent acting within the scope of his authority is the principal. As a result, the preliminary objection raised on this ground succeed. The 2nd to 3rd Respondents not being juristic persons are hereby struck out” -PER MOHAMMED DANJUMA, J.C.A.
WHETHER IT IS WITHIN THE COURT’S COMPETENCE TO SET PRECEDENT BY EXTENDING THE TENURE OF ANY POLITICAL PARTY BEYOND THE TIME SPECIFIED BY THE CONSTITUTION
In Ogbolosingha V. B.S.I.E.C. (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1455) 311 at 353, paras B-C, the Supreme Court held:
“From all deductions, there is nowhere provided by the Local Government Law or any other statue that Section 27(3) (a) under reference did clothe any Court with the powers to grant an extension tenure to a chairman whose term has been expended, truncated or is spent by another candidate of the same party. Again in Ladoja V. INEC and also Marwa V. Nyako (supra). Therefore, it is not within the Court’s competence and indeed not even this Court, as the apex Court, to set the precedent by extending the tenure of any political party beyond the time specified by the Constitution”-PER MOHAMMED DANJUMA, J.C.A.
CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE A TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY EVALUATED THE EVIDENCE BEFORE IT:
It is trite that where a trial Court or a lower Court appropriately evaluated the evidence before it, an appellate Court has nothing to evaluate again. See the case of Ozuzu V. Emewu (2019) 13 NWLR (pt. 1688) 143 at 158. Paras F—H. This issue is resolved in favour of Respondents and against the Appellants. – PER MOHAMMED DANJUMA, J.C.A.
WHETHER ELECTION CONDUCTED BY THE STATE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF A PARTY IS LEGAL
“The superior Courts in pronouncements have stated at various times that the only authentic, legitimate and valid election is that conducted by either the National working committee or the national executive committee of a political party. Any election conducted by the state executive committee of a party is illegal. See Emeka V. Okadigbo (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1331) page 55; Eze V. PDP & Ors (2018) LPELR-44907 (SC). It is trite law that speculation has no place in law” – PER MOHAMMED DANJUMA, J.C.A.
WHEN A PERSON AGGRIEVED BY ANY PRE-ELECTION MATTER IS EXPECTED TO FILE AN ACTION
It is the law that a person who is aggrieved by the action of a political party as regards any pre-election matter as in the instant case must file his action not later than 14 days after the occurrence of the act against which he complains, if he wishes to challenge such action in Court. See Section 285 (9) and 14(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). – PER MOHAMMED DANJUMA, J.C.A.
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING LIMITATION LAW AND ITS EFFECTS
In the very recent case of Wulangs V. C.B.N (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1802) 195 at 247, paras D—G, the Abuja Division of this Honourable Court, per lge JCA held:
“Time begins to run for the purposes of the limitation law from the date the cause of action accrues. In Amadi V. INEC (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1345) 595 at 631, Paras E-F, this Court held that: ‘The conspicuous effect of a limitation law is that legal proceedings cannot be properly validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Also, the Court is divested of its jurisdiction in the matter as it is no longer a live issue. It is dead in substance and in form. In the instant case, the Court of Appeal was under a statutory obligation and duty to hear and determine the Appellant’s appeal before it within the time prescribed by Section 285 (7) of the 1999 Constitution as amended’
See again on this, Osun State Govt. V. Dalami (Nig) Ltd (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1038) 66; Chigbu V. Tonimas (Nig) Ltd. (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt. 984) 189; Shettima V. Goni (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) 413; P.D.P V. C.P.C (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1277) 485.” – PER MOHAMMED DANJUMA, J.C.A.
MOHAMMED DANJUMA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Federal High Court, Abuja Division wherein Honourable Justice Taiwo O. Taiwo delivered on the 1st November, 2021. The Appellants, who were Plaintiffs at the trial Court, took out an originating summons against the Respondents on the 21st September, 2021 where they raised two questions for determination and thereafter sought five reliefs.
In the said originating summons, Appellants submitted the following two questions for determination. The issues are herein reproduced, thus:
i. Whether having regards to the subsisting order of the Supreme Court made on the 12th day of March, 2021 in Appeal No. SC.441/2019: USMAN MAHDI BADERI & 3 ORS VS. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY & 3 ORS the Defendants can validly proceed to conduct state congresses to elect officials into the offices of the People’s Democratic Party, State Party Chairman, State Party Secretary, State Party Youth Leader and State Party Women Leader in the 2021 Peoples Democratic Party Congresses in Borno State when the tenure of office of the Plaintiffs have not elapsed.
1. Whether having regards to the subsisting order of the Supreme Court made on the 12th day of March, 2021 in Appeal No. SC.441/2019: USMAN MAHDI BADERI ORS VS. PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY & 3 ORS and the provisions of the Constitution of the People’s Democratic Party, the Defendants can validly proceed to exclude the 1st Plaintiff from the conduct of the People’s Democratic Party Congresses in the Borno State Chapter of the 1st Defendant.
At pages 4-5 of the originating summons, the Plaintiffs/Appellants sought the following reliefs:
1. A DECLARATION that in view of the subsisting order of the Supreme Court made on the 12th day of March, 2021 in Appeal No. 441/2019: USMAN MAHDI BADERI & 3 ORS VS. PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY & 3 ORS any purported election of officials into the offices of the People’s Democratic Party, State Party Chairman, State Party Secretary, State Party Youth Leader and State Party Women Leader respectively in the 2021 People’s Democratic Party Congresses in Borno State when the tenure of office of the Plaintiffs have not elapsed is unlawful, arbitrary, excessive, wrongful, and of no effect whatsoever.
2. A DECLARATION that in view of order of the Supreme Court made on the 12th day of March, 2021 in Appeal No. 441/2019: USMAN MAHDI BADERI & 3 ORS VS. PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY & 3 ORS and the provisions of the Constitution of the People’s Democratic Party, any state congress conducted by the Defendants to the exclusion of the 1st Plaintiff in Borno State is contrary to the provisions of the 1st Defendant’s Constitution, illegal, null, void and of no effect whatsoever.
3. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court restraining the Defendants from conducting any elections into the offices of the Borno State People’s Democratic Party, State Party Chairman, State Party Secretary, State Party Youth Leader, and State Party Women Leader respectively until the present occupants of the said offices have completed their tenures of office.
4. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendants to issue the 1st Plaintiff with the nomination forms for 1st Defendant’s party congresses in Borno State for onward conduct of the Borno State Chapter of the 1st Defendant’s congresses.
5. AND FOR SUCH FURTHER or other order(s) as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case.
The originating summons and the supporting affidavit with attached exhibits as well as the written address appear at pages 3-139 of the record of appeal.
BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS CASE
This appeal stems from the judgment of the Federal High Court, Abuja in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/105/2021. It was initiated by originating summons based on Appellants’ concern that the 1st Respondent planned to conduct its Ward, Local Government and Borno State Congress for the election of the party executive officers and was going to unfairly short-change them in its congresses which held on the 5th of October, 2021.
The Appellants also contended in the suit that the 1st Respondent was going to exercise its powers under Section 31 (2) (a) of its Constitution to dissolve the Borno State’s Executive Committee of the 1st Respondent, which included their offices as the Appellants as the State Chairman, State Secretary, State Women Leader and the Youth Leader. This is contained in the Appellant’s originating summons and the supporting affidavit as well as the Constitution of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) as amended in 2017 at pages 3 to 14 and 67—125 respectively of the Record of appeal.
Upon being served with the originating summons, the Respondents’ Counsel raised a preliminary objection to the suit contending among others, that the suit is statute-barred, that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents are not juristic persons; that the suit is not justiciable; as well as that the Appellants has no reasonable cause of action against the Respondents. 1st–6th Respondents’ Counter Affidavit in opposition to the originating summons and Notice of Preliminary objection at the trial Court are contained at pages 159-179 and 140-158 respectively of the record.
In the decision of the trial Court on the preliminary objection, it held that the suit is statute-barred and not justiciable. In resolving the substantive matter, the trial Court held that the Appellant’s suit lacks merit and dismissed same.
Dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal containing five grounds of appeal on the 5th of November, 2021. See pages 299-304 of the record of appeal.
In the Appellants’ Brief of Argument as settled by their counsel, Ayodele Ogundele, Esq which was filed on 3rd December, 2021, the following issues for determination were distilled from the grounds of appeal:-
(a) Whether the Trial Court rightly determined the issue of tenure of office of the Appellants pursuant to law.
(b) Whether the Learned Trial Court, rightly held that the Appellants were rightly excluded from participating in the conduct of the year 2020 congresses of the Borno State Chapter of the 1st Respondent as scheduled by the 1st Respondent.
(c) Whether the Learned Trial Court rightly determined and held that the suit was statute barred as it relates to the congresses of the Borno State Chapter of the 1st Respondent.
Issue one: Arguing his first issue for determination, learned counsel to the Appellant submitted that the Trial Court erred in law in holding that in calculating the Appellants’ tenure in office, one must relate back to the swearing-in of other officials to avoid a lacunae or uncertainty in the tenure of all the officers in the Borno Branch of the 1st Defendant. He argued that the Constitution of the 1st Respondent provides that the elected officials are entitled to a fixed term of four (4) years in office subject to a further renewal for another term of four years. He submitted that the order of the Supreme Court made earlier in favour of the Appellants in Appeal No. SC. 441/2019, delivered on 12/3/2021 supports their position. This position, according to learned counsel, is the un-contradicted, unchallenged and undisputed documentary and affidavit evidence before the trial Court was that Appellants never occupied their respective offices, neither were they inaugurated or sworn into their respective offices until 30th of March, 2021, pursuant to the judgment of the Supreme Court which affirmed or restored all the decisions of Federal High Court, Maiduguri including but not limited to the declaration that the election conducted on 25/11/2017 by 1st Respondent at Gombe, Gombe State into Borno State Executive Committee was unconstitutional, null and void and of no legal effect. The bone of contention here, to sum up everything, is that Appellants, having being sworn-in on 30th March, 2021 are, by the provisions of the Constitution of the 1st Respondent, entitled to stay in office till 30th March 2024 to complete their tenure of four (4) years. This is the position of the Appellants. They oppose the insinuation that their tenure dates back to 2017 when other officials of the 1st Respondent assumed office.
The Appellants’ counsel denied that the Appellants are out to canvass for tenure elongation but that rather the Appellants are urging compliance with Section 47 (1) of the 1st Respondent’s Constitution, which granted Appellants 4 years in office having been sworn into office or inaugurated on 30/3/2021 by 1st Respondents which is only few months to the 1st Respondent’s next state congress. He stated that the 1st Respondent does not maintain a uniform or uniformity of tenure or term of office for all the Executive Committees of its state chapters and offices across the 36 States of the Federation or the 37 chapters inclusive of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, but that the Learned Trial Judge ignored, failed to consider or evaluate this fact.
According to Appellants’ Counsel, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) or that of the People’s Democratic Party or the Electoral Act, did not provide that state executive committees of political parties or that of the 1st Respondent shall operate on a joint or concomitant ticket basis as applicable to the offices of the President and Vice President of Nigeria as well as the offices of the Governors and Deputy Governors of States of the Federation. He submitted that having not therefore, been designed as a joint and concomitant ticket/election, the principle of joint commencement and termination of tenure cannot be made applicable. As such, he opined, it is out of place to allege that lacunae would be created or that there would be confusion if there is no uniformity of tenure.
Appellants’ counsel argued that the effect of Supreme Court’s invalidation of 25/11/2017 congress at Gombe is that officers elected therefrom and sworn-in or inaugurated by 1st Respondent on the basis of the said invalidated election were also deemed never elected and deemed never to have occupied the offices declared to have been won by Appellants or acted as members of the Borno State Executive Committee of 1st Respondent. The consequence of this, he continued, is that no tenure whatsoever, term or vacant term or tenure could emanate or arise from or be ascribed to the said invalidated election from which the Appellants could serve out any term or for which the Appellants’ tenure will or could relate back to. Reliance was placed on Isah Shuaibu Lau V People’s Democratic Party & Ors (2018) 4 NWLR Pt. 1608 page 60.
On issue two, learned counsel argued that as contained in the Constitution and Guidelines of the 1st Respondent for the conduct of the congresses, 1st Appellant and indeed the Appellants being members of the state executive committee of the 1st Respondent in Borno State were statutory members of the State party congress pursuant to Section 25(1) (a) (f) of 1st Respondent’s Constitution and paragraph 4.0 of the Guidelines.
Further, it is stated that 1st Respondent and indeed the Respondents were wrong in excluding the Appellants from participating in the preparations towards the conduct of the congresses and performing any of the functions and responsibilities assigned to their offices and Executive Committee contrary to the provision of the 1st Respondent’s Constitution and Guidelines.
Again he submitted that Appellants’ complaint is covered within the legal confines and provisions of Section 87(9) of Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) and it is justiciable. He relied on the unreported case of Usman Mahdi Baderi & 3 Ors VS. People’s Democratic Party & 11 Ors, in suit No. SC. 441/2019, delivered by the Supreme Court of Nigeria, on 12/3/2021.
In arguing issue three, learned counsel said that learned trial Judge was misled in holding that the suit was statute barred. According to him, the learned trial Court fail to consider Appellants’ position which mandates members to first avail themselves of remedies provided by the party before resorting to litigation. It is for this reason that the Learned Trial Court held that the Appellants ought to have commenced the action on the 24th of August, 2021 when they knew of the collection of the nomination forms. The true position, he averred, is that the cause of action was clearly established on 20/9/21 and/or 21/9/21 when it became clear and conclusive that the 1st Respondent was unwilling to address the issue of continuous exclusion of the Appellants from participating in the conduct of the congress and not on 24/8/21.–
In conclusion, he urged this Court to allow the appeal and resolve all the issues raised in favour of the Appellants.
The 1st Respondent in response to the Appellants’ Brief of Amendment filed its Brief of Argument dated 20/12/2021 whilst 2nd and 3rd, 4th to 6th Respondents filed Notice of Preliminary objection and Respondents’ Brief of Arguments all dated 20/12/2021, respectively. This Court will first examine 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument as settled by his counsel, Mahmud Abubakar Magaji, SAN in response to the Appellants’ Brief of Argument, then the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ Brief as settled by their counsel, Okechukwu Edeze, Esq and 4th to 6th Respondents’ Brief as settled by their counsel, Chris Kelechi Udeoyibo, Esq respectively before examining Notice of Preliminary Objection and then if still necessary, determine the substantive appeal.
To argue his case, learned Senior Advocate Counsel to the 1st Respondent adopted the three (3) issues formulated for determination in this appeal by the Appellant, to wit:
I. Whether the trial Court, rightly determined the issue of tenure of office of the Appellants pursuant to law.
II. Whether the learned trial Court, rightly held that the Appellants were rightly excluded from participating in the conduct of the year 2021 congresses of the Borno State Chapter of the 1st Respondent as scheduled by the 1st Respondent.
III. Whether the learned trial Court rightly determined and held that the suit was statute barred as it relates to the congresses of the Borno State Chapter of the 1st Respondent.
Before commencing his argument on the issues formulated for determination of this appeal, the learned Senior Advocate Counsel to the 1st Respondent pointed out what he considered constitute manifest defect in the Appellants’ brief, to wit, failure to formulate any issue relating to the decision of trial Court’s finding that the suit of the Appellants is not justiciable. That though, the Appellants formulated a Ground of Appeal attacking that finding (Ground 3 of their grounds of Appeal) they abandoned it and same grounds ought to be deemed abandoned. He placed reliance on the case of Isitor Vs Fakorede (2018) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1612) 328, at 341, Paras B. That the Appellants, having not appealed against the findings of the Honourable trial Court to the effect that the suit of the Appellants is not justiciable, that finding remains valid and this Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
In arguing issue one, Learned Senior Advocate submitted that the Honourable trial Court rightly determined the issue of tenure of office of the Appellants. It was stated that the Appellants are only four persons out of about 100 and all other members of this large Executive Committee were sworn in or inaugurated in 2017 except the Appellants. According to learned counsel, the Constitution of the 1st Respondent provides that the tenure of this committee is 4 years and that being a committee, the Constitution of the 1st Respondent intends that the life span of the committee would commence and terminate at the same time. In justifying this provision in 1st Respondent’s Constitution, he opined that this is because no member of the committee can operate in isolation of the other members.
Further, learned senior advocate submitted that neither the Supreme Court in Appeal No: SC/441/2019 (page 18) nor the Federal High Court sitting at Maiduguri in Suit No. FHC/MG/CS/76/2017 (page 15—17 of the Record), ordered that the Appellants should stay in office for 4 years subsequent on their being sworn in by the 1st Respondent. The Learned Senior Advocate argued, that having not shown that the Supreme Court made any order that they, Appellants, must remain in office for 4 years, nothing stops the 1st Respondent from exercising her powers under her Constitution including the power to dissolve a state executive committee, where necessary.
He further submitted that the cases of PETER OBI VS INEC (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 106) P. 568 and AKINTARO & ANOR VS. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND COMMISSIONER JUSTICE & ANOR. (2015) LPELR-4730 (CA) cited and relied on by the Appellants are not applicable in the instant case and should be discountenanced.
The 1st Respondent’s counsel stated that it is erroneous of the Appellant to insinuate that the Honourable trial Judge said the 1st Respondent conducts its congresses throughout the country at the same time. That the argument of the appellants at Paragraph 3.13 of their Brief (page 13 thereof) is misplaced as the issue is that the Appellants and other people numbering close to 100 form a committee whose lifespan is 4 years. A committee that commences its functions the same time and terminates its functions at the same time.
Learned senior Advocate said that the arguments of the Appellants in paragraph 3.14, 3.15, 3.16 and 3.17 of their Brief misses the point. Reason is that the issue as to the effect of the election conducted by the 1st Respondent on 25th November, 2017 at Gombe, Gombe State into the Executive Committee of the Borno State Chapter of the 1st Respondent has been dealt with by the Supreme Court of Appeal No: SC/441/2019 (Supra). That it is not an issue before this Court and it is not in contention by the parties before the Court.
On issue two, Learned Senior Advocate faulted the Appellants for claiming that they were excluded from the conduct participation in the 1st Respondent’s congresses in Borno State. Evidence, according to him, shows otherwise — the Appellants were not excluded at all and this is evident from exhibit 12 attached to the originating summons (page 40 of the Record). He also argued that contrary to Appellants’ claim, there is nowhere in the Constitution of the 1st Respondent where the Appellants or the 1st Appellant is entrusted with the duty or function of conducting the state congresses of the 1st Respondent, either in his capacity as the chairman of the state executive committee or the chairman of the state congress of the 1st Respondent in Borno State.
Learned Senior Advocate argued that the Appellants in paragraphs 3.2.5 of their Brief made reference to paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 of the Affidavit in support of their Originating Summons, the said paragraphs were duly denied by the Respondents in their Counter Affidavit to the Originating Summons. Accordingly, while paragraph 4(iii) of the said Counter-Affidavit is a general denial, paragraph 4(iv) (k), and (i) thereof are specific denial of the depositions in paragraph 21, 22 and 23 of the Appellants’ Affidavit (page 140—141 of the Record). It was stated by learned Senior Advocate that the claim of the Appellants at paragraph 3.2.9 of their Brief that they are statutory members of the state congress planning committee is not supported by any section of the Constitution of the 1st Respondent or her Guidelines for the conduct of congresses. That there is nowhere in the said Constitution or Guidelines where the Appellants are made statutory members of the state congress planning committee of the 1st Respondent by virtue of their being members of the state executive committee or state congress.
Furthermore, learned senior advocate averred that in view of the decision in Wushishi V. Imam (2017) 18 NWLR (pt. 1597) 175 at 211, Paras A-E, issue No. 2 as formulated by the Appellants should be discountenanced. His point is that at the trial Court, Appellants alleged that they were excluded from the “conduct” of the congresses but at appeal, the word “conduct” was replaced with “participating”. This, he said is serious enough to warrant discountenance of issue No. 2.
On issue three, the learned senior advocate started by stating that the Honourable Trial Court was right in finding that the case of the Appellants was statute barred. He submit that it is the law that a person who is aggrieved by the action of a political party with regard to any pre-election matter as in the instant case must file his action not later than 14 days after the occurrence of the act against which he complains, if he wishes to challenge such action in Court. He refers to Section 285 (9) and 14(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). He added that a look at the Affidavit of the Appellants supporting their Originating Summons, particularly, paragraph 24 thereof, (page 12 of the record of appeal) the Plaintiffs became aware of the fact that the Nomination forms meant for the Ward, Local Government and State Congresses of the 1st Respondent in Borno State was paid for and collected by a person other than them on the 24th August, 2021, so they ought to have filed their action not later than 14 days from the 24th August, 2021, inclusive of that very 24th August, 2021. The Appellants however, filed their action on the 21st September, 2021, that is 29 days after becoming aware of the alleged infringement on their right. He refers to the case of Saki V. APC (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1706) 515 at 543, Paras A-G. It was further submitted that in view of the case of the Appellants as is evidenced in their affidavit, particularly paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 thereof (page 11—13 of the record of appeal) as well as both the questions for determination and the reliefs sought by them. Learned Senior Advocate argued that their case is a pre-election matter which should have been brought within 14 days of the accrual of the alleged cause of action. But that they chose to wait until almost 30 days after the accrual of their cause of action, thus making their case statute-barred.
On the Appellants’ excuse that the delay in pursuing the action in Court was because they were exploring available resolution of the matter with the 1st Respondent, Learned Senior Advocate said that does not affect the valid provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) as it is trite that time does not stop from running because parties in a dispute are engaged in discussion about settling the dispute.
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
The 2nd and 3rd Respondents filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection on 20/12/2021, while the 4th–6th Respondents filed their Notice of Preliminary Objection on 20/12/2021. Their respective Counsels first argued their preliminary objection before going on to present their argument in the substantive suit.
In their preliminary objection, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents formulated two (2) issues for the determination of the preliminary objection. They are:
i. Whether the 2nd and 3rd Respondents are persons known to law such that they can sue and be sued.
ii. Whether the appeal as constituted has not become academic on issue one, learned counsel to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents argued that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents are not juristic persons known to law and not being juristic persons, they cannot sue or be sued in this appeal.
On issue one, he submitted that there is no known law or legal instrument that recognizes the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. Learned Counsel cited a plethora of authorities to argue that the law is firmly established that any person, natural or artificial may sue and be sued but no action can be initiated by or against any party other than a natural or artificial person or persons expressly or impliedly, unless such a party has been given by statute, rules of Court or by common law either a legal ‘persona’ under a name or a right to sue and be sued by that name. He refers to Chief Gani Fawehinmi Vs. NBA (No. 2) (supra) and Iyke Med Merch Vs. Pfizer Inc (Supra). He averred that in the circumstances that the 2nd-6th Respondents are not legal personalities or offices known to law, the Appellants cannot sue them in this appeal.
On the second issue, learned counsel submitted that the fact culminating to the institution of this suit involves intra party affairs of the 1st Respondent, People’s Democratic Party in Borno State and it is in respect of the congress it conducted at the Ward, Local Government and state levels on the 11th of November, 2017 for its state executive officers. He stated that at the conclusion of the congress held on the 11th November, 2017, all the elected officers, with the exception of the 1st—4th Appellants were duly sworn in, and they resumed and completed their four (4) years tenure in October, 2021 in accord with the provisions of Section 47 (1) of the Constitution of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) which pegged the tenures of its executives offices at four years. According to learned counsel, since the tenures of all the Borno State Executive Offices of the Party has expired; and new set of Executive Officers elected and sworn in, the question that arises is: Whether the appeal as presently constituted has not become academic? It was the contention of learned counsel that since the tenure of office that is sought to be protected has expired by effluxion of time, the subject matter of the appeal or res has become spent, academic and will confer no any utilitarian value to the Appellants. He refers to the case of Plateau State V. A—G, Federation (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt. 967) 346 at 419; and C.P.C. V. INEC (2011) LPELR 8257 (SC); (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) 493.
The 4th—6th Respondents in their Notice of Preliminary Objection, also formulated 2 issues for determination from the grounds of appeal:
(i) Whether the absence of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) as a necessary Party in this appeal is not fatal and capable of affecting the jurisdiction of Court.
(ii) Whether the appeal as presently constituted has not become spent and academic.
On issue one, learned counsel to the 4th—6th Respondents argued that there is lack of proper and necessary parties before the Court. He submitted that based on the subject matter, the questions for determination and the reliefs sought in the originating summons as well as the decision of the lower Court, that the Independent National Electoral Commission is a necessary party without whom this Honourable Court cannot effectively determine the appeal. That failure of the Appellants to join this electoral body in this appeal is a fundamental omission that bothers on non-joinder of crucial and necessary party and which is fatal to their case.
On issue two, learned counsel argued that the 1st Respondent’s Constitution pegged tenure of executive offices at four years and since the tenures of all the Borno State Executive Offices of the party has expired, and new set of executive officers elected and sworn in, the tenure of offices sort to be protected has expired by effluxion of time, the subject matter of appeal or res has become spent, academic and would not confer any utilitarian value to the Appellants.
In response to the preliminary objection filed by the 2nd and 3rd, 4th–6th Respondents, Appellants filed Reply Brief to 1st—6th Respondents’ preliminary objection and Brief of Argument on 21st of December, 2021.
On the question of whether the 2nd and 3rd Respondents are juristic person, learned counsel to the Appellants submitted that the Appellants can maintain an action against 2nd and 3rd Respondents whose offices are known and recognized as part of the 1st Respondent under Sections 29(1), 35(1) and 36(1) respectively, of the 1st Respondent’s Constitution. He averred that 1st Respondent is duly registered, operating and existing pursuant to Sections 221, 222, 223, 224, 228 and Item F-15(b), Part I, Third Schedule of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and Section 78(1) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). That the registration and recognition of the 1st Respondent and its organs and officers so recognized through the registration.
On whether the issue of tenure of Appellants has become an academic exercise, Appellants submitted that the issue is alive and constitutional one which can be redressed by a positive order of the Honourable Court.
In responding to the preliminary objection filed by the 4th—6th Respondents on the non-joinder of INEC, Appellants averred that the presence of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is not necessary before the Honourable Court can effectually and effectively determine the issue of whether or not the tenure of offices of the Appellants has expired.
Having thus responded to Notice of Preliminary Objection raised by the 2nd—6th Respondents, the Appellant then went ahead to respond to Argument in the Substantive Appeal and Respondents Brief of Argument of 1st—6th Respondents.
First, the 1st—6th Respondents stated at paragraphs 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 (of 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument) that Appellants have abandoned Ground 3 of their Notice of Appeal and same contention made at paragraphs 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 (of 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ Brief of Argument) and paragraphs 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 (of 4th-6th Respondents’ Brief of Argument) respectively. In his response to this, learned counsel to the appellants submitted that Appellants did not abandon Ground 3 as contended. That arguments in support of Ground 3 have been made under issue No. 2 submitted for determination at pages 17—24 of Appellants’ Brief of Argument.
In response to issue No. 1 of the Substantive Appeal, to wit — the arguments by Respondents on the rightness of the Decision of the Learned Trial Court in respect of the tenure of offices of the Appellants as canvassed in paragraph 4.0 — 4.24 (of 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument); paragraphs 5.0—5.24 (of 2nd and 3rd Respondents Brief of Argument) and 5.0—5.21 (of 4th-6th Respondents’ Brief of Argument), learned counsel averred that the case of Njaba L.G.C vs Chigozie (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1218) 166 infact supports the fact that the tenure of the holder of an executive office starts to run when he/she takes the oath of office.
In response to issue No. 2 as contained in the respective Briefs of Argument of Respondents, that the Appellant had not been consistent in their case specifically their flip-flopping between “conduct” and “participating”, learned counsel stated that the point they were trying to make all along is that they (most especially the 1st Appellant) had been excluded from the entire process and preparation towards the conduct of the congresses notwithstanding that he was the chairman of the state executive committee of the 1st Respondent’s chapter in Borno State by virtue of which he is also the chairman of the state congress, pursuant to Section 25(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the 1st Respondent.
In response to issue 3 as contained in the respective Briefs of Argument of Respondents, learned counsel adopt his submission on the issue as contained at pages 24—26 of Appellant’s Brief of Argument filed on 3/12/2021 and further submitted that the cause of action accrued and crystalized on 20th of September, 2021, when it became conclusively clear that the 1st Respondent had taken a final position in respect of Appellants’ petition and complaint.
On the whole, Appellants urged the Court to discountenance the Respondents’ Notice of Preliminary Objection and the totality of the arguments canvassed in the respective Respondents’ Briefs of Argument and allow the appeal.
DECISION ON THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION RAISED BY THE RESPONDENTS
Before proceeding to determine the substantive appeal, it will be more logical to examine and then determine issues raised in preliminary objection by the 2nd-6th Respondents. This is because the outcome in the examination of the preliminary objection will determine the fate of the substantive appeal.
I have read carefully the Appellants’ Briefs and noted their arguments. I have also gone thoroughly through the Respondents’ Briefs and considered their contents including preliminary objection. I will now proceed to decide same.
A juristic person means a body of persons, a corporation, a partnership or other legal entity that is recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties who can sue and be sued. This Court according to OGUNWUMIJU JCA (as she then was) in OKEKE VS. NNAMDI AZIKIWE UNIVERSITY TEACHING HOSPITAL (2018) LPELR-43781 (CA). It is not the specific name under which a person is sued that decides whether or not the person is a juristic person. What determines this issue is whether or not a natural person exists who bears that name or a similar name or had in fact hitherto bore that name. If it is a creation of statute, it is the recognition of that artificial person under an extant law that is relevant.
In the case of Chief Gani Fawehinmi V. NBA & Ors (No. 2), (1989) 2 NWLR Pt. 105 at page 558 particularly at page 605, paragraphs B—F the Supreme Court reviewed and approved the decision in the English case of Taff Vale Railway Co. V. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (1901) A.C 426. In that case, it was held that a Trade Union registered under the Trade Union Act, 1871 and 1876 could sue or be sued in its registered name. Lord Macnaghten in his speech in the House of Lords in the case said at page 437:
“Parliament has legalized trade unions, whether registered or not, if registered, they enjoy certain advantages”.
And at page 438;
“The substantial question, therefore, as Farwell, I put it, is this: Has the Legislature authorized the creation of numerous bodies of men capable of owning great wealth and of acting by agents with absolutely no responsibility for the wrongs they may do to other persons by the use of that wealth and the employment of those agents? In my opinion, parliament has done nothing of the kind. I cannot find anything in the Acts of 1871 and 1876, or either of them, from beginning to end, to warrant or suggest a notion”
Then, if trade unions are not above the law, the only remaining question, as it seems to me, is one of form. How are these bodies to be sued? I have no doubt whatsoever that a trade union, whether registered or unregistered, may be sued in a representative action if the person selected as Defendants be persons who, from their position, may be taken fairly to represent the body”.
From the forgoing, I am of the opinion that Appellants cannot maintain this action against the 2nd and 3rd Respondents though offices are recognized as part of the 1st Respondent under Sections 29(1), 35(1) and 36(1) respectively, of the 1st Respondent’s constitution. The 1st Respondent is duly registered, operating and existing pursuant to Sections 221, 222, 223, 224, 228 and Item F-15(b), part 1, Third Schedule of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and Section 78(1) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). The registration and recognition of the 1st Respondent by statute has conferred a suitable status only on the 1st respondent but also its organs and officers are so recognized through the registration.
It is certain that the Appellants cannot maintain this action against the 2nd and 3rd Respondents in their personal capacities.
It should be noted that it is a well established position of the law that an agent of a disclosed principal acting within the scope of his authority is ordinarily not personally liable on a contract he enters on behalf of the said principal, see OKAFOR V. EZENWA (2002) 13 NWLR (part 784) 319 OSIGWE V PSPLS MANAGEMENT CONSORTIUM LTD (2009) 3 NWLR (PT 1128) 378. The proper person to sue or be sued upon a contract entered into by such an agent acting within the scope of his authority is the principal. As a result, the preliminary objection raised on this ground succeed. The 2nd to 3rd Respondents not being juristic persons are hereby struck out.
On whether the appeal as constituted has not become academic, I am not convinced by the arguments put forward by the 2nd—6th Respondents. It would be unfair to object to the suit based solely on this ground. Let me say without any fear of contradiction that the issue is a live and constitutional one. As for how the Appellants can go about “reclaiming” their “shortened” mandate is not the issue before the Court. Truth be told however, effluxion of time cannot justify a dismissal of the Appeal at this stage.
On the non-joinder of INEC as a necessary party to the suit, learned counsel to the 4th and 6th Respondents made copious statements and cited many authorities most of which are of little help to his argument. I have considered the arguments of the parties on this and came to the conclusion that the presence of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is wholly unnecessary. As the Appellant’s Counsel rightly noted, there is no evidence on record to show that INEC conducted the election that was the subject matter of the suit that gave rise to the appeal in SC. 441/2019 to warrant making INEC a party to the suit. It is immaterial that INEC may have monitored/observed the said election as a matter of compliance with the law and for administrative purposes by virtue of Section 85(2) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). So, INEC is not and cannot be a necessary party to this case and I reject the argument to the contrary. So, this issue is resolved in favour of Appellants.
I will hereby proceed to determine the substantive appeal.
It could be noticed that I did not delve into the arguments in the substantive suit.
This is deliberate. Firstly, all the parties in this appeal adopted the three issues formulated for determination by the Appellants in their brief of argument. Secondly, the arguments of the 2nd & 3rd Respondents and of 4th—6th Respondents are mere repetition of the words of the 1st Respondent.
MAIN JUDGMENT
The Appellants in their brief of argument formulated three (3) issues for determination of this appeal. They are:
i. Whether the trial Court, rightly determined the issue of tenure of office of the appellants pursuant to law.
ii. Whether the learned trial Court, rightly held that the Appellants were rightly excluded from participating in the conduct of the year 2021 congresses of the Borno State Chapter of the 1st Respondent as scheduled by the 1st Respondent.
iii. Whether the learned trial Court rightly determined and held that the suit was statute barred as it relates to the congresses of the Borno State Chapter of the 1st Respondent.
The Respondents (i.e. all the Respondents) adopted that the three (3) issues formulated by the Appellants and went ahead to argue them accordingly.
The Respondents brought to the attention of the Court that the Appellants did not formulate any issue relating to the decision of the trial Court’s finding that the suit of the Appellants is not justiciable. That though, the Appellant formulated a Ground of appeal attacking that finding, (Ground 3 of their grounds of Appeal), they abandoned it and therefore Ground 3 of the Appellants’ Grounds of Appeal is deemed abandoned.
The appellants however submitted that they did not abandon Ground 3 as contended. According to Appellants, Ground 3 have been made under issue No. 2 submitted for determination at pages 17—24 of Appellants Brief of Argument. And indeed a careful appraisal of the said Ground 3 and issue No. 2 would reveal that this is the case, I rule the issue against the Respondents that ground 3 is not abandoned by the Appellants as claimed by the Respondent as it is subsumed in Issue No. 2.
Now we proceed to determine issue one of the substantive appeal, to wit;
Whether the Trial Court rightly determined the issue of tenure of office of the Appellants pursuant to law.
In Ogbolosingha V. B.S.I.E.C. (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1455) 311 at 353, paras B-C, the Supreme Court held:
“From all deductions, there is nowhere provided by the Local Government Law or any other statue that Section 27(3) (a) under reference did clothe any Court with the powers to grant an extension tenure to a chairman whose term has been expended, truncated or is spent by another candidate of the same party. Again in Ladoja V. INEC and also Marwa V. Nyako (supra). Therefore, it is not within the Court’s competence and indeed not even this Court, as the apex Court, to set the precedent by extending the tenure of any political party beyond the time specified by the Constitution”
Further, the Supreme Court in Appeal No: SC/441/2019 (page 18) did not order that the Appellants should be in office for 4 years subsequent on being sworn in by the 1st Respondent. Also, the order of the Federal High Court sitting at Maiduguri in Suit No: FHC/MG/CS/76/2017 (page 15—17 of the Record) did not say that the Appellants must occupy office for 4 years, whatever the circumstance.
Thus, having not shown that the Supreme Court made any order that the Appellants must remain in office for 4 years, at any event, it follows that nothing stops the 1st Respondent from exercising her powers under her Constitution.
The Constitution of the 1st Respondent specifies the tenure of the committee in question as 4 years. Being a committee, the Constitution of the 1st Respondent obviously intends that the life span of the committee (the Executive Committee) would commence and terminate on the same date. It should be noted that no one member of the committee can function in isolation of the other members.
Furthermore, Section 31(2) (e) of the Constitution of the 1st Respondent provides that:
“31(2) The National Executive Committee shall:
a…
b…
c…
d…
e. Where necessary, dissolve a state executive committee and appoint a care-taker committee to run the party until another Executive Committee is elected, provided that the period from the dissolution to the election of the new Executive Committee shall not exceed 3 months”
It must be conceded then that by the above provision of the Constitution of the 1st Respondent, the 1st Respondent through its National Executive Committee can dissolve a state executive committee like that of the Appellant, where necessary. This is what the 1st Respondent did in the instant case. I agree with the submission of the Learned Respondents’ Counsel that the cases of PETER OBI VS. INEC (2007) II NWLR (Pt. 1046) P. 568 and AKINTARO & ANOR VS. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND COMMISSIONER JUSTICE & ANOR. (2015) LPELR-4730 (CA) cited and relied on by the Appellants are not applicable in the instant case.
I agree with Respondents’ counsel that the Honourable trial Court Judge did not in his judgment say anything about the 1st Respondent conducting congresses throughout the country at the same date.
It is my opinion that the Honourable trial Judge indeed properly evaluated the evidence before it and also made findings appropriately.
It is trite that where a trial Court or a lower Court appropriately evaluated the evidence before it, an appellate Court has nothing to evaluate again. See the case of Ozuzu V. Emewu (2019) 13 NWLR (pt. 1688) 143 at 158. Paras F—H.
This issue is resolved in favour of Respondents and against the Appellants.
2. Whether the learned trial Court, rightly held that the Appellants were rightly excluded from participating in the conduct of the 2021 congresses of the Borno State chapter of the 1st Respondent as scheduled by the 1st Respondent.
On issue two, the Appellants contended that they were excluded from participating in the conduct of year 2021 congresses of the Borno State chapter of the 1st Respondent. I have carefully gone over the record and the only part I find relevant to the Appellants submission is found at page 283 of the record, where the Honourable trial Judge said:
“The superior Courts in pronouncements have stated at various times that the only authentic, legitimate and valid election is that conducted by either the National working committee or the national executive committee of a political party. Any election conducted by the state executive committee of a party is illegal. See Emeka V. Okadigbo (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1331) page 55; Eze V. PDP & Ors (2018) LPELR-44907 (SC). It is trite law that speculation has no place in law”.
I have considered the above statement and I find nothing wrong with it. It indeed represents the position of the law. Let me also make this clear that, there is nowhere in the Constitution of the 1st Respondent where the Appellants or the 1st Appellant is entrusted with the duty or function of conducting the state congress of the 1st Respondent, either in his capacity as the Chairman of the State Executive Committee or Chairman of Borno State chapter.
The 1st Appellant complain of not been given Nomination Forms for the conduct of the congress but failed to show where in the Constitution or the Guidelines of the 1st Respondent provision was made that the Appellants or the 1st Appellant has exclusive right to the Nomination forms. I resolve this issue in favour of Respondents and against the Appellants.
3. Whether the learned trial Court rightly determined and held that the suit was statute barred as it relates to the congresses of the Borno State chapter of the 1st Respondent.
It is the law that a person who is aggrieved by the action of a political party as regards any pre-election matter as in the instant case must file his action not later than 14 days after the occurrence of the act against which he complains, if he wishes to challenge such action in Court. See Section 285 (9) and 14(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).
From the Appellants’ affidavit supporting their originating summons, particularly, paragraph 24 thereof, (page 12 of the record of Appeal), the Plaintiff became aware of the fact that the Nomination Forms meant for the Ward, Local Government and State Congresses of the 1st Respondent in Borno State was paid for and collected by someone other than them on the 24th August, 2021. Consequently, the Appellants ought to have filed their action not later than 14 days from the 24th August, 2021, inclusive of that very 24th August, 2021 and not wait until the 21st September, 2021. See Saki V. APC (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1706) 505 at 543, paras A-G Further, in view of the case of the Appellants as can be evidenced in their Affidavit, particularly paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 thereof (page 11-13 of the Record of Appeal) as well as both the questions for determination and the reliefs sought by them, their case is a pre-election matter which should have been brought within 14 days of the accrual of the alleged cause of action. But instead, they chose to wait for almost a month after the accrual of their cause of action, thus making their case statute-barred. See APC V. Umar (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1675) 564 at 575 – 576, paras E – D.
In the very recent case of Wulangs V. C.B.N (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1802) 195 at 247, paras D—G, the Abuja Division of this Honourable Court, per lge JCA held:
“Time begins to run for the purposes of the limitation law from the date the cause of action accrues. In Amadi V. INEC (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1345) 595 at 631, Paras E-F, this Court held that: ‘The conspicuous effect of a limitation law is that legal proceedings cannot be properly validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Also, the Court is divested of its jurisdiction in the matter as it is no longer a live issue. It is dead in substance and in form. In the instant case, the Court of Appeal was under a statutory obligation and duty to hear and determine the Appellant’s appeal before it within the time prescribed by Section 285 (7) of the 1999 Constitution as amended’
See again on this, Osun State Govt. V. Dalami (Nig) Ltd (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1038) 66; Chigbu V. Tonimas (Nig) Ltd. (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt. 984) 189; Shettima V. Goni (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) 413; P.D.P V. C.P.C (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1277) 485.”
The Appellants at paragraph 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, pages 24-26 of their brief that they were pursuing available resolution of the matter with the 1st Respondent and this accounts for the delay in filing the suit. Argument such as this, will not avail the Appellant simply because it cannot affect the validity of the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). In any case, the Respondents denied in their Affidavit that any internal mechanism of negotiation for settlement was ever activated by the Appellant throughout the period in question.
So, I hold and resolve this issue in favour of the Respondents and against Appellants.
Having resolved all the issues in the substantive appeal in favour of the Respondents and against the Appellants, the appeal fails. This appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed.
The judgment of The Federal High Court, Abuja, delivered by Hon. Justice Taiwo O. Taiwo on 1st November, 2021 in suit No. FHC/ABJ/1095/2021 is hereby affirmed.
I make no order as to cost.
ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL, J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of a preview of the lead judgment just delivered of my learned brother, Danjuma, JCA. I fully agree with his reasoning and conclusion that this appeal ought to fail for being devoid of any merit. It is dismissed by me too. I abide by all the consequential orders in the lead judgment, including the order on costs.
MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM SIRAJO, J.C.A.: I have been availed a copy of the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Mohammed Danjuma, JCA, before now. I am in full agreement with his reasoning and conclusion that this appeal lacks merit. I too, dismiss the appeal with no order as to costs.
Appearances:
Ayodele E. Ogundele, Esq, with him, N.I. Kebordih, Esq. For Appellant(s)
Mahmud A. Magaji, SAN with him, Edet Akpan Esq, Clement I. Esq and Affis M. Esq – for 1st Respondent
Okechukwu Edeze, Esq. with him, A.A. Badmas Esq. for 2nd & 3rd Respondents
Chris Kelechi Udeoyibo, Esq. with him, B.O. Odigo Esq. for 4th – 6th Respondents. For Respondent(s)