BABANGIDA JOHN v. THE STATE (2011)

BABANGIDA JOHN v. THE STATE

(2011)LCN/4737(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 18th day of July, 2011

CA/IL/C.68/2010

RATIO

BURDEN OF PROOF: ON WHOM LIES THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

It is a cardinal principle of criminal laws in Nigeria that in all criminal cases, the burden of proving that any person has been guilty of any crime or wrongful act subject to any exceptions is on the Prosecution. see INO ISANSI v STATE (2008) 3 NCC 1 and section 138 of the Evidence Act. PER SOTONYE DENTON WEST, J.C.A.

OFFENCE OF CULPABLE HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE WITH DEATH: THE INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENCE OFFENCE OF CULPABLE HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE WITH DEATH UNDER SECTION 221 OF THE PENAL CODE

OFFENCE OF MURDER: ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS THAT THE PROSECUTION MUST PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT TO GROUND A CONVICTION FOR THE OFFENCE OF MURDER

In SULE VS THE STATE (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt 1116) pg 33 at pg 53-54, OGBUAGU JSC re-emphasized firmly the established ingredients of a murder charge when he affirmed thus, “now in a murder case, it is now firmly established that what the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt are- “(i) that the deceased had died (ii) that the death of the deceased resulted from the act of the appellant. (iii) that the act of the appellant was intentional with the knowledge that death or bodily harm was its probable consequence”. see the cases of Ogba v. The State (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt.222) 164; (1992) 2 SCNJ 106; Nwaeze v. The state (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt.428) 1 at 11; (1996) 2 SCNJ 42; Gira v. The State (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt.443) 375 at 383; (1996), 4 SCNJ 94; Igago v. The State (1999) 12 SCNJ 140 at 162, 166 and Uguru v. The State (2002) 4 SCNJ 282 at 293 just to mention but a few. PER SOTONYE DENTON WEST, J.C.A.

DEFENCE OF INSANITY: WHAT MUST BE PROVED IN ESTABLISHING THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY

Going by the decision in ANI v. STATE (2007) 17 NWLR (PT.742) 411 at 427 – 428, this court held thus; “In order to establish the defense of insanity, the defense must prove:- (a)That at the relevant time of committing the offence, the accused was suffering from either mental disease or natural mental infirmity; and (b)That the mental disease or natural mental infirmity was such that at the relevant time, the accused was as a result deprived of capacity; i. To understand what he was doing ii. To control his action or iii. To know that he ought not to do the act or make the commission. PER SOTONYE DENTON WEST, J.C.A.

INTERFERENCE WITH THE FINDINGS: ATTITUDE OF THE APPELLATE COURTS TO FINDINGS

It has been the stance of this court that appellate court should not ordinarily substitute its views of facts for those of the trial court. See. EBBA v. OGODO (1984) 1 SCNLR 372, BALOGUN v. AGBOOLA (1974) 1 All NLR (pt .2) 66. An Appellate Court will not ordinarily interfere with the findings of a fact by a trial court except where wrongly applied to the circumstances of the case or the conclusion reached was wrong or perverse. See NWOSU v BOARD OF CUSTOMS (1996) 10 NWLR (pt. 478) 265, EBEINWE v. THE STATE (2011) 7 NWLR (PT 1246) PG 402 at PG 418. PER SOTONYE DENTON WEST, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

TIJJANI ABDULLAHI (PJ) Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

SOTONYE DENTON WEST Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

BABANGIDA JOHN Appellant(s)

AND

THE STATE Respondent(s)

SOTONYE DENTON WEST, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Kwara state, Ilorin Division in suit No KWS/2C/2008. The judgment was delivered by Honourable Justice H. A Saleeman on the 1st Day of June, 2010. The appellant is appealing against the conviction and sentence passed on him by the court.
The appellant was convicted on a one-court charge which read this:-
“That you Babangida John on or about 18th day of June 2007 at Ripiyo village, Atere Camp via Banni Moro Local Government Area of Kwara State within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court committed culpable homicide punishable with death to wit; you did cause the death of Memunatu Rasaki by matcheting her severally with cutlass and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 227 of the Penal Code”
The Charge was read to the Appellant and he pleaded “Not guilty”. The Prosecution called three witnesses and tendered eight exhibits and the Appellant gave his evidence without calling other witnesses and he was eventually convicted and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment.
The Appellant being aggrieved by the decision of the Court below has, Ex debito justitiae, appealed to this Court. His Notice of Appeal filed 14/6/2010 was accompanied by eight grounds of appeal.
On 27/6/2011 when the Appeal was heard, learned Counsel for the Appellant adopted the Brief of Argument dated 19th day of August 2010 and urged that the Appeal be allowed. The Appellant distilled a singular issue thus;
Whether the Learned Trial Judge was right, to have convicted the Accused person /Appellant, solely on his confessional statement, without considering the totality of evidence before it.”
In the same fashion, on the stated date when the appeal came up for hearing, Learned Counsel for the Respondent adopted the Respondent’s Brief of Argument dated 19/4/2011 but deemed properly filed and served on 31/05/2011 and prayed that the Appeal be dismissed. In a concise manner, the Respondent Counsel adopted the Appellant’s sole issue for determination and resolution.

ISSUE ONE AS SOLE ISSUE
Whether the Trial Judge was right, to have convicted the Accused person /Appellant solely on his confessional statement without considering the totality of evidence before it.
The Appellant vide His Counsel submitted that by virtue of the provisions of Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act, the Burden of Proof in a criminal case is on the Prosecution and it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt .He referred this Court to the case of JUA V. STATE (2010) All FWLR (Pt.521) 1427 at 1443 to support his submission.
Appellant Counsel further argued that though the Confessional Statement of an accused person is enough to ground conviction without corroborative facts, but that where such confessional statement creates doubt in the mind of the Court, such doubt must be resolved in favour of the Accused person.
The Appellant alleges that Exhibit P8 and the evidence of the Appellant when combined, creates doubt in the mind of the Court and same should be resolved in favour of the accused person. He referred this Court to the case of SHEMFE V. NAF (2000) 15 WRN 56 at 69 to buttress his point.
Appellant further submits that in a Criminal trial, an accused person is entitled to any defense which on the totality of the evidence is available to him, whether or not he specifically raised it himself or not, that the Appellant stated in his alleged confessional statement that “I don’t know what came over me before I attacked the woman.” That the trial court should have considered it as a defense. He referred this court to the case of SALIHU v. STATE (1994) 3 NWLR (PT.332) 352 at 362 and TAUKIDA v. STATE (1969) 6 NSCC 270 at 273 to support his position.
Appellant contended that failure on the part of the trial judge to consider the issue of ingenuity in favour of the accused has occasioned miscarriage of justice, he referred this Court to the case of AKPABIO v. STATE (1994) 7 NWLR (PT. 359) 671 to buttress his argument.
Appellant Counsel submitted that the position of the law still remains that where a matter is capable of being interpreted in a manner favourable to an accused person, the Court should lean towards interpreting it in favour of the accused person. He referred this court to the case of GODWIN ANYIAM v. THE STATE (1961) 1 ALL NWLR (Pt.46) to support his argument.
The Appellant, therefore, urged this court to consider the defense of insanity in favour of the Appellant. He referred this Court to the case of EKPENYONG v. STATE (1991) 6 NWLR (pt.200) 682 at 698, UMANI v. STATE (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt.545) 142 at 167 to support his submission.
The Appellant submitted that the position in this case as regards the content of Exhibit P8 was similar to the case of OKONKWO VS THE STATE (1988) 4 NWLR (PT.545) 142, that the lower court only considered the incriminating part of the confessional statement without considering the defense open to the Appellant and that had occasioned miscarriage of justice
The Appellant finally urged this court to hold that failure of the learned trial judge to consider the evidence available to the Appellant has occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice to the Appellant and he prayed that this court should resolve the same issue in favour of the Appellant, allow the Appeal, set aside the decision of the lower court and discharge and acquit the Appellant.
The Respondent on his own agreed that it is the duty of the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt as enshrined in Section 138 of the Evidence Act, similarly, the Respondent agreed that the confessional statement of an accused can ground conviction without corroborative evidence.
Respondent submitted that the confessional statements, as it were, created no doubt in the mind of the lower court as to who committed the offence for which the Appellant was charged. He further submitted that what Exhibit 8 raised for the Appellant was the defense of insanity, which was not properly raised before the lower court and further submitted that, throughout the trial, the Appellant did not exhibit any abnormality in behavior nor raised insanity as a defense which was not properly raised before this honorable court. The Respondent went
further to state that the essential ingredient of the defense of insanity was properly stated in the case of ANI v. STATE (2001) 17 NWLR (PT.742) 411 at 427 – 428.
The Respondent further submitted that the salient points raised in the case that constitute the ingredient of insanity are in the negative in the present case. This court was referred to the case of ANI (supra) that the Appellant gave coherent and factual testimony and answers during trial and that there is absence of any antecedent evidence of insanity or evidence of past history of the incident of insanity given on his behalf prior to the date of the incident. The Respondent concluded that the Appellant was sufficiently knowledgeable when the incident occurred and that the Appellant knows the consequence of his action.
The Respondent further submitted that it is not within the judicial purview of a trial court to call for evidence as argued by the Appellant as that will amount to the judge descending into the arena of dispute and that the lower court gave the Appellant’s counsel opportunity to lead evidence on insanity but the defense counsel failed. He thereafter urged this court to discountenance the case of TAWUMA v THE STATE (supra) as cited by the Appellant’s counsel.
The respondent submitted that the case of IDOWU V STATE (1972) is apposite to their case and that the Appellant knew what he was doing when he killed the deceased. Finally, he prayed this court to uphold the decision of the lower court.

RESOLUTION OF SOLE ISSUE
It is a cardinal principle of criminal laws in Nigeria that in all criminal cases, the burden of proving that any person has been guilty of any crime or wrongful act subject to any exceptions is on the Prosecution. see INO ISANSI v STATE (2008) 3 NCC 1 and section 138 of the Evidence Act.

In order for the prosecution to establish an offence of culpable homicide punishable with death under Section 221 of the Penal Code, there are three ingredients of the offence which must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The ingredients of the offence are as follows;
i. That the death of a human being has actually taken place.
ii. That death was a probable result of the action.
iii. That the act was done with the intention of causing death. See MAIYAKI v. STATE (2008) 35 NSCQR 679 and at 694, OLALEKAN v. STATE (2001) 18 NWLR (PT. 746) 793 at 824.
In SULE VS THE STATE (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt 1116) pg 33 at pg 53-54, OGBUAGU JSC re-emphasized firmly the established ingredients of a murder charge when he affirmed thus, “now in a murder case, it is now firmly established that what the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt are-
“(i) that the deceased had died
(ii) that the death of the deceased resulted from the act of the appellant.
(iii) that the act of the appellant was intentional with the knowledge that death or bodily harm was its probable consequence”.
see the cases of Ogba v. The State (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt.222) 164; (1992) 2 SCNJ 106; Nwaeze v. The state (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt.428) 1 at 11; (1996) 2 SCNJ 42; Gira v. The State (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt.443) 375 at 383; (1996), 4 SCNJ 94; Igago v. The State (1999) 12 SCNJ 140 at 162, 166 and Uguru v. The State (2002) 4 SCNJ 282 at 293 just to mention but a few.
In the instant case leading to the appeal, the appellant, does not dispute the death of the deceased. What is in dispute, is that the death of the deceased, was not from the act of the appellant. While the prosecution maintains that it was the appellant who had a knife, and who stabbed the deceased with it. That when all the accused persons saw that the deceased had died, they all ran away. See the evidence of the PW1 at page 24 and PW3 at page 26 of the Records. The appellant in his evidence denied the assertions of the said prosecution witnesses. He testified in chief at pages 11 and 12 of the Records inter alia, as follows:
“…Before I could talk, deceased brought out his knife. He wanted to stab me but I dodged the knife, and held him. Then his leg fell into the gutter (sic) (meaning gutter). When he fell down the knife in his hand fell. He was struggling to pick the knife to stab me by all means but I first picked the knife before him. I wanted to run away with the knife so that he won’t stab me but he was bigger than me and I am not as powerful as the deceased. As deceased was struggling to collect the knife from me the knife then entered his tie. Deceased then shouted that he had been wounded and I then ran away….” (the underlining mine)
From the above, in my respectful view, the crucial issue to be determined by this Court or by me, is whether the Appellant, actually and deliberately stabbed the deceased with the knife or whether the said knife “entered” the tie of the deceased by the act of the appellant by way of self defence as has been canvassed by the learned Counsel for the appellant in their amended Brief or that the entry was accidental. This issue is covered by issues (i) and (ii) of the appellant and issues (i) and (iii) of the respondent. I will take the said issues together”

Sule’s case is a reecho of the instant appeal. However unlike Sule vs The State Supra, where the appellant is pleading self defense the instant appeal has to do with the plea of insanity. Self defence means that the accused person did the act while in the process of defending himself, but with no intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. However in this appeal, the plea of insanity is what the appellant is anchoring his defence upon and so differs completely in essence from Sule’s case
The absence of any of these ingredients together will make the court to discharge and acquit the accused. The question now is, were the three ingredients proved before the appellant was convicted? Before I proceed, it seems the Learned DPP is mixing up this case with another, on His Respondent’s Brief of Argument, page 1 paragraph 2.05, He said the Appellant was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment and on page 7 paragraph 3.24 of the same Brief of Argument He repeated it that the Appellant was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. However, on page 84 of the Record of Proceedings, the lower court held thus; “He is convicted of the offence of Culpable Homicide punishable with death contrary to section 221 of the penal code”. It seems the arguments of the prosecution as respondent are conflicting as regards the sentence granted the accused by the trial court and so this court cannot place any reliance on the respondent’s arguments as regards the fact of conviction and sentence thereof.
Back to the ingredients, it is clear from the record that there was the death of a human being and it is clear that the deceased died as a result of a matched cut from the Appellant, but the bone of contention is was the Appellant that macheted the deceased to death sane or insane as of the time of his action?.The Counsel did a very good research on this third point of whether the Appellant should be responsible for his action. Immediately, the Appellant was arrested and he volunteered the statement, at page 11 of the Record of Appeal, thus;
“I never had any previous quarrel with the woman (deceased) or anybody in the village. I don’t know what came over me before I attacked the woman”.
The question now is, what was the Appellant’s motive, why would he want to kill? Going by the decision in ANI v. STATE (2007) 17 NWLR (PT.742) 411 at 427 – 428, this court held thus;
“In order to establish the defense of insanity, the defense must prove:-
(a)That at the relevant time of committing the offence, the accused was suffering from either mental disease or natural mental infirmity; and
(b)That the mental disease or natural mental infirmity was such that at the relevant time, the accused was as a result deprived of capacity;
i. To understand what he was doing
ii. To control his action or
iii. To know that he ought not to do the act or make the commission.
The act of the Appellant was never portrayed as case of premeditated murder of the deceased, he said he never knew what came over him at that moment. Are we going to say that the Appellant’s act was premeditated or was it as a result of malice or revenge even though nothing of such showed up in this case?
It has been the stance of this court that appellate court should not ordinarily substitute its views of facts for those of the trial court. See. EBBA v. OGODO (1984) 1 SCNLR 372, BALOGUN v. AGBOOLA (1974) 1 All NLR (pt .2) 66. An Appellate Court will not ordinarily interfere with the findings of a fact by a trial court except where wrongly applied to the circumstances of the case or the conclusion reached was wrong or perverse. See NWOSU v BOARD OF CUSTOMS (1996) 10 NWLR (pt. 478) 265, EBEINWE v. THE STATE (2011) 7 NWLR (PT 1246) PG 402 at PG 418.
It is necessary at this juncture to point out that the lower court never considered the defense in the statement of the Appellant.
My Lordships, your Learned Brother Kolawole JCA (as He then was) held in the case of EKPENYONG v THE STATE (1991) 6 NWLR (PT.200) 682 at 698 said thus;
“It is a settled principle that an accused in a murder charge is not restricted in the consideration of the defense raised by him but it is open to the court to consider the other defenses available to the accused on the facts preferred or facts established before the court at trial. On Appeal, the Appeal Court will consider all the defenses open to the Appellant on facts established in court of trial in spite of the fact that such defenses were not considered in the lower court.” See UMANI v. THE STATE (1988) 1 NWLR (PT.70) 274 AND OKWONKWO v. THE STATE (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt.545)142 at 167.
Without being immodest, the Appellant stated in his extra-judicial statement that;
‘It was after I had done the crime that I came to realize, that what I have done is bad”. The above should have created a serious doubt in the mind of the lower court and which should have been to the advantage of the Appellant who was the accused. The decision in the case of QUEEN v. YARO BIU and the case of R v. YAYIYE (1957) N.R.N.L.R 207 applies to the penal code and the common law rules relating to the proof of insanity which also applies to the defense under section 28 of Criminal Code. The burden of proving insanity as a defence to a criminal charge lies on the accused and he must proof that he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or was doing what was wrong. In GUOBADIA V THE STATE (2004) LPELR-SC.295/2002, Per EDOZIE, JSC (p.12, paras. B-D) held that “The burden of proof on the accussed is on the balance of probability and not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt.” See SHEMDE v. NAF (2000) 76 WRN 56 at 69 AND TAWUD v. STATE (1969) 6 NSCC 270 at 273 also in SULE NOMA MOKOSA v. STATE the Supreme Court hereby held that “The law exempts a person from criminal responsibility when he is proved to fall within the provisions of section 57 of the penal code.” See EDOHO v. STATE (2007) WRN VOL. 12 86 AT 99 LINES 10 TO 25.

However, it seems imperative that the plea of insanity seems to avail the appellant, by reference to the case of MOHAMMED v. THE STATE, wherein the revered Justice of Supreme Court of Nigeria Per Wali, JSC commented on conditions upon which an accused can successfully plead insanity as a defense thus” A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission if at the time of doing the act or making the omission he is in such a state of mental disease or natural mental infirmity as to deprive him of capacity to understand what he is doing, or of capacity to control his actions or of capacity to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission. A person whose mind, at the time of his doing or omitting to do an act, is affected by delusions on some specific matter or matters, but who is not otherwise entitled to the benefit of the foregoing provisions of this section, is criminally responsible for the act or omission to the same extent as if the real state of things had been such as he was induced by the delusions to believe to exist.”
Under the Nigerian law, in order to establish a defence of insanity, the defence has to prove that at the relevant time of committing the offence, the accused was suffering either from mental disease or from natural mental infirmity, and, secondly, that the mental disease, or natural mental infirmity was such that at the relevant time, the accused was, as a result, deprived of capacity-
(1) to understand what he was doing, or
(2) to control his, actions; or
(3) to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission.
Where the defence raised is that of partial delusion the provisions of second part of S.28 which are similar to the rules in M’Naughten’s case, are applicable.The presumption under the law is that every person, is presumed to be of sound mind at any time and responsible for his acts or omissions. In S.27 of Criminal Code the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the exception is on the accused. The burden of such proof is not so heavy on the defence and is not higher than the burden on a person to civil proceedings. see s. 140 (2) of the Evidence Act and the cases of Onakpoya v. R (1959) 4 FSC. 150; (1959) SCNLR 384; R. v. Echem 14 WACA 158 and Sodeman v. R (1936) 2 All ER 1138.”
See further In Ogbu vs. The State (supra), the Supreme Court held that to establish a defence of insanity it must be shown that: (a) the accused was at the relevant time, suffering either from mental disease or from natural mental infirmity; (b) the mental disease or the natural infirmity must be such that at the material time the accused was as a result deprived of the capacity to understand what he was doing or to control his actions or to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission. See also R. v. Omoni 12 WAC.A. 511 at 512; Arum v. The State (1979) 11 S.C. 91 at 119. Per Uboezonu JCA.

On this singular issue, I am of the candid view that as at the time the Appellant committed the act, he was not himself, he never ran away as he was arrested in the village, this is contrary to other cases where the accused will run away. If the lower court had considered this available defense, she would not have come to that conclusion.
Though, none of the parties raised it but I was able to pick it that the Appellant allegedly committed the act when He was just 17 years old the date to be considered in a matter like this is the date the action took place and not the date when the court started trying the appellant.
However this is just by the way.
Furthermore, it is upsetting and indeed painful in circumstances such as presented in this appeal that an offence could have been committed and was actually committed by the accused person and yet still the facts before the court may not warrant or procure a conviction against the accused who himself in this matter had confessed to the committal of the offence just because the ingredients required to prove the offence committed are lacking or where present, pleas such as insanity would and could vitiate a conviction is crystal clear in this case. Therefore the onus placed on the prosecution is indeed very high and sometimes the law being an ass would allow a criminal to go scot free, because of the duty placed on the prosecution to proof the guilt of an accused person beyond reasonable doubt. That is our law enshrined even in the constitution and so we are bound by it.
Accordingly, I am in total agreement with the submission of learned Counsel for the appellant that the Prosecutor had failed to prove any of the essential ingredients of the offence as charged. Since the essential ingredients are not in place. He ought to be discharged and acquitted.
However, it is cardinal principle of the law that it is better for a guilty person to go scot free than to allow an innocent person to go to prison. At this juncture, I need to let it be known for the umpteenth time that the fact that an offence is rampant, and causes harm to the community will not mean that a court will close its eyes to injustice, rather, the constitution which presume an accused person innocent until proven guilty should be handled with all sacredness. The mere fact that a trial Judge thinks an accused has committed grievous offence, but as a Judge, he can only act based on direct positive precise and credible evidence to secure conviction. I would readily frown and not be happy to see a criminal or an accused person get away from the long arm of the law, but if the dictates of the law precipitates such an action then I am obliged pragmatically to apply the law as it is, as it is certain that the long arm of the law will always catch up with the criminal.
It is not proper for the Judge to use the evidence of the accused to collaborate his confessional statement more especially when the accused person maintains a firm denial of the facts leading to his conviction. In order to secure a conviction, a corroboration of his alleged confessional statement is required. In all cases where the law provides that corroboration is necessary, a conviction of an accused can only be valid when there is such corroboration evidence. See IKO v. THE STATE (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt.732), (2001) 7 S.C (PT11) 115, R V BASKERVILLE (1916-1917) All E.R Reprint 38 at 43. See also D.P.P v. HESTER (1973) AC 296 at 315 where LORD MORRIS said “The purpose of corroboration is not to give validity or credence to evidence which is deficient or suspect or incredible but only to confirm and support that which as evidence is sufficient and satisfactory and credible: and Corroborative evidence will only fill its role if it itself is completely credible evidence.”
see also Ogunbayo v. state (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt.1035), (2007) 3 S.C. (Pt II) 1, (2007) 3 FWLR 374, Mbele v. State (1990) NWLR (Pt.145) 2, (1990) 7 S.C (Pt.1) 1, Nwankwoala v. State (2005) 12 NWLR Pt. (940) P.637 at 679, Para G, Sanni v. State (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt.285) p.99 at 119, para A. Abolore Isiaka v. The State delivered on 13th December 2010 by this honorable court in suit no CA/IL/C.44/2008.
In view of the above, I hereby over-rule the decision of the lower court and set aside, by that mean the conviction and sentence as found in the judgment of the trial court dated 1st day of June 2010 as reflected on page 84 of proceedings or conviction and sentence of 14 years imprisonment as argued by the respondent counsel in this appeal. The Appellant is hereby discharged and acquitted.
Further the Nigerian Prison Authority is hereby directed to take him to a Government Psychiatrist Hospital for check -up and treatment before his final release.

TIJJANI ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the lead judgment prepared by my Learned brother, DENTON-WEST JCA. My noble lord has exhaustively treated all the issues that needed to be considered.
I am in full agreement with the judgment. The appeal is consequently allowed by me and abide by the order of discharge and acquittal contained in the lead judgment.

CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.C.A.: I agree

Appearances

Dr Akin Onigbinde with Tunde FalolaFor Appellant

AND

J. A Mumini, DPPFor Respondent