AZUBUIKE AJOMIWE v. CHIBUEZE PAUL NWAKANMA & ANOR (2019)

AZUBUIKE AJOMIWE v. CHIBUEZE PAUL NWAKANMA & ANOR

(2019)LCN/13425(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 7th day of June, 2019

CA/OW/326/2014

RATIO

THE RULE IN KOJO II VS. BONSIE: WHETHER THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN LAW AND MISDIRECTED HIMSELF BY USING THIS RULE

Whether the learned trial judge did not misdirect himself and therefore erred in law, when he resorted to the Rule in KOJO II VS. BONSIE (1957) 1 WRL 1223, in resolving this case in the defendants? favour? Ground 1 of the Appeal.

From the Record of appeal in this case, the parties at the lower Court fought their respective cases based on traditional history. The principles governing the assessment of evidence of traditional history have been stated by this Court in the case of NWISIGWU & ORS VS. NWANIKILI (2014) LPELR?23272 (CA) pages 16?17 paras C?D per Jega JCA thus:-
“Traditional evidence or history in respect of ownership of land is evidence albeit admissible hearsay as to the rights alleged to have existed beyond the time of living memory proved by members of the family or community who claimed the land subject of dispute as their own. It can equally be described as ancient history, thus, the principles of traditional history are: (a) Where the line of succession is not satisfactorily traced in an action for declaration of ownership of land or title and the line of succession has gaps and mysterious or embarrassing linkages which are not explained or established, such line of succession would be rejected; (b) Where a party pleads and traces the root of the title to a particular person or family, he must establish how that person came to the title vested in him. He cannot ignore proof of his overlord’s title and rely on long possession. (c) Where there are conflicts in the evidence given by witnesses called by the same party, the trial Court is duty bound to find which of the two conflicting histories is more probable by testing it against the other evidence. It is only when it can neither find any of the two histories probable or conclusive that it would declare both inconclusive and proceed to decide the case on the basis of numerous and positive acts of possession or actual user. FAYEMI v. AWE (2009) 13 NWLR (PT.1164) 315.”PER IBRAHIM ALI ANDENYANGTSO, J.C.A.

LAND LAW: 5 WAYS BY WHICH TITLE TO LAND CAN BE PROVED

LAND LAW: 5 WAYS BY WHICH TITLE TO LAND CAN BE PROVEN: ALL 5 WAYS MUST NOT NECESSARILY BE PROVEN
However, it is not the law that a claimant must plead and lead evidence in proof of all the five methods. It suffices that where one of the five methods is pleaded and proved it is enough.
See IDUNDUN VS. OKUMAGBA (1976) 9 -10 SC 227; MOGAJI VS. CADBURY NIG. LTD. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) 393; ADESANYA VS. ADEROUNMU (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 672) 370; ALABI VS. OLOYA (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 708) 37 at 40 R. 5.PER IBRAHIM ALI ANDENYANGTSO, J.C.A.

KOJO II V. BONSIE: THE PRINCIPLE

Now, the principle establishes, as has been held by this Court in WUSU & ORS VS. DAVID & ORS (2014) LPELR?22426 (CA) at pages 42?43 para B?A as follows:-
“The principle in KOJO II V. BONSIE establishes that where there is conflict of traditional history, one side or the other must be mistaken, yet both may be honest in their belief. The best way is to test the traditional history by reference to the fact in recent years as established by evidence and see which of the two competing histories is more probable. See KOJO V. BONSIE (1957) 1 WLR 122 ODOFIN v. AYOOLA (1984) 11 SC 72; BALOGUN V. AKANJI (2005) 10 NWLR (PT 933) 394. In IHEANACHO v. MATHAS CHIGERE (2004) 7 NWLR (PT 901) 180.PER IBRAHIM ALI ANDENYANGTSO, J.C.A.

KOJO II V. BONSIE: WHEN APPLICABLE

The issue arose before the Supreme Court as to when the Rule in KOJO V. BONSIE is applicable and it held that: “The rule in KOJO v. BONSIE (1957) 1 WLR 122 at 126 is that “where parties rely on traditional history in proof of their title and the evidence of traditional history is conflicting or is inconclusive, the rule is to be applied to the case by making reference to facts in recent history to resolve the issue.” This rule is usually applied in land cases where acts of ownership exercised within living memory is used as a litmus test in verification of evidence of traditional history.” In EBOADE V. ATOMESIN (1997) 5 NWLR (PT 506) 490 it was held that the rule will only apply where the two parties pleaded traditional history and led evidence in accordance with their pleadings at the trial. It will not apply where a party pleads settlement but leads evidence to show a grant and vice versa.”PER IBRAHIM ALI ANDENYANGTSO, J.C.A.

LAND LAW: DECALRATION OF TITLE TO LAND: IN BASING CLAIM OF TRADITIONAL HISTORY, WHAT MUST THE CLAIMANT PLEAD AND PROVE

It is trite that in basing his claim on traditional history the Appellant, as claimant was bound to plead and prove the following:-
(a) Who founded the land in dispute
(b) In what manner the land was founded and the circumstances leading to it
(c) The names of the persons through whom the land devolved down to the claimant, leaving no gaps or any mysterious unexplained or embarrassing circumstances.
See EZINWA VA. AGU (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 861) 431; EZE VS. ATASIE (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 676) 470 and OWOADE VS. OMITOLA (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 77) 413.PER IBRAHIM ALI ANDENYANGTSO, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

THERESA NGOLIKA ORJI-ABADUA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ITA GEORGE MBABA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

IBRAHIM ALI ANDENYANGTSO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

AZUBUIKE AJOMIWE Appellant(s)

AND

1. CHIBUEZE PAUL NWAKANMA
2. KANU NWAKANMA Respondent(s)

IBRAHIM ALI ANDENYANGTSO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Abia State High Court, sitting at Uzuakoli Judicial Division, delivered on 31/3/2014 by Hon. Justice J. E. Adiele, J. in Suit No. HUZ/1/2009, against the Claimant and in favour of the Defendants. Piqued by the decision, the claimant filed a notice of Appeal out of time but with the leave of this Court granted on 16/4/2017. The Record of Appeal was transmitted to this Court on 29/9/2014 but deemed properly compiled and transmitted on 6/4/2017. The Notice of Appeal contains 4 grounds including omnibus ground (Pages 460 ? 463 of the Record). The Claimant and Defendants shall be referred to as Appellant and Respondents respectively henceforth in this judgment.

The Appellant?s Brief of Argument dated 22/1/2016 was filed on 25/1/2016 but deemed properly filed and served on 6/4/2017. The Respondents filed their Brief of Argument on 11/5/2017, while the Appellant filed his Reply Brief on 23/5/2017.

The 4 grounds of appeal shorn of their particulars, are as follows:-
GROUND 1:
The lower Court erred in law and came

to a perverse decision when it held thus:
?In addition to the above, the defendants relied on all the other five methods of establishing ownership except document of title. In this case, both parties have relied on their account of their respective traditional histories. To resolve these conflicting claims, the Courts have held that the proper approach to ascertain which of the two sets of traditional history should be accepted as more probable should be by reference to acts, happenings, or events within living memory. See Chief Ido and Ors Vs Chief Okon Udo Akpaka and Ors (2000) 7 NWLR (pt. 34) 676, Anyanwu Vs.Mbara (1992) 5 NWLR (242) 386?.
GROUND 2
The lower Court erred in law and misdirected itself and came a perverse decision when it held thus:
Inasmuch as the claim of the claimant is over the Azulo Ebgbunte land, his survey plan being Exhibit ?A? showed the ?L? shaped house of Fred Nwakanma and the spot where the 1st defendant is building his house as areas in dispute. In his cross examination he stated that all the areas occupied by the defendants are not in dispute except the spot the defendant is

erecting his building. This area also tallied with spot the defendant survey ?F? showed to be in dispute. The identity of this land now is defined and is well known to the parties. It is hereby adjudged to be that of the 1st defendant.”
GROUND 3
The lower Court erred in law and or misdirected itself and came to wrong conclusion when it stated as follows:
?The claimant failed to pinpoint a particular part of the land where those trees were planted even when the Court went to locus. Exhibit ?A? is survey plan did not show any either.”
GROUND 4
Judgment is against the weight of evidence.?

From the 4 grounds the appellant formulated 3 issues which were adopted by the Respondents for determination as follows:-
?1. Whether the learned trial judge did not misdirect himself and therefore erred in law, when he resorted to the Rule in Kojo II. V. Bonsie (1957) 1 WRL 1223, in resolving this case in the defendants? favour?. Ground 1 of the Appeal.?
?2. Whether the learned trial judge arrived at his decision in this case, after following the proper

guidelines for decision making, laid down by the Supreme Court of Nigeria, in ODOFIN V. MOGAJI (1978) 4 SC 91 at page 93. Ground 2 of the Appeal.?
?3. Whether the learned trial judge properly and conclusively evaluated the evidence, put up by the claimant and defendants, as required of him, under the principle of imaginary scale of justice, before finding for the defendants, in this case? Grounds 3 and 4 of the Appeal.?

By a writ of summons dated 18/1/2009 Uzoanya Ajomiwe and Azubuike Ajomiwe commenced legal proceedings at the Abia State High Court of Justice at the Uzuakoli Judicial Division, presided over by Hon. Justice J. E. Adiele, J. in Suit No. HUZ/1/2009, between UZOANYA AJOMIWE AND AZUBUIKE AJOMIWE and CHIBUEZE PAUL NWAKANMA AND KANU NWAKANMA. In their amended statement of claim at paragraph 24 at pages 72 ? 73 of the Record, the Appellants claimed as follows:-
?24. WHEREFORE the Plaintiffs claim from the Defendants as follows:
(1) A declaration that the Statutory/Customary Right of Occupancy in respect of the piece or parcel of Land known as Azulo Egbunta and situateat Amaegbu Lohom Bende Local Government

Area is vested in the Plaintiff.
(2) Two Million Naira being special and general damages for trespass upon the Plaintiffs (sic) Land as averred above.
(3) An injunction permanently restraining the defendants, their servants, agents and/or workmen from further acts of trespass or interfering with the said Land.?
Now to the issues.
ISSUE 1
?Whether the learned trial judge did not misdirect himself and therefore erred in law, when he resorted to the Rule in KOJO II VS. BONSIE (1957) 1 WRL 1223, in resolving this case in the defendants? favour? Ground 1 of the Appeal.?
?
Onumajuru Esq., learned Appellant?s Counsel submitted that there was no need at all for the learned trial Judge to have any recourse or resort to the Rule in KOJO II?s case in resolving the dispute between the parties. He submitted that the principle in KOJO?s case applies only where the traditional history adduced by the parties on both sides to the Suit is inconclusive, intrinsically conflicting and/or none is preferable to the other, that the Court can proceed to decide the case on the basis of numerous and positive acts of

possession and ownership. He submitted that it is not the law that once there is conflict in the traditional history adduced, though not conceded in this case, the Court must promptly declare them inconclusive and thereupon proceed to consider recent acts.

Counsel submitted further that where the case is being fought on hearsay upon hearsay, the Court has a duty to find out, which of the two histories is more probable, by testing it against other evidence in the case; that it is when the Court can neither find any of the two histories probable nor conclusive, that it will declare both inconclusive and proceed to decide the case on the basis of numerous and positive acts of possession and ownership. He relied on the case of OBIOHA VS. DURU (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 365) 631 at 641.

Learned Counsel referred to the pleadings of the Appellants in paragraphs 1?25 of their amended statement of claim at pages 237? 239 of the Record and paragraphs 1?14 of the further amended Reply of the Appellants to the Respondents? amended statement of defence at pages 244?246 of the Record. He submitted that the Appellants had pleaded all the

essential requirements of the law which entitled them to the reliefs sought. He submitted that the Appellants had tendered documentary evidence, cogent enough for the trial Court to declare them winner of the case. He referred to the Exhibits tendered and submitted that oral evidence of witness has no probative value in this case, except the essentials of who founded the land in dispute, how the land was founded, and the particulars of those ancestors through whom the land passed to the present claimants. Counsel submitted that all these requirements have been pleaded and backed by evidence, referring to the Exhibits tendered at the trial Court without objection, and that the evidence of the appellants were credible and cogent. He referred to a lot of segments of the evidence of the witnesses and submitted that the pieces of evidence were unchallenged. He also referred to the evidence of the defence and submitted that their evidence was contradictory in respect of the name of the land in dispute and that the Appellants at the trial Court proved their case on the balance of probabilities and preponderance of evidence as required by law.
?
Onumajuru Esq.,

referred to Exhibit ?B? and submitted that where a previous judgment, as in this case, had vested ownership of the disputed land on a party, the onus is on the adversary to prove that the first party is not the true owner of the land, particularly where the adversary stood by and watched as in this case, the first party doing the first legal battle with a stranger. He added that the father of CW3 testified for the Appellants father in the previous case, referring to OKE VS. ATOLOYE (1986) 1 ALL NLW 100. Referring to LAMIDI LADIMEJI & ANOR. VS. SURA SALAMI & ORS (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt. 548) 1 and CHINWENDU VS. MBAMALI (1980) 3?4 SC 31 and Exhibits B and E, Counsel submitted that a plaintiff, though cannot plead res judicata, he could nonetheless rely on previous judgment and proceedings in his favour as relevant facts under Section 54 of the Evidence Act, 1945 (Learned Counsel appears to be living in antiquities).

Learned Counsel referred to all the Exhibits tendered by the Appellants at the lower Court and submitted that they support the case of the Appellants as they are hangers for oral evidence,

making the case of the Appellants conclusive, which the trial Court ought to have accepted and relied upon as more probable without any resort to the Rule in KOJO II and that the principles in KOJO II were not properly applied to this case, referring to PRINCE JAJUDELL OLANREWAJU VS. SIKIRU OYESOMI & ORS (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1418) 258 at 308 para D. Citing many authorities, learned Counsel submitted that if the learned trial Judge had not applied the Rule in KOJO II?s case he would have come to the conclusion that the traditional history of the Appellants was more probable to resolve the case in favour of the Appellants. Onumajuru Esq., reviewed all the pieces of evidence of the Appellant?s witnesses and the exhibits tendered and submitted that the Appellant?s case was more probable than that of the Respondent and so the learned trial Judge ought to have given judgment to the Appellants without resort to the Rule in KOJO IIs case.

Onumajuru Esq., then reviewed all the pieces of evidence of the Respondents? witnesses and submitted that their evidence was contradictory and conflicting with one another and ought not to have

been adopted and relied upon by the trial Court. He submitted that the Appellant?s case was more probable than that of the Respondents, relying on BASSEY VS. PAMOL (NIG.) LTD.& ORS (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt. 509) 443 at 452. Counsel also submitted that if the Respondents had sought to disprove the case of the Appellants at the trial Court, they were bound to plead and prove that the Appellant?s documentary evidence was false, fraudulent or forged; that the Respondents would have cross examined the Appellants and then led evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Exhibits A ? E were either false, fraudulent or forged, referring to GEORGE VS. DOMINION FLOUR MILLS (1963) 1 SCNLR 117.

Onumajuru Esq., stated that in this case the Appellants relied on traditional history, acts of possession and enjoyment of other connected lands adjacent to the land in dispute and also tendered documentary evidence in support of his case and thus proved title to the land in dispute, referring to IDUNDUN VS. OKUMAGBA (1976) 9 10 SC 227.

Onumajuru Esq., also contended that it was the Appellant?s parents who granted the Respondents the leave

to build mud houses on the part of the land in dispute, except Mr. Fred Nwakanma for whom the consent of the Appellants father, and with his permission, the relations of the Respondents were buried on the land in dispute. Counsel therefore referred to the Respondents as Customary tenants who are always customary tenants, no matter how long they stay on the land in dispute, and cannot acquire ownership, or divest the owner of the land of his radical title by virtue of long stay on the land; furthermore, that any attempt to divest the owner of his title would lead to forfeiture of the right of the customary tenant, relying on BASSEY VS. BASSEY (2009) 12 NWLR (Pt. 11560) 617.

Learned Counsel referred to SIMON OGUNDIPE & 2 ORS. VS. ADENIYI ADENUGA (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt. 336) 226 for definition of customary tenancy and urged us to intervene in the findings of facts made by the trial Court in this case, as some are perverse, or based on improper or non evaluation of evidence, or that the trial Court did not take proper advantage of its seeing and hearing the witness which has led to miscarriage of justice in this case, referring to MAINAGGE VS. GWAMMA

(2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 893) 323 and ARE VS. IPAYE (1990) 3 SC (Pt. 11) 109.

Submitting further,Onumajuru Esq., stated that in the competing traditional history of the parties there was no conflict in the strict sense of the word to warrant the learned trial judge?s recourse to the Rule in KOJO II VS. BONSIE?s case, and that the recourse to other extraneous matters to decide this case by the trial Court was uncalled for and urged us to reverse the decision of the trial Court and enter judgment for the Appellant, in terms of his writ or in the alternative, make and order of retrial of this case before another Judge of the same Judicial Division.

V. I. Onyeabor Esq., for the Respondents, in response to the Appellant?s submissions summarized the facts of this case and noted that the Appellant based his ownership of the disputed land on traditional history and claimed that the 1st Respondent trespassed into the land and destroyed his economic crops; that the Respondents denied the claims of the Appellant and asserted ownership of the land in dispute, basing their claims also on traditional history that the Respondents equally denied acts of

trespass and that the lower Court properly evaluated the evidence of both parties before passing judgment. Learned Counsel further noted that the Appellant based his argument under issue 1 on the applicability by the trial Court of the principle of KOJO II VS. BONSIE (1957) 1 WLR 1223, and argued that the learned trial Judge misapplied the principle of law therein, as the evidence of the Respondents was not plausible while that of the Appellant was more cogent and consistent with contemporary events and with documentary evidence in Exhibits A?E.

Onyeabor Esq., then submitted that the contention of the Appellant?s Counsel that the learned trial Judge misapplied the Rule in KOJO II?s case is wrong, as the learned trial Judge who saw and heard the witnesses give evidence was in a better position to ascribe probative value to the evidence presented before him. He submitted that the Respondents at the Court below gave uncontradicted traditional history of the land in dispute and traced the devolution of the land on them from the inception of deforestation of the same, and the Court of Appeal will not interfere with the findings of the trial

Court simply because it could have arrived at a different conclusion, relying on MICHAEL EYO VS. EMEKA COLLINS ONUOHA & ANOR (2011) ALL FWLR (Pt. 574) 3 R. 1. He further submitted that in this case the learned trial Judge who saw and heard the witnesses based his judgment on the evidence of the parties as presented to him and that the Appellant has not shown the perversity of the findings of the trial Court and no miscarriage of justice.

Onyeabor Esq., stated that the parties fought their case through traditional history which, when put side by side, are in conflict with each other and one side or the other must be mistaken, yet both may be honest on and in their belief, which makes demeanor unhelpful as a guide and so the best way is to test the traditional history by reference to the acts in recent years as established by evidence in order to determine which of the traditional histories is more probable. He contended that the trial Judge noticed, on comparing the two traditional histories, that each of them on its own is credible and plausible but in conflict with the other making it impossible for the Court to realistically and justifiably prefer one

to the other; that in such a situation, either of the two stories may rightly be regarded as likely to be true or that they are probable, making for testing each of the stories against recent acts of possession and ownership in order to determine which of the two stories is more probable. He then submitted that the learned trial Judge in the instant case, having ascertained the stories of the Respondents to be more probable, rejected that of the Appellant found to be less probable, relying on OGBUOKWELU VS. UMUANAFUNKWA (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 341) 676 at 698.

Onyeabor Esq., argued that the contention of the Appellant at page 5 of his brief that the Respondents pleaded insufficient materials is a ruse as the Respondents at the lower Court pleaded sufficient materials as required by law on the devolution of the land in dispute to them and they were neither contradicted nor cross examined on them, referring to pages 168-176, particularly 169-170 of the Record. He quoted the judgment of the learned trial Judge at page 453 of the Record where he cited and relied on the case of CHIEF IDIO NKOKO & ORS. VS. CHIEF OKON UDO UDO AKPAKA & ORS (2000) 7 NWLR (Pt.

664) 225. Learned Counsel referred to the Rule in KOJO II VS. BONSIE and submitted that the trial Court was right in applying same, having been faced with two competing histories, in order to determine which was more probable and found that of the Respondents more probable and so believed it and was justified in applying the Rule.

Onyeabor Esq., referred to the evidence of the Appellant as CW1 to the effect that he (Appellant) is not disputing the area the Respondents are living but only that very spot the 1st Respondent is erecting his building; that if the 1st Respondent had built the house where his father was buried, there would have been no problem; that the Appellant (by this piece of evidence) had accepted that where the 1st Respondent?s father was buried was his compound as rightly adjudged by the Elders, including the Appellant?s father.

Learned Counsel then interpreted the Appellant?s filing this suit to mean the Appellants wanted the 1st Respondent to build his house on top of his father?s grave which is frivolous. He added that the visit of the Court to the locus inquo showed that where the 1st Respondent was

building his house is on the same land within the compound where his father was buried, and that this discovery by the trial Judge made him to pass his judgment on page 457 as he did.

On the issue of an alleged murder of a member of Okoros family as argued by the Appellants Counsel on page 9 line 20, the history on which the Appellant based his claim at the trial Court, Onyeabor Esq., submitted that all the sons of Amaechi lived, died and were buried on the land in dispute without any challenge by the Appellant or any other member of his family. Learned Counsel stated that the Appellant?s case centered on how the Respondents ancestors came upon the land in dispute i.e. the murder of somebody in Okoro?s family. However, he referred to the DW5?s evidence to the effect that nobody in their family was murdered, yet this witness was not cross examined on it. He referred to the evidence of the Appellant as CW1 which he termed contradictory and submitted that the trial Judge captured all the contradictory evidence of the Appellants? witnesses before making the decision he did.

He submitted further that the learned

trial Judge did not make use of any extraneous matters in deciding the case as alleged by the Appellant, rather that the judgment was based on the facts presented to the trial Judge who watched the witnesses testify before him and the facts of his visit to the locus inquo to clarify or verify what transpired in the Court before delivering the judgment. Again, learned Counsel submitted that the allegation that the trial Judge based his judgment on extraneous matters was a mere speculation and that confirms the fact that the Appellant did not ask for the dismissal of the judgment but for a retrial in the alternative, referring us to page 19 paragraph 4.35 of the Appellant?s brief.

Submitting further learned Counsel stated that the judgment of the trial Court is not perverse, but represents the evidence of the parties and their witnesses and the correct application of legal principles and therefore did not occasion any miscarriage of justice.

Concluding on this issue Onyeabor Esq., urged us to discountenance the submissions of the Appellant and resolve the issue in favour of the Respondents.

The Appellant’s Counsel in his reply brief submitted

in the main, repeating the submissions in the main Appellant’s brief, that the judgment of the trial Court is replete with errors in law and non appreciation of the Appellant’s evidence (Exhibits A – E) which was unchallenged and uncontrovertible. Since the Respondent did not refute the evidence of the Exhibits “A” – “E”; that the Respondents have made out a new case different from that of the Appellant in their brief, without the leave of this Court first sought and obtained; that the learned trial Judge did not discredit Exhibit “A” – “E” on any ground and so by Section 105 of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended) the Exhibits constituted evidence which the learned trial Judge ought to have acted upon but did not do so leading to miscarriage of justice against the Appellant; that the Respondents’ Counsel made sweeping submissions in respect to the trial Court’s assessment of Exhibit “A” – “E” the admissibility of which the Respondents raised no objection at the lower Court that the reference by the Respondents’ Counsel to consideration and evaluation of evidence by the trial Court was a new issue never raised by the Respondents at the lower Court which smacks

of prejudice, referring to REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF AMORC VS. AWONIYI (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 355) 134; that Exhibits ?A?E? constitute acts of recent times of the Appellants making it more probable than that of the Respondents and finally that this Court is eminently qualified to further appraise the various pieces of documentary evidence, which, not being oral, do not put the credibility of the witnesses in issue, referring toSOLEH BONEH OVERSEAS (NIG.) LTD. VS. AYODELE (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 99) 549 that no oral evidence is admitted to add to or subtract from or vary the contents of a document, referring to FAGBENRO VS. AROBADI (2006) JNSC (Pt. 2) 174 at 180 R.7.

Learned Counsel concluded by urging us to set aside the judgment of the lower Court and enter judgment for the Appellant as the credibility of witnesses is not involved being documentary evidence that is involved in this case.

ISSUES 2 & 3
“WHETHER THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE ARRIVED AT HIS DECISION IN THIS CASE AFTER FOLLOWING THE PROPER GUIDELINES FOR DECISION MAKING LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE CASE OF ODOFIN VS. MOGAJI (1978) 4 SC 91 at 93

GROUND 2 OF APPEAL.”
AND
“WHETHER THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY AND CONCLUSIVELY EVALUATED THE EVIDENCE PUT UP BY THE CLAIMANT AND DEFENDANTS, AS REQUIRED OF HIM UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF IMAGINARY SCALE OF JUSTICE, BEFORE FINDING FOR THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE. (GROUNDS 3 & 4 OF APPEAL).

Onumajuru Esq., referred to the case of ODOFIN VS. MOGAJI (1978) 4 SC 91 at 93, which lays down the principle that a Court “should first put the totality of the testimonies adduced by the plaintiff on one side of the scale and that of the Defendant, on the other side and weigh them together. He will then see which is heavier” and then asked “did the trial Court follow this procedure, in arriving at its judgment in this case?” He answered this question in the negative and submitted that if the learned trial Judge had applied the aforesaid principle, enunciated by the Supreme Court in ODOFIN VS. MOGAJI (supra) in evaluating or assessing the evidence adduced by the parties at the trial, he probably would have come to a different conclusion and in favour of the claimant (Appellant). He noted that in a claim for declaration of title to land, based on

grant, or inheritance, from ancestors, as in this case, the claimant must plead and prove the names, or the histories of their several ancestors who founded the land in dispute and in what circumstances and the persons, on whom title in respect of the land had devolved since the first founding. He asserted that the Appellant in this case pleaded all the facts needed as above in his Further Amended Statement of Claim and Further Reply to the Defendants’ Amended Statement of Defence, referring us to pages 237 -239 and 244-246 of the Record. Learned Counsel referred to the Exhibits tendered without any objection thereto and submitted that if the learned trial Judge had properly and clearly evaluated all the evidence on record before him, he would have considered Exhibit “A” which is the claimants Survey Plan, showing the location, size, dimensions and features of his entire land, including the portion of the land in dispute, and granted the land in dispute to the claimant by arriving at the conclusion that the claimants further took possession of the land in dispute a long time ago.

Learned Counsel referred to Exhibits ?A?E?,

highlighting each one of them and then submitted that if the learned trial Judge had properly evaluated them he would have come to a different conclusion and found for the Appellants. He submitted in respect of Exhibits “B” and “E” that where a previous judgments had vested ownership of disputed land on a party, the claimant in this case, the onus is on his adversary, (the Defendants herein) to prove that the first party (Appellant in this case) is not the owner of the land particularly where the adversary stood by and watched the first party do the legal battle with a stranger, relying onOKE VS. ATOLOYE (1986) ALL NLR 100. Counsel noted that it is not in dispute that the fathers of CW4 and CW3 testified in favour of the father of the Appellant in the proceedings Exhibits “B” and “E” that the land in dispute belongs to the Appellants’ father. Learned Counsel almost repeated his submissions under issue 1 in particular material and referred to the testimonies of the defence witnesses and submitted that there were contradictions in their evidence which make the Respondents at the trial Court to woefully fail to debunk the claimants (Appellants’) evidence.

Onumajuru Esq., submitted that the trial Court failed in its duty of evaluating and ascribing probative value to the evidence of the parties in this case in which it hears, sees and assesses all the witnesses’ evidence. Again that the duty of the Appellate Court is to find out whether there is evidence on record on which the trial Court could have acted. Also that the Appellate Court can tamper with the evaluation of evidence by the trial Court where the trial Court made wrong or perverse findings, as in the instant case, referring to BALOGUN VS. AKANJI (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 70) 301. Referring to ODOFIN VS. MOGAJI (supra) learned Counsel submitted and urged us to find out whether the following can be found in the proceedings viz:-
(a) The evidence before the Court.
(b) Whether the trial Court accepted or rejected any evidence upon the correct perception.
(c) Whether the trial Court correctly approached the assessment of the evidence before it and placed the right probative value on it.
(d) Whether the trial Court used the imaginary scale of justice to weigh the evidence on either side.
(e) Whether the trial Court, upon the preponderance of

evidence appreciated which side the scale of justice weighed, having regard to the burden of proof.

Learned Counsel again reiterated his submissions that the trial Court did not evaluate the evidence placed before it thereby rendering its findings perverse as the findings did not evolve from the evidence on record, or it had taken into account extraneous matters or excluded relevant materials from its consideration, referring us to the case of YAKUBU VS. JAUROYEL (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1418) 203 at 213 R. 9. He then urged us to use our powers under Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act 2004 and intervene and exercise all the powers vested in the trial Court and right the wrongs occasioned by the judgment so far as the conditions calling for the application of Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act exist in this case, referring us toSALAKO VS. DOSUMU (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 517) 371; UMESIE VS. ONUAGULUCHI (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 421) 515 and EZEIGWE VS. NWAWULU (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1183) 159.

On page 28 paragraph 5.40, learned Counsel urged us not to send this case back for retrial as the factors for doing so do not exist, referring to ODOFIN VS. AYOOLA (1984) 11

SC72 and ONISAODU VS. ELEWUJU (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt. 998) 517.

Counsel finally concluded that we set aside the decision of the trial Court on the grounds that:-
(a) The trial Court misdirected itself in law by a clear understanding and misconception of the case before it.
(b) The trial Court’s reliance on the Rule of KOJO II VS. BOSIE (supra) in this case was misplaced and led to miscarriage of justice against the claimant (Appellant).
(c) The trial Court did not follow the proper guidelines for decision making set down by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of ODOFIN VS. MOGAJI (supra) in arriving at its decision.
(d) The trial Court did not properly evaluate the evidence before it in arriving at its decision in this case.
He then urged us to allow the appeal with the appropriate reliefs in favour of the Appellant.

Mr. Onyeabor in his response to these issues adopted the submissions of the Appellant’s Counsel as they concern the merging of the two issues together and the application of the principle of law as laid down in ODOFIN VS. MOGAJI (1978) 4 SC 91 at 93.

He stated that the trial Court correctly applied the

principle as laid down in the above case in determining the instant case. He also contended that the trial Court in its judgment clearly stated the evidence led by the parties and their witnesses, put them side by side on the imaginary scale of justice and found that of the Respondents weightier than that of the Appellant. He referred us to the said judgment at pages 424 – 459 of the Record.

Learned Counsel then submitted that the evaluation of evidence is neither the duty of the Appellant nor the Respondents as the learned Counsel for the Appellant tried to portray before us in his brief of arguments but pre-eminently that of the trial Court which has the benefit of seeing and watching the demeanor of witnesses in the course of their testimonies. He then submitted that the Appellate Court would ordinarily never disturb the findings of fact made by the trial Court unless it is proved that the findings are not supported by the evidence on record and therefore perverse, because the Appellate Court is at a disadvantage of not having seen, or watched, or observed the credibility of the witnesses.

He stated that in the instant case where the trial Court

rightly evaluated the evidence before it after visiting the locus and saw things for itself, this Court will have no basis to disturb such findings made by the trial Court, referring to MICHAEL EYO VS. EMEKA ONUOHA & ORS (2011) ALL FWLR (Pt. 574) 3 R. 2 and ANAEZE VS. ANYASO (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 291) 1. He submitted that the trial Court observed the witnesses in the course of their testimonies and took note of their demeanor which spoke volumes of their credibility. He referred us to pages 376, and 458 lines 12-17 of the Record in respect to the evidence of the Appellant as CW1 which he quoted and submitted that the trial Court correctly evaluated the evidence of the parties before it referring toOGUANUHU VS. CHEGBOKA (2003) WRN 11 at 126 line 35 per Fabiyi JCA (as he then was) which Counsel also quoted.

Onyeabor Esq., recalled that the learned trial Judge properly evaluated the evidence of the parties, assessing same and then arrived at a just decision after weighing the two traditional histories and preferring that of the Respondents to that of the Appellant. He referred to page 187 lines 24-25 of the Record especially the evidence of the Appellant under

cross-examination and submitted that where, as in the instant case, the trial Court had reached a right decision, the reason given for it is immaterial, as long as that decision justifies the findings, referring to ALHAJI SANDA NDAYAKO & ORS V DANTORO (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187 at 220 B-C per Edozie JSC. As to how the Respondents allegedly came into the land in dispute, learned Counsel referred us to pages 99-100 of the Record. He referred us toACB VS. GWAGWADA (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 113) 85 in support of his submissions that the evidence of the Appellant as to Constitution of NDEDIKE as a Development Union and so a separate community in order to claim the land as a village square, to be evidence against interest. He then submitted that the trial judge was right in its evaluation of evidence and disbelieved the evidence of the Appellant as regards the reasons for the Respondents? alleged coming into the land in dispute which the Judge found not to be in accord with natural course of events, referring to NWANKONI VS. ARUEZE (2011) ALL FWLR (Pt. 564) 77 R. 2 in respect of the bounding duty of a parties leading evidence in support of custom upon which his claim is

based and legal consequences of his failure to do so and submitted that the Appellant woefully failed to satisfy the Court that his case had a solid foundation. He submitted further that the findings of the lower Court cannot be faulted, as it is trite that the Respondents need not prove anything if the Appellant failed to prove his case, referring toPROGRESSIVE ACTION CONGRESS VS. INEC (2009) ALL FWLR (Pt. 428) 266 R. 6.

Onyeabor Esq., submitted that the trial Court was right in its reasoning as to why the Appellant failed to explain why his ancestor offeredAmaechi, the Respondents’ ancestor, a place in the area now in dispute in the same community against the custom of the people in respect to the people who committed murders. He referred us to page 454 of the Record for the correct observations of the learned trial Judge in respect to the evidence of the Appellant as against that of the Respondent.

Coming to the Exhibits tendered on which the Appellant’s Counsel laid so much emphasis that the trial Court did not evaluate them Onyeabor Esq., submitted that the trial Court did evaluate the Exhibits and rightly formed its opinion thereon. He stated

that the Respondents did not object to the tendering of the Exhibits because they wanted the Court to compare them with the land in dispute and form its opinion; that the Exhibits had no probative value as each varies with the land in dispute; that the lower court was right not to have attached any probative value to the Exhibits tendered. Learned Counsel then contended that Exhibit A did not tally with the land in dispute regarding its boundaries and did not tally with the pleaded facts by the Appellants as contained in Exhibits B, C and E showing that the land in dispute is the one for which the exhibits related or were made. He also contended that it was not difficult to conclude that the Appellant has been using these same exhibits to snatch other people’s land as Exhibit A did not show the part of the land disputed with BekeeIhekwaba or the portion involved in Exhibits C and E respectively; that the Survey Plan fraudulently made for the purpose of this case was not the one used in the various suits tendered because their production will certainly expose the Appellant. Referring us to page 58 of the Record learned Counsel submitted that it is undisputable

that none of the lands disputed by the Appellant with other people in the past has the village square as a boundary or Onugha family and not to talk of Ikeji as shown in Exhibit A.

Learned Counsel then raised the questions:- ?Why were Respondents still living on the land when it was purportedly pledged to them and redeemed? Why is it that the Exhibits do not relate to the land in dispute? Why is it that the purported economic trees on the land were not indicated on Exhibit A? Why is it that the Court was not shown the trees or their location on visit to locus inquo? Why is it that the Appellant abandoned his claim for damages

Onyeabor Esq., answered these questions by saying the trial Court found the exhibits to be unrelated to the disputed land and so held in its judgment. Counsel referred to the evidence tendered before the lower Court and submitted that the Appellant has failed woefully to maintain his action and the lower Court was right in its evaluation of the evidence and rejection of the evidence of the Appellant. Counsel referred us to Exhibits ?K? and ?N? and submitted that the allegations of the

Appellant could not stand based on the participation of the Appellant’s father as a member of UcheNwoukwu who signed Exhibit ?N? acknowledging the Respondents? ownership of the land in dispute. He submitted further that the Appellant was wrong to have expected the trial Court to rely on Exhibits ?B?, ?C?, and ?E? which are not related to the land in dispute, referring us to the evidence of CW1 at page 382 lines 3-7. He also referred to Exhibits?H?-?H3?, pages 396-397 line 2 of the Record and submitted that the evidence of the Appellant was full of contradictions. Counsel submitted further that it was clear that the land in dispute was/is different from the ones in the Exhibits ?A?E?.

Learned Counsel submitted that there were contradictions in the case of the Respondents as against the alleged claims and submissions of the Appellant, referring us to the verdict of the UcheNkwoUkwu in Exhibit N.

Onyeabor Esq., submitted that no oral evidence can be admitted to change the documentary evidence contained in Exhibit N, referring to

OBIAZIKINOR VS. OBIAZIKINOR (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1070) 551 at 575 paras A-C R. 7 & 8. He also referred us to page 378 lines 15-17 of the Record to note the admission of the Appellant in respect of the land on which the father of the 1st Respondent was buried. He referred us again to pages 140-144 of the Record and submitted that CW1 (the Appellant) had no credibility which was so found by the trial Court, relying on EZEMBA VS. IBENEME (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) 61 at 74 paras B-E R. 1-2. He then submitted that the Appellant did not produce cogent and credible evidence at the lower Court to convince that Court to grant him his prayers as he did not discharge the onus of proof laid on him by law.

Learned Counsel concluded that the Respondents have proved by cogent, credible and reliable evidence that they own the land in dispute which they have been in peaceable possession, exercising maximum acts of ownership over same. He urged us to dismiss the appeal as lacking in merit and uphold or affirm the judgment of the trial Court.

RESOLUTIONS
ISSUE 1
Whether the learned trial judge did not misdirect himself and therefore erred in law, when

he resorted to the Rule in KOJO II VS. BONSIE (1957) 1 WRL 1223, in resolving this case in the defendants? favour? Ground 1 of the Appeal.?

rejected; (b) Where a party pleads and traces the root of the title to a particular person or family, he must establish how that person came to the title vested in him. He cannot ignore proof of his overlord’s title and rely on long possession. (c) Where there are conflicts in the evidence given by witnesses called by the same party, the trial Court is duty bound to find which of the two conflicting histories is more probable by testing it against the other evidence. It is only when it can neither find any of the two histories probable or conclusive that it would declare both inconclusive and proceed to decide the case on the basis of numerous and positive acts of possession or actual user. FAYEMI v. AWE (2009) 13 NWLR (PT.1164) 315.”

In the instant case, both the Appellant and the Respondents pleaded and led evidence of traditional history. The learned trial Judge evaluated the evidence of both sides and arrived at the decision that he found that of the Respondents more probable and then accepted same as against that of the Appellant.

The learned trial Judge noted that the Appellant relied on both traditional history and acts of long possession and

enjoyment of the land in dispute.

Now, it is trite that in this nation it has long been established that there are five ways of proving title to land which are as follows:-
(1) By traditional history.
(2) By production of documents of title duly authenticated and executed.
(3) By acts of ownership extending over a sufficient length of time numerous and positive enough as to warrant the inference of true ownership.
(4) By acts of long possession and enjoyment.
(5) By proof of possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstance rendering it probable that the owner of such connected or adjacent land would in addition be the owner of the land in dispute.
However, it is not the law that a claimant must plead and lead evidence in proof of all the five methods. It suffices that where one of the five methods is pleaded and proved it is enough.
See IDUNDUN VS. OKUMAGBA (1976) 9?10 SC 227; MOGAJI VS. CADBURY NIG. LTD. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) 393; ADESANYA VS. ADEROUNMU (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 672) 370; ALABI VS. OLOYA (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 708) 37 at 40 R. 5.

It is the contention of the Appellant that the trial Court ought

not to have relied on the principle of law enunciated in KOJO II VS. BOSIE (1957) 1 WLR 1223. Now, the principle establishes, as has been held by this Court in WUSU & ORS VS. DAVID & ORS (2014) LPELR?22426 (CA) at pages 42?43 para B?A as follows:-
“The principle in KOJO II V. BONSIE establishes that where there is conflict of traditional history, one side or the other must be mistaken, yet both may be honest in their belief. The best way is to test the traditional history by reference to the fact in recent years as established by evidence and see which of the two competing histories is more probable. See KOJO V. BONSIE (1957) 1 WLR 122 ODOFIN v. AYOOLA (1984) 11 SC 72; BALOGUN V. AKANJI (2005) 10 NWLR (PT 933) 394. In IHEANACHO v. MATHAS CHIGERE (2004) 7 NWLR (PT 901) 180. The issue arose before the Supreme Court as to when the Rule in KOJO V. BONSIE is applicable and it held that: “The rule in KOJO v. BONSIE (1957) 1 WLR 122 at 126 is that “where parties rely on traditional history in proof of their title and the evidence of traditional history is conflicting or is inconclusive, the rule is to be applied to the case by making

reference to facts in recent history to resolve the issue.” This rule is usually applied in land cases where acts of ownership exercised within living memory is used as a litmus test in verification of evidence of traditional history.” In EBOADE V. ATOMESIN (1997) 5 NWLR (PT 506) 490 it was held that the rule will only apply where the two parties pleaded traditional history and led evidence in accordance with their pleadings at the trial. It will not apply where a party pleads settlement but leads evidence to show a grant and vice versa.”

the evidence of the parties, considered the principles of law dealing with the case and came to the conclusion that the Appellant failed to prove his title to the land in dispute.?
I have carefully reviewed the evidence adduced before the trial Court, the submissions and the principle of law applied in this case and I hold the firm view that the learned trial Judge has done justice to the issues raised before him. First of all the traditional history led by the Appellant was most improbable because same was rather out of tune with natural events in human life. The Appellant had pleaded and led evidence to the effect that a member of the family of the great, grandfather of the Respondents had murdered somebody which made them to be ostracized. He gave the name of the victim of the murder as Okoronta from Okoro?s family and so the entire family was banished from the Community. The learned trial Judge visited the place and discovered that the community was a single community separated only by a road and so there was no way the ancestor of the Appellant could have harbored the fleeing Respondents? family members. He therefore found this piece of

evidence unfounded.

The learned trial Judge found the case of the Appellant in respect of the Respondents? ancestor being their customary tenant unproved. The legal requirements in respect of traditional history enunciated above were not fulfilled by the Appellants. I therefore agree with the learned trial Judge that the Appellants did not establish their title. The Exhibits tendered were not useful as they had no bearing with the case. The judgment in Exhibit ?B? did not tie the case to this land in dispute as it was given in respect to Azulo Egbuta land which accommodates both the families of the Appellants and the Respondents.

In my firm view the analysis of the entire case especially at page 24 of the Judgment cannot be faulted. Issue 1 is therefore resolved in favour of the Respondents and against the Appellant.

PROPERLY AND CONCLUSIVELY EVALUATED THE EVIDENCE PUT UP BY THE CLAIMANT AND DEFENDANTS, AS REQUIRED OF HIM UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF IMAGINARY SCALE OF JUSTICE, BEFORE FINDING FOR THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE. (GROUNDS 3 & 4 OF APPEAL).?
The principle of the law laid down in the case of ODOFIN VS. MOGAJI (1978) 4 SC 91 at 93 by the Supreme Court simply is this:-
?That a trial Court in deciding a case should first of all put the totality of the evidence or testimonies adduced by the claimant or plaintiff on one side of the imaginary scale and that of the Defendant on the other side and weigh them together and see which one is heavier on the imaginary scale of justice.?
In this appeal, even though this complaint has been raised by the Appellant in his brief, it has not been demonstrated how the trial Court failed to follow or apply this principle of law. It is not incumbent on the trial Judge to announce that he is putting or had put the totality of the testimonies of the plaintiff on one side of the scale and that of the Defendant on the other for it to be accepted that he has complied with the law. To my mind, this principle

simply calls on the trial Judge to properly, carefully and dispassionately consider and analyze all the important or material pieces of evidence adduced by the parties, comparing one against the other to see which is more probable or believable. The application of this principle will, in my opinion, prevent any rash conclusion of the case upon matters or materials which are irrelevant to the case. In other words, it would prevent the Court from concluding the case without proper consideration of the material evidence adduced before it. The principle does not require the trial Judge to say either viva voice or in print, ?Hey! See, I am putting the evidence of the plaintiff on the right, and that of the defendant on the left side of the imaginary scale of justice and weighing same together to see which one is heavier.? No! it is as I have demonstrated above. In the instant appeal, there is clear indication that the trial Judge properly analyzed the evidence adduced by both parties before arriving at the conclusion he did. I am therefore satisfied that there was no breach of the principle of law laid down in ODOFIN VS. MOGAJI (supra).

We have

been called upon to declare the findings/decisions of the trial Judge perverse by the Appellant. I have painstakingly combed through the evidence, the evaluation, and the findings of the trial Judge and I have not found any element of perversity therein. The findings of a Court can only be perverse where it is not based on any legal evidence, or on wrong application of the principle of law either procedurally or substantially or misapplication of a principle of law. See STAG ENGINEERING CO. LTD. VS. SABALCO (NIG.) LTD. & ANOR. (2008) LPELR-8485 (CA) and PANYA VS. PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ORS. (2018) LPELR-44573 (CA).

I also note that the Appellant has duplicated his submissions under issue 1 in respect of these two issues and, having resolved that issue against the Appellant, I hereby resolve the two issues against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondents.

On the whole, this appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed by me. The Judgment of the trial Court is hereby affirmed. I award cost of N50,000.00 in favour of the Respondents and against the Appellant.

THERESA NGOLIKA ORJI-ABADUA, J.C.A.: I agree

ITA GEORGE MBABA, J.C.A.: I had the advantage of reading the draft of the lead judgment, just delivered by my learned brother, I.A. Andenyangtso JCA, and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion that the appeal lacks merit.

The Rule in Kojo (II) vs Bonsie (1953) 14 WACA 242, is usually resorted to where two competing traditional history of the parties claiming title to land are both conflicting, incredible and/or inconclusive, or where they are both probable, such that the Court cannot, justifiably, prefer one to the other. The Court, therefore, is guided by recent events and acts of the parties concerning the land as to who is in possession or has been in possession and exercised acts of ownership in recent history, to determine the person with better title to the land. See the case of Duru & Ors Vs Duru & Ors (2017) LPELR – 42490 CA; Kojo Il vs Bonsie (2001) Vol. 86 LRCN 1492; Enyinnaya vs otikpo (2015) LPELR – 25529 (CA); Taiwo & ors vs Ogundele & ors (2012) LPELR – 7803 SC.
Of course, where the traditional history of one of the parties is cogent, positive and conclusive

and preferred by the trial Court, the resort to the Rule in Kojo II Vs Bonsie becomes unnecessary. See Olumogbo Vs Odih (2018)LPELR- 46852 CA; Enyinnaya Vs Otikpo (supra), Balogun vs Akanji (1988)1 NWLR (Pt.70)301, Fasoro vs Beyioku & Ors (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 76) 263; Nwosu vs Eluwa & Ors (2017) LPELR – 41686 CA and Ashilonu & Anor. vs Ohale & Anor. (2018) LPELR – 44267 CA.
In this case, at hand, the trial Court had believed the traditional history as stated by the Respondent, and did not rely on the Rule in Kojo Il Vs Bonsie to resolve the case. It was the Appellant’s Counsel therefore that wrongly introduced the Rule in Kojo Il Vs Bonsie (supra) in this appeal and accused the trial judge of relying on it. That was unfair.
I too dismiss the Appeal, and abide by the consequential orders in the lead judgment.

Appearances:

Chief E.C. Onumajuru, Esq.For Appellant(s)

Ikenyirimba Vincent Onyeabor, Esq.For Respondent(s)

Appearances

Chief E.C. Onumajuru, Esq.For Appellant

AND

Ikenyirimba Vincent Onyeabor, Esq.For Respondent