AZEEZ AKEREDOLU & OTHERS V. LASISI AKINREMI(1985)

AZEEZ AKEREDOLU & OTHERS V. LASISI AKINREMI

In The Supreme Court of Nigeria

On Friday, the 22nd day of November, 1985

SC.187/1985(-R1)

JUSTICES

AYO GABRIEL IRIKEFE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

KAYODE ESO Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

ANTHONY NNAEMEZIE ANIAGOLU Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

AUGUSTINE NNAMANI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

BOONYAMIN OLADIRAN KAZEEM Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

SAIDU KAWU Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

CHUKWUDIFU AKUNNE OPUTA Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

AZEEZ AKEREDOLU & OTHERS Appellant(s)

AND

LASISI AKINREMI Respondent(s)

RATIO

THE PROVISION OF SECTION 31(2) OF THE SUPREME COURT ACT

It is to be noted that section 31(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act provides that:
(2) The periods prescribed for the giving of notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal are (a) in an appeal in a civil case, fourteen days in an appeal against an interlocutory decision and three months in an appeal against a final decision;
The term used is “three months” and not “three calendar months” as in Migotti v. Colvill (supra). And so, the interpretation applied in Migotti v. Colvill which all the Lord Justices in the case agreed was a technical one, must be strictly restricted to the phrase “three calendar months” and not applied to the situation in the Supreme Court Act 1960, in which the term “three months” is used. It is however, true that in section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act 1964, the term “month” is defined as “a calendar month” reckoned according to the Gregorian calendar, and Gregorian Calendar is the correction of the Julian Calendar made in 1582 by Pope Gregory XIII, (See 5th Ed. The Concise Oxford Dictionary page 540). PER ANIAGOLU, J.S.C.

THE COMPUTATION OF TIME TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL AT THE SUPREME COURT

This important issue which has been so keenly contested by learned Senior Advocates is the computation of the time specified in sub-section (2) of section 31 of the Supreme Court Act. The section itself provides –
“(1) Where a person decides to appeal to the Supreme Court he shall give notice of appeal in such manner as may be directed by rules of court within the period prescribed by sub-section (2) of this section that is applicable to the case.
(2) The period prescribed for the giving of notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal are –
(a) in an appeal in a civil case, fourteen days in an appeal against an interlocutory decision and three months in an appeal against a final decision;
(b) in an appeal in a criminal case, thirty days from the date of the decision appealed against. PER ESO, J.S.C.

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 31(2)(B) OF THE SUPREME COURT ACT PRESECRIBES THAT TIME IS TO BE COMPUTED FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION BEING APPEALED AGAINST IN CRIMINAL MATTERS

It is I think in recognition of this special case that in criminal matters Section 31(2)(b) of the Supreme Court Act prescribes that time will be computed from the date of the decision being appealed against.
The principle in Migotty’s case has not been applied in civil matters dealing with such issues as statute of limitation, bankruptcy etc. From the line of authorities it seems to have been established that in computing time the date of the event is normally excluded. See Radcliffe v. Batholomew 1892 1 Q.B.D.161; Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd (1961) 2 Q.B.135; Pritam Kaur v. S. Russel and Sons Ltd (1973) Q.B. 336. In re North Ex parte Hasluck (1895) 2 Q.B.264, 270 Lord Esher. N.R. said that there was no general rule for the computation of time either under the Bankruptcy Act or any other statute, or indeed where time is mentioned in a contract. The mode of computation is to have regard in each case to the purpose for which the computation is to be made
“A fair rule of construction” he said, “seems to be that where the computation is to be for the benefit of the person affected as much time should be given as the language admits of”
Time was here computed as running from a day after the seizure of goods. PER NNAMANI, J.S.C.

N. ANIAGOLU, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading judgment): A preliminary question dealing with the computation of the times and periods prescribed by Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1960, has arisen in this appeal which came from the Court of Appeal, Ibadan, on a judgment delivered by that court, sitting on appeal on a judgment of the High Court, Ilaro, in respect of a claim for ownership of a piece of land situate in Otta, Ogun State, along Lagos/Abeokuta Road. The respondent says that the appeal was filed out of time and has raised this by way of preliminary objection.
Judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered on Wednesday, 10th April, 1985. Mr. Ajayi, S.A.N., stated that the notice of appeal was filed on 10th July, 1985. Chief Williams, S.A.N., although arguing that the three months expiry date for filing the appeal should be the 10th day July, 1985, stated that in fact he filed his appeal on 8th July, 1985. I have since checked the file from the Court of Appeal and the records of this court and found the date of filing the appeal to be 10th July, 1985. Mr. Ajayi, in support of his objection, submitted that the time to appeal under Section 31(2) of the Supreme Court Act is “3 calendar months” and that the Interpretation Act 1964 made this clear. He argued that 3 calendar months from 10th April 1985 expired on 9th July, 1985 and that the appellants were out of time by one day. He relied on Migotti v. Colvill (1878) 4 C.P.D. 233. He pointed out that the appellants did not file any application for extension of time to appeal, and that even if they did, there must be an appeal pending to which an application for leave to appeal could be attached. The appellants, he said, made an application for leave to appeal before the Court of Appeal but that was refused by that Court. Even that application before that court was filed out of time, therefore, he said, no application was therefore, in law, made.
Chief Williams, in reply, argued that if judgment was given on 10th April, 1985, the 3 months period would expire on one whole month and not 29 days and a few hours. The day on which the event happened would not usually be
included. He gathered a pattern of general principles, namely, that
i. where a period of time is prescribed by statute and that period is to be computed by reference to an event which has happened, then the question whether the computation included or excluded, the day on which the event happened would depend on the true intention of the legislature;
ii. where the time prescribed is for the benefit of the person affected by the computation, then as much time should be given as the language of the statute admits. Generally, the computation would always exclude the date on which the event happened;
iii. when a construction of the time prescribed would work detrimentally against the person affected by the computation then the construction which avoids the detriment would be preferred.
He relied on In re North Ex parte Hasluck (1895) 2 QB. 264 particularly the judgments of Lord Esher M.R. and Rigby, L.J. These principles, he stated, had been applied to the statute of limitation in Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd. (1961) 2 QBD. 135 and Pritam Kaur v. Russel & Sons Ltd. (1973) QB. 336. He finally submitted that every period of 3 months is a period calculated in days, relying upon the provisions of the Interpretation Act 1964.
Mr. Ajayi, in replying to Chief Williams’ argument further submitted, relying on the definition of the word “month” in section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act 1964 where it is defined as meaning
“a calendar month reckoned according to the Gregorian calendar”,
that, the index of calculation is “month” and not “days” and that on that basis, 3 calendar months, calculating from 10th April, 1985 when the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment, would expire on 9th July, 1985. In Migotti v. Colvill (supra) the term “calendar month” was being interpreted with a view to determining the date for the discharge of a prisoner after the expiration of his sentence. In that case the prisoner was sentenced on 31st October, 1878, for one offence for “one calendar month” and or a second offence for a period of fourteen days, commencing after the expiration of the calendar month. He was taken into custody on 31/10/1878 and finally released on 14//2/1878. The prisoner claimed to be entitled to be released one day earlier, namely, 13/12/1878. In his judgment, the trial judge, Denman, J. posed the question: what was the meaning of one “calendar month” at the time the sentence was passed He answered it in the following words:
“And I am of the opinion that at that time, viz, on the 31st of October, those words meant a month ending on the day in the succeeding month corresponding to the day of the sentence according to the ordinary understanding of the words “this day calendar month.”
On appeal to the Court of Appeal all the three Lord Justices, Bramwell, L.J., Brett and Cotton, LL.J., agreed with Denman, J., Bramwell, L.J. at page 237 held:
“The only rule which can be laid down is, that where an imprisonment for a calender month begins on a day in one month and terminates in another, so many days must be taken from the second month, if there are enough as will bring the time up to day before that day in the second month which corresponds to the day on which the imprisonment began on the 5th it would end at 12 o’clock on the night of the 4th of the following month; if on the 25th it would end on the 24th; if on the 29th it would end on the 28th; that is to say, we must take as many days in the second month as had already passed in the month in which the imprisonment took place before the imprisonment.”
Brett, L.J., in agreeing, was of the view that the term “calendar month” was a legal and technical term which required a legal and technical interpretation.
He stated that
“The meaning of the phrase is that, in computing time by calendar months, the time must be reckoned by looking at the calendar and not by counting days; and that one calendar month’s imprisonment is to be calculated from the day of imprisonment to the day numerically corresponding to that day in the following month less one.”
Cotton, L.J. agreed and stated in general that the principle must be that a prisoner sentenced to a calender month’s imprisonment, will never be imprisoned for a greater number of days than there are in the month in which he was sentenced; that the matter was a question of law and “not a question of measurement of time but of the technical meaning of the words “calendar month.”
Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd. (1961) 2 QBD. 135 applying Radcliffe v. Batholomew (1892) 1 QB. 161 and not following the decision in Gelmini v. Moriggia (1913) 2 KB. 549 decided that in the computation of the period, under the Limitation Act 1939, within which the action should be brought, the day of the accident must be excluded. This is in line with section 15(2) of our Interpretation Act 1964.
The same exclusion was applied in In Re North Ex parte Hasluck (supra) where it was held that, under the Bankruptcy Act 1890, if a sheriff was to hold the debtor’s goods seized for 21 days, the day on which the seizure was made to be excluded.
It is to be noted that section 31(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act provides that:
(2) The periods prescribed for the giving of notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal are (a) in an appeal in a civil case, fourteen days in an appeal against an interlocutory decision and three months in an appeal against a final decision;
The term used is “three months” and not “three calendar months” as in Migotti v. Colvill (supra). And so, the interpretation applied in Migotti v. Colvill which all the Lord Justices in the case agreed was a technical one, must be strictly restricted to the phrase “three calendar months” and not applied to the situation in the Supreme Court Act 1960, in which the term “three months” is used. It is however, true that in section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act 1964, the term “month” is defined as “a calendar month” reckoned according to the Gregorian calendar, and Gregorian Calendar is the correction of the Julian Calendar made in 1582 by Pope Gregory XIII, (See 5th Ed. The Concise Oxford Dictionary page 540).
But, by section 15(2) (a) of the Interpretation Act 1964
“A reference in an enactment to a period of days shall be construed –
(a) where the period is reckoned from a particular event, as excluding the day on which the event occurs;”
It would follow that in computing the period for the filing of the appeal in this matter the date – 10th April, 1985 – on which the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment must be excluded. The calculation thus begins on 11th April, 1985 and three months from hence must end at midnight of 10th July, 1985.
The one day by which Mr. Ajayi has said the appellants were out of time becomes the one day which by section 15(2) of the Interpretation Act 1964, must be excluded in the computation, on the footing that the appeal was filed on 10th July, 1985. The principle of this exclusion of the day of the happening of the event has become a principle of general acceptance. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 12 Ed. page 309, citing Lester v. Garland (1808) 15 Yes. 248 and Re North Ex parte Hasluck (supra), has it thus:
“Where a statutory period runs “from” a named date “to” another, or the statute prescribes some period of days or weeks or months or years within which some act has to be done, although the computation of the period must in every case depend on the intention of Parliament as gathered from the statute, generally the first day of the period will be excluded from the reckoning, and consequently the last day will be included.”
For the foregoing reasons, I would accept the contention of Chief Williams that the appeal was not filed out of time. Accordingly, the preliminary objection is not well founded, and is therefore hereby overruled.

A. G. IRIKEFE, C.J.N. (Presiding): The preliminary issue here is on computation of time for the purpose of filing an appeal pursuant to the provisions of Section 31(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1960.
I had, before now, read the lead ruling just read by my learned brother Aniagolu, J.S.C. which dealt fully with all the issues canvassed and I am in complete agreement with his views thereon. Section 15(2)(a) of the Interpretation Act 1964, seem to me a powerful pillar in support of the view that, in computing time, the date of the happening of the event shall be excluded. It provides:-
“(a) Where the period is reckoned from a particular event , as excluding the day on which the event occurs.” Consequently, I also agree that the preliminary objection should fail. There will be no order as to costs.

K. ESO, J.S.C.: I have had the advantage of a preview of the Ruling which has just been delivered by my learned brother Aniagolu, J.S.C. and I am in agreement with his reasoning. I am only adding my view as the matter, though short, is so important.
This important issue which has been so keenly contested by learned Senior Advocates is the computation of the time specified in sub-section (2) of section 31 of the Supreme Court Act. The section itself provides –
“(1) Where a person decides to appeal to the Supreme Court he shall give notice of appeal in such manner as may be directed by rules of court within the period prescribed by sub-section (2) of this section that is applicable to the case.
(2) The period prescribed for the giving of notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal are –
(a) in an appeal in a civil case, fourteen days in an appeal against an interlocutory decision and three months in an appeal against a final decision;
(b) in an appeal in a criminal case, thirty days from the date of the decision appealed against.
Chief Williams had filed an application before this Court wherein he sought an order-
“(1) for extension of time within which to make the application in prayer 2 below (if, but only if, the Court should decide that it can only entertain the said prayer after granting an extension of time within which to make the application in prayer 2 below.
(2) for leave to appeal to this Honourable Court from the decision of the Court of Appeal delivered on the 10th day of April 1985 on grounds other than grounds of law.”
The contention of Mr. G.O.K. Ajayi, SAN. in a preliminary objection, was that the issue of the application made by Chief Williams does not arise as there is no appeal before this court, a purported one having only been filed out of time. That is, a day date late and without leave of this Court, wherein the Appellant would have stated the reasons for the delay in filing the appeal. It is a fine point indeed, which first looked obscure, but very important as, by the preliminary objection raised by learned Senior Advocate Mr. G. O. K. Ajayi, if he is right there is no appeal before this Court in which the leave being sought by Chief Williams could be granted.
The Court of Appeal, sitting in Ibadan, had determined an appeal from the judgment of the High Court Haro and the Appellant has filed a notice of appeal, being dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court of Appeal, to this Court on 10th July 1985. The judgment of the Court of Appeal had been delivered on 10th July and the question is whether the three months stipulated by section 31(2) expired on 9th July as Mr. G.O.K. Ajayi contended or 10th July as Chief Williams argued.
I would have thought the matter is settled by the provision of the Interpretation Act s.15(2)(a) of which provides –
“A reference in an enactment to a period of days shall be construed –
(a) where the period is reckoned from a particular event, as excluding the day on which the event occurs …”
but for the strong contention of Mr. G.O.K. Ajayi that the Act is in regard of enactment (like the Supreme Court Act) that makes reference to (unlike the particular provisions of the Supreme Court Act under consideration) days. In other words, the contention of Mr. G.O.K. Ajayi, and it is weighty, is that in interlocutory matters the enactment refers to days (fourteen days and not just a fortnight) and so would be caught by the Interpretation Act, but in final decision which refers to 3 months (and not 90 days) the provisions of s.15(2)(a) of the Interpretation Act does not apply.
I will deal specifically with the provisions of the Interpretation Act as my learned brother Aniagolu, J.S.C. has, in detail, examined the English Authorities on this point and come to the conclusion that those authorities made a distinction between detrimental and non detrimental provisions. I am inclined to the view that the pattern presented by the English authorities would appear to be –
(i) where a construction of the time prescribed would work detrimentally against the person affected by the computation then the construction which avoids the detriment would be preferred.
I would not limit it to strictly penal provisions as canvassed in the arguments before us. This explains cases like Migotti v. Colvill (1878)(4) CPD 233 which Mr. G.O.K. Ajayi has relied upon. The pronouncement of the Lord Justices are illuminating and I intend to refer to them in construing the provisions of our own Interpretation Act. Suffice it to say at this juncture that the provision being “penal” was interpreted liberally in favour of the prisoner and strictly against the Crown. The other set is-
(ii) where time prescribed is for the benefit of the person affected by the computation, then as much time should be given as the language of the Statute admits. Generally the computation would always exclude the date on which the event happened.
This proposition is present in the cases – Radcliffe v. Batholomew (1892) 1 Q.B.D. 161; In re North Ex parte Halsueh 1895 2 Q.B.D. 1351 Pritan Kaw v. S. Russel & Sons Ltd. 1973 Q.B.
In Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. 1961 2 Q.B. 135 Havers J. reviewed the authorities to wit: Radcliffe v. Batholomew (1892) 1 Q.B. 161, Williams v. Burgess 1840 12 Ad & E 1635 Young v. Higgor 1840 8 Dowl. 212, 6 M & W 49, Gelmini v. Moriggia 1913 2 K.B. 29 and held that the day of the accident complained of in the case was to be excluded form the computation of the period within which the action should be brought. The learned Judge followed Radcliffe v. Batholomew (supra).
In Radcliffe v. Batholomew (supra) itself Wills, J. declined to make a distinction between the construction to be placed on the words according as they occur in statutes dealing with civil or criminal matters. He said –
“Great mischief might, and almost certainly would, arise from altering the canon of construction of the same words, according to the subject-matter with which they dealt;”
The learned Judge was not prepared to make one and that was a case where an information was laid against the appellant charging him with ill-treating certain sheep under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act (12 & 13 Vit. c92). The complaint was to be made within one calendar month after the case of such complaint shall arise. It was held that in computing the calendar month the day on which the cause of complaint arose ought to be excluded.
It is with the background of this case which makes no distinction according to whether the subject matter was either criminal or civil that I would examine the earlier case of Migotti v. Colvill (supra). There was no reference throughout that case to Radcliffe v. Batholomew nor subsequent cases, in so far as my research goes to this case of Migotti v. Colvill.
In Migotti v. Colvill (supra) the plaintiff had been convicted by a metropolitan police magistrate of two different assaults and sentenced to imprisonment upon each conviction; the convictions took place at 11a.m. on 31st October and the commitments were drawn up in accordance with the sentences passed. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the calendar month, the term of the first sentence, commenced at midnight on the 30th of October. Denman J. held, as a general rule, except where it is necessary in order to settle which of two acts done on the same day is to prevail,
“that the law takes no notice of part of a day and that the first day to be counted is the day any part of which is occupied in the particular business which is to endure for-a certain number of days in order to fulfill any requirement of the law.”
The learned judge was aware however that –
“there are no doubt several cases in which, when the date is to run from an act done, it has been held that the day in which the act is done is to be excluded from the computation. There are also cases in which, when a payment is to be made, or something is to be done, within so many days or months, or at the expiration of so many days or months, the day of the event within, or at the expiration of, so many days from which payment is to be made, or the act done, is not included in the reckoning.”
In the Court of Appeal, Bramwell, L.J. accepted the rule laid down by Denman, J. as sensible which never operates to the detriment of the provision. Cotton, L.J. would also appear to have the detriment rule in mind when he said –
“Thus the prisoner sentenced to a calendar month’s imprisonment will never be imprisoned for a greater number of days than there are in the month in which he was sentenced.”
It appears to me that section 15(2)(a) of our Interpretation Act is clear enough and leaves no room for setting out any principle more than the clear and unambiguous words of the provision –
“a period of days shall be construed to exclude the day on which the event occurs”
This is clear enough.
Sub-section (2) of s.31 of the Supreme Court Act stipulates “days” while part of sub-section (1) stipulates months. The question is why “days” in one sub-section and months in the other. “Month” has been defined to mean “a calendar month reckoned according to the Gregorian calendar.” The next question is – how is the Gregorian calendar reckoned A Nursery Ryme makes it sound simple-
“Thirty days hath September,
April, June and November,
All the rest have thirty one,
Except February, alone”
And so the Gregorian calendar month is reckoned in days. In the Encyclopaedia Britanicca “Gregorian Calendar” having been defined ends thus” For the computation of the Gregorian calendar, see Calendar, “Calendar” in the Encyclopaedia Britanica states the twelve lunar months and adds ” Of these Martins Mains, Quintitus and October had each 31 days, the rest 29,
save Februarius which had 28″.
One thing is important whether by the Nursery Rhyme or the Encyclopaedia Britanica, Gregorian calendar is computed in days. The learned Judge Denman J. in Migotti v. Colvill and the learned Justices in the Court of Appeal (England) though the sentence being considered was in “months” computed it in days. So also in the other cases which I have earlier referred to. Whenever there was reference to a period of months or years the actual numerical computation is done in days.
The use of the words “three months” therefore in s.31(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act could not but indicate days, the number of the days in the month depending on which month.
I am therefore of the firm view that the “period of days” referred to in the Interpretation Act 1964 must necessary include the use of the word “months” in an enactment.
For these reasons, and the reasons so well stated in the Ruling of my learned brother, Aniagolu, J.S.C., I will also overrule the preliminary objection.

A. NNAMANI, J.S.C.: I had preview of the Ruling just delivered by my learned brother Aniagolu, J.S.C. I entirely agree with it. I merely wish to add a brief comment.
The substance of the preliminary objection by Mr. Ajayi, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent was that the appellant’s appeal to this Court was out of time as it was filed on 10th July, 1985 and not 9th July, 1985. This necessitated the interpretation of time to appeal as contained in Section 31(2) of the Supreme Court Act, 1960. The provision is in these terms:
“31(2) The periods prescribed for the giving of notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal are –
(a) in an appeal in a civil case, fourteen days in an appeal against an interlocutory decision and three months in an appeal against a final decision;
(b) in an appeal in a criminal case, thirty days from the date of the decision appealed against”
It is Section 31(2)(a) that is directly in point. Relying on Section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act 1964 where month is defined as “a calender month reckoned according to the Gregorian calender”, Mr. Ajayi contended that the 3 months provided in Section 31(2)(a) must be computed such that the time will run to the corresponding day less 1 day. Hence 9th July, 1985 instead of 10th July. He relied on Migotty v. Colvill 1878/79 C. P. Division 233, 237.
I would wish to say that Migotty’s case which is a criminal case does not seem to me to be applicable here. The case did not lay down any general rule. As it dealt with computation of time of imprisonment it would appear to fall into one of the principles urged on the Court by Chief Williams, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant. This is that where the time prescribed is to the detriment of the person affected by the computation then the construction which avoids the detriment or penalty should be preferred. In Migotty’s case, Bramwell L.J. said at p.238-
“The rule I have laid down is therefore a sensible rule, which never operates to the detriment of the prisoner. If he is sent to prison in a long month, he gets 31 days; if he is sent to prison in a short month he gets 30 days; if he is imprisoned in February he would have the advantage of the short month”
It is I think in recognition of this special case that in criminal matters Section 31(2)(b) of the Supreme Court Act prescribes that time will be computed from the date of the decision being appealed against.
The principle in Migotty’s case has not been applied in civil matters dealing with such issues as statute of limitation, bankruptcy etc. From the line of authorities it seems to have been established that in computing time the date of the event is normally excluded. See Radcliffe v. Batholomew 1892 1 Q.B.D.161; Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd (1961) 2 Q.B.135; Pritam Kaur v. S. Russel and Sons Ltd (1973) Q.B. 336. In re North Ex parte Hasluck (1895) 2 Q.B.264, 270 Lord Esher. N.R. said that there was no general rule for the computation of time either under the Bankruptcy Act or any other statute, or indeed where time is mentioned in a contract. The mode of computation is to have regard in each case to the purpose for which the computation is to be made
“A fair rule of construction” he said, “seems to be that where the computation is to be for the benefit of the person affected as much time should be given as the language admits of”
Time was here computed as running from a day after the seizure of goods.
In the instant case time has to be computed such that the appellant has a full month and not 29 days and a few hours. In that case the date on which judgment was given by the Court of Appeal has to be excluded.
The issue would appear to be settled by Section 15(2)(a) of the Interpretation Act 1964 which stipulates that “a reference in an enactment to a period of days shall be construed
(a) where the period is reckoned from a particular event, as excluding the day on which the event occurs”
Although the period stipulated in Section 31(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act 1960 is in months not days, I am in agreement with Chief Williams submission that every period of 3 months is a period of days. The period in this appeal is reckoned from a particular event – the day the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment i.e. 10th April, 1985.
The preliminary objection must therefore fail. No order as to costs.

B. O. KAZEEM, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of reading the draft of the Ruling just read by my learned brother Aniagolu, J.S.C., and I entirely agree that it has dealt with all the submission made before us on this matter; and I adopt the reasons given therefore as my own. However, I wish to add the following few points.
In my view, the preliminary objection raised by Mr. G.O.K. Ajayi, S.A.N. that the Notice of Appeal delivered on 10th July, 1985, was filed out of time, does not seem to have taken cognizance of the provisions of Sec. 15(2) (a) of the Interpretation Act, 1964 which provided thus:
“A reference in an enactment to a period of days shall be construed
(a) where the period is reckoned from a particular event, as excluding the day on which the event occurs:
(b) ………………………………..”
Indeed Sec. 31(2) of the Supreme Court Act, 1960 provides that the time limit within which to appeal in any civil matter is 3 months; and Sec. 18(1) of the Interpretation Act 1964 defines the word “Month” to mean “a calendar month reckoned according to the Gregorian calendar. But the event with which we are concerned in this case is not only to be reckoned in terms of months alone, but also in terms of days. For the decision appealed from by Chief Williams S.A.N. in his Notice of Appeal was delivered on 10th April, 1985. In order therefore to calculate the period of time in such a case, one must begin the reckoning with period of days. If that is so, the principles applicable for such reckoning are as formulated by Chief Williams in his submissions; and are also laid down in the case of In Re North Ex parte Hasluck (1895) 2 Q.B. 264 at pages 269, 271 and 272. considered in the lead Ruling of my learned brother Aniagolu J.S.C. and I do not wish to elaborate upon them here. It is therefore clear that in this civil matter where the time prescribed is for the benefit of the appellant who is the person affected by the computation, then as much time as one language of the statute permits, should be adopted; and generally, the computation would always exclude the date on which the event happened. Moreover, the principles laid down in In Re North Ex parte Hasluck (supra) has been applied to statutes of limitation in Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd. (1961) 2 Q.B.D. 135 and in Pritam v S. Russell & Sons (1973) 1 Q.B.D. 336. In the latter case Lord Denning M.R. when delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in England with which Karminski L.I. and Megarry J. agreed, said at page 348:-
“On September 5, 1967, Mr. Bikar Singh was working in a pit in a foundry. A skip suddenly fell on him and killed him then and there. On September 7, 1970, his widow issued a writ against his employers claiming damages for breach of statutory duty and for negligence. Her claim was under the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934.
We are asked to decide this preliminary point of law: Was the action commenced within the period of three years allowed by the Statutes of Limitation Or is it statute-barred The Act of 1939, as amended by the Act of 1954, says that the action “shall not be brought after the expiration of three years from the date on which the cause of action accrued:” The Act of 1846, as amended by the Act of 1954, says that it “shall be commenced within three years after the death.”
Nothing turns on the difference in wording. The period is the same in either case. The first thing to notice is that, in computing the three years, you do not count the first day, September 5, 1967, on which the accident occurred. It was so held by Havers J. in Marren v Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd. (1961) 2 Q.B. 135. The defendants here, by their cross-notice, challenged that decision: but I think I it was plainly right.
If you count three years from September 5, 1967, you get the last day as September 5, 1970.”
In the circumstances, I am of the view that in reckoning the period of three months from 10th April, 1985, the first day must be excluded; and if that is done, the statutory period prescribed by Sec. 31(2) of the Supreme Court Act, 1960 for filing an appeal would not have expired in this case. Hence Chief Williams was within time in filing his Notice of Appeal on 10th July, 1985. Consequently, the preliminary objection is hereby overruled.

S. KAWU, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of reading the draft of the Ruling just delivered by my learned brother, Aniagolu, J.S.C. and I entirely agree that for the reasons stated in the Ruling the appeal was not filed out of time and consequently the preliminary objection must be overruled.

C. A. OPUTA, J.S.C.: On the 24th September, 1985, the Appellants in the main appeal and Applicants in this motion applied under Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act of 1960, Order 6 Rule 2 Supreme Court Rules 1985 and Section 213(3) of 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for the following Orders:-
“1. For an extension of time within which to make the application in prayer 2 below (if but only if the court should decide that it can only entertain the said prayer after granting an extension of time within which to make the application in prayer 2 below)
2. For leave to appeal to this Honourable Court from the decision of the Court of Appeal delivered on the 10th day of April 1985 on grounds other than grounds of law.”
The Applicants filed an affidavit, explaining their delay as well as their proposed grounds (of appeal) “other than grounds of law”. They also filed a Brief of their argument.
Mr. Ajayi, S.A.N., learned counsel for the Respondents filed on the 30th October 1985, Notice of Preliminary Objection under Order 2 Rule 9(1) Supreme Court Rules 1985.The main thrusts of Mr. Ajayi’s objections are set out fully in his “Grounds of Objection” namely that-
“i. The Notice of Appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 10th of April was 1985 filed out of time.
ii. The application for leave to appeal filed before the Court of Appeal on the 10th of July 1985 was filed out of time.
iii. The applicants have failed to attach to their application the Ruling of the Court of Appeal on the applicants’ prior application for leave to appeal”.
The 3rd objection above will be an issue if there is no application for leave to appeal pending and this application is essentially for extension of time within which to obtain such leave. On the 11th day of September 1985, an application was made to the court below for leave to appeal. Refusing the application, the Court of Appeal Ibadan Division (per Uche Omo, P.J.) observed:-
“I am of the view that this court is bound by the clear and unequivocal decisions of the Supreme Court in Boweje v. Adediwura (1976) 6 S.C. 143 and Amudipe v Arijodi (1978) 2 L.R.N. 128 which clearly stipulate that an application for leave to appeal must be brought and heard within 3 months after the judgment sought to be .appealed against as provided by S.31(2) of the Supreme Court Act”.
Under S.31(3) of the Supreme Court Act No.12 of 1960, the Applicants had 15 days from the date of the refusal of their application in the court below – i.e. 26th September 1985 – to apply to this Court for such leave. The Applicants applied on the 24th September 1985 within the 15 days time limit.
It is common ground that the judgment of the Court of Appeal appealed against was delivered on 10th April 1985. It is conceded on both sides that the application for leave to appeal was filed before the Court of Appeal on 10th July 1985. The issue in dispute is whether or not that application complied with the time prescribed by Section 31(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act 1960. Mr. Ajayi says it does not while Chief Williams says it does. The only difference between the positions taken by both learned counsel is whether in the computation of time the first day is to be inclusive or exclusive.
I have had the privilege of reading in draft the lead Ruling just delivered by my learned brother Aniagolu, J.S.C. I am in complete agreement with him that Mr. Ajayi’s objection must be dismissed.
As this is the first occasion that this Court has been called upon not merely to interprete, generally, the provisions of S.31(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act, but to pronounce on the correct method of computing the time prescribed by the said Section 31(2)(a) above, I feel obliged to express my own views in further support of those expressed by my learned brother in the lead Ruling. In Bowaje v Adediwura (1976) 6 S.C. 143 this Court stated at pg.146 to 147:-
“Under the provisions of S.31(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act in a case where leave to appeal is required to be obtained, a party must not only file his application for leave to appeal within the period prescribed by the subsection but must also file his notice and grounds of Appeal having obtained the leave within the same period”.
In Amudipe v Arijodi (1978)2 L.R.N. following its earlier decision in Bowaje supra this Court again emphasised that “on the true construction of S.31(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act 1960 Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court against a final decision in a civil matter must be given within three months even when the court has granted an application for leave to appeal”. The application of Chief Williams, S.A.N. contains inter alia Notice and Grounds of Appeal as well as his Brief on Argument filed pursuant to Order 6 Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules 1985.The issue now is – Was this application for leave to appeal filed on 10th July 1985 against a judgment delivered on 10th April 1985 filed within time or filed out of time
Mr Ajayi arguing that the application was filed out of time, relied wholly on the case of Migotti v Colvill (1878) 4-5 C.P.D. 233. The head note to that case reads:-
“A person sentenced to imprisonment for the space of one calendar month is entitled to be discharged on the day in the succeeding month immediately proceeding the day corresponding to that from which his senctence takes effect.
On the above premise, Mr. Ajayi then urged this Court to hold that the expression “within three months” used in S.31(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act as it applies to the application now before the court will have to be computed as a day in the succeeding three months immediately proceeding the day corresponding to that on which the judgment appealed against was delivered,
that is to say 9th July not 10th July 1985. Therefore, so the argument continues, the application in this Court was one day out of time. This is an ingenious argument which will be valid if, and only if, Migotti v Colvill supra was laying down a general rule of interpretation of the term “one calendar month”. But unfortunately it was not doing anything of the sort. There are twelve months in the Gregorian calendar and the difficulty arises from the fact that the term calendar month is not strictly applicable, except of course to particular months named in the calendar. That term “calendar month” is both inelegant and inaccurate when applied to broken periods composed of two parts of different calendar months. This anomaly has given rise to various technical rules which in many cases had produced rather curious consequences.
Lord Bramwell, L.J. at p.237 of Migotti’s case supra emphasised that-
“The only rule which can be laid down is, that where an imprisonment for a calendar month begins on a day in one month and terminates in another, so many days must be taken from the second month, if there are enough as will bring the time up to the day before that day in the second month which corresponds to the day on which the imprisonment began …..
Lord Bramwell made it abundantly clear that the rule he was propounding related to the computation of “imprisonment for one calendar month”. Lord Brett L.J. in the same case at p.238 was both cautious and careful to point out that “one calendar month’s imprisonment is to be calculated from the day of imprisonment to the day numerically corresponding to that day in the following month less one”. (italics mine)
Cotton L.J. in his own judgment rightly observed:-
“Prisoners cannot always be imprisoned during one particular calendar month in the sense of a month the name of which is to be found in the calendar. What then is the meaning of the term when the sentence begins otherwise than at the first day of the calendar month”
It is thus obvious that Migotti v Colvill supra dealt only with the interpretation of “one calendar month’s imprisonment”. The three Lord Justices were not in that case laying down a general rule of law for the interpretation of a calendar month simpliciter. It will therefore be wrong to ascribe to Migott’s case as a general principle of interpretation, an interpretation which was rightly applied in deciding the meaning of “one calendar month’s imprisonment”.
Chief Williams in his own submission referred the Court to what he called the Common-sense Approach and formulated three propositions namely:
1. Where a period of time is prescribed by Statute and that period is to be computed with reference to an event which had happened, then the question whether the computation must include or exclude the date on which the event happened would depend on the true intention of the legislature.
2. Where the time prescribed is for the benefit of the person affected by the computation, then as much time should be given as the language of the Statute allows; accordingly the computation must always exclude the date on which the event happened.
3. Where the time prescribed is to the detriment of the person (say imprisonment or bankruptcy) then a construction which would avoid such detriment or penalty ought to be preferred.
I am in complete agreement with the above propositions which are supported by a very long line of cases. In Radcliffe v. Bartholomew (1892) 1 Q.B.D. 161 a case arising out of S.14 of the Act for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (12 and 13 Vic C.92), it was held that the day on which the alleged offence was committed was to be excluded from the computation of the calendar month within which the complaint was to be made. In Williams v. Burgess (1839) 12 A & E 653: 113 E.R. 189 the language of the Section was “within 21 days after the execution”. There it was held that the day of execution was to be reckoned exclusively. In re North Ex parte Hasluck (1895) Q.B.D. 264 dealing with S.1 of the Bankruptcy Act 1890, the time of 21 days was interpreted in such a way as to prevent making the applicant a bankrupt. There the day on which the event occurred necessitating the computation was excluded. Computation of time must be for a definite purpose and the function of the court is to determine what that: purpose is and to adopt a proper mode of computing time which will effectuate (not hinder) the purpose. Lord Esher M.R. in re North supra at p.269 noted that where the provisions of a Statute will have an adverse and detrimental effect on a person, the computation of time would be liberal and would thus be to the benefit of the person to be adversely affected.
In the case under review, the right to appeal to the Supreme Court is conferred by Section 213 of the 1979 Constitution. Section 31(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act merely imposes a limitation on the right to appeal. The interpretation of the expression with “3 months” used in S.31(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act should therefore be undertaken quite liberally in favour of the Applicants. The general policy of the law and the interest of justice both demand that cases and appeals be heard on their merit rather than that a party be shut out on a technical rule of construction based on a decision like Migotti (supra) whose general applicability is highly suspect. Excluding the date on which the event happened that gave rise to the computation accords with good sound common-sense, otherwise one will be faced with the difficulty of calculating a fraction of a day as a day. It is my humble view that unless expressly so provided by Statute, to argue that a fraction of a day is equal to a whole day involves the ineradicable fallacy of making a part equal to a whole. Such an interpretation would be an assault on common-sense and would do violence to the plain meaning words. To avoid regarding part of a day as a whole day, the day on which the event happened should be excluded from the computation. The judgment now appealed against could not have been delivered at 12 mid-night of 9th April 1985. If it were delivered any time after 9 a.m. (when the courts usually begin sitting) then the present Applicants are being allowed less than the 3 months granted them by S.31(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act 1960.
Sir William Grant in Lester v Garland 15 Ves 248 considered the two views (including the first day or excluding it) and the cases that support either view and came to the conclusion that if there were to be a general rule, it ought to be one of exclusion as being more reasonable than one to the opposite effect. Where something has to be done which is necessary to complete a person’s title or to perfect conditions of appeal (as in the present instance) the first day is to be excluded otherwise there would be a cutting down of the time allowed for doing the act:- In re Railways Sleepers Supply Co.29 Ch D.204. See also in re North Ex parte Hasluck supra per Rigby L.J. at p.274.
The question of whether the day on which the act is done, is to be included or excluded from the computation of time must in the final analysis depend on whether it is to the benefit or disadvantage of the person primarily interested. See Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd. (1961) 2 Q.B. 135 at p.138. In the recent case of Dodds v Walker (1981) 2 All E.R. 609 it was held that in calculating the period of a month or a specified number of months that had elapsed the occurrence of a specified event, such as the giving of a notice (here the filing of an application for leave to appeal) the general rule is that the period ended on the corresponding date in the appropriate subsequent month. Thus a period of “within three months” from 10th April 1985 will end on the 10th July 1985. This accords with Section 15(2)(a) of our Interpretation Act No.1 of 1964 which stipulates that:-
“2. A reference in an enactment to a period of days shall be construed-
(a) where the period is reckoned from a particular event, as excluding the day on which the event occurs”.
Mr. Ajayi’s argument that the date of the delivery of the judgment is to be included in the computation of the 3 months period appears to be in founded.
In the final result, the preliminary objection fails and it is hereby dismissed.