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ATTAHIRU AHMED v. THE STATE (2018)

ATTAHIRU AHMED v. THE STATE

(2018)LCN/12160(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 19th day of November, 2018

CA/S/159C/2017

 

RATIO

EVIDENCE: RETRACTION OF A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

“Now, the long settled position of the Law is that the Court can convict on a retracted confessional statement if satisfied that it was made voluntarily. This is the trite position of the law, once a confessional statement is proved as having been made voluntarily by being direct, positive unequivocal and clearly suggestive of an admission of guilt it is sufficient to ground conviction even where the maker resiled therefrom or retracted the same completely at the trial since such a u-turn does not necessarily make the confession in admissible. Retraction, in other words, does not render the confession inadmissible. It does not also deter a trial Court from acting thereon. A confessional statement, once properly proved, is sufficient to sustain a conviction despite any retraction by the maker. It is however desirable to have outside the confession some evidence that would make it probable that the confession was true. See Egboghonome V. The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt 307)383. KIM V STATE (1992)4 SCNJ 1.YAHAYA V STATE (2001) 10 NWLR (PT 721) 310, ACHABUA V STATE (1976) 4 SC 1, MOMOH V STATE (2015) LPELR 25412.” PER AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, J.C.A.

CRIMINAL LAW: INTENTION TO COMMIT A CRIME

“Founded on the maxim that the guilty mind instigates the guilty act or flows into the guilty act, the act of a person is proof of his mensrea. This is why the law presumes that a man intends the natural and probable consequences of his act and is deemed to know the natural consequence of his action. See GARBA & ORS VS THE STATE (2000) 6 NWLR (PT. 661) 379, STATE VS JOHN (2013) LPELR  20590 (SC). A person is taken to intend the natural consequences of his voluntary overt acts which he foresees are likeable to happen whether he intends them or not. If he intends to cause grievous bodily harm and death results he will be presumed to have intended to kill the other or to have the knowledge that death would be the probable consequence of the grievous bodily harm inflicted and be held culpable inrespective of the intention. See AUDU V STATE (Supra), NWOKEARU V STATE (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt 1215) 1, AFOLABI V STATE (2016) LPELR 40300 (SC), IBIKUNLE V STATE (2004) 2 NWLR (Pt 1019) 555.” PER AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, J.C.A.

 

JUSTICES

AMINA AUDI WAMBAI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ABDULLAHI MAHMUD BAYERO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

ATTAHIRU AHMED Appellant(s)

AND

THE STATE Respondent(s)

 

AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):

The appeal before us arose from the judgment of Hon. Justice A. M. Lamido of the Sokoto State High Court delivered on 1st December, 2016 in charge No. SS/8C/2015 which convicted the Appellant for the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death under Section 221 (b) of the Penal Code and accordingly sentenced him to death.

The Appellant was alleged on the charge sheet to have on or about the 24th day of November, 2013 at about 23:30 hours at the Sultan Palace Area Sokoto, stabbed one BILAL AMINU with a knife with the knowledge that death would be the probable consequence of his act.

The Appellant pleaded not guilty consequent upon which the prosecution called four witnesses and tendered two exhibits. Appellant was the sole witness for the defence and tendered no exhibits. After reviewing all the evidence and considering the written addresses of both counsel, the learned trial judge found that the prosecution proved all the ingredients of the offence against the Appellant and that neither the defence of self-defence nor of provocation avail the appellant and accordingly convicted the Appellant and sentenced him to death.

Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, the appellant commenced this appeal, the Notice of which was filed on the 24/2/2017 attacking the judgment on 4 grounds, from which M. A. Sambo Esq., who settled the Appellant’s brief of argument filed on 8/5/2018, distilled two issues for determination namely;

1. Whether the Lower Court was right when it held that the Respondent has proved the offence of Culpable Homicide punishable with death against the Appellant without cogent and credible evidence? (Distilled from Grounds 1, 2 and 4).

2. Whether the Lower Court was right when it convicted the Appellant despite his plea of self-defence? (Distilled from Ground 3 & 5)

Mohammed Mohammed Esq., the Director of Public Prosecutions, Ministry of Sokoto State who settled the Respondent’s brief of argument filed and deemed on 10/10/2018 raised a sole issue for determination to wit;

Whether looking at the totality of the evidence adduced before the trial Court, the lower Court was right in convicting the appellant for the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death contrary to Section 221(b) of the Penal Code and sentenced him to death.?

I shall determine this appeal on the sole issue formulated by the Respondent’s learned counsel which encapsulated the two issues raised by the learned Appellant’s counsel.

Arguing his issue No.1 which is whether the prosecution proved the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death against the Appellant, learned counsel enumerated the ingredients of the offence which the prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt to succeed and submitted that apart from the 1st ingredient which is that a human being died, the prosecution failed woefully to prove the other two ingredients.

On the 2nd ingredient that the death of the deceased was caused by the Appellant, it was submitted that while the evidence of PW1 and PW2 is hearsay evidence, PW3, the supposed eye witness is a tainted witness whose evidence ought to have been discarded or as an accomplice be corroborated but was not so corroborated. As to who is a tainted witness, he cited the cases of EGBIRIKA V STATE (2014) 4 NWLR (PT 1398) 558, 562 SC, OMOTOLA V STATE (2009) 7 NWLR (PT 1139) 148 SC.

He also accused the learned trial judge of relying heavily on the Appellant?s retracted confessional statement without considering the serious contradictions between it and the Appellant?s evidence in Court and that of PW3 as he ought to have done before deciding to rely on the statement as held in the case of Major HAMZA AL-MUSTAPHA V THE STATE (2013) NWLR (PT 1383) 350, 366.

The second ingredient he argued, was not proved through the Appellant’s exhibit A1 or through the evidence of PW3.

Equally, the 3rd ingredient which is that the Appellant’s act was intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence, learned counsel also contended that the prosecution also failed to prove that requirement in that neither the medical report, the weapon used nor the picture of the corpse was tendered in evidence, thus fatally affecting the prosecution’s case particularly that the Appellant consistently denied stabbing the deceased.

On the heavy reliance placed on the Appellant’s confessional statement Exhibit 1A, it was submitted that before convicting an accused on his extra – judicial statement, same must be direct and positive and must be corroborated by some evidence outside it no matter how slight but that Exhibit 1A is neither direct and positive nor is there any evidence outside the confession that will make it probable that it is true. He called in aid the case of OGOALA V STATE (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt 175) 509 SC urging to so hold.

Furthermore, as argued in his issue No. 2, learned counsel contended that a Court is bound to consider any defence raised by an accused person no matter how stupid or weak as held in the case of SHEIDU V STATE (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt 1429), 10.

It was submitted that the defence of self-defence would avail an accused person when the nature of the assault on him is such as to cause reasonable appreciation of death or grievous hurt and when on reasonable grounds, he believes that death or grievous harm was the only last resort that must be used as a defence, citing in support the case of ADEYEYE V STATE (2013) 11 NWLR (PT 1364) 47 @ 51. That the Appellant having by his evidence as DW1, his confessional statement, Exhibit A1, and the evidence of PW3 successfully raised the defence of self-defence that he was only protecting himself from attack by the deceased and PW3, the failure of the prosecution to disprove the Appellant’s entitlement to the defence is fatal to the prosecution’s case and entitles the Appellant to a discharge and acquittal.

In buttressing his argument that the prosecution and not investigate the appellant’s defence, counsel referred to the evidence of the I.P.O, PW4, who admitted doing nothing more than recording the Appellant’s statement and drawing our attention to the avoidance attitude of the witness by refusing to answering many questions by saying he does not remember many things. We were referred to the cases of FAMAKINWA V STATE (2016) 11 NWLR (PT 1524) 538, 545, and SHEIDU V STATE (Supra) an effect of such evidence.

In his response, the learned Respondent’s counsel submitting contrarily, contended that the prosecution succeeded in proving all the ingredients of the offence against the Appellant. The 1st ingredient that human being died he submitted, was proved by the evidence of PW1, PW2 that Bilal Aminu died.

On the 2nd ingredient, it was submitted that the evidence of PW3 and the Appellant’s confessional statement Exhibit A1 at pages 26 – 27 of the record shows that it was the act of the Appellant that caused the death.

The 3rd ingredient he argued can be inferred from the nature of the instrument used and the part of the body targeted. That where as in this case the victim was attacked with a dangerous weapon at a delicate part of the body as the Appellant attacked the deceased the with a knife and stabbed him on the back destroying the blood arteries leading to this death, a trial Court is at liberty to infer that the assailant intended to kill the victim or knew that death would be the probable consequence of his act. citing in support the case of ACHUKU V THE STATE (2014) LPELR 22651, NWOKEARU V STATE (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt 1380) 207 @ 285 among others. The prosecution he maintained has thus proved its cased beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant citing in support the cases of Ajayi V State (2013) 8 NCC 1, Alabi v State (1993) 7 NLWR (Pt 307) 511 among others urging us to so hold.

On the failure to tender the medical report and the weapon used in the commission of the crime learned Respondent’s counsel submitted that where the evidence adduced at the trial Court leaves no doubt as to the nature of the weapon used or the injury sustained, its severity, the manner it was inflicted and the part of the body so injured, failure to tender the weapon or the medical report is neither fatal to the prosecution’s case nor sufficient to dislodge the case of the prosecution. He cited in support the cases ACHUKU  V. STATE (Supra), VICTOR V THE STATE 2013 12 NWLR (PT 1369) 465, OLAYINKA V THE STATE (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt 1010) 561.

On the Appellant’s submission that the learned trial judge wrongly relied on the Appellant’s retracted confessional statement and without any evidence outside the confession, it was submitted that a voluntary confessional statement once direct and positive is sufficient to sustain a conviction more so that the evidence PW3 confirms the veracity of the confession. He cited in support the cases of YAHAYA V STATE (2001) 10 NWLR (PT 721) 310, ACHABUA V STATE (1976) 4 SC 1, MOMOH V STATE (2015) LPELR 25412.

On the Appellant’s contention that the learned trial judge did not consider the Appellant’s plea of self-defence, it was submitted that the trial judge properly considered the plea but found that it does not avail the Appellant. We were urged to dismiss the appeal the prosecution having proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant.

The offence for which the appellant was convicted is that of culpable homicide punishable with death. For the offence to be established, there must co-exist and be proved beyond reasonable doubt 3 indispensable ingredients. These are:

(i) that the death of a human being took place;

(ii) that such death was caused by the accused;

(iii) that the act of the accused caused the death with the intention of causing death or that the accused knew that death would be the probable consequence of his act.

See MAIYAKI VS THE STATE (2008) 15 NWLR (PT. 1109) 173; MAMMAN VS THE STATE (2015) LPELR 25963 (CA).

It is needless to emphasize that all these ingredients must co-exist and each be proved beyond reasonable doubt for the prosecution to secure or sustain a conviction. See the recent decision of the Supreme Court in GALADIMA VS THE STATE (2017) LPELR 41909 (SC) and also ALI VS THE STATE (2015) LPELR 24711 (SC) by the same Court.

On the first ingredient that a human being died, this fact is conceded by the defence. Moreover the evidence of PW3 who took the deceased to the hospital after the injury and was him until certified dead in the hospital, and those of pw1 and pw2 who saw the corpse in the hospital and to whom it was later released for burial prove this ingredient of the beyond reasonable doubt.

On the 2nd ingredient that such death was caused by the act of the appellant, the evidence on record consists of the Appellant’s confessional statement Exhibit A and A1, the evidence of pw3 as well as the appellant’s evidence in Court as DW1.

In Exhibit A1, the appellant stated inter alia:

“….On 24/22/2013 at about 23.00hrs I was at Binanci Area close to one transformer when I saw three people (1) Bilal Aminu (2) Abba Mazuga and on other whom I don’t know. As they came, I started fighting with them. Abba then beat me with a Stick and I revenged and Abba ran away. The Knife that was in the hand of Bilal fell down and I took it Bilal then ran away and l pursue him up to the house of the Sultan when I met him there, I then stabbed him with knife at his back and he fell down. I then left the knife there and ran away. Later I was arrested by the Police on an allegation that I was the one who killed Bilal. Honestly, I was the cause of his death because I was the one who stabbed him with a knife at his back. That is all I have to state.”

It is crystal clear from the reproduced contents of ExhibitA1 that the appellant admitted starting a fight in which PW3 beat him (appellant) with a stick which appellant avenged and then picked up the knife which fell down from the deceased’s hand, ran after the deceased and stabbed him on his back. The deceased fell down.

According to pw3 on the fateful day himself and the deceased were returning from Gudadawa area. When they approached the sultan palace area, the appellant stabbed the deceased. He saw Bilal, the deceased fell down and a knife stuck at his back. The appellant then drew out the knife and rushed at him (PW3). Both pw1 and pw2, the deceased uncles, noticed the stab at the deceased’s back.

The contention of the learned Appellant’s counsel is that the Exhibit A 1 heavily relied upon by the learned trial judge ought not to have been relied upon having been retracted by the appellant and without any evidence outside it to attest to its accuracy. Similarly, pw3 whose evidence along with Exhibit A1 was heavily relied upon, was a tainted witness whose evidence the trial Court ought to have discarded or at least as an accomplice, be corroborated but was not so corroborated.

Now, the long settled position of the Law is that the Court can convict on a retracted confessional statement if satisfied that it was made voluntarily. This is the trite position of the law, once a confessional statement is proved as having been made voluntarily by being direct, positive unequivocal and clearly suggestive of an admission of guilt it is sufficient to ground conviction even where the maker resiled therefrom or retracted the same completely at the trial since such a u-turn does not necessarily make the confession in admissible.

Retraction, in other words, does not render the confession inadmissible. It does not also deter a trial Court from acting thereon. A confessional statement, once properly proved, is sufficient to sustain a conviction despite any retraction by the maker. It is however desirable to have outside the confession some evidence that would make it probable that the confession was true. See Egboghonome V. The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt 307)383. KIM V STATE (1992)4 SCNJ 1.YAHAYA V STATE (2001) 10 NWLR (PT 721) 310, ACHABUA V STATE (1976) 4 SC 1, MOMOH V STATE (2015) LPELR 25412.

In the instant case, the voluntariness of the confessional statement was not challenged when tendered in evidence. The only ground of objection raised which was rightly rejected by the trial Court was that the signature of the superior police officer did not show that it was made by him. Exhibit A1 as rightly found by the trial Court was voluntarily made by the appellant and its content positive and direct that the appellant picked up the knife that fell off from the hand of the deceased, ran after the deceased and stabbed him on the back.

What therefore is important is for a trial Court to look for and an appellate Court to navigate the evidence on record, for some evidence no matter how slight outside the confession which supports or renders the confession true.

Now, pw3 who was the eye witness to the incident has been labelled as a tainted witness because by his and the appellant’s evidence, he was fully involved in the incident being the person together with the deceased who attacked the appellant.

The phrase “tainted witness” connotes either of the following: (a) a witness who is by evidence an accomplice in the offence charged or (b) a person who may be regarded on the evidence as having some purpose of his own to serve. He is a person who may be strictly an accomplice but is a witness with some purpose of his own to serve. See Onuoha v. The State (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 65) 331 at 346. See Ishola v. The State (1978) 9 & 10 SC 81 at 100.

It is to be noted that this term must strictly be confined to a witness who in the real sense of the word has a personal interest of his own to serve other than the cause of justice or to an accomplice who participated in the crime for which the accused is being tried and who if tried with the accused would equally be guilty. See OKOSI & ANOR V STATE (1989) 1 NWLR (100) 642.

The necessity for this clarification was aptly stated per Ngwuta JSC in the case of AKINDIPE V STATE (2012)16 NWLR (1325) 94 in the following terms:

“…. In my view, as a general rule, a witness who testifies in a case has a purpose to serve and that is to see that the side for whom he testifies in the dispute is vindicated. This is why Idigbe, JSC, issued the warning in Garuba Mailayi & Anor v. The State (1968) 1 All NLR 116 at 123 which was adopted by Iguh, JSC in Ogunlana v. State (1995) 5 NWLR (pt. 395) 266 at 284:

“… the expression ‘tainted’ is very loose and if it’s application is not kept within proper bounds, a great deal of confusion will be unleashed in an area of evidence which even now is fraught with difficulties.”

In the instant case, there is no doubt that from the contents of Exhibit A1 and the appellant’s evidence upon which the learned counsel anchored his argument, PW3 participated in the fight which the appellant stated that he started. I am of the candid view that merely participating in a fight started by an aggressor does not make the one attacked an accomplice or a tainted witness. Even if he were to wear such a toga and I am not saying so, the law remains that an accomplice is a competent witness for both the prosecution and the defence and a conviction based on the evidence of such accomplice is not illegal even where such evidence is uncorroborated, though the judge should warn himself of the danger of doing so. See OKOSI AND ANOR V THE STATE (supra). In the case at hand, I find in the contents of Exhibit A1 and the appellant’s evidence sufficient corroboration that the appellant stabbed the deceased on his back which stab from the evidence on record, resulted in the death of the deceased, BILAL AMINU.

It was contended for the appellant that in view of the serious contradictions between the said contents of Exhibit A1 and the appellant’s evidence in Court as well as that of pw3 the lower Court ought to have discountenanced the evidence. The contradictions he argued, is that while in Exhibit A1 the appellant stated that he was at Binnaci area close to one transformer when he saw the trio of pw3, the deceased and another person and he started fighting with them, in his evidence, he testified that it was pw3 who in company of the deceased and the other person who hit him with a stick and then the deceased drew a knife and the appellant held his hand. That they started to wrestle and the deceased fell on the knife on the ground and got stabbed on the back. On the other hand Pw3’s evidence he argued, is that he was with the deceased and when they reached sultan palace he saw the deceased fell down and a knife stuck at his back.

The law has been well laid down on the treatment of oral testimony of an accused person which is different or inconsistent with his extra judicial statement to the police. The inconsistency rule which applies to a witness who has previously given an extra judicial statement inconsistent with his evidence in Court does not apply to an accused person whose extra judicial statement is inconsistent with his oral evidence in Court. The inconsistency rule is that where a witness makes an extra-judicial statement which is inconsistent with his testimony at the trial, such testimony is to be treated as unreliable while the statement is not regarded as evidence on which the Court can act.

It must be pointed out that this rule evolved and developed in the interest of justice to resolve conflict between previous statement and later evidence for the prosecution or defence. The object was to ensure that the evidence relied on by the Court is credible since the retracting party is given an opportunity, while in the witness box, to explain the inconsistency. This rule is however restricted to the evidence of a witness, who made an extra-judicial Statement contradictory to his evidence given at trial. The previous statements are not evidence, which the Court can act on, and the evidence given at the trial is taken by the Court as unreliable. See EMOGA V STATE (1997) 9 NWLR 519 and Egboghonome v. State (1993) 7 NWLR (pt. 306) p. 383.

Surely, the inconsistency rule does not apply to an accused person and it is not meant to cover a case where an accused person’s extra-judicial statement is contrary to his testimony in Court. Where the inconsistency is between a voluntary confessional statement of the accused and his oral evidence in Court, the law is that the oral evidence should be treated as unreliable and liable to be rejected while the contents of the confessional statement be upheld unless a satisfactory explanation of the inconsistency is proffered. See Oladotun v. State (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1217) 490, Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Iweka (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1341) 285.

The appellant herein offered no explanation for the obvious inconsistency, why he was resiing from his voluntary statement which is obviously inconsistent with his oral evidence in Court. InBassey v. State (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1314) 209, the Supreme Court held that where an accused person confesses to an offence in his extra-judicial statement and had no objection to the statement being tendered and admitted in evidence and did not lead any cogent evidence in his testimony in Court resiling from the contents of the statement, there would be no need to look for evidence outside the confession anymore. It follows that rather than benefit from the inconsistency, the unexplained different positions taken by the appellant should work against him.

As between the evidence adduced by the prosecution, Exhibit A1 and the evidence of pw3, there is no material contradiction on the material fact that the appellant stabbed the deceased with a knife at the back.

The case of Major Hamza AI-Mustapha V. The State (supra) @ 366 relied upon by the learned appellant’s counsel where this Court held that “Where evidence of witnesses are contradictory of each other, it is the duty of the Court to discountenance same and treat the entire evidence as unreliable. This is a duty in law and not marked by discretion …” is inapplicable. For the law stated therein to be applicable, it must be shown that the contradiction is not only material but must be on the very life issue of the case and go to the root of the prosecution’s case. That is not the situation here.

The learned trial judge therefore found this ingredient of the offence proved beyond reasonable doubt and held:

“Therefore, I agree with the prosecution that the evidence of PW3 and the contents of Exhibit A have all gone to prove that it was the act of the accused that killed the deceased.”

I can not agree more, I also found this second ingredient of the offence proved beyond reasonable doubt.

On the 3rd ingredient that the Appellant knew or had reason to know that death would be the probable consequence of his act, the contention of the learned Appellant’s counsel is that the prosecution having not tendered either a medical report or the weapon allegedly used in the commission of the crime to establish that the Appellant’s act was intentional, more so that Appellant has consistently denied stabbing the deceased, has woefully failed to prove that death resulted from the Appellant’s intentional act or that death was the probable consequence of his act.

On the failure to tender the photograph and the medical report in evidence, let me quickly say that as vehemently and tenaciously as the learned counsel canvassed and held unto this argument, it possesses not the strength to withstand the force of judicial authorities to the contrary, as the indispensability of a medical report in proof of the nature of injury or cause of death has long been settled. The Appellant’s argument therefore cannot stand against the litany of decisions of the apex court including the case AKPAN V THE STATE (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt 368) 347 where ADIO JSC stated the correct position of the law thus:-

“the correct legal position is that where a person attacked another person with a lethal weapon and the other person died on the spot, it is not necessary to prove the cause of death. It can properly be inferred that the wound inflicted on the deceased caused the death.”

Similarly in BEN V STATE (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1006) 582 Akintan JSC held inter alia:-

“In cases where a man was attacked with lethal weapon, and he died on the spot, cause of death can properly be inferred. Put in another form, where the cause of death is obvious, medical evidence ceases to be of any practical or legal necessity in homicide cases? It could properly be inferred that the wound inflicted caused the death of the deceased.”

I will add that the position is the same whether the victim died on the spot or within a reasonable time after the attack.

Though a medical report may be desirable and in some cases necessary to prove the nature and severity of injury, the part of the body injured or the cause of death, it is not a sine qua non for the purpose of establishing the injury or the cause of death where credible evidence abounds showing the nature of the injury, its severity, the manner it was inflicted, and the part of the body so inflicted or the cause of death. A medical report becomes unnecessary in such circumstances and the trial Court can infer the cause of death or the severity of the injury as the case may be, with or without the medical report. In HARUNA V AGF (Supra) following the decision in ONYIA V State (Supra), the Court held that where there is clear and sufficient evidence that the death of the deceased was the direct result of the unlawful act of the accused person to the exclusion of all other reasonable possible cause, the lower Court can infer the cause of death with or without a medical report.

The same principle applies to the non-production of the photograph of the victim where sufficient credible evidence exists establishing the nature of the injury sustained.

After all, what is important is whether death would have been caused by the injuries inflicted on the victim by the Appellant and not whether from the medical point of view, death would have been caused by such injury.

The requisite Constituent of this ingredient is ‘intention’ to kill or ‘knowledge’ or ‘reason to know that death would be the probable consequence of the Appellant’s act. This is a question of fact to be determined from the surrounding circumstances and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the proved acts of the Appellant.

The pertinent question therefore is whether by such acts, the Appellant can be said to have intended to cause the death of the deceased or knew or had reason to know that death would be the probable and not only a likely consequence of his act.

Now, an act is said to be ‘likely’ to have a certain consequence or to cause a certain effect if the occurrence of that consequence or effect would cause no surprise to a reasonable man. On the other hand, an effect is said to be a probable consequence if the occurrence that of consequence would be considered by a reasonable man to be the natural and normal effect of that act. See Section 19 (1) & (2) of the Penal Code.

The determination of whether an act is likely or probable to cause death is a question of degree and is a matter of fact and not of law to be determined from the facts or circumstances of each case.

A likely consequence is one which would cause no surprise to a reasonable man but a probable consequence goes beyond that. It is one which would be considered by reasonable man to be the natural and normal effect of the act. The distinction is important because the greater the degree of certainty in the mind of the doer of the consequence of his act, the more justifiable the inference of his intention to kill or knowledge that death will be the natural consequence of his act.

Factors to be considered in determining whether the accused had the intention of causing death or knew that death was the probable or only likely consequence of his act include the followings:-

(1) The nature of the weapon used, whether lethal or non-fatal in nature;

(2) The part of the body struck or brutalized with the weapon;

(3) The extent of the proximity of the victim with the lethal weapon;

(4) Physical and health condition of both the deceased at the material time;

(5) If the deceased was treated at a hospital and died on admission, a report or certificate by the medical officer and the treatment of the death. See ATIKU V. STATE (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1199) 241.

Where a weapon is used, the nature of the weapon, the injury inflicted with it and the part of the body so injured, generally, matters in resolving the question. A non-lethal weapon does not have the same effect as a lethal weapon, a light stick does not have the same effect as a big or heavy stick, a blow struck on the leg does not have the same effect with a blow struck on the head, the chest or other delicate parts of the body. All these facts must be borne in mind and considered in determining whether the accused has the knowledge of the consequence of his act. See LAMBA KUMBIN V BAUCHI N.A. (1963) NMLR 49.

Founded on the maxim that the guilty mind instigates the guilty act or flows into the guilty act, the act of a person is proof of his mensrea. This is why the law presumes that a man intends the natural and probable consequences of his act and is deemed to know the natural consequence of his action. See GARBA & ORS VS THE STATE (2000) 6 NWLR (PT. 661) 379, STATE VS JOHN (2013) LPELR  20590 (SC)

A person is taken to intend the natural consequences of his voluntary overt acts which he foresees are likeable to happen whether he intends them or not. If he intends to cause grievous bodily harm and death results he will be presumed to have intended to kill the other or to have the knowledge that death would be the probable consequence of the grievous bodily harm inflicted and be held culpable inrespective of the intention. See AUDU V STATE (Supra), NWOKEARU V STATE (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt 1215) 1, AFOLABI V STATE (2016) LPELR 40300 (SC), IBIKUNLE V STATE (2004) 2 NWLR (Pt 1019) 555.

Applying all these to the case at hand can it be said that the Appellant had no intention to kill the deceased or the knowledge or reason to know that death was the probable consequences of his action? It can hardly be argued that a person who in a scuffle picks up a knife, runs after the other and then stabs the other with the lethal weapon at his back does not know that death would be the natural consequence of his act.

It has been argued for the Appellant that the Appellant in Exhibit A1 acted in self-defence, the successful plea of which entitle the Appellant to a discharge and acquittal but that the plea was not investigated.

It must be noted that when an accused person raises the defence of self-defence, he admits that his act caused the act complained of but that he had to do what he did to protect his own life or property or the life or property of another that is why in law a successful plea of defence of self-defence is a complete defence which exonerates or exculpates the accused person from criminal responsibility as provided by Section 33(2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) to wit:

“A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in contravention of this Section, if he dies as a result of the use, to such and in such circumstances as are permitted by law, of such force as is reasonably necessary (a) For the defence of any person from unlawful violence or for the defence of property.”

This provision has also been given effect to in our Penal and Criminal Codes. In Section 59 of the Penal Code, nothing is an offence which is done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. Section 60 specifically grants to every person, subject to the restrictions imposed therein, the right to defend his own body or the body of another person as well as his property and the property of another. Section 62 limits the right. The right does not extend to the inflicting of more harm than is necessary to inflict for the purpose of the defence. Herein lies the crucial question.

This is not all, to justify the taking of another person’s life in the name of self-defence, Section 222 (2) Penal Code provides that the right must be exercised in good faith; it must have been without a premeditation and it must be without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of the defence. For example a gun shot in retaliation for the slap on the face in unnecessary, unreasonable and disproportionate to the slap. Thus, the pre-conditions for the availability of the defence are (1) the necessity of the use of force and (2) the reasonableness or proportion of the force used in defence. InADEYEYE VS THE STATE (2013) 11 NWLR (PT. 1364) 47 Ogunbiyi JSC held:

“The two questions, which ought to be posed and therefore, answered before the trial Court, were: – (1) on the evidence, was the defence of self-defence necessary (2) was the injury inflicted proportionate to the threat offered, or was it excessive? If however, the threat altered is disproportionate with the force used in repelling it, and the necessity of the occasion did not demand such self-defence, then the defence cannot avail the Accused.”

Furthermore, the Courts have in a plethora of judicial decisions expounded the conditions upon which the plea can avail an accused person have been in a plethora of judicial decisions. These include;

a. the accused must be free from fault in bringing about the encounter;

b. there must be present an impending peril to life or of great bodily harm either real or so apparent as to create honest belief of an existing necessity;

c. there must be no safe or reasonable mode of escape by retreat; and

d. there must have been a necessity for taking life.

See the cases of OMOREGIE VS THE STATE (2008) 18 NWLR (PT. 1119) P. 464 AT 482 – 483 PARAG H – C and KWAGHSHIR V THE STATE (1995) 3 NWLR (PT. 386) 651. If at the end of the evidence adduced, the Court is satisfied that at the time the accused caused the death of the deceased there was reasonable apprehension of death or grievous harm and in the cause of defending himself the death of deceased occurred, the accused will have succeeded in the plea and be entitled to a discharge and acquittal.

In the instant case, the accepted evidence on record is that the appellant picked up the knife which fell off the hand of the deceased, ran after the deceased and stabbed him on the back. A stab on a fleeing person can not be said to be in self defence. More importantly, as at the time that the appellant dealt the fatal blow on the back of the fleeing victim, there was no longer any apprehension of death or any grievous harm to himself from a fleeing person that he chased, caught up with and stabbed from behind. The learned trial judge aptly concluded thus:

“To my mind, a person who pursued a fleeing combatant with a knife, catches up with him and stabbed him on the back cannot be said not to have taken undue advantage of the victim.”

In the case of MUHAMMAD VS THE STATE (2017) LPELR-42098 (SC) Augie JSC who read the lead judgment in rejecting the plea of self-defence raised therein quoted in approval the Court’s earlier decision in OWHORUKE VS C.O.P. (supra), where the deceased snatched a bottle of drink from the appellant and broke it. He then threatened the Appellant with the broken bottle. The Appellant confessed that he later overpowered the deceased; seized the broken bottle from the deceased, and then used it to stab the deceased in the neck. The issue was whether the Appellant was in apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm at the time. The Court held that – the Appellant was no longer in apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm since he stabbed the deceased after he had overpowered him and retrieved the broken bottle from him.

Similarly, by the stated facts and circumstances of this case, the private defence of self defence does not avail the appellant. The learned judge was thus right to have rejected the said plea. In the circumstance, I find no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. I affirm the appellant’s conviction and sentence as contained in the judgment of the lower Court delivered on the 1st December 2016.

FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO, J.C.A.: I had the opportunity of reading the draft of the Judgment of my learned Brother, AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, JCA just delivered and I am in agreement with his reasoning and conclusions in disallowing the Appeal. I am also in agreement that the Appeal is lacking in merit and therefore fails and it is accordingly dismissed for want of substance. I abide by the consequential orders made by Court.

ABDULLAHI MAHMUD BAYERO, J.C.A.: I read the draft copy of the Judgment just pronounced by my learned Brother Justice Amina Audi Wambai JCA. I agree with the conclusion and reasoning contained therein that the defence of Private Defence will not avail the Appellant as was held by the lower Court in the Judgment delivered on 1st December, 2016. The Appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. I also affirm the Appellant’s conviction and sentence as contained in the Judgment of the lower Court.

 

Appearances:

M.A Sambo, Esq.For Appellant(s)

Mohammed MohammedFor Respondent(s)