ATIKU ABUBAKAR & ANOR v. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS (2019)

ATIKU ABUBAKAR & ANOR v. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS

(2019)LCN/13540(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 24th day of June, 2019

CA/PEPC/002/2019(R)

RATIO

APPLICATION: GRANT OF APPLICATIONS IS DISCRETINARY

As a starting point, it must be emphasised that the grant or refusal of applications of this nature is discretionary and this Court will be willing to exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant where there is justification to do so. See BOWAJE VS. ADEDIWURA (1976) 6 SC 143; NATIONAL INLAND WATER WAYS AUTHORITY VS. SPDC (NIG) LTD (2011) 6 NWLR (PT. 1244) 618. In WILLIAM & ORS. VS. HOPERISING VOLUNTARY FUNDS SOCIETY (1982) 1 – 2 SC 145, the Supreme Court noted that:
“It is true, of course that the Court should bear in mind when exercising its discretion, the interests of the parties and the justice of the case, and should exercise its discretion where the justice of the case requires it to do so.”
In OYEKANMI VS. NEPA (2000) 15 NWLR (PT. 690) 414.PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.

THE RULES THAT GUIDE THE COURT’S DISCRETION

The Apex Court per Ogundare JSC (now of blessed memory) further posited thus:
“Prima facie, what are the Rules that guide the exercise of Court’s discretion. It has been said first that a Judge must act judicially, on known principles. He should not take into consideration extraneous matters, and he should not fail to consider something which he ought to have taken into consideration. Egerton Vs. Jones (1939) 3 All ER 889; Solanke Vs. Abiola (1968) 1 All NLR 46 at 52. The Judge should also act judiciously. There would be a balance consideration of the facts for each party before he arrives at a proper exercise of his discretion.”
The concept of proper exercise of judicial discretion was adequately considered in the case of AKIN AKINYEMI (AKIN AKINYEMI & ASSOCIATES) VS. ODU’A INVESTEMNT CO. LTD (2012) 1 SC (PT. IV) page 1, where in it was held that:
“A judicial discretion however, is the exercise of judgment by a judge or Court based on what is fair under the circumstances and guided by the rules and principles of law. In other words, it is a Court’s power to act or not to act as a matter of right. To make such discretion look judicially and judicious it has to be based on prudence, rationality, sagacity, astuteness, considerateness and reasonableness.”PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.

INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS: WHAT THE COURT MUST AVOID IN CONSIDERING SUCH APPLICATIONS

The law is settled that care should be taken when a Court is hearing an interlocutory application to avoid making an observation, comment or pronouncement in its ruling on that application which may appear to prejudge the main issue in the proceedings relative to the interlocutory application. In other words, a Court cannot, in an interlocutory application, decide an issue in the substantive case. See ODUTOLA HOLDINGS LTD & ORS. VS. MR. KUNLE LADEJOBI & ORS. (2006) 5 SCNJ 63; SHINNING STAR (NIG) LTD VS. ASK STEEL (NIG) LTD. & ORS. (2011) 1 – 12 SC (PT. 1) page 1; HALILU AKILU VS. CHIEF GANI FAWEHINMI (1989) 3 SC (PT. 11) page 1.PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.

JUSTICES:

MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ABDU ABOKI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

PETER OLABISI IGE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

1. ATIKU ABUBAKAR
2. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP) – Appellant(s)

AND

1. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC)
2. MUHAMMADU BUHARI
3. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS (APC) – Respondent(s)

MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Lead Ruling): The Petitioners herein brought this application by way of motion on notice pursuant to Section 151 (1) & (2) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), Section 71 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended); Paragraphs 18(7)(e),41(5) & (6),47(2) & 54 of the First Schedule to Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended); Section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended); filed on the 8th day of May, 2019 wherein they seek the following orders:
1. AN ORDER allowing access or a Court-supervised access and inspection by the petitioners, in the presence of the 2nd and 3rd respondents if they so desire, of the 1st respondent’s central servers wherein information was recorded and stored in database packets relating to accreditation of voters and transmission of results from the presidential election, the subject-matter of this petition.
2. AN ORDER directing the 1st respondent’s Chief National Electoral Commissioner and/or other officers to grant the petitioners access to the said database packets in the 1st respondent’s central servers.

3. AN ORDER granting leave to the petitioners to inspect and obtain certified true copies of smart card reader accreditation data from the smart card readers used in the said election and stored in the 1st respondent’s servers
4. AN ORDER granting leave to the petitioners to file a report of the inspection, examination and Analysis thereof at the trial.
5. And for such further order(s) as this honourable Court may deem fit and expedient to make in the circumstances.
The grounds upon which the application is brought are as follows:-
(a) The Petitioners in the Petition pleaded copiously that the results of the election were electronically transmitted to the 1st Respondent’s Central Server and gave notice that reliance will be placed on the extract of the electronic data from the said Central Server as at 25th February 2019.
(b) The 1st Respondent, as the body constitutionally and statutorily vested with the responsibility to conduct and manage the Presidential Election, set up electronic data central servers for the purposes of storage of transmitted accreditation data and results from smart card readers deployed for the election in an

apparent bid to ensure relative transparency of the process.
(c) The Respondents have, in their Replies, joined issues with the Petitioners in respect of the said data transmitted to the INEC’s central servers
(d) The data from the said central servers is very material and relevant for the just determination of this Petition.
(e) The Petitioners require the data from the said central servers to maintain this Petition.
(f) The Petitioners also require the extract of the data from the Smart Card Readers for the maintenance of the Petition.
(g) The Smart Card Readers were used at the said election verification, accreditation, and authentication of voters and for the transmission of results to the 1st Respondent’s for Servers
(h) To ensure objective, authentic, transparent and tamper- free process, a Court-supervised access and inspection of the content of the said INEC servers is required in the circumstances to ascertain the veracity of the data as they relate to the outcome of the disputed election.
(I) The data sought to be inspected is such as is retained by the 1st Respondent in its custody arising from the election which

ought to be open for inspection of a party in legal proceedings.
a) The data sought relates only to results and accreditation data transmitted, and excludes privileged data such as identity and particulars of voters.
(k) It will work tremendous hardship and grave injustice to refuse access to the contents of the central server that will assist the Honourable Court in the just consideration and determination of the issues involved in this matter or to allow a Party suppress or withhold access thereto.
(l) It is by an order for access and inspection that such captured data can be retrieved.
(m) It is in the interest of justice to grant this Application.

The application is supported by a 25 paragraph affidavit sworn by one Jude Daniel Odi of No 37A T.Y. Danjuma Street, Asokoro, Abuja. There is also a 10 page written address filed on the 8th day of May, 2019.

In opposing the said application, the 1st respondent filed a counter affidavit of 17 paragraphs deposed to by one Abimbola Oladunjoye of plot 436 Zambezi crescent FCT Abuja on the 23rd May 2019, and attached as “Exhibit 1” is the enrolled order of this Court made on 6/03/2019.

1st respondent also filed a written address of 18 pages on the same 23rd May, 2019 to justify the opposition to the petitioner’s application.

In response, the petitioners filed a further affidavit of 7 paragraphs and a reply on points of law to the 1st respondent written address. They were both filed on 11th June, 2019.

The 2nd respondent also opposed the application and subsequently filed a counter affidavit of 9 paragraphs on the 21st May 2019, to which are attached two documents marked Exhibits 1 & 2 respectively. The 2nd respondent also filed a written address of 15 paragraphs on 21st May 2019 and list of additional authorities on the 13th June 2019.

In response the petitioners filed a reply on points of law on 21st May 2019.

For the 3rd respondent, a 29 paragraph counter affidavit deposed to by one Thomas Ojo was filed on 24th May 2019. Two exhibits marked (APC1) and (APC2) respectively were annexed to the said counter affidavit. The 3rd respondent also filed written address on 24th May, 2019 in support of the affidavit.
The petitioners also reacted to the 3rd respondent’s counter affidavit and written address

by filing a reply on points of law on 6th June, 2019 and deemed properly filed on 13th June, 2019.

At the proceedings of the Court on 13th June 2019, the said petitioners motion on notice filed on 8th May 2019 was moved, wherein all the parties concerned duly adopted and relied on their respective affidavit, counter affidavits as well as written addresses in support of their stance on the orders sought.

In the petitioners written address filed on the 8th day of May, 2019 a sole issue was raised for determination as follows:
Whether having regards to the circumstances, this Honourable Court ought to grant this application in the interest of Justice.
Arguing in support of the said issue, Dr Livy Uzoukwu SAN, leading other senior advocates and counsel for the petitioners submitted inter alia that this Court has power to grant the application pursuant to the provisions of Section 151 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), Section 71 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as Amended), paragraphs 18 (e), 41(5) & (6), 47(2) 54 of the First Schedule of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), Section 6(6) of the 1999 Constitution as amended

as well as the inherent jurisdiction and wide powers of this Court.

With particular reference to Sections 151 and 71 of The Electoral Act (as amended), it was submitted that this Court has the powers to grant an order to inspect any packet in the custody of the 1st respondent for the purpose of maintaining an election petition and that a packet is the term used to describe a segment of data sent from one device to another over a network. Furthermore, that Section 71 acknowledges network data by the recognition given to the website of the 1st respondent. Also that Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011 recognises computer data and the evidence generated there from.

Learned senior counsel further contended that the term “any other packet in the custody of the Chief National Electoral Commissioner or any other officer of the commission” must be liberally interpreted to include and cover the packet of data stored by the 1st respondent in their central server, being polling data which the 1st respondent is entitled to keep in its custody and which must be opened to inspection upon the order of Court for the purpose of attainment of

justice.

On the rules and principles of interpretation of statutes the following cases were relied on, A.G LAGOS STATE V EKO HOTELS LTD & ANOR (2006) LPELR 3161 (SC); NURTW & ANOR V RTEAN & ORS (2012) LPELR 7840 (SC), IBRAHIM V SHERIFF (2004) 14 NWLR PT 892 43; ELABANJO V DAWODU (2006) 15 NWLR (PT.1000) 76; SOBAMOWO V ELEMUREN (2008) 11NWLR (PT.1097) 12.

In support of the stance that identifying the materials in respect of which access and/or inspection is needed and their relevance for the maintenance of the petition, the learned senior counsel referred to paragraphs 6 to 19 of the affidavit in support of the application. He added that what is in issue is not the admissibility of evidence received from the inspection of materials used for the election but for an order of access inspection and retrieval of captured data which will be presented to the Court in an admissible format.

It was further submitted that, by virtue of paragraph 41(5) & (6) of the 1st schedule to the Electoral Act (as amended) this Court may before the hearing of a petition order or direct that the evidence of a particular fact be given at the hearing in a

specified manner.

Learned senior counsel also noted that, if the contention of the 1st respondent is that its servers is empty and contains no results, or has been tampered with, the data logs and files will leave traces of data, time and size of modified, moved or deleted files. This Court was then urged to grant the application as prayed.

In their written address filed on 23rd May 2019. The learned Senior Counsel for the 1st Respondent formulated the following issues for determination:
Whether the Petitioners’ Application is not caught up by the Principle of Res Judicata thereby liable to be dismissed by this Honourable Court
IN THE ALTERNATIVE
Whether the Petitioners/Applicants are entitled to the reliefs sought having regards to the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended); Nigeria’s Public Policy and National Security.

Arguing on the main issue, Yusuf Ustaz Usman SAN leading other Senior Advocates and Counsel for the 1st Respondent, submitted that the Petitioners’ application as presently constituted amounts to a violation of the principle of Res judicata.

He added that it is judicially settled that for the

plea to succeed a party relying on it must establish the fact that the parties or their privies involved in both the previous and the present proceedings in which the plea as raised are the same; that the claim or issues in dispute are the same; that the res or the subject matter of the litigation in the two proceedings is the same; that the decision relied upon to support the plea is valid, subsisting and final; and that the Court that gave the previous decision relied upon to sustain the plea was a Court of competent jurisdiction.

The following cases were cited in support: DONALD VS. SALEH (2015) 2 NWLR (PT. 1444) 547; ADESINA & ANOR VS COMMISSIONER, IFON OILOBU BOUNDARY COMMISSION OSOGBO & ANOR. (1996) LPELR – SC; AGBAJE VS. INEC (2016) 4 NWLR (PT. 1501) 151.

Learned senior counsel further contended that the Petitioners had earlier filed an application before this Court seeking the same order to access the 1st Respondent’s central server wherein information was stored in database packets relating to the transmission and accreditation of votes and transmission of results from the presidential election and which order this Court in a

considered ruling refused to grant.

It was thus contended that, rather than explore the possibility of an appeal against the ruling, the Petitioners brought the present application seeking the same reliefs amongst others.

It was therefore submitted that a decision of a Court or Tribunal not appealed against remains subsisting and binding on all the parties, vide AGBAJE VS INEC supra.

He added that where a plea of res judicata is established, the Court is devoid of jurisdiction to entertain the subsequent action as held in DONALD VS. SALEH (supra) and DAKOLO VS. REWANE DAKOLO (2011) 16 NWLR (PT. 1272) 22 at 54. It was therefore urged on this Court to dismiss the application for want of jurisdiction to grant same.

On the alternative issue, formulated by the 1st Respondent, that is “whether the Petitioners/Applicants are entitled to the reliefs sought having regard to the provisions of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended); Nigeria’s Public Policy and National Security.”

Learned senior counsel submitted that, assuming without conceding that there is a server which the 1st Respondent has denied and issues joined on that point by the

parties; granting access to the server as requested by the Petitioners would amount to a compromising the Nigerian Public Policy and National Security.

In support reliance was placed on the case of OKEZIE VICTOR IKPEAZU VS. ALEX OTTI & ORS (2016) LPELR -40055 (SC), where the Supreme Court also at pages 37 to 39 restated the law on the relevance of card reader machine in proof of election petitions.

It was therefore contended that it will amount to an affront on the decision of the apex court on the issue whether card reader machine is supported by the Electoral Act if the application is granted, because the said decision implies that, until the Electoral Act is amended to include any form of technological instruments, the access to server is not required for the proof of the petition.

Reference was also made to Sections 52 (1), 54(1) and 125 of the Electoral Act to posit that they are intended to protect the secrecy of voting and the rights of voters. Further on the definition of Public policy and its implications the following cases were cited:
TOTAL NIG. PLC VS. AJAYI (2003) LPELR – 6174 (CA)

STATOIL (NIG) LTD VS. INDUCON (NIG) LTD & ANOR (2012) LPELR 7955 (CA); TINUBU VS. IMB SECURITIES PLC (2001) LPELR 3248 (SC) and DOKUBO-ASARI VS. FRN (2007) 12 NWLR (PT. 1048) 320.
He then urged on this Court to dismiss the application.

In their written address in reply on points of law, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners submitted inter alia, that the 1st Respondent completely misconceived the application as filed by the Petitioners. He added that the motion ex parte filed on 4/3/2019 and heard by this Court before the filing of the petition is totally different in form and substance from the present application on notice filed on 8/5/2019. Furthermore, that the present petition No CA/PEPC/002/2019 had not been filed and had not come to life when the previous ex parte application No. CA/EPT/PRES/1/M/2019 was heard and determined without any Respondent being involved.
Learned senior counsel further contended that the case of DONALD VS. SALEH (supra) relied upon by the 1st Respondent is not applicable because the parties are not the same as there were no Respondents in the motion ex parte and the decision is not final. Reliance was placed on

the case of SHITIU & ORS VS. OLAEGBE (2009) LPELR – 8918 (CA) and AFELUMO VS. OJO & ORS (2013) LPELR -19976 (CA).

It was also submitted that a distinction must be drawn between a motion ex parte wherein rights of parties have not been decided, and a motion on notice where parties are heard and a decision arrived thereon, on the rights of the parties moreso that a relief refused in an ex parte application may be granted in a motion on notice. Furthermore, that when there is a change or adjustment in circumstances, such as when a petition has not been filed but subsequently done and there now exist Respondents to be put on notice, an application can be brought again for the consideration and exercise of the discretion of the Court. Reliance was placed on the case of MBAS MOTEL LTD VS. WEMA BANK PLC. (2013) LPELR – 20736 (CA) and AMOO VS. ALABI (2003) 12 NWLR (PT. 835) 537).

Further citing the case of ECOBANK (NIG) PLC VS. KELIKUME & ANOR (2017) LPELR 43546 (CA), it was submitted that a Court cannot become functus officio with respect to an ex parte decision because it is not a final decision between the parties in litigation.

On the 1st Respondent’s contention that the relief sought in the application will compromise national policy and national security, learned senior counsel submitted that the 1st Respondent failed to show or demonstrate how such national public policy or national security will be jeopardised by the reliefs sought having regard to ground (k) of the grounds for the application and paragraph 16 of the supporting affidavit which stated clearly the nature and scope of the data sought.

It was further submitted that on the contrary, if there is any national public policy that the Court should be concerned with, it should be the transparency of the electoral process and the neutrality of the electoral umpire which are the two national public policies the Courts have sought to enshrine by judicial pronouncements as demonstrated in the following cases: A.G FEDERATION & ORS VS. ALHAJI ATIKU ABUBAKAR & ORS. (2007) 6 NWLR (PT. 1031) 626; JOE ODEY AGI (SAN) VS. PDP (2016) LPELR – 42578 (SC); HOPE UZODINMA VS. OSITA IZUNASO (NO.2) (2011) 17 NWLR (PT. 1275) 30 and INEC VS. OTTI & ORS. (2016) LPELR 40056 (SC). It was further urged on this Court

to grant the application.

In the 2nd Respondent’s written address filed on 21/5/2019, a sole issue was formulated for determination as follows:
“Given the circumstances of the petition before this Honourable Court, the reply already filed and the purport of the instant application, whether this Honourable Court will not discountenance the petitioner’s application.”

Arguing in support of the said issue, learned senior counsel for the 2nd Respondent submitted that the petitioner’s application herein is not only abusive of Court process but equally an invitation towards the violation of the respondents’ constitutional right of fair hearing and that it is the principle of law that all orders and decisions of Court are binding and effective until appealed and set aside. He cited the cases of: OKWARANONOBI V MBADUGHA (2013) 17 NWLR (PT 1383) 255; NWAOGU V ATUMA (2013) 11 NWLR (PT 1364) 117; ATANDA V ILIASU (2013) 6 NWLR (PT 1351) 529, GODWIN PIUS V STATE (2016) 9 NWLR (1517) 341 at 354 -355.
The learned senior counsel referred the Court to an order contained in Exhibit 2 annexed to the 2nd Respondent’s counter affidavit, and

thereby submit that this Honourable Court be functus officio in all issues on or relating to the reliefs sought on the face of the application citing the following cases: BUHARI V INEC & ORS (2008) 19 NWLR (PT 1120) 246 AT 375, also SANUSI V AYOOLA (1992) 9 NWLR (PT 265) 275; AROSO & ORS V ENTERPRISES BANK LTD (2015) 13 NWLR (PT 1479) 306 at 322 -323.

The learned senior counsel further contended by pointing out that the petitioners’ complaint as presented in the petition filed on 18th March, 2019 is anchored on data purported to have been obtained from some central server, and that the whole idea of a server belonging to the 1st respondent only exists in the imagination of the petitioners.

He added that if the Court grants the application it would have formed its opinion on the substantive case, by the simple order granting leave for the petitioners to inspect the alleged “central server”. This will, therefore, engender a likelihood of bias, thus, impacting negatively on respondent’s right to fair hearing, as invariably guaranteed under and by virtue of Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

He further submitted that the cardinal principle of law and justice is that the primary duty of the Court is to evaluate evidence submitted before it, and to ascribe probative values to same. He relied on the following cases: WOLUCHEM V. GUDI 1981 SCC 291, ONOWAN V. ISERHIEN (1976) I NWLR 263, IFER V. IKYANYON (2001) 4 NWLR (PT. 203) 324; ATOLAGBE V. SHORUN (1985) 1 NWLR (PT. 2) 360; ADELEKE V. IYANDA (2001) 13 NWLR (PT. 729) 1; OLAFEMI & ANOR. V. AYO & ORS. (2008) LPELR-4739 (CA) AND MAFIMISEBI V. EHUWA (2007) ALL FWLR (PT. 355) 562 AT 605.

It was therefore contended that if this Honourable Court is to grant the petitioners’ application, it would be bound to prematurely consider and evaluate the facts which have already been submitted for its determination in the substantive suit. This is more so as it is the same Court, which would have technically acquiesced to the existence of a server, that will ultimately be faced with the duty of considering the substantive suit. Furthermore, that this goes a long way in impinging on the second pillar of natural justice to wit:
“nemo judex in causa slid’ loosely interpreted as “one should not be a

judge in his own cause”. On this, the learned senior counsel relied on the case of L.P.D.C. V. FAWEHINMI (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 7) 300.

The learned senior counsel therefore concluded that the rule of natural justice will require that no finding or observation is made at an interlocutory stage, on any issue forming part of the substantive action before the Court but that this will however become inevitable, if this Honourable Court accedes to the advances of the petitioners, by proceeding to grant their application, which by a far-reaching implication, would have conceded to the existence of a “central server”, contrary to the case of the respondent.

In the petitioners reply on points of law as contain in their written address filed on 24th May, 2019, learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that the 2nd Respondent completely misconceived the application of the Petitioners because the ex parte motion filed by the Petitioners on 4th March, 2019 and heard by the Honourable Court before the institution of this Petition is totally different in form and substance from the present application by the Petitioners.

He added that the said relief and

the reliefs in the present application are certainly not the same and are not identical and that the present application is essentially for an order allowing access or a Court-supervised access and inspection by the Petitioners, in the presence of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents if they so desire, of the 1st Respondent’s central servers for information relating to accreditation of voters and transmission of results from the election, and also for inspection of the smartcard reader accreditation information.

Furthermore, that at the time the ex parte application was brought, the Petition had not been filed, and the Honourable Court limited itself to granting only Relief 2 which it adjudged was grantable at the time for the institution of a Petition, as the other reliefs were premature in a way at the time when no petition had been filed.

He further emphasized that the previous application in Petition No CA/EPT/PRES/1/M/2019 was filed, argued and determined before Petition No CA/PEPC/002/2019 was filed and the earlier application was therefore not filed or heard within the life of this Petition.

Learned senior counsel further contended that it is not

open to the 2nd Respondent to determine how Petitioners will prosecute their Petition or which materials or documents or packets the Petitioners must have access to. All the Petitioners need do is that materials needed are in the possession of the 1st Respondent and that the materials are needed to maintain the Petition.

It was his further contention that the submission of the 2nd Respondent, other than being suspect runs against the intendment and spirit of the provisions of Section 77(1)&(2) and 151(1)&(2) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) because a community reading of the sections of the Act will show unequivocally that the tribunal or Court and indeed officials of 1st Respondent must afford Petitioners or Respondents access to Electoral documents or packets in the life of the Petition, to maintain the Petition or defend the Petition. He relied on the case of AREGBESOLA V OYINLOLA (2009) 14NWLR (PT. 1162) P. 429 AT P. 478 PARA G; wherein it was held that:
“On no account should a party be denied the opportunity to place before the Court all documents that would assist him in proving his case.”

Also relying on the case

AMOO vs. ALABI (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 835) 537, it was submitted that the refusal of an interlocutory application is not a bar to bringing the same or similar application before the same Court.

On the 2nd Respondent contention that, considering the application at this stage would amount to making a finding on an issue forming part of the substantive action. Learned senior submitted that this amounts to a total misconception of the Petitioners’ application because this Court is not being called upon to make any finding whatsoever about the existence, contents or otherwise of the servers in any manner whatsoever.

The 3rd Respondent in reaction to the motion filed his written address on the 24th of May, 2019 whereby he formulated a lone issue for the determination of this application, thus:
“Considering the circumstances of the petition before this Honourable Court, the Respondent’s reply filed and the purport of the instant application, vis-a-vis established Principles of law, whether the petitioners/Applicants’ instant application is competent and grantable?”

Arguing on the said issue learned senior counsel for the 3rd

respondent submitted that the petitioners’ instant application is not only abusive of the process of this Honourable Court, it is also a misconceived invitation to this Court to violate the settled principle of law that once a Court has delivered its decision on any issue, it lacks the vires to review the decision on any suggestion that it made a mistake in the decision or that the party applying omitted to cite some authorities which would have led to a decision in his favour. Except in cases, where the applicant can show that the Court reached its decision without jurisdiction, in which case he can apply back to the same Court to set aside its decision reached without jurisdiction, the only remedy available to any person who is not satisfied with the decision of a Court is to appeal against it. He referred to the following cases: UBN V. CFAO (1997) 11 NWLR (Pt. 527), 118 at 127, TOMTEC NIG. LTD v. FHA (Pt. 1173) 358, 382DH, OKWARANONOBI vs. MBADUGHA (2013) 17 NWLR (PT. 1383) 255.

He added that it is an elementary principle of law that even where a decision of a Court is wrong, an Appellate Court cannot interfere with same, where there is no appeal

against the said decision.

It was also posited that the crux of the petitioners’ complaint as presented in the petition filed on 18th March, 2019, is anchored on data purported to have been obtained from some central server, claimed to belong to the 1st Respondent as shown in several paragraphs of the petition, wherein they challenged the Respondent’s victory on data obtained from the 1st Respondent server.

The learned senior counsel further submitted that the Respondent joined issues on all fronts, unequivocally and without mincing words, stating expressly that the whole idea of a server belonging to the 1st Respondent only exists in the imagination of the petitioners and this can also be deciphered in paragraphs 29, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 45 amongst others, of the 3rd Respondent’s reply. He added that by this fact, issues have been joined in respect of the existence or otherwise of the said server. It will therefore amount to prejudging the core of parties’ case at this interlocutory stage of the proceedings, should the Court proceed to grant any of the reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant motion given that no Court is permitted

to determine at an interlocutory stage, issues for determination in the substantive trial.

It was also contended that by granting the application as prayed the Court would have formed its opinion on the substantive case, by the simple order granting leave for the petitioners to inspect the alleged “central server”. This will, therefore, engender a likelihood of bias, thus, impacting negatively on Respondent’s right to fair hearing, as invariably guaranteed under and by virtue of Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). Therefore, if this Honourable Court proceeds to make such far reaching finding of the existence of the central server at this interlocutory stage, without taking oral evidence of witnesses in view of the hostile nature of the facts, then the cause of fairness and natural justice would have been prematurely terminated.

Learned senior counsel added that it is cardinal principle of law and justice that the primary duty of the Court is to evaluate evidence submitted before it, and to ascribe probative values to same as held in the case of: WOLUCHEM VS. GUDI (1981) SCC 291;

OPARAJI V OHANU (1999) 9 NWLR (PT. 618) 290 AT 307; ANDREW V INEC (2018) 9 NWLR (PT. 1625) 507 AT 564 PARAS F-G.

Further noting that by the instant application the petitioners/Applicants have purportedly invoked Sections 71 and 151 (1) and (2) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), paragraphs 18(7)(e), 41(5) and (6), 47(2) and 54 of the 1st Schedule to Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and under the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. It was submitted that aforementioned sections cannot be craved in aid to justify the grant of the prayers sought in the application in the entire peculiar circumstances of this case.

The petitioners filed a reply on point of law as contained in their written address dated 1st June, 2019 and filed on 6th June, 2019 but deemed properly filed on 13th June, 2019.

The argument therein are substantially similar to their reply on points on law to the 2nd respondent reply filed on 24th May, 2019 and earlier set out in this ruling.

However, in addition it was contended by the

learned senior counsel for the petitioners that 3rd respondent’s submission to the effect that considering the application at this stage will amount to making a finding on an issue forming part of the substantive action is a total misconception of the petitioners’ application because the Court is not being invited to make any finding whatsoever about the existence, contents or otherwise of the third respondents servers.

He added that, the said servers are in the custody of the 1st respondent and not the 3rd respondent. Furthermore, that it is strange and presumptuous for the 3rd respondent to claim the non existence of such server because as pleaded by the petitioners the 3rd respondent had through his spokesperson, Mr Festus Keyamo SAN, accused the petitioners for breaking or hacking into the said first respondent server to obtain the scores and votes pleaded by the petitioners. Therefore, a party must be consistent in his case and must not blow hot and cold at the same time.

It was further submitted that it preposterous to contend that to grant this application would amount acknowledging the existence of the central server and that same would

negatively impact on the 3rd respondent right to fair hearing, this is because an order of inspection could reveal the existence or non-existence of a server or servers.

On the principle that justice is a search for the discovery of the truth, learned senior counsel cited the case of EGESIMBA V ONUZURUIKE (2002) 15 NWLR PART 791466 at 520.

It is therefore submitted that an order allowing access to electoral materials cannot in anyway amount prejudging issues in the matter but one which ought to be greatly encouraged in the interest of justice.

Learned senior counsel further posited that electoral matters in Nigeria are sui generis as they transcend mere disputes between individuals and they touch and affect the entire society beyond the parties on record. Furthermore, that the 1st respondent is a public institution with constitutional and statutory responsibilities to the country, and the materials and records of how it conducted a national election must be subject to transparency and open to scrutiny when challenged in a court of law and not one shrouded in secrecy at the behest of disputed beneficiary. Reliance was placed on the case of

IKPEAZU V OTTI & ORS (2016) LPELR 40055 (SC) PG 56.

It was therefore urged on this Court to discountenance the argument of the 3rd respondent and to grant the application as prayed.

Due consideration has been given to the affidavits, counter affidavit and further affidavits as well as the submissions made in the parties written addresses. From the foregoing, the germane issue that calls for careful consideration is:
“Whether, it will meet the justice of the case to grant the petitioner’s application having regard to the facts as presented by the parties vis-a-vis the circumstances of this petition.”

As a starting point, it must be emphasised that the grant or refusal of applications of this nature is discretionary and this Court will be willing to exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant where there is justification to do so. See BOWAJE VS. ADEDIWURA (1976) 6 SC 143; NATIONAL INLAND WATER WAYS AUTHORITY VS. SPDC (NIG) LTD (2011) 6 NWLR (PT. 1244) 618. In WILLIAM & ORS. VS. HOPERISING VOLUNTARY FUNDS SOCIETY (1982) 1 – 2 SC 145, the Supreme Court noted that:
“It is true, of course that the Court

should bear in mind when exercising its discretion, the interests of the parties and the justice of the case, and should exercise its discretion where the justice of the case requires it to do so.”
In OYEKANMI VS. NEPA (2000) 15 NWLR (PT. 690) 414. The Apex Court per Ogundare JSC (now of blessed memory) further posited thus:
“Prima facie, what are the Rules that guide the exercise of Court’s discretion. It has been said first that a Judge must act judicially, on known principles. He should not take into consideration extraneous matters, and he should not fail to consider something which he ought to have taken into consideration. Egerton Vs. Jones (1939) 3 All ER 889; Solanke Vs. Abiola (1968) 1 All NLR 46 at 52. The Judge should also act judiciously. There would be a balance consideration of the facts for each party before he arrives at a proper exercise of his discretion.”
The concept of proper exercise of judicial discretion was adequately considered in the case of AKIN AKINYEMI (AKIN AKINYEMI & ASSOCIATES) VS. ODU’A INVESTEMNT CO. LTD (2012) 1 SC (PT. IV) page 1, where in it was held that:
“A judicial discretion however, is the

exercise of judgment by a judge or Court based on what is fair under the circumstances and guided by the rules and principles of law. In other words, it is a Court’s power to act or not to act as a matter of right. To make such discretion look judicially and judicious it has to be based on prudence, rationality, sagacity, astuteness, considerateness and reasonableness.”
It follows therefore, from the above cited authorities, that the exercise of discretion is one of the strongest weapons of a Court of law which should however not be exercised in vacuum. There must therefore be certain sets of facts to influence the Court in granting it. In this regard, the party asking for the exercise of a Court’s discretion in his favour must satisfy the Court that justice of his case demands its grant. See NIGERIAN NATIONAL SUPPLY CO. LTD. VS. ALHAN H. SABANA & CO LTD & ORS. (1988) 3 SC 221.

In the instant application, the four reliefs sought by the Petitioners/Applicants are hereinbelow set out as follows:
“(1) AN ORDER ALLOWING ACCESS OR A COURT-SUPERVISED ACCESS AND INSPECTION BY THE PETITIONERS, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE 2ND AND 3RD RESPONDENTS IF

THEY SO DESIRE, OF THE 1ST RESPONDENTS CENTRAL SERVERS WHEREIN INFORMATION WAS RECORDED AND STORED IN DATABASE PACKETS RELATING TO ACCREDITATION OF VOTERS AND TRANSMISSION OF RESULTS FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THIS PETITION.
(2) AN ORDER DIRECTING THE 1ST RESPONDENT’S CHIEF NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSIONER AND/OR OTHER OFFICERS TO GRANT THE PETITIONERS ACCESS TO THE SAID DATABASE PACKETS IN THE 1ST RESPONDENT’S CENTRAL SERVERS.
(3) AN ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO THE PETITIONERS TO INSPECT AND OBTAIN CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF SMART CARD READER ACCREDITATION DATA FROM THE SMART CARD READERS USED IN THE SAID ELECTION AND STORED IN THE 1ST RESPONDENT’S SERVERS.
(4) AN ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO THE PETITIONERS TO FILE A REPORT OF THE INSPECTION, EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS AT THE TRIAL.”

In support of the application, the petitioners deposed in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of their affidavit as follows:
“6. That the Petitioners had pleaded copiously in the petition that the result of the election were electronically

transmitted to the 1st Respondent’s central servers, in addition to the accreditation data from Smart Card Readers used in the said election.
7. That the Petitioners also pleaded that Smart Card Readers were used at the said election for verification, accreditation and authentication of voters and for the transmission of results to the 1st Respondent’s servers.
8. That the Respondents have joined issues with the Petitioners in respect of the said data transmitted to the INEC’s central servers.
9. That the 1st Respondent, as the body constitutionally and statutorily vested with the responsibility to conduct and manage the Presidential Election, set up electronic data servers for the purposes of storage packets of transmitted accreditation data and results from smart card readers deployed for the election.
10. That the 1st Respondent, the party in whose custody the server is, has refuted the figures as averred by the Petitioners as not having derived from its central server.
11. That the 1st Respondent before the election publicly stated and confirmed that it was employing the system of electronic transmission of

results to its central servers in addition to the manual method of transmission of results, having trained and engaged its officers at all levels of voting and collation across the federation, for the purpose in respect of which huge public funds were budgeted and expended.
12. That the Petitioners had pleaded the numerous newspaper reports, television broadcasts and news reports on the social media on the public declarations of the 1st Respondent on the issue, as well as the statement of the 2nd Respondent through its spokesperson, Mr. Festus Keyamo, SAN, confirming the existence of the INEC server and alleging that the said servers were hacked into.
13. That the Petitioners require access to the database packets containing the relevant information relating to received transmission of accreditation and results data, for same to be presented as a Report by Experts engaged by the Petitioners.
14. That the data from the said central servers is very material and relevant for the just determination of this petition.
16. That the data sought relates only to results and accreditation data transmitted, and excludes privileged data such as identity

and particulars of voters.
17. That the servers in question belong to the 1st Respondent, and the relevant figures and votes were transmitted to the 1st Respondent’s Presidential Result’s Server 1 and thereafter aggregated in INEC_PRES_RSLT_SRV2019 whose Physical Address Mac Address is 94-57-A5-DC-64-89 with Microsoft Product 00252-70000-00000-A/63S, which descriptions are unique to the 1st Respondent’s said Server.
18. That the said particulars of the IP Mac Address of the INEC servers were pleaded in the Petition.
19. That these servers and their contents are and have been in the custody of the 1st Respondent.
20. That I know that the data sought to be inspected is such as is retained by the 1st Respondent arising from the election which ought to be open for inspection of a party in legal proceedings.
21. That it will work tremendous hardship and grave injustice to refuse access to the contents of the central server that will assist the Honourable Court in the just consideration and determination of the issues involved in this matter or to allow a party suppress or withhold access thereto.”

On the other hand, the 1st Respondent

in its counter affidavit deposed to by one Bimbola Oladunjoye denied the existence or ownership of any central server or the use of electronic transmission or collation of results in the conduct of the Presidential election on 23/2/2019. For purpose of clarity, paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the 1st Respondent’s counter affidavit are hereinbelow set out:
“6. That contrary to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Petitioners’/Applicants’ Affidavit in support of their Motion on Notice dated May 8, 2019, Smart Card Readers were used for authentication purposes only.
7. Further to the above paragraph, the 1st Respondent did not adopt any electronic transmission or collation of results in the conduct of the 2019 Presidential election and denies the existence of any such electronic transmission packet of the result as the 1st Respondent was not empowered by the Electoral Act, 2010 and the Regulation and Guidelines for the conduct of the elections to so transmit.
8. That contrary to paragraphs 9, 10, 12, 13, 19 and 20 of the Petitioners’/Applicants’ Affidavit in support of their Motion on Notice dated May 8, 2019, the 1st Respondent

reasserts its position in paragraph (6) and (7) above and further states that it does not have the so called Central Server, for collation and transmission of election results as described by the Petitioners/Applicants.
9. Further to the above, the 1st Respondent further states that the accurate results of the presidential election is clearly shown in the declared result which is a reflection of the scores of the parties collated by the 1st Respondent.
10. That contrary to paragraph 11 of the Petitioners/Applicants’ Affidavit in support of their Motion on Notice dated May 8, 2019, the 1st Respondent, its chairman or authorized spokesperson never stated that it was employing the system of electronic transmission of result to any central server as there was not central server for that purpose or any other purpose identified by the Petitioners during or after the 2019 presidential election.
11. That contrary to paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the Petitioners’ Affidavit in support of their Motion on Notice dated May 8, 2019, the 1st Respondent has no Central Server, and the result of the 2019 Presidential election as manually collated,

has been declared by the 1st Respondent, and copies of the results were distributed to all the political parties including the 2nd Petitioner/Applicant.
12. That contrary to paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 the 1st Respondent asserts that no figures or votes collated during the 2019 Presidential election were transmitted to any Central server, and none was also aggregated in any server referred to as INEC RSLT SRV2019 whose physical address is 94-57A5-DC64-B9 as alleged by the Petitioners/Applicants. The said server is strange to the 1st respondent.
13. That the alleged Central Server INEC RSLT SR2019 whose physical address is 94-57A5-DC64-B9 does not belong to the 1st Respondent and the 1st Respondent has no access to same.”

Now based on the facts as deposed to in paragraphs 6 and 8 of the Petitioners/Applicants affidavit in support of the application, to the effect that election results were electronically transmitted to the 1st Respondents’ central servers in addition to the accreditation data from Smart Cards Readers used in the election and that the Respondents have joined issues with the Petitioners in respect of the said data transmitted to

the 1st Respondents’ central server. This Court will be circumspect and minded to peruse the Petition as well as the Respondents’ reply thereto. Therein it was confirmed that the Petitioners in paragraphs 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the petition averred to the fact that the Presidential election which held on 23/2/2019, the 1st Respondent deployed Smart Card Readers in addition to accreditation and also transmitted results from the polling units directly to its central server. The 1st Respondent on the other hand in paragraph 16 of their reply to the petition totally denied the existence or ownership of any server or the electronic transmission of results during the said presidential election.

It is indeed germane and expedient to set out the relevant paragraphs as averred to by the parties on this issue. For the Petitioners/Applicants’ paragraphs 26 to 29 of their petition reads thus;
“26. The Petitioners state that Smart Card Readers deployed by the 1st Respondent, in addition to accreditation, equally transmitted electronically the results of voting from polling units directly to the server of the 1st Respondent. The Presiding Officers of the 1st Respondent

directly inputted the results from the polling units at the end of voting and transmitted directly to the server, in addition to manually taking the Form EC8As to the Wards for collation. The 1st Respondent is hereby given notice to produce the records of results from each polling unit uploaded and transmitted electronically by officials of the 1st Respondent through smart card readers to the 1st Respondent’s servers.
27. The Petitioners plead and rely on the 1st Respondent’s Manual Technologies 2019, and notice is hereby given to the 1st Respondent to produce same at the trial. The 1st Respondent’s agents at the poling units used the Smart Card Reader for electronic collation and transmission of results. The Petitioners plead and shall rely on and play at the trial, the video demonstration by the 1st Respondent of the deployment of Smart Card Reader for authentication of accreditation and for transmission of data.
28. The Petitioners hereby plead and rely upon the extract of data as contained on the 1st Respondent’s servers as at 25th February, 2019, notice to produce whereof is hereby given to the 1st Respondent. The Petitioners

also will rely on the data on the 1st Respondent’s central server between 25th February, 2019 and 8th March, 2019 and hereby also give notice to produce same before this Honourable Court.
29. The Petitioners hereby plead the electronic data on the servers of the 1st Respondent and shall at the trial give evidence of the source of the data analysis and data material, including the website:
www.factsdontlieng.com.”

In challenging the above averments, the 1st Respondent deposed in paragraph 16 of the 1st Respondent reply to the petition as follows:
“16. Further to the foregoing, the website described as www.factsdontlieng.com was neither created nor owned by the 1st Respondent. It is a site not known to the 1st Respondent. The 1st Respondent does not share information with such an unclassified entity and any information purportedly derived therefrom which does not accord with the result as declared by the 1st Respondent is not authentic but rather was invented for the purpose of this case. The 1st Respondent did not adopt electronic transmission or collation of results in the conduct of the election, voting by

electronic means not having been adopted as a provision of the Electoral Act. The 1st Respondent specifically denies the existence of electronic transmission of results as it is unknown to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) and Regulations and Guidelines for the conduct of the elections, 2019, and put the Petitioners to the strictest of proof thereof.”

In the light of the above set out averments and as rightly acceded to by the parties, issues have been joined on the existence or non-existence of a central server and whether results of the Presidential election which held on 23/2/2019 were electronically transmitted.

Now given the germane nature of the issue so joined and which proof or ascertainment can only emerge during the hearing of the substantive petition, the big question that comes to the fore is, whether it will be rational, judicious or meet the end of justice for this Court to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioners by granting the reliefs as sought when the reality of the existence of the subject matter of the application has not been resolved.

For the 2nd Respondent it was contended at page 12 of their written

address that the rule of natural justice will require that no finding or observation is made at an interlocutory stage on any issue forming part of the substantive action before the Court and that will surely be the case if this Court proceeds to grant the Petitioners’ application, which by a far reaching implication would have conceded to the existence of a central server contrary to the stance of the 1st Respondent that there is no such server.

The stance taken by the 3rd Respondent on the issue is aptly summarised in paragraph 4:10 at page 11 of their written address wherein it was submitted that:
“The above line of argument will be better appreciated when it is realised that by the time this Honourable Court grants the instant application, it would have, whether technically or otherwise, acknowledge the existence of the alleged central server. In essence, the Court would have formed its opinion on the substantive case, by the simple order granting leave for the petitioners to inspect the alleged central server.” This will, therefore, engender a likelihood of bias, thus impacting negatively on the Respondents’ right to fair hearing, as invariably

guaranteed under and by virtue of Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (as amended).”

The Petitioners in their replies on point of law have a common response to the stance of the Respondents on the issue. Thus to the Petitioners this Court would not have formed its opinion on the substantive case by granting the application, rather the Court would be affording the Petitioners all necessary opportunity to present its case so as to enable it give a holistic decision on all the issues placed before it. Also that it is farfetched to claim that an order for access can amount to a finding with respect to the matters to be decided at the main trial.

It is however my humble view that, given the averments in the petition and the Respondents replies thereto as earlier set out in this ruling with regard to whether or not there exists a central server and whether there was electronic transmission of the results of the presidential election which was held on 23/2/2019 and which issue has admittedly been joined in the substantive petition, it will no doubt be out of place and justifiably clothe this Court with the garb of bias if

it proceeds to grant the reliefs as sought by the petitioners. In other words, by so doing, this Court would have delved into and resolved the contentious issue aforementioned at an interlocutory stage. The unpalatable scenario that will be created in the circumstance will be that this Court has by implication agreed that there is a central server in the custody of the 1st Respondent and this Court will be seen as having engaged in making an order that touches on the substantive matter.

SYLVANUS MORTUNE VS. ALH. MUHAMMADU GAMBO (1979) 3 – 4 SC 36, where the Supreme Court admonished further that care should be taken, when a Court is hearing an interlocutory application to avoid making an observation or order in its ruling on that application which might prejudge the main issue in the proceedings relative to the interlocutory application.
This Court has chosen to abide by the said admonition to exercise due care in order not to be held culpable for pre-judging a fundamental issue already joined by the parties in the substantive petition.

In this regard, I decline to grant the reliefs sought by the Petitioners in the application under consideration. The said application filed on the 8th day of May, 2019 is hereby refused and it is accordingly dismissed.

ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A.: I agree.

JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.: I agree.

SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.: I agree.

PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.: I agree.

Appearances:

Dr Livy Uzoukwu (SAN), Chief Chris Uche (SAN), Pius Akubo (SAN), Saka Abimbola Isau (SAN), Eyitayo Jegede (SAN), Chukwuma Machukwu-Ume (SAN), Dr Akinpelu Onigbinde (SAN), A.K. Ajibade (SAN), Emeka Okpoko (SAN), Dr. Mrs. V.J.O Azinge (SAN) with them, Prof. Yusuf Dankofa, Esq., Ahmed T. Uwais, Esq., Shikammah K. Sheltu, Esq., Jabiru Bashir Mohammed, Esq. and Silas Joseph Onu, Esq. For Appellant(s)

Yunus Ustaz Usman (SAN), Omoruyi Augustine Omonuwa (SAN ,OFR), Prof. Fabian Ajogwu (SAN, F.Carb), Samuel Tomi Ologunorisa (SAN), Tanimu M. Inuwa (SAN) with him, Abdulrahman Madaki, Esq., B.M. Salihu, Esq., Eze A. Nwa-Uwa, Esq., Mohammed Ibrahim Tola, Esq., Owolona A. Ako-Adekwu, Esq., Ifeanyl Ihejirika, Esq., Abdulaziz Sani, Esq., Hamza Gudaji, Esq., Mercy Nakpo Adabson, Esq. and Adeola Adeniyi, Esq. for the 1st Respondent.
Chief Wole Olanipekun (OFR,SAN), Yusuf Ali (SAN), Dr. Alex Izinyon (SAN), A.B. Mahmoud (SAN), Prof Taiwo Osipitan (SAN), , Femi Atoyebi (SAN), Mike Igbokwe (SAN), Osaro Eghobamien (SAN), Ken Mozia, (SAN), Dayo Akinlaja (SAN), Chief Olusola Oke (SAN), Nnamonso Ekanem (SAN), Akin Osinbajo (SAN), Stephen Zakari Adehi (SAN) with them, Mrs. Boma Alabi OON, Ayoola Ajayi, Esq., Dapo Akinosun, Esq., Edwin Anikwem, Esq., Lanre Akinsola, Esq., Adesina Agbede, Esq., Emmanuel Uwadoka, Esq., Adelani Ajibade, Esq., Charles Ndukwe, Esq., Akintola Makinde, Esq., M.I. Hanafi, Esq., Kolawole Aro, Esq., Alex Isinyon II, C.U. Adah, O.A. Ibadin, Esq., A. Gbemre, Esq. and Bisola Omotosho, Esq. for the 2nd Respondent.
L.O. Fagbemi (SAN), Chief Akin Olujinmi (SAN), Chief Charles U. Edosomwan (SAN), Funke Adekoya (SAN), Adeniyi Akintola (SAN FCIArb), Benbella Anachebe (SAN), Oladipo Okpeseyi (SAN), Y.C. Maikyau, (SAN), Ibrahim Bawa (SAN), Dr. Muiz Banire (SAN), Nasir A. Dangiri (SAN), Festus Keyamo (SAN) with him, Akin Oladeji, Esq., Nicholas Akintola Ladapo, Esq., Babatunde Ogala, Esq., Prof. Bagoni A. Bukar, Esq., Prof. Mamman Lawan Yusufari, Esq., Mutiu Ganiyu, Esq., Nureinin Jimoh, Esq., Funso Olukoga, Esq., Olusola A. Dare, Esq., Dr. Kayode Ajulo, Esq., Omosanya Popoola, Esq., Japhet Opawale, Esq., S.A Sanni, Esq., B.R. Gold, Esq., Chuka Iguh, Esq., Abdul Fatal Oyedele, Esq. MCIArb for the 3rd Respondent. For Respondent(s)

Appearances

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