ASA v. STATE (2020)

ASA v. STATE

(2020)LCN/14082(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ENUGU JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Wednesday, March 25, 2020

CA/E/15C/2018

Before Our Lordships:

Monica Bolna’an Dongban-Mensem Justice of the Court of Appeal

Misitura Omodere Bolaji-Yusuff Justice of the Court of Appeal

Joseph Olubunmi Kayode Oyewole Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

INNOCENT ASA APPELANT(S)

And

THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WHETHER ROR NOT ISSUES FORMULATED IN APPEAL MUST ARISE FROM THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL

The law is settled that issues formulated in an appeal must take its root from the ground(s) of appeal and while it is permissible to distil or formulate one issue from one or two on of more or more of grounds of appeal, the law is emphatic that formulation of more issues than the grounds of appeal is not acceptable. See MFA INONGHA (2014) LPELR-22010 (SC) AT 26 (D-E). OKWUAGBALA & ORS V. IKWUEME & ORS (SUPRA). In the instant case, the notice of appeal contains 3 grounds of appeal. The appellant submitted four issues for determination. In AMODU V. COMMANDANT, POLICE COLLEGE, MAIDUGURI & ANOR. (2009) LPELR-467 (SC) AT 10-11 (B) the Supreme Court held that:
“It is settled law that a party is not allowed to formulate more than one issue for determination out of a ground of appeal even though he can combine two or more grounds of appeal in formulating an issue for determination. This is the principle against proliferation of issues for determination. In the instant case learned counsel has submitted two issues out of the single ground of appeal for determination thereby rendering the issues incompetent”. In the case of Orji vs. The State (2008) 4 SCNJ 85, this Court per Mukhtar JSC held as follows at page 94:- “Issues for determination are supposed to be distilled from the grounds of appeal filed by an appellant, and not raised capriciously. They must not out-number the grounds of appeal, for where they so out-number them there is the danger that some of the issues do not derive their source from the grounds of appeal, and therefore are not related to one another. It is trite that an issue that does not so relate will not be tolerated…” PER BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF AN ACCUSED PERSON UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY

By virtue of Section 36 (5) of the Constitution, every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. The law is well settled that in any criminal proceedings, the burden is entirely on the prosecution to prove the alleged offence against an accused person beyond reasonable doubt. See SANMI V. STATE (2019) 13 NWLR (PT.1690) 551 AT 577 (C-F), (2019) LPELR-47418 (SC). PHILIP V. STATE (2019)13 NWLR (1690) 509 AT 533 -534 (G-E). For the prosecution to discharge this burden, cogent, credible and compelling evidence must be adduced to establish the ingredients of the offence charged. See Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act. ABIRIFON V. STATE (2013) LPELR-20807 (SC) AT 14-15 (D-A). The prosecution can discharge the burden by (a) evidence of eye witness or witnesses (b) Voluntary confessional statement of the accused or accused persons, and (c) circumstantial evidence. See AKINSUWA V. STATE (2019) LPELR-47621 (SC) AT 23-25. PER BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT A FREE AND VOLUNTARY CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT CAN SUSTAIN A CONVICTION

The law is settled that a free and voluntary confessional statement if positive and direct is sufficient to sustain a conviction once the Court is satisfied of the truth of the confession even if the accused person retracted or resile from the statement. However, where an accused retracts his statement or resiles from it, the Court is enjoined to look for evidence outside the statement to confirm the truth of the statement. PER BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT AN ACCUSED PERSON CAN BE CONVICTED SOLELY ON A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

I do not think that it should be so easy to convict an accused person solely on a confessional statement without passing the tests laid down in a plethora of authorities. See IFEANYI V. FRN (2018) LPELR-43941 (SC) AT 45-47 where the Supreme Court held that: “The trial Court should not, however, act on the confession without first testing the truth thereof. See: JAFIYA KOPA V. THE STATE (1971) 1 ALL NLR 150; JIMOH YESUFU V. THE STATE (1976) 6 SC 167; OBOSI V. THE STATE (1965) NMLR 119; R. V. OMOKARU (1941) 7 WACA 146. But so long as the Court is satisfied with its truth a confessional statement alone is sufficient to ground and support a conviction without corroboration. R. v SYKES (1913) 8 CAR 233; OBOSI V. THE STATE (SUPRA); YESUFU V. THE STATE (SUPRA). The test, however, for determining the veracity or otherwise of a confessional statement is to look for any other evidence be it slight, or circumstances which make if probable that the confession is true. In R. V. SYKES (1913) 8 CAR 233 AT 236, RIDLY, J, suggested the tests to be applied on an accused person’s confessional statement in the determination of its veracity to included: 1. Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it is true, 2. Whether the statement is corroborated, no matter how slight. 3. Whether the facts contained therein, so far as can be tested, are true. 4. Whether the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence. 5. Whether the confession was consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and proved in the matter. 6. Whether the confession of the accused person was possible. The above tests have been accepted and consistently applied by this Court over a long period of time in a number of cases. See: IKPASA V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BENDEL STATE (1981) 9 SC 7; ONOCHIE V. THE REPUBLIC (1966) NMLR 307; AKPAN V. THE STATE (1992) 6 NWLR (PT. 248) 439 AT 460.”PER BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.

MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Enugu State delivered on 11/12/2017 in charge no. E/14C/2015. The Respondent preferred a one count charge against the appellant to wit; murder contrary to Section 274 (1) of the Criminal Code, Cap.30 Vol. 12. Revised Laws of Enugu State, 2004. The Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution called 3 witnesses and tendered exhibits. The Appellant testified in his defence but did not call any witness. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial Court found the Appellant guilty of the charge of murder and sentenced him to death accordingly.

The Appellant was aggrieved by the judgment. He filed a notice of appeal against the judgment on 9/1/2018. The grounds of appeal with their particulars are:
GROUND 1
ERROR IN LAW: “Convicting the appellant based on indirect and non-positive retracted confessional statement.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR:
1. The trial Court erred in law by holding that the indirect and non positive retracted confessional statement which was impeached by the Appellant and which

is not in line with other available evidence before the Court was duly proved to warrant conviction of the appellant.
2. The Lower Court erred in law by holding that the handwriting of the Appellant made in the open Court on order of Court is exactly the same with the signature appended on the retracted confessional statement when indeed there is clear distinction between the two.
GROUND 2
ERROR IN LAW:
Failure to call the only vital eye witness
PARTICULARS OF ERROR:
1. The Honourable Court erred in law by convicting the appellant without the evidence of the only vital eye witness to the alleged crime. More so, when none of the witnesses adduced evidence as an eye witness to the crime.
GROUND 3
ERROR IN LAW:
Failure by the prosecution to prove the ingredients of the offence of murder.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR:
1.”The lower Court erred in law by convicting the appellant notwithstanding that the prosecution failed to prove the ingredients of the offence of murder and to establish the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt.”

The appellant’s brief of argument was filed on 13/6/2018.

It was deemed as properly filed and served on 25/2/2019. The respondent’s brief of argument was filed on 21/2/2019. It was deemed as properly filed and served on 25/2/2019. Appellant’s reply brief was filed on 11/3/2019. The appellant submitted the following issues for determination:
“A. Whether the retracted confessional statement was direct, positive and properly proved to ground conviction.
B. Whether the handwriting of the accused in the open Court is similar with the signature appended on the retracted confessional statement.
C. Whether failure by the prosecution to call the only vital eye witness is not fatal to their case.
D. Whether the ingredients of offence of murder was proved by the prosecution to warrant conviction of the accused.”

The respondent submitted the following issues for determination:
1. “Whether the Trial Court was right in acting on the extra judicial statement of the appellant in convicting him.
2. Whether the Respondent proved the charge of murder against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.”

The Respondent raised a preliminary objection to the

Appellant’s brief of argument by a notice of preliminary objection incorporated in his brief of argument. The grounds of the objection are:
a) The notice of appeal was signed by the Appellant’s counsel rather than the Appellant.
b) More issues for determination were formulated in the appellant’s brief than the number of Grounds of Appeal in the Notice of Appeal.

At hearing of the appeal, ground (a) of the objection was withdrawn. It is hereby struck out along with the argument in support. On ground (b) of the objection, the respondent submitted that where an appellant distils more issues than the grounds of appeal, it amounts to proliferation of issues and the Court must strike same out as it renders the appeal incompetent. He referred to Order 19 Rule 3 Court of Appeal Rules 2016. FRANCIS DURWODE V. THE STATE (1999) LPELR- 6629 (CA) INOGHA MFA v. MFA INOGHA (2014) LEGALPEDIA SC AY90 at 13. OKWUAGBALA & ORS V. IKWUEME & ORS (2010) LPELR – 2538 (SC). He urged the Court to strike out the appeal for proliferation of issues which renders the appeal incompetent as more issues than the grounds of appeal were formulated by the

appellant and the effect is that both the issues and grounds of appeal are liable to be struck out. He referred to NUHU ZAGBA YI V. BARR. DAVID UMUARU & ORS (2015) LEGALPEDIA CA LZ5H.

The Appellant conceded the fact that the issues formulated are in excess of the grounds of appeal. He urged the Court to strike out the excess issue which is issue B and hear the appeal on merit. He referred to AYANGADE V. O.A.U.T.H.C. M.B. (2001) 17 NWLR (PT. 711) 187. OMILANI V. OMISORE (2007) 3 NWLR (PT.1020) 77, (2006) LPELR-6096(CA).

RESOLUTION
The law is settled that issues formulated in an appeal must take its root from the ground(s) of appeal and while it is permissible to distil or formulate one issue from one or two on of more or more of grounds of appeal, the law is emphatic that formulation of more issues than the grounds of appeal is not acceptable. See MFA INONGHA (2014) LPELR-22010 (SC) AT 26 (D-E). OKWUAGBALA & ORS V. IKWUEME & ORS (SUPRA). In the instant case, the notice of appeal contains 3 grounds of appeal. The appellant submitted four issues for determination. In AMODU V. COMMANDANT, POLICE COLLEGE, MAIDUGURI & ANOR. (2009) LPELR-467 (SC) AT

10-11 (B) the Supreme Court held that:
“It is settled law that a party is not allowed to formulate more than one issue for determination out of a ground of appeal even though he can combine two or more grounds of appeal in formulating an issue for determination. This is the principle against proliferation of issues for determination. In the instant case learned counsel has submitted two issues out of the single ground of appeal for determination thereby rendering the issues incompetent”. In the case of Orji vs. The State (2008) 4 SCNJ 85, this Court per Mukhtar JSC held as follows at page 94:- “Issues for determination are supposed to be distilled from the grounds of appeal filed by an appellant, and not raised capriciously. They must not out-number the grounds of appeal, for where they so out-number them there is the danger that some of the issues do not derive their source from the grounds of appeal, and therefore are not related to one another. It is trite that an issue that does not so relate will not be tolerated…”
The effect of formulating more issues than the grounds of appeal is to render the issues which are in excess and not related to

the ground of appeal incompetent and not the entire appellant’s brief or the appeal. Issues A and B were formulated from ground 1 of the appeal. The appellant having conceded that issue B is a surplusage, it is hereby struck out.

I have considered the remaining issues formulated by both parties, I am of the view that the sole issue for determination in this appeal is whether the trial Court was right in convicting the appellant for an offence of murder based on his confessional statement.

It is the contention of the appellant that the retracted confessional statement which was admitted and marked Exhibit P4 was not direct and positive and was not corroborated by any other evidence adduced before the lower Court. It is submitted that from the entire evidence on record noting incriminating was recovered from the accused to link him to the alleged offence and PW1, PW2 and PW3 admitted not being eyewitnesses to commission of the crime. It is further submitted if the facts stated in the statement and the totality of evidence adduced in the open Court are tested, no other evidence outside the confessional statement points at the accused as the one

who shot the deceased and this Court will see that the confession is not true. He referred to AKPAN V. THE STATE (1992) 6 NWLR (pt. 248) 439 at p. 460. MOHAMMED V. STATE (2014) LPELR- 22916 (SC).

It is the contention of the Appellant that the trial Court applied S. 101(2) of Evidence Act, 2011 without considering Section 68 of the Act and without availing the Appellant an opportunity of defending himself in respect of the similarity of the handwriting as held by the Court when the Court barely told the appellant to write his name, sign his signature and make a sentence without more, after which the Court admitted the write up as Exhibit P4A. He submitted that the action of the trial Court prejudiced the case of the appellant as he would have sought for an external expert to defend himself if the trial Court had made that pronouncement in the open Court.

It is submitted that in criminal proceedings, the onus is always on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt by ensuring that all the ingredients of the charge are proved beyond reasonable doubt. He referred to YONGO & ANOR. V. C. O. P (1992) LPELR-

3528(SC). It is further submitted that it is only when the death of the deceased is linked to the act or omission of the accused person that the prosecution can be said to have proved the ingredients of murder beyond reasonable doubt. He urged the Court to hold that the ingredients of offence of murder were not proved in accordance with the existing law to warrant the conviction of the appellant.

In response to the appellant’s submissions, the respondent submitted that a confessional statement can ground a conviction regardless of the fact that the maker resiled there from or retracted same at the trial. He referred to UWA V. STATE (2013) LPELR – 20329 (CA). The respondent argued that since the appellant admitted in his extra judicial statement that the death of the deceased was caused by means of an act done in the prosecution of an unlawful purpose, which purpose was to kill the deceased, the trial Court was right to have relied on the confessional statement of the appellant to convict him. It is the respondent’s contention that the prosecution’s case cannot not fail because an ingredient of murder is not proved beyond all iota of doubt. He

referred to OLABODE V STATE (2008) WRN (VOL.2) 167 at 178 -179. Nasiru v. State (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt. 589) 87 at 98; (1999) 1 SC 1; (1999) 1 SCNJ 83 ANTHONY ITU V THE STATE (2001) ALL FWLR (pt 823). It is contended that the prosecution proved the ingredients of the offence of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

RESOLUTION
By virtue of Section 36 (5) of the Constitution, every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. The law is well settled that in any criminal proceedings, the burden is entirely on the prosecution to prove the alleged offence against an accused person beyond reasonable doubt. See SANMI V. STATE (2019) 13 NWLR (PT.1690) 551 AT 577 (C-F), (2019) LPELR-47418 (SC). PHILIP V. STATE (2019)13 NWLR (1690) 509 AT 533 -534 (G-E). For the prosecution to discharge this burden, cogent, credible and compelling evidence must be adduced to establish the ingredients of the offence charged. See Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act. ABIRIFON V. STATE (2013) LPELR-20807 (SC) AT 14-15 (D-A). The prosecution can discharge the burden by (a) evidence of eye witness or witnesses (b) Voluntary

confessional statement of the accused or accused persons, and (c) circumstantial evidence. See AKINSUWA V. STATE (2019) LPELR-47621 (SC) AT 23-25.

In the instant case, the appellant was charged for the murder of CHIBUEZE NDUBUISI. For the prosecution to establish the offence of murder, the following ingredients of the offence must be proved (1) The death of CHIBUEZE NDUBUISI (2) That the death was caused by the act or omission of the accused person (3) That the act of the accused was done intentionally or with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was the probable consequence. In the instant case, there is evidence from PW1 and PW2 that CHIBUEZE NDUBUISI died from gunshot wounds as confirmed by the medical report Exhibit P2. Therefore, the death of CHIBUEZE NDUBUISI can be said to have been established. The fact that his death was caused by grievous harm via gunshot wound can also be said to have been established beyond reasonable doubt. The contention in this appeal is whether it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that it was the act of the appellant that caused the death of the deceased.

From the entire evidence on record, there was no eye

witness evidence and no circumstantial evidence. The conviction of the appellant was based solely on the confessional statement tendered by the prosecution. The law is settled that a free and voluntary confessional statement if positive and direct is sufficient to sustain a conviction once the Court is satisfied of the truth of the confession even if the accused person retracted or resile from the statement. However, where an accused retracts his statement or resiles from it, the Court is enjoined to look for evidence outside the statement to confirm the truth of the statement. In the instant case, the trial Court was satisfied that the confessional statement of the appellant was corroborated by other credible evidence outside the confession. The basis for the conclusion of the trial Court is that:
“In his oral evidence in Court, accused person testified as DW1 and retracted this statement, telling the Court that he did not make any statement to the police. He also stated in Court that the reason why the police arrested him was because when they stopped the commercial bus he boarded on his way form a wedding, he confronted them telling them that

when it is time for them to work, they will not work. Because of this, the policeman threatened to deal with him and after searching all the passengers, took them to the police station.
Although the accused person stated that the wedding he attended on that day was that of his mother’s brother, Oko Asa, upon cross examination, he stated that he does not know his mother’s maiden name, even though he had said he attended the said wedding with his mother, although his mother left earlier. The Court therefore does not believe the story of the accused person as the Court is satisfied that it is an afterthought as it is strange that he attended the wedding of his mother’s brother and yet, he does not know the maiden name of his mother, which would be the family name of the said brother whose wedding he attended. The Court also notes that although the accused person claim that he did not sign Exhibit P4 and did not make any statement to the police, Exhibit P4A, which is the paper on which accused person wrote his name and signature in open Court, show otherwise. A comparison of the two exhibits in line with Section 101(2) of Evidence Act 2011,

shows clearly that the handwriting of the accused person in Exhibit P4A, which was made in open Court is the same with that on Exhibit P4. The Court is thus satisfied that the retraction of the accused person is an afterthought as he voluntarily made the statement contained in Exhibit P4 to the police, as was attested to by the Superior Police Officer, DSP Okereke C.N on 18/7/14 when he made the statement to the police.’’
Section 101 of the Evidence Act, 2011 on which the trial Court relied to direct the appellant to write Exhibit P4A provides that:
“101. (1) In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing, seal or finger impression is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing, seal or finger impression admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person may be compared with the one which is to be proved although that signature, writing, seal or finger impression has not been produced or proved for any other purpose.
(2) The Court may direct any person present in Court to write word or figure or to make finger impressions for the

purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words, figure or finger impressions so written with any words, figures or finger impression alleged to have been written or made by such person; provided that where a defendant does not give evidence he may not be so directed to write such words of figures or to make finger impressions.’’
The record of appeal before this Court shows that when the prosecution sought to tender the appellant’s statement through PW3, the investigating police officer who recorded the statement, the appellant stated that he did not make any statement and did not sign the statement. The trial Court without the prompting or application of either the prosecution or the appellant directed the appellant to write his name and signature with “the quick brown fox jumps over a lazy dog’’ on a plain sheet of paper which the appellant did. Without an application by either the prosecution or the appellant, the trial Court admitted the piece of paper on which the appellant wrote his name, the sentence dictated by the Court and signed as Exhibit P4A. It is clear from the portion of the judgment of the trial

Court stated above that what the trial Court did was to embark on the comparison of the appellant’s writing on Exhibit P4A with the writing and signature on Exhibit P4 which the appellant retracted. First, the appellant was denied the opportunity to challenge the conclusion of the trial Court by any means he may deem fit. Secondly, what the trial Court did tantamount to taking over and conducting the case of the prosecution, an act which is forbidden in the interest of justice. In SANMI V. STATE (SUPRA) AT 581 (E-H), (2019) LPELR-47418 (SC) AT 21-24 (F -D) the Supreme Court emphasized the need for the Court to maintain neutrality and not descend into the arena of judicial proceedings. Here is what the Court per GALUMJE ,J.S.C said:
“As laudable as the provision of Section 101 of the Evidence Act is, parties to a case must present a request to the Court for comparison of signature, before a Court can employ its discretion to grant or refuse such a request. There is no evidence that the trial Court was called upon to embark on such exercise by any of the parties. The procedure is very clear as I have stated elsewhere in this judgment, and that is

where an accused person denies making a statement, the Courts are enjoined to admit the statement and consider the weight to be attached to it at the end of trial. To embark on the exercise of comparing signatures will have the effect of descending into the arena of contest, where none of the parties has requested for such an exercise. Courts are forbidden from descending into the arena of contest and conducting cases for any of the parties.”
Even after the admission of Exhibit P4A suo muto by the trial Court, the Court was never urged to compare the writing on Exhibit P4 with Exhibit P4A. The application of Section 101 of the Evidence Act involves an exercise of discretion by the Court which discretion must be exercised judicially and judiciously. Though such a comparison is not forbidden in criminal proceedings and the Court may have done so in the past, the Court must be very cautious in doing so. See WILCOX V. QUEEN (1961) LPELR-25000 (SC) AT 2 (C-E). The standard of prove in criminal cases is beyond reasonable doubt. Even investigation by means of the most advanced technology is not entirely and totally free from human error or mistake.

Mistake as to similarity in hand writing and signature as a result of comparison by a non-expert is not totally unavoidable. I agree totally with the position of His Lordship, Ogunwumiju, JCA in ORJIAKOR V. THE STATE (2017) LPELR-42739 (CA) AT 19-21 that:
“The power to compare and draw conclusions on finger impressions given to the Court by the Evidence Act 2011 as it existed in legislations past is not a progress in the right direction. Even finger print experts in the past have been found to make grievous mistakes which have led to gross miscarriage of justice and sadly, innocent people wrongly sent to the gallows. The correct methodology in such instance is to use artificial intelligence to discover similarities in handwriting, voice and thumb print. I don’t know how that section calling for dependence on human intelligence found its way back into the statute books in this age despite the provisions of Section 68 which deals with the admissibility of expert opinion.’’
Section 68 of the Evidence Act provides that:
“68. (1) When the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, customary law or custom, or

of science or art, or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, customary law or custom, or science or art, or in questions as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, are admissible.
(2) Persons so specially skilled as mentioned in Subsection (1) of this section are called experts.”
I am of the strong view that when the Court is called upon to compare writings or signatures and form an opinion as to whether a confessional statement retracted or resiled from by an accused person was written and signed by him, the Court should have recourse to Section 68 of the Evidence Act and not Section 101 (1) and (2) of the Evidence Act. An accused person has the opportunity to challenge the opinion of an expert under Section 68 of the Evidence Act by way of cross examination or by proffering a counter opinion through another expert. An accused person has no such opportunity to challenge the finding of the Court based on the exercise of the power under 101 (1) and (2) of the Evidence Act in the confines of its chambers. Every necessary and adequate opportunity

must be given to an accused to defend himself before being condemned particularly in capital offences which attracts sentence of death as in this case. I am of the strong view that the comparison of handwriting and signatures carried out by the trial Court in this case occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

Secondly, the fact that the appellant did not know his mother’s maiden name has nothing to do with whether he killed the deceased. The finding that the mother’s maiden name would be the family name of the mother’s brother whose wedding he attended is pure speculation. There is no evidence that the appellant’s mother and her brother had the same surname. It is therefore totally unfair and unjust to come to the conclusion that the confession in the statement tendered by the prosecution is on that basis true. There is no credible evidence outside the confessional statement to show that it is true.

the Supreme Court held that:
“The trial Court should not, however, act on the confession without first testing the truth thereof. See: JAFIYA KOPA V. THE STATE (1971) 1 ALL NLR 150; JIMOH YESUFU V. THE STATE (1976) 6 SC 167; OBOSI V. THE STATE (1965) NMLR 119; R. V. OMOKARU (1941) 7 WACA 146. But so long as the Court is satisfied with its truth a confessional statement alone is sufficient to ground and support a conviction without corroboration. R. v SYKES (1913) 8 CAR 233; OBOSI V. THE STATE (SUPRA); YESUFU V. THE STATE (SUPRA). The test, however, for determining the veracity or otherwise of a confessional statement is to look for any other evidence be it slight, or circumstances which make if probable that the confession is true. In R. V. SYKES (1913) 8 CAR 233 AT 236, RIDLY, J, suggested the tests to be applied on an accused person’s confessional statement in the determination of its veracity to included: 1. Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it is true, 2. Whether the statement is corroborated, no matter how slight. 3. Whether the facts contained therein, so far as can be tested, are true. 4. Whether the accused person had the

opportunity of committing the offence. 5. Whether the confession was consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and proved in the matter. 6. Whether the confession of the accused person was possible. The above tests have been accepted and consistently applied by this Court over a long period of time in a number of cases. See: IKPASA V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BENDEL STATE (1981) 9 SC 7; ONOCHIE V. THE REPUBLIC (1966) NMLR 307; AKPAN V. THE STATE (1992) 6 NWLR (PT. 248) 439 AT 460.”
The statement upon which Appellant was convicted cannot be said to have passed any of the above tests. The conviction cannot stand. The appeal succeeds. The judgment of the High Court of Enugu State delivered on 11th December, 2017 in charge no. E/14C/2O15 is hereby set aside. The conviction of the Appellant and the sentence of death passed on him are hereby set aside. The Appellant is hereby discharged and acquitted.

MONICA BOLNA’AN DONGBAN-MENSEM, J.C.A.: I agree with the lead Judgment prepared by my learned brother; MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, JCCA.

The Apex Court and this Court have remained consistent in requiring that all confessional

statements must be subjected to the veracity tests set out in the cases of ALAO V. STATE (2019) LPELR-47856 SC, STATE V. ISAH & ORS (2012) LPELR-15519 SC and ABDULLAHI V. STATE (2018) LPELR-44491 CA.

Further, the ACJA (Administration of Criminal Justice Act) has laid down the procedure for the interrogation of an accused person. Where these procedures are not observed, a Trial Court has no obligation to countenance any confessional statement.
I too hereby allow this appeal.

JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading the draft of the lead judgment just delivered herein by my learned brother MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, JCA and I totally endorse the reasoning and conclusion therein. For the more detailed reasoning in the lead judgment, I equally find merit in this appeal and I hereby allow it.
I equally adopt the consequential orders in the lead judgment as mine.

Appearances:

O. Ezeagwuoma (Mrs.) holding the brief of Stella Chibueze (Mrs.) For Appellant(s)

D. Neboh, S. L. O Min. of Justice, Enugu State For Respondent(s)