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AQUA LIMITED V. ONDO STATE SPORTS COUNCIL-1988

AQUA LIMITED V. ONDO STATE SPORTS COUNCIL

(1988) LCN/2374(SC)

In the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Thursday, November 3, 1988


Case Number: SC. 204/1987

 

JUSTICES:

NNAMANI

AGBAJE

ESO

UWAIS

WALI

CRAIG

KARIBI WHYTE

BETWEEN

APPELLANTS

AQUA LIMITED

AND

RESPONDENTS

ONDO STATE SPORT COUNCIL

RATIO

WHETHER AN APPEAL AGAINST A FINAL JUDGMENT GIVEN BY A HIGH COURT IN A CIVIL CASE AND SITTING AT FIRST INSTANCE ON GROUNDS OF MIXED LAW AND FACTS ALONE FALLS UNDER SECTION 220(1)(A) OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THEREFORE LIES AS OF RIGHT OR WHETHER IT FALLS UNDER SECTION 221(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION IN WHICH CASE LEAVE OF THE HIGH COURT OR THE COURT OF APPEAL TO BRING IT IS A PRE-REQUISITE.

I shall now go into the crux of this appeal which involves the application and interpretation of sections 220(1)(a) and (b), 221(1) and 222(b) of the 1979 Constitution.
Section 220(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution provides as follows:-
“220 – (1) An appeal shall lie from decisions of a High Court to the Court of Appeal as of right in the following cases:-
(a) Final decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the High Court sitting at first instance:
(b) Where the grounds of appeal involves question of law alone, decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings.”
Under (a) supra, all that is required before a person exercises the right conferred by that sub-section is that the decision being appealed against is a final decision of a High Court sitting as court of first instance. The appellant has already conceded this. It does not matter whether the ground involves law, facts or mixed law and facts.
As regards Section 220(1) (b) supra, it has been provided to cater for appeals against
(i) the decision of a High Court in non-final decision involving question of law alone; and
(ii) decisions given by a High Court when not sitting as a court of first instance. that is on appeals coming before it from subordinate courts. otherwise coined as “double appeals.”
In other words, it caters for appeals in interlocutory decisions and decision in double appeals involving pure questions of law only.
From the above. it becomes clear that sub-sections (1)(a) and (b) arc provided to cater for two different situations. They are disjunctive.
The next section that came into focus in the arguments of learned Counsel is section 221 (l). It states thus –
“221 (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 220 of this Constitution, an appeal shall lie from decisions of a High Court to the Court of Appeal with leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal.”
This section caters for situations other than those covered by section 220(1) of the Constitution. To be more explicit. it is meant to cover –
(i) appeals in interlocutory decisions of the High Court involving facts or mixed law and facts; and
(ii) appeals in final decisions of the High Court in “double appeals”, involving facts or mixed law and facts.
In any of the two situations mentioned supra. a person wishing to appeal must first obtain leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal. It is a condition precedent to the validity of such appeal.
The rights conferred by sections 220 and 221 of the Constitution must be exercised in accordance with any Act of the National Assembly and rules of court for the time being in force regulating the powers. practice and procedure of the Court of Appeal. PER WALI, J.S.C.

WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE COURT IN CONSTRUING A STATUTE

In construing a statute, it is the duty of the Court to ascertain the meaning of the words actually used by reading them in their ordinary grammatical sense and to give them effect, unless such construction would lead to some absurdity or inconvenience, or would be plainly repugnant to the intention to be collected from other part of the statute. See Fowell v. Trainer 3 H & C 458 and Caledonian Railway Cop. Co. v. N. British Railway Co. 6 A.C. 114 at 131. PER WALI, J.S.C.

WHETHER THE ISSUE OF THE COMPETENCE OF AN APPELLANT HAS A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND ITS COMPETENCE TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION

I must point out at once that the issue of the competence vel non of an appellant has no direct relationship with the jurisdiction of the court and its competence to exercise jurisdiction. The appellant’s competence is a matter extrinsic to jurisdiction – see Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962)1 All NLR 587. PER KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.

WHERE THE WORDS OF THE CONSTITUTION ARE CLEAR, DIRECT AND UNAMBIGUOUS IN THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT OF THE CITIZEN, WHETHER IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT EFFECT MUST BE GIVEN TO SUCH WORDS NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF A PLAUSIBLE ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE SAME WORDS

The provisions of the Constitution have been formulated and designed to protect the rights of the citizen, hence any construction of the sections must be directed towards achieving that end unless of course the section construed is so clear, unequivocal, unambiguous and compelling in favour of a contrary view in which case such contrary view must be protected and enforced. See Nabham v. Nabham (1967)1 All NLR 47. Otherwise where the words of the Constitution are clear, direct and unambiguous in the protection of the right of the citizen, it seems to me imperative that effect must be given to such words notwithstanding the existence of a plausible alternative interpretation of the same words – See Mobil v. F.B.I.R. (1977) 3 SC.53. PER KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.

RIGHT CONFERRED BY CONSTITUTION CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY BY ANY OTHER PROVISION

“It is an elementary and fundamental proposition that a right conferred by the Constitution cannot be taken away by any other provision except by the Constitution itself. The Constitution having conferred a right of appeal as of right, the Court of Appeal Act, or rules of practice made under the Act which derive their force from the Constitution cannot take away such a right. Any law so made will be inconsistent with the constitutional provision and void” PER KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.

WALI, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The germane point raised in this appeal is the exercise of right of appeal under the provisions of Sections 220(1)(a) and (b), 221(1), 222 and 213 of the 1979 Constitution.
The facts of the case involved in the appeal can be briefly stated as follows:-
By a Writ of Summons issued out in the High Court of Justice. Ondo State, Akure Judicial Division, Akure, the plaintiff, Aqua Limited claimed against Ondo State Sports Council as follows:-
“The plaintiff’s claim is for the sum of N68,357.94 being money owing and due from the defendant to the plaintiff under a contract dated 4th May, 1978, between the plaintiff and the defendant in connection with the construction of Akure Stadium swimming pool.”
Pleadings were ordered and exchanged and issues joined. The plaintiff called one witness while the Defendant called three. The learned trial Judge after considering and evaluating the evidence adduced by the parties concluded that –
“Having regard to the reasons given above, I hold that the plaintiff’s claim for the sum of N68,357.94 being money owing and due from the defendant to the plaintiff under the said contract succeeds.”
The defendant was not satisfied with the trial Court’s decision and so it appealed against the same to the Court of Appeal. In that Court, the defendant filed the following grounds of appeal along with the Notice of Appeal-
“i. The Learned trial Judge misdirected himself on facts and came to a wrong decision when he held that the plaintiff had completed the stage one of the contract and that from the evidence before him, the plaintiff was due for the payment of the sum of N68,357.96 being 30% of the contract sum of N227 ,859.82 at the time of demand and that the defendant’s refusal to pay that sum was not justified and was contrary to the stipulations in the agreement.
Particulars of Misdirection
(a) There was evidence before the learned trial Judge that the defendant was not satisfied that the value of work performed by the plaintiff justified its demand for the second stage payment as per the terms of the contract agreement.
(b) There was evidence before the learned trial Judge that the 1st stage payment was effected only after the plaintiff had presented to the defendant a Performance Bond (Exhibit D) and not after the performance of any stage of the contract.
(c) There was evidence before the Learned trial Judge that the defendant’s refusal to pay the plaintiff the amount claimed was based on the advice of its Consultant who was employed to the knowledge of the plaintiff to supervise the plaintiff’s job and it was not alleged or proved that the defendant could not rely on the advice of its Consultant given and received bona fide.
(c) There was evidence before the Learned trial Judge that stage 2 payment was to be made “after installation of all inset concrete equipment” and Exhibit H showed that concreting was still going on months after the plaintiff had put in its claim for the said stage 2 payment.
(d) The learned trial Judge misdirected himself when he said” As a matter of fact, it was not stipulated in the agreement that the work done by the plaintiff and the materials supplied must be worth N91,143.92 before the plaintiff could be paid in respect of stage 2 of the contract” which led to wrong conclusion.
PARTICULARS OF MISDIRECTION
The evidence of the plaintiff was that at stage one the plaintiff had supplied all the pressure pipes and 75% of the equipment required for the swimming pool as a whole and that at the stage the plaintiff completed items to be buried in concrete seventy-five percent of the work required for the swimming pool from the point of view of mechanical and electrical installation had been completed.
The defendant in view of that was entitled to put value on the materials supplied as well as the amount of work done by the plaintiff before the stage 2 payment claimed could be effected.
iii. The learned trial Judge misdirected himself when he said “There is no evidence of a direct reply to that letter Exhibit C” whereas D.W.1 and D.W.2 offered evidence that the disapproval of payment was communicated to the plaintiff as soon as the defendant’s Consultant rendered the advice.
iv. The learned trial Judge misdirected himself in law and on the facts in holding that “However, it appears that there is no justification on the part of the defendant to unilaterally determine the contract in that there is no rigidity in the agreement Exhibit’ A’ as to when exactly the contract work would be completed, when no such evidence was placed before him at the trial.
v. The learned trial Judge erred in law in granting the plaintiff/respondent the relief or remedies sought when upon a proper appraisal of the evidence the plaintiff did not make a case for the said relief or remedies.
vi. The judgment is entirely against the weight of evidence.”
Learned Counsel for the plaintiff then filed a Notice of intention to rely upon preliminary objection which reads thus-
“The appeal before the court is incompetent having been filed in contravention of section 221(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
AND take notice that the grounds of the said objection are as follows:
1. The appellant’s grounds of appeal involve question of fact and/or mixed law and facts. (Vide Page 70 line 34 – Page 73 line 19 of the record).
2. No leave was sought nor was any obtained either of the Court below or of the Court of Appeal.”
The preliminary objection was taken by the Court of Appeal and after hearing learned Counsel on both sides, it ruled that there was no substance in the preliminary objection giving its reasons for pronouncing so as follows:”
That s.220(1) of the 1979 Constitution gives a right of appeal as of right to a party from a final decision of a High Court sitting as a court of first instance without leave, whether the grounds are of law, facts, or mixed law and facts.”
Learned Counsel for the appellant was not satisfied with the Ruling pronounced by the Court of Appeal and has now appealed to this Court on the following grounds of appeal –
“(1) The Court of Appeal failed to direct itself as to the legal point that sections 220(1) and 221(1), read together with the provision of section 222(b) “create two separate rights of appeal in respect of a final decision of the High Court sitting at first instance –
(a) appeal where the ground of appeal involves questions of law alone, and
(b) appeal where the ground of appeal involves questions other than law alone, such as questions of fact or mixed law and fact. In respect of (a) above no leave is required, but in respect of (b) above leave is required under section 221 (1) of the Constitution.
(2) In the absence of evidence on record that the respondent obtained leave either of the trial High Court or the Court of Appeal itself, within the period stipulated in section 25 of the Court of Appeal Act, 1976 and in accordance with order 3 Rule 3(3) of the Court of Appeal Rules 1981 (as amended) there can be no competent appeal before the Court.
ERROR IN LAW
It is an error in law for the Court of Appeal to dismiss the appellant’s preliminary Objection and to fail to strike out the respondent’s appeal on ground of incompetence.”
Learned Counsel on both sides filed and exchanged briefs. When the appeal came up for hearing on 28th March, 1988, before a panel of five Justices of this Court. it was realised that the issue raised involves application and interpretation of certain sections of the 1979 Constitution, to wit sections 220(1), 222 and 213, The issue was considered by the Court to be so fundamental, hence the appeal was adjourned to be taken by a panel of full court. Learned Counsel were also told that they could elaborate on their briefs, which they did. The Court also extended invitation to all Attorneys General in the Federation to appear as Amicus Curiae if they so wished. Only the Hon. Attorney-General of the Federation responded to the open invitation by filing his brief.
The full panel of the court was constituted and the appeal was accordingly argued on 19th September 1988.
For the purposes of this appeal, henceforth, the plaintiff and the respondent shall be referred to as the appellant and the respondent respectively, while the Hon. Attorney-General of the Federation shall be referred to as the Attorney-General where it is expedient to do so.
In the brief of argument filed by learned Counsel for the appellant, he formulated the issue for determination thus-
“ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION
The only issue for determination is whether the appeal before the lower Court, namely, Appeal No, C A/8/58/87, is competent, that is to say, whether the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to entertain appeal from final decision of the High Court sitting as Court of first instance on ground, which involve questions of fact or mixed law and fact without leave either of the High Court of Trial or of the Court of Appeal itself.”
It was his contention that out of the 6 grounds of appeal filed by the respondent in the Court of Appeal against the final decision of the trial High Court, Grounds 1,2,3,4 and 6 are grounds of pure facts, while ground 5 is of mixed law and facts. He therefore submitted that, for the Notice of Appeal filed by respondent to be competent, leave of either the trial High Court or the Court of Appeal is a condition precedent. He referred to sections 220(1)(a) and (b), 221(1) and 222(b) of the 1979 Constitution and further submitted that where the grounds of appeal involve questions other than law alone, as in the pending appeal before the Court of Appeal, the respondent must resort to section 221(1) and seek leave of either the High Court or the Court of Appeal and that such leave must be sought and obtained within the period stipulated in section 25 of the Court of Appeal Act, 1976 and in accordance with the procedure provided for in Order 3 Rule 3(2) and (3) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1981. He submitted that the case of Harriman v Harriman (1987)3 N.W.L.R. 244 cited by learned Counsel for respondent is irrelevant to the issue raised before the Court of Appeal.
It was also the contention of learned Counsel for the appellant that there is “some doubt or conflict in the provisions in sections 220(1)(a) and 220(1)(b) of the Constitution” which he enumerated as follows-
“The obscurity or doubt arises from the fact that an appeal from a final decision of a High Court sitting as a court of first instance may be on –
(a) ground of fact,
(b) ground of mixed law and fact, or
(c) ground of law alone.
If it is the intention of legislature to confer appeal as of right from a final decision of the High Court sitting as a court of first instance, and irrespective of the ground of appeal, what then is the necessity to provide in sub-section 220(1)(b) for appeal as of right on ground of law alone If it is the intention of the legislature to confer right of appeal and as of right in any event from a final decision of a High Court sitting as a court of first instance then Sub-Section 220(1)(b) of the Constitution is an unnecessary tautology. The legislature, like equity, does nothing in vain. To find out the true intention of the legislature with regard to the two sub-sections it is necessary to subject the provisions to some well established cannons of interpretation.”
In support of the submissions above, learned Counsel referred to and relied on several decided cases, both local and foreign among which are the following:- Seward v The Vera Cruz (1884) 10 A.C. 59 at 68; Savannah Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Pan Atlantic Shipping and Transport Agencies Ltd. (1987) 1 S.C. 198 at 304; Edet Akpan v The State (1986) 3 N.W.L.R. (PART 27) 225 at 239-240; Ojemen & Ors. v His Highness Momodu II (1983) 3 S.C. 173; and Tukur v Government of Gongola State (1988)1 N.W.L.R. (PART 68) 39 at 48; Ogbechie & qrs. v. Onochie & Ors. (1986) 2 N.W.L.R. 484 at 493.
He also submitted that the statement credited to UDO UDOMA, J.S.C. in Rabiu Nafiu v The State (1980)8-11 S.C. 130 at 156 lines 20-25 on the interpretation of section 220(1)(b) could be nothing but a mere slip. He finally urged this Court to allow the appeal.
In the brief of argument filed by learned Counsel for the Respondent he formulated two issues for determination and these are –
“(i) Whether the decision of Ojuolape J. in suit No. AK/46/84 given on 28th April, 1986 was a final decision in accordance with section 220(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1979.
(ii) Whether section 220(1)(a) of the Constitution should be construed in conjunction with section 221(1) of the same Constitution.
The first issue deals with the question whether the decision of the learned trial Judge was a final decision while the other deals with the question whether section 220(1)(a) should be read together with section 221(1) of the Constitution. as argued in the first brief filed by the appellant.
On the first issue, it was his submission that the decision of the learned trial Judge is a final decision and in support of that he cited and relied on the following decided cases -Bozson v Altrincham Urban District Council (1903) 1 K.B. 547 or (1903) 1 Q.B. 574; Ude v. Agu (1961)1 ALL N.L.R. 65; Blay v Solomon 12 W.A.C.A. 175 and Akinsanya v. U.B.A. Ltd. (1986) 4 N.W.LR. 273 at 299.
On the interpretation of sections 220(1) and 221 (1) of the Constitution, he submitted that each section stands by itself independent of the other as each creates a different situation for an appeal. He said whereas section 220(1) provides for instances for appeal as of right, section 221 confers right of appeal only with leave. He said the wording of the two sections are so plain to admit any other construction. He referred to MAXWELL on Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edition) p. 164; CRAINES on Statute Law, (7th Edition) p.222; Cowper – Essex v. Action London Borough (1889) A.C. 153 at 169; A.I. Wilson v. A.G. Bendel State and Ors. (1985)1 N.W.L.R. (Pt.4) 572; African Newspapers of Nigeria Limited & Ors. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (1985)2 N.W.L.R. (Pt.6) 137, and A.G. Kaduna State v. Mallam Umaru Hassan (1985) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt.8) 483 and a host of other authorities in support of his submissions. In conclusion, he submitted that the authorities cited and relied upon by the appellant do not help his case and are not apposite.
As I have earlier on said, at the invitation of this Court the learned Attorney-General of the Federation filed brief as amicus curiae. In the brief, he formulated the following issue for determination –
“Whether an appeal against a final judgment given by a High Court in a civil case and sitting at first instance on grounds of mixed law and facts alone falls under Section 220(1)(a) of the Constitution and therefore lies as of right or whether it falls under Section 221(1) of the Constitution in which case leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal to bring it is a pre-requisite.”
It was his submission that section 220(1)(a) of the 1979 Constitution did not only confer a general right of appeal without leave in civil matters from a final decision of a High Court sitting at first instance on grounds of law alone, facts or mixed law and facts, but also confers such a right in criminal matters. He also argued that section 220(1)(b) of the 1979 Constitution confers a general right of appeal in non-final decision of a High Court where the ground of appeal involves question of law alone. As for section 221(1) of the Constitution, he submitted that it deals with interlocutory decisions of a High Court involving ground of fact or mixed law and facts, and appeal from decision of a High Court involving either facts or mixed law and facts in ‘double appeals” – that is in final decision of a High Court on appeal from a subordinate court, involving facts or mixed law and facts. In support of these submissions, learned Counsel representing the Attorney-General cited and relied on Nafiu Rabiu v. The State (1980) 8-11 S.C. 130, particularly at pages 156 – 157. He concluded his arguments by submitting that the cases cited by the appellant are not relevant to the decision of this appeal and should be discountenanced.
The appellant conceded in his brief and oral arguments in elaboration, that the decision being appealed against and still pending in the Court of Appeal, is a final decision of the trial High Court sitting at first instance. There is therefore no need to flog this point any further.
In Nafiu Rabiu v. The State (1981)2 N.C.L.R. 293 in his concurring judgment, Udo Udoma, J.S.C., made this important judicial pronouncement on the interpretation of the 1979 Constitution wherein he said at page 326 –
“My Lords, in my opinion, it is the duty of this Court to bear constantly in mind the fact that the present Constitution has been proclaimed the supreme Law of the land ….. And where the question is whether the Court has used an expression in the wider or in the narrower sense, in my view, this Court should whenever possible, and in response to the demands of justice lean to the broader interpretation, unless there is something in the  or in the rest of the Constitution to indicate that the narrower interpretation will best carry out the objects and purposes of the Constitution.
My Lords, it is my view that the approach of this Court to the construction should be, and so it has been, one of liberalism, probably a variation on the theme of the general maxim ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’. I do not conceive it to be the duty of this Court to construe any of the provisions of the Constitution as to defeat the obvious ends the Constitution was designed to serve where another construction equally in accord and consistent with the words and sense of such provisions will serve to enforce and protect such ends.”
Bearing in mind the guidelines provided in the passages quoted supra, I shall now go into the crux of this appeal which involves the application and interpretation of sections 220(1)(a) and (b), 221(1) and 222(b) of the 1979 Constitution.
Section 220(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution provides as follows:-
“220 – (1) An appeal shall lie from decisions of a High Court to the Court of Appeal as of right in the following cases:-
(a) Final decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the High Court sitting at first instance:
(b) Where the grounds of appeal involves question of law alone, decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings.”
Under (a) supra, all that is required before a person exercises the right conferred by that sub-section is that the decision being appealed against is a final decision of a High Court sitting as court of first instance. The appellant has already conceded this. It does not matter whether the ground involves law, facts or mixed law and facts.
As regards Section 220(1) (b) supra, it has been provided to cater for appeals against
(i) the decision of a High Court in non-final decision involving question of law alone; and
(ii) decisions given by a High Court when not sitting as a court of first instance. that is on appeals coming before it from subordinate courts. otherwise coined as “double appeals.”
In other words, it caters for appeals in interlocutory decisions and decision in double appeals involving pure questions of law only.
From the above. it becomes clear that sub-sections (1)(a) and (b) arc provided to cater for two different situations. They are disjunctive.
The next section that came into focus in the arguments of learned Counsel is section 221 (l). It states thus –
“221 (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 220 of this Constitution, an appeal shall lie from decisions of a High Court to the Court of Appeal with leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal.”
This section caters for situations other than those covered by section 220(1) of the Constitution. To be more explicit. it is meant to cover –
(i) appeals in interlocutory decisions of the High Court involving facts or mixed law and facts; and
(ii) appeals in final decisions of the High Court in “double appeals”, involving facts or mixed law and facts.
In any of the two situations mentioned supra. a person wishing to appeal must first obtain leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal. It is a condition precedent to the validity of such appeal.
The rights conferred by sections 220 and 221 of the Constitution must be exercised in accordance with any Act of the National Assembly and rules of court for the time being in force regulating the powers. practice and procedure of the Court of Appeal. The relevant law and rules mentioned in Subsection 222(b) of the Constitution are-
1. The Court of Appeal Act 1976 and
2. The Court of Appeal Civil Procedure Rules. 1981. Section 25 of the Act provides as follows –
“25.-(1) Where a person desires to appeal to the Court of Appeal he shall give notice of appeal or notice of his application for leave to appeal in such manner as may be directed by rules of court within the period prescribed by the provision of sub-section
(2) of this section that is applicable to the case.
(2) The periods for the giving of notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal are –
(a) in an appeal in a civil cause or matter, fourteen days where the appeal is against an interlocutory decision and three months where the appeal is against a final decision;
(b) in an appeal in a criminal cause or matter ninety days from the date of the decision appealed against.”
The relevant order of the Rules referred to by both sections 222(b) of the Constitution and 25(1) of the Court of Appeal Act, 1976 is Order 3. Rule 2 of the Order regulates the procedure of filing notice and grounds of appeal while rule 3 deals with applications and conditions attached thereto.
Where the appeal is as of right as stipulated in section 220(1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution, the appellant is required to file his notice and grounds of appeal within –
(a) 14 days in interlocutory appeals;
(b) 3 months in final decisions in civil matters; and
(c) 90 days in final decisions in criminal matters.
In the light of my preceding analysis of the sections of the Constitution, the Court of Appeal Act and the Court of Appeal Rules (supra), the interpretation propounded by learned Counsel for the appellant, though ingenuously presented, is not tenable, having regard to the clear wordings of the sections and the judicial interpretation of the same by this Court in its previous decisions. And as pointed out by learned Counsel for the Respondent the cases cited by the appellant and the sections of the Court of Appeal Act and the Rules of that Court are of no help to his case.
In construing a statute, it is the duty of the Court to ascertain the meaning of the words actually used by reading them in their ordinary grammatical sense and to give them effect, unless such construction would lead to some absurdity or inconvenience, or would be plainly repugnant to the intention to be collected from other part of the statute. See Fowell v. Trainer 3 H & C 458 and Caledonian Railway Cop. Co. v. N. British Railway Co. 6 A.C. 114 at 131.
The wordings of sections 220(1)(a) and (b) and 221(1) are in my view so clear as to give no room for any ambiguity. Each subsection creates a separate right of appeal independent of the other and section 220(1)(b) is not a mere surplusage, section 220(1) provides for situations where a litigant can appeal as of right, while S. 221(1) applies to situations other than those covered by section 220(1). See Nafiu Rabiu v. The State (supra) and Irene Harriman v. Hope Harriman (1987) 3 N.W.L.R. 244 at 254 where Uwais, J.S.C., said-
“On close examination of sections 220(1) and 221(1) of the 1979 Constitution one is bound to come to the conclusion that the 1979 Constitution has created two rights of appeal, from any decision of a High Court, to the Court of Appeal. In other words, in any single case one may appeal to the Court of Appeal as of right under section 220(1) or with the leave of Court under section 221(1) of the Constitution.”
The court will always construe a statute or any written instrument consisting of diverse parts or clauses, by looking at the whole so as to ascertain and carry out the intention of the legislature; and by reading section 220 as a whole, it is easily comprehensible that sub-section 220(1)(b) is a special provision and an exception to the general right created by section 220(1)(a). See MAXWELL on Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edition) page 164 where the principle is thus stated –
“Where a general intention is expressed and also a particular intention which is incompatible with the general one, the particular intention is considered an exception to the general one.”
The distinctive features in section 220(1)(a) are the word “final” and the expression “first instance.”
In Nafiu Rabiu v The State (supra), Idigbe, J.S.C., while interpreting sections 220, 221 and 222 of the 1979 Constitution in his lead judgment, had this to say at pages 305 to 306-
“The 1979 Constitution gave a general right of appeal, that is, a right of appeal as of right on law and facts (and this includes mixed law and facts) from decisions in Criminal Law given by the High Court sitting at first instance. This right is contained in subsection (1)(a) of Section 220; and it is the first time in the legal history of this country that such a right of appeal has been given to a party in criminal proceedings. In the former Constitutions (1960 and 1963) such a general right was confined to decisions in civil proceedings and was not available to a party in criminal proceedings. A right of appeal as of right enured for the benefit of a party in criminal proceedings on questions of law alone from a decision of the High Court sitting at first instance (see Sections 110(2)(b) of the 1960 Constitution, and prior to the Amending Decree (No.2) of No. 42 of 1976 – Section 117(2)(b) of the 1963 Constitution) the latter right was removed by Act No. 42 of 1976). A right of appeal by leave (and not as of right) on facts or mixed law and facts enured for the benefit of such a party by virtue of Sub-section (4)(b) of Section 110 of the 1960 Constitution and – prior to Act 42 of 1976 – by Sub-section (4)( a) of Section 117 of the 1963 Constitution. However, in the 1979 Constitution, this general right of appeal is confined only to final decisions of the High Court sitting at first instance. With very great respect to their Lordships of the Court of Appeal, I do not share their view (as expressed in the leading judgment of Nasir P) that the contention of Chief Williams that Sub-section (1)(b) of Section 220 of the 1979 Constitution ‘only permits an appeal from non-final decision is untenable.’ In my view, the submission of Chief Williams is, indeed, tenable. Here, again: a close examination of the provisions of the 1960 and 1963 Constitution will show that for the first time in the legal history of this country (i.e. by the 1979 Constitution) a right of appeal – as of right and not by leave of court – has by Sub-section (1)(b) of Section 220 aforesaid, been given to ‘parties or litigants on question of law alone but, as it appears to me, only in (1) non-final (i.e. interlocutory) decisions and (2) in decisions given by the High Court – whether in civil or criminal proceedingsl;  when not sitting at first instance (i.e. in a case of ‘double appeals’ which really are appeals coming before the High Court from lower Courts). Prior to the 1979 Constitution a party appealing from a decision which falls into the second category, that is, in the case of ‘double appeals’ in civil or criminal proceedings, whether on point of law , facts or mixed facts and law, could only do so by leave of the court.”
In the decision (supra) the sections were construed in relation to the rights of appeal in criminal matters. The same is true and applicable as regards rights of appeal in civil matters save that even under the previous constitutions this general right of appeal existed in final decisions of the High Court sitting at first instance. The present provisions extended the right of appeal as of right to even non-final decisions and in cases of double-appeal, involving points of law alone. Learned Counsel for the appellant by his proposition is in fact asking this Court to revert to the positions as they were under the previous constitutions. Where an Act has been passed to change the law its operation shall not be minimised or neutralized by introducing notions taken from or inspired by the old law which the words of the Act intended to abrogate See Rose v. Ford (1937) A.C. 826.
As regards the provision of section 213 of the Constitution which deals with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, learned Counsel urged this Court to construe sections 220, 221(1) and 222(b) of the Constitution by ascribing to them the meaning given to section 213 by this Court. since the provisions of the sections are in pari materia.
It is a sound rule of construction to assign the same meaning to the same words occurring in different parts of an Act. See Courtauld v. Legh (1869) L.R. 4 Exch 126. But this principle that words have consistent meanings within one statute is no more than a presumption and it will only apply if “sufficient reason can be assigned, for construing the word in one part of the Act in a different sense from that which it bears in another part of the Act” – per TURNER LJ in Re National Savings Bank (1886) LRI CH. 547. It is necessary to consider the various parts of a statute and the varying weight to be given to each part. Without dwelling much on this point, I shall only say that while I accept that section 213(2). (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e),  is in general, in pari materia with provisions contained in sections 220(1)(b), (c). (d). (e), (f) and 221(1), the situations envisaged are not the same. Apart from the appellate jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by section 213, section 212 vests it with original jurisdiction in instances mentioned therein. It is also the final court of appeal. The Court of Appeal is an intermediary Court of Appeal with no original jurisdiction. The only thing they share in common is the right to hear appeal from the courts subordinate to them when such rights are conferred by the Constitution or any other enactment.
In summary, the position of the law may be thus stated – under Section 220(1)(a) a general right of appeal to the Court of Appeal as of right from a final decision of the High Court exercising original jurisdiction enures to a litigant in both civil and criminal proceedings irrespective of the nature of the grounds of Appeal; and under section 220(1)(b) in non-final decisions as I well as in double-appeals where the grounds of appeal involve issues of law alone; and in all cases other than those mentioned in sections 220(1)(c), (d) (e), (f) and (g), with the leave of either the High Court or the Court of Appeal.
The appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed with N500.00 costs to the Respondent. The
Ruling of the Court of Appeal Ibadan, dated 10th November, 1987 is hereby affirmed.

K. ESO, J.S.C.: I had a preview of the judgment which has just been delivered by my learned brother Wali J.S.C.
My learned brother having dealt in such detail with the issues of sections 220(1)(a) and (b), 221(1), 222 and 213 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 which issues are those raised in this appeal, I have the honour to agree with his reasoning and adopt the same.

A. NNAMANI, J.S.C.: I had the privilege of a preview of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Wali, J.S.C. and I entirely agree with his reasoning and conclusions. This appeal is without merit and I too dismiss it.
I make this short comment because this is a constitutional matter. For this short comment, I shall rely on the facts of this suit as ably set down by my learned brother. The constitutional issue raised here touches on the proper meaning and extent of Sections 220(1)(a) and (b); 221(1) and 222(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of NIGERIA (1979) (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution).
In his brief of argument, learned Counsel to the Appellant set down the single issue for determination as:
“Whether the appeal before the lower Court, namely, Appeal No.CA/B/58/87, is competent, that is to say, whether the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to entertain appeal from final decision of the High Court sitting as Court of First instance on grounds which involves questions of fact or mixed law and fact without leave either of the High Court of trial or of the Court of Appeal itself”
Perhaps the formulation of the learned Acting director of Public Prosecutions of the Federation brought out the issue even more clearly. In his brief, the issue was set down as, “Whether an appeal against a final judgment given by a High Court in a civil case and sitting at first instance on grounds of mixed law and facts alone falls under Section 220(1)(a) of the Constitution and therefore lies as of right or whether it falls under Section 221 (1) of the Constitution in which case leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal to bring it is a pre-requisite.”
This issue has been fully considered by this Court in previous decisions, and as it has not been contended that those decisions were wrongly decided, I would say, with respect, that this matter was no more than an unnecessary re-examination of a well beaten track. See Nafiu Rabiu v The State (1980) 8-11 S.C. 130 at 156 and 202; Ifediora v Urne (1988) 2 N.W.L.R. (Part 74) 5. The appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal is contained in Section 219 of the Constitution. That section states thus:
“Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Federal Court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction, to the exclusion of any other court of law in NIGERIA to hear and determine appeals from the…..High Court of a State..”
The sections in issue here – 220(1)(a) and (b) and 221(1) state that:
“220(1) An appeal shall lie from decisions of a High Court to the Federal Court of Appeal as of right in the following cases-
(a) final decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the High Court sitting at first instance;
(b) where the ground of appeal involves questions of law alone, decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings; (italics mine)
Section 221(1) states:
“Subject to the provisions of Section 220 of this constitution, an appeal shall lie from decisions of a High Court to the Federal Court of Appeal with the leave of the High Court or the Federal Court of Appeal”
Before construing these provisions, it should be mentioned that it is not in dispute that the decision of the Ondo State High Court being appealed against to the Court of Appeal was a final decision, Nor has there been any argument that the High Court sat other than at first instance, It seems to me, therefore, looking at all those sections that the question of leave or no leave can only arise when one has exhausted the rights granted by Section 220(1), Once the High Court sitting at first instance delivers a final decision, any appeal against such a decision (and this must necessarily imply that it matters not if the grounds of such appeal are on law, facts or mixed law and fact) is as of right and not with leave, There is no mention of grounds of appeal in subsection (1)(1) and when one compares this to subsection (1)(b) in which the right is restricted to “ground of appeal involving question of law alone”, that subsection (i.e. 1(a) must encompass any appeal on ground of law, mixed law and fact or fact.
As regards sub-section 1(b) of Section 220, it undoubtedly deals with non-final decisions. “Decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings” in subsection 1(b) are decisions of the High Court, but since not now sitting at first instance, this must envisage decisions given by the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction i.e. the case of double appeals, It is my view therefore that Section 220(1)(b) deals with decisions of the High Court in interlocutory matters and in the case of double appeals, Since appeals in such cases would lie on grounds of law alone, appeals in such cases on grounds other than law, i.e. facts etc, can only lie by leave, hence Section 221(1) of the Constitution.
In Ifediora v Ume (Supra) in which this Court dealt with the question of the nature of an order of consolidation and agreed it was an interlocutory decision, the decision reached proceeded on the basis that the decision being interlocutory fell into Section 220(1)(b) of the Constitution, Since the grounds of appeal were grounds of fact and mixed law and fact, and no leave was obtained, the appeal was held incompetent.
Two passages from Nafiu Rabiu’s case with which I was and am still in complete agreement, settled this matter a long time ago, Although that was a criminal case, Sections 220(1)(a)(b), 221 and 222(a) among others were fully examined, At page 156 thereof Udoma, J.S.C, said,
“On the other hand, under the provisions of Sections 220(1)(a) and (b) there is respectively a general right of appeal as of right from the decision of the High Court to the Federal Court of Appeal in all final decisions both in civil and criminal proceedings before the High Court sitting at first instance; and where the grounds of appeal involve questions of law alone in non-final decisions in both civil and criminal proceedings; It follows therefore, that a clear distinction must be drawn between the provisions of Section 220(1)(a) and 220(1)(b) of the present Constitution. Section 220(1)(a) deals with final decisions whereas Section 220(1)(b) is concerned with non-final or interlocutory decisions,”
Idigbe, J.S.C. of blessed memory put it even more clearly at pages 202 and 203. He said,
“The 1979 Constitution gave a general right of appeal as of right on law and facts (and this includes mixed law and facts) from decisions given by the High Court sitting at first instance. This right is contained in subsection (1) (a) of Section 220………….a right of appeal – as of right and not by leave of court – has by subsection (1)(b) of Section 220 aforesaid, been given to parties or litigants on questions of law alone but, it appears to me, only in (1) non-final (i.e. interlocutory) decisions and (2) in decisions given by the High Court – when not sitting at first instance (i.e. in a case of double appeals which really are appeals coming before the High Court from Lower Courts), Prior to the 1979 Constitution a party appealing from a decision which falls into the second category, that is, in the case of ‘double appeals’ which really are appeals coming before the High Court from lower Courts). Prior to the 1979 Constitution a party appealing from a decision which falls into the second category, that is, in the case of ‘double’ appeal is civil or criminal proceedings whether on point of law, facts or mixed law and facts, could only do so by leave of the Court.”
I abide by the order for costs made by my learned brother, WALI, J.S.C.

M. L. UWAIS, J.S.C.: I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother Wali, J.S.C. I entirely agree with the reasons and conclusions therein.
The question for determination in this appeal is –
Whether an appeal from the final decision of a High Court sitting at first instance in a civil proceeding which is based on grounds of mixed law and facts alone falls under Section 220 sub-section (1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria – 1979; or falls under Section 221 sub-section (1) of the Constitution, in which case leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal will be necessary.
The right to appeal from a decision of the High Court to the Court of Appeal is governed by the provisions of Sections 220 and 221 of the 1979 Constitution.
The appellant was the plaintiff in a suit which he instituted against the respondent as defendant in the High Court of Ondo State. At the end of the hearing of the suit judgment was given by the High Court against the defendant. The latter appealed to the Court of appeal. It was at the hearing of the appeal that the plaintiff filed a notice of preliminary objection challenging the right of the defendant to appeal on grounds of mixed law and fact without the leave of either the High Court or the Court of Appeal. The plaintiff contended that by the reason of the failure to obtain the leave, the defendant’s appeal was incompetent. The preliminary objection was considered by the Court of Appeal and was dismissed. Hence the present appeal by the appellant.
B The arguments of both counsel for the appellant and respondent as wellas that of Mr Nwadialo, learned Acting Federal Director of Public Prosecutions, who appeared on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Federation as amicus curiae, have been sufficiently stated in the judgment of my learned brother Wali, J.S.C. I do not intend to repeat them here, since my judgment is merely in support of the lead judgment.
It is not in doubt that the judgment of the High Court of On do State was a final judgment given in a first instance case. The question is: is leave required to appeal against the judgment on grounds of appeal that raise questions of mixed law and fact alone The answer to the question can only be found by the interpretation of Sections 220 and 221 of the 1979 Constitution.
Section 220 as relevant, provides in sub-section (1) (a) and (b) thereof as follows-
“(1) An appeal shall lie from decisions of a High Court to the Court of Appeal as of right in the following cases –
(a) final decisions in any civil….proceedings before the High Court sitting at first instance;
(b) where the ground of appeal involves questions of law alone, decisions in any civil……proceedings;”
Under sub-section (1)(a) once the decision of the High Court is a final decision as opposed to an interlocutory decision, then the right to appeal as of right, that is without the necessity to apply for leave to appeal, exists. In this case the decision of the High Court was final and it was given in a first instance case. It follows therefore that the respondent had the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal as of right whether on grounds of law, or fact or mixed law and fact, because the provisions of sub-section (1)(a) are not qualified by the nature of the grounds on which the appeal, as of right, is to be brought.
With regard to sub-section (1)(b), the provisions thereof apply to any civil proceedings that is either final or interlocutory. A right of appeal exists, as of right, in that case on condition that the ground of appeal raises question of law alone. It, therefore, follows that there cannot be an appeal as of right in an interlocutory matter, where the grounds of appeal do not raise questions of law alone, but facts or mixed law and fact. It seems to me that in the case of an appeal in a final decision of the High Court in a case at first instance, the sub-section merely strengthens the provisions of sub-section (1)(a) which allows appeal as of right on point of law, as well as on mixed law and facts.  The provisions of sub-section (1)(b) do not therefore have direct bearing on the present case.
Section 221 sub-section (1) of the 1979 Constitution reads-
“(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 220 of this Constitution, an appeal shall lie from the decisions of a High Court to the Court of Appeal with the leave of that High Court to the Court of Appeal.”
The import or intendment of these provisions is that where the appeal to the Court of Appeal is not an appeal –
(a) from the final decision of the High Court sitting at first instance, or
(b) from the final or interlocutory decision of the High Court on a point of law alone
then leave of either the High Court or the Court of Appeal becomes necessary in order to render the appeal competent. If for instance the High Court sits on an appeal from a decision of a court that is subordinate to it, any appeal to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the High Court in that respect, even if that decision is final, can only be made not as of right under Section 220 sub-section (1)(a) but with leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal. This is irrespective of whether the ground of appeal is on a point law alone, or on mixed law and fact or fact alone. A further example is where the appeal is an interlocutory matter whether from the decision of the High Court sitting at first instance or on an appeal from a subordinate court, and the ground or grounds of the appeal raises question of fact or mixed law and fact only. Here again the leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal will have to be obtained for the appeal to be competent.
As the present case was an appeal to the Court of Appeal from the final decision of the High Court of Ondo State sitting at first installed, the provisions of Section 221 sub-section (1) of the 1979 Constitution do not apply to it. The respondent had the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal on questions of mixed law and fact, without the necessity to obtain leave under Section 221 sub-section (1) because the provisions of Section 220 sub-section (1)(a) dispense with such leave and the provisions of Section 221 sub-section (1) apply only subject to the provisions of Section 220 of the 1979 Constitution.
For these and the reasons clearly given in the judgment of my learned brother Wali, J.S.C. I too would dismiss the appeal.
Accordingly, the appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed with N500.00 costs to the respondent.

A. G. KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.: I have read the draft of the judgment of my learned brother Wali JSC in this appeal. I agree with him that this appeal be dismissed. I however wish to make my own contribution to the reasoning in the judgment.
The short point, the subject-matter of this appeal is whether ill the light of the constitutional right of appeal, all appeal from a final decision of the judgment of the High Court sitting at first instance requires leave, of the High Court or of the Court of Appeal, where the ground of appeal consists off acts or mixed law and facts.
The facts which gave rise to the appeal before us are short, clear and undisputed. Appellant, who was Plaintiff brought an action against the Respondent as the Defendant claiming from the Respondents the sum of N68,357.94 being money owing and due from the Respondents under a contract dated 14th May, 1978 between the parties in connection with the construction of the Akure Stadium swimming pool. Judgment was given in favour of Appellants on the 28th April, 1986. On the 11th June, 1986, Respondents filed their notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal which contained six grounds of appeal. The appeal was listed for Monday the 9th November, 1987. On the 11th September, 1987 appellant, relying on Order 3 rule 15 Court of Appeal Rules, 1981 filed a notice of intention to rely upon a preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal on the grounds of the incompetence of the appeal filed in contravention of section 221(1) of the 1979 Constitution. The grounds of objection were that
“1. The appellant’s grounds of appeal involve questions of fact and/or mixed law and fact (vide Page 70 line 34 – Page 73 line 19 of the record).
“2. No leave was sought nor was any obtained either of the Court below or of the Court of Appeal.”
On the receipt of this application for a preliminary objection Respondent brought a motion relying on section 221(1) of the 1979 Constitution seeking leave of the Court to file and argue grounds of appeal based on facts, and mixed law and facts. The motion was fixed for 9th November, 1987. On the 10th November, 1987, appellant argued the motion for his preliminary objection. The Court of Appeal in a unanimous ruling dismissed that application without calling upon the Respondent to reply. The Court of Appeal in its ruling pointed out that section 220(1) of the Constitution 1979 which governs appeals as of right to the Court of Appeal enables the exercise of the right in seven different and distinct instances, none dependent on the other.
The Court of Appeal referred to Harriman v. Harriman (1987)3 NWLR. 244 relied upon by appellant as not in support of the proposition contended for, and concluded as follows –
“It is the view of this court that once the appeal is from a final decision of the High Court, there is a right of appeal without leave, and as of right.”
The application was accordingly struck out. This is the subject-matter of the appeal before us.
Appellant has filed two grounds of appeal seeking
(a) to set aside the above ruling dismissing Appellant’s preliminary objection, and
(b) to strike out the respondents’ appeal no. CA/B/58/87 on the ground of incompetence. The grounds of appeal are as follows –
“The Court of Appeal misdirected itself and erred in law in dismissing the appellant’s preliminary objection to respondent’s appeal and in failing to strike out same when the said appeal was in law incompetent.
MISDIRECTION IN LAW
(1) The Court of Appeal failed to direct itself as to the legal point that sections 220(1) and 221(1), read together with the provision of section 222(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, and Order 2 Rule 2(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules 1981 (as amended), create two separate rights of appeal in respect of a final decision of the High Court sitting at first instance –
(a) appeal where the ground of appeal involves questions of law alone, and
(b) appeal where the ground of appeal involves questions other than law alone, such as questions of fact or mixed law and fact.
In respect of (a) above no leave is required but in respect of (b) above leave is required under section 221(1) of the Constitution.
(2) In the absence of evidence on record that the respondent obtained leave either of the trial High Court or the Court of Appeal itself, within the period stipulated in section 25 of the Court of Appeal Act, 1976 and in accordance with order 3 Rule 3(3) of the Court of Appeal Rules 1981 (as amended) there can be no competent appeal before the Court.
ERROR IN LAW
It is an error in law for the Court of Appeal to dismiss the appellant’s preliminary Objection and to fail to strike out the respondent’s appeal on ground of incompetence.”
Briefs were filed by Appellants, Respondents, and the Federal Attorney-General invited as amicus curiae.
Because the point of law raised appeared to involve issues of constitutional importance a full court of seven justices, was empanelled to hear the appeal, and the Attorney-General of the Federation, only, of all the Attorneys-General of the country invited as amicus curiae, responded to the invitation.
Respondent, in his brief of argument adopted the formulation of the issues for determination by counsel for the Appellant. The issue so formulated is not materially different from that formulated by the Hon. Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice which I consider consummate and as more accurately representing the issues.
The question for determination for the purposes of this judgment is as follows.-
“Whether an appeal against a final judgment given by a High Court in a Civil Case and sitting at first instance on grounds of mixed law and facts alone falls under section 220(1)(a) of the Constitution and therefore lies as of right, or whether it falls under section 221(1) of the Constitution in which case leave of the High or the Court of Appeal to bring it is a pre-requisite.” Before us, during argument all counsel adopted their briefs of argument and orally expatiated on them to resolve ambiguities or obscurities where they considered necessary. Mr Mayaki for the Appellants relying on the construction of sections 220(1), 221 and 222(b) of the Constitution and conceding that the appeal was from a final decision of the High Court of Ondo State sitting at first instance, submitted, that notwithstanding, leave of the High Court of trial, or leave of the Court of Appeal was required to make the appeal competent or to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal.
In the absence of the requisite leave it was submitted the appeal ought to be struck out. I must point out at once that the issue of the competence vel non of an appellant has no direct relationship with the jurisdiction of the court and its competence to exercise jurisdiction. The appellant’s competence is a matter extrinsic to jurisdiction – see Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962)1 All NLR 587. Counsel for the Appellant has argued that the right conferred on the appellant under s.220(1)(a) was theoretical until exercised.
He pointed out that the right can only in civil proceedings be exercised in accordance with the Act of the National Assembly for the time being regulating the powers, practice and procedure of the Court of Appeal, i.e. the Court of Appeal Act 1976. This includes the rules of Court made under the Act. It was submitted relying on Order 3 rule 2(1) Court of Appeal Rules 1981 that although a final decision, the grounds of appeal contains grounds of facts and mixed law and facts, which are governed by section 221(1) of the Constitution 1979. Accordingly it was submitted, as a precondition for the validity of the notice, appellant ought to have sought leave either of the trial High Court or the Court of Appeal. Counsel criticised the view expressed by Ogundare JCA that Harriman v Harriman (1987) 3 NWLR 244 was concerned with an appeal against an interlocutory decision.
Counsel then went on to refer to what he regarded as “some doubt or conflict to be resolved in the appeal provisions in sub-sections 220(1)(a) and 220(1)(b) of the Constitution 1979.”
Counsel pointed out that the obscurity or doubt arises from the possibility of a combination of grounds of appeal in a final decision of the High Court sitting as a Court of first instance – there may well be (a) grounds of fact (b) mixed law and fact, (e) ground of law alone. It was submitted that in view of the all embracing content of section 220(1)(a), in respect of final decision section 220(1)(b) which allows appeal as of right on ground of law alone is unnecessary and tautology. Mr. Mayaki referred to the maxim generalibus speciala non derogani and the judgment of this court in Edet Akpan v. The State (1986)3 NWLR (Part 27) 225, 289 to argue that the specific provision of section 220(1)(b) overrides the general provision of section 220(1)(a). Also on this point it was submitted that the maxim expressum facit cessare taciturn, has the same effect. On the other hand applying the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, it was contended that the general provision of section 220(1)(a) cannot derogate from sub-section 220(1)(b) which is a special provision, which limits appeal as of right to appeal on grounds of law alone.
Arguing by analogy of section 213(2)(a) and 213(3) of the same Constitution which is in pari materia with section 221(1) of the Constitution 1979, the construction of the provisions of the earlier sections, where in considering grounds of appeal involving mixed law and fact from the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court has consistently held that leave must be obtained either from the Court of Appeal or from the Supreme Court. Counsel cited in support Akpasubi v Unweni (1982) 11 SC. 132; Oke v Eke (1982) 12 Sc. 228; Ojeme & Ors. v. Momodu 11(1983) 3 SC. 173 Akwiwu Motors Ltd. & anor. v Songonuga (1984) 5 SC. 184.
Counsel contended that the proper approach to the construction of sections 220(1)(a); 220(1)(b) and 221(1) as to whether leave is required or not under the constitution is to look at the grounds of appeal and not at the finality of decision. Mr. Mayaki drew attention to the judgment of this court in Nafiu Rabiu v Kano State (1980) 8 -11 Sc. 130 at p. 156 and Holman Bros. (Nigeria) Ltd. v Kigo (Nigeria) Ltd. (1980) 8 -11 SC. 43; Harriman v Harriman (1987)3 NWLR. 244; Ogbechie & ors. v. Onochie & ors. (1986)2 NWLR 484. Counsel urged us to allow the appeal.
Mr. Fagbe for the Respondent adopted his brief of argument in its entirety and did not offer any oral expatiation. (n his brief of argument counsel referred to the constitutional basis of the right of appeal in section 220(1) of the Constitution 1979. He referred particularly to section 220(1)(a) and (b). It was submitted that an appellant relying on section 220(1)(a) need only satisfy the Court that the decision appealed against is final. Counsel then defined a final decision and cited Bozson v Altricham UDC (1903) 1 KB. 547, Ude v Agu (1961)1 All NLR. 61 Blay v. Solomon 12 W.A.C.A. 175; Akinsanya v UBA Ltd. (1986) 4 NWLR. 273 in support.
Mr. Fagbe submitted that the relevant consideration in filing an appeal is whether the decision appealed against is final or interlocutory, and whether it was in the exercise of original or appellate jurisdiction. It is not a matter for grounds of appeal.
Considering the provisions of section 220(1)(a) and (b) counsel submitted that they are disjunctive. Whilst section 220(1)(a) provides for final decisions, section 220(1)(b) deals with cases where the decisions are not final. It was submitted that there was no surplusage in the provision of section 220(1)(b). Counsel argued that paragraph (b) is an exception to paragraph (a) and applies only to appeals in respect of decisions which are not final. He relied on p. 222 of Craies, on Statute Law, by S.G.G. Edgar 7th Edition for this submission. Accordingly, counsel rejected the contention that section 220(1)(b) was surplusage. He cited Ditcher v. Dennison 31 L.T. 61, for the view. It was also submitted that the maxim expressum facit cessare tacitum  was not applicable. While accepting the general presumption in the construction of statutes that the same words and phrases should be given the same meaning wherever possible, he pointed out the fundamental differences in section 213(2)(a) which applies to appeals to the Supreme Court, with only appellate jurisdiction and s.220(1)(b) which applies to appeals from High Courts which exercises both original and appellate jurisdiction, which of necessity must affect the interpretation of these sections. Mr. Fagbe referred to the words used in sections 220 and 221 of the Constitution 1979 and submitted that they are direct, straight-forward and unambiguous. He also referred to the side notes of the sections which acts as guide and submitted that the words ought to be given their ordinary plain meaning. Counsel cited African Newspapers of Nigeria Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (1985) NWLR (Part 6) 137. Mr. Fagbe then referred to the consequence of accepting appellants’ contention that it will amount to requiring leave in all appeals to the Court of Appeal from the High Court. Again, it will mean that a judgment will not be final until the High Court or Court of Appeal grants leave to appeal.
Counsel urged us to dismiss the appeal. Mr Nwadialo S.A.N., appearing as amicus curiae for the Attorney-General of the Federation, like the other counsel relied on his brief of argument. He referred to the provisions of section 220(1)(a)(b) and 221(1) and to Nafiu Rabiu v. Kano State (1980) 8 – 11 S.C. 130, at p. 136 where this court, interpreting the section said section 220(1)(a) conferred a general right of appeal both in law, and on facts including mixed law and facts. It was submitted that it is only section 220(1)(b) which limits grounds of appeal to questions of law alone. Counsel then submitted that decisions covered by section 220(1)(a) and 220(1)(b) are respectively final and interlocutory, as well as appellate decisions from the High Court. In respect of section 220(1)(a) this includes both grounds of fact and law, whereas section 220(1)(b) is limited to law as it states.
On section 221(1), Mr. Nwadialo pointed out and emphasised the fact that it is subject to the provisions of section 220 of the Constitution 1979 and submits that section 221(1) does not apply to a case which falls within section 220 including sub-section (1)(a). Thus final decisions involving questions of mixed law and facts which are included under the general rights of appeal conferred by section 220 do not fall within section 221(1). It was submitted that section 221(1) contemplates appeals against interlocutory decisions on grounds of facts or mixed law and facts, and appeals on the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the High Court. Mr Nwadialo referred to Harriman v. Harriman (supra) and submitted it was not helpful. Similarly Ojemen & ors. v. Momodu 11 (1983) 3 SC. 173,204, Ogbechie & Ors. v. Onochie & Ors. (1986) 2 NWLR 484 which dealt with right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The dictum relied upon in Holman Bros. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Kigo (Nig.) Ltd. (supra) was also of no assistance. It was submitted that appellant having not shown that the earlier decisions referred to were erroneous or given per incuriam or shown to have occasioned a miscarriage of justice or perpetuating injustice, there was no case for departing from them. The cases of Yonwuren v. Modern Signs Ltd. (1985) 2 Sc. 86 and Bucknor-Maclean vs. Inlaks Ltd. (1980) 8 – 11 SC. 1 were cited and relied upon. Furthermore Order 6. r.5(4) of the RSC. 1985 requires the appellant who seeks a departure from the rules to state this in a separate paragraph in his brief of argument. Appellant having not complied with the rule is not entitled to the indulgence of the court. Finally it was submitted that none of the authorities cited and relied upon by the appellant support his propositions. The issues raised have been decided in Nafiu Rabiu v. Kano State (supra). I have set out above, as concisely as I have been able to do in a judgment, the contentions of the parties in this appeal. The whole argument seems to me to be confined to the proper interpretation of the constitutional provisions conferring right of appeal on the aggrieved against the judgment of the High Court sitting at first instance.  The point of law here contested in this appeal is not primae impressionis. Though not raised in exactly the same manner, the same sections were considered in Nafiu Rabiu v. Kano State(1980) 8-11 SC. 130. However, in Harriman v. Harriman (1987)3 NWLR. 244, 254 – 255, Akeredolu & ors. v. Akinremi & ors. (1986) 2 NWLR. 710 at p. 720 cited by counsel to appellant the issue before the court was whether appellant may file only one notice of appeal or two in an appeal where the grounds relied upon consists of law, facts or mixed law and facts. The issue whether the decision is final or interlocutory was not discussed. These decisions are therefore not relevant. It is desirable to reproduce relevant portions of the principal sections of the Constitution involved in the propositions contended for in this appeal. These are sections 220(1)(a)(b); 221(1); 222(b); 213(1)(2)(a)(3).
“213. – (1) The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court of law in Nigeria to hear and determine appeals from the Federal Court of Appeal.
(2) An appeal shall lie from decisions of the Federal Court of appeal to the Supreme Court as of right in the following cases –
(a) where the ground of appeal involves questions of law alone, decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the Federal Court of Appeal;
(3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of this section, an appeal shall lie from the decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court with the leave of the Federal Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court.
220-(1) An appeal shall lie from decisions of a High Court to the Federal Court of Appeal as of right in the following cases-
(a) final decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the High Court sitting at first instance;
(b) where the ground of appeal involves questions of law alone, decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings;
221:- (1) Subject to the provisions of section 220 of this Constitution, an appeal shall lie from decisions of a High Court to the Federal Court of Appeal with the leave of that High Court or the Federal Court of Appeal.
222. Any right of appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal from the decisions of a High Court conferred by this Constitution –
(b) shall be exercised in accordance with any Act of the National Assembly and rules of court for the time being in force regulating the powers) practice and procedure of the Federal Court of Appeal.”
It is of crucial importance in this appeal to bear in mind that the court is invited to interprete the provisions of our Constitution which is our supreme and fundamental law, the source of appellant’s right protected under the Constitution and the foundation of the jurisdiction of the court. Accordingly any suggestion that the right claimed does not exist or that the court lacks jurisdiction must be founded in the provisions of the Constitution which has granted it and in no other law – See Bendel State v. The Federation (1981) 10 S.C. 1. The provisions of the Constitution have been formulated and designed to protect the rights of the citizen, hence any construction of the sections must be directed towards achieving that end unless of course the section construed is so clear, unequivocal, unambiguous and compelling in favour of a contrary view in which case such contrary view must be protected and enforced. See Nabham v. Nabham (1967)1 All NLR 47. Otherwise where the words of the Constitution are clear, direct and unambiguous in the protection of the right of the citizen, it seems to me imperative that effect must be given to such words notwithstanding the existence of a plausible alternative interpretation of the same words – See Mobil v. F.B.I.R. (1977) 3 SC.53.
In construing the provisions of the Constitution conferring any rights, it
is not only mandatory to consider the section as a whole – See Yesufu v. Ojo (1958)3 FSC. 106. It is useful to consider also related and associated sections to discover the meaning of the section, see Awolowo v Sarki (1966) 1 ALL NLR. 178. The essential approach is so to construe the sections as to achieve the intention of the citizen – see Sofekun v. Akinyemi (1980) 5-7 SC. 1 Bronik Motors Ltd. v. Wema Bank Ltd. (1983)1 SCNLR. 296. These are the principles I rely upon to govern my construction of these sections of the constitution. I have already reproduced the relevant sections of the Constitution involved in this appeal. I refer to sections 220(1)(a) and the word “final” therein and the phrase “sitting at first instance. ” Whereas the word “final” qualifies the word “decision” in this paragraph (a) the phrase “sitting at first instance” qualifies High Court. The word “final” is not used in section 220(1)(b), and the expression High Court “sitting at first instance” is also not used. It is also important to observe that section 221(1) starts with the expression “subject to section 220 of this Constitution.” These expressions fortunately have been subject-matter of judicial decisions in our courts. The expression “final decision” has been construed as a decision completely determining the rights of the parties before the court. See the cases of Omonuwa v. Oshodin (1985)2 NWLR. 938; Akinsanya v. U.B.A. Ltd (1986)4 NWLR. 273; Ude v. Agu (,961) 1 All NLR61; Chike Obi (No.2) v. D.P. P. (1961) All NLR. 458; Akintola v Aderemi & anor (1962) 1 All NLR. 461; Adegbenro v Akintola (1963) AC. 614.
The expression “High Court sitting at first instance” is self explanatory and requires no construction. The expression “subject to” subordinates the provisions of the subject section to the section referred to, which is intended not to be affected by the provisions of the former – See LSDPC v. Foreign Finance Corporation (1987)1 NWLR 461, Clark v. I.R.C. (1973)2 All ER. 513. The effect of this is that section 221(1) of the Constitution 1979 does not apply to the circumstances covered in section 220(1). Accordingly section 220 (1) is insulated and is not affected by the stipulations in section 221(1). Having prefaced the sections with these explanatory constructions it is now necessary to construe the sections themselves. I have already stated the general principles that I intend to apply in construing these sections. The sections under consideration appear to me plain and unambiguous even though counsel to the appellant seems to contend otherwise. Section 220(1) confers a general right of appeal without leave of the court, and as of right, but the paragraphs thereof prescribe the conditions for the exercise of the right. Each paragraph is independent of the other as to the rights conferred. Section 220(2) deals with all cases where there is no right of appeal; except paragraph (c) which confers right of appeal with leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal. Section 221(1) which is subject to section 220 is concerned with the exercise of right of appeal where leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal is required. A careful analysis of section 220(1)( a) & (b) discloses that the paragraphs of the sub-section govern the exercise of right of appeal, as of right and without the necessity to seek leave of the Court or of the Court of Appeal in respect
(a) final decisions of the High Court sitting at first instance.
(b) non-final decisions where the ground of appeal involves questions of law alone. – See State v. Albert (1982) 5 SC. 6, Gamiba & Ors. v. Esezi II & Ors. (1961) All NLR 584; Olawoyin & Ors. v. C.O.P. (No.2) (1961) All NLR 622.
It seems to me that the non-qualification in (a) of the ground for the exercise of the right, leaves it at large and enables the exercise of the right with respect to all grounds of error whether of law, fact, or mixed law and fact.
The section does not appear to me to contemplate appeals from final decisions of the High Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, described as double-appeals.
In such cases, it seems to me that the provisions of section 221(1) will apply. It is therefore correct to conclude that appellants exercising the right of appeal under section 220 (1) do so as of right and the competence of the appeal is not affected by absence of leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal. – See Nafiu Rabiu v. Kana State (1980) 8 – 11 S.C. 130. The view expressed above is supported by the judgments of Sir Udo Udoma, JSC and Idigbe, JSC in Nafiu Rabiu v. Kana State (supra), where Sir Udo Udoma construed section 220(1)(a) and (b) as follows –
“Under the provisions of section 220(1)(a) and (b) there is respectively a general right of appeal as of right from the decision of the High Court to the Federal Court of Appeal; in all final decisions both in civil and criminal proceedings before the High Court sitting at first instance; and where the grounds of appeal involve questions of law alone in non-final decisions in both civil and criminal proceedings. It follows therefore, that a clear distinction must be drawn between the provisions of section 220(1)(a) and 220(1) (b) of the present Constitution. Section 220(1)(a) deals with final decisions whereas section 220(1)(b) is concerned with non-final or interlocutory decisions.”
In the same case at pages 203 – 204 Idigbe, J.S.C. construing the same sections arrived at the same conclusions.
Mr. Mayaki, relying on the provisions of section 222(b) of the Constitution 1979 which stipulates that the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction must be in accordance with any Act of the National Assembly and rules of Court for the time being in force, submitted forcefully that the exercise of the right of appeal under section 220(1)(a) and (b) shall be in accordance with any Act of the National Assembly and the rules of court for the time being in force regulating the powers, practice and procedure. The Court of Appeal Act 1976 and rules made thereunder are therefore, relevant. Section 25 of the Court of Appeal Act prescribes the time for the exercise of the right of appeal conferred and Order 3 r. 2(1) prescribes the filing of grounds of appeal with the notice of appeal. Accordingly where an appeal against a final decision discloses grounds of facts or mixed law and fact, it was submitted, a reading together of sections 220 (1)(a) and 221(1) requires the appellant to seek leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal since the appeal is not based on law alone as provided under s. 220(1)(b).
It is necessary to correct an elementary misconception contained in the argument of counsel to the Appellant. It is an elementary and fundamental proposition that a right conferred by the Constitution cannot be taken away by any other provision except by the Constitution itself. The Constitution having conferred a right of appeal as of right, the Court of Appeal Act, or rules of practice made under the Act which derive their force from the Constitution cannot take away such a right. Any law so made will be inconsistent with the constitutional provision and void. See s. 1 (3) of the Constitution 1979. The provisions of section 25 of the Court of Appeal Act 1976 merely regulate the manner of exercise of the right and does not purport to take it away.
I entirely agree with Mr. Fagbe for the Respondents that the relevant considerations for giving notice of appeal is not whether the ground of appeal is on law alone or on facts as Mr. Mayaki for the appellant has submitted; but whether the decision appealed against is final or interlocutory. The grounds of appeal are merely the reasons given why the decision is wrong and ought to be set aside by a higher court. This is exemplified by section 25 of the Court of Appeal Act which prescribes the period within which notice of appeal shall be given whether the decision appealed against is interlocutory or final. The period of notice is not relevant to the grounds of appeal which the appellant wishes to file. Section 25(2) of the Court of Appeal Act provides as follows –
“The periods for the giving of notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal are-
(a) in an appeal in a civil cause or matter, fourteen days where the appeal is against an interlocutory decision, and three months where the appeal is against a final decision.”
Thus it is the nature of the decision i.e. whether interlocutory (non-final) or final, and not the ground of appeal which determines the filing of notice of appeal or the period for filing notice of appeal.
Counsel to the Appellant made certain inconsistent submissions concerning the relationship between section 220(1)(a) and section 220(1)(b). First it was submitted that the latter was unnecessary and tautologous since the former had completely covered the grounds of the latter. Again that by the maxim generalia specialia derogant; section 220(1)(b) being a specific provision has over-ridden the general provision of section 220(1)(a).
Learned counsel was mistaken in both submissions. It is clear that section 220(1)(a) and section 220(1)(b) are not intended to cover the same grounds. Whereas the former applies to final decisions of the High Court sitting at first instance, the latter applies to non-final decisions of the High Court whether sitting at first instance or in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction – See Nafiu Rabiu v. Kano State (1980) 8 -11 SC. 130. I think it is not only good law but also good common sense that where there are two provisions in a section dealing with the same subject-matter ,one being unqualified, and the other containing a qualification effect must be given to the provision containing the qualification. In Re Debtor (No. 416 of 1940) exparte Official Receiver(1950) Ch. 423, a general provision for “trustees” was made in one section, and a special provision was made for the official Receiver, it was held that the official Receiver could not take advantage of the general provision by calling himself a trustee. The word decision in section 220(1)(a) having been qualified by the word final and silting of first instance, effect must be given to it. The word remains unqualified in section 220(1)(b). The difference in the two sub-sections is so clear as to render their co-existence and the exercise of the different aspects of the right compatible. It is a misunderstanding of the effect of the provisions of the sub-sections to contend that section 220(1)(a) had covered the situation envisaged in section 220(1)(b). It has not.
Although generalia specialia derogant, there must be in existence both a general and specific provision. In Edet Akpan v. The State (1986) 3 NWLR (pt. 27)225 at p. 239 cited by counsel to the Appellant, in support of the application of this maxim, Oputa JSC carefully pointed out that that appeal was dealing specifically with a criminal offence, and accordingly the specific provision of section 33(4) of the Constitution 1979 with respect to fair hearing within a reasonable time of the criminal offence charged over-rides the general provision of fair hearing within a reasonable time in section 33(1) of the same constitution. There is no such general and specific provision in section 220(1)(b) of the Constitution: Section 220(1)(a) which relates to final decisions of the High Court sitting at first instance is not a general right as against section 220(1)(b) which relates to non-final decisions both at first instance and in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The fact that right of appeal may be exercised in respect of grounds of law. mixed law and fact and fact does not make the section general. I am of the opinion therefore that the maxim does not apply to section 220(1). The general right of appeal lies in section 220(1) which provides for the appeal as of right.
Similarly, since there is no question of derogation as between the two sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 220. the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant does not apply. Both sections 220(1)(a) and 220(1)(b) derive from section 220(1), and both are in their application independent of each other and apply in different situations. The maxim applies to save a general later law which tends to abrogate an earlier special law by mere implication – See Lancashire Asylums Board v. Manchester Corporation (1900)1 QB. 458,471. This is surely not such a case. I am therefore in total agreement with the submission of Mr. Fagbe for the respondent that section 220(1)(a) and (b) are disjunctive and provide for clearly different situations. The submission however that section 220(1)(b) is an exception to section 220(1)(a) cannot therefore in my opinion be right. It would have been a different consideration if the situations to which they are applicable were the same.
Mr. Nwadialo SAN as amicus curiae pointed out the differences in the rights conferred in s.220(1) in his submission that only section 220(l)(b) speaks of conferring a right of appeal on law alone. This emphasises its difference from section 220(1)(a). I am also in agreement with his submission that by the express specific provision of section 220(1)(b) providing for appeals on law alone in interlocutory decisions, it did not, contrary to the submission of the appellant, displace the general provision in section 220(1)(a). This leaves me with the construction of section 221(1). The words of section 221(1) seems to me plain, direct and unambiguous. I shall give effect to the words. It applies subject to s.220(1) and to those rights not mentioned in section 220(1). Accordingly section 221(1) applies to
(a) final decisions in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court whether on grounds of law, fact, or mixed law and fact
(b) Non-final decisions of the High Court on grounds of facts and mixed law and facts
(c) the cases mentioned in section 220(2) of the constitution 1979- see Holman v. Kigo (1986) 8 – 11 SC.43.
Mr Mayaki has submitted for the appellant that since section 213(2)(a) of the Constitution 1979 which has been construed in several decisions of this court is in pari materia with section 220(1)(b) and section 221(1) is in pari material with section 213(3) in each case limiting appeals as of right to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeal on grounds of law alone, and requiring leave respectively, the same construction should be applied to this case.
It is both necessary and pertinent to point out that the Court of Appeal in the instant case dismissed the preliminary objection on the ground that appellant had a right of appeal to the court by virtue of section 220(1)(a) of the Constitution 1979, on the ground that the appeal was against a final decision of the High Court sitting at first instance. The issue of section 220(1)(b) did not arise and was not specifically considered. It is therefore here irrelevant for the determination of this appeal.
Counsel for the appellant has invited us to apply the cases on the construction of section 213(2)(a) and 213(3) of the constitution to the construction of section 220(1)(b) which is in pari material with section 213(2). For a clearer exposition of the provision 1 set out hereunder section 213(2) of the Constitution 1979. I have already reproduced section 220(1) (b) in this judgment.
Section 213(2)  An appeal shall lie from decisions of the (Federal) Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court as of right in the following cases –
(a) where the ground of appeal involves questions of law alone, decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the Federal Court of Appeal…..
(3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of this section, an appeal shall lie from the decisions of the (Federal) Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court with leave of the (Federal) Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court.”
Although these provisions are in pari materia with sections 220(1)(b) and 221(1) of the Constitution 1979, the latter was not in issue in the court below and not necessary for the determination of the appeal. Thus apart from Ojemen & ors. v. Momodu II & ors. (1983)3 Sc. 173 which is relevant, all the cases cited in support are distinctly irrelevant. Ogbechie & ors. v. Onochie & ors. (1986) 2 NWLR. 484 was not decided on section 213(2)(a). The preliminary objection was on the non-compliance with section 213(3) of the Constitution 1979. In Holman Bros. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Kigo (Nig.) Ltd. (1980) 8 – 11 SC. section 213(3) alone was in issue. The appeal was against refusal of leave to appeal under that section. Mr. Fagbe for the respondent on his part has submitted that since the Court of Appeal did not exercise any original jurisdiction as the High Court and no issues of fact were likely to arise from the exercise of the right of Appeal on law alone to the Supreme Court, section 220(1)(b) and section 213(2)(a) ought not be construed similarly even though in pari materia. I do not think this view is correct. In each case the right of appeal exercised is on grounds of law alone, and no issues of fact are likely to arise. It makes no difference therefore whether the right exercised is from the High Court with original jurisdiction or the Court of Appeal. Without such jurisdiction, what is to be construed are similar words of the Constitution. I am of the opinion that in appropriate cases the word, of the section being so identical and in the same Constitution, the construction placed on section 213(a) of the constitution will apply to section 220(1)(b). It is also important to observe that that section 213(2), which is the general section, does not contain a provision similar to s.220(1)(a) which limits the right of appeal to final decisions of the court at first instance. The rationale for the grant of the right of appeal in each case can therefore not be the same. Mr Mayaki has invited this court to depart from its previous decisions on the interpretations of section 220(1) that appeals from final decisions at first instance in the High Court does not require leave and to hold that appeals against such decisions of the High Court involving grounds of mixed law and fact, or on facts alone, can only be made with leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal in compliance with section 221(1) of the Constitution 1979 and Order 3 rules of the Court of Appeal 1981.
The principles governing departure from our previous decisions are now well settled. It must be shown that the earlier decisions were erroneous or that they were given per incuriam or indeed it would be perpetuating injustice to continue to so hold. – See Johnson v. Lawanson (1971)1 All NLR 57 Paul Odi & anor. v. Osafile & anor. (1985) 1 SC. 37, Yonwuren v. Modern Signs Ltd. (1985) 2 SC. 86; Bucknor-Maclean v. Inlaks Ltd. (1980) 8 – 11 SC.1.
The decisions of this Court on the construction of the provisions of section 220(1)(a) of the Constitution 1979 have not been shown to be erroneous, given per incuriam or perpetuating injustice. The position from analysis of the sections and Nafiu Rabiu v. Kano State (1980) 8 – 11 SC.130 decided by this court is that the construction is in accordance with the principles of interpretation and just.
In conclusion, the effect of section 220(1)(a) of the Constitution 1979 is to confer on a person aggrieved by a final decision of the High Court at first instance a right of appeal, as of right and without leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal, whether on grounds of law, mixed law and facts or on facts alone.
All the grounds of appeal therefore fail. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appellant shall pay N500 as costs to the Respondent.

A. G. O. AGBAJE, J.S.C.: The only point arising for determination in this appeal is concerned with the construction of Section 220(1 lea) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979. It provides as follows:-
220-(1) An appeal shall lie from decisions of a High Court to the Court of Appeal as of right in the following cases-
(a) final decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the High Court sitting at first instance.”
The words of this constitutional provision are clear, precise and unambiguous and free of any absurdities. So on the authorities no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary senses, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the framers of the Constitution, see Income Tax Commissioners v. Pemsel (1891) A.C. 534 and A.G.for the Province of Ontario & Ors. v. A. C. for the Dominion of Canada (1912) A.C. 571 at 583 -584 referred to with approval by this Court in Nafiu Rabiu v. Kano State (1980) 8 – 11 S.C. 130 at 149 – 150.
Having done this, I am satisfied that on a true and proper construction of Section 220(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, an appellant can appeal as of right to the Court of Appeal from a final decision of a High Court of the State or of a Federal High Court when the grounds of appeal raise –
(a) questions of law alone or
(b) questions of fact alone or
(c) questions of mixed law and fact alone or
(d) questions of law, questions of fact and questions of mixed law and fact, all together or any two of them together.
In short I am satisfied this appeal lacks merit.
For these reasons and the fuller reasons given in the lead Judgment of my learned Brother Wali, J.S.C., which I have had the opportunity of reading in draft, I too dismiss the appellant’s appeal with costs assessed at N500.00 to the Respondent.

E. B. CRAIG, J.S.C.: I have had the advantage of a preview of the judgment of my learned brother, Wali J.S.C., and I agree with his reasoning and conclusions.
The only point which arose on this appeal was, (as formulated in the appellant’s brief),
“Whether the appeal before the lower court, namely, Appeal No. CA/8/58/87, is competent, that is to say, whether the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to entertain appeal from final decision of the High Court sitting as Court of first instance on grounds which involve questions of fact or mixed law and fact without leave either of the High Court of trial or of the Court of Appeal itself.”
The appellant contends that there is some conflict as between section 220(1)(a) of the 1979 Constitution and section 220(1)(b). He argues that section 220(1)(a) confers a general right of appeal from a final decision of the High Court sitting at first instance on grounds
(1) of fact, or
(2) grounds of mixed law and facts, or
(3) on grounds of law,
whilst section 220(1)(b) confers a right of appeal in any civil or criminal proceedings “where the grounds of appeal involve questions of law alone.”
Counsel therefore submits that if section 220(1)(a) had provided a right of appeal on grounds involving questions of law , then it was not necessary to repeat that fact in the next succeeding section. In the opinion of Chief Mayaki, Counsel for the Appellant, section 220(1)(b) of the Constitution is:
“an unnecessary tautology.”
That opinion, in my view, is erroneous for several reasons. First, it must be appreciated that section 220 of the Constitution provides a general right of appeal in eleven different instances set out in the section. For the purpose of clarity, I shall reproduce that section in full.
“220.-(1) An appeal shall lie from decisions of a High Court to the Federal Court of Appeal as of right in the following cases-
(a) final decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the High Court sitting at first instance;
(b) where the ground of appeal involves questions of law alone, decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings;
(c) decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings on questions as to the interpretation or application of this Constitution;
(d) decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings on questions as to whether any of the provisions of Chapter IV of this Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be, contravened in relation to any person;
(e) decisions in any criminal proceedings in which the High Court has imposed a sentence of death;
(f) decisions on any question whether any person has been validly elected to any office under this Constitution, or to the membership of any legislative house or whether the term of office of any person has ceased or the seat of a person in a legislative house has become vacant;
(g) decisions made or given by the High Court-
(i) where the liberty of a person or the custody of an infant is concerned,
(ii) where an injunction or the appointment of a receiver is granted or refused,
(iii) in the case of a decision determining the case of a creditor or the liability of a contributory or other officer under any enactment relating to Companies in respect of misfeasance or otherwise,
(iv) in the case of a decree nisi in a matrimonial cause or a decision in an admiralty action determining liability, and
(v) in such other cases as may be prescribed by any law in  force in Nigeria.”
It will be seen that on each of those eleven occasions, a litigant is given an automatic right of appeal. He does not need to obtain any leave from any Court.
It will also be appreciated that each occasion when he may exercise that right is different and distinct – none is the same as any of the others. But the appellant seemed to have confused the conditions governing the first occasion – (Section 220(1)(a) with those applicable to the second occasion – (section 220(1)(b)). He thinks that the conditions laid down in (1)(b) are an unnecessary repetition of those already set out in 1(a). This is not so, as a careful examination of the two sub-sections will show.
Thus in subsection 1(a), an appellant may appeal as of right only if:
(i) The proceedings in the case came before the High Court as a court of first instance.
and
(ii) the decision arrived at in the case was a final one.
On the other hand, Sub-section 1(b) would apply:
(a) Where the decision reached is not final. (i.e. it is interlocutory.)
and
(b) Where the High Court had not sat on the case as a Court of first instance.
(but in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction).
In N Rabiu v. The State (1980) 8 – 11 S.C. 130, this Court took time to explain the distinction between the two sub-sections – see the judgments of Udoma J.S.C. at pp. 155 -156 and Idigbe, J.S.C. at pp. 203 – 204.
There is therefore no reason to confuse the two sub-sections because neither is subordinate to or merged with the other.
Before us, Chief Mayaki admitted that the appeal in the lower Court related to a final decision which was given in civil proceedings taken at first instance before the High Court. He therefore had to agree that sub-section 1(a) of section 220 of the Constitution applied, and that the appellant did not need any leave to appeal.
At this stage, it is perhaps necessary to observe that section 221(1) of the Constitution is prefaced by the phrase
“Subject to the provisions of section 220 of this Constitution,” and, by the canon of construction, this means that the sub-section should be applied subject to whatever is stipulated in Section 220.
In other words, if a litigant wishes to appeal on any grounds which are not covered by section 220, then he would need to apply for leave of either the High Court or the Court of Appeal.
For the above reasons as well as for the fuller ones set out in the lead judgment, I would dismiss the appeal and confirm the judgment of the lower Court. I make the same consequential orders as contained in the judgment of my learned brother, Wali J.S.C.

Appeal dismissed

 

Appearances

Chief S. I. Mayaki – For Appellant

 

AND

Fagbo, Deputy Solicitor-General, Ondo State For Respondent